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Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences

dc.contributor.authorHouba, Harold
dc.contributor.authorWen, Quan
dc.description.abstractThe players behave quite differently in the negotiation model under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies on the key presumption that all continuation payoffs are bounded from above by the bargaining frontier resulted from stationary contracts. When players have different time preferences, however, intertemporal trade may lead to continuation payoffs above the bargaining frontier. In this paper, we provide a thorough study of this problem when players have different time preferences. Our results tie up all the previous findings, and also clarify the confusion that arose in the past.
dc.publisherVanderbilt Universityen
dc.subjecttime preference
dc.subjectendogenous threats
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: C72
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: C73
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: C78
dc.titlePerfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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