dc.contributor.author | Dhillon, Amrita | |
dc.contributor.author | Wooders, Myrna | |
dc.contributor.author | Zissimos, Ben | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-14T00:31:04Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-14T00:31:04Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15809 | |
dc.description.abstract | In a classic model of tax competition, we show that the level of public good provision and taxation in a decentralized equilibrium can be efficient or inefficient with either too much, or too little public good provision. The key is whether there exists a unilateral incentive to deviate from the efficient state and, if so, whether this entails raising or lowering taxes. A priori, there is no reason to suppose the incentive is in either one direction or the other. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | en |
dc.subject | Efficiency | |
dc.subject | Nash equilibrium | |
dc.subject | over-provision | |
dc.subject | tax competition | |
dc.subject | under-provision | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: C72 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: H73 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: H21 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: H42 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: R50 | |
dc.subject.other | | |
dc.title | Tax Competition Reconsidered | |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.department | Economics | |