dc.contributor.author | Cartwright, Edward | |
dc.contributor.author | Wooders, Myrna | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-13T21:32:26Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-13T21:32:26Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15772 | |
dc.description.abstract | Kalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash. In this paper we demonstrate that the existence of an approximate expost Nash property implies a purification result of the standard sort for the original Bayesian game. We also provide an example showing that the bound we obtain on the distance of a purified approximate equilibrium from an exact equilibrium is tight. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | en |
dc.subject | Ex-post Nash equilibrium | |
dc.subject | noncooperative games | |
dc.subject | incomplete information | |
dc.subject | purification | |
dc.subject | epsilon ex-post Nash equilibrium | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: C72 | |
dc.subject.other | | |
dc.title | On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium | |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.department | Economics | |