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The GATT and Gradualism

dc.contributor.authorZissimos, Ben
dc.description.abstractThis paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be achieved, if punishment for deviation from an agreement is limited to a `withdrawal of equivalent concessions' and if initial deviation from an agreement is also limited. The paper shows how (sufficiently patient) countries have an incentive to deviate in a limited way when operating under GATT dispute settlement procedures.
dc.publisherVanderbilt Universityen
dc.subjectFree trade
dc.subjectgradual trade liberalization
dc.subjectstrategic interactions
dc.subjecttrade agreement
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: F02
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: F13
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: F15
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: C73
dc.titleThe GATT and Gradualism
dc.typeWorking Paperen

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