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On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium

dc.contributor.authorCartwright, Edward
dc.contributor.authorWooders, Myrna
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-13T21:32:26Z
dc.date.available2020-09-13T21:32:26Z
dc.date.issued2005
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/15772
dc.description.abstractKalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash. In this paper we demonstrate that the existence of an approximate expost Nash property implies a purification result of the standard sort for the original Bayesian game. We also provide an example showing that the bound we obtain on the distance of a purified approximate equilibrium from an exact equilibrium is tight.
dc.language.isoen_US
dc.publisherVanderbilt Universityen
dc.subjectEx-post Nash equilibrium
dc.subjectnoncooperative games
dc.subjectincomplete information
dc.subjectpurification
dc.subjectepsilon ex-post Nash equilibrium
dc.subjectJEL Classification Number: C72
dc.subject.other
dc.titleOn Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.description.departmentEconomics


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