dc.contributor.author | Zissimos, Ben | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-14T01:39:57Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-14T01:39:57Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15923 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper presents a new theory of trade policy-making based on the possibility of social conflict, and determines the conditions under which it will apply. In a setting where property rights are poorly enforced, the paper shows that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem embodies a set of sufficient conditions for a revolution to occur. By pinpointing a conflict of interest between the ruling elite and workers over trade policy, the theorem implies that workers may have an incentive to mount a revolution. However, this also implies that the elite can use trade policy to make concessions to the workers and hence avert a revolution. In an extended framework, a set of sufficient conditions for revolution to occur are provided even when the Stolper-Samuelson theorem fails to hold. Among other uses, the new theory presents a resolution to the long-standing puzzle over why Britain repealed the Corn Laws. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | en |
dc.subject | Protectionism | |
dc.subject | social conflict | |
dc.subject | Stolper-Samuelson | |
dc.subject | trade policy | |
dc.subject | unilateral trade liberalization | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: D30 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: D74 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: F11 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: F13 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: P14 | |
dc.subject.other | | |
dc.title | Social Conflict and the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem | |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.department | Economics | |