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From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law

dc.contributor.authorO'Connor, Erin O'Hara, 1965-
dc.contributor.authorRibstein, Larry E.
dc.date.accessioned2014-07-31T19:01:29Z
dc.date.available2014-07-31T19:01:29Z
dc.date.issued2000
dc.identifier.citation67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1151 (2000)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/6621
dc.description.abstractThis article proposes a comprehensive system for choice of law that is designed to enhance social wealth by focusing on individual rather than governmental interests. To the extent practicable, parties should be able to choose their governing law. In the absence of an explicit agreement, courts should apply rules that facilitate party choice or that select the law the parties likely would have contracted for - that is, the law of the state with the comparative regulatory advantage. The system relies on clear rules that enable the parties to determine, at low cost and ex ante, what law applies to given conduct, and therefore to choose the applicable law by altering their conduct. State regulatory concerns are accounted for through explicit state legislation on choice of law rather than ad hoc judicial determination of the states' interests. The article shows how this system might be implemented through jurisdictional competition.en_US
dc.format.extent1 PDF (83 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherUniversity of Chicago Law Reviewen_US
dc.subject.lcshConflict of laws -- United Statesen_US
dc.titleFrom Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Lawen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ssrn-urihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=253796


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