Browsing Department of Economics by Author "Reinganum, Jennifer F."
Now showing items 1-19 of 19
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2009)In this paper we examine a dynamic model of the process by which multiple related lawsuits may be filed and combined; we also examine actions a defendant may employ that may disrupt the formation of a joint suit. Our initial ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2010)We model the game between an informed seller (a lawyer) and an uninformed buyer (a potential client) over the choice of compensation for the lawyer to take a case to trial, when there is post-contracting investment by the ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2007)Firms communicate product quality attributes to consumers through a variety of channels, such as pricing, advertising, releases of research reports and test results, or warranties and returns policies. The conceptualization ...
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Reinganum, Jennifer F.; Daughety, Andrew F. (Vanderbilt University. Dept. of Economics, 2004-07)How does the need to signal quality through price affect equilibrium pricing and profits, when a firm faces a similarly-situated rival? In this paper, we provide a model of non-cooperative signaling by two firms that compete ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2011)In the traditional model of the law and economics of torts, harm accrues proportional to use. This has the remarkable implication for products-generated torts that product performance concerns (e.g., issues of care and of ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)We briefly review two basic models of settlement bargaining based on concepts from information economics and game theory. We then discuss how these models have been generalized to address issues that arise when there are ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2002)"Most-favored-nation" (hereafter, MFN) clauses have been used in analyses of international trade, durable goods monopoly pricing, and franchise contracting to address a repeat player's time-inconsistency problem. Recent ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2000)We examine the effect of "split-award" statutes (wherein the State takes a share of a punitive damages award) on equilibrium settlements and the incentives to go to trial. We find that split-award statutes simultaneously ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2006)Can the presence of private information in a transaction yield a Pareto-improvement over complete information? In this paper we show that the combination of multi-agent simultaneous signaling of private information, and ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2005)We examine the interplay of imperfect competition and incomplete information in the context of price competition among firms producing horizontally- and vertically-differentiated substitute products. We find that incomplete ...
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Balboa, Orlando I.; Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2001)We explore the interplay of market structure and government trade policy in the context of a heterogenous goods duopoly model (allowing for goods to be substitutes or complements) wherein governments simultaneously and ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2003)In this paper we examine the nexus between product markets and the legal system. We examine a model wherein oligopolists produce differentiated products that also have a safety attribute. Consumption of these products may ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2007)We explore how the incentives of a plaintiff and her attorney, when considering filing suit and bargaining over settlement, can differ between those suits associated with stand-alone torts cases and those suits involving ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2008)We develop and explore a new model of the economics of privacy. Previous work has focused on "privacy of type," wherein an agent privately knows an immutable characteristic. We consider "privacy of action," wherein privacy ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2006)In this paper we examine the behavior of a firm that produces a product with a privately-observed safety attribute; that is, consumers cannot observe directly the product¬πs safety. The firm may, at a cost, disclose its ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2011)We show that, in the context of the market for a professional service, adverse selection problems can sufficiently exacerbate moral hazard considerations so that even though all agents are risk neutral, welfare can be ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2003)We employ a simple two-period model to show that the use of confidential settlement as a strategy for a firm facing tort litigation leads to lower average product safety than that which would be produced if a firm were ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2008)This survey of the modeling of pretrial settlement bargaining organizes current main themes and recent developments. The basic concepts used are outlined as core models and then several variations on these core models are ...
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Daughety, Andrew F.; Reinganum, Jennifer F. (Vanderbilt University, 2002)We draw together concepts from political science, law, and economics to model discretionary actions by agents in a weak hierarchical system, wherein agents at a higher level cannot directly discipline those at a lower ...