dc.contributor.author | Stack, Kevin M. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-07-11T21:17:25Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-07-11T21:17:25Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 2391 (2011) | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/6565 | |
dc.description.abstract | Separation of powers has a new endeavor. The PCAOB decision
makes the validity of good-cause removal protections depend on the
separation of adjudicative from policymaking and enforcement
functions within the agency. At a minimum, within independent
agencies, it preserves the second layer of removal protection only for
dedicated adjudicators. But its logic extends further. In PCAOB, the
demand for political supervision over rulemaking and enforcement
trumped Congress's choice to preserve the independence of officials
who perform those roles and also adjudicate. In that way, PCAOB
reversed the consistent constitutional validation of good-cause removal
protections for those who engage in adjudication. While PCAOB might
well be confined to two (or greater) levels of good-cause removal
protection, it has the potential to restructure the constitutional footing
for agencies with a single level of good-cause removal protection,
preserving that protection for dedicated adjudicators but casting it aside
for agencies with more than just adjudicative functions. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1 document (31 pages) | en_US |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Cardozo Law Review | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Public Company Accounting Oversight Board | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Separation of powers -- United States | en_US |
dc.title | Agency Independence After PCAOB | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.ssrn-uri | http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534574 | |