Browsing Department of Economics by Subject "signaling"
Now showing items 1-5 of 5
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(Vanderbilt University, 2007)Firms communicate product quality attributes to consumers through a variety of channels, such as pricing, advertising, releases of research reports and test results, or warranties and returns policies. The conceptualization ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2006)Can the presence of private information in a transaction yield a Pareto-improvement over complete information? In this paper we show that the combination of multi-agent simultaneous signaling of private information, and ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2005)We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally- and vertically-differentiated substitute products. We find that incomplete ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2008)We develop and explore a new model of the economics of privacy. Previous work has focused on "privacy of type," wherein an agent privately knows an immutable characteristic. We consider "privacy of action," wherein privacy ...
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(Vanderbilt University, 2006)In this paper we examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a privately-observed safety attribute; that is, consumers cannot observe directly the product¬πs safety. The firm may, at a cost, disclose its ...