

The German Understanding of National History in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*

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Glossary of Terms

Bundestag

Federal Diet; federal legislative body of BRD since 1949

Hauptstadtdebatte

Capital city debate

Vereinigung

Unification

Vergangenheitsbewältigung

Coping with the past

Wiedervereinigung

Reunification

Stunde Null

Zero hour

TIMELINE

Kaiserreich

German empire

1871-1918

Weimar Republic

1918-1933

Third Reich

Hitler's Nazi regime

1933-1945

BRD

Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Federal Republic of Germany, or West Germany

1949-present

DDR

Deutsche Demokratische Republik: German Democratic Republic, or East Germany

1949-1989

POLITICAL PARTIES

Bündnis 90/Grüne

Green political party

CDU

Christian Democratic Union

CSU
Christian Social Union of Bavaria

FDP
Free Democratic Party

PDS/Linke Liste
Party of Democratic Socialism

SED
Socialist Unity Party; the state party of the DDR

SPD
Socialist Democratic Party

PROPOSALS

Consensus Proposal

Berlin would become the seat of parliament, while Bonn would remain the seat of government.

Bonn Proposal

Bonn would remain both the parliamentary and the governmental seat of Germany, but Berlin would be the official capital of Germany, a largely ceremonial title.

Berlin Proposal

Berlin would retain both the title and function of the German capital.

Introduction

The Continued Significance of History in Modern Germany

On June 16, 1871, following unification, Berlin hosted a celebration of Germany's new national status that reflected the Prussian militaristic foundation of the state. Otto von Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm I, along with 40,000 soldiers, marched down Unter den Linden, the main boulevard in Berlin, towards Pariser Platz at the foot of the Brandenburg Gate. Spectators who gathered in the Platz fought for spots from which to watch the festivities, with many even climbing atop the 70-foot tall Brandenburg Gate itself.¹ Yet, the enthusiasm and sense of national pride rife in this 1871 display of military might did not correspond to overwhelming approval of Berlin as the national capital.

Opposition to settling the capital in Berlin came from both detractors of the Prussian basis of the Reich and from the regime leaders themselves. Many Germans worried about the possible negative ramifications for individual state independence from placing the Reich capital in the same location as the center of Prussian power.² On the other hand, Bismarck and Wilhelm I feared what they perceived as Berlin's predilection for disorder and general disrespect for authority.³

Interestingly, the objections to Berlin as capital of the *Kaiserreich* resonated clearly with the debate surrounding the placement of the German capital following unification over 100 years later in 1990. Germans opposed to reinstating Berlin as the national capital feared a revival of the nationalistic fervor rampant in the city's past, as well as the potential for uprisings and rebellions. Similar to the situation in Bismarck's Germany, these concerns sprang up from all corners, including government officials. Unlike the 1871 reaction, though, after unification in

¹ David Clay Large, *Berlin* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 4.

² *Ibid*, 5.

³ *Ibid*, 40.

1990, no grand military parade marched down Unter den Linden to celebrate. The celebration in Berlin following official unification on October 3, 1990 represented the culmination of a peaceful revolution that enabled East Germans to finally travel freely into the West.

The road to German reunification began with East German unrest due to their government's repressive travel restrictions. As the DDR government attempted to deal with the increasing unease of their populace, one politician's misinterpretation of a planned policy change led to the historic opening of the Berlin Wall. With two words, "sofort, unverzüglich," Günter Schabowski, member of the DDR's central executive committee, abruptly altered the lives of Germans living in East Berlin, which would, in turn, lead to an enduring effect on the future of Germany as a united whole. Schabowski probably never imagined that his ignorance of the details of the new East German policy on travel visas would lead to the opening of the Berlin Wall to the West that same night and eventually the unification of East and West Germany. Yet, that represented exactly what happened. By stating that the new policy would take effect "immediately, without delay," Schabowski initiated the flood of East Germans to the Berlin Wall border crossings within hours of hearing the details of Schabowski's press conference on the television news. Schabowski's misrepresentation of the immediacy of the new DDR policy acted as the catalyst for the game of dominos that started with the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989.

The subsequent unification of Germany following the events of November 9, 1989 led directly into the debate known as the *Hauptstadtdebatte* over the correct location for the capital of the newly unified Germany. Just as Schabowski's simple response in a press conference had far-reaching consequences, so too did the matter of placing the German capital in either Bonn or Berlin have a greater meaning for contemporary Germany. The *Hauptstadtdebatte* came to

represent broader themes such as how to create a truly cohesive unified Germany and how to deal with the history of Germany in its times of both unification and division. In this manner, the debate became the stage on which Germans played out the questions about the meaning of their national history that plagued them during this period. The stark contrast between the events of 1871 and 1991 brought up the question of what had changed for Germany in the century spanning the two unifications. The dynamic nature of German history has attracted much analysis from scholars in all fields, not only historians, but also psychologists and sociologists, among others.

Unification took on the form of an enlargement of the BRD in 1990, with each state in the former East voting to join the nation in the West. In the event of unification, a Bundestag resolution called for moving the capital back to Berlin. Yet, in 1990, the return of the capital to Berlin did not seem as clear-cut as the Bundestag resolution prescribed. Many Germans resisted the idea of moving the capital from Bonn back to Berlin, and a debate over the best location for the capital of newly unified Germany ensued. The form of absorption of the East into the BRD likely influenced the *Hauptstadidebatte* that followed, because many Germans felt most comfortable with a continuation of the BRD that had governed from Bonn for the past forty years.

While the capital of the DDR remained in Berlin after World War II, the BRD opted to locate its political center elsewhere as long as Germany remained divided. West Germany eventually selected Bonn to act as its capital, which seemed especially attractive for its status as a provincial city of little import that placed Bonn in stark contrast with chaotic, history-laden Berlin. According to a Bundestag resolution on November 3, 1949, the capital of Germany would return to Berlin “as soon as free, equal, and direct elections are held throughout Berlin and

in the Soviet Occupation Zone.”⁴ This resolution prescribed the temporary nature of the placement of government power in Bonn. Historian Henry Ashby Turner, Jr. argued that the small-city characteristics of Bonn and the physical government set-up there reinforced the belief that the capital would not remain in Bonn. He observed, “In part to emphasize that removal of the government from Berlin should be viewed as only a temporary expedient, the Parliamentary Council chose as the provisional capital of the Federal Republic the small Rhenish university city of Bonn, where the council had held its sessions in a building formerly used as a teachers’ college.”⁵ While the temporary nature of Bonn as the German capital came into question as unification seemed more and more unlikely to contemporary observers, the parliamentary resolution stipulating the move back to Berlin in the event of unification remained in place. The conflict between the wish to leave the capital in Bonn and the resolution requiring a return to Berlin would lead to the subsequent debate over the right place for the capital of this new German nation. The contentious question of Bonn or Berlin persisted in German society, as well as in the Bundestag, which voted on the issue on June 20, 1991. Berlin emerged narrowly victorious from this vote, and thus the seat of government eventually fully returned to its original home on the Spree.

Attempts to reconcile contemporary society with the dark events of German history played an important role in the debate. Endeavoring to somehow live with the darkest parts of their history represented a recurrent theme in German everyday life and scholarship on German society, people, and history. In true German fashion, a word existed specifically for this phenomenon; *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* conveyed the idea of coming to terms with or coping with (*Bewältigung*) the past (*Vergangenheit*). Originally meant as a way to describe German

⁴ Large, *Berlin*, 545.

⁵ Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., *Germany from Partition to Reunification* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 38.

attempts to deal with the problematic legacy of the Nazi period, the term also came to include dealing with the aftermath of the repressive communist regime in the DDR. In his article, “‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ After Totalitarian Rule in Germany,” historian Eckhard Jesse compared the regimes in both the Third Reich under the Nazis and the DDR under the communists as a means to prove the necessity of finding a way to deal with the historical problems left from both eras.⁶ The concept, and attempts at practice, of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* came across quite clearly in the *Hauptstadtdebatte* following unification. As German history, and particularly Berlin’s history, cropped up often in the arguments both for and against bringing the capital back to Berlin, personal struggles to deal with certain aspects of this history became apparent.

Differing theories for ways to cope with the travesties of German national history arose in the wake of the end of World War II in 1945 and then again in 1989 with the impending unification of East and West Germany. Debate over the meaning of 1945 for Germany centered largely on the contested idea of the Nazi surrender marking a *Stunde Null*, or zero hour, for the nation. By accepting the existence of the *Stunde Null*, some Germans hoped to make a fresh start for themselves and build a country free of the problematic associations of their past, especially those connected to the Nazis.⁷ The actual need for rebuilding physically, politically, and also emotionally following the war supported the concept of a fresh start as both compulsory and beneficial. The problem with acceptance of a *Stunde Null*, however, lay with the implicit justification of forgetting the past. A true fresh start allowed, if not required, severing oneself from historical events that would influence future decisions and actions. In this way, the *Stunde*

⁶ Eckhard Jesse, “‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ nach totalitärer Herrschaft in Deutschland,” *German Studies Review* 17 (1994), 157-171.

⁷ Stuart Parkes, *Understanding Contemporary Germany* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 148.

Null appeared to oppose the direct dealing with the past for which *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* advocates would hope.

Attempts to work through varying interpretations of German history often translated into the assignment of symbolic meanings to the capital cities of Bonn and Berlin. Christine Lutz, in her book *Berlin as Capital of the Reunified Germany: Symbol for a New German Self-Understanding?*, traced the changing symbolism of Berlin for Germany through the capital's history. With the decision in 1991 to return the capital to Berlin, Lutz also looked specifically at whether Berlin contributed to a better understanding of the German identity. In order to understand Berlin's role in propelling Germans toward a more enlightened view of themselves and their history, Lutz identified the exact symbolic meanings of Berlin throughout its history. She noted, "Berlin is a symbol for the German history. German history, with all its fractures and continuities, concentrated itself in Berlin like in a magnifying glass."⁸ Lutz explained that all components of German history, including the positive and negative associations with Prussia, the glamour and failure of the Weimar Republic, the Nazis' crimes, the resistance against the Nazis, and the forty years of German division, radiated out from the city of Berlin. In her symbolic construct, if one applied a magnifying glass to the capital city, each of these parts of German history would be visible.⁹ Berlin served as the capital of five different German regimes: the Kingdom of Prussia, the Kaiserreich, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and the DDR. Even with all the political changes in German history, beginning with the Prussian state that would become the core around which Germany first unified, Berlin remained the capital of the German state.

⁸ Christine Lutz, *Berlin als Hauptstadt des wiedervereinigten Deutschlands: Symbol für ein neues deutsches Selbstverständnis?* (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2002), 109.

[“Berlin ist ein Symbol für die deutsche Geschichte. In Berlin bündelte sich wie in einem Brennglas die deutsche Geschichte mit all ihren Brüchen und Kontinuitäten.”]

⁹ *Ibid*, 110.

A question common to many historians and commentators of the period following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 concerned the terminology for the resultant political events in Germany. Most fall into two categories: observers who opted for *Vereinigung* (unification) and those who chose *Wiedervereinigung* (reunification). This decision between two seemingly similar terms actually reflected divergent views of German history, as well as of the events leading up to the dissolution of the DDR.¹⁰ *Wiedervereinigung* indicated unified Germany had existed before and thus brought the historical baggage of previous German states, including Bismarck's *Kaiserreich* and Hitler's Third Reich. Alternatively, *Vereinigung* suggested that German history began again with the creation of the BRD following the end of World War II, which corresponded with the idea of *Stunde Null*. Richard J. Evans showed his support for the *Wiedervereinigung* view of German history in the title of his book, *Rereading German History 1800-1996: From Unification to Reunification*. Evans argued that German history did not begin again following World War II, but rather continued its historic pattern of continual change. He explained, "Rather, the events of 1989/90 suggest that changing boundaries and state forms have been a feature of German history all along."¹¹ Interestingly, the historic events often negatively associated with the term *Wiedervereinigung* represented the events most used in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*. These events created a connection between the divergent views of unification and the varying interpretations of national history in the arguments in the debate.

The worries over whether to use *Wiedervereinigung* or *Vereinigung* in reference to the events following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the associated views of national history played such an important role during the period from 1989 to 1991 because of a common concern over

¹⁰ David Schoenbaum and Elizabeth Pond, *The German Question and Other German Questions* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 6.

¹¹ Richard J. Evans, *Rereading German History 1800-1996: From Unification to Reunification* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 243.

the role history would play in the future German state. Germans opposed to *Wiedervereinigung* were perhaps most concerned with distancing the new German state from the troublesome parts of German history, such as the aggressive regimes led by Bismarck and Hitler. *Vereinigung* provided a clean slate from which Germany could work to create a nation unburdened by the problematic history of the Nazis, for example.

In the *Hauptstadtdebatte* leading up to the Bundestag vote on June 20, 1991, Germans employed aspects of German national history to make cases for both Berlin and Bonn. Berlin's role as capital of Prussia, the Kaiserreich, Weimar Republic, Third Reich, and DDR presented opportunities for both criticism and support of the plan to move the capital back to the city on the Spree. Arguments for Berlin and Bonn demonstrated the construction of historical meaning for each of the cities, which then could affect the future of unified Germany. The methods whereby Germans remembered and used history in the *Hauptstadtdebatte* revealed the continuing relevance of national history to modern conceptions of Germany. This thesis will examine how German national history shaped arguments of the 109 Bundestag members who spoke in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*, including concerns about creating a strong federalist government, how to best deal with Germany's past, and which parts of German history remained most pertinent to its future.

This thesis will first look at the influence personal factors such as age, birthplace, district represented, political party, and religion, as well as combinations thereof, had on members' voting in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*. While none of these factors seemed conclusive by itself, certain voting tendencies emerged within the specific characteristics. The lack of overarching, decisive voting trends based on any one characteristic, though, suggested the deeply personal nature of the members' favoring of one city over the other. Furthermore, inspection of the members'

speeches advocating for one proposal to solve the *Hauptstadtdebatte* over the others demonstrated the importance of other unquantifiable factors. Many members constructed symbolic meanings for each city based on its history and relationship to the German nation. Not only did national history play a role, but a member's view of the city in terms of both history and personal memory also influenced his/her opinion in the debate. Personal experiences of German history affected the construction of meaning for the cities and the German nation as a whole, as well the members' voting. Acting as a microcosm of debates over Germany's past and its role in the country's future, the *Hauptstadtdebatte* showed Bundestag members working through various understandings of German national history in both history and memory, while also attempting to deal with that past through forms of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* or the acceptance of a *Stunde Null*.

Chapter I

Analysis of the Voting of the 109 Bundestag Debate Speakers

Following chapters will study the way in which members constructed their arguments for each proposal in the *Hauptstadtdebatte* through analysis of the content and structure of their speeches to the Bundestag. This chapter, however, analyzes the votes cast by the 109 Bundestag members who spoke in the debate on June 20, 1991 according to quantifiable personal characteristics of the members. The members' age, birthplace, party, and district represented, as well as combinations of these factors, comprise the characteristics highlighted here.¹ The statistics represent only the 109 members who spoke in the Bundestag debate as these members provided the material for further analysis in this thesis.

For the Bundestag as a whole, 654 members first voted on the "Consensus Proposal Berlin/Bonn" (hereafter, "Consensus Proposal"), which would split up political power in the newly unified Germany. Berlin would become the seat of parliament, while Bonn would remain the seat of government. The Bundestag rejected this proposal with a vote of 75% "No," 22% "Yes," and the other 3% abstaining. Next, the Bundestag voted on the two proposals that would keep the governmental power together in either Bonn or Berlin. The "Bonn Proposal" meant that Bonn would remain both the parliamentary and the governmental seat of Germany, but Berlin would be the official capital of Germany, a largely ceremonial title. The "Completion of the Unity of Germany Proposal" (hereafter, "Berlin Proposal") sought to retain both the title and

¹ The tables showing the statistics for the voting on each proposal based on each factor can be found in the Appendix.

The data used for analysis in this chapter came from two main sources:

-*Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages, 1949-2002*, comp. Rudolf Vierhaus and Ludolf Herbst (München: KG Saur, 2002).


-Wissenschaftlichen Dienste des Deutschen Bundestages, *Die Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages*, 13th legislative period, 1998, Nr. 127.

function of the German capital together in Berlin. Members could only cast one vote between the Bonn and the Berlin Proposals, meaning that they needed to pick one or the other. The vote was very close, with 51% of the Bundestag casting their vote for the Berlin Proposal and 49% for the Bonn Proposal.² With an extremely narrow victory, Berlin became the official capital of Germany again, both in name and function.

The voting results for the 109 speakers, when compared to the Bundestag as a whole, appeared representative. For the Consensus Proposal, 64% of the members voted “No,” 28% voted “Yes,” and 6% abstained. The speakers, thus, opposed the Consensus Proposal less strongly than the general Bundestag population. The vote on the Bonn and Berlin Proposals was very close to the overall Bundestag vote, with 50% of the speakers voting for Berlin and 48% voting for Bonn.

For the purposes of this study, the members’ birthplaces and districts represented are divided into four geographic regions. The “East” comprises the former DDR, which includes Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Berlin, Saxon-Anhalt, Thuringia, and Saxony. The “Northwest” consists of Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Bremen, Lower Saxony, and North Rhine-Westphalia. The Northwest region thus includes the capital city contender of Bonn. The “Southwest” includes Hesse, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, and Baden-Württemberg. The “South” stands for the state of Bavaria.

² Only 2 members abstained, which constituted 0.3% of the voters.



1. Birthplace

Birthplace could affect a member's vote in that he/she felt a certain attachment to the area of Germany in which he/she was born. Even if a sort of unquantifiable sentimental attachment failed to exist, the location of the birthplace would affect that member's experience growing up. Being born in the West, especially after the division of Germany, meant a significantly different experience and understanding of Germany than members who were born in the East.

Birthplace affected the votes of members from the East and the Southwest in the votes on

both the Bonn and Berlin Proposals. Support for the Bonn Proposal decreased significantly only for members born in the East and increased only for those born in the Southwest. Being born in the East made the members slightly more likely to support moving the capital back to Berlin. Similarly, being born in the Southwest made members more likely to reject the proposal to return the capital to Berlin. Interestingly, the pattern of increased rejection of Berlin and support of Bonn did not apply to members born in the Northwest and South, which represented the other two sections of Western Germany. Since being born in the Northwest and the South did not affect the members' voting, being born in the West in general did not influence voting, but rather being born in the Southwest in particular. Rather than signifying a split in preference based solely on East-West associations, looking at the factor of birthplace demonstrated an effect only on those born in the East and the Southwest.

2. Year Born

Of the 109 members who spoke in the debate on June 20, 1991, the oldest member at 77 years old, Willy Brandt, was born in 1913. Meanwhile, twenty-five year old Hans-Martin Bury, the youngest member in this group, was born over fifty years later in 1966. Within this group of speakers, 80% were born before 1945. The vast majority of these members, therefore, were born before the end of World War II. Furthermore, 49% were born before 1939, meaning that they likely had some first-hand experience of the aftermath of Nazi Germany and World War II. Memories of growing up in post-war Germany would have been even clearer for the members born before 1939.

Age alone influenced the voting of members on the Consensus Proposal more than the Berlin or Bonn Proposals. For the Consensus proposal, younger members, born between 1946 and 1966, voted "No" more frequently than the rest of the members. Meanwhile, 8% more of the

oldest members, born 1913 to 1939, voted "No." Yet, the percentage of the members born between 1940 and 1945 who voted "No" was 14% lower than the overall percentage of members who voted "No." For the Bonn proposal, the percentage of members who voted for the proposal remained similar for each age group compared to the overall group. No age group varied more than 2% from the general vote of 48% for the proposal. The age of the members thus played little role in the members' support for keeping the capital in Bonn. For the Berlin Proposal, members from every age set also voted for Berlin at a rate similar to that of the entire group. None of the age groups varied more than 3% from the general vote. Age thus played no role in the voting of members on the Berlin Proposal.

3. Year Born and Birthplace

Similar to the idea that birthplace and age would affect what parts of German history the member experienced, these two factors combined could more accurately reflect what the member experienced. Within an age set, a member would likely have had a different experience of German history, even in the same time period, depending on where he/she was born. With the Bonn and Berlin Proposals, birthplace and year born influenced the votes of members more than age alone did. For the older members, being born in the Southwest or the East affected voting patterns on the Bonn and Berlin Proposals more than any other region. Those older members born in the East voted more frequently for Berlin, while those born in the Southwest voted more frequently for Bonn. The younger members born in the South voted most differently from their peers on the Bonn and Berlin Proposals, with higher approval for Bonn. The younger members born in the East voted much less extremely against Bonn than the older members born in the East.

4. Party

In the 12th electoral term of the Bundestag, which included the debate on June 20, 1991, the CDU/CSU and SPD served as the governing coalition. With 319 seats, the CDU/CSU constituted 48% of the parliamentary body, while the SPD, with 239 seats, made up 36% of the Bundestag. The FDP was the largest minority party, with seventy-nine seats or 12% of the Bundestag. The PDS/Linke Liste had seventeen seats or about 3% of the total seats, and the Bündnis 90/Grüne had the smallest membership with eight seats.

The CDU/CSU is the Christian democratic party of Germany, which includes the Christian Social Union of Bavaria. The CDU had been a majority party power in West Germany for many years, and the party, under the leadership of Helmut Kohl, advocated for reunification in the election of 1990. The CDU, in partnership with the FDP, won the 1990 election, the first free election for all of Germany since the election of 1932. The FDP, the Free Democratic Party, is the liberal party that occupies the center-right portion of the political spectrum with the CDU/CSU. The FDP supported reunification efforts alongside the CDU/CSU, which contributed to their coalition's victory in 1990. The Social Democratic Party, SPD, was a center-left party that constituted the other major party in West Germany besides the CDU/CSU. The CDU did better in the East in the 1990 elections than the SPD. The Bündnis 90/Grüne party was a green political party. The Bündnis 90/Grüne failed to even meet the 5% minimum required for representation in the Bundestag in the former DDR in the 1990 elections, perhaps as a result of their focus on issues such as global warming instead of the German nation. They received seats in the Bundestag only because the 5% threshold required to garner seats in parliament was applied separately to the East and the West in the election. The Party of Democratic Socialism, or PDS, was the reincarnation of the state political party of the former DDR, the Socialist Unity Party. The left-wing PDS received only minimal support in the West, but continued to garner

votes from the former East.

Political party would be the most easily discernible explanation for a member's voting decision. If political party affiliation were the determining factor for members, then members would have voted for a proposal in accordance with the other members of their party. Political party membership, however, had little influence on the voting of members across the three proposals and across the five parties represented.

Although political party influenced the strength of the vote on the Consensus Proposal, political party did not switch the majority of a party from the direction of the overall vote, except for the CDU/CSU. The CDU/CSU was the only party that voted "Yes" on the proposal, although still only 50% of the party approved the proposal. Every other party followed the general pattern of voting "No" on the proposal. Political party affected the strength of the rejection of the proposal for most of the other parties with the Consensus Proposal. In the voting on the Bonn and Berlin Proposals, though, political party appeared to play little role at all. For the Berlin Proposal, political party played an even less significant role than in the Bonn Proposal vote. The votes for all of the parties except the Bündnis 90/Grüne were much more similar to the generally close vote. Thus, political party affiliation was not the deciding factor for the majority of the members, because parties did not vote unanimously on most proposals nor decidedly differently from the overall group.

5. Birthplace and Party

Although political party affiliation on its own did not significantly influence the members' voting, it seemed reasonable that within a party, the member's birthplace would affect his/her vote. For the Consensus Proposal, birthplace affected the votes of the three largest political parties in some regions. The differences between party members based on their

birthplaces, however, did not seem to follow any meaningful pattern.

Birthplace influenced the voting of members within their political parties for the Bonn Proposal, especially when compared to the relatively insignificant difference in voting based on party or birthplace factors alone for all four regions. Birthplace had an influence on party voting for the Berlin Proposal, but on a less widespread basis than for the Bonn Proposal, affecting the CDU/CSU and SPD the least. Nevertheless, birthplace influenced the voting of members on the Berlin Proposal in a manner similar to the Bonn Proposal, suggesting again that birthplace played a role in the decision making within political parties.

6. District

Across all three proposals, the district represented affected members from the South and the East more than the other two regions. Members representing districts in the South favored keeping the capital in Bonn, while those representing Eastern districts unsurprisingly wanted the capital back in Berlin. The preference for Berlin from members representing the East followed the tendency of members born in the East to support the Berlin Proposal. While members born in the Southwest, not the South, tended to support Bonn more consistently than members born in other Western regions, the pattern of members born in the South favoring Bonn more frequently than members representing other Western regions followed the pattern of differences between Western regions. It appeared that a general affiliation with the West was not responsible for swaying voting because the three Western districts did not vote similarly on all of the proposals. In the case of districts, representing the East and South affected voting on all three proposals.

7. District and Party

Similar to the analysis of the members' voting within the party framework based on their birthplaces, a study of the role the district represented played in the party members' voting might

have provided more information about the influence geographic associations exerted within political parties. Since the location of the district a member represented affected his/her vote, breaking down the party votes by regional districts allows for further analysis of the ways in which regional affiliations affected voting. The district members represented influenced the members' voting across all parties and regions.

For the three largest parties, the district the members represented influenced their votes on the Consensus Proposal. District represented had the greatest affect on the CDU/CSU members. For SPD members, the district they represented influenced their votes much more in the South, East, and Southwest. District represented influenced FDP members from all regions. The Southwest and East were more strongly opposed to the Consensus Proposal than the FDP as a whole, with members from both district unanimously voting against the proposal. FDP members representing districts in the Northwest, in contrast, were more conflicted than the other two districts and the party as a whole, but an 89% majority still voted "No." The district the members represented thus influenced voting within the political party, apparently largely regardless of the party or the region in question.

The district represented influenced the major three parties the most in their voting on the Bonn Proposal. Districts influenced most members of the CDU/CSU in their voting on the Bonn Proposal. Members representing Southern and Northwestern districts voted for Bonn much more frequently than the CDU/CSU party as a whole with both voting around 20% more for Bonn than the general vote. District affected CDU/CSU members from the Southwest and the East also voted similarly with members from both districts voting about 15% less for Bonn than the party overall. District represented influenced SPD members in every region except the Northwest. Members representing Southern and Southwestern districts both voted much more frequently for

the Bonn Proposal, while none of the SPD members from the East voted for Bonn. District affected FDP members most in the Southwest and the Northwest. FDP members representing the Southwest voted almost 30% more frequently for Bonn, while those members representing the Northwest voted over 10% less frequently for the proposal. The location of their district thus affected the three largest parties across all four regions.

With the Berlin Proposal, district represented influenced the votes of party members even more universally than in the voting on the Bonn Proposal. For the CDU/CSU, members from every region except the East voted much less frequently for Berlin than the overall party vote of 47% for Berlin. The voting SPD members also varied widely by region. Members representing districts in the South and the Southwest voted least for Berlin, and members representing Northwestern districts, in contrast, voted 6% more for Berlin than the party overall, which also gave Berlin a majority approval in that region. SPD members representing Eastern districts voted unanimously for Berlin. Districts represented affected the voting of FDP members in the Northwest and the Southwest, but not significantly in the East. District represented influenced the voting of the smaller parties too. Within the Bündnis 90/Grüne members representing districts in the East unanimously approved the Berlin Proposal, while those from Southwestern districts unanimously opposed the proposal. District represented had a similarly polarizing effect on the PDS/Linke Liste members. Those from the East unanimously supported the Berlin Proposal, while those representing districts in the Northwest unanimously opposed moving the capital to Berlin.

8. Religion

In Germany, citizens can register as a member of either the Catholic or Protestant faiths as a means for churches to collect taxes from their members. Of the 109 speakers, forty-two

members registered as Protestant and thirty-two as Catholic. For the Consensus Proposal, the members' religious affiliations did not significantly change their voting from the overall group. Religious affiliation, however, affected Protestants more significantly than Catholics on both the Bonn and the Berlin proposals. Those members registered as Protestant supported Berlin more frequently than the overall group and, consequently, more often than Catholics who were split as was the group as a whole.

Conclusions

The member's geographic associations influenced his/her voting more than other factors such as age or political party. The geographic associations, however, did not follow a simple pattern of Eastern support for Berlin or Western support for Bonn. For the older members, birth in all regions except the Northwest affected their voting, while birthplace affected the youngest members most in the South and in the East. Members born in the East and members who represented districts in the East both supported Berlin, unsurprisingly, at a higher rate than their peers. Birth in the West or representation of a Western district, though, did not affect all members from the Northwest, Southwest, and South. Members born in the Southwest voted for Bonn at a higher rate than their peers from other regions, while members representing districts in the South supported Bonn at a higher rate. The influence of regional differences of both birthplace and district affected members within the parties across the party spectrum and across proposals. While the factor of party affiliation alone had almost no effect on the voting patterns of the Bundestag members, political party affiliation influenced the strength with which geographic associations affected voting. Religious affiliation affected Protestants more than Catholics, and Protestants voted more frequently for Berlin than the group as a whole.

The inability to ascribe responsibility for differences in voting to simple East-West

associations, along with the increased intensity of the regional differences when combined with age or political parties, demonstrated the complexity of the issues for the members. Quantifiable factors such as the ones studied here illustrated the influence of certain personal characteristics on a member's voting, however, the interaction between these factors offered little evidence for a pattern of voting applicable across all these factors. Rather, the patterns found here offered insight into the voting decisions of members on a much more specific level, such as the tendencies of members born in the Southwest versus the West as a whole. The dearth of widespread patterns of voting corresponded with the idea that voting in the Bundestag on June 20, 1991 constituted an issue both deeply important and deeply personal to the members, because of the significance of the vote for their view of German history and their hopes for Germany's future. A member's decision resulted from the interaction of multiple personal characteristics, some of which can never be quantified. A member's experience of Germany in his personal history likely influenced the construction of specific meanings for the cities of Berlin and Bonn and thus also his/her voting in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*.

Chapter II

Cities as Symbols: The Meaning of Berlin and Bonn in the Bundestag Debate

Located about fifteen minutes south of Cologne, on the Rhine River in western Germany, Bonn drifted along as a largely unassuming university town until after World War II. The fact that Ludwig von Beethoven was born there in 1770 remained one of the city's largest claims to fame. Yet, Bonn was in for a radical change when the newly formed BRD decided in 1949 to provisionally locate its capital there. This decision brought physical change in the form of 200,000 more inhabitants who tripled the town's population and began taking up more and more room in the city in order to run the government of this newly created state. But Bonn's new position as capital also brought less tangible, but still influential changes as it became the center and public face of Germany's first successful democracy. Bonn's forty years as the capital of this stable and respected state were likely at the forefront of many representatives' minds as they met in the once quiet city to determine the city's fate in the newly formed united Germany. At 10:00 in the morning on June 20, 1991, the Bundestag gathered in Bonn to discuss and finally vote on the location of the German capital. Before the members could vote on the proposals for the capital city location, however, members gave what amounted to more than ten hours of speeches advocating for the five different proposals set before them.

As described earlier, the five proposals offered to the Bundestag members boiled down to essentially three different alternatives for solving the capital city problem. The Bonn Proposal suggested a continuation of the BRD in that Bonn would remain the seat of both the parliament and the government. Only the president, a largely ceremonial role in the German political system, and the Bundesrat, or legislative council subordinate to the Bundestag, would relocate to Berlin. The Consensus Proposal offered a compromise in which Bonn would remain the seat of

German parliament but the seat of government would move back to Berlin. The final alternative, the Berlin Proposal, advocated for the completion of the parliamentary resolution that called for the relocation of both the parliamentary and government seats back to Berlin. In a somewhat unusual structure intended to give the debate a more representative democratic basis, parliament members each had five minutes to articulate their support for a proposal in front of the whole body.¹ After the proposals were introduced, the 109 members advocated for either Bonn or Berlin or a combination thereof to be the capital of unified Germany.

Through these short speeches, the *Hauptstadtdebatte* came to represent broader themes such as how to create a truly cohesive unified Germany and how to deal with the history of Germany in its times of both unification and division. In this manner, the debate became the stage on which Germans played out the questions about the meaning of their national history that plagued them during this period. Consequently, the rhetoric of the arguments for both Berlin and Bonn constructed the identities of the cities largely as symbolic of the history that occurred in each.

Viewing the cities as symbols of larger issues such as historical events and certain governments made sense even in terms of current usage. Newspapers and history books alike use capital cities to refer to the governments located there. When one hears about the latest news from Washington, he knows that the speaker is referencing a political occurrence of some sort that took place in the capital of the United States. In this way, the use of capitals as a synonym for a government provides a useful shortcut for both the speaker and the listener. In the *Hauptstadtdebatte*, however, using capital cities to refer to governments took on a new dimension. Many members of the Bundestag structured their arguments for one city or the other around the idea of the particular city as a symbolic representation of either an event that occurred

¹ Helmut Dubiel, *Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte* (München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1999), 250.

during the city's time as a national capital, or as a representation of an idea based on historical occurrences or regimes. The difference seemed to be that the *Hauptstadtdebatte* participants viewed the city as actually representative of the historical events, rather than as a synonym for the governmental forces at work in the city that constitutes the common usage today.

Structuring the *Hauptstadtdebatte* around the idea of Bonn and Berlin as symbols with definite meanings became prevalent in the Bundestag debate on June 20. The widespread use of Bonn and Berlin as symbols reflected the idea of the cities as representative of particular aspects of German history, especially in the minds of Germans. How Germans viewed the cities and the parts of German history that they associated with the city appeared at the forefront of many Bundestag members' minds. The prevalent use on both sides of the debate of Bonn and Berlin as symbolic of larger ideas, when combined with the historical nature of these ideas, demonstrated the important role perceptions of history played in the debate and in the formation of opinion about the right location for the German capital. Interpretations and understandings of history led Germans to construct symbolic meanings for Bonn and Berlin based on their personal experiences with German national history, which then helped solidify their support for one city over the other.

In the debate, Bundestag members spoke about Berlin and Bonn as symbols both explicitly and implicitly. The explicit designations of the cities as "standing for" or "connected with" portions of German history or regimes represented perhaps the most interesting use of symbolism. The symbolic meanings of the cities were largely historically based, and members attributed both tangible and intangible historic meanings to the cities. For example, a large majority of the speakers identified Bonn with the idea of democracy and a new beginning in the form of the second German republic.

Those both for and against moving the capital back to Berlin acknowledged the dark aspects of the city's history. Some, such as Dr. Hans-Jochen Vogel of the SPD, portrayed Berlin's incorporation of many different parts of German history as a favorable asset for a capital. Vogel claimed, "I would like the parliament and government to have their seat where we are not only reminded of a good and level-headed portion of German history, but rather of our entire history with all its highs and lows."² Berlin represented unity to many, including Vogel who was born in Göttingen, Lower Saxony in 1926, because it served as the capital of the Weimar Republic in which both East and West Germany were united and because Berlin has served as capital for longer than Bonn. Vogel grew up in the last stages of the Weimar Republic and then served in the German army in France and Italy in 1943. He lived in West Germany but served in the Berlin state parliament from 1981 to 1983, was mayor of Berlin for a short period, and eventually represented Berlin in the Bundestag.³ As such, he personally experienced the highs and lows of the German century after World War I. Vogel also understood the situation in Berlin at the time in a more intimate manner that perhaps contributed to his certainty that Berlin should once again serve as the capital of united Germany. Other members representing districts in the East also voted more frequently for Berlin than members from other regions, as did other SPD members representing districts in the East.

Even the intangible qualities such as unity that the cities symbolized thus stemmed from the history members associated with the city. The historical events and regimes attributed to the cities appeared similar across the debate, which seemed relatively unsurprising given the factual

² Deutscher Bundestag, ed., *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991 (Bonn, 1991), <http://drucksachen.bundestag.de/drucksachen/index.php>, 2761.

[“Ich möchte, daß Parlament und Regierung dort ihren Sitz haben, wo wir nicht nur an einen guten und besonnenen Abschnitt der deutschen Geschichte, sondern an unsere ganze Geschichte mit all ihren Höhen und tiefen erinnert werden”]

³ *Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages, 1949-2002*, comp. Rudolf Vierhaus and Ludolf Herbst (München: KG Saur, 2002), 900.

nature of most of the historical associations. The interesting variations come in the manner in which members chose to use the historically based symbols to further their arguments for one city over the other and the few members who objected to the use of symbols in the debate overall.

In fact, a select number of members chose to spend significant portions of their allotted speaking times arguing against the use of symbols in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*. The protests against the use of symbols in the *Hauptstadtdebatte* responded to the multi-faceted use of symbolism in the debate. These members worried about the reduction of Bonn and Berlin to symbols that had little real meaning or even unfairly presented the cities as representative of the history of entire German regimes. Yet, the way in which these members structured their arguments seemed problematic given that they failed to account for the real beliefs and feelings existent behind the symbolic associations many members, and likely most Germans, held with relation to both Bonn and Berlin.

Of the five members who expressed their worries about the dominant role symbols play in the debate, four framed their concerns in the context of their argument for keeping the capital in Bonn. The wish to move away from the more abstract approach to a focus on the tangible advantages of one city over the other made sense for the Bonn advocates. Practically speaking, Bonn had more definitively positive entries on its capital city résumé. When judging based on the political and economic success of the BRD, Bonn appeared to be the clear winner. Additionally, unlike Berlin, Bonn was not the capital during any of the messier periods of German history. Thus, concentrating on the achievements of the BRD, rather than on a representation of its capital as symbolic of intangible ideas such as democracy or freedom, created an opportunity for the Bonn advocates to gain an advantage in the debate.

In addition to the historic meaning of each city, members also remained very concerned with the idea of the symbolic meaning of choosing one city over the other. The arguments put forth in the Bundestag on June 20 illustrated the idea of the location of the capital as a symbolic gesture. Some members saw choosing Berlin as a vote of solidarity with East Germans, while others worried that picking Berlin would represent an acceptance of the National Socialist or socialist regimes that shared Berlin as their capital. In formulating her argument for Bonn, Dr. Irmgard Adam-Schwaetzer of the FDP argued what she considered the most sensible approach to deciding the *Hauptstadtdebatte*. A member of the Bundestag since 1980, Adam-Schwaetzer voted to keep the capital in the Northwest where she was born in Münster, North Rhine-Westphalia in 1942. After articulating her belief in the necessity of providing help for Berlin and creating solidarity between the East and West, she wondered about the best way to create this unity with the East. She asked, "From where can we best assist the coalescence? Is it really dependent on the symbolic meaning of a decision for Berlin, or should we look at it sensibly, how the question can be examined economically and historically?"⁴ Adam-Schwaetzer wanted to focus the debate on two specific areas in which Bonn seemed to have a definite advantage over Berlin.

Bonn, as many other Bundestag members noted, was the capital of the BRD during the time of perhaps the most economically successful period of German history. Additionally, the history of Bonn as the capital city remained untarnished by any of the bad periods of German history. Socialists and National Socialists did not dominate the history of Bonn as they did for many when they considered Berlin's history. While Bonn might have had less emotional

⁴ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2778. ["Von wo können wir das Zusammenwachsen eigentlich am besten fördern? Ist es tatsächlich von der symbolischen Bedeutung einer Entscheidung pro Berlin abhängig, oder sollten wir uns sinnvollerweise nicht ansehen, wie diese Frage wirtschaftlich und historisch betrachtet werden kann?"]

connotations, both positive and negative, than Berlin, when one reflected on the economic and historical position of Bonn relative to Berlin, as Adam-Schwaetzer suggested, keeping the capital in Bonn made sense. Adam-Schwaetzer thought that these tangible advantages made Bonn capable of supporting the unification process of Germany even if Bonn could not offer the symbolic gesture of reaching out to the East inherent in putting the capital back in Berlin. Interestingly, Adam-Schwaetzer voted differently from the majority of the members who also represented a district in the Northwest, both in the speaker group as a whole and in the FDP in particular.

A fellow member born in Bad Kreuznach, Rhineland-Palatinate in 1938, Dr. Wolfgang Bötsch of the CSU similarly believed that by focusing on symbols, his fellow Bundestag members ignored the more important methods for evaluating the comparative worth of each city as capital. Bötsch observed, “Symbols are much spoken about here. I think that we should examine this question not only symbolically; I have made my decision based much more on political-historical, practical, but also financial factors.”⁵ However, unlike Adam-Schwaetzer, Bötsch spent much of his speech arguing not for the specific advantages of Bonn, but rather against the proposal to split the parliament and seat of government between Bonn and Berlin. Following his self-described practical approach to the debate, Bötsch explained that he considered the suggestion to build a new parliament and government seat in Berlin unwise.⁶

Similar to Adam-Schwaetzer, Bötsch acknowledged the help many areas in East Germany needed, yet he argued that symbolism would not solve these problems, but rather everyday political work, which could stem from Bonn. Here he provided historical evidence for

⁵ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2788.

[“Es ist hier viel von Symbolen geredet worden. Ich meine, wir sollten die Frage nicht nur symbolisch betrachten; ich habe mich vielmehr aus politisch-historischen, aus praktischen, aber auch aus finanziellen Gründen entschieden.”]

⁶ *Ibid.*

his claim and contended, "It was not symbolism, my colleagues, that we already undertook massive efforts for disadvantaged regions in the BRD."⁷ Bötsch applied his own methodology by using a concrete example of the historical success of Bonn in solving a problem directly applicable to the needs of areas in East Germany. He thus employed empirical evidence rather than symbols in order to make his case for keeping the capital in Bonn. In later voting for Bonn, Bötsch shared his opinion with the majority of the members also born in the Southwest.

As the only advocate for Berlin who voiced his concern about the prevalence of symbols in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*, Wolfgang Thierse of the SPD presented an objection to the use of symbols in the debate that differed from that which the Bonn supporters put forth. Thierse's worry lay in the likelihood that a debate revolving around symbols would lead to giving Berlin the title of capital, but none of the power. Interestingly, none of the proposals denied the importance of Berlin as the ceremonial capital of Germany, with even the Bonn Proposal allowing Berlin to keep the title of capital although with none of the power.

Thierse worried that by allowing the debate to continue on as a battle between symbolic representations of the two cities, members would ignore the real ramifications of the debate, especially for creating unity with the East. Thierse explained, "The debate today is not only about a symbol, like the Bonn advocates claim. Conversely, wanting to make Berlin the location of the representation, only adorning Berlin with the title of capital, means compensating East Germany with a symbol."⁸ He worried that because symbols dominated the debate, members would think giving Berlin symbolic attention in the form of the title of capital would suffice and

⁷ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2788.

[“Es war keine Symbolik, meine Damen und Herren Kollegen, daß wir gewaltige Anstrengungen für benachteiligte Regionen schon in der BRD Deutschland unternommen haben”]

⁸ *Ibid*, 2740

[“Es geht bei der heutigen Entscheidung eben nicht nur um ein Symbol, wie die Bonn-Befürworter behaupten. Im Gegenteil, Berlin zum Ort der Repräsentation machen zu wollen, Berlin mit dem Hauptstadttitel nur zu schmücken, heißt, den Osten Deutschlands mit einem Symbol abzufinden.”]

thus vote for the Bonn Proposal. Thierse wanted the Bundestag to give actual power to Berlin in order to show West Germany's solidarity with the East. Only through the granting of real, rather than symbolic, power to the East would Germany be able to work towards unity. Thierse identified practical political power as superior to symbolic titles similar to both Bötsch and Adam-Schwaetzer, but Thierse used this argument to support his case for moving the government seat back to Berlin.

Thierse's personal family history helped explain his concern with insuring the former East had a say in the governing of the new German state. Born in 1943 in Breslau in modern-day Poland, Thierse's father had to flee with his family after the war to South Thuringia. Thierse did not join a political party until 1990 when he entered the SPD. As a member of the Bundestag, Thierse continued to advocate for the East German states and the preservation of DDR history.⁹ Through placing the capital in Berlin, Thierse believed he could help insure that the eastern states played a role in unified Germany. Thierse, who had experienced first-hand the effects of the war and life in East Germany, wanted to maintain real, rather than just symbolic power for his former state. In advocating for Berlin, Thierse voted similarly to the majority of those members born in the East, including voting with the other older members born in the East and the other SPD members born in the East.

The prevalence of using symbols as a way to formulate arguments for either city related to the tendency of many Bundestag members to attribute the history of an entire country or historical period to one city. This move could be rhetorical in the sense that the speakers wanted to use the city as synonymous with the history they addressed in their arguments. The attribution of large historical periods or events to a city provided the speaker a rhetorical shortcut. It might

⁹ *Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages, 1949-2002*, comp. Rudolf Vierhaus and Ludolf Herbst (München: KG Saur, 2002), 875.

have been easier and faster to simply use “Berlin” and “Bonn” to represent the historical periods in which the city served as the national capital, rather than referring to the title of the particular German state, such as the Weimar Republic or the German Democratic Republic. Problems arose though when the use of “Berlin” and “Bonn” to refer to the history of an entire country stemmed not from a rhetorical decision, but rather from a belief that the city itself was somehow responsible for the actions of an entire political movement, such as National Socialism or socialism in Berlin.

Unsurprisingly, concerns over the use of cities to represent larger historical ideas cropped up most prevalently on the side of the Berlin advocates. The concentration of these worries on the Berlin side of the debate seemed reasonable given the more negative and darker aspects of history associated with Berlin compared to Bonn. Willy Brandt of the SPD, former mayor of West Berlin from 1957 to 1966 and chancellor of West Germany from 1969 to 1974, questioned the frequent attribution of National Socialism, nationalism, and socialism to Berlin more than to other cities and regions in Germany. He contended,

One reprieves us, I want to say, with the absurd talk – some of which was transmitted over the television in an unsavory way yesterday evening – , through which Berlin was imprinted more than other German cities as a refuge of criminal Nazism and dangerous nationalism, or that, as a city and a populace, it should be responsible for the leadership of the SED that resided in the eastern part of the city and its bloc partners.¹⁰

Brandt expressly named the darkest points of German history in pointing out the way in which many identified these historical occurrences with Berlin more than any other part of Germany. He went on to argue that German cities and regions should share a “collective embarrassment”

¹⁰ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2750.

[“Man verschone uns, will ich sagen, mit dem unsinnigen Gerede – gestern abend war davon wieder einiges auf unappetitliche Weise über das Fernsehen vermittelt worden - , durch das Berlin mehr als andere deutsche Städte zum Hort verbrecherischen Nazismus und gefährlichen Nationalismus gestempelt werden soll oder als Stadt und Bevölkerung für die im Ostteil der Stadt angesiedelte Führung der SED und ihrer Blockpartner verantwortlich sein soll.”]

for the shameful parts of German history.¹¹ The way in which Brandt framed this contention appeared interesting, because he did not shy away from the low points of German history that other members of the Bundestag seemed reluctant to mention explicitly. He also did not deny Berlin's role in the National Socialist, nationalist, and socialist movements, but rather noted that Berlin was not the sole location of these movements.

Brandt's personal history made his relationship to both the German nation and Berlin unique. As someone who felt first-hand the powerful and far-reaching influences of World War II and the Third Reich, Brandt remained unafraid to bring up the lowest points of German history and was quick to point out that members should not hold the city of Berlin responsible for these dark eras. Born in Lübeck, Schleswig-Holstein in 1913, Brandt joined the SPD in 1930, at just seventeen years old and joined Socialist Workers' Party of Germany, a left-wing splinter group from the SPD, a year later. In 1933, he changed his name and fled to Oslo, where he remained politically active and continued to build up German resistance to the Nazis. The Nazis expatriated him in 1938 and he would not become a German citizen again until 1948. Active once again in German politics, he represented Berlin in the Bundestag's first voting period and then served as mayor of Berlin from 1957 to 1966 and chancellor of the BRD from 1972 to 1974. From his position in West Germany, Brandt advocated for a new peace in Germany and Europe, in which Germany could move away from the consequences of World War II and the Nazis. For Brandt, though, ignoring Germany's history or assigning all the historical blame to Berlin in reunification did not represent the way to achieve this peace in Europe.¹² Instead, Brandt wanted Germany to take responsibility as a country for the lowest points of its history, which he

¹¹ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2750. ["kollektive Peinlichkeit"]

¹² *Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages, 1949-2002*, comp. Rudolf Vierhaus and Ludolf Herbst (München: KG Saur, 2002), 91.

experienced both home in Germany growing up, abroad in Europe before and during the war, and after the war upon his return to Germany. Interestingly, none of Brandt's peers in birthplace, age, district represented, or party voted significantly more frequently for Berlin than Bonn. Brandt's support for Berlin stemmed not from one factor, but rather from his entire experience as a German.

The concepts of "responsibility" and "embarrassment" that Brandt addressed here appeared central to the German conception of certain parts of its national history, yet Brandt's speech marked one of the only points in the Bundestag debate on June 20 in which they came up. It seemed that other members, especially those who argued for keeping the capital in Bonn, would rather dismiss the idea of Berlin as capital on the grounds of its historical burden than have to deal directly with these embarrassing and even painful aspects of German history.

By attributing the problematic historical truths of National Socialism, nationalism, and socialism to Berlin specifically, it became easier for members to make a compelling argument for retaining Bonn as the capital and thus keeping Germany's capital clean of the stains of history. Moreover, the concerns about the association of Germany's darker history with the capital demonstrated how German history still plagued Germans. The arguments in favor of keeping the capital in Bonn in order to avoid recalling certain historical events presupposed that these events would negatively affect Germany's future.

The prominence of Berlin's history in arguments in the media about the *Hauptstadtdebatte* demonstrated the very real fear of repeating the mistakes of the German past. Memories of the catastrophes of German history, such as the Third Reich, came up often in reference to Berlin and to arguments to keep the capital in Bonn, because the chief concern for many Germans seemed to be that a capital in Berlin would recall all these dark aspects of their

history and perhaps even facilitate their recurrence. In a letter to the editor in *Die Zeit*, a weekly national newspaper based in Hamburg, Andreas Schmidt from Pluwig in Rhineland-Palatinate argued against the assumption that moving the capital back to Berlin would not have consequences, including the possibility of repeating past mistakes. He stated,

The argument that the vote for Berlin itself will assist the dispute with the German past overlooks the fact that this symbolically meant act would be misunderstood abroad as well, and especially, as domestically and can produce unwanted effects. Constant and robotic repetitions of the phrase 'the Germans have learned from their history' cannot preclude the possibility.¹³

Schmidt denounced the concept that Germans could simply will away the possibility of repeating their past with what he condescendingly called "constant and robotic" repetitions of a phrase. Here he implied that those Germans who repeated that mantra as such did not truly understand or practice its meaning. Schmidt seemed justified in worrying about the likelihood of duplicating past mistakes if Germans truly did not comprehend the consequences of repeating the past. He cited the claim that selecting Berlin as the German capital would help Germans deal with the past, yet he condemned this position as ignorant of the effect of such a decision. Underlying Schmidt's comments appeared to be a real concern with the likelihood of moving the capital to Berlin causing historical evils to arise again, even if only through the city's symbolic meaning as the capital during the occurrence of these evils.

Many Bundestag members believed that Germany's success depended largely on the country's ability to distance itself from the troublesome aspects of its history. Given the

¹³ "Aufstand der Provinz gegen die Metropole," *Die Zeit* Online, May 24, 1991, Ed. 22, <http://www.zeit.de/1991/22/Aufstand-der-Provinz-gegen-die-Metropole>.

[“Das Argument, daß gerade die Wahl Berlins die Auseinandersetzung mit der deutschen Vergangenheit fördere, übersieht die Tatsache, daß dieser symbolisch gemeinte Akt sowohl im Ausland als auch und insbesondere im Inland falsch verstanden "werden und unerwünschte Wirkungen zeitigen kann. Gebetsmühlenartiges Wiederholen der Phrase „die Deutschen haben aus ihrer Geschichte gelernt" kann diese Möglichkeit nicht ausschließen”]

prevalence of national history in the Bundestag debate, this concern with picking a capital with the best historical associations seemed apropos. The genuine importance of working out the historical meanings connected with Bonn and Berlin thus raised the stakes of the dispute over how to correctly ascribe history to the cities.

In keeping with the idea of attributing history accurately to the country as a whole, rather than just Berlin, Dr. Burkhard Hirsch of the FDP argued for the importance of creating a truthful conception of the German historical identity. Hirsch, however, attacked what he saw as the fallacious crediting of democracy to both Bonn and Berlin after 1945. He used the same argument as Brandt by objecting to the attribution of the democratic achievements of the post-war period to one city, but he did so in order to counteract the use of an association with democracy building as an achievement Berlin or Bonn alone could claim.¹⁴ Hirsch, born in 1930 in Magdeburg, Saxony-Anhalt, worked in politics in the West since 1965. As such, he had experience with the division of Germany and the growth of democracy in Bonn. Similar to other members born in the East, although different from those who represented the Northwestern region, Hirsch supported Berlin. Hirsch's support for Berlin, however, did follow the tendency of FDP members representing the Northwest.

In a similar vein, but from a distinctly Eastern perspective, Dr. Gregor Gysi of the PDS/Linke Liste condemned those who blamed the problems in German history on Berlin, which he saw as a way in which people could shift responsibility from themselves and the rest of Germany onto Berlin. Gysi himself had a special connection to Berlin as he was born there in 1948 and his family had long been established in the city. He was also connected to the Eastern German government there as his father was involved in DDR politics as cultural minister and

¹⁴ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2784.

ambassador to Rome, and Gysi himself joined the SED in 1967.¹⁵ In the debate, Gysi declared, “I also know that there are arguments from the history of the city that are used against the city Berlin. I don’t think that that works. First, German history has never taken place in one city alone. Second, I think that one must accept history. One does not solve it by avoiding cities. That does not seem to be a solution to me.”¹⁶ Like Brandt, Gysi pointed out the fallacy of blaming Berlin for all that happened in German history.

Gysi also added a new facet to the debate by noting that history cannot simply be forgotten or avoided. In order to solve the problems that memories and fears of German history created for the country, Germany needed to address its problems directly. Highlighting the negative aspects of German history helped alienate those who might otherwise consider moving the capital back to Berlin, because correlating Berlin with National Socialism and socialism made it so support of Berlin equated to approval of these historical blemishes. By creating this image of Berlin that related directly to National Socialism and socialism, opponents constructed a straw man, which they could more easily beat down. Gysi provided an argument that not only dealt with the issue of assigning blame to Berlin alone, but also that got to the heart of the fallacious strategy many members employed in creating a case against Berlin. In response to these tactics, Gysi argued that, first of all, the association of Berlin with the mistakes of an entire country was patently unfair and second of all, the popular reaction, which tried to avoid the problems altogether, and in this case by advocating against Berlin as the capital, did not actually solve the problem.

¹⁵ *Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages, 1949-2002*, comp. Rudolf Vierhaus and Ludolf Herbst (München: KG Saur, 2002), 289.

¹⁶ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2745.

[“Ich weiß auch, daß es Argumente aus der Geschichte der Stadt gibt, die gegen die Stadt Berlin herangezogen werden. Ich finde, daß das nicht geht. Erstens hat sich deutsche Geschichte nie in einer Stadt allein abgespielt. Zweitens finde ich, Geschichte muß man annehmen. Man lost sie nicht dadurch, daß man Städte meidet. Das scheint mir überhaupt keine Lösung zu sein.”]

The media also criticized the rejection of Berlin on the basis of its role as the capital of the Third Reich. Berlin, they insisted, served as the political capital of the government not the Nazi movement itself. Additionally, as Dieter E. Zimmer, in *Die Zeit* article "Berlin for the first," plainly stated, "Hitler did not like Berlin."¹⁷ Berlin never appealed to Hitler and he even distrusted the city, preferring to base his movement in Munich instead. While it remained true that the Third Reich government based itself in Berlin, the ideological center of the movement never truly called Berlin home. Zimmer contended that Berlin as a city was not in fact guilty of most of the things people charged it with in relation to the Third Reich.

Dr. Oscar Schneider of the CSU, although younger than Gysi and from Bavaria, raised issue with the use of Berlin as representative of the failure of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism in a manner similar to Gysi. He first created a clever grammatical distinction in the attribution of the Weimar Republic's fate to Berlin itself. He contended, "The first German democracy failed not by Berlin, the first German democracy failed in Berlin."¹⁸ Here Schneider pointed out an important distinction members should have made if they employed Berlin as a symbol of the countries and governments for which it served as the capital. Using Berlin as a symbol should not imply that Berlin alone was somehow responsible for the actions of its country or government. Berlin in this context merely served as the geographic location in which the capital existed and as the physical representation of the country or government in question. Problems occurred when the use of capitals as symbols became more than a figure of speech or a mental model for representing a larger, perhaps more amorphous entity such as a government.

¹⁷ Dieter E. Zimmer, "Berlin zum Ersten," *Die Zeit* Online, May 3, 1991, Ed. 19, <http://www.zeit.de/1991/19/Berlin-zum-ersten>.

[“Hitler mochte Berlin nicht.”]

¹⁸ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2782.

[“Die erste deutsche Demokratie ist nicht an Berlin, die erste deutsche Demokratie ist in Berlin gescheitert.”]

Schneider believed that people understood the use of Berlin in arguments for keeping the capital in Bonn as literally a commentary on the city itself and therefore defended the city in his speech. He hoped to show that Berlin did not act as the agent responsible for the failure of the Weimar Republic, or of the success of the National Socialist movement. He added, "Berlin did not carry a solitary title of the National Socialist movement. What was carried out in Berlin was just what had been politically prepared in all the parts of the empire."¹⁹ Here Schneider established the historical context he believed supported his contention that Berlin alone could not accept the blame for National Socialism, nor was it fair to connect the city automatically with that movement. In support of Gysi's view of the correct way to deal with history, Schneider did not want to forget about history, even the negative parts, but instead wanted to realize the role the country as a whole played in shaping national history and use this enlightened view of national history to pick a capital. Born in 1927 in Bavaria, Schneider experienced WWII firsthand through his service in the Luftwaffe in 1944 during which he was injured in Berlin and became an American prisoner of war in 1945.²⁰ Schneider's support for Berlin ran contrary to the majority of his party representing districts in Bavaria, who instead voted for Bonn much more often. His vote for Berlin, however, did follow the general trend of the oldest members born in the South voting more frequently for the Berlin Proposal.

The prevalence of attributing vast portions of history to Berlin rather than the country as a whole related to the tendency in the Bundestag debate to view Berlin as a symbol. The arguments against blaming Berlin for the historical events that took place while it was capital of different German regimes interpreted the use of Berlin to represent this history literally. When

¹⁹ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2782.

[“Berlin hat nicht einen einzigen Ehrentitel des NS-Bewegung getragen. In Berlin wurde nur vollstreckt, was sich zuvor in allen Reichsteilen politisch vorbereitet hatte.”]

²⁰ *Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages, 1949-2002*, comp. Rudolf Vierhaus and Ludolf Herbst (München: KG Saur, 2002), 770.

speakers presented arguments against moving the capital back to Berlin, for example, on the grounds of negative connotations of German history associated with the city, they did not necessarily mean that Berlin alone was responsible for the historical events. The use of capitals as a way to refer to an entire government or country represented a commonly accepted practice, rather than an attempt to shield the government or country from bearing responsibility for its actions by shifting the blame onto the capital alone. More importantly, if the problem were really the use of Bonn and Berlin as synonyms for historical events or regimes, as these members' arguments assumed, then the problem might have been relatively easy to solve through rhetorical changes. The objections to using symbols, however, missed their target by attacking the rhetoric of the debate rather than the underlying issue of the symbolic meaning of the cities. Arguing against using symbols in the debate failed to address the larger issue of the Bonn Proposal only giving Berlin a ceremonial title, or that popular views of the cities also relied on the symbolic historical meaning of both Bonn and Berlin.

In the media, letters to the editor expressed worries that a move back to Berlin would recall all the worst parts of German history. Similar to the letter from September 3, 1990, Martin Neuffer of Hamburg wrote to *Die Zeit* on May 24, 1991 about the issue of Berlin's negative historical connotations. He contended,

Berlin is a symbol of the lost Germany. Symbol for Kaiserreich and war, Hitler, Jewish persecution and war again, for German megalomania and German catastrophes. Does one really want to affiliate with this tradition? Bonn stands in contrast for a successful new beginning, for a Germany that is economically successful and socially stable, that is aware of its international responsibility, and for a country with which the large majority of the citizens identify and that the world respects.²¹

²¹"Aufstand," *Die Zeit* Online, May 24, 1991.

[“Berlin ist Symbol eines untergegangenen Deutschlands. Symbol für Kaiserreich und Krieg, Hitler, Judenverfolgung und wieder Krieg, für deutschen Größenwahn und deutsche Katastrophen. Will man tatsächlich an diese Tradition anschließen? Bonn steht dagegen für einen erfolgreichen Neuanfang, für ein Deutschland, das

Helmut Neuburger of Ostermünchen in Bavaria also worried about the potential for further consequences of the overreaching nationalism prominent in Berlin's history. He claimed, "Seven decades of German politics 'made in Berlin,' those are seven decades of megalomania and national delusion that ended with the appalling consequence of the catastrophe of 1945."²² Neuburger went even further in directly blaming Berlin's politics for seventy years of dark German history.

The authors of these letters seemed primarily concerned with the apparent tendency for German nationalism to become out of control and then disastrous for the nation, as with the destruction of World War II. The letters even used the same term "megalomania," and this choice seemed especially interesting in light of its uniqueness to these letters. Other accounts and arguments in the media and the Bundestag debate regarding the *Hauptstadtdebatte* called attention to the historical problems present in Berlin, but none identified these problems as the result of "megalomania."

Other opinions published in the media, however, worried that focusing too heavily on the dominant regimes based historically in Berlin would prove detrimental to Germany's future. Richard von Weizsäcker addressed the potentially harmful nature of making arguments against Berlin based on factors such as its role as the Prussian regime's capital. Born in Stuttgart, Baden-Württemberg in 1920, Weizsäcker moved around Europe growing up because of his father's occupation as a diplomat. As member of the CDU, Weizsäcker had been involved in BRD politics since entering the Bundestag

ökonomisch erfolgreich und sozial stabil ist, das sich seiner internationalen Verantwortung bewußt ist, und für einen Staat, mit dem sich die große Mehrheit der Bürger identifiziert und den die Welt respektiert."]

²² "Aufstand," *Die Zeit* Online, May 24, 1991.

[“Sieben Jahrzehnte deutsche Politik ‘made in Berlin’, das sind sieben Jahrzehnte Großmannssucht und nationaler Wahn, die mit erschreckender Konsequenz in die Katastrophe von 1945 mündeten.”]

in 1969 and served as mayor of West Berlin from 1981 to 1984 and president of the BRD from 1984 to 1994. Weizsäcker thus had important connections not only to German politics in the BRD, but also to Berlin. In his “Memorandum to the Capital,” printed in *Der Spiegel*, a weekly national news magazine based in Hamburg, Weizsäcker dismissed fear of a revival of a government similar to Prussia’s as unfounded. Therefore, arguments against Berlin because it served as the empire’s capital and could remind Germans of the problems of Prussian centralism also became baseless. Weizsäcker saw these concerns as actually dangerous to the future of unified Germany. He explained, “He who turns himself against Berlin out of fear of the Prussian-German myth and centralism, his motives are turned backwards and not forwards.”²³ Weizsäcker considered fear of Berlin’s Prussian past as injurious to unified Germany, because they were rooted “backwards,” solely in history, and not “forwards,” in the future of the country.

For better or for worse, as a result of the widespread nature of symbolic associations with cities, people will probably always correlate the capital city with the actions of its resident government or surrounding country. Thus, these members of the Bundestag who objected to the affiliation of Berlin with the history of both Germany and East Germany were probably fighting a losing battle, or at least the wrong battle. The objections members raised against Berlin in light of National Socialism and socialism, for example, reflected more their views on these problematic aspects of German history, than any personal vendettas against Berlin as a city. Arguing against attributing historical events unfairly to Berlin ignored the symbolic aspect of the

²³ Richard von Weizsäcker, “Berlin als Drehscheibe,” *Der Spiegel* Online, March 3, 1991, Ed. 11, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-13488163.html>. [“Wer sich aus Angst vor preußisch-deutschem Mythos und Zentralismus gegen Berlin wendet, dessen Motive sind rückwärts gewandt und nicht vorwärts.”]

debate. No one could change the fact that Berlin was the capital during the Third Reich and the division of Germany. Nor could these members change the symbolic association most Germans had with regards to Berlin and National Socialism and socialism. This did not mean, however, that its particular history as the capital doomed Berlin to an eternal connection with the negative parts of German history. As many other members of the Bundestag pointed out in the debate on June 20, Berlin's history could prove an asset if allowed to become capital of Germany again.

In keeping with Schneider's distinction between what happened in Berlin versus what Berlin could reasonably accept responsibility for, a fellow West German born in 1944, Günter Verheugen of the SPD, represented the only advocate for Bonn who spoke out against blaming Berlin for everything that happened while the city served as capital of the Third Reich. He contended, "One may not charge Berlin with everything that happened in its walls. I quietly add: incidentally, the same goes for Bonn. One may not identify Berlin with the unhappy history of the empire."²⁴ Verheugen's claim appeared much more interesting given that he was the only Bonn advocate to address the issue of unfairly attributing historical events to Berlin. In fact, after he finished his speech, members of the CDU/CSU called out, "That was the best speech for Berlin!"²⁵ Yet, despite the support he provided for not blaming Berlin for the atrocities of the Third Reich, Verheugen still believed the capital should remain in Bonn.

Verheugen's conclusion that Bonn represented the better choice for the capital, along with the CDU/CSU's appraisal of his speech as support for the Berlin cause, brought up the question of interpretation in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*. The events in German history remained the same whether one supported Berlin or Bonn as the future capital of the country. Thus, when

²⁴ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2783.

[“Man darf Berlin nicht anlasten, was in seinem Mauern alles geschehen ist. Ich füge leise hinzu: Bonn übrigens auch nicht. Man darf Berlin nicht mit der unglücklichen Geschichte des Reiches identifizieren.”]

²⁵ *Ibid*, 2784.

[“Das war die beste Rede für Berlin!”]

history played a role in the arguments for either side, interpretations of the historical events and their meanings explained the main differences between the arguments. The members' personal characteristics and affiliations created certain tendencies in terms of voting in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*, but none of the factors alone could entirely explain or predict a member's vote. The symbolism rampant in the rhetoric of the debate reflected the important historical meanings attached to both Berlin and Bonn. Members often spoke of these historical meanings in advocating for a proposal and, in doing so, exposed their different interpretations of history and consequently different plans for Germany's new capital. The varying uses and understandings of history then played an integral role in deciding which capital each member supported.

Chapter III

Capitals of the Past: History and Memory in the Bundestag Debate

“Because primarily remembering allows every opportunity to take pleasure in the future,” German President Rudolf Herzog wisely noted.¹ Herzog, speaking in 1996 to a commission in Berlin about the two German dictatorships of the Third Reich and the DDR, wanted his audience to contemplate how memories of these traumatic periods in German history would and could affect the nation’s future. Here Herzog brought up a concept of paramount importance to Germans, especially during the period of reunification and in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*. Members in the Bundestag debated how to best remember German history, especially as it played out in Bonn and Berlin, as well as how to best interpret that history’s meaning for the future. Herzog’s observation that acknowledgement of past events, including the traumatic periods of German national history, remained integral to the achievement of a happy future reflected the belief implicit in the speeches of many Bundestag members on June 20, 1991.

Members used historical facts and personal memories to paint differing portraits of Bonn and Berlin that depended on what type of experience they had with the city and its history. The differences in the illustrations of Bonn and Berlin became indicative of effect of history and memory on creating meaning for the city. Varying aspects of German history proved more important to members based on their own use of history and memory in deciding on the best capital for the new German state. The differing interactions between history and memory also became indicative of differing views of how Germans should view their national history. Similar to Herzog’s idea that a successful future depended on remembering, many members in the Bundestag interpreted their evaluations of history as critical to choosing the right capital for the

¹ Roman Herzog, *Die Zukunft der Erinnerung*, ed. Michael Rutz (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1999), 173. [“Denn erst das Erinnern erlaubt, der Zukunft alle Chance abzugewinnen.”]

future of the newly unified German state.

Walter Momper, mayor of West Berlin and later unified Berlin from 1989 to 1991, evaluated the worries about Berlin's Prussian past as ultimately deleterious to Germany's future. In *Die Zeit*, Momper wrote an article entitled "We need a Center: Why Berlin should become the Capital," in which he argued for remembering history in making decisions for the future. While he viewed Berlin's particular history as beneficial to a unified Germany, he also noted that certain aspects of German history could negatively affect contemporary politics. He observed, "A ghost goes around the capital discussion: the overpowering centralistic juggernaut that wears away the federalism."² According to Momper, the ghost of overpowering Prussian centralism created an aversion to federalism even in his modern day Germany. If he wished to create a unified Germany based on federalism, then fears resulting from Prussian domination make the realization of this federal Germany more difficult. Yet, as Momper observed, Prussia no longer existed and therefore fears of another Prussian-like power domination through Berlin as the national capital should not control contemporary political decisions.

In the Bundestag, advocates for Bonn expressed their own fears about Berlin's alleged proclivity to become a hegemonic power. Feelings of distrust toward Berlin began with the creation of Germany and continued through the *Hauptstadtdebatte*. Much of this distrust stemmed from fears of the city's ability to monopolize power first as the center of Prussian power prior to unification in 1871 and continuing through Hitler's dictatorship. Ernst

² Walter Momper, "Wir brauchen einen Mittelpunkt," *Die Zeit* Online, November 16, 1990, Ed. 47, <http://www.zeit.de/1990/47/Wir-brauchen-einen-Mittelpunkt>.
["Ein Gespenst geht um in der Hauptstadtdiskussion: der übermächtige zentralistische Moloch, der den Föderalismus aushöhlt."]

Walthemathe of the SPD argued for Bonn where there was “no danger from hegemony.”³

Walthemathe had experienced the ramifications of Hitler’s hegemony when, at the age of three, he had to move to Amsterdam from Bremen as a result of Nazi persecution of his mother. They returned to Germany in 1948 and he became a civil servant in the West, where he remembered the dangers of a powerful government based in Berlin.

Worries about Berlin becoming too powerful as the capital of united Germany echoed more general concerns about the city’s history. Many Bundestag members focused on the historical events that occurred in Berlin during its time as the capital of Germany and seemed uneasy about the possibility of these events negatively affecting Germany’s future. Born in 1942 in Gleiwitz, current day Poland, and the only Bundestag member not affiliated with a party, Ortwin Lowack contended, “As the German capital, Berlin carries many burdens of our history.”⁴ Many other members voiced similar concerns about Berlin’s particular history, specifically mentioning each of the problematic eras of German history that played out in Berlin. These eras included the periods of Nazi dictatorship, war, and then division and Communist reign. Lowack’s characterization of these events as “burdens” seemed telling in the negative connotation the word placed on the city. Lowack also constituted part of the minority of members born in the East to oppose placing the capital back in Berlin.

In focusing on Berlin’s troubled history, the Bundestag members created a stark contrast to Bonn’s advantages for Germany’s future that formed the basis for one of their primary arguments for Bonn as capital. While these members associated negative political and social memories with Berlin, Bonn offered a chance to continue on the democratic path the BRD

³ Deutscher Bundestag, ed., *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991 (Bonn, 1991), <http://drucksachen.bundestag.de/drucksachen/index.php>, 2797.

[“keine Gefahr von Vorherrschaft”]

⁴ *Ibid.*, 2785.

[“Als deutsche Hauptstadt trägt Berlin viele Hypotheken unserer Geschichte”]

started over forty years before the *Hauptstadtdebatte*. Bonn advocates then connected Bonn's positive political history with a chance for Germany to move forward on the same trajectory that included economic success and healthy international relations. Numerous members cited Bonn's "positive" history as one of the reasons behind their support for leaving the capital in the west.⁵

The Bonn Proposal that would allow Berlin to remain the capital of Germany, while Bonn would still serve as the seat of government and parliament. Proponents of this solution, including CDU member Peter Harald Rauen, provided interesting evidence for their arguments that sought to deal with both the emotional and practical concerns of many Germans. Rauen explained, "Berlin was and remains the symbol of freedom and stability. Berlin is and remains the capital of the Germans and represents future Germany as a whole. Bonn remains the seat of parliament and government and with that center of a stabile democracy that has developed since the Second World War with Bonn as provisional capital."⁶ Here Rauen, born in 1945 in Salmrohr, Rhineland-Palatinate, tried to satisfy both those who wanted Berlin as capital for historical consistency and those who worried that Berlin would not be able to govern Germany properly in the future. Rauen voted with the majority of the other members born in the Southwest in supporting keeping the capital in Bonn, as well as the overwhelming majority of those born from 1940 to 1945 in the Southwest who voted for Bonn. In voting for Bonn, however, he remained in the minority of the members representing districts in the Southwest, including members of the CDU/CSU representing that region. Rauen's characterization of Bonn also brought up the idea of the BRD democracy as a stable system of government.

⁵ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991. [Blüm, Schwalbe, Roitzsch]

⁶ *Ibid*, 2793.

[“Berlin war und bleibt Symbol der Freiheit und Beständigkeit. Berlin ist und bleibt die Hauptstadt der Deutschen und repräsentiert zukünftig Deutschland als Ganzes. Bonn bleibt Sitzung von Parlament und Regierung und damit Zentrum einer stabilen Demokratie, die sich nach dem Zweetien Weltrieg mit Bonn als provisorischer Hauptstadt entwickelt hat”]

Scholars often remarked on the German desire for stability that cropped up in the pro-Bonn *Hauptstadtdebatte* arguments. Michael Mertes discussed the German desire for stability and consensus in terms of the stability West Germans had enjoyed and which East Germans sought.⁷ David Clay Large alluded to the role the proclivity for stability played in the *Hauptstadtdebatte* in his tongue-in-cheek description of Chancellor Helmut Kohl's conflicted stance in the debate. Although Large claimed Kohl understood the importance of moving the capital to Berlin, Kohl also "had the typical small-town German's horror of pulling up roots and moving to a new place, with all the 'trauma' of buying a new house, finding a new school for the kids, making new friends, and – most wrenching of all – settling on a new *Stammkneipe* (favorite pub)."⁸ Germany's tumultuous history from its very origins to the *Hauptstadtdebatte* could also help explain the prevalent desire for political consistency. In these ways, the stability Bonn advocates referred to could represent both literally not having to move from Bonn to Berlin, but also in terms of another contrast to Berlin's chaotic history.

Berlin advocates also opted for consistency and stability as rationales for placing the capital back in its original location on the Spree. Unlike Bonn advocates, though, Berlin advocates saw the opportunity for stability in choosing the city that had historically been the capital and that legally should have been the capital in the event of unification. Although Berlin served as the capital of the Nazis and Communists, members reminded each other that Berlin also represented the only capital of a unified Germany in the past. As such, these members believed that only Berlin could represent the entire history of Germany as a united country. Christine Lucyga of the SPD noted, "I know that Bonn stands for the happier part of the German post-war history. Berlin stands for our shared history as a whole, with the bright and dark

⁷ Michael Mertes, "Germany's Social and Political Culture," in *In Search of Germany*, eds. Michael Mertes, Steven Muller, and Heinrich August Winkler (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 8.

⁸ David Clay Large, *Berlin* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 549.

sides.”⁹ Advocates such as Lucyga believed that acknowledging Berlin as the capital of Germany represented an integral part of creating a genuinely unified country. Berlin advocates worried that those who wanted the capital to remain in Bonn desired simply an enlargement of the existing BRD to include the former East. The manner in which unification took place in 1990 supported this fear in that the eastern states simply voted to join the BRD, which then absorbed them into its existing infrastructure. The majority of representatives such as Lucyga, born in 1944 in Kolberg, current day Poland and who grew up in Rostock in Eastern Germany, worried about protecting the interests of the East and thus sought to keep the capital in Berlin.

Richard Schröder, member of the SPD in the Bundestag and former DDR politician, responded to each of the major objections to moving the capital to Berlin in *Die Zeit* article “Signal to the East.” In answer to the claim that Berlin only would remind Germans of their darkest history if made the capital, Schröder admitted that the city was “full of memories.”¹⁰ Yet, Schröder refused to concede that all these memories recall only negative occurrences, but rather insisted: “In Berlin the German history is unavoidably present with light and shadows.”¹¹ Here Schröder called attention to Berlin’s important role throughout German history, one that involved the city in both the high and low points of the nation.

By dwelling on the negative aspects of German history that occurred when Berlin was the capital, Bonn advocates deemed Berlin unfit to serve as the capital again. Berlin supporters in the Bundestag worried that the West would not only attempt to erase the former DDR, but also other troublesome aspects of German history. These advocates then saw picking Berlin as a way

⁹ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2789. [“Ich weiß, Bonn steht für den glücklicheren Teil der deutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte. Berlin steht für unsere gemeinsame Geschichte ganz, mit den Licht- und Schattenseiten”]

¹⁰ Richard Schröder, “Signal nach Osten,” *Die Zeit* Online, May 10, 1991, Ed. 20, <http://www.zeit.de/1991/20/Signal-nach-Osten>.

[“...allerdings voller Erinnerungen.”]

¹¹ *Ibid.*

[“In Berlin ist die deutsche Geschichte mit Licht und Schatten unübersehbar präsent.”]

to prevent the mere continuation of the BRD, as well as to remember German history before the creation of the BRD in 1949. Berlin advocates contended that Berlin's history, even with its most troublesome aspects, remained important because only Berlin could represent more of German history and the only history of united Germany. Unified Germany had never before existed except with Berlin as its capital.

By recognizing that Berlin served as the stage for both the "bright and dark sides" of German history in their arguments for placing the capital back there, Berlin advocates acknowledged the importance of addressing and dealing with German history. Bonn would allow Germans to focus on the rosy, post-war success of the BRD, without the stained history of Berlin with the wars, Nazis, and Communists. Yet, as the Berlin advocates pointed out with their contentions that only Berlin represented the entirety of German history, Bonn's history as capital from 1949 to 1989 embodied only a portion of history and only that of the West. Bundestag members on both sides of the debate agreed that Berlin remained inextricably linked to its history as the German capital. Berlin advocates, though, considered Berlin's ability to recall all of German history to be advantageous for creating a truly unified Germany. These members practiced a form of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in openly discussing the worst parts of German history and advocating for confronting this history in Berlin. Berlin's historical associations appeared unavoidable to the Bundestag members and likely to most Germans, but Berlin supporters believed that placing the capital there once more would compel Germans to face this history. According to the idea of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, facing history could facilitate coping with the historical events, which would also diminish the chances of Germans forgetting the lessons their history could teach them.

Several Berlin advocates accused Bonn supporters of only focusing on a very narrow

portion of German history, namely the BRD after 1949. Wolfgang Lüder of the FDP argued, “The post-war time did not begin with the founding of the BRD. It began in 1945 with the first rebuilding efforts of the democracy. It was the Berliners, and it was Berlin, that showed the world that they resisted the material temptations only because that was the only way to protect freedom.”¹² Here Lüder reminded his fellow Bundestag members that not only did the BRD represent only a small part of German history, but also that the BRD did not represent the beginning of the post-war era. The view that the BRD comprised the entirety of the post-war era seemed troublesome because it ignored the facts of the post-war division that only led to the BRD’s creation four years after the war ended. Lüder, born in 1937 in Celle, Lower Saxony, likely only had vague memories of this period, but he remained attached to Berlin. He completed his schooling and worked as an attorney in Berlin, and then he later served in the Berlin state parliament and served as the substitute mayor from 1976 to 1981 there.¹³

Members such as Gerd Wartenberg of the SPD worried about the consequences if Bonn advocates could simply forget about German history outside the BRD and selectively use what they wanted. Wartenberg accused Bonn advocates of shortsightedness in their estimation of the BRD’s place in German history. He claimed, “The origin of the democratic beginnings in Germany are identified with the beginning in Bonn in 1949. That is a truncation; that is absence of history; that doesn’t work.”¹⁴ Even though Wartenberg was only born in 1944, he was born in

¹² *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2763.

[“Die Nachkriegszeit began nicht erst mit der Gründung der BRD. Sie began 1945 mit den ersten Wiederaufbaubemühungen der Demokratie. Es waren die Berliner, und es war Berlin, die der Welt zeigten, daß sie den materiellen Versuchungen widerstanden, weil nur so Freiheit zu bewahren war”]

¹³ *Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages, 1949-2002*, comp. Rudolf Vierhaus and Ludolf Herbst (München: KG Saur, 2002), 521.

¹⁴ *Plenarprotokolle [Plenary Minutes]*, 12th legislative period, 34th session, June 20, 1991, 2777.

[“Der Ursprung der demokratischen Anfänge in Deutschland wird mit dem Beginn in Bonn 1949 festgelegt. Das ist eine Verkürzung; das ist Geschichtslosigkeit; das geht nicht”]

Swinemünde, present day Poland, and represented Berlin in the Bundestag from 1980 to 1994.¹⁵

In the case of Bonn advocates focusing on the democratic nature of the Bonn republic, Wartenberg sought to remind his listeners that Germany had democratic governments before the BRD. Yet, Wartenberg failed to acknowledge what Bonn advocates also emphasized; the BRD represented the only successful democracy in German history. In fact, the BRD represented the only successful government in German history. The BRD, however, only comprised a portion of what had traditionally been Germany and what would be Germany after unification in 1990.

The narrow focus on the BRD's history as the most important or relevant part of German history corresponded with a popular interpretation of German history, the *Stunde Null*. According to the idea of a *Stunde Null*, German history began again with the end of World War II in 1945. The premise that a country can simply start fresh without the burdens of its history weighing on it, though, stood in direct opposition to the idea of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* that one must deal with history. Interestingly, although many Bonn advocates favored the ability to forget the rest of German history prior to the creation of the BRD, they did not wholly agree with the existence of a *Stunde Null* that began in 1945. As Lüder reminded the rest of the Bundestag, the war ended in 1945 and thus the post-war period did not begin with the BRD in 1949. Members such as Wartenberg worried about the consequences of forgetting the rest of German history in favor of the more pleasant history of the Bonn republic. Not only did the manner in which Bonn advocates tried to paint German history prove inaccurate, as Wartenberg and Lüder pointed out, but this view of history might cause problems for the nation moving forward.

Perhaps the most fundamental difference between Bonn and Berlin lay not only in the historical events that occurred in each city, but also in the relative amount of history each city

¹⁵ *Biographisches Handbuch der Mitglieder des Deutschen Bundestages, 1949-2002*, comp. Rudolf Vierhaus and Ludolf Herbst (München: KG Saur, 2002), 922.

experienced as a capital. Bonn had only been capital of a part of Germany for forty years, while Berlin had remained the capital of at least part of the German nation since unification in 1871. While Berlin's longer run as capital obviously allowed for a longer and more varied history than Bonn, another important distinction between the cities was the ability of Bundestag members to speak authoritatively on the events that happened in the respective cities as a result of the capital age difference. Most Bundestag members during the June 20, 1991 debate would have been able to speak from first-hand experience about the two cities as capitals of divided Germany. Many members would also have been able to share first-hand accounts of Berlin during the Second World War and the Third Reich, as 49% of the speakers in the debate were born before 1939. Berlin's earliest history, though, of the Prussians and Bismarck and the Weimar Republic would have been history in the truest sense to the Bundestag members in 1991. While their families may have experienced Berlin during this time period, the members' knowledge of the events would have been second-hand. A crucial difference between Bonn and Berlin for the members would have been the source of their knowledge of the two cities. The difference between the two types of knowledge regarding Bonn and Berlin likely influenced the members' own feelings towards the two cities and the *Hauptstadtdebatte* as a whole.

The interaction between history and memory thus played an important role in the formation of opinions in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*. While the Bundestag members likely all had first-hand memories of Bonn and of Berlin, much of Berlin's past as brought up in the debate could only have come from knowledge obtained outside the member's direct personal experience. This meant not only that the type of knowledge about Bonn was different from that about Berlin, but also that knowledge about Berlin was a more complicated mix of history and first-hand experience, or memory.

The interesting part of German history's role in the debate then came in the decisions members made to either use history or memory. Many members chose to use history in referring to Berlin's beginnings as the German capital that they could not speak about from personal experience. The distinction between history and memory became blurred for many members in talking about Berlin, because its history as the capital of Germany had spanned so many years. When members spoke about Bonn, though, they almost always used their personal memories because they had direct experience with the BRD in divided Germany.

The relationship between history and memory for Germans in the *Hauptstadtdebatte* seemed especially interesting given the dramatic nature of German history, as well as its ability to incite strong opinions. Both historical events and personal remembered history played a large role in the arguments members crafted for both cities. Use of history and memory also reflected the influence personal characteristics such as birthplace or district represented, especially in combination with age or political party, exerted on members in their decisions in the debate. The correlation between those who wanted the capital moved back to Berlin and their experience in East Germany suggested that direct knowledge of the history present there made these members more likely to confront this history. In the case of the *Hauptstadtdebatte*, the advocates for Berlin largely practiced a form of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* in their attempts to deal with all of Germany's history by placing the capital in the country's largest reminder of those events, Berlin. Moving the capital to Berlin thus became a way for Germany to face its troublesome history and work to deal with it on an everyday basis that could help insure a more successful future. Bonn might allow for a smoother transition to a united state, but these advocates believed that Berlin and its inherent historical associations could build a more secure united state and a more enlightened national identity.

Memory for both Bonn and Berlin advocates likely influenced how they personally felt about each city, as well as how they constructed arguments for each city. The role personal experience in the *Hauptstadtdebatte* then likely reflected the influence other factors exerted over members and their support for a particular city. First-hand memory of divided Germany then could explain why geographic affiliations, in concert with other personal characteristics, influenced which city a member supported. The complicated nature of the members' voting tendencies reflected the complex interaction between history and memory in constructing meaning for Bonn and Berlin. A member's birthplace, age, religion, political party, or district represented all could have influenced the type of history he/she learned, as well as his/her own personal experiences and therefore memories of the German nation. These varying histories and memories affected the members' opinions of Bonn and Berlin in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*, as well as their understanding of German history and its role in the present and future of the country.

Conclusion

Coping with the Past to Work Towards a Unified Future

In the nineteenth century, the problem of defining a German identity became a very practical concern in the debate over what would physically constitute a German nation-state. With the collection of small states in the German-speaking world, the geographic boundaries of a German state remained unclear. The nineteenth century also marked the emergence of a wider spread sense of a German nation and a sort of patriotism associated with those feelings, which complicated the ability to decide borders based on a ruler's power or victories in battle, for example. When the German states united in 1871, they formed a state around a military powerhouse of the era, Prussia. Even though these states united to form a country called Germany they still brought their individual histories with them, making a cohesive definition for Germany as a state and as an identity difficult.

Forming a cohesive German nation continued to constitute a problem for both Germans and scholars through the twentieth and into the twenty-first centuries. After World War II another complication emerged in the wake of German aggression and international trauma. With World War II and Hitler's campaign against the Jews fresh in their memory, many Germans wondered whether having a strong national identity remained acceptable. Therefore, many Germans refrained from outward expressions of national pride or identity, which complicated the definition of a nation even further. Additionally, the creation of two German states in 1949 added another layer to the national identity issue in that citizens of either the BRD or DDR, while still German, began to develop widely differing national ideas and loyalties.

The events of November 9, 1989 opened both a literal gateway to the West for East Germans and a figurative floodgate in the uncertainty surrounding the German nation and its

history. Questions arose from all sides over not only the future of the two German states, but also again the basic question of what constituted the German nation. Even legal unification on October 3, 1990 did little to settle the uncertainty and concerns for the now unified state's future and the future of its residents. The extent of this uncertainty became clear in the subsequent debate over where to locate the capital of the new German state.

The *Hauptstadtdebatte* demonstrated the critical importance of forming a state that could deal with many of the issues paramount to citizens of both the BRD and DDR. Concerns over Germany's future, especially given its troubled and varied history cropped up often in both the media coverage prior to the Bundestag vote on June 20, 1991 and in the Bundestag members' arguments on that day. Differing views of the most important qualifications for a capital city and the qualities Bonn and Berlin each had to offer illustrated divergent views of national history, as well as its role both in the present and in moving forward as a new nation. The ways in which advocates for both Bonn and Berlin formulated their arguments for either city based on its history as a German national capital reflected larger issues surrounding Germany's history. The differences not only between each member's preference for the capital city, but also the ways in which they used the city's history to create an argument for that city demonstrated the importance of history, both national and personal, to the *Hauptstadtdebatte*.

The members' personal characteristics affected their voting in the *Hauptstadtdebatte*, although no quantifiable factor alone could explain support for a particular proposal. Rather, the member's personal experience of Germany, reflected in various combinations of the characteristics studied here, determined how history and memory influenced their conceptions of Berlin and Bonn as capital city candidates and as representatives of German national history. Bundestag members used history and memory in constructing their arguments in the

Hauptstadtdebatte, which came to represent often-divergent opinions of how to deal with German history in the best interest of unified Germany in the future.

As the rhetoric of the *Hauptstadtdebatte* evidenced, Bonn and Berlin came to be representative of certain aspects of German history, as well as symbolic of different ways of viewing this history. While many members from the former East strongly believed the capital should return to Berlin, many members from the West wished to preserve the BRD status quo by keeping the capital in Bonn. This desire to keep the capital in Bonn translated into accusations from Berlin advocates of attempts to ignore the difficult aspects of German national history. Rather than shy away from the history Berlin symbolized, these Germans hoped to confront it head on as a means of attempting to cope with it. Berlin's dramatic history then became an asset to Germany's future, according to many of its advocates, because it facilitated facing and dealing with German national history in its entirety.

The manner in which Bundestag members argued for Bonn and Berlin became representative of larger issues for Germany. Germans often differed on the issue of how to best deal with their past, perhaps largely because of the traumatic and far-reaching consequences of events such as the Holocaust. How members structured their views and interpretations of history reflected differing schools of thought in Germany. Attempting to face and cope with all of their national history through a form of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, literally coping with the past, came to contrast with the idea that a country could begin with a *Stunde Null*, or zero hour, after World War II.

Differing views on how to best address history in contemporary society also related to divergent opinions on the meaning of the event from 1989 to 1991. Scholars, as did Germans at the time, still disagree about what to call the creation of a new German state. While some opted

for unification, others termed the events the reunification of Germany. While constituting only a small difference in terms, the difference in meaning represented largely divergent views of the course of German history. Those who advocated for Bonn desired an enlargement and continuation of the BRD in which case unification appeared fitting. Reunification, in contrast, suggested that when this new Germany emerged it had existed before and had suffered only a temporary separation. Reunification, like the city of Berlin, then recalled the times in Germany's past when it was unified, including during the troublesome events of the early twentieth century.

The *Hauptstadtdebatte* served as a microcosm of the issues troubling Germans at the time, as well as many concerns that continue to plague Germans and scholars alike. A large part of trying to understand German national history depended on working through the problems the *Hauptstadtdebatte* raised. A concern common to advocates for both Bonn and Berlin was the question of how Germany could move forward as a new, unified state, and the arguments they used for either capital demonstrated the important role national history and its interpretations in modern contexts played in ideas of this future.

Appendix: Voting Statistics Tables

1. Birthplace

1.1 CONSENSUS PROPOSAL

<i>Birthplace</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Abstain</i>
<i>Northwest</i>	27%	67%	7%
<i>Southwest</i>	22%	65%	9%
<i>South</i>	40%	60%	0%
<i>East</i>	30%	60%	8%
All	28%	64%	6%

1.2 BONN PROPOSAL

<i>Birthplace</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Northwest</i>	47%
<i>Southwest</i>	61%
<i>South</i>	50%
<i>East</i>	38%
All	48%

1.3 BERLIN PROPOSAL

<i>Birthplace</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Northwest</i>	50%
<i>Southwest</i>	39%
<i>South</i>	50%
<i>East</i>	58%
All	50%

2. Year Born

2.1 CONSENSUS PROPOSAL

<i>Year Born</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Abstain</i>
<i>1913-1939</i>	23%	72%	6%
<i>1940-1945</i>	35%	50%	12%
<i>1913-1945</i>	28%	63%	8%
<i>1946-1966</i>	29%	71%	0%
All	28%	64%	6%

2.2 BONN PROPOSAL

<i>Year Born</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>1913-1939</i>	47%
<i>1940-1945</i>	50%
<i>1913-1945</i>	48%
<i>1946-1966</i>	48%
All	48%

2.3 BERLIN PROPOSAL

<i>Year Born</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>1913-1939</i>	51%
<i>1940-1945</i>	47%
<i>1913-1945</i>	49%
<i>1946-1966</i>	48%
All	50%

3. Year Born and Birthplace

3.1 CONSENSUS PROPOSAL

<i>Year Born and Birthplace</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Abstain</i>
<i>1913-1939</i>	23%	72%	6%
Northwest	20%	70%	10%
Southwest	20%	70%	10%
South	40%	60%	0%
East	27%	73%	0%
<hr/>			
<i>1940-1945</i>	35%	50%	12%
Northwest	50%	50%	0%
Southwest	44%	67%	22%
South	25%	75%	0%
East	38%	38%	19%
<hr/>			
<i>1913-1945</i>	28%	63%	8%
Northwest	25%	67%	8%
Southwest	21%	68%	11%
South	33%	67%	0%
East	32%	55%	10%
<hr/>			
<i>1946-1966</i>	29%	71%	0%
Northwest	17%	67%	0%
Southwest	25%	50%	0%
South	100%	0%	0%
East	44%	78%	0%
All	28%	64%	6%

3.2 BONN PROPOSAL

<i>Year Born and Birthplace</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>1913-1939</i>	<i>47%</i>
Northwest	45%
Southwest	50%
South	40%
East	40%
<i>1940-1945</i>	<i>50%</i>
Northwest	50%
Southwest	78%
South	50%
East	31%
<i>1913-1945</i>	<i>48%</i>
Northwest	46%
Southwest	63%
South	44%
East	35%
<i>1946-1966</i>	<i>48%</i>
Northwest	50%
Southwest	50%
South	100%
East	44%
All	48%

3.3 BERLIN PROPOSAL

<i>Year Born and Birthplace</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>1913-1939</i>	<i>51%</i>
Northwest	50%
Southwest	50%
South	60%
East	53%
<i>1940-1945</i>	<i>47%</i>
Northwest	50%
Southwest	22%
South	50%
East	63%
<i>1913-1945</i>	<i>49%</i>
Northwest	58%
Southwest	37%
South	56%
East	58%
<i>1946-1966</i>	<i>48%</i>
Northwest	50%
Southwest	50%
South	0%
East	44%
All	50%

4. Party

4.1 CONSENSUS PROPOSAL

<i>Party</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Abstain</i>
<i>CDU/CSU</i>	50%	45%	5%
<i>SPD</i>	15%	73%	13%
<i>FDP</i>	6%	94%	0%
<i>Bündnis 90/Grüne</i>	33%	67%	0%
<i>PDS/Linke Liste</i>	35%	75%	0%
<i>No Party</i>	0%	100%	0%
All	28%	64%	6%

4.2 BONN PROPOSAL

<i>Party</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>CDU/CSU</i>	45%
<i>SPD</i>	50%
<i>FDP</i>	47%
<i>Bündnis 90/Grüne</i>	33%
<i>PDS/Linke Liste</i>	75%
<i>No Party</i>	100%
All	48%

4.3 BERLIN PROPOSAL

<i>Party</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>CDU/CSU</i>	47%
<i>SPD</i>	48%
<i>FDP</i>	53%
<i>Bündnis 90/Grüne</i>	67%
<i>PDS/Linke Liste</i>	50%
<i>No Party</i>	0%
All	50%

5. Birthplace and Party

5.1 CONSENSUS PROPOSAL

<i>Party and Birthplace</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Abstain</i>
<i>CDU/CSU</i>	50%	45%	5%
Northwest	50%	50%	0%
Southwest	33%	33%	22%
South	57%	43%	0%
East	50%	50%	0%
<hr/>			
<i>SPD</i>	15%	73%	13%
Northwest	15%	69%	15%
Southwest	18%	82%	0%
South	0%	100%	0%
East	0%	62%	23%
<hr/>			
<i>FDP</i>	6%	94%	0%
Northwest	0%	100%	0%
Southwest	0%	100%	0%
South	n/a	n/a	n/a
East	14%	86%	0%
<hr/>			
<i>Bündnis 90/Grüne</i>	33%	67%	0%
Northwest	n/a	n/a	n/a
Southwest	n/a	n/a	n/a
South	n/a	n/a	n/a
East	33%	67%	0%
<hr/>			
<i>PDS/Linke Liste</i>	25%	75%	0%
Northwest	0%	100%	0%
Southwest	n/a	n/a	n/a
South	n/a	n/a	n/a
East	33%	67%	0%

<i>No Party</i>	0%	100%	0%
Northwest	n/a	n/a	n/a
Southwest	n/a	n/a	n/a
South	n/a	n/a	n/a
East	0%	100%	0%
All	28%	64%	6%

5.2 BONN PROPOSAL

<i>Party and Birthplace</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>CDU/CSU</i>	45%
Northwest	50%
Southwest	33%
South	57%
East	43%
<i>SPD</i>	
	50%
Northwest	38%
Southwest	82%
South	50%
East	23%
<i>FDP</i>	
	47%
Northwest	25%
Southwest	67%
South	n/a
East	57%
<i>Bündnis 90/Grüne</i>	
	33%
Northwest	n/a
Southwest	n/a
South	100%
East	0%
<i>PDS/Linke Liste</i>	
	75%

Northwest	100%
Southwest	n/a
South	n/a
East	0%
<i>No Party</i>	<i>100%</i>
Northwest	n/a
Southwest	n/a
South	n/a
East	100%
All	48%

5.3 BERLIN PROPOSAL

<i>Party and Birthplace</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>CDU/CSU</i>	47%
Northwest	50%
Southwest	67%
South	43%
East	50%
<i>SPD</i>	48%
Northwest	46%
Southwest	18%
South	50%
East	77%
<i>FDP</i>	53%
Northwest	75%
Southwest	33%
South	n/a
East	43%
<i>Bündnis 90/Grüne</i>	67%
Northwest	n/a

Southwest	n/a
South	100%
East	50%
<i>PDS/Linke Liste</i>	50%
Northwest	0%
Southwest	n/a
South	n/a
East	67%
<i>No Party</i>	0%
Northwest	n/a
Southwest	n/a
South	n/a
East	0%
All	50%

6. District

6.1 CONSENSUS PROPOSAL

<i>District</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Abstain</i>
<i>Northwest</i>	20%	74%	6%
<i>Southwest</i>	21%	71%	7%
<i>South</i>	43%	57%	0%
<i>East</i>	43%	57%	7%
All	28%	64%	6%

6.2 BONN PROPOSAL

<i>District</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Northwest</i>	51%
<i>Southwest</i>	55%
<i>South</i>	71%
<i>East</i>	28%
All	48%

6.3 BERLIN PROPOSAL

<i>District</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Northwest</i>	49%
<i>Southwest</i>	45%
<i>South</i>	29%
<i>East</i>	66%
All	50%

7. District and Party

7.1 CONSENSUS PROPOSAL

<i>Party and District</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Abstain</i>
<i>CDU/CSU</i>	50%	45%	5%
Northwest	31%	69%	0%
Southwest	44%	33%	22%
South	63%	38%	0%
East	64%	36%	0%
<i>SPD</i>	15%	73%	13%
Northwest	15%	69%	15%
Southwest	8%	92%	0%
South	20%	80%	0%
East	17%	50%	33%
<i>FDP</i>	6%	94%	0%
Northwest	22%	89%	0%
Southwest	0%	100%	0%
South	n/a	n/a	n/a
East	0%	100%	0%
<i>Bündnis 90/Grüne</i>	33%	67%	0%
Northwest	n/a	n/a	n/a
Southwest	n/a	n/a	n/a
South	n/a	n/a	n/a
East	33%	67%	0%
<i>PDS/Linke Liste</i>	25%	75%	0%
Northwest	n/a	n/a	n/a
Southwest	n/a	n/a	n/a
South	n/a	n/a	n/a
East	25%	75%	0%

<i>No Party</i>	0%	100%	0%
Northwest	n/a	n/a	n/a
Southwest	n/a	n/a	n/a
South	0%	100%	0%
East	n/a	n/a	n/a
All	28%	64%	6%

7.2 BONN PROPOSAL

<i>Party and District</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>CDU/CSU</i>	45%
Northwest	69%
Southwest	30%
South	63%
East	33%
<i>SPD</i>	50%
Northwest	46%
Southwest	67%
South	80%
East	0%
<i>FDP</i>	47%
Northwest	33%
Southwest	75%
South	n/a
East	50%
<i>Bündnis 90/Grüne</i>	33%
Northwest	n/a
Southwest	n/a
South	n/a
East	33%
<i>PDS/Linke Liste</i>	25%

Northwest	0%
Southwest	n/a
South	n/a
East	25%
No Party	
	100%
Northwest	n/a
Southwest	n/a
South	n/a
East	0%
All	48%

7.3 BERLIN PROPOSAL

<i>Party and District</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>CDU/CSU</i>	47%
Northwest	31%
Southwest	23%
South	13%
East	58%
SPD	
	48%
Northwest	54%
Southwest	33%
South	20%
East	100%
FDP	
	53%
Northwest	67%
Southwest	25%
South	n/a
East	50%
Bündnis 90/Grüne	
	67%
Northwest	n/a

Southwest	n/a
South	0%
East	100%
<i>PDS/Linke Liste</i>	<i>50%</i>
Northwest	0%
Southwest	n/a
South	n/a
East	100%
<i>No Party</i>	<i>0%</i>
Northwest	n/a
Southwest	n/a
South	n/a
East	0%
All	50%

8. Religion

8.1 CONSENSUS PROPOSAL

<i>District</i>	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Abstain</i>
<i>Evangelical</i>	31%	62%	5%
<i>Catholic</i>	31%	59%	6%
All	28%	64%	6%

8.2 BONN PROPOSAL

<i>District</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Evangelical</i>	38%
<i>Catholic</i>	53%
All	48%

8.3 BERLIN PROPOSAL

<i>District</i>	<i>Yes</i>
<i>Evangelical</i>	60%
<i>Catholic</i>	47%
All	50%

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