dc.contributor.author | Cuff, Katherine | |
dc.contributor.author | Hong, Sunghoon | |
dc.contributor.author | Schwartz, Jesse | |
dc.contributor.author | Weymark, John A. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-14T01:39:55Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-14T01:39:55Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15918 | |
dc.description.abstract | A necessary and sufficient condition for dominant strategy implementability when preferences are quasilinear is that, for any individual i and any choice of the types of the other individuals, all k-cycles in i's allocation graph have nonnegative length for every integer k ≥ 2 . Saks and Yu (Proceedings of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC'05), 2005, 286-293) have shown that when the number of outcomes is finite and i's valuation type space is convex, nonnegativity of the length of all 2-cycles is sufficient for the nonnegativity of the length of all k-cycles. In this article, it is shown that if each individual's valuation type space is a convex product space and a mild domain regularity condition is satisfied, then (i) the nonnegativity of all 2-cycles implies that all k-cycles have zero length and (ii) all 2-cycles having zero length is necessary and sufficient for dominant strategy implementability. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | en |
dc.subject | 2-cycle condition | |
dc.subject | dominant strategy implementation | |
dc.subject | mechanism design | |
dc.subject | revenue equivalence | |
dc.subject | Rockafellar-Rochet Theorem | |
dc.subject | Saks-Yu Theorem competition | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: D44 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: D71 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: D82 | |
dc.subject.other | | |
dc.title | Dominant Strategy Implementation with a Convex Product Space of Valuations | |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.department | Economics | |