

Review

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to devote himself entirely to the mission when Silas and Timothy arrived, presumably because they brought money that freed Paul from having to work with Priscilla and Aquila (p. 167). This reading harmonizes Acts with information from the Pauline letters, for Acts mentions no financial assistance. While Talbert's "canonical" interpretation may very well suggest how those familiar with the Pauline letters would have heard this episode, the verb tenses in Acts 18:4–5 indicate simply that Silas and Timothy found Paul actively engaged in the mission when they arrived (compare Acts 20:33–34). The transition in the narrative of Luke-Acts at this point (read apart from a "canonical" context) is not between verse 4 and verse 5 but rather between verses 2–3 and 4–8. Read in this way, the narrative says nothing about a change in Paul's financial position at Corinth, thereby requiring a different explanation of the relation of verses 2–3 to the rest of the narrative about events at Corinth and information elsewhere in Acts about Priscilla and Aquila. Talbert tends to miss opportunities to explore the different Christian contexts in which the actual episodes of Acts could have been heard by early Christians.

There is a similar lack of connection between Talbert's discussion of genre in the introduction and his actual interpretation of the text in the commentary. In the introduction, Talbert identifies the genre of Luke-Acts as a type of biography that included a succession narrative after an account of the life of the founder of a community. Little, however, in his actual commentary on Acts suggests that this genre identification makes much difference for how one reads (or hears) the individual episodes in the narrative. Talbert draws parallels from all types of ancient literature to understand each episode with little reference to his understanding of the genre of Acts. Interestingly, his discussion of the function of the speeches in Acts (pp. 45–47) largely appeals to conventions of ancient historiography (though in passing he notes that biography could follow the same conventions). Elsewhere he appeals to parallels in ancient novels to clarify the meaning of particular episodes in the narrative. Since history, narrative fiction, and biography have been proposed as mutually exclusive identifications of the genre of Acts, it would have been interesting to see more clearly how Talbert's own genre identification made a difference for the reading of Acts.

It is just because Talbert has attempted to read Acts in terms of large units of thought that such questions about the interpretive context for understanding the narrative of Acts become clear, questions often lost in commentaries that proceed in a word-by-word or verse-by-verse manner. Even if his exposition of individual episodes does not always carry through the interpretive framework established in his introduction, Talbert's commentary provides a good introduction to a text whose canonical familiarity often obscures the literary and theological intentions of the author.

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JONES, JAMES W. *Religion and Psychology in Transition: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Theology*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996. xii+164 pp. \$22.50 (cloth).

If Sigmund Freud created psychoanalysis to resolve a conflict between scientific Enlightenment thought and orthodox religious belief, as some argue, then the work of James Jones, clinical psychologist and religion professor, might be characterized as one further step in the struggle. Questions raised by an earlier publica-

tion, *Contemporary Psychoanalysis and Religion* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), lead Jones back into three further explorations in *Religion and Psychology*: Freud's influence on the interpretation of religion, the role of gender, and the theological implications of psychoanalytic views. In many ways, Jones's objective is modest: to show how more receptive readings of religion evolve out of recent changes in psychoanalytic theory. Reversing Freud's own position, British object relations theory and the American school of self psychology suggest that religion arises from pre-oedipal, maternal dynamics, rather than from internalized paternal authority or distorted narcissistic wishes, and plays a creative role in human well-being. Whether this answers or simply extends the problem introduced by Ludwig Feuerbach is perhaps the biggest question left dangling throughout the book until the final chapters. Assessment of Jones's answer is especially important since he claims theological relevance for his investigation.

The book is divided into two parts around Freud's twofold reading of religion as a superego formation and as a narcissistic deviation of the id. The first part investigates psychoanalytic and theological theories of the relational dimension of human nature and implications for religion and therapy. The second part moves from new understandings of narcissism into epistemological questions. Chapters in the first section move from Freud to offer concise summaries of large bodies of thought, from W. R. D. Fairbairn and Heinz Kohut to Paul Tillich, Martin Buber, John Macmurray, and feminist and process theology, all of which presume as fundamental the constitution of personhood and reality in relationality. The fulcrum of development and, in turn, pathology shifts from the drives and oedipal struggles to the quality of early relationships. Religion in this view is less a pathological aberration of misdirected drives than a factor in the self's pursuit of cohesive structures in a relational matrix. Jones illustrates with two cases that oddly revolve around ambiguous father (not mother) images.

Up to this point, Jones does not add much to his earlier work or the work of others. So people find and create gods in the image of human relationships. This, Freud (among others) established. What more do we glean from Jones's review? To my mind, the second part of the book, using recent psychoanalytic theories to revise understandings of knowing, is where the discussion gets interesting. New views of narcissism, the id, transitional process, and illusion as sources of creativity and imagination, rather than primitive states to be outgrown, signal important changes in psychoanalytic theories of knowing that cohere with philosophical arguments in Richard Bernstein and others about the inseparability of objectivity from subjectivity and data from theory. In assessing the ontological status of God, Jones ventures slightly—but just slightly—beyond Ana-Maria Rizzuto and William Meissner's functional view of religious symbols as fictive creations. The reality of God exists in the intermediary space of interaction and is both there and not there, created and discovered. Objects of religious knowledge exist in the paradox of Winnicott's transitional space, with greater specificity within religious circles than without, and accessible through spiritual disciplines. For postmodern debates over absolute truth and relativism, Jones provides, then, psychoanalytic infrastructures for a theory of critical realism. And he provides a nice psychoanalysis of unbelief. The desire to reduce faith to witless or childish thinking embodies sexist repression of connection, idolization of objectivity, rejection of emotional experience out of fear of loss of control, and refusal to enter transitional space.

Jones does not quite deliver on the promise of the title to investigate "psychology" beyond psychoanalysis, to engage feminism extensively, or to give theology comparable weight. But he succeeds well in sharpening psychoanalytic arguments

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for the importance of religion and the reality of God. Whether or not object relations theory is adequate to this task is perhaps less important than the conclusion that new psychological theory is necessary if one is to understand the intrapsychic and cultural role of religion in a changed world. Freud is less wrong than short-sighted. The real question becomes whether there is a psychological theory capable of understanding the complexity of psychological and spiritual life today and whether faith-committed theologians can pick up the discussion where Jones leaves off.

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AUSTIN-BROOS, DIANE. *Jamaica Genesis: Religion and the Politics of Moral Orders*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997. xxiii+295 pp. \$50.00 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

Diane J. Austin-Broos, holder of the Radcliffe-Brown Chair of Anthropology at the University of Sydney, Australia, attempts to discern what makes Pentecostalism particularly Jamaican. For the answer, she investigates three diverse cosmologies that, in her analysis, converge to form a Jamaican-creole way of being. To such a creolization, European Christianity contributed a religious discourse with sin lodged in the individual, and, consequently, one dealt with it through individual moral discipline with a reward in heaven. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Christian missionaries emphasized redemption from the presence of sin. For Europeans, joy existed only in the afterlife, which opposed the sins of the earth.

In contrast, enslaved Africans brought to Jamaica an approach to life embracing the coexistence of evil and good in the world negotiated through rite and the ambivalence of a trickster figure. Trickster ambivalence links directly to the fluid impact on the individual of the companions of good and evil, neither of which rigidly occupied separate spheres. Furthermore, ritual acts were employed by these Africans to heal a biomoral malaise and a disordered world. The healing in this world suggests the ability to experience both joy and moral practices simultaneously before death.

When Pentecostalism arrived from the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century, Jamaicans converted to this new form of Christianity. However, Austin-Broos asserts her theoretical insights at this juncture. Not only did American Pentecostalism convert Jamaicans, but the Jamaicans used Pentecostalism as a site at which to confront and transform the original meanings brought by European Christianity and African religions. A specific Jamaican creolization deployed Pentecostalism as a contentious site of new-against-old meanings. Thus a Jamaican religious discourse consists of a refashioned (i.e., synthesized) amalgamation of other religious sensibilities transformed through practice. In a word, meaning changes through a dynamic use—a negotiated undertaking involving European Christianity (e.g., personal sin, moral discipline, and guilt) versus African religion (e.g., ritual, eudemonic, and celebration of healing rites on the body). With Pentecostalism as the location for the resolution of these two cosmologies, specifically in the church itself, Jamaicans have deepened further their own particular religious discourse. Use and practices merged and transformed old meanings into a *tertium quid*—a creole religion.

Austin-Broos, grounded in her extensive fieldwork, Weberian insights, and postmodern theory, examines the Pentecostal church as the site of a Jamaican