dc.contributor.author | Zissimos, Ben | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-14T01:28:05Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-14T01:28:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15891 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper shows how distance may be used to coordinate on a unique equilibrium in which trade agreements are regional. Trade agreement formation is modeled as coalition formation. In a standard trade model with no distance between countries a familiar problem of coordination failure occurs, giving rise to multiple equilibria; any one of many possible trade agreements can form. With distance between countries, regional trade agreements generate larger rent-shifting e ects than non-regional agreements. Countries use these effects to coordinate on a unique equilibrium. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | en |
dc.subject | Coalition | |
dc.subject | coordination | |
dc.subject | regionalism | |
dc.subject | preferential trade agreement | |
dc.subject | trade liberalization | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: F02 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: F13 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: F15 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: C72 | |
dc.subject.other | | |
dc.title | Why are Trade Agreements Regional? | |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.department | Economics | |