dc.contributor.author | Wooders, Myrna | |
dc.contributor.author | Cartwright, Edward | |
dc.contributor.author | Selten, Reinhard | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-13T21:32:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-13T21:32:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15773 | |
dc.description.abstract | In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to conform in their behavior to the behavior of similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such behavior can be consistent with self-interest. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash or approximate Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few societies, each consisting of similar individuals playing the same or similar strategies. In this paper we introduce a notion of a society and characterize a family of games admitting the existence of such an equilibrium. We also introduce the concept of 'crowding types' into our description of players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player -- those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others -- and his tastes, taken to directly affect only that player. With the assumptions of 'within crowding type anonymity' and 'linearity of taste-types' we show that the number of groups can be uniformly bounded. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | en |
dc.subject | Behavioral conformity | |
dc.subject | noncooperative games | |
dc.subject | pregames | |
dc.subject | Nash equilibrium | |
dc.subject | purification | |
dc.subject | social norms | |
dc.subject | behavioral norms | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: C72 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: Z13 | |
dc.subject.other | | |
dc.title | Behavioral Conformity in Games with Many Players | |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.department | Economics | |