dc.contributor.author | Serizawa, Shigehiro | |
dc.contributor.author | Weymark, John A. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-13T20:40:31Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-13T20:40:31Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2002 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15711 | |
dc.description.abstract | For exchange economies with classical economic preferences, it is shown that any strategy-proof social choice function that selects Pareto optimal outcomes cannot guarantee everyone a consumption bundle bounded away from the origin. This result demonstrates that there is a fundamental conflict between efficiency and distributional goals in exchange economies if the social choice rule is required to be strategy-proof. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | en |
dc.subject | social choice | |
dc.subject | strategy-proofness | |
dc.subject | exchange economies JEL Classification Number: D71 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: | |
dc.subject.other | | |
dc.title | Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchangeand Minimum Consumption Guarantees | |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.department | Economics | |