Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Rousseau, Peter L.; Stroup, Caleb (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      We trace directors through time and across firms to study whether acquirers' exposure to non-public information about potential targets through board service histories affects the market for corporate control. In a sample ...
    • Stroup, Caleb; Zissimos, Ben (Vanderbilt University, 2010)
      This paper shows how a nation's elite maintain ownership of their wealth by creating a `pampered bureaucracy.' The elite thus divert part of an otherwise entrepreneurial middle class from more productive manufacturing ...
    • Stroup, Caleb; Zissimos, Benjamin (Vanderbilt University, 2011)
      This paper shows how, under threat of revolution, a nation's elite are able to maintain political stability and hence ownership of their wealth by creating or expanding a `pampered bureaucracy.' The elite thus divert part ...