dc.contributor.author | Schwartz, Jesse A. | |
dc.contributor.author | Wen, Quan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-14T01:04:38Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-14T01:04:38Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15837 | |
dc.description.abstract | We introduce a perfect price discriminating (PPD) mechanism for allocation problems with private information. A PPD mechanism treats a seller, for example, as a perfect price discriminating monopolist who faces a price schedule that does not depend on her report. In any PPD mechanism, every player has a dominant strategy to truthfully report her private information. We establish a revelation principle for dominant strategy implementation: any outcome that can be dominant strategy implemented can also be dominant strategy implemented using a PPD mechanism. We apply this principle to derive the optimal, budget-balanced, dominant strategy mechanisms for public good provision and bilateral bargaining. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | en |
dc.subject | Dominant strategy implementation | |
dc.subject | Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms | |
dc.subject | public good provision | |
dc.subject | bilateral bargaining | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: C72 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: C78 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: D44 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: D82 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: H41 | |
dc.subject.other | | |
dc.title | A Revelation Principle for Dominant Strategy Implementation | |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.department | Economics | |