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The Role of Government in the Credit Market

dc.contributor.authorEden, Benjamin
dc.description.abstractThe paper assumes a government advantage in collecting income contingent payments and develop a proposal for a government loan program that is an integral part of the tax system. The focus is on administrative costs and the difference between the collection technologies available to the public and the private sectors. In the process of developing the proposal the paper addresses some theoretical issues in the field of monetary economics and public finance. Among the questions addressed are: the optimality of the Friedman rule, the optimal interest rate(s), and the desirability of money substitutes and privately created bubbles.
dc.publisherVanderbilt Universityen
dc.subjectGovernment loans
dc.subjecttax reform
dc.subjecttax evasion
dc.subjectcollection technology
dc.subjectFriedman rule
dc.subjectSamuelson rule
dc.subjectmoney substitutes
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: E42
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: E52
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: E51
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: E58
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: H20
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: H21
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: H26
dc.titleThe Role of Government in the Credit Market
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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