Competition over Traditional Leadership and Public Welfare: Evidence from Central Malawi

By

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To my husband, Hasan Isham, for his love

And

My mom and dad, MiYoung and JangSoo, for believing in me as they always have been

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Introduction

On April 7, 2018, *Nyasa Times* produced a story about a traditional leader,[1] Chilipa, that praised his hard work in bringing development to the local community.[2] Villagers and government officials complimented his dedicated leadership and humble approach in solving community problems. In contrast, another story about a different traditional leader, Kayesa, was published in *The Maravi Post* on February 27, 2015.[3] This leader was arrested for colluding with a government officer in creating a ghost village to get fertilizer voucher coupons for themselves.

These divergent stories speak to the highly variable role that similarly positioned elites can play in driving local development outcomes. Such variation likely underlies the marked lack of consensus among scholars regarding how traditional leaders impact the well-being of local people. Many scholars view traditional leaders as largely extractive elites and detriments to public welfare (Mamdani 1996; 2001; Carlson 2020; Carlson and Seim 2018). Other studies have portrayed the same leaders as grassroots advocates for their communities, who valuably lobby the state for local public goods (Gottlieb and Larreguy 2020; Koter 2016; Baldwin 2014; 2016; 2018). Such disagreements suggest the need to study the roots of variation in traditional leaders' impact on their communities.

In this introductory chapter, I summarize the theoretical arguments explained and tested in subsequent chapters, situate the dissertation in the context of unelected local leaders in the world

[1] Traditional leaders are also often referred to as traditional chiefs and chiefs. I use these terms interchangeably.
[2] Mogha-Mana, Solister. "Model of Servant Leadership: Group Village Headman Chilipa," *Nyasa Times*. April 7, 2018 (https://www.nyasatimes.com/model-of-servant-leadership-group-village-headman-chilipa/).
[3] "ACB Arrests Agriculture Staff and Village Headman in Mchinji," *The Maravi Post.* Feb 27, 2015 (https://www.maravipost.com/acb-arrests-agriculture-staff-and-village-headman-in-mchinji/).

and Malawi, and briefly mention the primary data for analysis. This chapter also provides an overview of each chapter.

1. Competition and Types of Goods and Services

My dissertation focuses on how one key and overlooked factor – competition – determines the performance of traditional leaders. The hereditary nature of the position and customary rules about traditional leadership has led some scholars to assert that chiefs are incompatible with democracy because there is neither an accountability system nor an alternative leader and, thus, downplay the role of contestation in traditional leadership (e.g., Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2017). Traditional leaders have power through their association with traditional customs, and most of them inherit the position from family members. In principle, traditional leadership is directly passed from fathers to their sons in patrilineal communities, while the leadership is bequeathed from maternal uncles to their nephews in matrilineal communities. The first son of the predecessor in patrilineal societies and the first son of the first sister of the predecessor in matrilineal societies get the first call, respectively (W. C. Chirwa 2014).

However, my interviews and surveys with traditional leaders and their ruling families in Malawi reveal a different story.[4] The data suggests that the ruling family for traditional leadership decides the successor when a traditional leader passes away. About 48% of surveyed ruling families considered multiple members of the family as a candidate for the next leader at the time of succession, and 38% of the survey respondents reported that their current traditional leader was not the first in line to succeed in the leader position. Moreover, political competition over traditional leadership does not occur only in the succession phase. In 14% of the surveyed

[4] Ruling families are locally known as royal families in Malawi. Simply put, they can be viewed as an extended family of a former traditional leader, but see Chapter 2 for a more accurate definition.

traditional leadership positions, members of their families disputed traditional leaders' authority to assert themselves in the leadership position even after a new leader was sworn in. This observation challenges conventional wisdom about traditional leadership, indicating that competition over leadership is essential for understanding the determinants of villagers' welfare.

A few recent studies about traditional leaders also examine political competition in traditional institutions (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 2014; Voors et al. 2018; Baldwin and Mvukiyehe 2015; Gottlieb 2017) and measure the competition with the number of ruling families (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 2014; Voors et al. 2018). However, this approach yields a noisy variable with low validity because whether and how many ruling families stage a competitive challenge to keep leaders in check is unknown. Instead of the number of *potential* competitors (i.e., the number of ruling families in previous studies), this dissertation directly measures *actual* competitive challenges. With this shift in the measurement approach, this dissertation attempts to answer the following research questions: what are the implications of political competition on the welfare of local people? Does it have divergent consequences across different types of goods and services (i.e., private vs. local public goods)? Lastly, how does the effect of political competition regarding actual competitive challenges differ from that of potential competition?

By focusing on actual competitive challenges, this dissertation argues that political competition over traditional leadership strengthens the hand of the ruling family and incentivizes the leaders to be more responsive to the needs of the ruling family vis-à-vis the general public. However, the ruling family's strengthened leverage has divergent consequences for the broader public depending on the nature of the good in question. For the distribution of *private goods*, the competition allows leaders to disproportionately target the ruling family at the expense of other villagers because private goods and services are rivalrous and excludable. Competitive challenges,

in this case, would induce an increased likelihood of favoritism for ruling families in customary court rulings and the distribution of farm input subsidies, cash transfers, and employment opportunities, which generally undermines the welfare of villagers. Conversely, leaders cannot exclude a subset of people from the benefit regarding the provision of local public goods. As the public goods are locally non-excludable, the welfare of regular villagers will improve alongside the welfare of ruling family members even if leaders' concern primarily lies with the interests of their ruling family. Thus, the provision of clean water sources, road conditions, and community security will improve with the presence of competitive challenges over leadership.

Some might contend that ruling families prefer receiving private goods over public goods, and traditional leaders will strategically allocate their time and effort to be aligned with the ruling family's priority. However, local public goods like drinking water and passable roads necessary to sustain one's living are insufficient in rural Malawi. In this context of poor infrastructure, access to private goods would not cancel out the ruling family's demand for the local public goods. Furthermore, with regards to the private goods from the government, there is little that individual traditional leaders can do to increase the quantity of the resources. The leaders' authority is limited to facilitating the completion of the beneficiary list and resource distribution.

This dissertation has real-world policy implications regarding the evaluation of the performance of traditional chiefs who are omnipresent in rural Africa, echoes the recent scholarly attention for classifying different goods and services, and calls for scholarly attention to the distinction between private and local public goods. Furthermore, by examining the role of competition in unelected hereditary positions, the dissertation engages with the discussion about the scope condition of political competition literature.

2. Unelected Local Leaders in the World

Traditional leaders in Africa exert significant influence over the lives of rural residents working with the government or NGOs, although the level of their influence varies across countries (Logan 2013). While this dissertation contributes to the discourse about the impacts of traditional leaders – unelected local leaders – in rural Africa, the examples of unelected local leadership are found in various contexts. Religious leaders like *marabouts* in West Africa (Gottlieb 2017; Koter 2013) and *maliks* in Afghanistan[5] wield substantial influence over the local population. Village chiefs in Cambodia are involved in the government's poverty alleviation program (Jacobs and Price 2006). Slum leaders in India and village leaders in China affect the provision of public goods such as drinking water, paved roads, proper sanitation and waste removal, street lights, and schools (Auerbach 2016; Auerbach and Thachil 2018 for India and Tsai 2007a; 2007b for China). *Caciques* in Mexico facilitated the penetration of state and/or party influence on indigenous settlements (Rus 2005).

While some unelected local leaders have vanished with their traces only to be found from historical archives and artifacts,[6] others have survived or even enhanced their influence over local communities like the examples mentioned above. Traditional leaders in Africa are a prototype of strong unelected local leaders in the contemporary world. Their authority was expected to decline with the democratization in Africa (Englebert 2002), but traditional institutions have shown resilience to regime changes and remained influential (Chiweza 2007; Logan 2009; 2013). The

[5] Muslim rulers (*maliks*) in Afghanistan negotiate the terms of the agreement between their government and internationally sponsored projects and influence the distribution of international aid (https://english.cambodiadaily.com/news/village-chiefs-to-be-chosen-by-quota-system-51678/) and garner votes (https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR386_Resources-over-Reform-in-Afghanistan.pdf).

[6] These include village headman (*Shôya in the central, Nanushi in the east, and kimoiri in the north*) in early modern Japan (Edo period), large landowners in early 20th century Chile (Loveman 2001), Colombia, and Peru (Cotler 1967; Martz 1997), and land-owning rural aristocrats in Victorian England (Seymour 1915).

expansion of traditional chiefs' authority called for burgeoning interests in the effects the leaders have on service delivery and political accountability in recent years (Baldwin and Raffler 2019).

3. Traditional Leaders in Malawi

Studying the impacts of traditional leaders in their communities is predicated on the assumption that they exercise significant authority over the distribution and provision of resources. Malawi is a country that meets this precondition. The ubiquitous authority of traditional leaders is attested in various aspects of present-day Malawian society. With only 18% of the country's population residing in urban areas and the government's limited capacity to administer their rural residents, the great majority of the population is subject to the traditional rule. Traditional leaders in rural areas are trusted information sources, organizers, mobilizers, and gatekeepers to the rural population (Dionne 2017). As they are equipped with specialized local knowledge and information, the Malawian government relies on traditional chiefs to carry out census surveys and national identity registration (Eggen 2011) and choose beneficiaries for farm input subsidy programs (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020). In recognizing their local influence, the Malawian government has been expanding its efforts to integrate the informal leaders into the formal institutions by gazetting them into the district government registrar and granting a monthly salary (locally known as *mswahala*). The public opinion data from Afrobarometer Round 4 shows that Malawians overwhelmingly support this integration.[7]

[7] The majority of survey respondents "strongly agree (70%)" or "agree (17%)" with the following statement "traditional leaders serve their communities and the government, and they should receive a salary from the government for their work."



Figure 1.1 Cross-Country Public Opinion about Traditional Leaders' Relations with the Government and Political Parties

Note: The question for Panel A is "Do you think that traditional leaders should sit on your local government council, or not? If so, do you think they should be elected by the people to these seats, appointed by government officials, or selected in some other way?" where it indicates the aggregate of the following three responses: "Yes, should have seats elected by people/ should have seats appointed by government officials/ should have seats selected in some other way." Panel B shows the question "Do you think that the amount of influence traditional leaders has in governing your local community should increase, stay the same, or decrease?" with the percentage of "increase somewhat/a lot" responses. The two statements for Panel C are "To best serve their people, traditional leaders must remain independent of the government. They should not receive government salaries" vs. "Traditional leaders serve their communities and the government, and they should receive a salary from government for their work." The statements for Panel D are "Traditional leaders must represent all of their people equally. They should remain non-partisan, and not affiliate themselves with any political party" and "Traditional leaders are citizens like everyone else and have the right to decide for themselves whether to support a political party" and the percentages of responses "agree or strongly agree with statement 2" are shown in Panel C and D.

The public opinion in Malawi about traditional institutions' relations with their government and political parties does not represent the archetypal public opinion of the continent of Africa. The public support for the fusion of the government and traditional institutions in Malawi is above the corresponding statistics of average African countries. The great majority of Malawians believe that traditional leaders should have their voice in local government councils (Figure 1.1 Panel A), the leaders' influence should increase rather than decrease (Figure 1.1 Panel B), and they should receive a salary from the government (Figure 1.1 Panel C). Moreover, Malawi's public opinion is also contrasted from the rest of African countries in the way that an overwhelming majority believes that the traditional leaders should remain non-partisan (Figure 1.1 Panel D).

However, that does not mean that Malawi is an outlier in Africa. Panel A in Figure 1.2 shows that countries like Burkina Faso, Niger, Senegal, Mali, Gambia, Madagascar, Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, and Sierra Leone exhibit higher public trust in traditional leaders than Malawi. Furthermore, Panel B in Figure 1.2 displays that about 60% of Malawians approve of their traditional leaders' performance, which situates the country right about in the mid-rank among the surveyed countries.

My data, focusing on traditional leaders in Malawi, examines one of the "most likely cases" for contested leadership and its impact on villagers' welfare. "Least likely cases" contribute to building a strong foundation for generalizability (Gerring 2007), but cases like Malawi are valuable for theory building (Eckstein 1975). If leaders do not have leverage over the distribution and/or provision of goods and services, contestations over the position would not likely have any impact on their localities, and it would have little policy implications in the real world. By studying varied impacts of competition over traditional leadership, this study suggests policymakers

consider both the intended and unintended consequences for the well-being of the local population that may come from bestowing more power onto unelected traditional institutions.



Figure 1.2 Cross-Country Public Trust and Approval Rating of Traditional Leaders

Note: The survey question for Panel A is "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: traditional leaders?" and the figure in the graph corresponds to the aggregate of "somewhat" and "a lot" responses. The survey question for Panel B is, "Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: your traditional leader?" and the figure shows the percentage of "approve" and "strongly approve" responses.

4. Methodological Approach

This dissertation employs a mixed-method approach with heavy reliance on large-N quantitative survey data for empirical evidence and, as well, with qualitative interviews supplementing the main data from theory-building. While I introduce large-N quantitative methods in detail in the first relevant chapter, I preview them here. First, I take note of the core qualitative approach: in-depth interviews.

In-Depth Semi-Structured Interviews. Multiple chapters of this dissertation draw upon a set of 60 semi-structured interviews that I conducted with traditional leaders in May-July 2019. I

conducted the interviews in four of the country's twenty-eight districts. Selected districts include three in the Central Region (Lilongwe, Kasungu, and Dowa) and one in the South (Chikwawa). In both Lilongwe and Kasungu districts, the Chewa people – the ethnic group with the highest population in the country - constitute the majority of the district population. The remaining two districts have a more ethnically heterogeneous population. Tumbuka and Ngoni in Dowa and Lhomwe and Yao in Chikwawa reside in the same district with a substantial Chewa population. The ethnic composition of traditional leaders typically mirrors the general population, but Chewa traditional leaders tend to reign over the Lhomwe population in Southern Malawi. Thus, the selection of study sites was designed to overrepresent Chewa traditional leaders but also include leaders from other minority ethnic backgrounds.

I interviewed traditional leaders in four Traditional Authorities (TAs) – administrative jurisdictions under districts - in Lilongwe, nine TAs in Kasungu, four in Dowa, and another four in Chikwawa. Within a district, I selected study sites to be geographically dispersed, as shown in **Error! Reference source not found.**.3. Prior to a visit, a local research assistant made a phone c all to the high-rank traditional leader of the study area, whose contact numbers were available from the district government. In the phone call, the assistant communicated an intended date of visit and requested the leader to recruit two other traditional leaders from lower ranks beside him/herself for an interview. This recruitment procedure resembles snowballing sampling method relying on personal networks (Goodman 1961).

In order to prevent the sample from only including respondents personally close to the high-rank leader, Recruitees needed to satisfy the following two criteria: 1) not blood-related to the high-rank traditional leader, and 2) live at least five kilometers away from the high-rank leader's house. As the snowballing sample design relies on high-rank traditional leaders' personal

networks, there was a high chance of interviewees consisting of people close to the high-rank leader. Then, the recruited low-rank traditional leaders might exhibit higher performance in governance because of their access to resources which might be attributable to their geographical and personal closeness to the high-rank leader. To ameliorate this concern and get insights into what contributes to low-rank leaders' varied performance, the imposition of these criteria was important and necessary.



Figure 1.3 Interview Locations by Districts

Note: The map displays locations of semi-structured interviews. The names of the districts are Lilongwe, Kasungu, Dowa, and Chikwawa from the top left and right, to the bottom left and right. The boundaries in the map on the right are supposed to display TA demarcations, but they are not up-to-date because the boundaries of recently created TAs are not reflected on the map. The discrepancy prevents even someone conversant with Malawi from guessing the identity of interviewees and allows the interviewees to remain anonymous.

The initial fieldwork interviews were conducted *before* the theory development, and the interview data helped shape the theory of this dissertation. While questions that directly test my hypotheses were not asked in the interviews, I use the interviews to proffer contextual knowledge and interpret some of the quantitative results. Unless otherwise noted, the interview data referenced in this dissertation is drawn from these interviews.

Survey with interested parties for traditional leadership. From May 2020 to March 2021, I conducted two rounds of surveys with traditional leaders, one round with ruling families and another round with secretaries in the Kasungu district in Malawi. There were two primary reasons why I conducted surveys with multiple interested parties instead of one. First, traditional leaders might not be the best source of information because questions about competitive challenges might instigate social desirability bias [8] and because leaders themselves might not have precise information about village demographics.[9] Second, surveys were conducted over the telephone due to COVID-19, but this survey mode severely restricts the number of questions and lengths of the survey.[10] Thus, I developed separate questionnaires for traditional leaders, their ruling families, and their secretaries to shorten the length of each survey by carefully discerning questions for each interested party.

[8] Social desirability refers to study subjects' tendency to provide answers or associate themselves with statements that they deem to be desirable (Edwards 1957).

[9] Some leaders in the semi-structured interview could not elaborate on questions that required detailed information and instead turned to their secretaries, who keep traditional court records and census books. The secretaries were also more likely to provide objective and neutral answers than the leaders.

[10] Respondents of telephone and online surveys are more sensitive to the length of an interview, and longer interviews are associated with lower response rates (Lavrakas 2008). Respondents are more likely to be distracted by their surroundings with phone/online surveys vis-à-vis face-to-face surveys, which raises the concern for the quality of data and seriously constrains the length of surveys. In developing countries, the concerns might be graver as poor infrastructure makes the quality of phone calls poor and more vulnerable to weather conditions.

Instead of collecting a nationally representative sample, I initially identified three TAs in the Kasungu district and then expanded the study areas to seven other TAs in the district.[11] The research team completed the following surveys: an n=684 traditional leader survey (round 1), an n=657 traditional leader survey (round 2), an n=680 ruling family survey, and an n=669 secretary survey. Traditional leaders, ruling families, and secretaries provided information about the jurisdiction under a traditional leader and the leader. The unit of analysis is jurisdiction under each traditional leader, where Traditional Leader Surveys, the Ruling Family Survey, and the Secretary Survey combined providing complete information for each jurisdiction. A complete set of variables was collected from 508 jurisdictions in total,[12] as at least one of the three surveys was not conducted for some of the selected jurisdictions.

5. Plan of the Dissertation

Chapters 2 and 3 address descriptive questions about traditional leaders in Malawi and Africa, establish the puzzle that the dissertation addresses and present the main theoretical argument. From Chapters 4 to 5, I subject the argument's assumptions and implications to a set of various empirical tests. The plan of the dissertation is as follows:

Chapter 2 serves two purposes. First, the chapter provides a conceptual framework of traditional leaders in Africa and contextualizes them in Malawi using original elite interviews and

[11] The selection of study sites was made considering budget and logistical restrictions that go along with in-person data collection. The local and Vanderbilt IRB granted me permission to conduct in-person surveys in November 2020 without me personally traveling to the country but remotely supervising local enumerators in Malawi. However, by the time the local research team was prepared to continue the study after re-training, COVID-19 cases were surging in Malawi. A week after the team was dispatched to the field, I decided to cancel the plan for further in-person surveys.
[12] Traditional leaders recruited for surveys include *de facto* village headmen and group village headmen. Village headmen oversee only one village, but group village headmen superintend several of them (see Chapter 2 for descriptions of traditional leaders' rank titles, such as village headmen and group village headmen). To embrace the variation in the number of villages under the recruited leaders, I use the term jurisdiction instead of a village.

surveys with traditional leaders, ruling families, and secretaries. Second, the chapter introduces the methodological approach, the mode of original surveys, and the selection of study sites within the country in detail, alongside methodological contributions and limitations.

Chapter 3 starts by challenging the myth of uncontested traditional leadership and engaging with the selectorate theory. By using interviews and surveys, the chapter shows that ruling families can be viewed as the selectorate, the polity that can take part in choosing a leader, and argues that leaders may place the needs of ruling families before that of the public. Then, I suggest a modified version of the selectorate theory accounting for the following contextual facts: 1) ruling families desire not only private goods but also local public goods, as the receipt of private goods does not compensate for the lack of basic infrastructure so long as they reside in a rural village, and 2) competitive challenge is not institutionalized nor established as a norm in the traditional institution.

I hypothesize that competitive challenges can bring divergent effects over different types of goods and services by activating leaders' political survival mindset while a mere presence of potential competitors does not have such impacts. That is, the presence of competitive challenges is associated with the higher likelihood of favoritism for the ruling family at the expense of average villagers in light of customary court rulings, and distribution of three major government social protection programs (i.e., farm input subsidies, cash transfers, and temporary employment opportunities). On the other hand, the existence of competitive challenges is related to a safer community, more clean water sources, and better conditions of feeder roads. The hypotheses in this chapter also juxtapose the implication of actual competitive challenges and the number of potential competitors, emphasizing the importance of the former over the latter. Lastly, the chapter concludes after presenting how two aspects of competition (i.e., competitive challenges and the presence of potential competitors) are measured.

Both Chapter 4 and 5 begin by describing four private goods/services and four local public goods/services selected for empirical tests, respectively, and show observational data analysis results, using original surveys with traditional leaders, ruling families, and secretaries. In the first half, the chapters present variations on the distribution of private goods and local public goods provision to substantiate the validity of outcomes under investigation. I show that the goods and services for hypotheses testing satisfy the exclusionary condition for private goods and non-exclusionary condition for local public goods, have high impacts on local people's wellbeing, and are subject to traditional leaders' authority except for a placebo case.

The second half of Chapters 4 and 5 report empirical models and findings and discuss interpretations of the test results. The empirical evidence from the distribution of private goods shows that the judicial system in the traditional institution and the beneficiary selection of the cash transfer program for the poor are more likely to be partial for a ruling family member in jurisdictions where competitive challenges arise. That is, customary courts are more likely to rule in favor of a ruling family member than a regular villager, and the chances of a ruling family member being selected as a recipient for the cash transfer program vis-à-vis a regular villager become higher in jurisdictions governed by a traditional leader who experienced a competitive challenge than in other jurisdictions. For local public goods, traditional leaders who maintained their position through competitive challenge outperformed in the provision of roads compared to leaders who have not faced a competitive challenge; yet, those same traditional leaders comparatively underperform in terms of security and the supply of electricity. I conclude the chapter by discussing potential explanations for the mixed results.

Chapter 6 discusses the dissertation's findings regarding the impacts of competition in relation to the previous research that offers optimistic and pessimistic perspectives on strong

traditional leadership. I conclude by discussing the implication of this dissertation for traditional leaders, the relations between formal and informal institutions, and accountability in non-democratic settings both in Malawi and beyond.

Chapter 2

Introduction to Traditional Leaders and Malawi

1. Introduction

Although both scholars and local communities have recognized traditional leaders as capable of exerting a significant influence on the welfare of villagers in contemporary Africa (Walsh et al. 2018), political scientists historically have paid little attention to traditional chiefs. However, their interest in the chiefs has grown over the last two decades. Logan shows that the general public finds traditional leaders more trustworthy than elected officials (Logan 2009). She demonstrates the public's belief that the authority of these figures should increase rather than decrease. Moreover, survey respondents who reported that traditional leaders exert a great influence on their community were also more likely to support the expansion of this role (Logan 2013). Traditional chiefs are still an emerging subject, and the field of traditional leaders' service delivery and political accountability, in particular, is in its early stages. Furthermore, the extent to which these figures positively or negatively impact the local community remains contentious.

This chapter serves two purposes. First, I define traditional leaders and examine divergent appraisals of this role in the scholarly literature. Scholars who view traditional roles and institutions as the heritage of pre-colonial societies tend to focus on the positive influence of traditional leaders on their local community. In contrast, others who understand traditional chieftaincy as a colonial invention tend to stress their negative impacts. Then, I also provide divergent evaluations of traditional chiefs' legacy and their contemporary impacts in present-day Africa. Second, this chapter lays the groundwork for subsequent chapters by introducing how the original survey data used in this dissertation was collected. This study begins by providing

information about traditional leaders in Malawi. It then discusses the selection criteria for study sites within the country, the methodological challenges, and the specifics of the data collection. I collected 684 traditional leader surveys (round 1), 658 traditional leader surveys (round 2), 680 ruling family surveys, and 669 secretary surveys. Specifics about the data collection, including the mode of surveys, target subjects, inclusion and exclusion criteria, and logistics, are also described.

2. The Conceptualization and Varied Views on Traditional leaders

2.1. Traditional Leaders in Pre-colonial, Colonial, and Post-colonial Period

While various definitions of traditional leaders exist in the relevant literature, this dissertation employs the definition from Baldwin (2015). She defines traditional leaders as "rulers who have power by virtue of their association with the customary mode of governing a place-based community (p.21)"; as such, Baldwin emphasizes the leaders' association with local customs and the governance of communities. This definition, which does not make a connection to pre-colonial roots, accounts for the fact that many scholars do not consider contemporary traditional leaders to be "traditional" as their roles have been invented and reinvented through the colonial and post-colonial period. Scholars who view the traditional institution as the heritage of pre-colonial societies tend to focus on the positive aspects of traditional leaders to their local community, whereas others who understand traditional chieftaincy as a colonial invention tend to stress their negative impacts.

The origin of the traditional institution traces back to the pre-colonial era. Although few African societies have their own written sources on their pre-colonial history due to oral traditions, the few studies about pre-colonial Africa available, occasional accounts written by early European visitors or explorers, and the oral traditions of local people inform us that the traditional institutions

precede colonialization (Baker and Phiri 2000). The specific powers traditional leaders in pre-colonial Africa wielded varied widely with divergent reports about the leaders' authority over conflict management, sanctioning powers to enforce their decisions, and collection of tributes, tolls, and taxes (Baldwin 2015, 27). On one side of the spectrum, there were traditional leaders with few specific duties and no privileges, such as !Kung, a stateless subgroup of the San, who live mostly in northern Namibia, southern Angola, and Botswana (Vaughan 1986). Traditional leaders on the other side of the spectrum, such as the Tswana chief, were described as "a ruler, judge, maker and guardian of law, repository of wealth, dispenser of gifts, leader in war, priest and magician of the people (Schapera 1994)." Regardless of how much power was concentrated around chieftaincies, the most valued function of traditional authorities was resolving disputes (Baldwin 2015, 27). People gave customary tributes and gifts to chiefs in return as "an outcome of a negotiated process at the local level" (Beall, Mkhize, and Vawda 2005). The subjects who constantly requested chiefs' help to solve problems attest to the legitimacy of the leaders (Meneses 2006). Likewise, traditional leaders in Malawi were revered and respected for providing social order and discipline, allocating lands, resolving disputes surrounding the issue, and overseeing religious affairs (Chiweza 2007; Mair 1952).

With the hereditary nature of most traditional authority, 75% of indigenous African societies did not have institutionalized methods for removing chiefs who performed poorly (Baldwin 2016). However, anthropologists and other observers' descriptions of traditional leaders paint them as figures who were far from despots (e.g., Bourdillon 1976). Some traditional chiefs had councils with which they consulted prior to making decisions and shared responsibility, and popular inputs into decision-making processes were also observed, albeit rare (Murdock 1959; 1967). Subjects of the leaders were able to express dissenting opinions by refusing to provide

customary tribute, gossiping about or ridiculing the leader (Baldwin 2015, 28), or making leaders discharge their duties in the scarce case of the abuse of power (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes 1940; Moto 1998; Owusu 1986; 1989). Moreover, traditional leaders had incentives to govern well as they were often socially and economically embedded in their communities, and impoverished subjects could not materially support themselves or their leaders (Baldwin 2015, 26).

Other scholars criticize that line of scholarship for romanticizing the undemocratic hereditary rule and, instead, argue that traditional institutions are a colonial artifact through a system of indirect rule (Lugard 1922; Mamdani 1996; Meneses 2006). The colonial state dismantled pre-colonial hierarchies where traditional rulers were viewed as too powerful, whereas they imposed hierarchy in decentralized societies even if no such authority structure had existed previously (Baldwin 2015, 30). As traditional institutions became subordinated to the colonial administration, traditional practices concerning appointments were compromised. The colonial government gave the authority to appoint traditional leaders to local colonial government (Baker 1975). The local government did not necessarily appoint a family member of original heritage as a traditional leader but rather selected those who collaborated with the government (Hailey 1950, 26). As government aides, traditional leaders were in charge of the collection of the hut tax, the maintenance of law and order, the reporting of village deaths, the construction of roads, the communication with the rural population, and other such functions as demanded by the government (Chiweza 2007, 56). Through this transition, the chief's source of livelihood shifted from customary tribute and gifts to tax revenue (Chiweza 2007).

The post-colonial government's relationship with traditional institutions considerably resembles that of the colonial government (Eggen 2011). After independence, the powers of chiefs decreased everywhere (Boone 2014; Posner 2005; Rathbone 2000), but they resurged in many

countries during the past twenty years (Baldwin 2016; Chiweza 2007; West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999). The government continued to use traditional leaders as intermediaries for its own purposes. While chiefs' control over formal tax revenue was almost uniformly curtailed, their power to allocate land and resolve conflict remained in many countries (Baldwin 2015, 33). After independence in 1964, the Malawian government tasked traditional institutions with the maintenance of law and order, allocation of land tenure, administration of justice through traditional courts, mobilization of community labor, and communication with the rural population on behalf of the government, informal involvement in garnering votes for the ruling parties, and quelling any protests and riots (Chiweza 2007). Thus, the post-colonial government's approach toward traditional institutions closely resembles the colonial experience.

The "administrative chiefs," designated as the intermediaries for the colonial or post-colonial state, were no longer exclusively responsive to local imperatives and have become alienated from local communities and upwardly accountable (Mamdani 1996; Meneses 2006; Lugard 1922).[13] This line of scholarship characterizes traditional leaders as the antithesis of democracy (Beall 2005; Mamdani 1996; Ntsebeza 2008; Ribot 2002) and local development (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002; Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 2014; Robinson and Parsons 2006).[14] Traditional institutions run counter to democratic ideals because members of a ruling family often appoint chiefs, the position is hereditary and for life, and the relationship between traditional leaders and villagers is hierarchical (Beall, Mkhize, and Vawda 2005). Ntsebeza (2008) finds that present-day traditional leaders in South Africa exhibit the same

[13] However, other scholars advocate that colonial and post-colonial states imposed dual accountability pressure on chiefs - one from the state and the other from local subjects – instead of completely severing their ties to villagers (Akyeampong et al. 2014, 19), which accords with mixed accounts about contemporary traditional chiefs briefed in the next section.

[14] Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2003) and Robinson and Parsons (2006) argue that the presence of relatively constrained chiefs during the pre-colonial period was an important determinant of Botswana's subsequent development.

characteristics: unelected, unrepresentative, and unaccountable. Fanthorpe (2006) found that traditional leaders' corruption feeds youths' grievances in rural areas.

2.2. Varied Evaluations on Traditional Leaders in the Contemporary World

Historical disagreements extend into the scholarship on contemporary chiefs. On the one hand, scholars argue that traditional leaders are detrimental to public welfare. They characterize such leaders as representing the antithesis of democracy and local development. Acemoglu and his colleagues view chiefs in Sierra Leone to be extractive leaders who undermine property rights and exploit lands for their own benefits and find that constraints on the chief's authority lead to higher levels of economic development in their chiefdoms (Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 2014). When local leaders like traditional chiefs successfully garner votes for politicians in competitive constituencies in Uganda, constituencies' expenditures dissipate because the government turns a blind eye to the embezzlement in exchange for votes (Carlson 2020). Evidence from South Africa shows significantly high vote shares for the ruling party in places where chiefs maintain authority *vis-à-vis* places where chiefs are absent and suggests degraded democratic accountability under the chiefs' influence (de Kadt and Larreguy 2018). All these studies point to the fact that constraints on traditional leaders' authority are beneficial to the public.

Other studies suggest that traditional leaders promote the interests of local communities, predicated on the assumption that leaders and the rest of their community are founded on reciprocal relationships (Kaler and Watkins 2001; Swidler and Watkins 2007; Chabal 2009). Securing leaders' own prosperity translates into bringing development to the entire community, as they are locally "embedded" (Baldwin 2016; Swidler 2013; Pitcher 2002; Schultz, Wibbels, and Huntington 2015). These advocates of traditional leadership believe that the presence of and/or the expansion of the

leaders' authority contributes to the development of their locality. Higher levels of political centralization around chiefdoms in pre-colonial African societies are associated with higher regional development in the present day (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2013; 2015) and fewer events of land confiscation by the state (Honig 2015). Traditional leaders in areas where pre-colonial governance institutions were left intact by colonizers protect their communities from the expropriation of communal land by organizing collective action, whereas such concerted efforts do not exist in areas where colonial rule abolished traditional institutions (Honig 2015). Acephalous chiefdoms following the recent deaths of chiefs in the office are also correlated with the low provision of local public goods, while vacant MP positions do not have the same effect (Baldwin 2018). In exchange for bringing votes to politicians, traditional leaders deliver materials to their communities as their strength as a leader rests on the delivery of material goods (Koter 2013). In war-torn Somalia, local reconciliation was achieved in regions where traditional institutions were recognized and assisted rather than marginalized (Menkhaus 1996).

The limitation of both arguments is that they view traditional leaders as either extracting resources from the local community in service of their own benefit or as more accessible grassroots leaders. A third argument suggests that chiefs inhabit an ambiguous position as they are in a tight spot where the state pressures leaders to deliver subjects to the government while subjects simultaneously pressure them to improve their livelihood (Krämer 2016; Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1987; von Trotha 1996). This dissertation starts by acknowledging the lack of consensus in the existing literature and attempts to understand the conditions in which traditional chiefs promote public welfare when they are not exclusively accountable to their subject.

3. Traditional Leaders in Malawi

Located in Southern Africa, Malawi is a small land-locked country with a landmass of 94,080 square kilometers and a population of 21,196,629 (estimated in July 2020). Malawi is one of the world's poorest countries, with a $412 GDP per capita (current US$) in 2019.[15] About 50% of the population lives below the poverty line,[16] and 37% of children under five years old suffer from chronic malnutrition (Fink et al. 2014). The supply of public goods and services is severely low. Only 0.036 physicians (estimate from 2018)[17] and 1.3 hospital beds (estimate from 2011) are available per 1,000 people,[18] and only 54% of each cohort persist to the last grade of primary school (estimated in 2013).[19] Considering extreme poverty, resource distribution and the public goods provision have significant importance in people's lives.

Malawi gained its full independence from the United Kingdom in 1964 and started as a one-party state which lasted until 1993, when a multi-party system was adopted. They established a republic with executive, legislative, and judiciary branches. Currently, the executive branch includes the president, the vice president, and cabinet members. The president and vice president are elected together as a running mate, but the president may appoint a second vice president from a different political party. Although the 1994 Malawian constitution provides for a senate of 80 seats representing traditional leaders and special interest groups (e.g., women, youth, and the disabled) (Power 2020), Parliament repealed it, and the country has had a unicameral National Assembly of 193 members in practice. [20] Presidential and parliamentary elections are held

[15] This figure leaves the country ranked 206th out of 208 countries whose GDP per capita data is available for the year 2019 (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?most_recent_value_desc=false).
[16] International Monetary Fund. 2017. "Malawi: Economic Development Document." IMF Staff Country Reports 17 (184): 1.
[17] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.PHYS.ZS
[18] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.MED.BEDS.ZS?locations=MW&view=chart
[19] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.PRSL.ZS
[20] Malawi 1994 (rev. 1999). Constitute. (https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Malawi_1999?lang=en)

concurrently every five years, and both elections follow the plurality rule (first-past-the-post).[21] The current president Lazarus Chakwera is affiliated with Malawi Congress Party (MCP). MCP led the country to independence and was the only legal party during the twenty-nine years of one-party rule. Nevertheless, the party has not taken control of the state after the multi-party system was introduced until the current President Chakwera led the party to a victory in the 2020 election.

Malawi is an excellent case to study the impacts that traditional leaders have within their local community; their influence in rural communities has been ever-present. The state – both colonial and post-colonial - has incorporated traditional leaders in governing rural Malawi, as they found it difficult to collect taxes and govern the local population without support from the leaders (see (Baker 1975) on the colonial rule and (Chiweza 2007)] on the post-colonial rule). The *Native Authorities Ordinance of 1912*, drafted during the British colonial regime, and the *Chiefs Act* of 1967, enacted during the post-colonial Hastings Banda's regime, codify chiefs' roles in preserving the public peace, carrying out traditional functions under the customary law, and assisting local government's tax collection and administration. The colonial regime endowed considerable authority to traditional leaders (Chiweza 2007). While the ruling party operatives during the one-party regime usurped traditional leaders to some degree (Hussein and Muriaas 2013), local leaders remained influential (Dionne 2017) and strengthened their influence in rural areas after the multi-party transition (Chiweza 2007).

Traditional leaders in rural areas are trusted information sources, organizers, mobilizers, and gatekeepers to the rural population (Dionne 2017). Equipped with specialized local knowledge and information, the Malawian government relied on traditional chiefs to carry out census surveys and national identity registration (Eggen 2011) and choose beneficiaries for farm input subsidy

[21] Malawi: Electoral System: *African Democracy Encyclopaedia Project.* (eisa.org/wep/mal4.htm)

programs (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020). Traditional leaders in my interviews reported that they mobilize villagers to "mold bricks" and "dig holes" in order to attract government and NGOs' attention,[22] which is important in a context where government resources are scarce (Baldwin 2016; Swidler 2013). Lastly, as gatekeepers, the leaders oversee every event in their village. Multiple articles (Makuwira 2004; Posner 2004), testimonials from NGO workers, and my personal experience working in an NGO and implementing a research project affirm that traditional leaders grant or deny external actors' access to their village and no projects can take place without permission from the leaders. Their control also extends to local development committees, which are supposed to be independent of local elites' influence. Some of these meetings are held in the presence of the leaders or village representatives related to the leader (Chiweza 2010). With about 82% of people in the country living in rural or semi-rural areas, most of the population in the country lives under the administration of traditional leaders who provide leadership in a venue devoid of governmental control.

[22] Interview 021, Kasungu; Interview 024, Chikwawa; Interview 031, Dowa.



Figure 2.1 Traditional Hierarchy

The traditional institution in Malawi has a hierarchical structure with multiple layers of leadership headed by paramount chiefs, who preside over senior chiefs, then chiefs, sub-chiefs, group village headmen, and finally village headmen (see **Error! Reference source not found.**).[23][24] While a village headman (VH) oversees only one village, a group village headman (GVH) manages a cluster of villages. Should there be a message from a highly ranked traditional leader, GVHs deliver the message to VHs under their supervision. As highly stratified as the chain of

[23] According to official records in 2009, the traditional hierarchy of Malawi was composed of 7 paramount chiefs, 28 senior chiefs, 173 chiefs, 61 sub-chiefs, 3,286 GVHs, and 22,724 VHs (Hussein and Muriaas 2013, 157). The number of traditional leaders has grown since then. As of 2019, there were seven paramount chiefs, 77 senior chiefs, 164 chiefs, and 80 sub-chiefs, while the exact numbers of GVHs and VHs are unknown (data obtained from the Chief's office in the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development). Regarding the expansion of traditional leaders, Hussein and Muriaas (2013) state that "the increase in numbers implies the recognition of the important role chiefs play in governance, yet…, the increase in numbers of chiefs may also be politically motivated."

[24] Other countries in Africa like Zambia and Ghana have similar hierarchical traditional structure (Baldwin 2016; Nathan 2019).

command may seem, the interviews I conducted with traditional leaders provide evidence that a meaningful distinction can be found only between the four ranks from the top (i.e., paramount chiefs, senior chiefs, chiefs, and sub-chiefs) and the rest (i.e., GVHs and VHs).[25] So far, this dissertation introduced the term Traditional Authority (TA) as a place-based community, but it also technically refers to a specific rank in the traditional hierarchy in Malawi (i.e., Chiefs), which is in practice used to encompass paramount chiefs, senior chiefs, and sub-chiefs as well as chiefs. To avoid confusion, this dissertation refrains from using the term TA to refer to a specific rank in the traditional hierarchy. Instead, I denote any of the four highest-ranking positions as a *high-rank*, and GVH and VH as a *low-rank* or a *village-level leader*.

While the Malawian government has information about all high-rank leaders, they do not have data on all low-rank leaders. The *Chiefs Act of 1967* endows the president with authority to appoint and remove high-ranking chiefs. Both the central and local governments have a directory of the high-rank leaders with their basic demographic information and contact numbers. All the high-rank participate in district council meetings as ex-officio members and receive monthly salaries (*mswahala*) from the government. On the other hand, the *Chiefs Act* delegates the authority to appoint and remove village-level chiefs – GVHs and VHs - to the high-rank (Patel, Tambulasi, and Molande 2007), where the high-level leaders consult with the ruling family of the position for appointment or removal (Dionne 2017). While some GVHs and VHs are gazetted in the government registrar and receive monthly salaries,[26] others remain as informal leaders without the

[25] The hierarchical relations among the top four play a role in cultural ceremonies of ethnic groups but not in everyday governance. Most GVHs and VHs do not interact with senior chiefs or paramount chiefs unless they live in the nearby neighborhood. Some traditional leaders interviewed even mentioned that they do not know who their senior chiefs and paramount chiefs are (interview 025, Kasungu).

[26] The monthly salaries for traditional leaders in each rank are like the following: 50,000 Malawian Kwacha (MWK)/ 60.98 US dollars (USD) for a paramount chief, MWK 30,000/USD 36.59 for a senior chief, MWK 18,000/USD 21.95 for a chief, MWK 5,000/USD 6.10 for a GVH, and lastly MWK 1,000/ USD 1.22 for a VH. The exchange rate applied here and out is 1:820 for USD to MWK based on the rate as of December 10, 2021.

official recognition by the government and are left not captured under the radar of the state.[27] The Malawian government is expanding its effort to integrate the informal leaders into the formal institution, but there are no comprehensive records of the low-ranking leaders.

This study focuses on registered low-ranking leaders, and it is worth mentioning why the distinction between registered and unregistered leaders is important. From the viewpoint of the government, the unregistered leaders are under the umbrella of the registered leaders. About 95% of traditional leaders from my original survey data testified that government officials contact only the registered leaders regarding resource distributions (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). I nterviewees also reported that the registered administer the flow of resources to villages under the unregistered. Furthermore, the registered leaders might form better ties with government officials as they meet them more frequently relative to the unregistered leaders. To relieve the concern for the systematic differences between the two types of village-level leaders, this dissertation focuses on the registered.[28]

[27] Due to budget restrictions and the expansion of traditional leadership, not all traditional leaders are enrolled in the government system.
[28] Furthermore, obtaining the list of unregistered-traditional leaders is deemed logistically infeasible.



Figure 2.2 Leaders Contacted by Government

Note: Survey of Traditional Leaders Round 1 (2020-2021). N= 678. The survey question used for this figure is "when the government collects information from or distributes resources to villages, do they contact registered traditional leaders and have them reach out to other unregistered traditional leaders?" and the response options are "1. Yes, the government contacts only registered traditional leaders, 2. No the government contacts both registered and unregistered traditional leaders, 3. No, the government contacts neither registered nor unregistered traditional leaders."

The study of village-level leaders offers significant contributions in terms of data originality and policy implications. Extant studies about rivalry (or cooperation, as the other side of the same coin) surrounding traditional leadership examined leaders at higher levels (e.g., Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 2014; Baldwin 2018; Baldwin and Mvukiyehe 2015; Clayton, Noveck, and Levi 2015), but systematic data collection from low-level traditional leaders is non-existent to the knowledge of this author. Furthermore, my interviews with traditional leaders –

from paramount chiefs to village headmen – demonstrate that the lifestyle of village-level leaders is more likely to resemble that of villagers, and their economic activity is more deeply intertwined with local economic activities compared to that of the topmost leaders. Many high-rank leaders have significantly larger residences than average villagers, own several vehicles, and possess the types of electronics (e.g., computers and televisions) that are rare commodities in rural Malawi. This lifestyle is a stark contrast to the living conditions of low-rank leaders and villagers.[29] Furthermore, in providing information about their jurisdiction, the high-rank leaders were at times unable to provide figures about their jurisdiction, unlike the swift responses of the lower-ranked who were aware of events in their communities. As the leadership of low-rank leaders might have more noteworthy impacts on villagers' welfare than that of high-rank leaders, researching them could also have significant policy implications.

4. Selection of Study Sites for Surveys

Malawi has twenty-eight districts in three regions, six districts in the north, nine in the center, and thirteen in the south. Instead of collecting nationally representative data, I conducted surveys in one district due to logistical complications and budgetary restrictions.[30] Besides the realistic concerns, sampling from a relatively small area entails a statistical advantage: respondents from the same area might share many socioeconomic and political similarities relative to respondents sampled from dispersed areas, allowing me to have a shorter list of control variables and a higher degree of freedom given the sample size.

[29] Most low-rank traditional leaders had three out of six items (i.e., radio, television, motor vehicle/motorcycle, computer, bank account, and mobile phone) in the survey module to measure assets. Most of the leaders possessed a radio, a mobile phone, and a bank account but no television, motor vehicle, or computer.

[30] I could have collected a nationally representative sample with telephone calls as the medium of surveys. Yet, the decision about study sites was made in consideration of face-to-face surveys in the future without anticipating that the COVID-19 pandemic would hamper carrying out in-person surveys.



Figure 2.3 Survey Sites

Note: The map displays the locations of surveys. The left panel highlights the Kasungu district in a darker grey color on a map of Malawi, and the right panel shows ten TAs for surveys on a map of the Kasungu district. The boundaries in the map on the right are supposed to display TA demarcations, but they are not up-to-date because the boundaries of recently created TAs are not reflected on the map. The discrepancy prevents even someone conversant with Malawi from guessing the identity of interviewees and allows the interviewees to remain anonymous.

Out of many districts, I selected the Kasungu district in the central region as the study area. A date in the late 16th or early 17th century has been suggested for the bulk of the Chewa migrations into the Kasungu district, and political life around traditions began after the arrival of the ruling families of Chulu, Lukwa, and Kaomba in the Kasungu district (Baker and Phiri 2000, 126). The district is chosen for the following reasons.[31] First, Kasungu has the second-largest landmass as a district in the country and has a large population (842,953 people, 2018 census), which makes the

[31] The Kasungu district is not representative of other districts in Malawi. For instance, the ethnic composition in the country is 34% Chewa, which constitutes a plurality of the population, followed by Lhomwe (19%), Yao (13%), Ngoni (10), and Tumbuka (9%). However, there is no significant Lhomwe population in the Kasungu district, and the three main ethnic groups in the district are Chewa, Ngoni, and Tumbuka.

district have the second-largest number of TAs after the capital city Lilongwe. This also indicates the existence of a larger number of GVHs and VHs in comparison to other districts and consequently a larger pool of potential survey participants. Additionally, traditional leaders and public officials in the district office were accommodating of my research during the preliminary stages when I conducted interviews with traditional leaders in 2019. Table 2.1 shows that the Kasungu district has a larger land and a higher population than other districts. Also, a lower percentage of households in the district have refrigerators, televisions, and computers or tablets, but more radios and mobile phones than households in other districts.

	Kasungu	**Average of Other Districts**
Land (sq.km)	8017	3189.33
Population	842,953	540,923.30
Refrigerator (% of household)	2.4	3.66
Radio (% of household)	32.7	31.79
Television (% of household)	7.3	8.92
Mobile Phone (% of household)	53	50.22
Computer/Tablet (% of household)	2.2	2.53

Table 2.1 Information about Kasungu and Other Districts

Note: The data comes from "2018 Malawi Population and Housing Census Main Report" *National Statistical Office*. May 2019. (http://www.nsomalawi.mw/images/stories/data_on_line/demography/census_2018/2018%20Malawi%20Population%20and%20Housing%20Census%20Main%20Report.pdf). I took the mean of 28 districts, excluding four city administrations (Mzuzu city, Lilongwe city, Blantyre city, and Zomba city). Counting the cities in with other districts significantly increases the percentage of households with the household items.

A second-tier administration unit below a district is a TA, which is governed by a high-ranking traditional chief. Out of thirty TA jurisdictions in the Kasungu district, I selected ten TAs as study sites for a convenience sample (see Table 2.2). I initially selected three TAs (Kaomba, Lukwa, and Mwase) and then expanded the study to seven other TAs to increase the sample size. The proximity to the town, the population, and the presence of a living TA dictated the choice of

study sites. The average population of the selected TAs is 67,265, which is higher than the population of average TAs in the Kasungu district (58,605) or in the country (56,257).[32] Besides these three selection criteria, chosen study sites also share commonalities of having Chewas as the majority ethnic group[33] and electing Malawi Congress Party (MCP) candidates for Members of Parliament (MP) and ward councilor positions in the 2019 general elections.

To ensure a sufficient number of the target population to pool the sample from, I selected these TAs based on their population because the number of village-level leaders is commensurate with the size of the population. I excluded secluded TA areas for successful telephone surveys as the town, and nearby areas have better cellphone reception. I did not sample jurisdictions without a living TA because the vacuum of high-level traditional leadership affects the provision of local public goods (Baldwin 2018), and it might also affect the influx of private goods.[34] Table 2.2 shows that the selected TAs have a larger population, land, and a higher percentage of forest area than the rest of the TAs in the district. However, the two groups have a similar percentage of people without access to a borehole and a comparable number of police units.

[32] In Malawi, the smallest TA is TA Simdemba in the Kasungu district with a population of 2,249, and the largest TA is TA Kalolo in the Lilongwe district with a population of 177,087 (2018 census).
[33] The Chewa people are mainly based in the west, central, south, and east of the district, while the Ngonis and Tumbukas are mostly found in the north and northeast (Kasungu District Council: Socio Economic Profile 2017-2022).
[34] TA Kaluluma passed away at the age of ninety-four after a long battle with heart failure and high blood pressure. It was a few weeks after the data collection was initiated in the jurisdiction, and survey enumerators reported having difficulties in soliciting participation for surveys after the death of the TA.

TA	Population	Land Size	Population w/o Borehole (%)	Forest Area (%)	No. Police Units
Study Area					
Group-mean	67265	109.75	48.80	0.49	1.00
Chilowamatambe	45170	76	29.71	0.71	0
Kaluluma	52620	93	84.34	0.20	2
Kaomba	127530	133	63.73	0.07	1
Kawamba	36020	71	36.15	0.23	1
Lukwa	79515	N/A	61.33	N/A	1
Mnyanja	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0
Mwase	80985	127	63.26	0.43	1
Njombwa	54755	125	16.45	0.53	1
Simlemba	68570	118	63.91	1.62	1
Wimbe	60220	135	20.29	0.13	2
Not Study Area					
Group-mean	51496.25	88.50	41.98	0.22	0.83
Chidzuma	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0
Chisemphere	52620	N/A	89.60	N/A	1
Chisikwa	N/A	69	N/A	N/A	1
Chulu	55835	116	18.06	N/A	1
Kapelula	25635	113	4.43	0.34	1
Santhe	71895	56	55.84	0.11	1

Table 2.2 Information about TAs (Not) Selected for Study

Note: "Kasungu District Council: Socio Economic Profile 2017-2022" (p.45, 53-54, 103, 132).

5. Methodological Challenges for Quantitative Analyses and Data Collection

It is worth noting some of the methodological challenges that I faced in the collection and analysis of quantitative data used in this dissertation project. The first and foremost problem was the lack of large-N data on village-level traditional leaders and resource provision and distribution in their jurisdictions. Although qualitative interviews brought my attention to competitive challenges for theory building, I needed data that would allow me to make some degree of generalizations for my theory. Some official Malawian statistics (e.g., beneficiaries of the farm input subsidies and geocoordinates of boreholes) and few studies of rural governance (e.g., Basurto, Dupas, and

Robinson 2017) have data on the distribution of resources at a level as low as individual villages.[35] Nevertheless, they lack information about the level of competition for traditional authority and degrees of nepotism which are key explanatory and dependent variables of this research, respectively.[36] Furthermore, as many present-day village-level leader posts have been created throughout the colonial and post-colonial rule, there is neither enough archival records nor media coverage about village-level traditional leadership and competitive challenges.

I thus designed original surveys to collect previously unavailable data and conducted telephone surveys. As the medium of phone survey imposes considerable restrictions on the number of questions and the length of surveys, I developed three separate questionnaires carefully discerning questions best answered by traditional leaders, other members of their ruling families, and secretaries. Relatively high cognitive burdens and distractions accompanying telephone surveys led me to choose three short questionnaires instead of one long-form. The original plan involved conveying in-person surveys, which are standards for many barometer surveys in developing countries, but COVID-19 spread throughout the globe when my survey was about to launch. With ethical concerns about public health arising and restrictions on international travel imposed, I conducted most of the surveys via telephone calls, whereas a small proportion of surveys were conducted face-to-face in the second week of January 2021.[37]

[35] I obtained the list of beneficiaries of the Farm Input Subsidy Program from 2017 to 2019 with personal identification information. However, names are not a good indicator to approximate nepotism because even ethnic groups who practice matriliny for succession and inheritance take surnames from their paternal side. With most survey respondents in the study area coming from matrilineal ethnic groups, family names would mislead in identifying the inner-circle nepotism for a ruling family.

[36] The borehole administrative data provides geocoordinates but not names of villages where they are located in. Connecting leaders' characteristics and the provision of boreholes would, thus, require cartographic village boundary data, which is not available as off-the-shelf data.

[37] Until December 2020, countries in Africa – including Malawi – seemed to fare relatively well with respect to COVID-19, contrary to concerns from the international community. In workshops and conferences, scholars reported low death tolls in African countries in 2020 in comparison to previous years and attributed this to lockdown and reduced traffic accidents. Consistent with the scholarly findings, my local research team perceived that COVID-19 in Malawi was under control, and local communities were not severely affected by the virus. With COVID-19 vaccines on the horizon, I undertook a plan to convey in-person surveys to recruit the target population without cellphones or

Another rationale for three separate surveys was to obtain accurate information from cross-verification; a few important questions were cross-checked across different actors.[38] My interviews with traditional leaders insinuate that leaders might not be the best source of information for a question like a competition against their authority. They might underreport contestation, especially if it occurred. Some interviewees downplayed the challenges to their authority, saying that "there's no problem in my village" or "the challenge was nothing serious." For these kinds of sensitive questions, other members of ruling families, instead of leaders themselves, might be a more reliable source of information.[39] Additionally, some leaders could not elaborate on questions that required detailed information and turned to their secretaries. As secretaries keep records of matters in their jurisdiction, such as traditional court records and census books, they are good informants for accurate data. Secretaries are also more likely to provide objective and neutral answers concerning the provision of local public goods than leaders because they are not responsible for providing such goods. Furthermore, some evidence suggests that many secretaries are not beholden to their leaders. In the Secretary Survey, 32% of respondents reported that leaders cannot remove them from the position and 12% of them reported that they served not only their current leader but also their predecessor.

good cellphone reception and conduct survey experiments. I cleared the IRB amendment from both Vanderbilt and Malawi in November, re-trained enumerators with public health guidelines, and launched in-person surveys in the second week of January 2021. In the same week, COVID-19 cases surged, and two cabinet members died of COVID-19 while two other cabinet members contracted the virus. With the Malawian government's decision to shut down schools having come out at the end of the week, I canceled future in-person surveys and decided to conduct telephone surveys in seven other TAs in addition to the initial three TAs to expand the sample size.

[38] For instance, questions about competitive challenges and the number of households in a village were asked both in the traditional leader survey and ruling family survey.

[39] Ruling families would not have difficulties in recollecting events like competitive challenges. The events are rare but significant, and the family members are deeply involved in the discussion and arbitration surrounding traditional leadership.



Figure 2.4 (Un)Registered Mid- and Low-rank Traditional Leaders

Note: Grey-colored groups are recruited for surveys.

Any traditional leader in the study area who is *registered* in the government as a VH or GVH was subject to recruitment in this research. Some leaders are gazette, but not as the actual position in their community and, instead, as a rank below. For instance, some traditional leaders who are locally recognized as and serve the role of a GVH are registered as a VH and receive the monthly payment equivalent to the registered title (See **Error! Reference source not found.** for v isual aid).[40] Traditional leaders who are either registered as a GVH or a VH are recruited for the study. As each traditional leader – regardless of their rank in the traditional hierarchy - has only

[40] This inconsistency is attributable to financial burdens on the government and a burgeoning number of traditional leaders.

one secretary (locally known as *Mlembi* in Chichewa), the inclusion and exclusion criteria for secretaries remain the same as their leaders' criteria.[41] While there are multiple members in a ruling family for each traditional leader, unlike secretaries, only one of them is recruited for the study. I obtained a list of contact numbers of up to six members of the ruling family from surveys with traditional leaders and used a random number generator to select one member for recruitment. If the initial target did not answer a phone call, an enumerator moved on to the next person on the list.[42] Once connected to respondents, enumerators inquired about respondents' age to filter out minors (under 18) and seniors (over 65) who might have difficulties comprehending the survey.

As phonebooks for none of the target population - traditional leaders, ruling families, and secretaries – were readily available, I identified jurisdictions under registered traditional leaders and constructed a survey frame using the 2017-2019 Farm Input Subsidy Program beneficiary lists, which I obtained from my previous trip to the country.[43] The list of jurisdictions closely resembles the list of traditional leaders registered in the government because each traditional leader supervises a place-based community.[44] In other words, if there is a jurisdiction called Lukwa, there is also a traditional leader under the title of GVH/VH Lukwa. The three-year recipient lists allow me to identify 1,186 government-registered jurisdictions in the study area. With this tentative survey frame, my local research assistants in Malawi visited the office of the selected TAs to

[41] Many traditional leaders also have one messenger. These aides do not hold any official positions and are appointed by their traditional leader.
[42] If a given random number is three, an enumerator called the 3rd person on the list and moved on to the fourth person on the list in a case when the first attempt failed.
[43] I use the term jurisdiction because the registered place-based community on the list can be either a village or a cluster of several villages, depending on whether their traditional leader is registered as a VH or GVH.
[44] Traditional leaders are often called by their title, which is a combination of their rank and the name of their village. For instance, a traditional leader who governs village Lukwa is referred to as VH Lukwa, and a leader who supervises a group of villages called Mwase is referred to as GVH Mwase.

confirm the list of registered traditional leaders and collect contact numbers of the leaders in February 2020 for the first three TAs and December in the same year for the rest of the TAs.[45]

Armed with the contact numbers of target leaders, research assistants carried out phone surveys with traditional leaders as a first step and collected contact numbers of several members of their ruling families and secretaries from the leaders. Then, the team surveyed ruling families and secretaries. All surveys were carried out by Malawian enumerators residing in the capital city, Lilongwe. I recruited my local research team using my past research network.[46] Due to the university-wise ban on international travel for research purposes, I trained the team by assigning tasks (e.g., several rounds of mock surveys with hypothetical respondents based on pre-scripted scenarios), checking their training progress over emails, and holding one-to-two-hour sessions on Skype per week to share my feedback. Once none of the enumerators made repeated mistakes, the research team conducted pilot surveys with a few respondents outside of the study area and then proceeded with the study area. During the survey, enumerators used a pre-translated Chichewa instrument, which went through several rounds of translation and back-translation from English to Chichewa and Chichewa to English. The research team entered response answers into the online survey platform (initially Qualtrics, then Commcare), where survey instruments were pre-programmed. The survey platform gives a record of survey durations and allows me to point out false attempts with a too short period for completion if enumerators finish a survey without reaching out to respondents.

[45] For leaders who do not have their own mobile devices, the office of the TA provided me with contact numbers of target subjects' relatives or neighbors who can lend their phones to target subjects.
[46] I hired eight survey enumerators in total throughout the research period. I worked with all my enumerators in the past in an international NGO, and some of them assisted me in carrying out the preliminary research for this project.



Figure 2.5 Flow of the Study

My local research team completed 684 traditional leader surveys (round 1), 658 traditional leader surveys (round 2), 680 ruling family surveys, and 669 secretary surveys, most of which were via telephone calls (see **Error! Reference source not found.**). Typical surveys took 20 m inutes for the traditional leader survey, 20 minutes for the ruling family survey, and 30 minutes for the secretary survey. The surveys looked at objective and subjective indicators of the presence and the quality of local public goods, distribution of finite resources, number of potential heirs for traditional leadership, practices of customary rule, leaders' characteristics, and their personal priorities across varieties of services. Traditional leaders provided information on some dependent and control variables. Ruling family surveys filled in the data for key explanatory variables, and secretary surveys completed the dataset with the rest of the dependent and control variables. The unit of analysis is jurisdiction under each traditional leader, where three surveys combined provide complete information for the analysis. The large-N quantitative analyses presented in this dissertation rely on variations across villages in the ten selected TAs.

	Phone survey	In-person survey
Traditional Leader Survey (R1) (N = 684)	April 23 – May 20, 2020, January 20 – March 17, 2021 (N = 657)	January 11 – 16, 2021 (N = 27)
Traditional Leader Survey (R2) (N = 658)	January 20 – March 17, 2021 (N = 585)	January 11 – 16, 2021 (N = 73)
Ruling Family Survey (N = 680)	June 2 2020 – July 1, 2020, January 20 – March 17, 2021 (N = 652)	January 11 – 16, 2021 (N = 28)
Secretary Survey (N = 669)	September 24 – December 2, 2020, January 20 – March 20, 2021 (N = 634)	January 11 – 16, 2021 (N = 35)

Table 2.3 Survey Dates and Number of Observations

The overall survey response rates were 58% and 55% with traditional leaders for rounds 1 and 2, respectively, 57% with ruling families, and 56% with secretaries. The response rates also vary across TAs (see Chapter 2 Appendix). The general low response rates compared to in-person surveys are driven by poor coverage of cellphone towers. Once a target subject picked up a phone call, most of them agreed to participate and stayed on the line until the end of the survey.[47]

The idea behind pivoting to carry out in-person surveys was to recruit the target populations who were not reachable via phone and alleviate the concern about a non-representative sample within the study area. Although the in-person survey plan was halted after a week of data collection due to the rise of COVID-19 cases, the in-person survey data allowed me to compare the populations who were recruitable by the phone and those who were recruitable only by visits.

[47] There was only one traditional leader and one member of a ruling family whom enumerators successfully contacted but did not consent to participate in the study. Then, there was another where an enumerator could not complete the survey because the traditional leader had a hearing problem that was not related to the phone call quality.

Error! Reference source not found. reveals that there are no systematic differences b etween the two samples collected through the medium of telephone calls and in-person visits in most of the leaders' demographic variables, although some variables related to the size of jurisdictions and their demographic composition show statistically significant differences. The bivariate OLS results below show that traditional leaders who were recruited for in-person surveys stayed longer in their position and their jurisdictions tend to have a smaller population and smaller number of relatives but a higher number of ruling family members within the jurisdiction relative to the telephone survey group. Yet, an array of other demographic variables about leaders and their villages yields no statistically significant differences between the two samples.

	Dependent variable:					
	Female	Age	Matriliny	Education	Wealth	Year in power
In-person	0.09	0.46	0.01	-0.26	0.13	0.80**
	(0.11)	(0.30)	(0.02)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.32)
Constant	0.24***	3.73***	0.99***	2.93***	3.01***	2.44***
	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.01)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.15)
Observations	104	104	104	104	104	101
R^2	0.01	0.02	0.002	0.01	0.003	0.06
Adjusted R^2	-0.003	0.01	-0.01	-0.002	-0.01	0.05
Residual Std. Error	0.44 (df = 102)	1.24 (df = 102)	0.10 (df = 102)	1.19 (df = 102)	0.92 (df = 102)	1.32 (df = 99)
F Statistic	0.73 (df = 1; 102)	2.25 (df = 1; 102)	0.25 (df = 1; 102)	0.81 (df = 1; 102)	0.34 (df = 1; 102)	6.15** (df = 1; 99)

	Dependent variable:					
	First call enforced	Log(Num household)	Log(Num non-coethnic)	Log(Num relative)	Log(Num ruling fam)	GVH
In-person	-0.34	-0.74**	-0.38	-0.66**	0.37*	0.16
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.59)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.10)
Constant	3.28***	6.03***	2.15***	3.83***	1.85***	1.75***
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.29)	(0.18)	(0.10)	(0.05)
Observations	96	95	75	64	100	104
R^2	0.01	0.05	0.01	0.07	0.03	0.02
Adjusted R^2	0.001	0.04	-0.01	0.05	0.02	0.01
Residual Std. Error	1.21 (df = 94)	1.26 (df = 93)	2.21 (df = 73)	1.18 (df = 62)	0.90 (df = 98)	0.41 (df = 102)
F Statistic	1.13 (df = 1; 94)	5.20** (df = 1; 93)	0.43 (df = 1; 73)	4.39** (df = 1; 62)	2.87* (df = 1; 98)	2.43 (df = 1; 102)

Table 2.4 Comparison of In-person and Telephone Survey Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p<0.01. The sample of this analysis includes only respondents in TA Kaomba. Other TAs are not analyzed because face-to-face surveys were only conducted in TA Kaomba. Demographic variables about jurisdictions – the number of households, the number of non-coethnic households to traditional leaders, the number of households of the leaders' relatives, and the number of households of the leaders' ruling family – are logarithmized due to their skewness.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the concept of traditional leaders and their roles which were altered over time from pre- to post-colonial rule. It also presented positive and negative accounts about traditional chiefs that stemmed from dual accountability pressures – to the government and their subjects – and illuminated the glaring lack of consensus on the impacts traditional leaders have on local communities. The gap in the literature led me to the research question of under what circumstances traditional chiefs become more accountable to their general subjects.

Then, I situated readers into the Malawi case and provided justifications for selecting the Kasungu district in the country. I showed that Malawi is one of the best country cases for studying traditional leaders with significant policy implications. Lastly, I explained methodological challenges from the lack of data and COVID-19 and described the data collection process and survey data.

I highlighted the contribution of the original data collection. First, this study is the first to provide systematic quantitative data about village-level traditional leaders in sub-Saharan Africa. Second, this study pioneers a unique data collection method adapted to the world with COVID-19 by implementing three short surveys with relevant parties over telephone calls instead of conventional long face-to-face surveys. The survey data is used to describe traditional chieftaincy in the next chapter, presenting a theory of competition in traditional leadership and providing quantitative evidence in the empirical chapters.

Chapter 3

A Theory of Competition in Traditional Leadership

1. Introduction

Traditional institutions created in the pre-colonial era permeated rural Africa throughout the colonial and post-colonial eras. Their influence in rural areas persisted or continued to grow even after the arrival of multi-party elections. Chapter 2 showed that despite these stakes, there is insufficient understanding of the conditions under which traditional chiefs promote the welfare of villagers. This chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework to explain the divergent performance of traditional leaders, and it has two parts. The first part lays the ground for the theoretical framework by establishing the existence of political competition in the traditional institution and introducing the existing the selectorate theory, and the second part applies the theory with modifications to generate the theoretical expectations for this study.

This chapter starts by debunking the myth of uncontested traditional leadership and presenting evidence for the existence of competition over traditional leadership at different phases: at the time of leadership transition and during a leader's rule. After that, I briefly review existing studies about competition and its impact on public welfare and introduce the selectorate theory to apply it to the context of traditional leadership. Using original data from Malawi, this chapter shows that ruling families are the selectorate, the polity that can take part in choosing a leader by its definition and selects the leader at the time of succession and make decisions at the time of succession and the arrival of competitive challengers in the case of traditional leadership. I argue that ruling families' significance may incentivize leaders to buy the support of the ruling family to circumvent competition during their rule. However, accounting for the fact that competitive

challenge is not a norm in the traditional institution, I contend that traditional chiefs' political survival strategy to buy the selectorate's support takes shape only *after* – not before - a leader experienced a competitive challenger and transition into a political survival mode.

My applied selectorate theory argues that ruling families desire both private goods and local public goods in a resource-scarce setting, as the receipt of private goods does not compensate for the lack of basic infrastructure so long as they reside in a rural village. Thus, leaders endeavor to deliver both types of goods. However, due to divergent characteristics of private goods and local public goods, channeling private goods for the benefit of ruling family members comes at the cost of average villagers whilst such provision of local public goods benefits not only ruling family members but also average villagers. Then, I discuss the operationalization of the concept and measurements, laying the foundation for the empirical chapters that make up the remainder of this dissertation.

2. The Myth of Uncontested Traditional Leadership

2.1. Competition at the Time of Leadership Vacuum

Traditional leaders have power by virtue of their association with traditional customs, and most of them have inherited the position from family members. The hereditary nature of the position and customary rules about traditional leadership often led scholars to believe that traditional chieftaincy is a sphere devoid of competition, which caused previous studies on traditional leadership to pay insufficient attention to political competition around the position. On the other hand, some scholars have acknowledged that traditional leaders can be removed from office or reprimanded in principle while at the same time recognizing the rarity of such instances (Owusu 1989; Evans-Pritchard and Fortes 1940; Dionne 2017). The survey data that Basurto, Dupas, and

Robinson (2017) collected from traditional chiefs in Southern Malawi reveal that only 1 out of 105 traditional chiefs reported ever being suspended.

However, that most leaders stay in power should not suggest the absence of accountability pressure. Competitive challenges against traditional leaders emerge even if the attempts turn out to be unsuccessful in ousting the leader. The leaders may face varying degrees of competition that are not captured in their suspension or removal. The descriptive evidence in this section debunks any belief in the idea that the customary law rigidly dictates who the successor of traditional leadership will be and illustrates the fact that multiple candidacies do, in fact, appear for the hereditary position. The data further demonstrate that competitive challenges against traditional leaders (namely, by would-be challengers who are attempting to overthrow the leader) emerge more often than previous studies have suggested.

Traditional chieftaincy is believed to be devoid of competition due to its hereditary nature and customary rules of succession. The customary law about traditional leadership in Malawi dictates that the chieftaincy should be bequeathed from fathers to their sons in patrilineal communities and maternal uncles to their nephews in matrilineal communities (W. C. Chirwa 2014). "The first call rule" in customary law specifically gives the claim to the first son of the predecessor in patrilineal societies and the first nephew (i.e., the first son of the first sister) of the predecessor in matrilineal societies, respectively (Mitchell 1949).[48] According to my ruling family survey, 575 out of 611 respondents (94%) - whose leader inherited the position from his ancestors - reported that the first call rule exists for their chieftaincy.[49]

[48] Another account suggests that in patrilineal ethnic groups like Ngoni, the eldest son of a chief's wives succeeds traditional leadership (Gluckman, Mitchell and Barnes, 1949, 100).

[49] The survey question in verbatim was "Regarding the succession of the [title of traditional leader], is there a customary law about who receives the first call?" with "Yes/No" response options. This question was asked to ruling family members only if they answered in a preceding question that their traditional leader inherited the position.

Even if the first call rule does occur, divergent notions of the rule exist across different ruling families. **Error! Reference source not found.** demonstrates that 66% of ruling families in m atrilineal ethnic groups and 75% of patrilineal ethnic groups selected response option 1, denoting that their answers were consistent with scholars' previous observations about the first call rule. However, the figure also illuminates that the description of the first call rule is not congruent with the existing account in 36% of matrilineal ruling families and 25% of patrilineal ruling families.



Figure 3.1 First Call Rule

Note: Survey of Ruling Families (2020-2021). N= 491 (left panel) and N = 77 (right panel). The left and right panels show the responses for the following question from matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups, respectively: "Regarding [title of traditional leader], who receives the first call?" This question was only asked to ruling families who reported that their leader inherited the position and that the first call rule existed, which left 555 ruling families subject to this question. The response options for matrilineal ethnic groups were "1 = first son of the first sister of the traditional leader" and "2 = first son of any sister of the traditional leader." The options for patrilineal ethnic groups are "1 = first son of the first wife of the last traditional leader" and "2 = first son of any wife of the last traditional leader." Most responses in the "other" category in Panel A come from the report of "first son or daughter of the first sister of the traditional leader."

Furthermore, the first call rule functions more as a non-binding guideline for most ruling families. Only about 38% of ruling families reported that their own notion of the first call rule

is consistently enforced (Figure 3.2A). The absence of a strictly binding rule about the order of succession opens up an avenue for multiple candidacy and competition in the phase of succession. As a result, about half of the ruling families considered more than one candidate in the succession decision (Figure 3.2B).



Figure 3.2 Potentials of Competition

Note: Survey of Ruling Families (2020-2021). N= 611 (left panel) and N = 570 (right panel). The survey question for the left panel is "regarding [title of traditional leader], how strictly is the customary law about the succession enforced?" with the response options of "0 = first call rule does not exist, 1 = never enforced 2 = rarely enforced, 3 = sometimes enforced, 4 = often enforced, and 5 = always enforced." The survey question for the right panel is "How many people have they (=the selectorate in the ruling family) seriously considered for the [title of traditional leader] position except for the current traditional leader?" These questions were only asked to ruling family members who reported that their leader inherited the position, which left 613 ruling families subject to this question.

In multiple-candidacy, succession decisions in traditional leadership are made in consideration of the personal qualities of eligible candidates as well as their rank in succession lines by blood (Mitchell, 1949, 141). Interviewees most commonly mentioned being a "drunkard" as a reason for disqualification when asked why the first eligible person was not chosen. The

reason provided to explain why the current leader was chosen over other candidates includes the intrinsic right to the chieftaincy, such as "being a member of a ruling family" and "being the first eligible person." However, the ruling families also frequently cited personal qualities such as "having a good judgment/being wise" and "getting along with villagers well" (See Figure 3.3 for various other reasons) as a means of explaining the selection.



Figure 3.3 Reasons Considered for Leadership

Note: Survey of Ruling Families (2020-2021). The left panel shows the reasons why candidates besides the current leader were considered as a candidate, and the right panel presents the reasons why the current leader was selected over other candidates. The survey question for the left panel was "why were other candidates considered?" and for the right panel was "If there was more than one candidate considered, why was the current traditional leader chosen over other candidates?" Response choices were "1 = *first eligible person*, 2 = *member of the ruling family*, 3 = *older than other candidates*, 4 = more education than other candidates, 5 = worked in a government, 6 = hard-working/ self-disciplined, 7 = fair judgment/ wise, 8 = good at managing conflicts between villagers, 9 = gets along with villagers well, 10 = respects old people in the ruling family, 11 = lived in a village for long, 96 = Others, specify." Responses not italicized refer to acquired qualities. These questions were only asked to ruling families who reported that there were other candidates considered in the succession decision, which left 273 ruling families subject to these questions. Respondents were allowed to provide multiple answers.

2.2. Competition during a Leader's Rule

Multiple candidacies expose leaders to competition even after they are sworn in. During a leader's rule, some ruling family members, once viable candidates for power, might vigilantly await an opportunity to take over the leadership position. My survey data substantiates the contestation over the hereditary leaders' rule. 94 out of 677 (14%) ruling families reported that their leader faced a competitive challenge from a ruling family member after the leadership transition phase (Figure 3.4A). In 67 out of 94 (71%) of the cases, the contender overtly expressed their intent to take over the position (Figure 3.4B). For the remainder of the cases, ruling families explained that the challengers "defied the orders of the traditional leader (7 cases)", "shared their criticisms with the ruling family (8 cases)", or "shared their criticisms with villagers (15 cases)" in a multiple-select question. This observation aligns with the findings from other studies. Traditional leaders were dethroned by a movement led by members of ruling families (Owusu 1986; 1989) or were pressured to delegate their duties when they did not conduct them (Evans-Pritchard and Fortes 1940). As others in the line of succession can undermine the leaders' authority, they play an essential role in competitive challenges.



Figure 3.4 Competitive Challenges

Note: Survey of Ruling Families (2020-2021). N= 677 (left panel) and N = 94 (right panel). The exact wording of a survey question for Panel A was "After the current [title of the leader] was installed, have you noticed anybody in the ruling family expressing their willingness to take the [title of the leader] position while the traditional leader is alive?" with "Yes/No" responses. The survey question for Panel B in verbatim was "Thinking about the last incident, did this person explicitly say that the current [title of the leader] has to step down from the position?" with "Yes/No" responses. This question was only asked to ruling families who reported that there were competitive challengers for their traditional leader, which left 94 ruling families subject to the questions.

Competitive challenges against traditional leadership do not occur at high frequency, but some leaders face them more than once during their rule. Surveyed ruling family members reported that 32 percent (30 out of 94 cases) of leaders who faced an overthrow-attempt experienced such an incident more than once during a median tenure of thirteen years (see Figure 3.5). The frequency of cases challenging leadership varied from two (twenty cases), three (eight cases), and five (two cases).



Figure 3.5 Number of Competitive Challenges

Note: Survey of Ruling Families (2020-2021). N= 94. The survey question in verbatim was "After the current [title of traditional leader] was installed, how many of such incidents have you observed?" where "such incidents" refer to competitive challenges as this question came right after the question about competitive challengers (question used in Figure 3.4A). Respondents were asked to provide numeric values.

The rise of a competitive challenger who attempts to topple an incumbent might cause the replacement of a traditional leader or result in varying degrees of power concessions and resource distribution. The responses to the question in the ruling family survey, "Thinking about how the last incident which has been resolved, did the person who expressed his/her willingness to take the [title of traditional leader]'s position get anything from the leader?" attests to the varied consequences after political contestation. While most traditional leaders whose position was

contested remained in power,[50] about 35 percent of them (33 out of 94) made various concessions to the challenger (see Figure 3.6). Among them, five traditional leaders even relinquished some of their land and people to the contender, which indicates that competitive challenges can significantly undermine their authority. In other cases, leaders made various combinations of the following concessions to the challenger: sharing resources that leaders received from the government (9 cases) or collected from the village (6 cases); allowing the contender to attend official government meetings (2 cases); or appointing them as one of the judges of the customary court (7 cases). The fact that contestations undermine traditional leaders' authority incentivizes the leaders to prevent any further such events in the future.

[50] My Ruling Family Survey data presents the number of cases where their last traditional leader was thrown out due to a leadership dispute by the ruling family (one case) and the leader's crime and misconduct (four cases). Nonetheless, the figures related to the leadership challenge might underrepresent the actual frequency of competitive challenge-related leadership replacement cases, because the survey sample excludes traditional chieftaincies with an acting leader at the time of data collection. Since interim leaders perform at the time of leadership vacancy, the population excluded from the sample are likely to be the chieftaincies that lost the last traditional leader due to their deaths or resignations related to leadership disputes.



Figure 3.6 Concessions after Competitive Challenges

Note: Survey of Ruling Families (2020-2021). The survey question is "thinking about how the last incident which has been resolved, did the person who expressed his/her willingness to take the [title of traditional leader]'s position get anything from the leader?" Response options are "1 = some goods from the government, 2 = some goods from villages (e.g., levies from villagers), 3 = authority to attend government meetings, 4 = Authority in a traditional court, 5 = New title, 6 = Nothing" Respondents were allowed to provide multiple answers.

3. Beyond Competition and the Selectorate Theory

My theoretical framework departs from the dominant approach in the political economy literature on competition and performance for both elected and unelected leaders.[51] Many scholars have theorized that more political competition between parties and candidates for office enhances public interest (Arvate 2013; Barro 1973; Becker 1958; Downs 1957; Kosec et al. 2018; Stigler 1972; Wittman 1989). As political competition is analogous to market competition (Becker 1958; Stigler 1972; Wittman 1989), more intense political competition should curtail political rents and inefficiencies (Ashworth et al., n.d.; Becker 1958; Downs 1957; Stigler 1972; Polo 1998; Wittman 1989), corruption (Rose-Ackerman 1978), patronage (Geddes 1994), fiscal irresponsibility (Wibbels 2005), and parties' or leaders' abilities to exploit resources (Grzymala-Busse 2007; Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 2014).

Other scholars posit that competition might favor some people but not others. The electoral competition encourages political parties to cater to the needs of the informed (Grossman and Helpman 1996; Larcinese 2005),[52] the wealthy (Larcinese 2005), and ideologically aligned voters (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002).[53] A recent study from Mali shows evidence that political competition produces a net negative effect on the public goods provision by increasing

[51] Scholars have compared competitive democracies and less competitive non-democracies (Mesquita et al. 2003; Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Wintrobe 1998) and across constituencies or voting blocks within a democratic country (Ansolabehere and Snyder 2006; Ashworth et al., n.d.; Auerbach 2016b; Besley and Burgess 2002; Besley and Preston 2007; Besley, Persson, and Sturm 2005; Padovano and Ricciuti 2009). While non-democratic regimes seem to lack competition at first glance, a handful of studies have examined competition under autocratic regimes or institutions that do not hold elections, such as Indian slums and traditional leadership in Sierra Leone (Besley and Kudamatsu 2007; Auerbach 2016b; Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson 2014).

[52] Grossman and Helpman (1996) argue that electoral competition maximizes the welfare of the average voter if parties choose a platform that serves the general interest of the public and appeals to a well-informed electorate, but not if parties choose policies that cater to special interests and target less-informed voters.

[53] Some studies in the U.S. argue that electoral competition coupled with the victory of a left-wing party contributes to the redistribution for the poor, but not when right-wing party wins the election (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer 2002; Jennings 1979). The same result is not found in Latin American countries; right-wing regimes in Mexico and Chile demonstrate that electoral competition for low-income voters can give rise to distributive reforms regardless of the ideological leaning of a government (Fairfield and Garay 2017).

the inefficiency of legislative bargaining (Gottlieb and Kosec, n.d.). My theory is aligned with this latter argument that competition might bring positive derivatives to some people but not others.

To fully understand the ramifications of political competition, studies need to examine various outcomes. Recent studies in distributive politics acknowledged that an explanatory variable may have divergent effects across different countries and various outcome variables (Franck and Rainer 2012; Kramon and Posner 2013) and brought attention to a drawback of examining one distributive outcome (Kramon and Posner 2013).[54] Notably, some scholars have reconciled contrasting results by showing that these divergencies were underpinned by differences in the outcomes being examined. For example, some studies have focused on the distinction between attributable (i.e., high observability) and nonattributable goods (i.e., low observability) (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991; Mani and Mukand 2007; Harding and Stasavage 2014).[55] Lindberg (2010) emphasized the distinctions among pure public goods, impure public goods (club goods), and private goods.[56] In this stream of categorizing outcome variables, this dissertation focuses on the distinction between local public goods and private goods to uncover the implication of competition over leadership on the welfare of citizens.[57]

Illuminating the distinction between public vs. private goods, I apply the selectorate theory of Mesquita et al. (2003) to the context of hereditary traditional leadership. They define the

[54] In investigating ethnic favoritism in four outcome variables, Kramon and Posner (2013) found that a president's coethnics were better off in terms of infant survival in Benin, education in Kenya, education and infant survival in Malawi, and water and electricity in Zambia, but the coethnics were at a disadvantage with regards to education in Mali, education and infant survival in Senegal. Franck and Rainer (2012) showed greater ethnic favoritism with the existence of one dominant religion. They also found that countries with strong fiscal capacity exhibit high ethnic favoritism in education but not in infant mortality.

[55] They predicted that democracy incentivizes elected officials to allocate more attributable goods, but the same effect is not found in the provision of nonattributable goods.

[56] Lindberg (2010) found that MPs in Ghana focused on producing and distributing private goods such as clientelistic goods the most, whilst they overlooked delivering pure public goods such as legislation and executive oversight.

[57] Pure public goods are out of the scope of this research as most traditional leaders do not have influence over law enactment and executive oversight.

selectorate as the set of people in the polity who can take part in choosing a leader, the *winning coalition* as the quantity of selectors that the leader must retain to remain in office, and the *support coalition* as the set of those selectors who support the current leader. If the size of the support coalitions falls short of the size of the winning coalition, a challenger might form a coalition of her own and replace the leader. According to the selectorate theory, democracies have a large selectorate and require a larger winning coalition, whereas one-party autocracies, monarchies, and military juntas have a smaller selectorate and require a smaller winning coalition. Regardless of the regime types, leaders hold the loyalty of their winning coalition by producing goods and services. However, democracies produce more public goods because they have a larger winning coalition and more supporters to please, making public goods a more efficient way for the leader to retain the support of his support coalition. Conversely, non-democracies tend to buy the needed loyalty with personal benefits as the winning coalition is small.

The dynamic in which rulers offer resources to their clients in exchange for their loyalty and clients support their patron to access rewards is known as patronage politics. Patronage serves as an instrument for regulating intra-elite competition, permitting the leader to ration resources by placating aggrieved groups (Arriola 2009) and exacerbating the collective action problem involved in the ousting a leader (Acemoglu, Verdier, and Robinson 2004). In the absence of patronage, the selectorate's reliance on a leader diminishes, and they are better able to discipline the leader as their interests lie with replacing the leader (Besley and Kudamatsu 2007). Authoritarian leaders

often opt for cooptation as a tactic to hold onto power.[58] Arriola (2009) presented a systematic relationship between patronage and political stability.[59]

When the logic of patronage and political survival is applied to the context of traditional chieftaincy, traditional leadership is expected to provide a suboptimal level of public goods and focus on distributing private goods to the small group of the selectorate. Yet, there are several factors to consider in applying the selectorate theory to the context of traditional leadership. First, Mesquita et al. (2003) do not acknowledge that the selectorate might demand public goods regardless of the availability of private goods. In their theory, the selectorate's personal preference either does not matter, or the selectorate is ambivalent about whichever good they receive from the leader. However, when public goods are absolute necessities, such as drinking water or passable roads, which are often not sufficiently provided in rural Malawi, the selectorate might prioritize public goods as much as or even more so than private goods. Moreover, local leaders at the bottom of the hierarchical power structure are likely to be not in a position to make budgetary decisions in determining how much to invest in private goods vs. local public goods.

Second, the selectorate theory assumes that leaders buy the loyalty of the support group to prevent a challenger with a winning coalition from emerging, but traditional leaders might not take such preemptive actions until the political survival mindset is *activated* after facing a competitive challenger. Challengers emerge in traditional leadership, but such events are not as frequent as elections. Also, as I will show later in this chapter, most traditional leaders who confronted a competitive challenger survived and sustained their grip on power with or without material

[58] There are many other strategies that authoritarian leaders use, such as repression and threats. One might wonder whether and why traditional chiefs do not utilize such measurements. The simple answer is that cracking down on their family delegitimizes their own rule. As mentioned earlier, leaders justify their rule over their subjects from their lineage. Should leaders debilitate their ruling family, their traditional institution will be equally disempowered.

[59] Arriola (2009) shows that African leaders tend to extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments.

compensation or power delegations. Namely, leaders might not feel the dire need to buy the support coalition's loyalty out until they face competitive challenges.

4. Ruling Families as the Selectorate and Their Importance

This section explains what ruling families are, focusing on their core functions as the selectorate and the pool of potential contestants. Then, I continue to explain when the ruling family exerts their power over traditional leaders and why leaders become responsive to the needs of the ruling family using quantitative and qualitative data descriptively.

What is a ruling family for a traditional chief, and who are the individuals that make up the families? The term ruling families, locally known as royal families, is frequently used in everyday life in rural Malawi. Mentions of ruling families are also easily found in media and academic articles. However, a clear definition of the term is hard to find. Its connotations have evolved over time. The concept of a ruling family in Malawi goes as far back as the seventeenth century during the pre-colonial period, and the lineage of the ruling family served "the function … to justify and explain both the people's existence and the rulers' legitimate right to rule and own the land (Langworthy 1970, 35)." However, new chiefs and ruling families were invented during the colonial and post-colonial periods (Power 2020).

While the evolution of chieftaincies over time and varied customs make it hard to define the term, two features of ruling families are commonly described. First, (only) ruling families provide a pool of legitimate candidates for chieftaincy. Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014) described that "only individuals from the designated "ruling families" of a chieftaincy - the elite created and given exclusive right to rule by the British at the initiation of the system in 1896 – are eligible to become paramount chiefs" in Sierra Leone (321). Other scholars also mentioned that

chiefs are selected within "royal families" according to local customs (Baldwin 2014) and "a leader's authority may come from "royal blood" (Cammack 2012, 262). Second, individuals from a ruling family nominate successors for the chieftaincy. Dionne (2017) mentions that village-level traditional leaders are normally appointed by their high-ranking traditional chief in consultation with the former traditional leaders' family. When asked who decides a successor to chieftaincies, the vast majority of my original ruling family survey respondents answered that the ruling family chooses the successor. Thus, I define ruling families as individuals of an extended family of a former traditional leader who might themselves be the selectorate or a potential heir for the chieftaincy or people who are consanguineous to these people.[60]

The boundaries of a ruling family – especially the selectorate who influences the survival and removal of traditional leadership - vary across chieftaincies. Although relations to male members in the patriliny and female members in matriliny are important markers in determining ruling families, the cultural practices to define a precise boundary of a ruling family with political leverage vary from one chieftaincy to another in the present day. Ruling family survey data in **Error! Reference source not found.**A shows that matrilineal ethnic groups are overwhelmingly m ore likely to report that women in their ruling family - sisters of the last leader/aunt and mother of the current leader to be exact - are involved in the succession decisions. And this role does not often fall to men. On the other hand, male members are substantially more likely to be engaged in the succession decisions in patrilineal ethnic groups relative to matrilineal ethnic groups (Figure 3.7B). Nevertheless, there is variation within both types of ethnic groups. Some matrilineal ethnic groups involve their male members in the succession decisions, while others do not.

[60] Terms like "an extended family" and "a potential heir" leave room for flexibility in the definition as customs regarding succession vary across different chieftaincies. Ruling families are not the same as relatives, although members of a ruling family are a subgroup of relatives. According to my survey data, the median value for the proportion of ruling families in a jurisdiction is 3%, while the corresponding statistics for relatives is 17%.



Figure 3.7 Selectorate for Traditional Leadership

Note: Survey of Ruling Families (2020-2021). The left and right panels correspond to matrilineal and patrilineal ethnic groups, respectively, for the question "who decided the successor of the last [title of traditional leader]?" Values on the x-axis indicate "1 = the last traditional leader, 2 = uncles of the current leader (Panel A)/brothers of the last leader (Panel B), 3 = aunts of the current leader (Panel A)/sisters of the last leader (Panel B)." This question was only asked to 613 ruling families who reported their leader inherited the position. The "96 = Other" category includes female cousins (14), cousins (no mention of gender) (11), nieces (4), nephews (1), women in the ruling family (3), and other elders (8) for Panel A and female cousins (1), cousins (no mention of gender) (2), and other elders (7) for Panel B. Respondents were allowed to provide multiple answers.

The importance of the selectorate within ruling families during the time of succession is self-explanatory, as they choose the leader from multiple eligible individuals, yet the selectorate also possesses significant influence if a competitive challenge emerges. Consider a situation where a rival is interested in deposing a leader. The selectorate in the ruling family makes decisions about the rival's claim. Although they may cast votes to express independent opinions, the preferred approach for conflict resolution is a unanimous decision through arbitration and discussion. The majority does not simply dismiss minority opinions, as most individuals in ruling families inhabit the same or nearby village(s), and this incentivizes them to maintain amicable relationships in the long term. This deliberative process results in typical leadership dispute that last six months to one year (**Error! Reference source not found.**). Assuming that a support coalition can persuade others t

hrough arbitration, leaders may not need to buy out or win over every single member in the selectorate. Nevertheless, a leader's faction should be large enough to dominate the discourse and form a winning coalition during mediation to elicit concessions from the rival camp. From the perspective of conspirators, their number should outweigh the size of the leader's coalition who would resist the plot to overthrow a leader (Charap and Harm 1999). If a leader and rival faction within the ruling family get deadlocked, the leadership dispute matter goes to the court of a higher traditional leader or the District Commissioner who is involved in the appointment of traditional leaders.



Figure 3.8 Lengths of Competitive Challenges

Note: Survey of Ruling Families (2020-2021). N= 94. The survey question in verbatim was "thinking about the last incident which has been resolved, how long did it take to be resolved?" and response options were "1 = Less than a week, 2 = 1 week to less than 2 weeks, 3 = 2 weeks to less than a month, 4 = 1 month to less than 6 months, 5 = 6 months to less than a year 6 = 1 year to less than 2 years, 7 = 2 years and more, and 8 = Not resolved."

The selectorate makes decisions at the time of succession and the arrival of competitive challengers, but they themselves are not eligible for the position and do not pose a threat to leadership as bound by the customary law in most cases, with a few exceptional cases. My interviews with traditional leaders revealed that most competitive challenges arose from ruling family members who were eligible for the chieftaincy but not chosen (i.e., children of the former traditional chief in patriliny and children of the former traditional chief's sister in matriliny). However, in a few cases, attempts to subvert a leader emerged from people in the succession line for the next generation, such as children of the current leader or the current leader's sisters who wanted to move up their time of rule.[61] As who would be a potential threat is not apparent, leaders may attempt to buy out both the selectorate and would-be challengers to retain the control of their village and power from resource management.

Like politicians are interested in getting (re)elected, leaders in non-democratic institutions want to preserve their power. Based on this premise, I argue that the primary concern of traditional leaders centers around maintaining their position, whether the motivation is driven by the pursuit of respect from a community or perks from the position. Rulers – whether they are elected or unelected - provide more goods and services to a subset of the selectorate crucial to forming a winning coalition (Mesquita et al. 2003).[62] Similarly, traditional leaders might also cater to the needs of a group of villagers who have higher leverage over leaders' survival or removal from the office. As I have stated above, for traditional leaders, ruling families are both the selectorate and

[61] Interview 053. Chikwawa.

[62] The decisive group could be swing voters (Arulampalam et al. 2009; Dahlberg and Johansson 2002; Denemark 2000; Johansson 2003; Milligan and Smart 2005), supporters (Alperovich 1984; Horiuchi and Lee 2008; Levitt and Snyder 1995; Remmer 2007) and/or opponents (Horiuchi and Lee 2008; John and Ward 2001; Treisman 1996) in elections.

the pool of competitive challengers, which makes leaders more responsive to the needs of their ruling family compared to other villagers.

One might wonder whether there is any trade-off in prioritizing the ruling family and villagers hold sway in the removal of a leader. Traditional chiefs who are corrupt and not responsive to the public are likely to reduce their reputation in the eyes of villagers. According to Dionne's (2017) observation, villagers who are not satisfied with their village headman can complain to traditional leaders higher up the chain, and village-level traditional leaders demonstrate healthy concern in keeping villagers happy for fear of action against them. She also presents an anecdote of an ousting of a headman in the Mchinji district. However, as Dionne (2017) notes, villagers toppling a chief is rare.

Furthermore, ruling families still play a role as higher-level leaders – who appoints village-level traditional leaders - decide the removal and appointment in consultation with the ruling family (Dionne 2017). Lastly, even if a particular leader can be removed, the ruling family stays in the same place, and the next successor will still come from the same family according to the customary laws backed up by the central government.[63] The fact that the ruling group does not have to fear losing their power by replacing a particular leader gives even higher leverage to the ruling group (Padró i Miquel 2007). In short, even if there may be accountability to villagers to some extent in the multi-layered institution, the average villager's influence is not as grave as that of the ruling family.

[63] The fact that a successor comes from the same ruling family even after the removal of a leader also makes a crucial distinction between ruling family vs. non-ruling family and coethnic vs. non-coethnic. While power transition may theoretically occur from one ethnic group to another in multi-ethnic societies, only one entity (i.e., the ruling family) nominates its candidates to traditional leadership, leaving average villagers as an out-group. As the existing theories about identity politics are not developed in a context where one group is permanently a second-class citizen even after the successful removal of a leader, the power dynamics between the ruling family vs. average villagers and coethnic vs. non-coethnic are different.

5. The Selectorate Theory Applied to Traditional Leadership

5.1. Divergent Implications of the Selectorate Theory on Local Public Goods Versus Private Goods

The next question in line is what leaders need to deliver to appease their ruling family. Just as politicians in Africa make valence appeals in election campaigns (Bleck and Van de Walle 2013), traditional chiefs also use valence discourse to describe their job duties. Across interviews with different traditional chiefs, "development" was frequently mentioned as an important problem to tackle or their duty to handle, but not a single leader mentioned issues such as inequality and redistribution.[64]

Some might contend that ruling families might prefer receiving private goods over public goods. In Malawi, local public goods like drinking water and passable roads, which are necessary to sustain one's living, are insufficient. Many traditional chiefs, during their interviews, mentioned the scarcity of water as one of the direst problems in their community. Besides, feeder roads that connect villages to the main roads are unpaved, making them susceptible to becoming muddy and riled during the rainy season. Some feeder roads become impassable after rain, which significantly affects villagers' access to marketplaces. Therefore, I argue that ruling families' desire to access private goods would not cancel out the demand for the local public goods in the study context.

Furthermore, traditional leaders cannot save the resources on local public goods that benefit the many and use the reserve on private goods for the ruling family. Local Development Fund (LDF) and the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) - two major resources for local development - are run by the district government or Members of Parliament (MPs), respectively.

[64] The term "development" is used liberally, indicating the improvement of life in general aspects. In this sense, development not only includes the provision of local public goods such as schools, hospitals, and roads, to name a few but also include benefits for individuals such as scholarship for students and income-generating activities for households.

District Councils or MPs manage the water supply in cooperation with relevant ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Water Development (MoAIWD) and the Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP), and the supply of electricity in partnership with a parastatal organization the Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi (ESCOM). As ruling families, as well as their chiefs, do not make decisions or influence how much to allocate private goods vs. local public goods, ruling families may simply desire more goods rather than to maneuver to channel one type of good over the other.

Then, how does ruling families' desire for more goods and services affect regular villagers' welfare? Notably, the discretionary power to invest in one good over the other does not lie with village-level traditional chiefs for private goods, but the leaders can influence the amount of local public goods. Quotas per village for private goods such as the farm input subsidy programs, social cash transfer programs, and public works programs depend on objective figures such as the population size and the number of households in extreme poverty.[65] However, the budget for local public goods at the level of villages is not strictly set. The interview with an officer at the Lilongwe district council informed me that there are no hard rules or regulations about budget allocations across TAs regarding local public goods, and the resource distribution within TA jurisdictions is up to the high-rank traditional leader who presides over the area. High-ranking traditional leaders, thus, vouch for more goods and services for their jurisdiction, and village-level traditional leaders'

[65] In terms of whether the rule is followed in practice, several local media reported separate incidents of discovering "ghost villages" created in an attempt to divert resources. In some cases, government officials were solely to blame (Nzangaya 2020; Mhango and Khamula 2020) and in other cases, traditional leaders colluded with government officials ("ACB Arrests Agriculture Staff and Village Headman in Mchinji - The Maravi Post" n.d.). There are no official statistics about how rampant this practice is. However, when my research team visited local TA offices with the list of registered villages for the Farm Input Subsidy Program to obtain village-level traditional leaders' contact information, the TA office was unaware of the village on the list in only a few cases.

role is mobilizing village labor to attract the funds and distribute resources and services of a set quantity.

The distinguishing attributes of private goods and local public goods impose divergent incentives in distributive politics. Owners of private goods can prevent others from utilizing the good, and one's consumption prevents that of another (Powell 2014), which accompanies scarcity and calls for competition (Hallgren 1995). On the other hand, local public goods are shared and used by a small collective or a club such as a village or an organization.[66] The benefits of local public goods accrue only to the members of a particular community. Local public goods resemble pure public goods within the community as they are non-divisible within that group (Lindberg 2010), but they function like private goods between communities (Stiglitz, n.d.).[67] The differences between the two types of goods point to the fact that individuals' interests may collide for private goods but coalesce for local public goods within a village.

Conflicting interests in private goods are illustrated in Carlson and Seim's (2020) study. They found increased nepotism in the distribution of iron roofing sheets monitored by villagers as opposed to others (government and donor agents) and attributed the increased nepotism to the

[66] The term "local public good" is not incorporated in the taxonomy presented by Ostrom and Ostrom's (1977) seminal work. They identify four types of goods: private goods, common-pool resources, club goods, and public goods. Local public goods refer to both club goods and common-pool resources in their definition. According to Ostrom and Ostrom, club goods are excludable but non-rivalrous, such as cinemas, private parks, and satellite television, whereas common-pool resources are non-excludable but rivalrous, such as fish stocks, timber, and coal. However, the examples of club goods may also be rivalrous due to limited seats in cinemas and bandwidth for satellite television. Furthermore, other scholars mention that the increased use of club goods might instill rivalries between members and result in interference in the utility of members (Buchanan 1965; Sandler and Todd 2001; Tiebout 1956). Lindberg's example of club goods – too many vendors in local markets – resembles the example of cinemas and private parks. Following this line of work, I do not distinguish club goods and common-pool resources, and local public goods, collective goods, and club goods can be used interchangeably. As the collective in my research is a village and/or the surrounding area, I prefer the term local public goods, which invokes geographical connotation. I acknowledge that some local public goods of interest in this paper, such as water might be more subject to crowding than others.

[67] The examples of local public goods in this paper are geographically concentrated, but local public goods are not by definition related to geographic locations. Legislative instruments providing free healthcare for expectant mothers and general subsidies to sports clubs are also examples of collective goods.

conflicting interests among villagers. While most villagers prefer need-based allocations, a subset of the villagers – the chief's relatives – preferred to receive sheets themselves, and their demands overrode the demands of the rest of the villagers when all subjects were informed about the availability of resources. The distribution of limited private goods like iron roofing sheets inevitably leads to a zero-sum game. If one person receives a resource, another person's chance of benefiting reduces. Most private goods with a limited quantity inescapably incite rivalry among villagers because the government establishes a resource quota per village.

However, not all resources offer the same incentive structure as in the iron roofing sheets example. Local public goods do not create a zero-sum game and instigate rivalry between members of a community. Unlike private goods, the quantity and/or quality of local public goods are not stringently limited. For instance, villagers can make their community safer by forming a neighborhood watch or improve road conditions by organizing village clean-up days. Villagers can also contribute their labor or money to showcase their concerted effort and eagerness to bring local public goods such as boreholes and public taps. Traditional leaders whom I interviewed informed me that what they can do to channel local public goods to their community is to start molding bricks or digging a hole by mobilizing villagers. Furthermore, deterring community members from consuming public goods is almost impossible without extortionate monitoring and punishment (Ostrom 1990). This non-excludable attribute incentivizes community members to organize themselves to manage local public goods better or demand more from the government with a uniform voice as a community rather than jostling over limited resources and creating friction among community members.

In sum, the two types of goods are different with regard to how traditional leaders influence resource distribution and whether they are excludable and rivalrous. The leaders can influence the

quantity of a local public good both by organizing demands made on the government and encouraging community self-provisioning while they are given a fixed amount of private goods. Additionally, private goods are rivalrous and excludable, while local public goods are not. With private goods, leaders can decide who gets it, but not how much. With local public goods, it is the reverse. Thus, the efforts that need to be made in providing public and private goods are different, so competition can simultaneously affect both: 1) it induces more bias in private good disbursement, and 2) It induces more effort in public goods procurement.

5.2. When Does the Political Survival Mindset Get Activated?

Thwarting competitive challenges by coopting would-be challengers and appeasing ruling families for that purpose is a winning strategy for traditional leaders to stay in power. However, is this a strategy that all traditional leaders adopt at any time during their rule, or does it appeal to some traditional leaders more than others?

There are high uncertainties related to competitive challenges—especially their timing—in the traditional institution because there are no electoral cycles for such a hereditary position. Perhaps, such a contest might be deemed as a low-probability event unless the leaders experience it themselves. A new traditional leader comes into power with the support of a ruling family. Since freshly installed traditional leaders have the backing of a ruling family, leadership challenges may be the last thing about which they are concerned, as most newly elected leaders enjoy a "honeymoon period" at least for a while. All the same, there is the prospect that a competitive challenge will develop over time if leaders cannot keep the ruling family content, but they may underestimate such a possibility.

However, the experience of a leadership challenge teaches leaders the lesson that cooptation is the optimal strategy for political stability. As ruling family members function as the selectorate at the time of a competitive challenge, coopting a sufficient number of ruling family members may frustrate the attempts of would-be challengers in the future by lowering the possibility of a successful leadership replacement. Traditional leaders thus offer the resources at their disposal to a ruling family to acquire its loyalty in return. In essence, the political survival mindset for traditional leaders to take preemptive actions is activated after their encounter with the first competitive challenger, not before.

This argument is subject to empirical examination by predicting the likelihood of resource sharing with the presence of past competitive challengers using the logistic regression model. The unit of analysis is the jurisdiction under each traditional leader, where two rounds of Traditional Leader Surveys, the Ruling Family Survey and the Secretary Survey combined provide complete information for each jurisdiction. For the tendency of traditional leaders to share available resources, the author leverages the following survey question, "With how many households of the ruling family do you [= traditional leader] share money from the government?" which provides integer values. The variable was recoded into an indicator variable, taking a value of 1 if a leader shared financial resources with the ruling family and 0 if otherwise. The money from the government in the question refers to the leaders' monthly salary, which is the principal resource over which they have direct discretionary power. Traditional leaders' salaries are a suitable case for examining how leaders use the resources since external factors cannot influence how they utilize their salaries.[68]

[68] Although it is commonly believed that traditional leaders oversee resource distribution for their community, my survey data demonstrate wide variations – from very easy to very difficult to influence - in the leverage that the leaders wield over different resources. The variations in the discretionary power that traditional leaders wield might be attributable to external factors, such as the government's differential approach to individual leaders.

The presence of the competitive challenge variable was first coded to take a value of 1 if there was any competitive challenger in the past and 0 if otherwise. Models 3 and 4 in Table 3.1 show the results with an alternative coding scheme using the number of competitive challenges with integer values. The author also controlled for leaders' demographic variables (i.e., gender, age, matrilineal/patrilineal ethnic group, education level, wealth, years in power, and position), demographic variables related to their jurisdiction (i.e., the number of households in a village, the number of ruling family households, the number of households related to a leader, and the number of non-coethnic households to a leader), and the enforceability of the first call rule. Standard errors are clustered at the TA level across all models.[69]

The results from Models 1 to 4 indicate that leaders who had handled a competitive challenger in the past were more likely to share their salary with a ruling family than leaders who had not encountered such a leadership challenge (statistically significant at the 0.05 level). The correlation between the likelihood of sharing the salary and the existence of competitive challengers becomes higher when other covariates are controlled, and its statistical significance remains at the same 0.05 level. These results are also robust to replacing the presence of competitive challenge (*Challenger*) with its frequency (*Num Challenger*), which attests to the fact that leaders who previously experienced more frequent leadership challenges were more likely to share money with their ruling family in the present. The wording of the survey questions assuages any concerns regarding reverse causality–resource sharing inducing leadership contestations–because the survey questions ask about competitive challenges in the past and resource sharing in the present (i.e., at the time of the survey).

[69] See Chapter 3 Appendix B for the codebook and descriptive statistics.

Models 5 to 8 in Table 3.1 speak to when traditional leaders start to adopt political survival strategies. If the number of ruling family members in the succession line is used as a yardstick to gauge the possibility of competitive challenges emerging, leaders with many ruling family members in the succession line are more likely to share their salary with the ruling family than other leaders. In predicting the likelihood of traditional leaders sharing their salaries with a ruling family, the number of ruling family members in the succession line is measured in two ways: first, the number of sons of the last chief in patrilineal ethnic groups/nephews of the last chief in matrilineal ethnic groups accounting for only male members; and second, the number of sons and daughters of the last chief in patrilineal groups/nephews and nieces of the last chief in matrilineal groups. The analyses mirror the models from columns 1 to 4. The dependent variable and covariates remain the same, and standard errors are clustered at the TA level.

In contrast to the emergence of competitive challenges, these findings indicate the negative correlations between the number of ruling family members in the succession line and the likelihood of leaders sharing resources with a ruling family. Having more male members in a succession line is correlated with a lower likelihood of leaders sharing their salary with a ruling family, although the statistical significance disappears once control variables are included in the model. The number of both male and female members in the succession line shows statistically significant negative correlations (at the 0.05 level) with the likelihood of resource sharing with and without control variables. Thus, the results show that merely having a larger number of ruling family members in the succession line does not elicit traditional leaders' cooptation strategy.

	Share resource							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Challenger	0.11**	0.14**						
	(0.05)	(0.07)						
Num Challenger			0.07**	0.08*				
			(0.03)	(0.04)				
Log(Male in succession line)					-0.12***	-0.06		
					(0.03)	(0.04)		
Log(Male & female in succession line)							-0.14***	-0.09**
							(0.03)	(0.04)
Female		-0.08		-0.08		-0.10		-0.11
		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)
Age		0.02		0.02		0.01		0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Ethnic matriliny		-0.22***		-0.23***		-0.23***		-0.21***
		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)
Education		0.004		0.004		0.01		0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Wealth		-0.08***		-0.08***		-0.09***		-0.08***
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Year in power		-0.003		-0.003		-0.01		-0.004
		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)		(0.01)
GVH		0.03		0.03		0.05		0.05
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.06)

Log(Num household)		-0.03		-0.03		-0.04		-0.04
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Log(Num non-coethnic)		0.03**		0.03**		0.03*		0.03*
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Log(Num relative)		0.02		0.02		0.02		0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Log(Num ruling family)		-0.04		-0.04		-0.04		-0.04
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.03)
Enforce first call		0.01		0.02		0.02		0.02
		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)		(0.02)
Constant	0.62***	1.04***	0.62***	1.04***	0.82***	1.25***	0.95***	1.30***
	(0.02)	(0.20)	(0.02)	(0.20)	(0.06)	(0.22)	(0.07)	(0.22)
Observations	643	446	643	446	528	410	526	409
Log Likelihood	-441.84	-290.18	-441.67	-290.65	-363.10	-263.91	-356.60	-261.44
Akaike Inf. Crit.	887.67	608.36	887.35	609.31	730.20	555.81	717.21	550.89

Table 3.1 Likelihood of Sharing Salary with Ruling Family Members

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p< 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p<0.01. I used logged values for the following variables due to their high skewness: the number of members of the ruling family in the succession line and demographic variables of jurisdictions.

Some might argue that competitive challenges might be ruling families' strategic way to negotiate with their leader to receive benefits rather than a genuine attempt to replace the leadership and that there would be no end to the demand, making leaders' attempt to win support turn out to be unsuccessful. The first half of the statement is not incompatible with the selectorate theory. Factions in a ruling family might use competitive challenges as leverage to negotiate with traditional leaders to obtain more goods, and leaders' intent might lie with keeping them satisfied and buying their loyalty by delivering goods. For the latter half of the alternative explanation, I argue that ruling families do not have a limitless demand for goods. If ruling families cannot be bought off, would-be challengers will pose repeated threats in an attempt to elicit more concessions. However, this is not the majority of the cases.

One might argue that favoritism in resource distribution is a function of cultural pressure rather than a calculated political strategy. People in Malawi are expected to support not only their direct family but also their extended family (Swidler and Watkins 2007). Scholars found nepotism within village-level traditional leaders regarding the distribution of agricultural inputs and food subsidy programs (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020), and iron roofing sheets (Carlson and Seim 2020). People in Malawi are expected to support not only their direct family but also extended family (Swidler and Watkins 2007, 150). Traditional chiefs are not free from these expectations and may use the resources and authority they have at hand to comply with this societal pressure. Nonetheless, the results in Table 3.1 illustrate that some traditional leaders are more likely to share resources with the ruling family and that tendency coincides with challenges to their

leadership.[70] What the results do not indicate is that most traditional leaders consistently share resources with a ruling family in alignment with the cultural pressure argument.[71]

6. Hypotheses and Measurement

6.1. Hypotheses

I discussed that traditional leaders are to be responsive to their ruling family vis-à-vis average villagers because the family wields significant power over the sustenance of traditional leadership. Leaders who undergo competitive challenges will be concerned about the recurrence of such political contests and take preemptive actions to solidify their patronage relationships by channeling resources to their ruling family. The selectorate theory implies that traditional leaders are expected to focus on distributing private goods for their ruling family instead of providing local public goods that benefit their community as a whole. Then, there are two important modifications to be made. First, different types of goods and services provide different incentive structures; rulers' choice to satisfy the needs of the ruling family accompanies the sacrifice of average villagers regarding private goods but not local public goods. Second, traditional leaders - presiding over a position where competition is neither institutionalized nor frequent - are not in the survival mindset before they actually encounter competitive challenges. This section highlights the observable implications and hypotheses of competition accounting for these contextual variables.

For private goods, when two subjects compete for the acquisition of limited resources, traditional chiefs' attempt to buy the selectorate's support to thwart competitive challenges or build a winning coalition in case of the advent of competitive challenges in the future induces nepotism,

[70] Also, note that wealth, matriliny/patriliny ethnic group, and number of non-coethnic households in leaders' community are correlated with their likelihood of resource sharing.
[71] Indeed, 37 percent, or 239 out of 654, of surveyed traditional leaders reported that they do not share the salary with a single household of the ruling family.

which undermines the welfare of villagers in general. This is because traditional leaders can influence the quantity of local public goods but have no such power when it comes to private goods. The leaders' power is only limited to whom private goods are disbursed. Also crucially, private goods allow leaders to disproportionately apportion the benefits to their ruling family, excluding average villagers from them. Thus, increased nepotism after competitive challenges comes at the cost of average villagers (*H1*).

> *H_1: Competitive challenges are associated with the increased likelihood of nepotism by the challenged leader in the distribution of private goods.*

Conversely, regarding the provision of local public goods, chiefs' attempt to buy the selectorate's allegiance would improve the provision of the public good, increasing the welfare of regular villagers (*H2*). Crucially, they can increase the quantity of the local public goods, but not who benefits, the inverse of private goods. Even though leaders' motivation to channel more local public goods primarily comes from their intent to garner support from their ruling family, they cannot deliver local public goods exclusive to ruling family members. Due to this nature of local public goods, the better provision of the goods, driven by competitive challenges, equally benefits ruling family members and regular villagers.

> *H_2: The emergence of competitive challenges presents positive associations with the increase in the level of local public goods provision.*

Furthermore, there is a crucial difference before and after an initial competitive challenge regarding activating leaders' political survival mindset. To support my point about competitive challenges as a trigger, I additionally test whether the likelihood of the rise of competitive challengers - the number of ruling family members in the succession line - is not correlated with the nepotism in private goods distribution or the provision of local public goods, as laid out in the following two hypotheses:

H_3: The likelihood of competitive challenges shows no statistically significant association with increased nepotism in the distribution of private goods.

H_4: The likelihood of competitive challenges demonstrates no statistically significant correlation with an increase in the level of local public goods provision.

6.2. Competitive Challenge Realized and Its Likelihood

As hypothesized above, this research focuses on both the *risk of and actual realized competitive challenges*. The verbatim wording of the survey question used to capture an explicit competitive challenge in the ruling family survey is "After the current [title of the leader] was installed, have you noticed anybody in the ruling family expressing their willingness to take the [title of the leader] position while the traditional leader is alive?" The fact that 67 out of 94 (71%) respondents reported that the challenger "explicitly said that the current leader has to step down from the position" substantiates that the construct validity of the survey question, calibrating competitive challenge to overturn the leadership.

For the risk of competition, I adopted an operationalization strategy similar to that of Acemoglu, Reed, and Robinson (2014), who estimated competition using the number of ruling

families for the following reason: "even if one family is able to dominate the chieftaincy for many generations, with more ruling families there will be a greater potential for the incumbent to lose the paramount chieftaincy in an election (321)." While chieftaincy in Malawi usually does not involve more than one ruling family, I mirror their approach and approximate the risk of competitive challenge with the number of eligible candidates within the ruling family, which translates into sons of the last chief in patriliny and nephews of the last chief in matriliny.

While men are more likely to be considered as candidates for the succession of chieftaincy, women are also equally considered in some traditional leader positions. For example, some traditional leaders interviewed reported that his female cousin staged a competitive challenge who was also considered for succession plans after the death of his predecessor.[72] Furthermore, there are more than a few female traditional leaders, although male leaders still dominate the ranks of traditional leadership. 80 out of 604 traditional leaders (12%) who were recruited for round 1 of traditional leader surveys were female. Therefore, I measure the risk of competition in two ways: 1) the number of male candidates (*male candidate*), and 2) the number of both male and female candidates (*both_candidate*) as an alternative measurement.

7. Conclusion

This chapter provides a refined theoretical argument about competition and leaders' performance in the context of the unelected hereditary leader position. I provided the interpretation of the context of traditional leadership in the framework of the selectorate theory, arguing that traditional leaders are accountable to their ruling family, who is a more substantial threat relative to the mass public. However, this study goes a step further from the existing selectorate theory. Alternative to

[72] Interview 032, Dowa; Interview 046 Chikwawa.

the existing selectorate theory, this chapter presented refined selectorate theory accounting for two contextual variables: different types of goods/services and the timing of political survival strategy comes into play. In rural Malawi, where traditional leaders exert significant influence, the selectorate desires both public and private goods. Since leaders are incentivized to deliver both types of goods despite the small size of the selectorate, the ramification is bifurcated public welfare across private goods and local public goods. Additionally, I refined the existing theory by providing when the political survival mindset is activated for leaders in contexts where institutionalized competition is not a norm, which previous studies about political survival have overlooked. This application of the existing theoretical framework also emphasizes the importance of contextual variables. The chapters that follow subject the theory to a diverse set of empirical tests.

Chapter 4

Competition and Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods

1. Introduction

The hypotheses in Chapter 3 comprise two aspects of socioeconomic welfare: private goods and local public goods. I described - with interview and survey data – how often competitive challenges occur, who ruling families are, why they are essential to understand how traditional leadership operates, how leaders' motivations to stave off competitive challenges may lead to divergent outcomes for the welfare of villagers across different types of goods and services, and when such political survival mindset is triggered. My theoretical framework is subject to empirical tests in Chapters 4 and 5. This chapter investigates the relations between competition and the distribution of private goods, which constitutes half of the theoretical framework.

The original survey data for quantitative analyses were collected from village-level traditional leaders' jurisdictions in one district in Central Malawi and conducted with 684 traditional leaders for Round 1, 658 leaders for Round 2, 680 ruling families, and 669 secretaries of the leaders. Surveys with the mentioned parties combined provide complete information for each jurisdiction (see Chapter 2 for the data description).

This chapter is organized in the following order. The first part illustrates four private goods of inquiry (i.e., customary court rulings, temporary employment opportunities, farm subsidies, and cash transfers for the ultra-poor), addressing their importance and traditional leaders' influence over the distribution of each good. The second part of the chapter discusses my empirical strategy and provides findings to test hypotheses, robustness check results, and other exploratory findings for future research.

2. Identifying Private Goods in Rural Malawi

The supply of resources, especially private goods, is severely limited in rural Malawi. From the shortlist of private goods, this dissertation concentrates on customary court rulings and three other social protection programs - the Malawi Social Action Fund Public Works Program (MASAF PWP or PWP), the Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP), and the Social Cash Transfer Program (SCTP) - to study the relations between competition over traditional leadership and the allocation of private goods.[73]

All the chosen private goods and services are excludable and rivalrous, meaning that individuals can be prevented from utilizing the good and that one's consumption reduces or deprives another's consumption. The court rulings are rivalrous and excludable because verdicts favor one party or another in most cases. The selected social protection programs are also excludable and rivalrous. The quantity of resources assigned to each jurisdiction is finite, and the supply is not sufficient to cover the entire population in each community. Before getting into the details of empirical strategy, the following section provides illustrations of each outcome of interest.

2.1. Customary Court Verdicts

Many scholarly accounts demonstrate that the paramount role of traditional chiefs lies in presiding over ordinary dispute resolution (e.g., Newman 1983 86-95; van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1991; Van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1987). Chiefs' role in dispute mediation and arbitration traces back

[73] The social protection programs mentioned in other policy reports but excluded from this study include school feeding programs, village savings and loans programs, and microfinance. These private goods are not apt for this study as there is little room for traditional leaders to intervene in the distribution of the goods and services by design. For school feeding programs, all students receive a daily meal once their school is selected as a target. For village savings and loan programs, and microfinance, beneficiaries self-select into the programs.

to the pre-colonial periods (Meneses 2006) and persists in present-day rural areas (Chiefs Act of 1967). Rural residents seek justice from the customary court as traditional chiefs are the most accessible leaders to them. The Malawian government also leaves the handling of day-to-day disputes and conflicts in villages to customary courts instead of formal institutions like the magistrate court or police.[74] Traditional courts are held on a weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly basis. The intervals between individual traditional court sessions depend on the number of disputes, and the number of disputes is contingent on the size of leaders' jurisdictions. Roughly speaking, courts of group village headmen (GVH) are held more frequently than the courts of village headmen (VH).

I collected the data about customary court cases from secretaries of traditional leaders. To facilitate the data collection, survey enumerators made an advance call to respondents one or two days prior to the scheduled survey date, informing secretaries that the survey entails questions about the most recent cases in the customary court and requesting them to have a court record book with them if possible. The survey module included a batch of questions about two most recent cases: one between a ruling family member and a regular villager, and the other between two regular villagers. Questions about each case included when the case was brought to the court, in whose favor was the ruling made, whether the case was appealed to a higher court and who made the appeal if so,[75] whether the higher court ruled differently from the initial ruling, and lastly, what the case was about.

[74] Interview 042. July 10.

[75] The customary courts exist for traditional leaders at all levels, from village headmen to paramount chiefs. If any party in a dispute is dissatisfied with the judgment of the initial ruling, the case can be brought to a higher court. If the initial verdict was made in a village headman's court, the appeal would generally take place in a group village headman's court, like how appealing in the formal judiciary system works.

The data yielded 287 cases between a ruling family member and a regular villager and 619 cases between two regular villagers. In other words, the cases involving a ruling family member were found in 42.90% of the jurisdictions, and the cases not involving a ruling family member were found in 92.53% of the jurisdictions. The fact that ruling families – who constitute only 3% of the population in most of the sampled jurisdictions – are involved in court disputes in nearly half of the jurisdictions indicates that ruling family members are highly litigious.

While court verdicts are not typically thought of as a good or service, goods and services encompass tangible and intangible items or activities that underpin economic transactions. Rulings of civil cases favor one party over the other, usually mandating material compensations. Thus, court verdicts fit into the definition of a good or service. Furthermore, verdicts of traditional court cases are rivalrous and excludable, satisfying the criteria for private service as most of them are (processed as) civil cases.

Table 4.1 shows cases in traditional courts, with cases between a ruling family member and a regular villager on the left column and cases between two regular villagers on the right column. The predominant cases in both cases concern land disputes followed by thefts and physical fights.[76] [77]The fact that land disputes, which essentially revolve around recognizing one's customary right over a piece of land, constitute almost half of the total cases attests to the notion that most of the court rulings provide rivalrous and excludable benefits. Likewise, this chapter focuses on material compensation for theft and physical violence cases.[78] The court orders the accused, who is proven

[76] Over 60% of the respondents in sub-Saharan Africa perceive traditional leaders, as opposed to the central/local government or community members, to be responsible for allocating land (Afrobarometer Data, 20 Sub-saharan African Countries, Round 4, Years 2008/2009, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org).

[77] Despite the similarities in the proportions of different cases, the two types of disputes have dissimilarities as well. For disputes between a ruling family and an average villager, 68% of verdicts favored a plaintiff, 5% no clear ruling, and 27% in favor of a defendant. Regarding disputes between two regular villagers, 77% and 23% favored a plaintiff and a defendant, respectively.

[78] Thefts and physical fights can be processed as criminal or civil cases. Chapter 5 focuses on the criminal aspect of these cases.

guilty, to compensate the victim with livestock for the victim's financial losses or physical damages instead of sentencing jail time.[79] [80] In most cases, the compensation is a chicken or two, and less often, a goat; the values of a chicken and a goat were around 5,000 and 30,000 Malawian Kwacha (MWK), respectively, as of October 26, 2021, which were equivalent to or $6.16 and $36.97.[81] As the verdicts of theft and physical violence cases in the customary court are about financial compensations between afflicted individuals, the rulings are essentially considered a private good.

	Ruling family vs. regular villager		Between regular villagers	
	Freq	%	Freq	%
Boundaries of land/garden	126	44	287	46
Theft	38	13	85	14
Debt	33	11	73	12
Physical violence/fights	42	15	81	13
Domestic violence	25	9	44	7
Physical invasion of/ damage to property	7	2	9	1
Arguments/verbal fight	5	2	5	1
Adultery/divorce/abortion	2	1	15	2
Other	9	3	20	3
Total	287	100	619	100

Table 4.1 Cases in Customary Courts

Note: Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021). The exact question was, "What was the case about?" The observations reported are smaller than 669 as cases between a ruling family vs. a regular villager were not reported in 382 jurisdictions (no such dispute N=353; refused to answer N=1; do not know N=21; no answer N=7), and cases between regular villagers were not reported in 50 jurisdictions (no such dispute N=41; do not know N=6; no answer N=3).

Figure 4.1 suggests the existence of favoritism in customary courts. Ruling family members are more likely to bring their dispute cases to the court than average villagers. Panel A in Figure 4.1 shows that 65% of the cases were brought to the court by a villager who was not a

[79] If cases are processed as criminal cases, traditional leaders refer them to the magistrate court or police.
[80] Interview 023. July 2. Kasungu.
[81] From here and out, this dissertation applies the 1:820 exchange rate for USD to MWK based on the rate of December 10, 2021.

ruling family and that 76% of the cases in the customary courts were ruled in favor of a non-ruling family villager. A quick glance at these figures may give an impression that villagers are highly likely to turn to their traditional court when they are involved in a dispute with a ruling family member and that the court gives them a fair chance of winning. However, the median percentage of the ruling family households in the sampled jurisdictions remains at 3%. Suppose the chances of bringing a dispute to the customary court are equal among ruling family members and regular villagers. In that case, the cases of villagers as a plaintiff should constitute 97% of the total cases.



Figure 4.1 Plaintiff and Verdict Favors

Note: Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021) N= 286. The survey question for Panel A was "Who brought the case to a traditional court?" with response options of "a member of a ruling family," "not a member of a ruling family," "both of them," and "other." The survey question for Panel B was "To whom was the ruling in favor?" with response options of "a member of a ruling family," "not a member of a ruling family," "both/neither of them," and "other." The cases between ruling family vs. villager are found only in 287 jurisdictions. One jurisdiction is missing in this figure because a respondent chose "other." For this case, the enumerator specified that "the one who was beaten" brought the case to the court but did not indicate whether this person was a ruling family member or not.

Panel B in Figure 4.1 displays favoritism in customary court verdicts regarding a dispute between a member of a ruling family and a regular villager. I code the variable to take a value of 1 if a ruling favored a ruling family member, 0.5 if no clear winner, and 0 if a ruling favored a

regular villager. The informal judicial system does offer some degree of fairness; even when ruling family members bring their case to the court (33%), the verdicts do not always favor the ruling family (20%).

2.2. MASAF Public Works Program

Another private good to examine favoritism is Malawi's most extensive public works program: the Malawi Social Action Fund.[82] Public works programs are standard social protection tools in low-income settings (Grosh et al. 2008), promoted as tools to protect poor households in the face of large macroeconomic or agroclimatic shocks due to their relatively rapid rollout (Ravallion 1999). Public works programs transfer income to non-labor constraint poor by providing limited employment opportunities (Besley and Coate 1992) and aim to supplement poor households' income and improve public infrastructure (Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg 2017). The MASAF PWP in Malawi provides short-term, labor-intensive employment opportunities to poor households with able-bodied adults (Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg 2017).[83] Projects are mostly road rehabilitation or construction with some afforestation and irrigation, which are generally associated with high-intensity labor.

[82] There are four main PWPs in Malawi: 1) EU's Rural Infrastructure Development Programme (RIDP) with a funding of $45.6 million, covering 26,201 households, 2) World Bank's PWP operated by the Local Development Fund (LDF) and Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) with a funding of $115.2 million covering 521,000 households, 3) World Bank's other PWP - the Irrigation, Rural Livelihoods and Development Project (IRLADP) – with a funding of $107 million covering 677,502 households, and lastly, 4) World Food Programme's (WFP) Food-For-Assets (FFA) with a funding of $3.96 million covering 85,000 individuals (van de Meerendonk, Cunha, and Juergens, n.d.). Although the implementation of the programs differs in detail, they share common approaches in terms of targeting and objectives.

[83] Some reports (e.g., Oxfam 2002; Southern African Labour and Development and Research Unit 2005) note that Malawi, alongside South Africa and Zimbabwe, has used the PWP program to include weaker populations by providing lighter tasks that involve service provision, such as child care. However, the MASAF PWP concentrates on labor-intensive activites. Traditional Leaders, during their interview, mentioned the beneficiaries' physical strength (as well as impoverishment) as one of the criteria for selecting the beneficiary.

The MASAF PWP has been operational since the mid-1990s, scaled up to cover about 500,000 households (about 12.5% of the country's population) per year in 2012 (Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg 2017), and even reached 678,000 direct beneficiaries at its peak in 2016 (The World Bank 2019).[84] This made Malawi's PWP rank fourth in the population covered among all such programs in low- and middle-income countries (World Bank 2015). However, this growth was accompanied by little evidence of the program's effectiveness.[85] The finances for the MASAF PWP were cut back to cover no more than 35,000 households annually, which was "a dramatic scale-down" from the coverage under the previous cycle of the project (The World Bank 2019). My original survey data affirm the let-up of the project (see Figure 4.2). According to the secretaries' report, not a single household in 83% of the sampled jurisdictions benefited from the MASAF PWP in 2019 (Panel A). In places where the project benefit was available, typically 6% of the population in the sampled jurisdictions received the benefit (Panel B).

[84] The number of households covered in 2011 was 265,000 (Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg 2017).
[85] Several studies reported that the MASAF PWP has no direct or indirect effects on the food security of the program's beneficiaries (Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg 2017; Khembo and Chapman 2017). The failure of the PWP in Malawi is presumed to be due to the relatively short duration and low-intensity transfers compared to other successful programs in Ethiopia and India (Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg 2017).



Figure 4.2 Beneficiary Coverage of MASAF PWP

Note: Survey of Traditional Leaders Round 1 (2020-2021) N= 684 & Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021) N=669. The survey question for Panel A was "How many households in all [number] villages under the [title of traditional leader] were selected as beneficiaries for the MASAF Public Works Program in 2019?" where respondents of the secretary survey provided a numeric answer. The values in the Panel B come from two survey questions "Among the households which were selected as beneficiaries of the MASAF Public Works Program in 2019, how many of them are ruling family members of [title of traditional leader]?" from the secretary survey and "How many of the following households are in [number of] villages under you? A. Households in villages" from the traditional leader survey (R1). Then, figures from the former were divided by figures from the latter. The loss of observations in Panel A comes from not being asked (N=1) and "don't know (N=12)," and the loss in Panel B comes from no recipient of the FISP in a given jurisdiction (N=507). The calculated value exceeded the range of -1 and 1 (N=1), missing the number of recipients (N=13) and missing the number of households (N=33).

Despite the downsizing of the program in recent years, the MASAF PWP remains a valuable private good in a resource-scarce rural Malawi. Many traditional leaders, in their interviews, often mentioned the project to be an important social welfare program. The duration of project participation has become elongated from 12 days to 48 days per year since 2012, split into two cycles of 24 days each (Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg 2017). The first and second cycles take place during the planting season (October to December) and after the harvest season (June and July), respectively, targeting the same beneficiaries in both cycles (Beegle, Galasso, and

Goldberg 2017).[86] In each cycle, beneficiaries work for 12-day waves each month for two months, and payments are made in cash generally within one or two weeks of the end of each wave (IZA Institute of Labor Economics n.d.). The wage rate is MWK 490 for four hours of work per day (USD 0.60/day) for a total payment of MWK 5,880 (USD 7.17) for a 12-day wave and MWK 22,320 (USD 27.22) for a year in a country with a per capita GNI of only USD 380 in 2019 (van de Meerendonk, Cunha, and Juergens, n.d.).[87] The wage from the program has been adjusted for inflation over years of implementation[88] but was set to be below the minimum wage (MWK 500) to ensure that projects only attract laborers with few other income-generating opportunities (van de Meerendonk, Cunha, and Juergens, n.d.).

The beneficiaries of the MASAF PWP are determined via two stages. The first stage is pro-poor geographic targeting. The amount of funds for each district is proportionally allocated according to population size, poverty rates, and other government measures of the vulnerability of the district, and then district officials apportion the given budget to a subset of extension planning areas (EPAs) within the district based on poverty and vulnerability level (Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg 2017). In the second stage, traditional leaders use a mixture of community-based targeting and self-selection. The high-rank traditional leaders in EPAs allot funds to a subset of GVHs; GVHs determine how many households from each village will be employed for the PWP based on available funding and work with VHs and other members of each village committee to select participating households (Beegle, Galasso, and Goldberg 2017). The community-based targeting and self-selection method endow varying degrees of traditional leaders' authority in

[86] The timeline of the MASAF PWP was synchronized with the FISP to promote beneficiaries of the PWP using the earned income to redeem subsidized farm input coupons (IZA Institute of Labor Economics n.d.).
[87] The GNI data is from the World Bank database.
[88] The wage was increased from MWK 200 to MWK 300 in 2012 (IZA Institute of Labor Economics n.d.) and then to the current rate in 2014.

selecting beneficiaries. Secretaries of traditional leaders reported that it is "very difficult (68%)", "somewhat difficult (16%)," "somewhat easy (9%)," or "very easy (7%)" for their leaders to register someone of their preference as a beneficiary of the MASAF PWP.[89]

The favoritism for a ruling family on the PWP is measured as the probability of a ruling family receiving the benefit subtracted by the corresponding probability of an average villager. For this variable, I collected the following four statistics in the jurisdiction of a traditional leader: the number of households in a jurisdiction; the number of households of members of a traditional leader's ruling family; the number of households of beneficiaries of the PWP; and the number of households of ruling family members among the selected beneficiaries. The differences in probability range from -1 to 1; -1 indicates absolute favoritism for a regular villager, 1 points to utter partiality for a ruling family member, and 0 means that a ruling family member and an average villager are equally likely to receive the benefit.

In using this measurement, I assume that ruling family members and villagers do not have divergent levels of demand for the PWP and that there is no natural variation in how likely ruling family members are (versus villagers) to seek inclusion within the private good legitimately. One might expect that ruling family members are wealthier than average villagers, yet there has been little empirical evidence to support this idea. In fact, the data from two districts of Southern Malawi demonstrates that those who reported as being related to a traditional chief were slightly poorer than those who were not related (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020).

Panel A in Figure 4.3 presents the probability of being selected as the MASAF PWP beneficiary for a ruling family member, and Panel B shows the difference in the likelihoods

[89] Secretaries in jurisdictions where at least one household benefited from the PWP evaluated their leaders' leverage over the beneficiary list of the PWP to be slightly higher than those secretaries in jurisdictions with no beneficiary. Secretaries in jurisdictions that received the MASAF PWP in 2019 reported "very difficult (59%)," "somewhat difficult (18%)," "somewhat easy (12%)," and "very easy (11%)."

between a ruling family member and a regular villager (i.e., the favoritism for a ruling family). Both panels suggest that regular villagers are generally more likely to be selected as recipients than members of a ruling family. As the following graphs focus on the probability of an individual ruling family member (or regular villager) receiving the benefit, the fact that the ruling family members constitute only a minute proportion of the net population in each jurisdiction does not matter.



Figure 4.3 Probability of Being Selected as Beneficiary of MASAF PWP

Note: Survey of Traditional Leaders Round 1 (2020-2021) N= 684 & Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021) N = 669.

2.3. Farm Input Subsidy Program

Fertilizer subsidies are introduced to spur agricultural production, improve food security, and enhance rural income. The rationale behind the program is that input subsidies reduce costs, increase input profitability, lessen farmers' financial constraints, and encourage the adoption of modern inputs to boost production (Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, and Fisher 2013). The subsidy program is widespread across the developing world and takes up significant fractions of government budgets in some cases. Many countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zambia, implemented input subsidies for agriculture (Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, and Fisher 2013). Sri Lanka, Malawi, and India devote 10–20% of their budget to fertilizer subsidies (Wiggins and Brooks 2010), and Zambia and Tanzania spend 1–2% of their budget on the program (Baltzer and Hansen 2011). In Malawi, The FISP subsidizes agricultural production to boost the incomes of resource-poor farmers. Farmers with vouchers only need to pay USD 1.70 to obtain USD 97.60 worth of items that will boost their agricultural production; as the vouchers cover 98% of the prices for farm inputs, their take-up rates are reported to be 100% (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020). [90] [91]

Malawi's farm input subsidy program is an archetypal example of a large-scale, national program. Smaller input subsidy programs have existed since 1998 in Malawi (Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, and Fisher 2013), but the government of Malawi started implementing the large-scale FISP in the 2005/06 cropping season after a drought in 2004 (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020; Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, and Fisher 2013). This largely government-funded program reached its peak in 2018/19 (Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, and Fisher 2013), receiving 74% of the Ministry of

[90] All the statistics in this sentence are based on 2013.
[91] The ratio from the redemption price to the fertilizer voucher value increased from 64% in 2005/2006 to 98% in 2012/2013. See E. Chirwa and Dorward (2013) for variations across fiscal years.

Agriculture budget and 16% of the entire Malawian government budget and accounting for 3-6% of their GDP (Arndt, Pauw, and Thurlow 2016).[92] The program aims to distribute subsidized fertilizer to approximately 50% of farmers in the country (Dorward and Chirwa 2011). This figure is roughly equivalent to 40% of the country's population, as 80% of the people are farmers. However, only about a quarter of households in the nation were selected as beneficiaries in recent years. According to the beneficiary list obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture, approximately one million in 2019 and 900,000 in 2018 households were selected as recipients of the farm subsidy program out of approximately four million households in the country.[93] Figure 4.4 below shows that 98% of the sampled jurisdictions in the study area had at least one recipient of the FISP (Panel A), and the median value of the ratio of the recipient to the population in a given jurisdiction is 19% (Panel B).[94]

[92] The program started with 5.6% of the national budget in 2005/06 and grew to 16.2% of the national budget in 2008/09. With a substantial decrease in subsequent years, the program accounted for 6.5% of the national budget in 2010/11. The high variability in the program's annual budget is deemed to be attributable to the availability of donor aid since the national budget in Malawi considerably depends on donor support. For example, budgetary support from donors constituted 43.7% of the proposed national budget in the 2007/08 fiscal year (Government of Malawi and World Bank, n.d.; Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 2007).

[93] According to National Statistical Office, about two million smallholder farm households received coupons for subsidized fertilizer in 2005/06 (NSO 2010). In 2012/13, the program reached 1.5 million recipients from the registered farm households (Dorward and Chirwa 2011). The number of registered farm households is variable across different sources. The figure in 2008/09 is 2.5 million according to Dorward and Chirwa (2011), but 3.4 million according to the MoAFS. Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, and Fisher (2013) argue that the lower figure is more credible than the higher estimate. With 4.7 people in an average household in Malawi, using the 3.4 million figure places the total smallholder population at over 15 million, exceeding the national population.

[94] The percentage of households that received the FISP is significantly lower than the official target of 50%. Too few coupons reach the villages due to corruption (S. Holden and Lunduka 2018). The Malawi FISP has been criticized for widespread diversion and leakage (Dorward et al. 2008; S. Holden and Lunduka 2018). There have been reports of government officials and traditional leaders taking coupons and reselling subsidized fertilizers as commercial fertilizers and recipient households reselling vouchers and fertilizers in the secondary market (Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, and Fisher 2013). Moreover, there are variations across districts and regions. Data collected from two districts – Machinga and Balaka – in southern Malawi inform that the percentage of households that received input subsidies was 58% in 2008 and 81% in 2012 (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020).



Figure 4.4 Beneficiary Coverage of FISP

Note: Survey of Traditional Leaders Round 1 (2020-2021) N= 684 & Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021) N=669. The survey question for Panel A was "How many households in all [number] villages under the [title of traditional leader] were selected as beneficiaries for the Farm Input Subsidy Program in 2019?" where respondents of the secretary survey provided a numeric answer. The values in the Panel B come from two survey questions "Among the households which were selected as beneficiaries of the Farm Input Subsidy Program in 2019, how many of them are ruling family members of [title of traditional leader]?" from the secretary survey and "How many of the following households are in [number of] villages under you? A. Households in villages" from the traditional leader survey (R1). Then, figures from the former were divided by figures from the latter. The loss of observations in Panel A comes from "refused (N=3)" and "do not know (N=9)," and the loss in Panel B comes from no recipient of the SCTP in a given jurisdiction (N=10). The calculated value exceeded the range of -1 and 1 (N=6), missing the number of recipients (N=12), and missing the number of households (N=32).

The distribution of vouchers is timed to be in September/October preceding the main rainy season, which runs from planting in November/December until harvest in April-August, to avoid logistical complications from poor conditions of feeder roads accompanying heavy rain (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020; E. Chirwa and Dorward 2013). The vouchers are redeemable at local agricultural shops. The specific items covered by the voucher subsidy evolved over time (see E. Chirwa and Dorward 2013; Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, and Fisher 2013), but the four chief items covered throughout different fiscal years were 1) planting fertilizer (a 50-kilogram bag of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium), 2) top-dressing fertilizer (a 50-kilogram bag of urea), 3) hybrid maize seeds (a 5-kilogram bag), and 4) hybrid groundnut seeds (a 2-kilogram bag). These four items

combined were worth $97.60 in a country with $348.43 GDP per capita, and farmers with vouchers only needed to pay $1.70 to redeem them.[95] Since 98% of the prices for farm inputs are covered by the coupon, the take-up rate of FISP beneficiaries is reported to be 100% (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020).[96]

The identification of beneficiaries has four main stages (E. W. Chirwa, Matita, and Dorward 2011). First, the government conducts a national farmer registration census. Second, based on the farming population and the acreage under cultivation, the central government allocates vouchers to districts (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020). Third, the local government – the District Agriculture Development Office (DADO) – distributes vouchers across villages based on farming population shares (E. W. Chirwa, Matita, and Dorward 2011; E. Chirwa and Dorward 2013). Finally, once the number of subsidies available to the jurisdiction is known, a list of eligible villagers is made in each jurisdiction through community meetings - which is the stage when GVHs or VHs can exercise their discretion - and is then audited by the DADO. Upon the receipt of beneficiary lists, the DADO establishes a date and venue for distributing the vouchers. Traditional leaders gather up villagers, but a staff member from the DADO distributes the coupons. Listed beneficiaries have to show their voter registration card to receive the vouchers and redeem them at the retail stores (MoAFS 2009).

There is no clear-cut answer to who is selected as a beneficiary of the voucher. Although the intention is to target the poor and vulnerable, there are no strictly defined official eligibility criteria for the subsidy (Lunduka, Ricker-Gilbert, and Fisher 2013). The official FISP guidelines state that beneficiaries should be full-time resource-poor smallholders or vulnerable populations

[95] All the statistics in this sentence are based on 2013.
[96] The ratio from the redemption price to the fertilizer voucher value increased from 64% in 2005/2006 to 98% in 2012/2013. See E. Chirwa and Dorward (2013) for variations across fiscal years.

such as the elderly; those who are HIV positive; households headed by women, children, orphans, or the physically challenged; and heads of households looking after the elderly and physically challenged (MoAFS, 2009). However, it is important to note that there is no threshold cut for what defines "resource poor." The guideline is also unclear about how much the vulnerable populations, who are likely to be unable to be full-time farmers, are prioritized over resource-poor able-body full-time farmers. Moreover, there is little empirical evidence that the subsidy program effectively targets the poor. Holden and Lunduka (2013) find that the program enhances food production and food security, but it does not target the poor better than a random assignment. Similarly, Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson (2017) discover that the subsidies are distributed to households with higher returns to farm inputs, with a minor prevalence of nepotism, increasing the net production but diverging from poverty-targeting.[97]

Extant studies – conducted several years ago – present evidence that traditional leaders have *de facto* discretionary power to determine the recipient list. In 2012 and 2013, around 70% of households believed that the chiefs decided on voucher recipients before the official meeting (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020; Dorward et al. 2013). The corresponding figure reported by village chiefs remains at 62% (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020). In short, reports from both villagers and leaders attest to the leaders' involvement in deciding beneficiaries.

However, my interviews with traditional leaders and their secretaries portray a different picture. While a small number of traditional leaders admitted their involvement in the beneficiary list,[98] many others reported that they no longer have the authority.[99] The secretary survey data also cross-validates traditional leaders' limited role in selecting FISP beneficiaries. When asked how

[97] Multiple Studies found the subsidy program effective in increasing crop yields (Arndt, Pauw, and Thurlow 2016; Chibwana et al. 2014).
[98] Interview 058, 07/29/2019, Chikwawa.
[99] Interview 020, 07/02/2019, Kasungu.

easy or difficult it is for their leader to register someone for the program, 77% of secretaries reported that it is "very difficult," while 13% reported "somewhat difficult," 6% "somewhat easy," and 4% "very easy."[100] In an open-ended question in the survey, some secretaries reported that "the leader decided beneficiaries before 2018, but now they [the government officials] come with their own list" and "the traditional leader's role in the FISP is only to mobilize villagers to gather in one place to receive the vouchers."[101] Taking all these accounts together, I conclude that traditional chiefs used to have their share of control over the FISP, but their influence has deteriorated or was dissipating at the time of the data collection.

The favoritism for a ruling family in the FISP is measured by the probability of a ruling family receiving the benefit deducted by the corresponding probability of an average villager. To measure this variable, I utilize the following four statistics in the jurisdiction of a traditional leader: the number of households in a jurisdiction; the number of households of members of a traditional leader's ruling family; the number of households of beneficiaries of the FISP; and the number of households of ruling family members among the selected beneficiaries. Like how favoritism in the PWP is measured, the differences in probability range from -1 to 1. Figure 4.5 presents the probability of a ruling family member being selected as the FISP beneficiary (Panel A) and the difference in the probabilities between a ruling family member and a regular villager (Panel B). Unlike the PWP, the high density above zero in Panel B suggests that ruling family members are generally more likely to be selected as a recipient in comparison to an average villager in jurisdictions where the FISP is offered.

[100] When the sample is narrowed down to jurisdictions with FISP beneficiaries, the proportion breakdown remains the same because most jurisdictions have at least one beneficiary.
[101] Secretary survey 0961, 02/18/2021, Kasungu.



Figure 4.5 Probability of Being Selected as Beneficiary of FISP

Note: Survey of Traditional Leaders Round 1 (2020-2021) N= 684 & Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021) N = 669.

2.4. Social Cash Transfer Program

The SCTP, commonly known as *Mtukula Pakhomo* in Malawi, is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program targeting 10% of ultra-poor and labor-constrained households and aims to reduce poverty and hunger and increase school enrollment.[102] CCT programs seek to reduce poverty by transferring money to persons who meet specific criteria, unlike unconditional cash transfer programs without any conditions upon the receivers' actions. Many countries in the world, especially in Latin America, adopted CCT programs (e.g., Programa de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion in Mexico, Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil in Brazil, and the Atencion a Crisis in Nicaragua), and studies have systematically examined and proven the effectiveness of the programs in child development (Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld 2008; Macours, Premand, and Vakis 2012; Manley, Fernald, and Gertler 2015). While CCT programs are not as widespread in

[102] "Malawi's Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP)" *The Transfer Project.* (https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/countries-2/malawi/) accessed Jan 29, 2021.

Africa as in Latin America, many pilot studies have been conducted in African countries (see K. Kilburn et al. 2020; K. N. Kilburn et al. 2018).

In Malawi, the program followed a strategy of gradual expansion with three phases. In the first phase funded by the Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau (KfW) - German Development Bank - and Irish Aid, the SCTP was implemented as a pilot in the Mchinji district, with eight other districts following suit (Brugh et al. 2018). In the second phase (2009-2012), the program was launched as a regular state program and included in the national budget, but KfW and Irish Aid took over the funding of the program because the Malawian government failed to deliver funds for the initiative (de Arruda 2018; van de Meerendonk, Cunha, and Juergens 2016). The program entered the third phase in 2012 with funding from Irish Aid, the EU, and the World Bank (Angeles et al. 2016; van de Meerendonk, Cunha, and Juergens 2016). The government of Malawi also started funding one district in 2012 (van de Meerendonk, Cunha, and Juergens 2016).[103] With each district's coverage target set to be ten percent of the population (van de Meerendonk, Cunha, and Juergens 2016), the SCTP went to a full scale in eighteen out of twenty-eight districts in 2015 (Abdoulayi et al. 2016). As of August 2020, the program reached approximately 283,000 households and 1,195,000 individuals (7% of the total population).[104] Once the program runs full-scale and nationwide, the total beneficiaries of the program are projected to reach 319,000 households and over 1.5 million individuals (van de Meerendonk, Cunha, and Juergens, n.d.). In the Kasungu district, the study area, 17,000 households were earmarked to receive the benefit for four years as of 2018 (Khonje 2018). In the sampled jurisdictions in the study area, 81% of jurisdictions had at least one SCTP

[103] With no funding coming from the government at the first two phases, the government was simply an implementing agent, but they started to contribute money and pledged to provide at least 10% of the funding after 2010 (Jimu 2015).
[104] "Malawi's Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP)" *The Transfer Project.* (https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/countries-2/malawi/)

recipient household (Panel A), and typically 5% of the population in a given jurisdiction benefited from the SCTP (Panel B) in Figure 4.6.



Figure 4.6 Beneficiary Coverage of SCTP

Note: Survey of Traditional Leaders Round 1 (2020-2021) N= 684 & Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021) N=669. The survey question for Panel A was "How many households in all [number] villages under the [title of traditional leader] were selected as beneficiaries for the Social Cash Transfer Program in 2019?" where respondents of the secretary survey provided a numeric answer. The values in the Panel B come from two survey questions "Among the households which were selected as beneficiaries of the Social Cash Transfer Program in 2019, how many of them are ruling family members of [title of traditional leader]?" from the secretary survey and "How many of the following households are in [number of] villages under you? A. Households in villages" from the traditional leader survey (R1). Then, figures from the former were divided by figures from the latter. The loss of observations in Panel A comes from "refused (N=2)" and "don't know (N=14)," and the loss in Panel B comes from no recipient of the SCTP in a given jurisdiction (N=122). The calculated value exceeded the range of -1 and 1 (N=2), missing the number of recipients (N=16) and missing the number of households (N=29).

Transfer amounts vary by household size and the number of school-aged children. As of August 2020, the monthly transfer amount for the household of sizes one, two, three, and four or more are MWK 2,600, 3,300, 4,400, and 5,600, respectively.[105] [106] Then, a bonus to incentivize school enrollment is provided to each school-aged child: MWK 800 for primary school and MWK

[105] "Malawi's Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP)" *The Transfer Project.* (https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/countries-2/malawi/) accessed Jan 29, 2021.

[106] The listed amounts are equivalent to $3.17, $4.02, $5.37, and $6.83. The initial transfer amounts ranged from MWK 1,700 to 3,700 with a bonus of MWK 500 for each primary school-age child and MWK 10,000 for a secondary school-age child, but it was adjusted to inflation.

1,500 for secondary school per month. Benefit values were set to cover the gap between the consumption of the lowest income quintile household (MWK 5,103/month in 2006) and the extreme poverty line (MWK 6,447/month) (Angeles et al. 2016; C. Miller, Tsoka, and Reichert 2008). The transfer amounts take up about 23% of pre-intervention household consumption (The Transfer Project 2017). The cash transfers have positive impacts in the following respects: improved nutrition and food security, larger curative care-seeking rates, higher education rates (Abdoulayi et al. 2015; Brugh et al. 2018; C. M. Miller et al. 2010; C. M. Miller, Tsoka, and Reichert 2011; C. Miller and Tsoka 2012), the increased overall value of production, the higher number of livestock, reduced household debts, and decreased child labor (Asfaw, Pickmans, and Davis 2016).

The SCTP selection process involves a combination of community-based, categorical (i.e., dependency ratio of at least 3:1), and proxy means testing (PMT)[107] to target the poorest 10% of households in the catchment area (de Arruda 2018; van de Meerendonk n.d.). As a first step, a Community Social Support Committee (CSSC) - which consists of up to twelve members who are elected by the community at a village cluster meeting - is constituted (Chinsinga 2009), and its members collect information about all households in the catchment area via a standardized form known as Form 1 (Angeles et al. 2016; de Arruda 2018; van de Meerendonk, Cunha, and Juergens

[107] Proxy means testing refers to the method of measuring household wealth with household or individual characteristics. Using various household or individual characteristics as proxies for wealth is contrasted with simple means-testing, which measures the wealth of a household with a single indicator such as a household income (Gazeaud 2020).

2016).[108] [109] The completed hard copies are digitized and fed into the SCTP Management Information System (MIS), which validates the household dependency ratio and estimates the poverty level of households through PMT (Angeles et al. 2016; van de Meerendonk, Cunha, and Juergens 2016). Lastly, the District Social Welfare Office (DSWO) organizes a meeting with the CSSC and other community members to correct any inclusion and exclusion errors (de Arruda 2018). The community assesses whether certain households filled in incorrect information, which is subsequently to be replaced with a new Form. However, the community holds no power to arbitrarily alter the ranking of priority eligibility (de Arruda 2018).

After 10% of households in the catchment area are enrolled in the program through the process, the selected households are called for another community meeting at which they receive explanations about the program rules (van de Meerendonk, Cunha, and Juergens 2016). Payments are made manually on a bi-monthly basis due to logistical complications for doling out every month.[110] The existing accounts about little room for traditional leaders' interference in the SCTP accord with the data from my original Secretary Survey: 75% of secretaries reported that it is "very difficult" for their leader to register someone for the SCTP; 17% reported "somewhat difficult," 5% "somewhat easy," and 3% "very easy."[111]

[108] Up until 2012, the discretionary power to assess the poverty of households and identify 10% of eligible households remained with the CSSC (de Arruda 2018). The CSSC determined which households to visit to assess their eligibility for the SCTP and collected basic household data from door-to-door visits (de Arruda 2018). They also nominated about 15% of households per village cluster in order to achieve the transfer's target of a 10 % coverage rate (Jimu 2015). The list also ranked the most to the least deserving households (Chinsinga 2009). Then, extension workers verified the information on the forms, and traditional leaders signed each form (Chinsinga 2009). However, since 2012, every household in catchment areas fill in Form 1, and the qualification process for the SCTP has become automated (de Arruda 2018).

[109] Form 1 collects information on the demographic composition of the household, income sources of the household, their access to meals and other consumption items, and the health status of the family members.

[110] Two districts (i.e., Balaka and Mchinji) introduced e-payment pilots (de Arruda 2018), but not the study area.

[111] The proportion breakdown when the sample is narrowed down to jurisdictions with SCTP beneficiaries is 77% (very difficult), 17% (somewhat difficult), 4% (somewhat easy), and 2% (very easy).

Similar to the favoritism measurement for the PWP and FISP, the partiality for a ruling family in the SCTP is measured by the probability of an average villager being enrolled in the program subtracted from the probability of a ruling family being enrolled in the same program. The favoritism for the ruling family variable ranges from -1 to 1. Figure 4.7 presents the probability of a ruling family member being selected as the SCTP beneficiary in Panel A and the difference in the probabilities between a ruling family member and a regular villager in Panel B. The fact that observations are concentrated around 0 in Panel B shows that the likelihood of receiving the benefit typically remains the same for a ruling family member and an average villager. However, the long tail on the right side in Panel B attests that the ruling family is more likely to benefit from favoritism than regular villagers.



Figure 4.7 Probability of Being Selected as Beneficiary of SCTP

Note: Survey of Traditional Leaders Round 1 (2020-2021) N= 684 & Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021), N = 669.

2.5. Summary

While all the selected goods meet the criteria for private goods or services, they have dissimilarities as well. For one, the majority of traditional leaders appraised the FISP (65%) as the first and

foremost important good, the SCTP (54%) as the second, and the PWP (58%) as the last when they were requested to provide personal priorities among the three (see Figure 4.8).[112] [113]



Figure 4.8 Importance of Private Goods

Note: Survey of Traditional Leaders (2020-2021) N= 648. The question in verbatim is, "In your opinion, which of the following three programs is the most important for the welfare of someone in your jurisdiction? Rank them from one to three, where one means the most important, and three means the least important. The programs are Farm Input Subsidy Program, Social Cash Transfer Program, MASAF Public Works Program."

[112] The survey question presented the FISP, the SCTP, and the PWP for ratings, not the customary court. There are many differences between the social protection programs and the customary court. The dissimilarities between the welfare programs and the customary court might make it hard for respondents to compare them, and this incomparability might raise a question about the construct validity of the survey question. The initiative of the social welfare programs lies with the Malawian government, while the initiative of the customary court lies with traditional leaders. The welfare programs follow formal rules and regulations set by the government, while the court rulings abide by the customary law and practices.

[113] The welfare programs were read as either 1) FISP first and PWP last, or 2) PWP first and FISP last. The survey platform was programmed to determine the order of the list randomly.

Moreover, there are variations across different private goods with regards to how much influence individual traditional leaders have on the distribution of a given private good or service. According to leaders' secretaries, 47% of traditional leaders do not give verdicts in the customary court. Secretaries also conveyed that it is "very difficult" for the traditional leader whom they serve to register someone of their choosing as a beneficiary for the PWP (69%), the FISP (77%), and SCTP (75%).



Figure 4.9 Leverage over Private Goods

Note: Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021) N= 669. The question for Panel A is, "In the traditional court of the current [title of traditional leader], who decides or influences rulings to the cases?" with choices of "only traditional leader," "traditional leader & other people," and "only other people." The verbatim question for Panel B-D is "How easy or difficult is it for the current [title of traditional leader] to register someone of his/her choice for the [Public Works Program/Farm Input Subsidy Program/Social Cash Transfer Program]?" with response options from "very easy" to "very difficult." Response options are recoded so that their values are commensurate with leaders' leverage in the court and social welfare programs.

Table 4.2 provides a summary of the different features of each selected private good. Generally, the perceived importance of a good or service is more closely tied to its value than its coverage, and traditional leaders have lower leverage over goods with higher values than goods with lower values. The good or service that the largest number of traditional leaders have leverage over is customary court cases, followed by the PWP. Yet, the court ruling pertains only to people involved in a dispute. The benefit of the PWP is substantially lower than the FISP or SCTP, and the beneficiaries are required to provide their labor which also accompanies an opportunity cost. These aspects help us understand why leaders reported that the PWP is less important for the welfare of villagers than the other two social welfare programs. The FISP and SCTP are similar in many aspects. The programs provide relatively high benefits to their beneficiaries and target the poor without any conditions. They are also considered to be the most important for the welfare of villagers but the least amenable to being under the oversight of traditional leaders. However, they present some differences in their coverages and the target populations. While the FISP covers about 20% of the population in the study area, the SCTP provides benefits to 5%. Furthermore, the target population of the FISP is more loosely defined than the SCTP.

	Importance	**Leverage**	**Value**	**Coverage**	**Target**	**Cost**
Court rulings	N/A	1	$6.10-$36.59	N/A	People in dispute	N/A
PWP	3	2	$27.11	6%	Non-labor constraint poor	Labor & opportunity cost
FISP	1	4	$92.96	19%	Poor and vulnerable	N/A
SCTP	2	3	$38.05-$81.95	5%	The poorest 10%	N/A

Table 4.2 Features of Selected Private Goods

Note: The numbers in the first two columns indicate rankings, where one means the most important in the first column and the highest leverage in the second column.

With all these different characteristics of private goods and services, it is hard to establish ex-ante expectations about which good would be the most or least likely case for my hypothesis. If findings support my hypotheses about political competition and increased nepotism across the board, it suggests that the relationship is not highly dependent on the characteristics of each good. On the other hand, suppose the hypotheses hold only in some private goods but not in others. In that case, it means that some of the varying factors (i.e., traditional leaders' leverage over a good/service, the value of a good/service, their coverage, and conditionality) might be a significant determinant for the distribution of private goods. Overall, examining private goods with different features provides a deeper insight into the generalizability of the hypothesis and will contribute to future studies.

3. Estimation

Focusing on the four selected private goods and services, I evaluate whether members of the ruling family are more likely to receive favorable treatment from their leaders relative to other villagers when a competitive challenge against a leader emerges (H_1) and when the risk of competition is high (H_3). To assess the association, I estimate ordered logistic models for customary court cases, and ordinary least squares (OLS) models for the PWP, FISP, and SCTP like below:

$$Favoritism_{sj} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Challenge_j + \beta_2 MaleCandidate_j + \beta_3 X_j + \beta_4 \varepsilon_j \ \ldots (1)$$

$$Favoritism_{sj} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Challenge_j + \beta_2 BothCandidate_j + \beta_3 X_j + \beta_4 \varepsilon_j \ \ldots (2)$$

$Favoritism_{sj}$ refers to the degree to which the distribution of good or service *s* in jurisdiction *j* is favorable to members of a ruling family vis-à-vis a regular villager, where a

jurisdiction refers to a village or a cluster of villages.[114] The survey questions calibrating each private good or service distribution are introduced in the previous sections. To recap, the favoritism in customary courts variable takes a value of 1 if the ruling was favorable to a ruling family, 0.5 if no clear winner, and 0 if the ruling was unfavorable to a ruling family member. For favoritism in the three social protection programs (i.e., the PWP, FISP, and SCTP), I compute the difference between the probability of a ruling family being selected as a beneficiary and the corresponding probability for a regular villager using the following formula:

$$Favoritism = \frac{num\ of\ beneficiary\ in\ ruling\ family}{num\ of\ ruling\ family} - \frac{num\ of\ beneficiary\ in\ not\ ruling\ family}{num\ of\ not\ ruling\ family}$$

where the value ranges from -1 to 1. Positive values of the *Favoritism* variable indicate that a ruling family is more likely to receive a given resource than a regular villager.

Challenge, the explanatory variable, measures the explicit attempt to depose an incumbent leader. This variable utilizes the following survey question "After the current [title of the leader] was installed, have you noticed anybody in the ruling family expressing their willingness to take the [title of the leader] position while the traditional leader is alive?" which requires a "Yes (1)" or "No (0)" response.

This survey question does not provide a clear time horizon regarding the emergence of competitive challenges. However, the survey questions about the distribution of the PWP/FISP/SCTP expressly referred to the year 2019. From the fact that traditional leaders who

[114] Traditional leaders recruited for surveys include *de facto* village headmen or group village headmen. Village headmen oversee only one village, but group village headmen superintend several of them. To embrace the variation in the number of villages under the recruited respondents' supervision, I use the term jurisdiction instead of a village. 74 out of 682 jurisdictions in the sample are a single village, and the median value of the number of villages is 6.

encountered a competitive challenger had such experience only once in thirteen years, most competitive challenge cases likely happened in years prior to 2019. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the ruling family would attempt to overturn the leadership because their leader tends to rule in favor of them or allocate resources to them. Thus, concerns about reverse causality can be alleviated.

Other key variables include *MaleCandidate* in equation 1 and *BothCandidate* in equation 2, which approximate the prospect of competition with the number of ruling family members who were eligible to succeed a traditional leader position as their birthright. *MaleCandidate* and *BothCandiate* focus on eligible candidates of male and both genders, respectively (see Chapter 3 for details about the variable operationalization).[115] The number of eligible candidates measured in both ways is logarithmized because they are skewed towards the right and have a skewness higher than one (see the distribution of the variables in Chapter 3 Appendix A).[116]

Potential covariates (*Xj*) vary by outcome variables. For rulings in customary courts, I control for leaders' demographic variables (i.e., gender,[117] age,[118] matrilineal/patrilineal ethnic

[115] Male candidates in patrilineal ethnic groups include sons of the last traditional leader, and the male candidates in matrilineal ethnic groups include nephews of the last leader. However, some ruling families of traditional leadership reported that female members in the family are also considered candidates. Thus, I include female candidates – daughters in patriliny and nieces in matriliny – as well as their male counterparts in the alternative measurement *BothCandidate*.

[116] I used a syntax *log1p* in R for these variables and other logarithmized variables in this chapter because they all include a value of 0.

[117] A message about child marriage reform instills public support only when the message comes from female traditional leaders (Muriaas et al. 2017). The gender of traditional leaders may matter in other agendas beyond gender-related issues.

[118] Baldwin (2019) finds that younger chiefs, who have a longer life expectancy, are better at eliciting villagers' contributions to building and improving schools than older chiefs. As leaders' age affects their performance, it might also impact leaders' decisions about distributing private goods.

group,[119] education level, wealth,[120] years in power,[121] and position[122]), the enforceability of the first eligible person rule, and whether a ruling family member was a plaintiff or not. For the distribution of government resources, I control for demographic variables of both a leader (as listed above) and their village (i.e., the number of households in a village, [123] the number of ruling family households, [124] the number of households related to a leader, [125] and the number of non-coethnic households to a leader) [126] [127] and the enforceability of the first eligible person rule.[128] Standard errors are clustered at the TA level across all models. See Chapter 3 Appendix B for the codebook of control variables and descriptive statistics.

The quantities of interest here are β_1 and β_2 in both equations, and I test the following hypothesis. Traditional leaders tend to favor their ruling family members after experiencing a leadership contestation – but not before – as a competitive challenge activates traditional leaders' political survival mindset. As leaders who experience a competitive challenge are incentivized to

[119] Ethnic identity might be a crucial demographic variable as the practices in traditional leadership might vary across different ethnic groups. However, due to the limited sample size, the sample includes only one or two cases for some ethnic groups. Thus, instead of including ethnic dummies, I focus on the distinction between matriliny/patriliny.
[120] Education and wealth are key indicators of one's socioeconomic status. If traditional leaders represent villagers' interests as they rely on the same livelihood as villagers, their socioeconomic status would be a contributing factor to leaders' performance.
[121] Years in power can be a critical predictor of leaders' performance, but the direction is unclear. New leaders may be more ambitious and motivated, while experienced leaders may have skills and knowledge.
[122] The position – GVH vs. VH – is related to the number of villages they govern. There may also be more prestige in a higher-level position, making the position more competitive.
[123] The size of jurisdictions could be a predictor of resource distribution. Leaders in small communities might feel more accountable to their villagers and exhibit less nepotistic behavior than leaders in large communities.
[124] The size of ruling families is likely to be correlated with the number of eligible candidates and the emergence of competitive challenges. Having a sizeable ruling family might also be related to the distribution of private goods, as a large selectorate makes buying their loyalty costly for leaders.
[125] The number of households related to a traditional leader is an important confounder; leaders might share more empathetic sentiments with villagers if a larger share of the villagers is related to themselves.
[126] In comparing ethnically heterogeneous and homogenous groups, studies found higher numbers of disputes and conflicts in heterogeneous areas (Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray 2012) and less cooperation among members in heterogeneous groups (Habyarimana et al. 2007). The lack of harmony and cooperation might make it difficult for leaders to mobilize village labor to provide public goods. Also, many studies investigated whether leaders favor their coethnics in resource distributions.
[127] I logarithmized all these variables because they are skewed towards the right and have a skewness higher than one.
[128] Some traditional leadership applies the first eligibility customary law more rigidly than the others. If ruling families who strictly hold on to the customary law are less judicious and/or benevolent, the stringent/lenient application of the rule might be related to the unfair/fair distribution of resources.

deliver perks for their ruling family, favoritism for ruling families and the rise of competitive challengers will show a positive association ($\beta_1 > 0$ in Equations 1 & 2). On the other hand, the mere number of ruling family members who were eligible for succession, which approximates the likelihood of leadership contestation before an actual competitive challenge, would show no statistically significant correlation with increased favoritism for ruling families ($\beta_2 = 0$).

4. Findings

Figure 4.10 below presents the hypotheses test results from the full sample regardless of how much influence traditional leaders' secretaries reported that their leaders have over a given good or service. The left panels show the coefficient estimates (β_1) of competitive challenges (*Challenge*), and the right panels display the estimates (β_2) of potential challengers (*MaleCandidate or BothCandidate*). The results show that competitive challenges over traditional leadership pronounce the favoritism for a ruling family in the realm of customary court rulings and the SCTP beneficiary selection but in the PWP and FISP (Panel A). Being aligned with the hypotheses, having a larger pool of potential challengers is not a predictor of favoritism in any private good or service in examination (Panel B).

The output shows that, for traditional leaders who faced competitive challenges, the log odds of a customary ruling verdict favoring a ruling family under the rule of a leader who experienced competitive challenges is 0.90 (equation 1) or 0.91 (equation 2) points higher than that of traditional leaders who did not undergo the challenges.[129] In other words, the odds of customary court verdicts favoring a ruling family member vis-à-vis an average villager with

[129] However, that does not mean that disputes involving a ruling family are an uneven playing field for regular villagers. Indeed, the plaintiff of most cases surrounding a ruling family member is a regular villager (186/286, 65%), and the likelihood of getting a favorable verdict for themselves when they are a plaintiff is 39% for a ruling family and 85% for regular villagers.

competitive challenges is 2.46 times (equation 1) or 2.48 times (equation 2) than that without the challenges. Moreover, under the rule of traditional leaders who underwent competitive challenges, the probability differences between a ruling family member and an average villager to be the SCTP beneficiary is six percentage points higher than under the rule of traditional leaders who did not go through the leadership challenges. The likelihood of a ruling family member benefiting from the SCTP is already higher than that of an average villager by 12.8%, even without competitive challenges, but the gap becomes even wider – to 17.1% - with competitive challenges.



Figure 4.10 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods on Competition: Full Sample

Note: Thick and thin lines indicate 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively. The numbers of observations are shown in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the TA level. The X-axes of the right panels are on a log scale. The estimates of the risk of competition remain the same even when the competitive challenge variable is removed. See Appendix 4A.1 for regression tables.

One may wonder if traditional leaders' leverage over a good/service is a confounding variable that influences both the independent and dependent variables. If so, not accounting for the variable results in biased estimates. In plain language, traditional leaders with minute leverage over the court or private good distribution decision would not be able to significantly change the outcome even if they intend to do so. Thus, the variations in the leverage might mask the correlations between power struggle over traditional leadership and favoritism in the distribution of private goods/services.

Figure 4.9 shows the variations in light of individual traditional leaders' leverage over each good/service. According to the Secretary Survey data, 50% of traditional leaders make verdicts in conjunction with other judges in their customary court. However, 46% of the leaders' secretaries reported that their traditional leaders do not decide or influence rulings on a case. Furthermore, while over a majority of secretaries reported that it is "very difficult" for their leader to register someone of his/her choice for the PWP, FISP, or SCTP, 23-32% reported "somewhat difficult," "somewhat easy," or "very easy."

To alleviate the concern about traditional leaders' influence as a confounding variable, I replicate the main regression analysis and coefficient plots in Figure 4.10 after dissecting the data into two samples – high or low leverage samples - depending on leaders' reported influence over a particular good/service. I classify traditional leaders with minute power over a specific good/service and sort them into the "low leverage group" and the rest into the "high leverage group." The low leverage sample includes traditional leaders who are not directly involved in the verdict and those who are reported to have difficulties influencing the registry ("very difficult").[130]

[130] I focus on the distinction between "very difficult" and the rest of the categories (from "very easy" to "somewhat difficult"). Respondents – both traditional leaders in semi-structured interviews and secretaries in surveys – reported that influencing the rosters of social safety net programs is undesirable and unadvisable by the government. Given

The low leverage group regarding the customary courts includes jurisdictions where traditional leaders are reported to be not involved in making a verdict on a case. The low leverage sample for the three social welfare programs includes jurisdictions where it is reported to be "very difficult" for their traditional leader to register someone of their preference to the beneficiary list.[131]

Favoritism after competitive challenges is presumed to be pronounced even more in the high leverage group, but the same pattern would not be observed in the low leverage group. Nevertheless, these expectations are made with a caveat of relying on the self-report data about traditional leaders' influence over private goods/services. While recognizing the limitation, readers should also keep in mind that the data about traditional leaders' influence comes from traditional leaders' secretaries, not leaders themselves. The secretaries do not have strong incentives to over- or under-report their leader's influence. Some evidence suggests that the secretaries' jobs are not tied to that of their leader; 32% of secretaries reported that their leaders do not have the authority to lay them off, and 12% of them reported that their career precedes that of their leader.

Figure 4.11 presents findings from the high leverage group sample. Like Figure 4.10, the left panels present the coefficient estimates of competitive challenges, and the right panels display the estimates of potential challengers. The results from the high leverage sample are similar to the findings from the full sample in the sense that competitive challenges are associated with higher favoritism for a ruling family in light of court rulings (statistically significant at 0.1 with equation 1 or 0.05 level with equation 2) and the selection of SCTP beneficiaries (statistically significant at 0.05 level with both equations 1 and 2).

interviewees' reluctance to admit that beneficiary lists can be under the influence of leaders, I speculate that traditional leaders might still have leverage over recipient rosters when their secretary reports it to be "somewhat difficult."

[131] I keep the "somewhat difficult" category in the analyses to prevent the size of the sample from being considerably reduced.

However, the correlations between competitive challenges and favoritism are more pronounced with the high leverage sample than the correlations from the full sample, which is consistent with the prior expectations. The log odds of a verdict favoring a ruling family under the rule of a leader who experienced competitive challenges is 1.15 (equation 1) or 1.17 (equation 2) points higher than that of traditional leaders who did not experience the challenges. This means that customary court verdicts that favor a ruling family member are 3.18 times (equation 1) or 3.21 times (equation 2) more likely to occur when their leader underwent competitive challenges in comparison to their leader without such challenges. These odds are higher than the odds from the full sample (2.46 and 2.48). As for the SCTP beneficiary selection, a ruling family member is 18.39 percentage points more likely to be selected than an average villager when their leader experienced a competitive challenger than when they did not. This gap is also bigger than the effect size of 6 percentage points from the full sample.



Figure 4.11 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : High Leverage Sample

Note: Thick and thin lines indicate 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively. The numbers of observations are shown in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the TA level. The X-axes of the right panels are on a log scale. The estimates of the risk of competition remain the same even when the competitive challenge variable is removed. See Appendix 4A.2 for regression tables.

An unexpected finding from Figure 4.11 is reduced favoritism in the PWP in the face of competitive challenges, and this goes against the hypothesis.[132] [133] The explanation might have to

[132] However, the number of observations used for the analysis is only twenty, so the result and interpretation must be taken with a grain of salt.

[133] Other intriguing findings are that 1) favoritism in the distribution of FISP and SCTP is more likely to arise in jurisdictions with a larger number of households, and 2) verdicts favorable to a ruling family are more prevalent in matrilineal ethnic groups than patrilineal ethnic groups. In the sample used for this analysis, 37 traditional leaders and their ruling families practice patriliny, and 107 follow matriliny. The favoritism in the distribution of PWP, FISP, and SCTP is less likely to occur in jurisdictions with a larger number of ruling family households. The negative correlations between the number of ruling family households and favoritism in resource distribution substantiate that leaders do not favor the ruling family because of their cultural and social obligations to take care of the extended family.

do with the fact that the selected beneficiaries of the PWP have to contribute their labor to receive the material compensation. Selectees cannot easily renege on the public works project because these projects usually require village-to-village collaborations and are under the purview of multiple traditional leaders. Moreover, the monetary benefit from the PWP is not as high as those of the FISP or SCTP (see Table 4.2). After considering relatively low wages and the opportunity costs in the PWP together, this income-generating activity may not be as appealing as other benefits. Thus, the incentives ruling family members have may work against being selected as a beneficiary for the project.

The descriptive statistics from the previous section lend some support to this interpretation. The density graph of favoritism in the FISP and SCTP shows clear high-density distribution above 0, indicating a general trend of favoritism for a ruling family member. However, the graph for the PWP resembles more of a symmetric normal distribution. This attests to the fact that there are no differences between a regular villager or a ruling family member in the likelihood of being chosen as a beneficiary for the PWP.

Figure 4.12 shows the placebo test results with the low leverage sample. As expected, competition variables – both the emergence of competitive challenges and the prospect of competitive challenges – do not predict favoritism of private goods in most cases. The null results from the placebo cases are unlikely to be driven by the limited sample size or lack of variations in the outcome variables because some of the controlled variables predict the dependent variables with statistical significance. Customary court verdicts favorable to a ruling family member are more likely to be made under wealthier traditional leaders. Courts are also likely to rule in favor of ruling family members if they bring cases to the court. Favoritism in the PWP is less likely to be observed in jurisdictions with a more significant number of households that do not come from

the same ethnic group as their leader. Similar to the result with the high leverage group above in Figure 4.11, the larger size of the ruling family is associated with a reduced likelihood of the ruling family receiving the FISP or SCTP vis-à-vis a regular villager. Lastly, the size of jurisdictions - measured in the number of households - is associated with a higher degree of favoritism in the FISP and SCTP.



Figure 4.12 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : Low Leverage Sample

Note: Thick and thin lines indicate 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively. The numbers of observations are shown in brackets. Standard errors are clustered at the TA level. The X-axes of the right panels are on a log scale. The estimates of the risk of competition remain the same even when the competitive challenge variable is removed. See Appendix 4A.3 for regression tables.

5. Robustness Check

5.1. Dependent Variable on a Dichotomous Scale

This section provides robustness check results. The results are robust to a different coding scheme of the dependent variable and missing value imputations using multiple packages. For the first robustness check, I transformed the outcome variables measuring favoritism in the PWP, FISP, and SCTP distributions from continuous to indicator variables so that positive values previously are assigned with a value of 1 and other values with 0. The results with recoded outcome variables mirror the findings with the original coding scheme. For the hypothesis tests with the high leverage sample, the realized competition is positively correlated with the favoritism in the SCTP, while it is negatively correlated with favoritism for ruling families in the PWP with small sample size. The prospect of competition also shows no statistically significant correlations with most private goods of interest, except for increased favoritism in the FISP. The competition variables in placebo tests with the low leverage sample remain statistically insignificant (see Appendix 4B for the coefficient plots).

5.2. Missing Value Imputation

For further robustness checks, I replicated the main analysis in Figures 4.10-4.12 after substituting missing values with 1) a median value of each variable, 2) randomly assigned values, and 3) values generated by predictive mean matching.[134] The predictive mean matching was employed using *Missforest,* and *MICE* in R across different sets of variables (see Appendix 4C for details of each imputation model and coefficient plots). The findings that emerged across the data with different

[134] The numbers of missing observations for each dependent variable are 20/111 (18.02%) for PWP, 188/647 (29.06%) for FISP, 62/526 (7.41%) for SCTP after data cleaning. The data cleaning process includes replacing observations where their value exceeds the valid values range with NA. The numbers of missing observations before data cleaning are 10/111 (9.01%) for PWP, 47/647 (7.26%) for FISP, and 39/526 (7.41%) for SCTP.

missing value imputation strategies are 1) the increased favoritism in the SCTP and 2) decreased favoritism in the PWP in jurisdictions with competitive challenges. However, the relationship between the prospect of competition and nepotism in the FISP distribution does not reach statistical significance at conventional levels.

5.3. Likelihood of Sharing Benefits

I replicate the analyses controlling how likely a given private good is to be shared in a jurisdiction. Although the possibility of sharing benefits might be a post-treatment variable, I report findings with the additional variable controlled because it might be an important covariate. Community members sharing benefits violates assumptions about private goods. If leaders can command regular villagers to share goods with the ruling family, leaders would not need to enlist ruling family members to a beneficiary list directly. In other words, leaders' motive to enroll members of the ruling family into a beneficiary directory transpires if leaders cannot informally pressure recipients to share the perks with the ruling family.

To test this idea, I leverage the question "How likely is it that selected beneficiaries of the [PWP/FISP/SCTP] in the jurisdiction of [title of traditional leader] share their benefits with other non-beneficiaries?" in the Secretary Survey. Respondents were provided with four answer choices: "not at all likely," "not very likely," "somewhat likely," and "very likely." The modal answers for the three social protection programs were "not at all likely."

The results controlling for the likelihood of sharing a given private good remain primarily similar to the findings from the main analyses. The emergence of competitive challenges is correlated with a higher likelihood of favoritism in the SCTP but with a lower likelihood of favoritism in the PWP. However, the risk of the competition variable no longer predicts the

increase in favoritism in the FISP with statistical significance with the additional control variable. See Appendix 4D.1 for regression tables.

To further test the idea, I split the data into two - benefits shared ("very likely," "somewhat likely," and "not very likely" to share) and benefits not shared ("not at all likely" to share) – and replicated the main analyses.[135] As expected, competition variables are not correlated with the increased favoritism in jurisdictions where sharing is likely. The only statistically significant relationships between the competition variables and favoritism in the private goods are found in the sample of jurisdictions where the PWP is not likely to be shared in the community. However, favoritism in the PWP distribution is less likely to be found - not more - when the likelihood of competitive challenge is high. Thus, omitting the likelihood of sharing a given private good would not be a concern for biased estimates. See Appendix 4D.2 for regression tables.

5.4. Contacting TAs

Another potential factor to consider but not having been explored is the relationship between village-level traditional leaders and high-rank leaders. A personal network with high officials can affect leaders' ability to channel resources to their community. Clayton, Noveck, and Levi (2015) found frequent contact between elected community councilors and chiefs in Sierra Leone foment collusion and induce lower levels of public goods provision.

This dissertation alleviates the concern for this confounding variable by controlling for village-level traditional leaders' contact rate of TAs (Traditional Authority). The Secretary Survey collected the information with the question, "How many times has the current [title of traditional leader] contacted the TA by phone, letter, or in person in the last 12 months?" This *Contact TA*

[135] I do not split the sample into high/low leverage groups in this analysis because of limited sample sizes.

variable takes integer values and is logarithized due to its skewness (see Chapter 4 Appendix E for descriptive statistics). This research focuses on the relationship between village-level traditional leaders and their high-rank traditional leaders (i.e., TA). This is because semi-structured interviews revealed that village-level leaders seldom bypass their high-rank traditional leaders and directly reach out to government officials.

The main result holds even when the *contact TA* variable is controlled. Leaders who face competitive challenges exhibit higher favoritism for their ruling family in selecting the SCTP both in the full sample and high leverage samples than leaders who do not experience leadership challenges (See Appendix Figure 4E.1).

To further the test, I categorized leaders into *frequent contact* and others as *not frequent contact*. The median value for village-level traditional leaders contacting their TA is 24 days. Leaders who contacted more frequently than 24 days in a year is coded as frequent contactors and others are coded as not frequent contactors. Then, I split the sample based on this variable. Then, I split the samples based on two different categories and replicated the analyses. When the sample is split, the competitive challenges predict higher favoritism in the SCTP with a statistical significance of 0.1, regardless of which sample is used. (See Appendix 4E.2).

6. Discussion

The reduced favoritism in the PWP with the realized competition might be attributable to the fact that the selectees of the program have to offer their time and effort to labor-intensive public projects. With other social welfare programs available, temporary employment as part of the PWP might not be the most appealing perk for ruling families. Many traditional leaders also rated the PWP as the least important private good among the three government welfare programs. On the

other hand, the lack of positive correlations between the competitive challenge and favoritism in the FISP might be attributable to its high priority. Traditional leaders reported that the farm input subsidy vouchers are highly valuable, making the FISP a good target for nepotism if a leader's view is shared with their ruling family. However, the fact that the general public might also share their leader's priorities heightens the program's visibility, making the distribution of the FISP appropriately monitored by the government and villagers. However, systematically examining the similarities and differences across different private goods and which features render certain goods to be more pliable to be a target of nepotism would be a potential area for future research to explore.

7. Conclusion

This chapter presented empirical evidence that competition over traditional leadership has significant implications for favoritism in the distribution of some private goods. Consistent with two hypotheses in Chapter 3, findings from the high leverage group show that ruling family member's overt attempt to overthrow their traditional leader is related to higher degrees of favoritism in court verdicts and the SCTP in jurisdictions, while the risk of competitive challenges does not show consistent correlations with increased favoritism. One unexpected result was that competitive challenges were correlated with reduced favoritism in the distribution of PWP. The mixed results will not come as a surprise if we consider that the private goods examined in this chapter have many different qualities, such as their coverages and target groups.

This paper channels its way to future studies exploring the effects of competition over traditional leadership on favoritism in divergent private goods. Although some studies explored how the visibility of goods/services affects how politicians distribute resources (Harding 2015), they have not explored how leaders' and citizens' priorities affect the distribution of goods and

services and how they interact with competition over leadership. Exploring how citizen-elite priority congruence, visibility of resources, and competition interactively affect the resource distribution of traditional chiefs would be a good future research agenda.

Chapter 5

Competition and the Local Public Goods Provision

1. Introduction

This dissertation explores the impact of competition over traditional leadership on local people's lives. In doing so, it delves into the distinction between the types of goods and services and the ways in which the timing of the political survival strategy plays a role. Chapter 4 examined the relations between competition and public welfare, focusing on the distribution of private goods, and this chapter investigates the relations by concentrating on the other half of the theoretical framework: the provision of local public goods.

This chapter continues to utilize the original survey data about village-level traditional leaders' jurisdictions collected from 684 traditional leaders for Round 1, 658 leaders for Round 2, 680 ruling families, and 669 secretaries in the Kasungu district in Malawi. This chapter proceeds as follows: First, I identify three local public goods (security, water, and roads) for main tests and another (electric grids) for a placebo test among countless other local public goods. Then, using the survey data, I demonstrate that the electric grid is considered the least important and least subject to the influence of traditional leaders than three other local public goods. Next, this chapter presents estimation strategies and variable descriptions, followed by findings, robustness check results, and my interpretations. Lastly, I discuss why some findings support the hypotheses while others do not.

2. Identifying Local Public Goods in Rural Malawi

Local public goods refer to goods that are shared and used by a small collective. A local public good is similar to a pure public good since it is non-divisible within a group. Yet, the benefits of a local public good only accrue to members of a community. Individuals' well-being does not just hinge on individual income but also on local public goods such as passable roads and electric grids. Yet, there has been a glaring gap between the supply and demand for the local public goods in the global South. Thus, scholars who study these regions have emphasized investigating the provision of local public goods and its relations to political accountability (e.g., (Ichino and Nathan 2013).

With numerous local public goods in the world, scholars have studied different goods and services in different contexts. Auerbach (2016a) examined paved roads, sewer lines, streetlights, municipal trash collection, government medical camps, and piped water in India, and Tsai (2007b) studied paved roads and paths, classrooms unusable in the rain, age of school buildings, and the existence of running water in China. Díaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Ruiz-Euler (2014) measured access to electricity, sewerage, and education with the ratio of households who reported having access to water, sewerage, and electricity their illiteracy.

I identify community security, improved drinking water sources, road conditions, and electric grids as suitable local public goods to examine the impacts of village-level traditional leadership on local communities in rural Malawi. All the chosen goods and services are non-excludable - meaning that any individual in a community cannot be excluded from utilizing them - as local public goods, and their supply levels vary at the community level.[136]

[136] Local public goods - such as sewer lines, streetlights, trash collection, medical camps, secondary schools, and health clinics - do not suit well for this dissertation. According to administrative data, there are only 52 secondary schools, 358 primary schools, and 67 health clinics in the study district. Yet, there are 1488 registered villages in the area. Since most villages do not have access to the mentioned goods/services due to their scarcity, they are not suitable for this study examining varied levels of local public goods provision at the village level.

2.1. Security

Security is indispensable for people's lives. According to social contract theory, free men gain security in return for subjecting themselves to an absolute sovereign (Hobbes 1651) 1967). However, should the state not provide security, others, such as neighborhood vigilantes in Latin American countries (Ungar 2007) and traditional chiefs in African countries, fill the void (Bagayoko, Hutchful, and Luckham 2016). In Malawi, a chief's role in maintaining peace and order traces back to the colonial era. The *1933 Native Authority Ordinance* allowed them to issue minor legislation for peace and order (Dionne 2017), and the still-in-effect 1967 *Chiefs Act* states preserving public peace is one of the core functions of traditional leaders. Leaders themselves also perceive peace and security as one of their core responsibilities; in semi-structured interviews, many leaders repeatedly mentioned "peace and security" when asked to identify their most important responsibilities (26%).

One might consider that security is more of a pure public good than a local public good. This claim has some valance in the sense that neighboring villages may enjoy the benefit of security of a village to some degree; having a peaceful and orderly neighbor would positively affect the security of my jurisdiction than neighboring a hotbed of crimes since crimes may spill over. However, preventing petty crimes and providing judicial justice through customary court, which is the main role that traditional leaders play in their jurisdictions, are local. Traditional leaders may take preventive measures for crimes in their jurisdiction by leading neighborhood watch formations and heavy sentencing domestic abusers and assaulters. However, the course of action traditional leaders take is left under the discretion of individual leaders, which creates variation in the level of security at the community level.

While security is a multifaceted concept – consisting of but not limited to human security, economic security, personal security, community security, and national security (Behm 2017), this research focuses on personal security when it comes to measurement. Personal security aims to protect people from possible crimes such as physical violence, domestic abuse, or predatory adults. If villagers fall victim to these crimes, villagers in Malawi turn to the customary court because village chiefs are more easily accessible than the police.[137] When asked, "What are the most common cases that you deal with in the traditional court?" leaders in interviews reported land disputes (18), domestic abuse (9), thefts (4), physical violence (3), and personal debts (2) in that order. [138]

Considering the definition of security and common issues in traditional courts altogether, I measure security with the number of thefts, physical violence cases, and domestic abuse cases reported to a traditional court in 12 months period of time.[139] To mitigate concerns about underreporting, these data were collected from leaders' secretaries instead of leaders themselves. The exact wording of the survey question is: "In the last 12 months, how many of the following incidents were reported from villages under [title of the traditional leader]?" where the list of incidents were A. thefts, B. physical violence, and C. domestic abuse. Respondents were asked to provide numeric answers to each question.

[137] The Kasungu district has one police station and sixteen police units, which are spread out in fifteen TAs in the district. The remaining fifteen TAs do not have police units. There are 260 police officers for a population of 858,782 as of 2015, which gives a ratio of 1:3,303 for a population (Kasungu District Council: Socio Economic Profile 2017-2022, p.132).

[138] While disputes over land ownership are most frequently mentioned, they are not considered personal security issues. Personal security involves protection from personal harm rather than protection from an invasion of privacy or proprietorship. Additionally, disputes over property rights are excludable and do not satisfy the criteria for local public goods.

[139] Traditional leaders from interviews noted that they do not handle fights involving severe bodily injuries themselves, such as bleeding but refer the cases to a higher leader's court or the police (Interview 036. July 7, 2019). Therefore, I ask the number of cases reported, not cases handled in the customary court, to capture not only cases that are brought to the customary court but also the cases referred to the magistrate court or the police.



Figure 5.1 Frequency of Thefts, Physical Fights, and Domestic Abuse

Note: The data source is the original Secretary Survey administered to 669 secretaries of traditional leaders.

I combined the frequency of thefts, physical fights, and domestic abuse in a jurisdiction of a traditional leader to approximate the number of crimes. The distribution in Figure 5.2 Panel A shows the total number of three offenses combined. The minimum and modal values of this variable are zero, and its maximum value is 50. Due to its high skewness, all results reported later in this chapter utilized a log-transformed version of the variable. The distribution of the logged variable is shown in Panel B in Figure 5.2.



Figure 5.2 Frequency of Criminal Activities

Note: Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021), N = 669.

2.2. Improved Drinking Water Sources

Rural residents in Africa usually fetch water from wells, boreholes, and public taps in their community. As these water sources are common-pool resources, even traditional leaders cannot exclude certain villagers from drawing water without extortionate efforts for monitoring and punishment (Ostrom 1990). Thus, community water resources are local public goods.

Malawians rank water supply as one of the top issue priorities, and traditional leaders assist in providing this resource. Public opinion data from Afrobarometer (Round 7) shows that Malawians regard water supply (25%) as the fourth most important problem of the country after famine (64%), management of the economy (38%), and farming/agriculture (26%). In my original survey, an overwhelming majority (over 80%) of traditional chiefs ranked water to be the most important local public good for the welfare of villagers over security, road, and electricity (Figure 5.7). Moreover, multiple traditional chiefs stated in their interviews that they mobilize village labor to dig water drainage around boreholes and public taps and manage funds for their maintenance.[140]

This study measures the supply of improved drinking water sources with the presence of tube wells, boreholes, public taps, or standpipes in each traditional leader's jurisdiction. According to the World Health Organization, the most common improved drinking water sources in developing countries include household connections, public standpipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater collection.[141] [142] I disregard household connections and rainwater collection tanks because they are privately owned – they do not meet the criteria for local public goods - and are rarely observed in rural Malawi.

[140] Interview 023, July 1 Kaomba.
[141] "Meeting the MDG Drinking Water and Sanitation Target: A Mid-term Assessment of Progress" (https://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/monitoring/jmp04.pdf)
[142] Unimproved drinking water sources are unprotected wells, unprotected springs, rivers or ponds, vendor-provided water, bottled water, and tanker truck water. Bottled water is not considered improved due to limitations in the potential quantity, not quality, of the water.

Thus, my survey questions asked about the existence and the number of tube wells or boreholes, and public taps or standpipes like the following: "Is there a functioning [A. tube well or borehole/ B. public tap or standpipe] in villages under you? If so, how many?"[143] Figure 5.3 displays the provision of tube wells or boreholes in Panel A and public taps or standpipes in Panel B. Most jurisdictions (237/680, 35%) have one tube well or borewell, but a significant number of jurisdictions (194/680, 29%) do not have any of them. When it comes to public taps or standpipes, the absolute majority of the jurisdictions (635/680, 93%) do not have any.



Figure 5.3 Provision of Tube Wells/Boreholes and Public Taps/Standpipes

Note: Survey of Traditional Leaders Round 1 (2020-2021), N= 684.

[143] The survey question did not collect information about when an improved water source was first put in place. In part, it was a decision made because of the limited space in the survey instrument. However, it was also a deliberate choice to account for both the initial installation and maintenance aspects. New water sources are not delivered frequently, but they do go out of order if not adequately managed. A lot of traditional leaders during interviews reported outages of their water sources. Thus, asking *about currently functioning* water resources captures the current state of the provision of the improved water source.

Then, I combine the two variables plotted in Figure 5.3 to provide one measurement for the provision of water sources. Panel A in Figure 5.4 displays the number of water sources, and Panel B in the same figure shows the distribution of the logged variable. The water supply variable ranged from 0 to 51, with a median value of 1. As this variable is highly skewed to the right, all results reported later in this chapter utilized a log-transformed version of the variable.



Figure 5.4 Provision of Improved Drinking Water Sources

Note: Survey of Traditional Leaders Round 1 (2020-2021), N= 684.

2.3. Road Conditions

Roads are often considered a local public good unless they are private roads owned and maintained by a private agent collecting tolls from a passer-by. There are no private roads in Malawi, so their roads fit into the concept of local public goods.

Roads also play an important part in villagers' lives, and traditional leaders have leverage over the maintenance of the streets in their villages. When presented with four local public goods,

traditional leaders ranked roads as having the second-highest impact on the welfare of villagers after water (see Figure 5.7). Numerous studies also found an association between rural roads and poverty reduction in Africa and Asia (e.g., Bryceson, Bradbury, and Bradbury 2008) and Malawi (Edriss and Chiunda 2017). Moreover, secretaries of traditional leaders reported that their leaders have as much influence over improving road conditions as clean water (see Figure 5.8). Multiple traditional leaders in qualitative interviews mentioned that they mobilize villagers to repair damaged roads while they simultaneously condemn the lack of government intervention.[144]

According to the administrative data from the Ministry of Transport & Public Infrastructure, there are five kinds of roads in the country: district road, main road, secondary road, tertiary road, and undesignated road, and I focus on undesignated roads in villages. Village-level traditional leaders have higher leverage over undesignated roads in their villages than other roads outside of their villages which require cross-village cooperation. When the work necessitates the collaboration of multiple leaders, it would be difficult to attribute the (un)improved road conditions to the leadership of village-level traditional leaders.

As government administrative data or off-the-shelf survey data provide little information about roads within a village, I utilize the following original survey question to capture the road conditions within a village: "from "very good" to "very bad," where very good indicates easy to traverse and very bad means difficult to traverse due to potholes, waterlogging, or other issues, what are the conditions of the roads in the villages under the [title of traditional leader]?"[145] The survey respondents were also presented with the response options of "no roads, very poor,

[144] As one traditional leader puts it, "There are so many roads that are being done [repaired] which we don't get paid for because it is a time when we say the road should be repaired." Interview 023. July 1.
[145] The survey question does not explicitly indicate the timing of the provision of roads. However, it can be reasonably assumed that the question inquires about the condition of roads as of the data collection.

somewhat poor, somewhat good, and very good." As shown in Figure 5.5, most secretaries reported that the quality of roads is "very poor."



Figure 5.5 Road Conditions

Note: Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021), N = 669.

2.4. Electric Grid (Placebo)

The distribution of electricity in Malawi depends on the extension of the grid and decentralized off-grid systems (Girdis and Hoskote 2005). Off-grid electrification primarily includes renewable energy, such as solar and diesel, and hybrid energy, which are not considered to be local public

goods. For instance, households can easily be excluded from using solar panels in possession of a village leader. On the other hand, the electric grid, an interconnected network for delivering electricity, meets the definition of local public goods.

However, unlike security, drinking water, and roads, traditional leaders do not wield substantial influence over electric grids. Electric grids are a capital-intensive and technology-dependent good. Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi (ESCOM), a parastatal company, operates interconnected grids. Furthermore, while the majority of respondents in rural Malawi (634 out of 968, 65%) reported in Afrobarometer surveys (round 7) the deficiency of electric connections from mains to their house,[146] both semi-structured interviews and surveys with traditional leaders attest that their primary concerns do not center around the supply of electricity. None of the leaders in my qualitative interviews mentioned electricity as their responsibility, and leaders evaluated that electricity has the lowest impact on villagers' welfare out of four local public goods (see Figure 5.7). Electric grids would make a case for a placebo test, considering the low importance and little influence leaders have over the good.

Placebo tests are usually used as a strategy for causal inference (Eggers, Tuñón, and Dafoe, n.d.).[147] However, in this research, having a placebo case would be particularly useful in comparing results from different outcomes. This research juxtaposes various local public goods which exhibit widely differing traits. Having a placebo case would be particularly helpful in understanding null results from non-placebo cases. When null effects are found, the first thing to

[146] The question from the Afrobarometer survey is "do you have an electric connection to your home from the mains?"
[147] Placebo tests are useful in diagnosing problems with research designs in observational studies, such as omitted variable bias, bad controls, model misspecification, or differential measurement error. A placebo test checks for an association that should be absent if the research design is sound but not otherwise. Placebo tests can thus be seen as a strategy for checking the soundness of a research finding and, more broadly, improving causal inference.

do is to evaluate the statistical power. If that is not the issue, we can also assess whether the outcome with a null effect shares critical common traits with the placebo case.[148]

To measure the grid-based electrification in traditional leaders' jurisdictions, I focus on the existence of main electric grids in a village instead of asking about the connection between the mains and house like the question in the Afrobarometer survey. The electric connection from the mains to individual homes might depend on the household income, which makes the connections private goods rather than public goods. The exact wording of the question is, "in the villages under the [title of traditional leader], is there an electric grid that most houses can access? The electric grid does not include a portable power supply such as solar batteries." Since some village leaders in the target population oversee multiple villages, the response choices were "yes, in all the villages," "yes, in some of the villages," and "no, in none of the villages."[149]

The variable ranges from 0 to 1, where the minimum and the maximum value indicate no electric grid in a single village and the existence of the grid in all villages in the jurisdiction of a traditional leader, respectively. If the electric grid is reported to be present in some of the villages in the jurisdiction of the same leader but not in others, a subsequent question, "If so, in how many villages?" was asked. The answer to this question was divided by the number of villages under a traditional leader provided the proportion of villages with electric grids in a traditional leader's jurisdiction (Panel B in Figure 5.6). Lastly, the distribution of electric grids is shown as a continuous variable in Figure 5.6C. For this variable, the proportion of villages with electric grids

[148] This chapter also discusses the implication of finding a null effect on the placebo case.

[149] Other local public goods are easily measurable on a continuum. Security is measured by the number of crimes/illegal activities; clean water supply is captured by the number of various tube wells/boreholes/public taps/standpipes; roads are measured by the general perception of their condition. However, the provision of electric grids cannot be approximated by their frequency or quality. Therefore, I measure electric grids with their coverage.

(variable in Panel B) was plugged into the categorical variable in Panel A, replacing its middle category ("yes, in some of the villages") with the proportion of villages with the local public good.



Figure 5.6 Provision of Electric Grid

Note: Survey of Secretaries (2020-2021), N = 669.

2.5. Summary

Traditional leaders from semi-structured interviews frequently mentioned security, water, and road as important issues they need to tackle but not electricity. Similarly, in rank-order questions, over 50% of traditional chiefs listed electric grids as the least important local public good for the welfare of their villagers.

Moreover, secretary survey data shows that their leaders have the least leverage over the supply of electric grids vis-à-vis the supply of other local public goods (see Figure 5.8). Almost 78% of surveyed secretaries reported that it is "very difficult" for village-level traditional leaders to provide electric grids. This figure is significantly higher than the comparable figure regarding security (16%), water sources (59%), and road conditions (53%).



Figure 5.7 Importance of Local Public Goods

Note: The data source is the Traditional Leaders Survey Round 2 administered to 684 traditional leaders. The question in verbatim is, "In your opinion, which of the following four local public goods is the most important for the welfare of someone in your jurisdiction? Rank from 1 to 4, where one means the most important and four means the last important. The local public goods are security, improved drinking water sources, improved road conditions, and electric grids."



Figure 5.8 Leverage over Local Public Goods

Note: The data source is the Secretary Survey administered to 669 secretaries of traditional leaders. The questions were "How easy or difficult is it for the current [title of the leader] to provide [security/improved drinking water sources/improved road conditions/electric grid] to his/her jurisdiction?" with response options from "very easy" to "very difficult." Response options are recoded so that their values commensurate with leaders' leverage in the court and social welfare programs.

Table 5.1 summarizes the importance of the selected local public goods and leaders' leverage over them. Most traditional chiefs stated that water supply is the most crucial local public good, but their secretaries testified that the leaders have the most leverage over security. Although the rank orders regarding the importance of local public goods and leaders' leverage over them do not precisely match, electric grids are reported to be the least important and least amenable to the

influence of traditional chiefs. Therefore, I pinned down security, water sources, and road conditions as core goods to study and electric grids as a placebo case.

	Importance	Leverage
Security	3	1
Water sources	1	3
Road conditions	2	2
Electric grids (placebo)	4	4

Table 5.1 Features of Selected Local Public Goods

Note: The numbers in the table indicate rankings, where one means the most important/the highest leverage.

3. Estimation

The previous section identified (in)security, improved drinking water sources, and road conditions as local public goods appropriate to test the hypotheses, and electric grids as a local public good for a placebo test. To uncover the associations between competition over traditional leadership in different phases and the provision of local public goods, I estimate ordinary least squares models (OLS) for security, water, the electric grids, and ordered logistic models for roads like the following equations.

$$PublicGood_{sj} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Challenge_j + \beta_2 MaleCandidate_j + \beta_3 X_j + \beta_4 Y_j + \beta_5 \varepsilon_j \ \ldots (1)$$

$$PublicGood_{sj} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Challenge_j + \beta_2 BothCandidate_j + \beta_3 X_j + \beta_4 Y_j + \beta_5 \varepsilon_j \ \ldots (2)$$

The provision of good/service s in jurisdiction j is indicated as $PublicGood_{sj}$ (s = insecurity, improved sources for drinking water, road conditions, and electric grids). The sections above in this chapter, which provided detailed illustrations about each local public good, presented the survey question(s) calibrating the provision of each local public good. In summary, the level of a local public good concerning (in)security is measured by the number of thefts, physical violence, and domestic abuse over the past 12 months, and the provision of improved water sources is

calibrated by the existence of tube wells/boreholes and public taps/standpipes. Both of these variables take zero or higher integer values. The variables for road conditions and the electric grids utilize secretaries of traditional leaders' reports on a scale of five and a continuum, respectively. Higher values in water, roads, and electric grids stipulate the higher provision of local public goods, but higher values in the insecurity variable indicate the lower provision of local public goods.

Like Chapter 4, the key explanatory variables include *Challenge*, which captures the rise of a competitive challenger against traditional leadership, and *MaleCandidate* in equation 1 and *BothCandidate* in equation 2 to tap onto the likelihood of a competitive challenge (see Chapter 3 for details about the variable operationalization). *Challenge* is a dichotomous variable, whereas *MaleCandidate* and *BothCandidate* variables take a value of zero or any positive integers. For the number of eligible candidates variables, their logged values are used for analyses because of their high skewness.[150]

To obtain unbiased estimates of explanatory variables, I control for potential covariates denoted in X_j in Equations 1 & 2. The control variables include leaders' demographic information (i.e., gender,[151] age, [152] matrilineal/patrilineal ethnic group,[153] education level, wealth,[154] years in power,[155] and position[156]) as well as village demographic variables (the number of households in

[150] I used a syntax *log1p* in R for these variables and other logarithmized variables in this chapter.
[151] Muriaas et al. (2017) find that a message about child marriage reform instills public support only when it comes from female traditional leaders. The gender of traditional leaders may play a role in governance beyond gender issues.
[152] Younger chiefs with longer life expectancy are better performers than older chiefs in mobilizing collective actions to provide local public goods (Baldwin 2019).
[153] I control for patrilineal/matrilineal ethnic identity because the practices in traditional leadership might vary across the two types of ethnic groups.
[154] Education and wealth are key indicators of one's socioeconomic status. If traditional leaders are good spokespeople who represent villagers' interests because they rely on the same livelihood, their socioeconomic status would be an essential factor in determining leaders' performance.
[155] Years in power can be an important predictor of leaders' performance, although the direction is unclear. New leaders may be more ambitious and motivated, whilst seasoned leaders may have know-how and knowledge.
[156] The position – GVH vs. VH – is related to the number of villages they oversee. Also, there may be more prestige in a higher rank position, making the position more contentious.

a village,[157] the number of ruling family households,[158] the number of households related to a leader,[159] and the number of non-coethnic households to a leader),[160] [161]and the degree to which the customary law about the first eligible person is enforced in practice.[162] When the outcome variable is water, I also control for the existence of improved water sources in neighboring villages. I include TA fixed-effects (Y_j) and cluster standard errors at the TA level to account for any remaining unexplained correlations within each TA.[163]

The quantities of interest are β_1 and β_2 in Equations 1 & 2, where each of them is a coefficient estimate of a competitive challenge and the likelihood of a competitive challenge, respectively. As traditional leaders' incentive to satisfy the needs of their ruling family is activated after a competitive challenger, the jurisdictions ruled by a traditional leader who encountered leadership challenges would provide a higher level of local public goods than those leaders who did not. For security, decreased number of criminal activities translates into an improvement in personal security. As competitive challenges would be associated with reduced crime rates, I expect β_1 in Equations 1 & 2 to take negative values ($\beta_1 < 0$ in Equations 1 & 2). Conversely, as

[157] The size of jurisdictions could be a confounder of resource provision. Disputes might break out more frequently in large jurisdictions, and as large jurisdictions might have more tube wells and boreholes due to the sheer size of the population and the landmass.
[158] The size of the ruling family is a confounder in many aspects: 1) this variable is likely to be correlated with the number of eligible candidates and potentially the emergence of competitive challenges, and 2) this is variable is likely to be associated with the size of the selectorate, and having a large selectorate makes buying their loyalty costly for leaders, and 3) large ruling families may complicate solving collection action problems and make it more difficult for leaders to deliver local public goods.
[159] The analysis controls for the number of households related to a traditional leader as leaders might be more empathetic with villagers and endeavor harder to deliver local public goods if more local people are blood-related to leaders themselves.
[160] Studies found a higher number of disputes and conflicts in ethnically heterogeneous areas (Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray 2012) and less cooperation among ethnically diverse groups (Habyarimana et al. 2007). The lack of harmony and cooperation might make it difficult for leaders to mobilize village labor to provide local public goods.
[161] I logarithmized all these variables because they are skewed towards the right and have a skewness higher than one.
[162] Suppose ruling families who strictly hold on to the customary law are less benevolent. In that case, the strict application of the rule might be related to the lower levels of local public goods provision.
[163] According to "Kasungu District Council: Socio Economic Profile 2017-2022," some TAs have a higher level of local public goods and resources than others. My local research team also conveyed that some TAs have better telephone signals than the others in conducting telephone surveys, which ended up affecting divergent response rates across different TAs.

higher values in the variables regarding the existence of improved drinking water sources and perceived road conditions correspond with the higher level of local public goods provision, both of these variables will be positively associated with the explicit act of competitive challenge ($\beta_1 > 0$ in Equation 1 & 2). However, the same association will not be observed between the likelihood of competitive challenge and local public goods provision. Thus, the probabilities of competitive challenges would show no statistically significant correlations with increased local public goods provision ($\beta_2 = 0$). Lastly, for a placebo case of electric grids, the competitive challenge variable is expected to be statistically not different from zero (Fail to reject $\beta_1 \neq 0$ in Equations 1 & 2).

4. Findings

I predict the correlation coefficients of competition variables and the provision of various local public goods: number of crimes, number of improved water sources, and the report of road conditions for hypothesis testing, and the existence of electric grids for a placebo test. Based on the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, local public goods provision is expected to be high when a competitive challenge against a leader emerges (H_2) but not when the risk of competitive challenges is high (H_4) compared to the alternative cases. The left panels in Figure 5.9 show the estimates of the realized competitive challenge variable (β_1 in Equations 1 & 2), and the right panels project the estimates of the likelihood of competitive challenges (β_2 in Equations 1 & 2).



Figure 5.9 Provision of Local Public Goods on Competition Variables

Note: Thick and thin lines indicate 95% and 90% confidence intervals, respectively. The numbers of observations are shown in brackets. TA fixed effects are included, and standard errors are clustered at the TA level. The X-axis of the right panels is on a log scale. The estimates of the risk of competition remain the same even when the competitive challenge variable is removed. See Appendix 5A of this chapter for regression tables.

The hypothesis about the rise of competitive challenges and improved local public goods is supported by the finding from road conditions but not by others. The experience of competitive challenges (*Challenger*) shows a statistically significant positive association with improved road conditions (at 0.1 level) in support of H_2 in Equations 1 & 2. The magnitude of these estimates is also substantial. As the coefficient of the variable is 0.53, traditional leaders who encountered a competitive challenger are 1.70 times (based on Equation 1) and 1.69 times (based on Equation 2)

more likely to have better quality roads than traditional leaders who did not encounter such challenges. However, there is no statistically significant correlation between competitive challenges and security or improved drinking water sources, which does not align with my hypothesis. Furthermore, the rise of competitive challenges negatively correlates with the provision of electric grids. This is unexpected because electric grids are expected to have no association with the competitive challenge variable.

The likelihood of the competitive challenge variable is expected to be not statistically significantly correlated with the provision of local public goods regardless of whether they are a placebo case or not (H_4). However, the right panels in Figure 5.9 show statistically significant correlations in the following relations: positive coefficient of *BothCandidate* on insecurity (statistically significant at 0.05 level) [164] and negative coefficients of *MaleCandidate* and *BothCandidate* on access to clean water (statistically significant at 0.1 and 0.05 level)[165], which

[164] To understand where the elevated insecurity comes from, I replicated the regression models for Figure 5.9 by breaking down the composite variable insecurity into thefts, physical fights, and domestic violence (see Appendix 5B.1). The increased insecurity result is driven by thefts. *BothCandidate* variable is a predictor of the number of thefts but not physical fights or domestic abuse. The lack of statistical significance in physical fights and domestic violence is not because these events are rarer than burglaries. The breakout rates of thefts are 44% in the sample, and the corresponding rate for physical fights is 44% and 43% for domestic violence.

There may be several explanations for the unexpected correlation. For one, unobserved factors, such as average household income, and the income inequality within a jurisdiction, might have led to divergent baseline crime rates between compared groups. Another possible explanation is that potential competitors may commit crimes themselves, assuming that consequences for their predatory behaviors would not ensue with their leverage over the leader. Lastly, a large number of potential competitors – hence disempowered leaders – spurs a toxic environment, where villagers who have close ties to key power holders in the ruling family expect to be looked after even when they commit crimes.

The data at hand does not allow me to directly tease out the mechanism. However, it is worth pointing out that the correlation between insecurity and the number of both male and female candidates remains even after controlling for the presence of a neighborhood watch (Appendix 5B.2). The presence of neighborhood watch is an important proxy variable. It may reflect baseline crime rates if we assume that the demand for neighborhood watch would be higher in areas with high crime rates than the areas with low crime rates.

Furthermore, ruling family members are more likely to be involved in a dispute with regular villagers when competitive challenges arise (Appendix 5C.3), and the number of crimes increases when ruling family members are in dispute with other villagers. Since more crimes are observed when ruling family members are in dispute with regular villagers, the relationship between the two does not seem symbiotic. All these findings together weigh in on the explanation that increased insecurity where a high number of potential competitors are present is attributable to crimes committed by ruling family members themselves and encroaching on the properties of regular villagers.

[165] Leveraging the fact that the improved water supply variable was calibrated by the supply of tube wells/boreholes and public taps/standpipes, I predict each of these components on the same set of explanatory variables and covariates that are used for Figure 5.9. to uncover if any single component drives the result. For the supply of clean water, both

suggests that a larger number of potential competitive challenges are associated with a lower level of public goods provision.

The concern for reverse causality is low based on how each survey question that captures outcome and explanatory variables is phrased. Questions for road conditions, the number of improved water sources, and electric grids are coined to capture the condition or provision of such local public goods at the time of data collection, and the question about crimes specifies the time window to be the last twelve months from the time of data collection. Since a competitive challenge occurs once in thirteen years on average for those leaders who encounter the challenge, the chance of a competitive challenge happening in a twelve-month window is slim. The likelihood of competitive challenges – measured in the number of potential male (or both male and female) competitive challengers – is determined at the time of birth of corresponding ruling family members. Thus, the provision or the lack of the studied local public goods is unlikely to be the result of the rise of or the likelihood of competitive challenges.

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measurements of the risk of competition – *MaleCandidate* and *BothCandidate* – show negative correlations with the number of tube wells and boreholes. While *BothCandidate* variable shows statistically significant negative correlations with the supply of public taps and standpipes, *MaleCandidate* variable does not. (see regression tables in Appendix 5C.1). Public taps and standpipes are rare local public goods in the study area, as only 6% of the jurisdictions in the sample are reported to have them. However, the lack of statistical significance on the public gaps and standpipes might not be due to the rarity of the event and the accompanying inflated standard error problem. The estimated coefficients of the number of candidates on public taps/standpipes are also smaller than the corresponding coefficients on tube wells/boreholes.

This finding holds even after accounting for a potential confounder: measures to enforce collective actions. When there is an incentive to free ride, successful collective actions require monitoring and punishment for non-compliers. Suppose the existence of many potential contestants hinders traditional leaders from implementing punitive measures on villagers who do not contribute to collective actions. In that case, the underprovision of local public goods associated with the size of potential contestants might be attributable to the collective action mechanism (see Appendix 5C.2 for regression results).

To further delve into the collective action problem, I examine the maintenance of local public goods - which requires communities' collective actions in resource-scarce settings - and whether it is explained by competition over traditional leadership. However, the data shows that outages were more recent in communities where leaders impose punitive measurements for collective actions and that the length of period to fix the disruption was not predicted by the existence of punitive measures (see Appendix 5C.3 for regression results). Thus, these empirical findings do not support the collective action expalnation.

5. Robustness Check

5.1. Missing Value Imputation

This section offers robustness check results and results from other analyses to explore alternative explanations where empirical results do not support my hypotheses. In replicating the main analyses in **Error! Reference source not found.**, missing values were computed with a single v alue (i.e., median), randomly assigned values, and values generated by predictive mean matching.[166] The predictive mean matching was implemented using *Missforest,* and *MICE* in R across different lists of variables (see Appendix 5D for details). The results are robust to different missing value imputation approaches: the rise of competitive challenges is positively associated with the quality of roads; a larger number of potential competitive challengers – accounting for both male and female members in the ruling family - is associated with a higher crime rate. Jurisdictions with a higher value in *MaleCandidate* and *BothCandidate* are less likely to have access to improved drinking water sources such as boreholes and public taps. Results from the robustness check corroborate that, out of four local public goods examined, only road conditions provide consistent results with my hypothesis.

5.2. Punitive Measurement

This finding holds even after accounting for a potential confounder: measures to enforce collective actions. Local public goods essentially provide an incentive to free ride for local people in delivering their labor to community projects. When there is an incentive to free ride, successful collective actions require monitoring and punishment for non-compliers. Suppose the existence of many potential contestants hinders traditional leaders from implementing punitive measures on

[166] The numbers of missing observations for each dependent variable are 28/414 (6.76%) for insecurity, 15/412 (3.64%) for water, 25/414 (6.04%) for road, and 28/414 (6.76%) for electric grids.

villagers who do not contribute to collective actions. In that case, the underprovision of local public goods associated with the size of potential contestants might be attributable to the collective action mechanism

I investigated whether the effect of risk of and the rise of competitive challenges hold after controlling for the implementation of punitive measures. The question used is, "If villagers do not provide their labor for community projects, how likely is it that the current [title of traditional leader] punishes them?" The responses of secretaries were "not at all likely (7%)," "not very likely (11%)," "somewhat likely (30%)," and "very likely (52%)."[167] In replicating the main analyses with the supply of drinking water, road, and the electric grid as outcomes of interest, the coefficient estimates of competitive challengers and the number of male/both gendered candidates largely remained unaffected when the likelihood of punishment for non-compliers was controlled for. (see Appendix 5C.2 for regression results).

5.3. Contact TAs

A personal network between traditional leaders and high officials can affect the amount of resources flowing into a community. Thus, the analyses here control for village-level traditional leaders' contact rate of TAs (Traditional Authority). The main result holds even when the *contact TA* variable is controlled. Leaders who face competitive challenges provide better quality roads but poorer supply of electric grids than leaders who do not encounter such challenges. Interestingly,

[167] Some traditional leaders mentioned in their qualitative interviews that they do not enforce any punishment on people who do not contribute to community projects because the most common reason for no contribution is destitution. In the analyses predicting the implementation of punishment, I do not have a poverty measurement of each jurisdiction. The only predictor of the implementation of punishment among the measured variables is leaders' age. Older leaders tend to be stricter than younger leaders in enforcing punishment.

the *Contact TA* variable itself shows statistically significant correlations with insecurity and road conditions improving both outcomes (See Appendix Figure 5F.1).

To further the test, I categorized leaders who contacted their TAs as frequently as the median value of 24 days or more frequently as *frequent contact* and others as *not frequent contact*. Then, I split the samples based on two different categories and replicated the analyses. When the sample is split, the competitive challenges predict road quality with a statistical significance of 0.05 level but not the supply of electric grids for leaders who contact frequently. When it comes to leaders who do not contact their TAs frequently, coefficients of roads and electric grids lose their statistical significance, although the directions remain the same (See Appendix 5F.2).

6. Discussion

Why are there mixed results? There could be two explanations. First of all, the differences among improved water sources, roads, and electric grids might lie in whether they are labor-intensive or capital-intensive goods/services. Improving feeder road conditions in rural Malawi relies on low-skilled physical labor but not capital or technical skills/equipment because they are not covered with cement or asphalt. However, the installation of electric grids requires skilled electricians and accompanies materials costs, and improved water sources require both labor and capital. Capital is not something most village-level traditional leaders can locally source. Instead, they need to reach out to high-rank traditional leaders who can deliver local needs to the government or directly contact the local government. In an environment with low accountability, making their superiors or government officials deliver might require constant and persistent in-person visits. Since these trips are time-consuming in rural Malawi, where public transportation is almost non-existent and leaders' time is limited, many traditional leaders receive the assistance of

their ruling family members in this regard. However, leaders who face competitive challenges might be unable to garner such internal assistance from their ruling family, resulting in ineffectiveness in attracting government funds and delivering capital-intensive local public goods/services.

Community security falls as an exception to the above-mentioned explanation. According to the secretaries of traditional leader survey, community security is the topmost area where their leaders leverage over. However, my data indicates that ruling family members tend to be more involved in a dispute with regular villagers when competitive challenges arise. This suggests that ruling family members are the people who commit crimes and directly contribute to escalated numbers of crimes (see Appendix 5B.3).

In summary, competitive challenges may be associated with the underprovision of local public goods/services if the lack of the ruling family's support annihilates or directly hampers traditional leaders' efforts. However, the data collected now does not allow me to test this hypothesis directly, and future research needs to delve into this further.

7. Conclusion

The empirical evidence in this chapter supports that competition over traditional leadership has significant ramifications in local public goods provision in some of the cases examined but not in others. Specifically, in support of my hypothesis, road conditions were improved in jurisdictions where explicit displays of competitive challenges arose, but the same improvement was not found in other non-placebo local public goods. Moreover, a mere prospect of competitive challenges was not correlated with the level of public goods provision in road development as hypothesized, but the variable was negatively associated with the level of security and water supply. The fact that the only improvement in the local public goods provision is made after competitive challenges can

be interpreted as that leaders' perceptions about leadership challenges and their incentives to appease the intra-elite group are activated after – not before - the explicit act of competitive challenges. By examining competition in two different phases, this paper contributes to the scholarship of competition over traditional leadership in local development, where a systematic assessment of the correlations is hardly found.

Although the mixed findings do not show strong support for my theoretical framework, it stresses the need to study multiple socioeconomic outcomes to assess public welfare: the context where my theoretical framework sprouted. In this sense, this chapter also provides a stepping stone for future research exploring divergent ways in which competition over traditional leadership affects the provision of different types of local public goods and the underlying mechanisms behind the relationship.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

1. Summary

Both local media coverage and scholarly accounts provide divergent portrayals of traditional leaders regarding the leaders' impact on the well-being of local people. While some view traditional leaders as largely extractive elites and detriments to public welfare, others understand the same leaders as grassroots advocates for their communities, who valuably lobby the state for local public goods. Such disagreements suggest the need to study the roots of variation in traditional leaders' impact on their communities, and my dissertation focuses on how one key and overlooked factor – competition – determines the performance of traditional leaders in governance.

By using original interview and survey data, this dissertation provides a thorough description of competition over traditional leadership and its impact on local people's welfare. This study first establishes the existence of political competition in the traditional institution. The fact that competitive challenges occurred in 14 percent of traditional leader positions repudiates the findings of previous studies that have argued that leadership contestations are rare.

Another principal conclusion of this work is that competition over traditional leadership provides an avenue for the ruling family to demonstrate its leverage as the selectorate - the polity that can take part in choosing a leader - and incentivize leaders to fulfill the needs of the selectors. It is hypothesized that traditional leaders who have faced competitive challenges are more likely to distribute private goods to ruling family members at the expense of regular villagers but also provide a higher level of local public goods.

The results from various private and local public goods lend partial support to the hypothesis. The empirical evidence from the distribution of private goods shows that the judicial system in the traditional institution and the beneficiary selection of the cash transfer program for the poor are more likely to be partial for (that is, biased in favor of) a ruling family member in jurisdictions where competitive challenges arise. For local public goods, traditional leaders who maintained their position through a competitive challenge outperformed in the provision of roads compared to leaders who have not faced a competitive challenge. Yet, those same traditional leaders comparatively underperform in terms of providing security and electricity.

2. Policy Implications

Where do the findings of this dissertation leave us in terms of policy implications? Since political competition over traditional leadership has mixed impacts on different types of goods and services, it is hard for policymakers to take a stance on whether to encourage or discourage accountability by the ruling family. Furthermore, outside agencies such as the government's attempts to intervene in the matters of the traditional leadership might give rise to local communities' suspicions about ulterior motives.[168] The government of Malawi, after independence, has treated traditional leaders as a political machine to garner votes (Hussein and Muriaas 2013). However, as 75% of Malawians believe that their traditional leaders should remain non-partisan,[169] the government's attempt to intervene in succession decisions or leadership challenges might undermine the credibility of both the government and traditional leaders. Being aware of this, the Malawi

[168] An interviewee with a traditional acting leader noted that if a government intervenes in the succession decisions, they get suspicious. (interview 021).
[169] https://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online

government does not interfere in the power struggle over traditional leadership – unless it is solicited by the ruling family - even if it persists for several years.

The government should, instead, approach their relationship with the traditional institution by maneuvering how much leeway they grant to traditional leaders. The leaders should be empowered in areas where they would bring positive impacts, while their power should be limited where it is expected to yield adverse outcomes. In other words, policymakers should delegate and empower the traditional institution regarding projects where collective actions can make substantial contributions, such as the maintenance of village roads. However, holding traditional leaders in check regarding their power over court cases between ruling family members vs. regular villagers and highly valued finite resources such as the government cash assistance would serve the public interest better. The evidence from placebo cases in Chapter 4 – where traditional leaders are reported to have limited power over the good or service – demonstrates that the chance for a ruling family member to win a court case or receive the Social Cash Transfer is not substantially different whether their leader underwent competitive challenges or not.

This seems to be the direction that the Malawian government is already pursuing. In 2012 and 2013, around 70% of households believed that their chiefs decided on voucher recipients before the official meeting (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020; Dorward et al. 2013), and 62% of traditional chiefs reported that they decided on voucher recipients before the community meeting (Basurto, Dupas, and Robinson 2020). However, 77% of the secretaries of traditional leaders, recruited for my survey in 2019, reported that it is "very difficult" for their leader to determine who receives the FISP. They also reported in an open-ended question that their leaders used to hold sway in the selection of beneficiaries in the past, but it is no longer the case. Furthermore, the selection of beneficiaries for the Social Cash Transfer Program, a relatively more

recent government social safety net program compared to the Farm Input Subsidy Program, is based on objective measurements rather than subjective perceptions or arbitrary decisions.

The approach of keeping traditional leaders in check seems to be aligned with the popular sentiment in Malawi. As the government of Malawi gradually limited traditional leaders' discretionary power over some social welfare programs, the perceived corruption level of traditional leaders in Malawi decreased by 10.9 percentage points between two rounds of the Afrobarometer survey, from 65.2 % in 2016 (Round 6) to 54.3% in 2019 (Round 7).[170] The reduction in the perceived prevalence of corruption places Malawi in 3rd place in 2019 regarding traditional leaders' transparency, which is a substantial improvement from the 13th place in 2016 among the sub-Saharan countries. In recent years, the rate of contacting traditional leaders also improved in Malawi. While Malawians were already contacting the leaders at a high rate compared to other countries in the African continent, the contact rate improved from 39.5% in 2016 to 45% in 2019 (a 5.5 percentage point increase).[171] The increased contact rate situates the country at the number one position in the contact rate.

[170] The survey questions from Afrobarometer Round 6 and 7 verbatim are "How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: traditional leaders?" where response options vary from "none", "some of them", "most of them", and "all of them. Respondents who chose the last two categories are counted as the population who perceive traditional leaders are corrupt.

[171] The survey questions from Afrobarometer Round 6 and 7 verbatim are "During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following persons about some important problem or to give them your views? A traditional leader" where response options vary from "never", "only once", "a few times", and "often". Respondents who chose the last two categories are included in the percentages plotted in Figure 6.1.



Figure 6.1 Contact Rate and Perceived Corruption Level in Sub-Saharan Africa

Note: Afrobarometer Data, 29 Sub-saharan African Countries, Rounds 6 and 7, Years 2016 and 2019, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org.

The evidence from Malawi and two neighboring countries – Zambia and Zimbabwe – in Figure 6.2 corroborates that the public wants traditional leaders kept in check than having unlimited power. The figure displays the marginal effect of feeling free to criticize traditional leader - which was asked in three countries for Afrobarometer Round 7 - on various measurements

of public perception of traditional leaders, controlling for several demographic variables (i.e., respondents' gender, age, level of education, wealth, and ethnicity).[172] Malawians who report having higher freedom to criticize their traditional leaders are more likely to contact the leaders, evaluate the leaders' performance highly, perceive that fewer leaders are corrupt, and exhibit higher levels of trust in the leaders. In Zambia and Zimbabwe, the freedom to express criticisms about traditional leaders is not positively correlated with four of the mentioned aspects. However, being able to criticize traditional leaders is associated with lower levels of perceived corruption of the leaders in both Zambia and Zimbabwe and higher levels of trust in the leaders in Zimbabwe. The positive correlations between the confidence to express criticisms about traditional leaders and evaluations about the leaders attest to the public demand for transparency and responsiveness of the leaders.

[172] The survey question about freedom to criticize verbatim is "In this country, how free do you feel to criticize the following: your traditional leader." The contact measurement and corruption measurement use the same survey questions used in Figure 6.1. Other questions plotted as outcomes in Figure 6.2 are "Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? Your traditional leader" for the performance measurement, and "How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? Traditional leaders" for the trust measurement. All the mentioned variables are normalized to range from 0 to 1 and coded in a way that positive outcomes (feel free to criticize, contact frequently, fewer leaders are corrupt, trust leaders a lot) to take higher values. Appendix X includes a codebook of control variables.



Figure 6.2 Feeling Free to Criticize Traditional Leader

Note: Afrobarometer Data, Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, Round 7, Year 2019, available at http://www.afrobarometer.org.

3. Contributions and Limitations

First of all, this dissertation contributes to the field by examining political competition around traditional leadership to which scholars have paid insufficient attention. The descriptive evidence in Chapter 3 debunks any belief that the customary law rigidly dictates who the successor of traditional leadership will be and illustrates that multiple candidacies do, in fact, appear for the hereditary position. Furthermore, by shifting the focus from the outcome of leadership challenges to such attempts, this dissertation demonstrates that the attempts to overthrow a traditional leader occur more often than previous studies have suggested and that competitive challenges are an important predictor of the provision of some private goods and local public goods. Thus, this dissertation sets a cornerstone for future studies which examine the ramifications of political competition over traditional leadership on political accountability, responsiveness, representation, and service delivery, to name a few.

Moreover, this dissertation provides a new theoretical interpretation of the ruling family in traditional leadership by applying the selectorate theory. This study builds upon previous studies, which uncovered that people in the same local community do not necessarily have one concerted interest (e.g., Carlson and seim 2020) but provides a unique understanding that ruling family members - a subset of community members - might be more successful in carrying their interest through their leader due to their political leverage as a group of selectors. By illuminating the power struggle behind the scene in the sphere of the traditional institutions, this study expands the scope of the scholarship on intra-elite power struggle to local traditional leaders in sub-Saharan Africa.

Lastly, this dissertation has advantages in terms of providing scarce information about understudied local leaders using real-world data. Although systematic data collection efforts about traditional leadership in Africa are on the rise in tandem with the growing interest in traditional leadership, most of the efforts have concentrated on high-rank leaders who oversee hundreds (if not more) of traditional leaders at the village-level. Yet, village-level traditional leaders are more embedded in their local community than are their superiors. Thus, examining the performance of village-level traditional leaders – who have direct influence over their local community - with real-world data has a great bearing on real-world policy implications.

One of the challenges of this study is to establish a causal relationship between the competition over traditional leadership and different outcomes like many observational studies. Nevertheless, the associations in Chapters 4 and 5 are unlikely to capture reverse causal relations because competitive challenges are likely to have preceded the provision of private goods and local public goods. The distributions of studied private goods occurred a year prior to the time of data collection, and the provision of local public goods such as neighborhood security, water supply,

and road conditions require regular upkeep. On the other hand, traditional leaders who encountered any competitive challenge underwent only one leadership challenge during thirteen years of rule, which makes it unlikely that most leadership challenges to have been posed after the provision of private goods or local public goods. Furthermore, the associations discovered in this dissertation - even if they are not causal - establish an important step for future research because it sheds light to variables or subjects that researchers have traditionally paid little attention to.

The data in this study does not directly speak to the generalizability of the findings. Nevertheless, it is feasible to extrapolate the argument to similar contexts which satisfy the fundamental assumptions of this study. First, leaders' political survival is contingent on the support of a small group who has higher leverage over their leader than the general public, and the support base expects material compensation for their loyalty. Second, leaders can increase the quantity or improve the quality of local public goods, but they can only influence the distribution of a set quantity regarding private goods. While cases that meet these criteria may be found in traditional leaders in African countries, they may also be found in other places. Therefore, future research is recommended to assess the applicability of the argument in other contexts.

Subsequent studies may examine broader implications of traditional leaders' accountability to a ruling family for the local community. Such research could focus on whether accountability to a ruling family spurred by political competition causes the leaders' alienation from the rest of the villagers or whether such accountability provides an informal channel for regular villagers' interests to be represented better through a ruling family. One might also investigate the impact that political competition has on citizens' perception of traditional leadership regarding the leaders' performance. The existence of political contestation over a leadership position provides the foundation for future scholarship on the accountability of traditional leadership.

APPENDICES

Appendix to Chapter 2

A. Response Rates by TAs

I initially selected three TAs (Kaomba, Lukwa, and Mwase) and then expanded the study to seven other TAs to increase the sample size. In-person surveys were conducted only in TA Kaomba for a week.

	Traditional Leader Survey (R1)	Traditional Leader Survey (R2)	Ruling Family Survey	Secretary Survey
		Initial TAs		
Kaomba	78.79% (104/132)	74.24% (98/132)	77.27% (102/132)	78.03% (103/132)
Lukwa	96.72% (118/122)	82.79% (101/122)	98.36% (120/122)	97.54% (119/122)
Mwase	52.17% (60/115)	50.43% (58/115)	53.04% (61/115)	52.17% (60/115)
		Expanded TAs		
Chilowamatambe	45.05% (41/91)	45.05% (41/91)	45.05% (41/91)	45.05% (41/91)
Kaluluma	22.14% (31/140)	22.14% (31/140)	22.14% (31/140)	20.71% (29/140)
Kawamba	37.86% (39/103)	36.89% (38/103)	36.89% (38/103)	33.98% (35/103)
Mnyanja	70.34% (83/118)	69.49% (82/118)	67.80% (80/118)	64.41% (76/118)
Njombwa	91% (91/100)	93% (93/100)	75% (75/100)	75% (75/100)
Simlemba	37.87% (64/169)	37.28% (63/169)	37.28% (63/169)	37.28% (63/169)
Wimbe	54.64% (53/97)	54.64% (53/97)	71.13% (69/97)	70.10% (68/97)
Total	684	658	680	669

Table 2A Response Rates by TAs

Appendix to Chapter 3

A. Number of Male Candidates & Both Male and Female Candidates



Figure 3A Number of Candidates Eligible for Succession

Note: Top panels show the distribution of *MaleCandidate* and *BothCandidate* variables in their original values, and the bottom panels show the distribution with logged values.

B. Control Variables Descriptive Statistics

B.1. Survey Questions

Table 3B illustrates a comprehensive list of control variables for analyses in Chapters 3-5 and its Appendix. A traditional leader below refers to a village-level leader who is the subject of this research.

Variable Name	Description
Female	(indicator) a traditional leader's gender from the Traditional Leader Survey (R1). 0. Male 1. Female
Age	(ordinal) a traditional leader's age from the Traditional Leader Survey (R1). For the survey question "How old are you?" respondents answered either in the format of their birth year or age. Birth years were converted into respondents' age by subtracting their year of birth from the year of data collection. The age variable in integer values was then transformed into a categorical variable. 1. equal to or less than 35 2. from 36 to 45 3. from 46 to 55 4. from 56 to 65 5. from 66 to 75 6. more than 75
Ethnic matriliny	(indicator) Whether a traditional leader's ethnic group practices matriliny or patriliny, obtained from the Traditional Leader Survey (R1). If a traditional leader belongs to an ethnic group that practices matriny, this variable takes a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. Matrilineal ethnic groups include Chewa, Yao, Lomwe, Mang'anja, and Tonga, and Patrilineal ethnic groups include Tumbuka, Nkhonde, Lambya, Ngoni, Sena, Sukwa, and Senga. If a respondent identified him/herself with an ethnic group not listed in the response option, an enumerator asked whether the ethnic group was patrilineal or matrilineal. 0. Patrilineal ethnic group 1. Matrilineal ethnic group
Education	(ordinal) A traditional leader's education level from the Traditional Leader Survey (R1). The verbatim question was "What is your highest level of education?" and the response options varied from 1-10. Then, the variable was recoded to range from 1 to 6 due to the insufficient number of observations in each category. The recoded values are: 1. No formal schooling/informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling) 2. Some primary schooling 3. Primary school completed 4. Intermediate school or some secondary school/high school

	5. Secondary school/high school completed 6. Post-secondary qualifications other than university/some university/university completed/post-graduate
Wealth	(ordinal) The wealth of a traditional leader's household from the Traditional Leader Survey (R1). This variable measures the number of following household items of a respondent: A. radio, B. television, C. motor vehicle or motorcycle, D. Computer, E. Bank account, F. Mobile phone. The variable takes a value of 0 if a traditional leader's household does not have any of the items and 6 if it has all of them.
Year in power	(ordinal) Years passed since a traditional leader was first sworn into traditional leadership, obtained from the Ruling Family Survey. For the survey question "In which year, was the current [title of traditional leader] FIRST installed as a traditional leader?" respondents answered either in the format of the first year of the installment or the number of years passed. The first years were converted into the years in power by subtracting the initial year from the year of data collection. The year in power variable in integer values was then transformed into a categorical variable. 1. Less than or equal to 5 2. From 6 to 10 3. From 11 to 15 4. From 16 to 20 5. From 21 to 25 6. More than 26
Enforce First call	(ordinal) The enforceability of the first call rule from the Ruling Family Survey. The verbatim survey question was, "Regarding the [title of traditional leader] position, how strictly is the customary law about the succession enforced?" 0. First call rule does not exist 1. Never enforced 2. Rarely enforced 3. Sometimes enforced 4. Often enforced 5. Always enforced
Group Village Headman	(indicator) a traditional leader's current rank from the Traditional Leader Survey (R1). 0. Village Headman 1. Group Village Headman
Plaintiff	(categorical) Whether a ruling family member brought the dispute case that they got involved in with an average villager or not, obtained from the Secretary Survey. The exact wording of the survey question used was "Who brought the case to a traditional court?" and its responses take the following values. 0. Not a member of a ruling family 0.5 Both of them 1. Member of a ruling family
Ln(Num household)	(continuous) The number of households in a traditional leader's jurisdiction from the Traditional Leader Survey (R1). If respondents

	provided a range, average values were used. I take the natural log of this variable due to its skewness.
Ln (Num Non-coethnic)	(continuous) The number of households in a traditional leader's jurisdiction whose household head came from different ethnic groups from the leader, obtained from the Traditional Leader Survey (R1). If respondents provided a range, average values were used. I take the natural log of this variable due to its skewness.
Ln (Num relative)	(continuous) The number of households in a traditional leader's jurisdiction whose members are not related to the leader by blood, obtained from the Traditional Leader Survey (R1). If respondents provided a range, average values were used. I take the natural log of this variable due to its skewness.
Ln (Num ruling family)	(continuous) The number of ruling family households in a traditional leader's jurisdiction, obtained from the Traditional Leader Survey (R1). If respondents provided a range, average values were used. I take the natural log of this variable due to its skewness.

Table 3B Description of Control Variables

B.2. Descriptive Statistics



Figure 3B.2.1 Distribution of Control Variables 1



Figure 3B.2.2 Distribution of Control Variables 2

Appendix to Chapter 4

A. Regression Result

A.1. Full Sample

	Ruling in Customary Court			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	0.90*	0.91*		
	(0.49)	(0.49)		
Male candidate	-0.28		-0.26	
	(0.30)		(0.30)	
Both candidate		-0.24		-0.22
		(0.25)		(0.25)
Female	-0.79	-0.79	-0.62	-0.62
	(0.66)	(0.66)	(0.62)	(0.63)
Age	-0.26	-0.26*	-0.26	-0.27*
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Ethnic matriliny	1.15**	1.16**	1.06**	1.07**
	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Education	-0.05	-0.04	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Wealth	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.14
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Years in power	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.07
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Enforce first call	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.23
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Group Village	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Plaintiff	1.51***	1.51***	1.44***	1.44***
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.36)
Observations	209	209	209	209

Table 4A.1.1 Favoritism in Customary Court: Full Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	PWP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	0.04	0.04		
	(0.14)	(0.14)		
Male candidate	0.01		0.01	
	(0.07)		(0.07)	
Both candidate		-0.001		-0.003
		(0.06)		(0.06)
Female	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Age	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.16	-0.16	-0.15	-0.15
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Education	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Years in power	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Enforce first call	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Num household	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.07*	-0.07*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Num relative	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Num ruling family	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.19***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Group Village	0.17	0.17	0.18	0.17

	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Constant	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03
	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Observations	53	53	53	53
R^2	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36
Adjusted R^2	0.12	0.12	0.15	0.15
Residual Std. Error	0.31 (df = 38)	0.31 (df = 38)	0.30 (df = 39)	0.30 (df = 39)
F Statistic	1.53 (df = 14; 38)	1.53 (df = 14; 38)	1.68 (df = 13; 39)	1.68 (df = 13; 39)

Table 4A.1.2 Favoritism in PWP: Full Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

	FISP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	-0.03	-0.03		
	(0.05)	(0.05)		
Male candidate	0.03		0.03	
	(0.03)		(0.03)	
Both candidate		0.02		0.02
		(0.03)		(0.03)
Female	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*	0.11*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic matriliny	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wealth	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Years in power	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	0.01	0.01	0.005	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num Non-coethnic	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num ruling family	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Group Village	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.19
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Observations	316	315	316	315
R^2	0.20	0.20	0.20	0.20
Adjusted R^2	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.17
Residual Std. Error	0.30 (df = 301)	0.30 (df = 300)	0.30 (df = 302)	0.30 (df = 301)
F Statistic	5.37^{***} (df = 14; 301)	5.39^{***} (df = 14; 300)	5.77^{***} (df = 13; 302)	5.79^{***} (df = 13; 301)

Table 4A.1.3 Favoritism in FISP: Full Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

	SCTP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	0.06*	0.06*		
	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Male candidate	-0.01		-0.01	
	(0.02)		(0.02)	
Both candidate		-0.01		-0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Female	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic matriliny	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Years in power	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	0.06***	0.06***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.001	0.001	0.0000	-0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num ruling family	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Group Village	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.06
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Observations	322	321	323	322
R^2	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16
Adjusted R^2	0.13	0.13	0.12	0.12
Residual Std. Error	0.22 (df = 307)	0.22 (df = 306)	0.23 (df = 309)	0.23 (df = 308)
F Statistic	4.28^{***} (df = 14; 307)	4.29^{***} (df = 14; 306)	4.44^{***} (df = 13; 309)	4.48^{***} (df = 13; 308)

Table 4A.1.4 Favoritism in SCTP: Full Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

A.2. High Leverage Sample

	Ruling in Customary Court			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	1.15*	1.17**		
	(0.59)	(0.59)		
Male candidate	-0.20		-0.25	
	(0.33)		(0.33)	
Both candidate		-0.18		-0.21
		(0.29)		(0.29)
Female	-0.63	-0.61	-0.56	-0.52
	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.73)	(0.72)
Age	-0.24	-0.25	-0.25	-0.26
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Ethnic matriliny	1.43**	1.44**	1.35**	1.35**
	(0.61)	(0.62)	(0.60)	(0.60)
Education	0.08	0.08	0.02	0.02
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Wealth	-0.15	-0.16	-0.18	-0.19
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Years in power	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.08
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Enforce first call	0.32	0.33	0.33	0.33
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Group Village	-0.58	-0.58	-0.57	-0.58
	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.46)
Plaintiff	0.63	0.64	0.53	0.53
	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Observations	144	144	144	144

Table 4A.2.1 Favoritism in Customary Court: High Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

	PWP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	-0.49***	-0.56***		
	(0.16)	(0.16)		
Male candidate	-0.08		0.08	
	(0.09)		(0.11)	
Both candidate		-0.09		0.07
		(0.07)		(0.08)
Female	0.08	0.06	0.32	0.31
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.20)
Age	-0.04	-0.05	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Ethnic matriliny	0.74**	0.81**	-0.01	0.01
	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.39)
Education	-0.06	-0.07	-0.08	-0.06
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Wealth	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.06
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Years in power	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Enforce first call	0.06*	0.05**	0.03	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Num household	0.13	0.14	-0.14	-0.12
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.14)
Num Non-coethnic	0.08**	0.08**	0.10	0.10
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Num relative	0.31***	0.33***	0.11	0.11
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Num ruling family	-0.46***	-0.47***	-0.35***	-0.35***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Group Village	-0.11	-0.17	0.40	0.39
	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.32)
Constant	-0.87	-0.94	0.89	0.75
	(0.94)	(0.79)	(1.19)	(1.02)
Observations	20	20	20	20

R2	0.94	0.95	0.81	0.82
Adjusted R2	0.76	0.79	0.41	0.42
Residual Std. Error	0.14 (df = 5)	0.13 (df = 5)	0.22 (df = 6)	0.22 (df = 6)
F Statistic	5.36** (df = 14; 5)	6.22** (df = 14; 5)	2.00 (df = 13; 6)	2.07 (df = 13; 6)

Table 4A.2.2 Favoritism in PWP: High Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

	FISP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	0.03	0.03		
	(0.10)	(0.11)		
Male candidate	0.10*		0.10*	
	(0.06)		(0.06)	
Both candidate		0.04		0.05
		(0.06)		(0.06)
Female	0.24*	0.19	0.24*	0.19
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Age	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.18	-0.14	-0.19	-0.15
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Education	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth	-0.01	-0.005	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Years in power	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Enforce first call	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num household	0.08*	0.08*	0.08*	0.08*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num Non-coethnic	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num relative	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Num ruling family	-0.22***	-0.21***	-0.22***	-0.21***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group Village	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Constant	0.35	0.39	0.36	0.40

	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.37)
Observations	72	72	72	72
R2	0.35	0.33	0.35	0.32
Adjusted R2	0.19	0.16	0.20	0.17
Residual Std. Error	0.29 (df = 57)	0.30 (df = 57)	0.29 (df = 58)	0.29 (df = 58)
F Statistic	2.20** (df = 14; 57)	1.96** (df = 14; 57)	2.40** (df = 13; 58)	2.14** (df = 13; 58)

Table 4A.2.3 Favoritism in FISP: High Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

	SCTP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	0.18**	0.18**		
	(0.08)	(0.08)		
Male candidate	-0.02		-0.02	
	(0.05)		(0.05)	
Both candidate		-0.03		-0.03
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Female	-0.12	-0.12	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Age	0.001	-0.0002	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.08	-0.08	-0.15	-0.15
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Education	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wealth	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Years in power	-0.01	-0.004	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Enforce first call	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num household	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**	0.09**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num relative	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num ruling family	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.14***	-0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Group Village	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant	0.32	0.36	0.49	0.53

	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Observations	78	78	78	78
R2	0.32	0.33	0.27	0.27
Adjusted R2	0.17	0.18	0.12	0.12
Residual Std. Error	0.24 (df = 63)	0.24 (df = 63)	0.25 (df = 64)	0.24 (df = 64)
F Statistic	2.13** (df = 14; 63)	2.17** (df = 14; 63)	1.81* (df = 13; 64)	1.83* (df = 13; 64)

Table 4A.2.4 Favoritism in SCTP: High Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

A.3. Low Leverage Sample

	Ruling in Customary Court			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	-0.22	-0.20		
	(2.39)	(2.24)		
Male candidate	1.75		1.71	
	(2.06)		(2.04)	
Both candidate		1.76		1.72
		(2.18)		(2.11)
Female	1.12	1.38	0.91	1.18
	(5.92)	(5.71)	(5.79)	(5.49)
Age	-0.37	-0.22	-0.40	-0.26
	(1.03)	(1.00)	(0.98)	(0.91)
Ethnic matriliny	0.61	0.15	0.69	0.26
	(2.39)	(2.78)	(2.21)	(2.48)
Education	-0.27	-0.21	-0.26	-0.20
	(0.76)	(0.75)	(0.74)	(0.73)
Wealth	2.34**	2.27**	2.36**	2.29**
	(1.12)	(1.03)	(1.10)	(1.00)
Years in power	-0.20	-0.37	-0.16	-0.33
	(0.83)	(0.84)	(0.67)	(0.66)
Enforce first call	0.94	0.97	1.00	1.02
	(1.19)	(1.14)	(0.99)	(0.97)
Group Village	3.12	3.03	2.95	2.90
	(3.31)	(3.07)	(2.72)	(2.63)
Plaintiff	5.63***	5.91***	5.66***	5.91***
	(2.09)	(2.23)	(2.08)	(2.22)
Observations	49	49	49	49

Table 4A.3.1 Favoritism in Customary Court: Low Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

	PWP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	0.32	0.33		
	(0.21)	(0.21)		
Male candidate	0.08		0.10	
	(0.14)		(0.15)	
Both candidate		0.07		0.08
		(0.12)		(0.12)
Female	-0.07	-0.08	-0.08	-0.10
	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Age	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.44*	-0.42*	-0.42*	-0.39*
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.23)
Education	-0.06	-0.05	-0.07	-0.05
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
Wealth	0.13*	0.13*	0.13*	0.12
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Years in power	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Enforce first call	0.001	0.004	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Num household	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.14***	-0.15***	-0.13**	-0.13**
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Num relative	0.10	0.10	0.07	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Num ruling family	-0.10	-0.09	-0.12	-0.11
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Group Village	0.22	0.22	0.27	0.26
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Constant	-0.72	-0.80	-0.69	-0.78
	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.57)	(0.58)

Observations	33	33	33	33
R2	0.60	0.60	0.55	0.55
Adjusted R2	0.30	0.30	0.25	0.24
Residual Std. Error	0.29 (df = 18)	0.29 (df = 18)	0.30 (df = 19)	0.30 (df = 19)
F Statistic	1.96* (df = 14; 18)	1.96* (df = 14; 18)	1.80 (df = 13; 19)	1.79 (df = 13; 19)

Table 4A.3.2 Favoritism in PWP: Low Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

	FISP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	-0.05	-0.05		
	(0.06)	(0.06)		
Male candidate	0.01		0.01	
	(0.04)		(0.04)	
Both candidate		0.02		0.02
		(0.03)		(0.03)
Female	0.08	0.09	0.08	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic matriliny	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wealth	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Years in power	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num household	0.06**	0.06**	0.06**	0.06**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num Non-coethnic	0.01	0.005	0.01	0.005
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.04*	0.04	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num ruling family	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.18***	-0.18***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)

Group Village	0.001	-0.001	0.004	0.002
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Constant	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.15
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Observations	244	243	244	243
R2	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.19
Adjusted R2	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Residual Std. Error	0.30 (df = 229)	0.30 (df = 228)	0.30 (df = 230)	0.30 (df = 229)
F Statistic	3.73*** (df = 14; 229)	3.77*** (df = 14; 228)	3.97*** (df = 13; 230)	4.00*** (df = 13; 229)

Table 4A.3.3 Favoritism in FISP: Low Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

	SCTP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	0.01	0.01		
	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Male candidate	-0.002		-0.01	
	(0.03)		(0.03)	
Both candidate		-0.01		-0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)
Female	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic matriliny	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Years in power	0.0002	-0.0000	0.001	0.001
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	0.02	0.02	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num ruling family	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.11***	-0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Village	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02

	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	-0.004	0.01	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Observations	244	243	245	244
R2	0.15	0.15	0.16	0.16
Adjusted R2	0.10	0.10	0.11	0.11
Residual Std. Error	0.22 (df = 229)	0.22 (df = 228)	0.22 (df = 231)	0.22 (df = 230)
F Statistic	2.95*** (df = 14; 229)	2.96*** (df = 14; 228)	3.28*** (df = 13; 231)	3.31*** (df = 13; 230)

Table 4A.3.4 Favoritism in SCTP: Low Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

B. Recoded Dependent Variable

This section presents results from the robustness check. For readability and due to space limits, I only report coefficient estimates of key explanatory variables in figures. Regression results are available upon request. The first robustness check approach recodes the favoritism in PWP/FISP/SCTP variable into an indicator variable. The dependent variables then take a value of 1 if the probability of a ruling family receiving a benefit from the PWP/FISP/SCTP is greater than 0, and 0 otherwise.



Figure 4B.1 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : Full Sample & Recoded



Figure 4B. 2 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition :High Leverage Sample & Recoded



Figure 4B.3 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition :Low Leverage Sample & Recoded

C. Missing Value Imputation

The robustness check analyses here replicate the main analyses after processing the data with missing value imputation using five approaches (i.e., median value imputation, random value imputation, missForest package imputation, and MICE package imputation). I impute missing values for the PWP, FISP, and SCTP, but not for court cases. Missing value imputations do not lead to any change in the dataset for court cases.

C.1. Median Value

In this analysis, missing values are replaced with the median values of each variable included in each model. The variables in the model include favoritism in the distribution of the PWP/FISP/SCTP (the dependent variables of each model), the number of competitive challengers, the number of male candidates, the number of male and female candidates (explanatory variables), and gender, age, matriliny/patriliny, education, wealth, years in power, the enforceability of first call rule, number of households, number of non-coethnics, number of relatives, number of the ruling family, and position (control variables).



Figure 4C.1.1 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : Full Sample & Missing Imputed with Median Values



Figure 4C.1.2 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : High Leverage Sample & Missing Imputed with Median Values



Figure 4C.1.3 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : Low Leverage Sample & Missing Imputed with Median Values

C.2. Random Value

Missing values of each variable are replaced with random values within the range of the variable. The variable list for this analysis remains the same as the previous analysis with median values.



Figure 4C.2.1 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : Full Sample & Missing Imputed with Random Values



Figure 4C.2.2 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : High Leverage Sample & Missing Imputed with Random Values



Figure 4C.2.3 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : Low Leverage Sample & Missing Imputed with Random Values

C.3. MissForest

This package and another package later (MICE) create multiple imputations as opposed to a single imputation such as mean and median. All of them also assume that the missing data are missing at random (MAR), which means that the probability that a value is missing depends only on observed values. If there is a variable with missing values, the variable is regressed on other variables in the dataset, and the predictive value from the regression replaces the missing values.

The results here are produced after missing values in the dataset are imputed with the *missForest* package in R. The package implements random forest algorithm, which is a non-parametric imputation method applicable to various variable types. It yields out-of-bag (OOB) error, measuring the prediction error. The dataset used to predict missing values included all dependent variables, explanatory variables, and control variables in analyses.



Figure 4C.3.1 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : Full Sample & Missing Imputed with missForest Package



Figure 4C.3.2 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : High Leverage Sample & Missing Imputed with missForest Package



Figure 4C.3.3 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : Low Leverage Sample & Missing Imputed with missForest Package

C.4. MICE

MICE stands for Multivariate Imputation via Chained Equations. Using predictive mean matching (PMM) for prediction, I generated 5 datasets where each dataset went over 50 iterations. The results from 5 datasets are pooled together using the *pool* function in *mice* package.



Figure 4C.4.1 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : Full Sample & Missing Imputed with MICE Package



Figure 4C.4.2 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : High Leverage Sample & Missing Imputed with MICE Package



Figure 4C.4.3 Favoritism in the Distribution of Private Goods on Competition : Low Leverage Sample & Missing Imputed with MICE Package

D. Likelihood of Sharing Private Goods

	Not at all likely	Not very likely	Somewhat likely	Very likely	Total
Share PWP	304	147	145	59	655
%	46.41	22.44	22.14	9.01	100
Share FISP	213	133	173	150	669
%	31.84	19.88	25.86	22.42	100
Share SCTP	322	197	104	41	664
%	48.49	29.67	15.66	6.17	100

Table 4D. Distribution of Likelihood of Sharing Private Goods

D.1. Sample Split: Full, High Leverage, and Low Leverage Sample

	PWP		FISP		SCTP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Challenger	0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.06	0.06
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male candidate	0.003		0.03		-0.01	
	(0.07)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
Both candidate		-0.004		0.02		-0.01
		(0.06)		(0.03)		(0.02)
Share PWP	-0.01	-0.01				
	(0.05)	(0.05)				
Share FISP			0.02	0.01		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
Share SCTP					-0.01	-0.01
					(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.03	-0.04	0.10*	0.11*	0.02	0.03
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.14	-0.13	0.002	0.004	0.01	0.01
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	-0.03	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth	0.07	0.08	-0.02	-0.02	-0.005	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Years in power	-0.03	-0.03	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	-0.005	-0.005	0.004	0.005	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)

Num household	0.09	0.09	0.07***	0.07***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.06	-0.06	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.001	0.0001
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num ruling family	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.11***	-0.11***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Village	0.16	0.16	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	0.07	0.07	0.17	0.17	0.06	0.07
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Observations	52	52	316	315	321	320
R^2	0.37	0.37	0.20	0.20	0.17	0.17
Adjusted R^2	0.11	0.11	0.16	0.16	0.13	0.13
Residual Std. Error	0.31 (df = 36)	0.31 (df = 36)	0.30 (df = 300)	0.30 (df = 299)	0.22 (df = 305)	0.22 (df = 304)
F Statistic	1.40 (df = 15; 36)	1.40 (df = 15; 36)	5.07*** (df = 15; 300)	5.08*** (df = 15; 299)	4.07*** (df = 15; 305)	4.09*** (df = 15; 304)

Table 4D.1.1 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods with Likelihood of Sharing : Full Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	PWP		FISP		SCTP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Challenger	-0.53**	-0.61***	0.04	0.05	0.17**	0.17**
	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Male candidate	-0.09		0.09		-0.005	
	(0.10)		(0.06)		(0.05)	
Both candidate		-0.10		0.02		-0.01
		(0.08)		(0.06)		(0.05)
Share PWP	-0.02	-0.03				
	(0.06)	(0.06)				
Share FISP			0.03	0.04		
			(0.03)	(0.03)		
Share SCTP					-0.05	-0.05
					(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	0.07	0.04	0.24*	0.18	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Age	-0.03	-0.05	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic matriliny	0.76*	0.83**	-0.19	-0.16	-0.10	-0.10
	(0.41)	(0.36)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Education	-0.06	-0.07	-0.02	-0.03	0.01	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wealth	0.02	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Years in power	-0.06*	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Enforce first call	0.06*	0.05*	0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num household	0.14	0.16	0.08*	0.09*	0.10***	0.10***
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Num Non-coethnic	0.08*	0.08*	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num relative	0.31***	0.34***	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04

	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num ruling family	-0.46***	-0.48***	-0.23***	-0.22***	-0.13***	-0.13***
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Group Village	-0.15	-0.22	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant	-0.90	-0.95	0.34	0.40	0.28	0.29
	(1.04)	(0.86)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.34)
Observations	20	20	72	72	78	78
R^2	0.94	0.95	0.36	0.34	0.35	0.35
Adjusted R^2	0.71	0.75	0.19	0.16	0.19	0.19
Residual Std. Error	0.16 (df = 4)	0.14 (df = 4)	0.29 (df = 56)	0.30 (df = 56)	0.24 (df = 62)	0.24 (df = 62)
F Statistic	4.09* (df = 15; 4)	4.90* (df = 15; 4)	2.10** (df = 15; 56)	1.91** (df = 15; 56)	2.21** (df = 15; 62)	2.22** (df = 15; 62)

Table 4D.1.2 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods with Likelihood of Sharing : High Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	PWP		FISP		SCTP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Challenger	0.39*	0.40*	-0.04	-0.04	0.01	0.01
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male candidate	0.16		0.01		-0.003	
	(0.18)		(0.04)		(0.03)	
Both candidate		0.10		0.01		-0.01
		(0.15)		(0.03)		(0.02)
Share PWP	0.03	0.03				
	(0.07)	(0.08)				
Share FISP			0.01	0.01		
			(0.02)	(0.02)		
Share SCTP					-0.002	-0.002
					(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.01	-0.04	0.08	0.09	0.04	0.05
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Age	0.07	0.07	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.60**	-0.52**	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	-0.11	-0.08	0.02	0.02	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth	0.11	0.11	-0.01	-0.02	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Years in power	-0.05	-0.04	-0.004	-0.004	0.0000	-0.0002
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	0.002	0.01	-0.002	-0.002	0.02	0.02
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	0.10	0.11	0.06**	0.06**	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Num Non-coethnic	-0.19***	-0.19***	0.01	0.005	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.17*	0.16	0.04*	0.04	0.01	0.01
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num ruling family	-0.11	-0.09	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.11***	-0.11***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Village	0.31*	0.28	-0.002	-0.005	0.02	0.02
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	-0.86	-0.96	0.14	0.14	-0.01	0.002
	(0.58)	(0.60)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Observations	32	32	244	243	243	242
R^2	0.64	0.63	0.19	0.19	0.16	0.16
Adjusted R^2	0.29	0.28	0.13	0.14	0.10	0.10
Residual Std. Error	0.30 (df = 16)	0.30 (df = 16)	0.30 (df = 228)	0.30 (df = 227)	0.22 (df = 227)	0.22 (df = 226)
F Statistic	1.86 (df = 15; 16)	1.81 (df = 15; 16)	3.50*** (df = 15; 228)	3.53*** (df = 15; 227)	2.78*** (df = 15; 227)	2.79*** (df = 15; 226)

Table 4D.1.3 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods with Likelihood of Sharing : Low Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

D.2. Sample Split: Likely/Unlikely to Share

	PWP		FISP		SCTP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Challenger	-0.08	-0.10	0.01	0.0002	0.05	0.04
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male candidate	-0.03		0.002		-0.01	
	(0.09)		(0.05)		(0.03)	
Both candidate		-0.06		-0.005		-0.01
		(0.08)		(0.04)		(0.02)
Female	-0.04	-0.03	0.28***	0.32***	0.05	0.07
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	-0.11	-0.11	0.002	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic matriliny	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.03
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	0.04	0.04	0.04	0.05	-0.0004	0.0004
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wealth	0.15**	0.16**	0.001	0.0001	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Years in power	0.03	0.03	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	-0.003	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	-0.04	-0.03	0.03	0.04	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	-0.23**	-0.25**	0.004	-0.002	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num ruling family	-0.12	-0.12	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.12***	-0.12***
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Village	0.23*	0.22*	0.05	0.04	0.02	0.01
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)

Constant	1.22**	1.28**	0.19	0.20	0.03	0.03
	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Observations	30	30	159	158	237	236
R^2	0.73	0.74	0.19	0.20	0.18	0.18
Adjusted R^2	0.48	0.50	0.11	0.13	0.13	0.13
Residual Std. Error	0.23 (df = 15)	0.23 (df = 15)	0.30 (df = 144)	0.30 (df = 143)	0.23 (df = 222)	0.23 (df = 221)
F Statistic	2.95** (df = 14; 15)	3.10** (df = 14; 15)	2.46*** (df = 14; 144)	2.63*** (df = 14; 143)	3.42*** (df = 14; 222)	3.45*** (df = 14; 221)

Table 4D.2.1 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods: Likely to Share

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	PWP		FISP		SCTP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Challenger	0.37	0.30	-0.06	-0.07	0.11	0.11
	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Male candidate	-0.18		0.02		0.01	
	(0.10)		(0.04)		(0.04)	
Both candidate		-0.18*		0.001		0.004
		(0.08)		(0.04)		(0.04)
Female	-0.49	-0.54*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	0.02	0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic matriliny	0.05	0.11	-0.03	-0.02	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Education	-0.07	-0.10*	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wealth	0.07	0.08	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.05**
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Years in power	-0.02	-0.04	0.02	0.02	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	-0.004	-0.02	0.003	0.004	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num household	0.15	0.11	0.11***	0.12***	0.04	0.04
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.13	-0.10	0.003	0.003	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.19	0.22	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num ruling family	-0.11	-0.15	-0.22***	-0.22***	-0.11***	-0.11***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Group Village	-0.17	-0.19	-0.08	-0.08	0.005	0.01
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)

Constant	-0.46 (0.59)	-0.12 (0.60)	0.21 (0.21)	0.22 (0.21)	0.24 (0.20)	0.24 (0.20)
Observations	22	22	157	157	84	84
R^2	0.80	0.82	0.33	0.33	0.25	0.25
Adjusted R^2	0.40	0.47	0.26	0.26	0.10	0.10
Residual Std. Error	0.26 (df = 7)	0.24 (df = 7)	0.28 (df = 142)	0.28 (df = 142)	0.19 (df = 69)	0.19 (df = 69)
F Statistic	2.00 (df = 14; 7)	2.35 (df = 14; 7)	4.97^{***} (df = 14; 142)	4.95^{***} (df = 14; 142)	1.65^{*} (df = 14; 69)	1.65^{*} (df = 14; 69)

Table 4D.2.2 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods: Unlikely to Share

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

E. Frequency of Contacting High-Rank Traditional Leaders



Figure 4E. Distribution of Contact High-Rank Traditional Leaders

E.1. Sample Split: Full, High Leverage, and Low Leverage Sample

	PWP		FISP		SCTP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Challenger	0.02	0.01	-0.05	-0.06	0.09**	0.09**
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male candidate	-0.001		0.01		-0.01	
	(0.08)		(0.03)		(0.02)	
Both candidate		-0.02		0.01		-0.01
		(0.07)		(0.03)		(0.02)
Contact TA	0.09	0.09	-0.02	-0.02	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.12	-0.12	0.13**	0.14**	0.02	0.03
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	0.04	0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.03	-0.02	-0.002	0.0000	0.02	0.02
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	-0.06	-0.06	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth	0.05	0.06	-0.002	-0.002	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Years in power	-0.04	-0.04	0.0001	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0003
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	-0.04	-0.04	0.001	0.001	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	0.12	0.12*	0.08***	0.08***	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.09*	-0.08*	0.004	0.003	-0.01	-0.01

	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num ruling family	-0.18***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.19***	-0.10***	-0.10***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Village	0.12	0.11	0.01	0.005	0.001	-0.0005
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	-0.32	-0.31	0.16	0.17	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Observations	43	43	282	281	286	285
R^2	0.46	0.46	0.23	0.23	0.18	0.18
Adjusted R^2	0.16	0.16	0.18	0.18	0.13	0.13
Residual Std. Error	0.29 (df = 27)	0.29 (df = 27)	0.30 (df = 266)	0.30 (df = 265)	0.22 (df = 270)	0.22 (df = 269)
F Statistic	1.53 (df = 15; 27)	1.54 (df = 15; 27)	5.17*** (df = 15; 266)	5.20*** (df = 15; 265)	3.91*** (df = 15; 270)	3.92*** (df = 15; 269)

Table 4E.1.1 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods with Contact Frequency : Full Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	PWP		FISP		SCTP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Challenger	-0.44	-0.44	0.03	0.03	0.22**	0.23**
			(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Male candidate	0.004		0.11		0.001	
			(0.07)		(0.05)	
Both candidate		0.003		0.05		-0.02
				(0.07)		(0.05)
Contact TA	0.23	0.23	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	0.55	0.55	0.32**	0.27	-0.15	-0.15
			(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Age	-0.10	-0.10	0.01	0.01	-0.001	-0.002
			(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic matriliny	0.76	0.76	-0.23*	-0.19	-0.09	-0.08
			(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Education	-0.11	-0.11	0.004	-0.002	0.001	0.001
			(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wealth	0.01	0.01	-0.004	0.003	-0.03	-0.03
			(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Years in power	-0.04	-0.04	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Enforce first call	0.19	0.19	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.04
			(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num household	-0.03	-0.03	0.09*	0.09*	0.09**	0.09**
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Num Non-coethnic	0.11	0.11	-0.001	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01

			(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num relative	0.30	0.30	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
			(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num ruling family	-0.46	-0.46	-0.21***	-0.20***	-0.13***	-0.13***
			(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Group Village			0.02	0.01	-0.04	-0.04
			(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Constant	-1.32	-1.33	0.02	0.04	0.41	0.45
			(0.46)	(0.51)	(0.36)	(0.37)
Observations	15	15	62	62	70	70
R^2	1.00	1.00	0.40	0.37	0.37	0.37
Adjusted R^2			0.20	0.16	0.19	0.20
Residual Std. Error			0.30 (df = 46)	0.30 (df = 46)	0.24 (df = 54)	0.24 (df = 54)
F Statistic			2.01** (df = 15; 46)	1.79* (df = 15; 46)	2.11** (df = 15; 54)	2.12** (df = 15; 54)

Table 4E.1.2 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods with Contact Frequency : High Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	PWP		FISP		SCTP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Challenger	0.58***	0.57***	-0.08	-0.08	0.04	0.04
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male candidate	-0.03		-0.01		-0.01	
	(0.11)		(0.04)		(0.03)	
Both candidate		-0.02		0.002		-0.01
		(0.09)		(0.03)		(0.02)
Contact TA	0.11	0.11	-0.03	-0.03	0.04*	0.03*
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.05	0.06
	(0.19)	(0.18)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Age	-0.06	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.17	-0.19	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.05
	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	-0.03	-0.04	0.02	0.02	0.001	0.001
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Wealth	0.15**	0.16**	0.003	0.0000	0.003	0.003
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Years in power	0.04	0.04	-0.001	-0.001	0.002	0.002
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	0.18***	0.18**	0.07**	0.07**	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.17***	-0.17***	0.004	0.004	-0.01	-0.01

	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.06	0.06	0.04*	0.04	0.01	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num ruling family	0.01	0.01	-0.19***	-0.18***	-0.10***	-0.10***
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Village	0.09	0.09	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-1.60***	-1.57***	0.20	0.20	-0.13	-0.12
	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Observations	28	28	220	219	216	215
R^2	0.77	0.77	0.22	0.23	0.16	0.16
Adjusted R^2	0.49	0.48	0.17	0.17	0.10	0.10
Residual Std. Error	0.22 (df = 12)	0.22 (df = 12)	0.30 (df = 204)	0.30 (df = 203)	0.21 (df = 200)	0.21 (df = 199)
F Statistic	2.70** (df = 15; 12)	2.69** (df = 15; 12)	3.91*** (df = 15; 204)	3.93*** (df = 15; 203)	2.51*** (df = 15; 200)	2.52*** (df = 15; 199)

Table 4E.1.3 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods with Contact Frequency : Low Leverage Sample

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

E.2. Sample Split: Frequent/Not Frequent Contact

	PWP		FISP		SCTP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Challenger	0.15	0.16	-0.01	-0.01	0.12*	0.12*
	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Male candidate	-0.05		0.01		-0.02	
	(0.12)		(0.05)		(0.04)	
Both candidate		-0.06		-0.003		-0.01
		(0.10)		(0.04)		(0.03)
Female	-0.10	-0.11	0.39***	0.39***	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Age	0.06	0.06	-0.003	-0.002	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.04	-0.05	0.03	0.04	0.02	0.01
	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wealth	-0.002	0.001	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Years in power	-0.11	-0.11*	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	-0.12*	-0.12*	0.004	0.003	-0.01	-0.005
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num household	0.22	0.23	0.06*	0.06*	0.06*	0.05*
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.13	-0.13	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)

Num relative	0.04	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num ruling family	-0.15	-0.14	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.16***	-0.16***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Group Village	0.11	0.10	0.10	0.10	0.05	0.04
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	-0.07	-0.04	-0.14	-0.12	0.37*	0.37*
	(0.69)	(0.68)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Observations	21	21	111	111	108	108
R^2	0.79	0.80	0.36	0.36	0.29	0.29
Adjusted R^2	0.31	0.33	0.27	0.27	0.19	0.18
Residual Std. Error	0.30 (df = 6)	0.29 (df = 6)	0.27 (df = 96)	0.27 (df = 96)	0.24 (df = 93)	0.24 (df = 93)
F Statistic	1.65 (df = 14; 6)	1.71 (df = 14; 6)	3.85*** (df = 14; 96)	3.85*** (df = 14; 96)	2.74*** (df = 14; 93)	2.71*** (df = 14; 93)

Table 4E.2.1 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods: Frequent Contact

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	PWP		FISP		SCTP	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Challenger	0.55	0.56	-0.08	-0.09	0.08*	0.08
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Male candidate	-0.12		0.02		-0.01	
	(0.15)		(0.05)		(0.03)	
Both candidate		-0.09		-0.002		-0.01
		(0.11)		(0.04)		(0.03)
Female	-0.28	-0.29	-0.01	-0.004	0.004	0.01
	(0.95)	(0.95)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	0.09	0.08	-0.01	-0.01	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.34	-0.34	-0.06	-0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Education	-0.10	-0.12	0.001	0.002	-0.01	-0.004
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wealth	0.20	0.21	0.01	0.01	0.002	0.002
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Years in power	0.001	0.005	-0.005	-0.005	0.01	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	0.01	-0.003	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	0.10	0.08	0.12***	0.12***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num Non-coethnic	0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02**	-0.02**
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	-0.21	-0.21	0.004	0.0001	-0.01	-0.01

	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num ruling family	0.22	0.22	-0.20***	-0.20***	-0.08***	-0.08***
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Village	-0.47	-0.45	-0.09	-0.09	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.35)	(0.34)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	-0.38	-0.23	0.21	0.23	-0.05	-0.04
	(2.22)	(2.21)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Observations	22	22	171	170	178	177
R^2	0.61	0.61	0.24	0.24	0.16	0.17
Adjusted R^2	-0.18	-0.18	0.17	0.17	0.09	0.09
Residual Std. Error	0.30 (df = 7)	0.30 (df = 7)	0.30 (df = 156)	0.30 (df = 155)	0.21 (df = 163)	0.21 (df = 162)
F Statistic	0.77 (df = 14; 7)	0.77 (df = 14; 7)	3.49*** (df = 14; 156)	3.50*** (df = 14; 155)	2.26*** (df = 14; 163)	2.30*** (df = 14; 162)

Table 4E.2.2 Favoritism in Distribution of Private Goods: Not Frequent Contact

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

Appendix to Chapter 5

A. Regression Result

`	Insecurity			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	-0.09	-0.10		
	(0.12)	(0.12)		
Male candidate	0.06		0.05	
	(0.07)		(0.07)	
Both candidate		0.12**		0.12*
		(0.06)		(0.06)
Female	0.02	0.06	0.02	0.05
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Age	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ethnic matriliny	0.05	0.03	0.06	0.03
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Education	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Years in power	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Enforce first call	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num household	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num Non-coethnic	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***	0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num relative	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)

Num ruling family	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group Village	0.13	0.13	0.14	0.13
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Constant	0.35	0.25	0.32	0.21
	(0.43)	(0.44)	(0.43)	(0.43)
Observations	415	414	416	415
R2	0.17	0.18	0.17	0.18
Adjusted R2	0.12	0.13	0.12	0.13
Residual Std. Error	0.79 (df = 391)	0.78 (df = 390)	0.78 (df = 393)	0.78 (df = 392)
F Statistic	3.50*** (df = 23; 391)	3.64*** (df = 23; 390)	3.66*** (df = 22; 393)	3.78*** (df = 22; 392)

Table 5A.1 Provision of (In)Security

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

	Water			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	0.02	0.02		
	(0.08)	(0.08)		
Male candidate	-0.14***		-0.14***	
	(0.05)		(0.05)	
Both candidate		-0.11***		-0.11***
		(0.04)		(0.04)
Female	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Age	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic matriliny	0.16	0.15	0.16	0.15
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Education	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wealth	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Years in power	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Enforce first call	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num household	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***	0.25***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num Non-coethnic	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num relative	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num ruling family	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Group Village	-0.17***	-0.18***	-0.17***	-0.18***

	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Alternative nearby	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004	-0.002
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-0.83***	-0.81***	-0.83***	-0.80***
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Observations	413	412	414	413
R^2	0.39	0.38	0.39	0.38
Adjusted R^2	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
Residual Std. Error	0.53 (df = 388)	0.53 (df = 387)	0.53 (df = 390)	0.53 (df = 389)
F Statistic	10.20*** (df = 24; 388)	10.04*** (df = 24; 387)	10.66*** (df = 23; 390)	10.51*** (df = 23; 389)

Table 5A.2 Provision of Improved Drinking Water Source

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	Road			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	0.53*	0.53*		
	(0.30)	(0.30)		
Male candidate	-0.05		-0.06	
	(0.18)		(0.18)	
Both candidate		0.01		-0.01
		(0.17)		(0.16)
Female	-1.69***	-1.63***	-1.64***	-1.58***
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.42)	(0.42)
Age	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Ethnic matriliny	0.11	0.08	0.10	0.08
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.43)
Education	-0.12	-0.11	-0.11	-0.11
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Wealth	0.02	0.01	0.002	-0.01
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Years in power	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.13**	-0.13**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Enforce first call	-0.12	-0.12	-0.10	-0.10
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Num household	0.18	0.18	0.22*	0.22*
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.08	-0.08	-0.09	-0.09
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Num relative	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Num ruling family	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Group Village	-0.61**	-0.62**	-0.61**	-0.62**
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Observations	415	414	416	415

Table 5A.3 Road Conditions

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	Electric grid			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	-0.05*	-0.05*		
	(0.03)	(0.03)		
Male candidate	0.02		0.01	
	(0.02)		(0.02)	
Both candidate		0.01		0.01
		(0.01)		(0.01)
Female	0.05*	0.05*	0.05	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education	0.02**	0.02**	0.02*	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Years in power	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.002
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.004	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num ruling family	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Group Village	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Observations	415	414	416	415

R2	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Adjusted R2	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
Residual Std. Error	0.18 (df = 391)	0.18 (df = 390)	0.18 (df = 393)	0.18 (df = 392)
F Statistic	2.42*** (df = 23; 391)	2.40*** (df = 23; 390)	2.40*** (df = 22; 393)	2.37*** (df = 22; 392)

Table 5A.4 Provision of Electric Grid

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

B. Further Exploration on (In)security

B.1. Sub-categories

	Theft		Physical Fight		Domestic Abuse	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Challenger	-0.05	-0.06	0.08	0.07	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Male candidate	0.05		0.05		0.01	
	(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)	
Both candidate		0.11**		0.07		0.05
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
Female	-0.05	-0.03	-0.01	-0.001	0.09	0.10
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Age	-0.05*	-0.05*	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ethnic matriliny	0.11	0.09	-0.07	-0.08	0.07	0.06
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Education	-0.02	-0.01	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wealth	0.01	0.004	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Years in power	0.02	0.02	0.003	0.002	0.01	0.005
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Enforce first call	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.002	0.002
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num household	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.06*	-0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num Non-coethnic	0.02	0.02	0.04*	0.04*	0.06***	0.06***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num relative	-0.001	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num ruling family	0.0000	-0.002	-0.05	-0.05	0.03	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Group Village	0.02	0.02	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)

Constant	0.09	-0.01	0.002	-0.04	0.13	0.08
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.32)
Observations	415	414	415	414	415	414
R^2	0.18	0.19	0.11	0.11	0.23	0.23
Adjusted R^2	0.13	0.14	0.06	0.06	0.18	0.18
Residual Std. Error	0.58 (df = 391)	0.58 (df = 390)	0.58 (df = 391)	0.58 (df = 390)	0.57 (df = 391)	0.57 (df = 390)
F Statistic	3.71^{***} (df = 23; 391)	3.95^{***} (df = 23; 390)	2.13^{***} (df = 23; 391)	2.18^{***} (df = 23; 390)	4.99^{***} (df = 23; 391)	5.02^{***} (df = 23; 390)

Table 5B.1 (In)security by Sub-categories

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

B.2. Neighborhood Watch

I examined the association between the likelihood of competitive challenges, the presence of a neighborhood watch, and crime rates, using the question “In the villages under [title of traditional leader], is there a neighborhood watch?” from the Secretary Survey. Models 1 and 2 predict the presence of neighborhood watch in multivariate models, and Models 3 and 4 predict the level of insecurity in multivariate models with the presence of neighborhood watch controlled in addition to the set of covariates used in other analyses in this chapter. However, the presence of a neighborhood watch was not predicted by any competition variables in multivariate analyses, and neither crime rates were predicted by the presence of a neighborhood watch in multivariate regression analysis. The significant correlation between the number of male and female candidates in the ruling family and high insecurity remained the same even when the presence of a neighborhood watch was controlled for. Since the presence of a neighborhood watch is not associated with the increase or decrease in crime rates, the increased crime rates are not attributable to the failure to organize security forces.

	Neighborhood Watch		Insecurity	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Neighborhood Watch			0.04	0.04
			(0.16)	(0.16)
Challenger	0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.09
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Male candidate	0.02		0.05	
	(0.05)		(0.07)	
Both candidate		0.01		0.12*
		(0.04)		(0.06)
Female	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Age	0.002	0.002	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.01	-0.0004	0.07	0.04
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Education	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Years in power	0.003	0.003	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Enforce first call	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num household	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num Non-coethnic	0.004	0.004	0.08***	0.07***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num relative	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num ruling family	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)

Group Village	0.01	0.01	0.12	0.12
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Constant	0.66**	0.67**	0.33	0.22
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.46)	(0.46)
Observations	407	406	407	406
R^2	0.12	0.12	0.17	0.18
Adjusted R^2	0.07	0.07	0.12	0.13
Residual Std. Error	0.25 (df = 383)	0.25 (df = 382)	0.79 (df = 382)	0.79 (df = 381)
F Statistic	2.34*** (df = 23; 383)	2.27*** (df = 23; 382)	3.31*** (df = 24; 382)	3.44*** (df = 24; 381)

Table 5B.2 (In)security on Neighborhood Watch

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

B.3. Ruling Family in Dispute

When ruling families view their leadership to be ineffective, ruling families may take advantage of the situation by committing thefts and stealing someone else's land. To explore this possibility of misused authority by ruling families, I leverage the fact that members of a ruling family are implicated in a dispute with villagers in some jurisdictions but not in others. I found positive correlations between the size of the potential contestant pool and the likelihood of ruling family members being inflicted in a dispute with a regular villager, although it is not statistically significant. The result also shows that disputes involving a ruling family member are less likely to develop in jurisdictions where leaders had a competitive challenger. Given the fact that the court verdicts are likely to be impartial in favor of ruling families in jurisdictions with the rise of a competitive challenger (see Chapter 4 for this finding), fewer dispute cases between a ruling family member and a regular villager in the customary court indicate that regular villagers avoid the customary court out of an expectation that justice will not be served. In that case, increased insecurity related to competition over traditional leadership might be attributable to the ruling family members and a partial judicial system. The outcome variable in Model 1 & 2 – ruling family in dispute – takes a value of 1 if there was a dispute between a ruling family member and an average villager, and 0 otherwise. I ran logistic regressions for this variable.

	Ruling Family in Dispute		Insecurity	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ruling Family in Dispute			0.58***	0.59***
			(0.09)	(0.09)
Challenger	-0.14**	-0.13**	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Male candidate	0.04		0.04	
	(0.04)		(0.07)	
Both candidate		0.02		0.12**
		(0.03)		(0.06)
Female	0.18**	0.16**	-0.06	-0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Age	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.12	-0.11	0.12	0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Education	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Wealth	0.0002	0.003	0.04	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Years in power	0.002	0.002	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Enforce first call	-0.002	-0.001	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num household	-0.04*	-0.05*	0.01	0.004
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num Non-coethnic	0.02	0.02	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num relative	0.03	0.03	0.002	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Num ruling family	0.05	0.05	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Group Village	-0.02	-0.02	0.16*	0.16*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.09)

Constant	0.24	0.25	-0.01	-0.13
	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.43)	(0.43)
Observations	392	391	392	391
R^2			0.26	0.26
Adjusted R^2			0.21	0.22
Log Likelihood	-198.47	-198.35		
Akaike Inf. Crit.	444.94	444.70		
Residual Std. Error			0.75 (df = 367)	0.74 (df = 366)
F Statistic			5.26^{***} (df = 24; 367)	5.48^{***} (df = 24; 366)

Table 5B.3. (In)security and Ruling Family in Dispute

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p<0.1$, $^{**}p<0.5$, $^{***}p<0.01$

C. Further Explanation of Water Source

C.1. Sub-categories

	Tube Well/Borehole		Public tap/Standpipe	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Challenger	-0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male candidate	-0.12***		-0.03	
	(0.05)		(0.02)	
Both candidate		-0.10**		-0.04*
		(0.04)		(0.02)
Female	-0.04	-0.04	0.08*	0.09*
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Age	-0.001	-0.002	0.004	0.004
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic matriliny	0.12	0.11	0.08	0.08
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	0.09***	0.09***	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Years in power	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	0.25***	0.25***	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.01	-0.01	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	-0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num ruling family	0.002	0.0003	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Village	-0.15**	-0.16**	-0.06*	-0.07**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.03)

Alternative nearby	-0.001	-0.0001	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-0.71**	-0.70**	-0.32**	-0.31**
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Observations	414	413	413	412
R^2	0.35	0.35	0.14	0.14
Adjusted R^2	0.31	0.31	0.08	0.09
Residual Std. Error	0.52 (df = 389)	0.52 (df = 388)	0.27 (df = 388)	0.27 (df = 387)
F Statistic	8.84*** (df = 24; 389)	8.66*** (df = 24; 388)	2.58*** (df = 24; 388)	2.63*** (df = 24; 387)

Table 5C.1. Water Source by Sub-categories

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

C.2. Punitive Measure to Enforce Collective Actions

	Punitive Measure		Water Source	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Punitive measure			-0.01	-0.01
			(0.03)	(0.03)
Challenger	-0.19	-0.17	0.02	0.02
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Male candidate	-0.20		-0.14***	
	(0.17)		(0.05)	
Both candidate		-0.32*		-0.11***
		(0.16)		(0.04)
Female	-0.23	-0.31	-0.03	-0.02
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Age	0.18**	0.17*	0.01	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Ethnic matriliny	0.16	0.23	0.16	0.15
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Education	0.14	0.13	0.09***	0.09***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Wealth	0.10	0.12	0.05	0.05
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Years in power	0.03	0.04	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Enforce first call	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num household	-0.22*	-0.22*	0.25***	0.25***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num Non-coethnic	0.09	0.10	0.01	0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num relative	0.26**	0.28**	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Num ruling family	-0.26*	-0.26*	0.01	0.01
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Group Village	-0.09	-0.08	-0.18***	-0.18***
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.07)	(0.07)

Alternative nearby			-0.004	-0.003
			(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	-0.77	-0.75	-0.79**	-0.76**
	(0.54)	(0.55)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Observations	415	414	413	412
R^2			0.39	0.38
Adjusted R^2			0.35	0.34
Residual Std. Error			0.53 (df = 387)	0.53 (df = 386)
F Statistic			9.78*** (df = 25; 387)	9.63*** (df = 25; 386)

Table 5C.2. Water Source Provision and Punitive Measure

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

C.3. Maintenance of Water Source

To further delve into the collective action problem mechanism, I proceed to examine the maintenance of local public goods - which requires communities' collective actions in resource-scarce settings - and whether it is explained by competition over traditional leadership. For this analysis, I focus on 1) how recently water sources went out of order and 2) how long the outage lasted until it was fixed, using the following two questions: "When was the last time that drinking water sources such as tube wells, boreholes, public taps, or standpipes went out of order in any of the villages of the current [title of traditional leader]?"[173] and "How many days, weeks, or months have passed between the problem was identified and when it was fixed?"[174]

The data shows that outages of water sources less recently occurred in jurisdictions with a higher number of contestants, but the outages more recently happened in communities where leaders impose punitive measurements for collective actions. Furthermore, the duration it took to fix the disruption in water sources was not predicted either by competition variables or the existence of punitive measures.[175] In a nutshell, these empirical findings do not lend support to the collective action mechanism.

[173] The response options were "less than 2 weeks ago," "2 weeks and more, but less than a month ago," "a month and more, but less than 6 months ago," "6 months and more, but less than a year ago," "a year and more, but less than 2 years ago," "2 years and more, but less than 5 years ago," "5 years and more ago," "no outage." The variable takes the highest value of 8 if a breakdown happens within 2 weeks from the time of the survey.

[174] The response choices were "less than a day," "a day and more, but less than a week," "a week and more, but less than 2 weeks," "2 weeks and more, but less than a month," "a month and more, but less than 6 months," "6 months and more, but less than a year," "a year and more," and "never fixed," where the variable ranges from 1 to 8 and longer durations were assigned with high values.

[175] I replicated the same analysis without the response option "never fixed" because the variations in when outages began make it an unreliable measurement category. Removing the category does not change the coefficient estimates of competition or competition variables. The regression result table will be available upon request.

	Recency of Outage		Duration for Repairment		Duration for Repairment	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Punitive	0.25**	0.23**	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Challenger	0.25	0.24	0.03	0.02	-0.11	-0.12
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Male candidate	-0.31**		-0.08		0.16	
	(0.14)		(0.17)		(0.12)	
Both candidate		-0.39***		-0.03		0.22**
		(0.13)		(0.16)		(0.11)
Female	0.17	0.15	-0.34	-0.32	-0.26	-0.25
	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Age	-0.002	-0.01	0.05	0.05	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Ethnic matriliny	0.67**	0.70**	-0.50	-0.52	-0.31	-0.33
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.25)	(0.24)
Education	-0.03	-0.03	-0.10	-0.10	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Wealth	-0.05	-0.04	0.14	0.14	0.10	0.10
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Years in power	-0.01	-0.001	-0.11*	-0.11*	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Enforce first call	-0.01	-0.004	-0.10	-0.10	-0.04	-0.04
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Num household	0.03	0.04	-0.13	-0.13	-0.03	-0.04
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Num Non-coethnic	-0.06	-0.06	0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num relative	-0.01	-0.01	0.07	0.07	-0.04	-0.05
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.07)

Num ruling family	-0.03	-0.03	0.17	0.16	0.17*	0.17*
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Group Village	-0.05	-0.07	0.55**	0.54**	0.25	0.25
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Alt nearby	-0.20***	-0.19***	0.11	0.11	0.05	0.04
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Num Water Source	0.005	-0.01	-0.07	-0.06	0.13	0.14
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Constant	6.05***	6.32***	2.42*	2.40*	1.34	1.19
	(1.03)	(1.03)	(1.25)	(1.26)	(0.83)	(0.83)
Observations	331	331	307	307	284	284
R^2	0.26	0.27	0.15	0.15	0.23	0.24
Adjusted R^2	0.19	0.21	0.07	0.07	0.16	0.16
Residual Std. Error	1.51 (df = 304)	1.50 (df = 304)	1.77 (df = 280)	1.77 (df = 280)	1.12 (df = 257)	1.12 (df = 257)
F Statistic	4.06*** (df = 26; 304)	4.29*** (df = 26; 304)	1.85*** (df = 26; 280)	1.84*** (df = 26; 280)	3.03*** (df = 26; 257)	3.14*** (df = 26; 257)

Table 5C.3. Maintenance of Water Source

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

D. Missing Value Imputation

This section shows results that replicate the main analyses after processing the data with missing value imputation. For readability and due to space limits, I only report coefficient estimates of key explanatory variables in figures. Regression results are available upon request.

D.1. Median Value

In this analysis, missing values are replaced with the median values of each variable included in each model. The variables in the model include insecurity, water, road, and electric grid (the dependent variables of each model), the number of competitive challengers, the number of male candidates, the number of male and female candidates (explanatory variables), and gender, age, matriliny/patriliny, education, wealth, years in power, enforceability of first call rule, number of households, number of non-coethnics, number of relatives, number of the ruling family, and position, number of alternative water sources (only when the dependent variable is water) for control variables.



Figure 5D.1 Local Public Goods Provision on Competition : Missing Imputed with Median Values

D.2. Random Value

Missing values of each variable are replaced with random values within the range of the variable. The variable list for this analysis remains the same as the previous analysis with median values.



Figure 5D.2 Local Public Goods Provision on Competition : Missing Imputed with Random Values

D.3. MissForest

The results in **Error! Reference source not found.** are produced after missing values in the dataset a re imputed with the *missForest* package in R. The package implements random forest algorithm, which is a non-parametric imputation method applicable to various variable types. It yields out-of-bag (OOB) error, measuring the prediction error. The dataset used to predict missing values included all dependent variables, explanatory variables, and control variables in analyses.



Figure 5D.3 Local Public Goods Provision on Competition : Missing Imputed with missForest Package

D.4. MICE

MICE stands for Multivariate Imputation via Chained Equations. Using predictive mean matching (PMM) for prediction, I generated 5 datasets where each dataset went over 50 iterations. For insecurity and water, the results from 5 datasets are pooled together using the *pool* function in *mice* package. For road conditions, I randomly chose 1 out of 5 datasets as the pool function does not support ordinal logistic regression models.



Figure 5D.4 Local Public Goods Provision on Competition
: Missing Imputed with MICE Package

E. Punitive Measurement

	Water		Road		Electric grid	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Punitive measurement	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.001	0.002
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Challenger	0.02	0.02	0.54*	0.53*	-0.05*	-0.05*
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Male candidate	-0.14		-0.05		0.02	
	(0.14)		(0.18)		(0.02)	
Both candidate		-0.11		0.01		0.01
		(0.13)		(0.17)		(0.01)
Female	-0.03	-0.02	-1.69***	-1.63***	0.05*	0.05*
	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.005	-0.004
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic matriliny	0.16**	0.15	0.11	0.08	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education	0.09	0.09	-0.12	-0.11	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.01	-0.02**	-0.02**
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Years in power	-0.01	-0.01	-0.12*	-0.12*	0.002	0.002
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	0.02	0.02	-0.12	-0.12	0.01	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	0.25***	0.25**	0.19	0.18	0.01	0.01
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num Non-coethnic	0.01	0.01	-0.08	-0.08	-0.004	-0.004

	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.03	0.01	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num ruling family	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Group Village	-0.18	-0.18	-0.61**	-0.62**	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Alternative nearby	-0.004	-0.003				
	(0.05)	(0.05)				
Constant	-0.79	-0.76			-0.01	-0.01
	(1.03)	(1.03)			(0.10)	(0.11)
Observations	413	412	415	414	415	414
R^2	0.39	0.38			0.12	0.12
Adjusted R^2	0.35	0.34			0.07	0.07
Residual Std. Error	0.53 (df = 387)	0.53 (df = 386)			0.18 (df = 390)	0.18 (df = 389)
F Statistic	9.78*** (df = 25; 387)	9.63*** (df = 25; 386)			2.31*** (df = 24; 390)	2.30*** (df = 24; 389)

Table 5E.1 Local Public Goods Provision with Punitive Measure Controlled

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

F. Frequency of Contacting High Rank Traditional Leaders

F.1. Controlling for Contact

	Insecurity		Water		Road		Electric grid	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Contact TA	-0.08*	-0.08*	-0.001	-0.002	0.40***	0.40***	0.01	0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Challenger	-0.09	-0.10	0.02	0.02	0.58*	0.58*	-0.06**	-0.06**
	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Male candidate	0.09		-0.14***		0.07		0.01	
	(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.19)		(0.02)	
Both candidate		0.16**		-0.11**		0.11		0.01
		(0.07)		(0.05)		(0.18)		(0.01)
Female	-0.03	0.002	-0.01	-0.01	-1.56***	-1.51***	0.05	0.05
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	-0.04	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.001	0.002
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic matriliny	0.03	-0.001	0.17	0.16	-0.06	-0.08	0.0001	0.001
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education	-0.01	-0.01	0.09***	0.09***	-0.16	-0.15	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth	-0.01	-0.02	0.05	0.05	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Years in power	0.001	-0.004	-0.01	-0.004	-0.09	-0.09	0.003	0.002
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.13	-0.13	0.02***	0.02***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	-0.05	-0.05	0.25***	0.25***	0.10	0.10	0.01	0.01

	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num Non-coethnic	0.08***	0.08***	0.003	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.001	-0.001
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.02	0.02	-0.001	0.002	0.10	0.09	0.01	0.005
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num ruling family	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.13	-0.13	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Group Village	0.19*	0.19*	-0.15**	-0.16**	-0.75***	-0.75***	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Alternative nearby			-0.003	-0.001				
			(0.02)	(0.02)				
Constant	0.80*	0.67	-0.79**	-0.76**			-0.12	-0.12
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.35)	(0.35)			(0.10)	(0.10)
Observations	368	367	367	366	368	367	368	367
R^2	0.20	0.21	0.38	0.37			0.13	0.13
Adjusted R^2	0.14	0.15	0.33	0.33			0.07	0.07
Residual Std. Error	0.77 (df = 343)	0.77 (df = 342)	0.55 (df = 341)	0.55 (df = 340)			0.17 (df = 343)	0.17 (df = 342)
F Statistic	3.57*** (df = 24; 343)	3.75*** (df = 24; 342)	8.30*** (df = 25; 341)	8.14*** (df = 25; 340)			2.22*** (df = 24; 343)	2.22*** (df = 24; 342)

Figure 5F.1 Local Public Goods Provision with Contact Frequency Controlled

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

F.2. Sample Split: Frequent/Not Frequent Contact

	Insecurity		Water		Road		Electric grid	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Challenger	0.13	0.12	-0.03	-0.03	1.02**	0.97**	-0.06	-0.07
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.48)	(0.49)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male candidate	0.13		-0.16**		0.09		0.04	
	(0.13)		(0.08)		(0.32)		(0.03)	
Both candidate		0.16		-0.10		0.49		0.04*
		(0.12)		(0.07)		(0.30)		(0.02)
Female	-0.17	-0.17	0.01	0.04	-2.65**	-2.50**	0.10	0.09
	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(1.18)	(1.18)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Age	-0.09	-0.09	-0.05	-0.05	-0.02	-0.04	-0.001	-0.0002
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ethnic matriliny	0.38	0.37	0.21	0.19	-0.42	-0.54	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	-0.02	-0.02	0.05	0.05	-0.20	-0.18	0.01	0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Wealth	-0.04	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	0.01	-0.06	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Years in power	0.001	0.001	0.03	0.03	-0.07	-0.06	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	-0.05	-0.05	0.02	0.02	-0.04	-0.02	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	-0.07	-0.08	0.20***	0.19***	0.03	-0.001	0.02	0.02
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num Non-coethnic	0.08	0.08	0.01	0.01	0.10	0.09	-0.0001	-0.001

	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	0.09	0.09	-0.02	-0.02	-0.17	-0.20	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num ruling family	0.18	0.18	0.09	0.10	-0.35	-0.35	-0.02	-0.02
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Village	0.01	0.01	-0.05	-0.06	-1.00**	-0.98**	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Alternative nearby			-0.005	0.001				
			(0.02)	(0.02)				
Constant	0.07	-0.04	-0.26	-0.28			-0.12	-0.14
	(0.84)	(0.85)	(0.54)	(0.55)			(0.17)	(0.17)
Observations	138	138	138	138	138	138	138	138
R^2	0.30	0.31	0.46	0.45			0.31	0.31
Adjusted R^2	0.16	0.17	0.35	0.33			0.17	0.17
Residual Std. Error	0.83 (df = 114)	0.83 (df = 114)	0.52 (df = 113)	0.52 (df = 113)			0.17 (df = 114)	0.17 (df = 114)
F Statistic	2.17*** (df = 23; 114)	2.22*** (df = 23; 114)	4.01*** (df = 24; 113)	3.84*** (df = 24; 113)			2.21*** (df = 23; 114)	2.22*** (df = 23; 114)

Figure 5F.2.1. Local Public Goods Provision: Frequent Contact

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	Insecurity		Water		Road		Electric grid	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Challenger	-0.25	-0.25	-0.002	-0.002	0.34	0.32	-0.05	-0.05
	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Male candidate	0.08		-0.10		0.09		-0.001	
	(0.09)		(0.07)		(0.26)		(0.02)	
Both candidate		0.16*		-0.08		-0.02		-0.01
		(0.08)		(0.06)		(0.24)		(0.02)
Female	0.07	0.10	-0.03	-0.02	-1.19**	-1.20**	0.03	0.03
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	-0.02	-0.002	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Ethnic matriliny	-0.31	-0.37*	0.12	0.12	0.56	0.59	0.03	0.03
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Education	-0.03	-0.03	0.11***	0.11***	-0.06	-0.06	0.02*	0.02*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Wealth	0.01	-0.01	0.10**	0.10**	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Years in power	0.01	0.01	-0.04	-0.04	-0.11	-0.11	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Enforce first call	0.01	0.002	0.0003	0.0001	-0.20*	-0.19	0.01	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num household	-0.03	-0.03	0.29***	0.29***	0.15	0.15	-0.0001	0.001
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num Non-coethnic	0.09**	0.08**	0.01	0.02	-0.07	-0.08	-0.004	-0.004
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num relative	-0.002	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.24	0.23	0.02	0.01

	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num ruling family	-0.05	-0.05	0.01	0.004	-0.10	-0.08	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Group Village	0.16	0.16	-0.22**	-0.22**	-0.40	-0.41	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Alternative nearby			-0.01	-0.01				
			(0.02)	(0.02)				
Constant	0.95*	0.85	-1.08**	-1.05**			-0.07	-0.06
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.43)	(0.44)			(0.13)	(0.13)
Observations	230	229	229	228	230	229	230	229
R^2	0.22	0.23	0.41	0.41			0.09	0.10
Adjusted R^2	0.13	0.14	0.35	0.34			-0.01	-0.01
Residual Std. Error	0.73 (df = 206)	0.73 (df = 205)	0.56 (df = 204)	0.56 (df = 203)			0.17 (df = 206)	0.17 (df = 205)
F Statistic	2.49*** (df = 23; 206)	2.60*** (df = 23; 205)	6.01*** (df = 24; 204)	5.95*** (df = 24; 203)			0.93 (df = 23; 206)	0.94 (df = 23; 205)

Figure 5F.2.2. Local Public Goods Provision: Not Frequent Contact

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

Appendix to Chapter 6

A. Survey Questions

The table below lists a comprehensive list of control variables for analyses in Figure 6.2.

Variable Name	Description
Gender	(indicator) a respondent's gender 0. Male 1. Female
Age	(ordinal) a respondent's age is measured with the question "how old are you?" Integer value is converted to the following six categories. 1. equal to or less than 25 2. from 26 to 35 3. from 36 to 45 4. from 46 to 55 5. from 56 to 65 6. more than 65
Education	(ordinal) The verbatim question is "What is your highest level of education?" and the response options varied from 1-9. Then, the variable was recoded to range from 1 to 3 like below: 1. Less than primary school (No formal schooling/informal schooling only/some primary schooling) 2. Less than high school (Primary school completed/intermediate school or some secondary school) 3. High school + (secondary school completed/post-secondary/some university/university completed/post-graduate)
Wealth	(ordinal) This variable measures the number of following household items of a respondent with the question "which of these things do you personally own? [if no ask] does anyone else in your household own one?": A. radio, B. television, C. motor vehicle or motorcycle, D. Computer, E. Bank account, F. Mobile phone. The variable takes a value of 0 if a respondent's household does not have any of the items and 6 if it has all of them.
Ethnicity	(categorical) a respondent's ethnicity is measured with the question "what is your ethnic community, cultural group or tribe?"

Table 6A. Description of Control Variables

B. Regression Results

	Contact	Performance	Corruption	Trust
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Feel free to criticize	0.10***	0.04**	0.12***	0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	0.03	0.02	-0.05**	-0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Age	0.12***	0.10***	0.09**	0.17***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Education	-0.19***	-0.12***	-0.09**	-0.11**
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Wealth	-0.16***	-0.05	-0.13***	-0.03
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Constant	0.70***	0.54***	0.57***	0.40***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Observations	1,158	1,117	1,139	1,165
R^2	0.09	0.04	0.06	0.06
Adjusted R^2	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.05
Residual Std. Error	0.36 (df = 1141)	0.30 (df = 1100)	0.35 (df = 1122)	0.44 (df = 1148)
F Statistic	6.69*** (df = 16; 1141)	3.14*** (df = 16; 1100)	4.53*** (df = 16; 1122)	4.74*** (df = 16; 1148)

Table 6B.3 Feel Free to Criticize: Malawi

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	Contact (1)	Performance (2)	Corruption (3)	Trust (4)
Feel free to criticize	-0.01	0.04*	0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.04*	-0.003	-0.03	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.11***	-0.01	0.07*	0.20***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Education	-0.18***	-0.07**	-0.06	-0.09**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Wealth	-0.09**	0.01	-0.02	-0.25***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Constant	0.79***	0.66***	0.64***	0.34***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Observations	1,009	1,008	858	1,117
R^2	0.12	0.05	0.07	0.13
Adjusted R^2	0.08	0.01	0.03	0.10
Residual Std. Error	0.33 (df = 971)	0.25 (df = 971)	0.28 (df = 821)	0.38 (df = 1079)
F Statistic	3.42*** (df = 37; 971)	1.34* (df = 36; 971)	1.77*** (df = 36; 821)	4.45*** (df = 37; 1079)

Figure 6B.4 Feel Free to Criticize: Zambia

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

	Contact (1)	Performance (2)	Corruption (3)	Trust (4)
Feel free to criticize	0.09***	0.07***	0.02	0.005
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.004	0.01	0.01	-0.06**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.11***	0.003	0.12***	0.26***
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Education	-0.19***	-0.06*	-0.08*	-0.03
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Wealth	-0.11**	-0.08**	-0.04	-0.15***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Constant	0.73***	0.73***	0.63***	0.27***
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Observations	917	891	797	956
R^2	0.11	0.06	0.06	0.10
Adjusted R^2	0.09	0.04	0.04	0.09
Residual Std. Error	0.32 (df = 899)	0.24 (df = 873)	0.31 (df = 779)	0.37 (df = 938)
F Statistic	6.34*** (df = 17; 899)	3.20*** (df = 17; 873)	2.71*** (df = 17; 779)	6.34*** (df = 17; 938)

Figure 6B.3 Feel Free to Criticize: Zimbabwe

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.5, ***p<0.01

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