dc.contributor.author | Zissimos, Ben | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-09-14T00:31:03Z | |
dc.date.available | 2020-09-14T00:31:03Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2006 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15808 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper shows how the institutional rules imposed on its signatories by the GATT created a strategic incentive for countries to liberalize gradually. Trade liberalization must be gradual, and free trade can never be achieved, if punishment for deviation from an agreement is limited to a `withdrawal of equivalent concessions' and if initial deviation from an agreement is also limited. The paper shows how (sufficiently patient) countries have an incentive to deviate in a limited way when operating under GATT dispute settlement procedures. | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | |
dc.publisher | Vanderbilt University | en |
dc.subject | Free trade | |
dc.subject | gradual trade liberalization | |
dc.subject | strategic interactions | |
dc.subject | trade agreement | |
dc.subject | welfare | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: F02 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: F13 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: F15 | |
dc.subject | JEL Classification Number: C73 | |
dc.subject.other | | |
dc.title | The GATT and Gradualism | |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.description.department | Economics | |