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Pampered Bureaucracy and Trade Liberalization

dc.contributor.authorStroup, Caleb
dc.contributor.authorZissimos, Ben
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows how a nation's elite maintain ownership of their wealth by creating a `pampered bureaucracy.' The elite thus divert part of an otherwise entrepreneurial middle class from more productive manufacturing activities, reducing economic efficiency. Trade liberalization is potentially destabilizing since it lowers the opportunity cost to the lower classes of challenging the elite for their wealth. If trade liberalization does take place, it may mandate expansion of the pampered bureaucracy. Therefore, trade liberalization may actually reduce economic efficiency. The econometric results support our model and contribute to the literature on trade liberalization and the size of government.
dc.publisherVanderbilt Universityen
dc.subjectinefficient institutions
dc.subjectsocial conflict
dc.subjecttrade liberalization
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: D30
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: D73
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: D74
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: F10
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: F15
dc.titlePampered Bureaucracy and Trade Liberalization
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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