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Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws

dc.contributor.authorO'Connor, Erin O'Hara, 1965-
dc.date.accessioned2016-04-26T20:29:04Z
dc.date.available2016-04-26T20:29:04Z
dc.date.issued2002
dc.identifier.citation90 Geo. L.J. 941 (2002)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/7553
dc.descriptionarticle published in law journalen_US
dc.description.abstractThis piece is a response to an article by Andrew Guzman, which proffers an efficiency framework for choice-of-law problems in interjurisdictional conflicts. The response incorporates insights from public choice theory into choice of law to draw two conclusions. First, public choice theory confounds our attempts to draw normative conclusions about efficient choice-of-law policies. Second, assuming that we can overcome these difficulties to ascertain the content of efficient choice-of-law policies, public choice theory exposes the practical difficulties of moving courts toward more efficient choice-of-law decisions. In short, the problem is both more difficult and more elusive than others, including Guzman, have presupposed.en_US
dc.format.extent1 PDF (18 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherGeorgetown Law Journalen_US
dc.subject.lcshConflict of laws -- Economic aspectsen_US
dc.titleEconomics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Lawsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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