dc.contributor.advisor | | |
dc.contributor.author | Siegel, Nolan | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2022-09-07T22:56:15Z | |
dc.date.available | 2022-09-07T22:56:15Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022-08-25 | |
dc.identifier.citation | Siegel, N. (2022). From Preference to Policy: Wealth, Institutions of Government, and the Search for Democracy. UCL Journal of Economics, vol. 1 no. 1, pp. 150-167. DOI: 10.14324/111.444.2755- 0877.1408 | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/17674 | |
dc.description | Economics Department Honors Thesis. | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | What is the nature of substantive representation within American institutions of government, and to what extent do constituents’ preferences turn into adopted policy? To answer these questions, I analyze data on federal policies proposed between 1964 and 2006 and constituents’ support for them by running a series of linear probability models to estimate the chance of policy adoption as a function of constituent support. I find the president is more responsive to constituents than Congress, and high-income constituents’ preferences – but not those of median- and low-income constituents – are significantly correlated with policies adopted by both Congress and the president. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | UCL Journal of Economics | en_US |
dc.subject | Democracy | en_US |
dc.subject | Representation | en_US |
dc.subject | Income Inequality | en_US |
dc.subject | Linear Probability Models | en_US |
dc.subject | USA | en_US |
dc.title | From Preference to Policy: Wealth, Institutions of Government, and the Search for Democracy | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
dc.description.college | College of Arts and Science | |
dc.description.department | Economics | |