EMIGRATION INTENTIONS, PARTICIPATION PATTERNS, AND EXPATRIATE VOTING IN LATIN AMERICA: A STUDY OF PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND MIGRATION

By

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Dedicated to my family.

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CHAPTER 1

Motivations for Migration and Participation

In a time of increasingly fragile democracies (Zechmeister and Lupu 2019; IDEA 2019), many of which were part of the third wave of democracy (Huntington 1991; Smith 2005), and an increase in human mobility—both voluntary and forced— (UN 2020; Portes and Rumbaut 2006), the political attitudes and behaviors of migrants as citizens has become an increasingly important component to our understanding of emerging democracies. This dissertation project seeks to contribute to a growing body of work on migrants as political actors in two ways. First, by analyzing the individual motivations for potential migration, this study provides insights on who potential migrants are, and how they behave politically before departure. Through this focus, I also hope to deepen our understanding of the socioeconomic and political profiles of current diasporas and how they might behave politically. Second, by delving into the political behavioral profile of potential migrants, I offer insight on the ways in which those individuals "waiting to leave" engage with their political system. The final section of this project examines the voting behavior of actual migrants through analysis of voting patterns of the expat communities of five Latin American countries.

While the global pandemic may have slowed down movement across borders in 2020, recent upticks in migrants reaching borders around the world indicate that there are still individuals willing to take great risks to seek a better life (UN 2020). In 2021, a surge of migrants from Central America and other countries have reached the U.S.-Mexico border fleeing violence and threats to their lives (NPR 2021) while in Europe, reports of over 6,000 migrants attempting to swim to across the barrier to one of Spain's autonomous cities highlights the

desperation evident among many individuals around the world. (BBC 2021). Given the continued prevalence of migration in our time, determining the motivations and political behaviors of this under-studied, yet growing, group of actors in comparative political behavior research is important because this group could be an indicator for the health of the emerging democracies they came from.

This dissertation project takes a wide view of migrant political behavior and seeks to examine the links among migration motivations, domestic participation, and expatriate participation for those who are contemplating leaving or have left their country of origin. Learning more about who wants to leave and why can inform our understanding of how these individuals may participate electorally from abroad. These processes of migration and participation, whether voting domestically or from abroad, can inform our understanding of how these individuals, and their patterns of political behavior, compare to those of their fellow citizens who have not emigrated. Broadly stated, this project will make a contribution to the existing literature with a treatment and analysis of migrants as political actors—from the point at which they have expressed a desire to leave to the point at which they have become settled in their new countries and expend the effort and costs required to cast a vote in their home-country elections.

1.1 Why Study Migration Motivations?

Prior to 2020, migration had increased significantly in recent years with around 281 million people living outside their country of origin, representing more than 3.5 percent of the world's population (UN 2020). Latin America now stands as the third largest migrant sending region of the world after Europe and Central and Southern Asia (UN 2020) with 43 million

individuals from the region living outside their home country in 2020, an increase of over 16% since 2015 and an increase of 65% since 2000 (UN 2020; 2016).[1] While the migrant corridor from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to North America was the second-largest globally in both 2000 and 2020, with 44 million people in 2020 making that particular journey, migration within the region has grown to over 10 million in that same time period (UN 2020).

This increase in migration is notable because many of those individuals departing from the LAC region are coming from emerging democracies where individuals have the opportunity to meaningfully participate in politics for the first time in a number of years (Smith 2005). Instead of making their voice heard in the political realm, these individuals have chosen to leave (Waldinger 2015). This is a puzzle for scholars of democracy that has not been sufficiently explored. Given that a democracy rests in large part on the participation of citizens in free and fair elections, the growing exodus of individuals from many of the newly democratic systems in Latin America may be problematic. It thus becomes important to know whether these millions of citizens leaving emerging democracies helps or hurts the chances of survival of these governments. While this project cannot answer that whole question, it will shed light on the potential and actual role migrants play in the development of the fledgling democracies across the region.

Absent survey data on the voting behavior of migrants, this project instead attempts to gather sufficient indirect evidence to infer how populations abroad vote in elections back home. One approach will be to examine the political behavior and attitudes of potential migrants in the LAC region. For these analyses, I rely on individual-level survey information. Understanding the reasons for migration can shed light on what issues may be of particular concern to this group

[1] That figure was 37 million in 2015 and 26 million in 2000 (UN 2020; 2016).

once they have left. For instance, if an individual departed their country of origin because of poor economic conditions, then that person may be particularly sensitive to observing those same conditions while abroad and this may influence how they behave politically when they are able to cast a ballot. So, understanding why individuals are considering leaving their country-of-origin sheds light on two populations—those who are thinking about leaving and those who have not yet left. Using the available data to understand the former population can inform our knowledge of the latter.

While there are many other reasons to study this growing population of potential migrants (Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright 2013; UN 2020; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Docquier, Özden, and Peri, 2014; de la Garza and Lowell 2002; Maimo and Ratha 2005; Migration Data Portal 2021), for this analysis I focus on the potential drivers of emigration intentions as a way to both understand their behaviors prior to leaving and perhaps gain insight into the political behaviors of those who have already left.

1.2 Why Study Participation by Potential Migrants?

There are several theoretical reasons for exploring domestic electoral participation by potential migrants. This research question can both deepen our understanding of expatriate communities abroad and allow us to learn about the political behavior patterns of the increasing number of citizens who want to leave their country of origin. If, for example, voting is habitualized domestically, then knowing the voting tendencies of potential migrants may give insight on their behavior abroad (Blais 2000; Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2015).

Another explanation comes from the exit, voice, and loyalty framework outlined by Hirschman (1970; 1978). Originally, members of any group have two options when they

experience dissatisfaction with the organization—they can exit or voice their displeasure with those members of the organization who have the power to effect change (Hirschman 1970). Those who are loyal to an organization may be less likely to exit and more likely to use their voice to try and change circumstances from the inside (Hirschman 1970). This is more difficult to apply in a large organization, such as a state (Hirschman 1978). In this case, the exit option becomes a form of voice because individuals have voted with their feet and let politicians know their dissatisfaction in that way (Hirschman 1978).

So, if individuals have already made the decision to exit, but have not yet done so, will they be likely to express their voice politically? If potential migrants participate at the same level (or even more) than their compatriots who wish to stay, then maybe some of the loyalty framework has taken hold and potential migrants are willing to voice their preferences at least one more time before finally considering departure (Hirschman 1970; 1978). If potential migrants participate less than their fellow citizens, this would indicate a tradeoff between the exit and voice options as well as a disconnect from the national body politic (Hirschman 1970; 1978). While both are theoretically plausible outcomes of making plans to leave, knowing the impact emigration intentions have on political behaviors can shed light on whether those already exited their country might still consider using their voice to express their political preferences from a distance.

1.3 Why Study Expatriate Voting?

Studying the political behavior of migrants from Latin America is important because the dramatic increase in migrants across many countries in Latin America has taken place alongside the region's watershed era of democracy, understanding variations in the electoral influence of

expatriate communities becomes important in answering the larger question of how the region's migration trends have influenced its democratization process. Adding to the simple numerical import of the Latin American migrant population is the fact that many migrants tend to be risk-accepting, rather than risk-averse, personality types, making them more likely, all else being equal, to be involved in politics as well as undertaking the risks of leaving their country of origin and setting up new lives elsewhere (see, e.g., Canache et al. 2013). Thus, as expatriate voting rights began to expand across the region, in conjunction with advances in communication and remittance transfer technologies, the potential political role of this most recent wave of migrants is arguably greater than at any point in the region's history[2] (Bauböck 2007, Anderson 2006, Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008, Kapur 2010), yet we know very little about the implications of this trend of voting from abroad for Latin America's many emerging democracies.

Turning to those who have actually migrated and their political behavior, there are many questions that we still do not have definitive answers for. If expatriates are neither bound by many of the laws in their country of origin, nor stand to benefit or suffer from many policies passed,[3] why do so many seek the right to vote? Similarly, why do elected officials in some countries, but not in others, respond to these demands? While some countries (e.g., Uruguay) do not have any form of expatriate voting, there is a wide range of expatriate voting rights across those countries that have extended the franchise to citizens living abroad (Cortizas and Molnar 2014, IDEA 2007).

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[2] Indeed, for much of Latin America's history, the region was a net-receiving country, with many more immigrants than emigrants.

[3] There are some circumstances under which certain laws would have effects on expatriates. For instance, an expatriate might notice differences in changes to investment laws with any holdings maintained in their country of origin. In addition, there would, of course, be laws that would be of interest to family members back home.

Is expatriate voting normatively "good" for democracy? There are several reasons put forth by scholars that may explain the motivations behind states implementing expatriate voting laws. The first is that money talks. The amount of money expatriates send back as remittances often times represents a substantial portion of a country's foreign exchange that can only serve to help incumbent politicians' claims of being good stewards of the nation's economy. As a consequence of the domestic economic windfall provided by migrant remittances, domestic political officials will, according to this perspective, pursue expatriate voting rights as a means to curry the favor of the migrant community and strengthen their ties, emotional and, perhaps, economic, to the home country (Barry 2006).

A second reason put forth by scholars is that political elites have changed their views on the citizenship rights and standing of emigrants, moving from a view of those who leave as traitors to their country to one that embraces the heroism and contributions of migrants to a country (Gamlen 2013; Ragazzi 2009; Jimenez-Cuen 2008). A final proposition revolves around a possible diffusion effect, where as more and more countries have adopted expatriate voting laws, other countries with large emigrant populations feel pressured to adopt such laws as well. (Fierro 2007; Turcu and Urbatsch 2014).

Most of this voting takes place in person at a local consulate, but in other cases, votes must be mailed to the home country electoral agencies (IDEA 2007). Some countries have compulsory voting laws for citizens living abroad, while for other countries, the act of casting a vote while living abroad seems to have been made intentionally difficult. In some countries, expats are only allowed to vote for president, while in others, those living abroad can participate in legislative elections as well (IDEA 2007).

Significant variations exist in expatriate voting laws across the region,[4] which matters because these variations highlight the differences within the region with regard to how expat communities are viewed domestically and how long they have been allowed to exercise their political voice. Some countries, like Colombia (1962), adopted external voting decades ago (de Acosta 2007) while for others, like Mexico in 2006, expat voting is a relatively recent phenomenon (Portes and Rumbaut 2006, IDEA 2007). Chileans exercised their right to vote as expatriates for the first time in 2017 (Gobierno de Chile 2014). In other countries, however, citizens living outside of their home country are not allowed to cast votes from abroad. In the Caribbean, Haitian migrants, despite representing a significant percentage of the country's population, do not have any voting rights, as is the case in several English-speaking island nations (IDEA 2007, Erlingsson 2014, Collyer 2014).

Among South Americans, migrants from Uruguay and Suriname are the only remaining citizens on the continent to not have the right to vote from abroad. In Uruguay, this ban on expatriate voting rights continues despite a growing level of public support in the country for such a right (IDEA 2007; Glickhouse and Keller 2012). A referendum granting expatriate voting rights by mail-in vote from abroad gained only 37% of the vote in 2009, but new measures granting suffrage to this group are again under consideration (Cortizas and Molnar 2014) with surveys in late 2015 indicating close to 60% of respondents support the right to vote for

[4] While this dissertation project only examines whether expatriate voting laws are enacted, there is a tremendous variation in how these expatriate voting laws are implemented across the region. In Brazil, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic, voters are only allowed to participate in presidential elections while in other countries, such as Argentina and Peru, migrants are allowed to vote in both legislative and presidential elections (IDEA 2007). In addition, Brazil and Peru have compulsory voting, even for expatriates, with varying levels of enforcement (Power and Roberts 1995; IDEA 2007; ONPE 2013). Neither Colombians nor Ecuadorians are required to cast a ballot from abroad but do have the right to vote if they so choose (IDEA 2007). Colombians abroad elect two representatives to serve in the legislature, providing yet another institutional variation in how expatriates can affect politics back home (IDEA 2007; Glickhouse and Keller 2012). Ecuadorians and Panamanians abroad also elect representatives to the national legislature (IDEA 2007)

Uruguayans living abroad (Mora 2016). Currently, those expatriates who are able to return from surrounding countries (mainly Argentina) can vote, while other expat communities provide the opportunity to cast symbolic votes overseas (Cortizas and Molnar 2014). In sum, the Latin America and Caribbean region offer an analytically rich landscape with respect to the degree to which migrants can participate in their home-country politics through voting.

In addition to the variety of the expatriate voting laws across the region, there is also the need to understand on what basis do expatriates cast a ballot and how that may affect the electoral influence among Latin America's migrant communities. Depending on the size of a country's diaspora, the deciding vote in presidential elections could very well be cast abroad (Clej 2014). In high migration countries like El Salvador and Mexico, the expatriate role in the electoral processes is such that presidential candidates from these countries actually campaign in the U.S. in order to win over this important constituency (Burke 2013). Curiously, though, in the case of Mexicans living abroad, a strikingly low percentage exercised their right to vote in the highly contested 2006 and 2012 Mexican elections, again highlighting the need to understand better why and how migrant communities choose to engage with their home country political systems. Expatriates can also influence the vote choices of others back home through the ideas and preferences communicated through conversations with friends or family (Levitt 1998, Pérez-Armendáriz 2014, Nyblade and O'Mahony 2014, Kapur 2010, Córdova and Hiskey 2015). Therefore, the vote choice of the expatriate may have a multiplier effect back home since the expatriate may act as an opinion leader in their community.

In summary, we know very little about the political role of increasingly larger segments of the populations of many Latin American countries that have either decided to move abroad or actually left. This research seeks to provide one of the first efforts to understand expat voting by

Latin Americans with an eye towards contributing to a better understanding of the impact that the region's millions of migrants are having on their home country political processes. Though framed in the context of perhaps the most often-asked questions in political science – "Who votes and on what basis do they vote?" – the above discussion should make clear that the answers to these questions when directed toward those living abroad are far from established.

1.4 Countries to Be Studied

In an attempt to respond to these questions, I focus on five Latin American countries over the course of the study: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Taken together, these countries present a wide variation across a number of factors related to emigration and expatriate voting arrangements. In terms of the main reasons for emigration, economic instability was a driving factor in Brazil while many Colombians fled violence and Peruvians emigrated due to both. In addition, each of these five countries has a variety of expatriate voting arrangements, ranging from mandatory voting for president only in Brazil to the ability to vote for both president and legislators in Ecuador. In addition, this group of countries includes Colombia, which has the oldest expatriate voting procedures in the region, and Chile, which has one of the newest.

I recognize that these countries are not typically examined as migration sending countries in the Americas since there is greater focus on emigration from Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. It is useful to examine, however, whether the same patterns established in the literature related to those countries hold for these particular cases. Are these potential and actual emigrants like others in the region or are there other forces motivating their departure? In the

following section, I provide a brief overview of each of these country's diaspora communities in order to lay the foundation for subsequent analyses of their voting behavior.

1.4.1 Brazil

Brazil was originally a country that received large numbers of immigrants from Europe, the Middle East, and Japan, among other countries, in the 19th and 20th Centuries (Lesser 1999; Skidmore 2010; Sheringham 2013). The migrant tide started to turn after the military dictatorship took power in the 1960s, when many prominent Brazilians sought refuge outside the country (Sheringham 2013). The real growth in emigration from Brazil came in the mid- to late-1980s, due to both a softening of the military dictatorship, and, more importantly, an economic downturn within the country (Margolis 2005; Sheringham 2013). The economic decline presented as both hyperinflation, which reached over 2,500% annually by 1994, until the government put controls in which reduced inflation later that year, and chronic underemployment for those with professional backgrounds who were unable to find full-time employment with a reasonable wage in their given area of expertise (Margolis 2005; Sheringham 2013). An additional strand of emigration started in the early 1970s with rural southern Brazilians seeking agricultural work in neighboring countries (mainly Paraguay) due to land consolidation and mechanization (Margolis 2005).

Once they reach countries abroad, particularly in the U.S., U.K., and Japan, some migrants work blue collar jobs, even though their credentials prepared them for white collar work (Margolis 2005; Sheringham 2013). This downward career shift is particularly true for those Brazilians who arrive without legal documentation (Margolis 2005; Sheringham 2013). Those who have legal documentation are much more likely to be entrepreneurs or hold white collar jobs (Margolis 2005; Sheringham 2013; Blizzard and Batalova 2019). Based on data from

the U.S. Census, in 2017, the median household income for immigrant Brazilians is $61,700, which is more than the median income for the foreign-born and U.S.-born population (Blizzard and Batalova 2019). With that wealth, Brazilians sent $2.9 billion home in remittances, according to the World Bank, and that figure represents about 0.2% of Brazil's GDP (Blizzard and Batalova 2019).

According to the Brazilian Foreign Relations Ministry, 3.1 million Brazilians, out of a domestic population of over 205 million, are registered at consulates abroad (Ministério das Relações Exteriores 2014; IBGE 2016). The Brazilian diaspora is spread around the world, but with large populations in the United States, Canada, Japan, Europe, and Paraguay (the exact numbers can vary significantly based on which organization is collecting the information) (Margolis 2005). According to the Brazilian consulates in 2010, just under 1,400,000 Brazilians lived in the U.S. (Margolis 2005). On the other hand, based on results compiled by the U.S. Census, the Brazilian expatriate population grew from around 41,000 in 1980 to 451,000 in 2017, significantly lower than what was counted by the Brazilian government (Blizzard and Batalova 2019). The largest number of Brazilians in the U.S. are located in Boston, New York, and Miami (Blizzard and Batalova 2019). Around 2001, about 500,000 Brazilians lived in Paraguay, 250,000 lived in Japan, 200,000 lived in Europe with much smaller populations in Canada (30,000) and Australia (Margolis 2005). According to estimates by the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations compiled in 2010, 200,000 lived in Paraguay, 230,000 in Japan, and over 900,000 Brazilians live in all of Europe (Sheringham 2013).

Looking at specific age and education levels among Brazilians in the United States, in 2017 Brazilians have a median age of 39 years, which is older than the average age of the native-born population (36 years old) but lower than the average age of the foreign-born population (45

years old) (Blizzard and Batalova 2019). A whopping 87% of Brazilian immigrants are between the ages of 18 and 64, which highlights the economic reasons for their departure from Brazil, since those are the prime working years of an adult's life (Blizzard and Batalova 2019). In terms of education, Brazilian immigrants have higher average levels of education than both the native-born and immigrant population, as a whole, according to data compiled in 2017 (Blizzard and Batalova 2019). Among Brazilian immigrants, 42% have a college degree while only 11% did not have a high school diploma (Blizzard and Batalova 2019). Given the diversity of the Brazilian diaspora, what are the rules guiding their electoral participation from abroad?

While the legislation to allow Brazilians to vote from abroad has been in place since the military dictatorship in the mid-1960s, those abroad did not actually participate until after the 1988 constitution was implemented, which meant the first ballots were cast from abroad in the 1994 election (Calderón-Chelius 2007). While abroad, Brazilians are allowed to vote only for president (IDEA 2007). They must vote in person at a Brazilian consulate (not by mail) and voting remains compulsory, even when abroad (IDEA 2007). Those who do not vote must provide a justification and, if they do not, must pay a fine. Failure to pay the fine results in penalties ranging from not being able to renew their passports, or receive any salary if they hold a public post (Calderón-Chelius 2007). Brazilians are allowed to participate in both rounds of the presidential vote (Calderón-Chelius 2007).

1.4.2 Chile

While Chile was not much of an immigrant receiving country, as compared to Brazil, the triggering of an emigrant wave was a military coup, as with Brazil (Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010; Wright and Oñate 2005). The military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet on

September 11, 1973, triggered a forced exile of at least 200,000 Chileans (2% of the population at the time) (Wright and Oñate 2005). Two months after the coup, the new regime enacted a decree "which gave it virtually unconditional authority to expel citizens" and, in conjunction with the newly-established secret police, made it impossible for a range of individuals who either supported the former president, Salvador Allende, or held progressive views to remain in Chile by making impossible to hold a job or through measures such as harassment, incarceration, or torture (Wright and Oñate 2005, 58). Many of the departures happened between 1974 and 1976 and those who could took their families with them (Wright and Oñate 2005).

The geography of Chile's diaspora evolved over time and eventually reached at least 110 countries (Wright and Oñate 2005). Initially, since many thought the dictatorship would not last, emigrants left for the neighboring countries of Argentina and Peru (Wright and Oñate 2005). These two countries became less desirable as destinations as time went on due to Peru's weak economy and the political turmoil and violence in Argentina, which started in earnest by mid-1974 (Wright and Oñate 2005). Within the Americas, Chileans settled mainly in Venezuela, Mexico, Cuba, Costa Rica, Brazil, and Canada (Wright and Oñate 2005). About one third to one half of the Chilean diaspora settled in Western Europe, particularly in Italy, Sweden, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, and Spain after the fall of the Franco dictatorship in 1975 (Wright and Oñate 2005). Many Chileans went further afield to countries such as Australia and others where they could be admitted (Wright and Oñate 2005). Given the leftist political affiliation of the diaspora, many decided to settle in communist countries such as the USSR and countries in Eastern Europe as well as newly-established social democratic regimes such as Nicaragua, Angola, and Mozambique (Wright and Oñate 2005).

More recently, according to Chilean government figures collected in 2003 and 2004 from over 100 countries, more than 480,000 Chileans were living abroad along with over 370,000 of their children who had been born abroad (INE & MRE 2005). More than half of Chileans abroad and their children live in Argentina, over 110,000 live in the U.S., over 42,000 in Sweden, over 37,000 in Canada, over 33,000 in Australia with Brazil, Venezuela, Spain, France, and Germany rounding out the top ten (INE & MRE 2005). Those 10 countries comprise over 88% of Chileans abroad (INE & MRE 2005). Women comprise more than 50% of the population of Chileans abroad and over 57% of those abroad have been in their place of residence for over 20 years (INE & MRE 2005). According to the collected data, 40% emigrated for economic reasons, 30% for family motivations, and 12% for political reasons (INE & MRE 2005). About 24% of Chileans abroad have advanced degrees (INE & MRE 2005). Taken together, this information reveals that the Chilean diaspora represents a geographically diverse population with deep roots in the country in which they settled. On the institutional side of the diaspora, Chileans were allowed to vote from abroad for president for the first time in 2017 (Gobierno de Chile 2014).

1.4.3 Colombia

As compared with Chile, Colombia is another country which became an emigrant-sending nation after domestic political violence. Also, like Chile, Colombia did not receive many European immigrants, at least until the 20th century, and instead its population was more of a mixture of the original Spanish colonizers, the indigenous population, and enslaved Africans brought to the country (Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010). The first major wave of emigration from Colombia was precipitated by a period known as *La Violencia*, which lasted from 1946 to

1964, with peak violence occurring between 1948 and 1953 (Collier and Gamarra 2001; Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010). As a result of this violence between the Colombian Conservative and Liberal parties, more than 200,000 Colombians died (Collier and Gamarra 2001; Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010). This first wave of emigration lasted until the end of the 1970s and was comprised of mainly young men who either left with their families or were joined by them later from all socio-economic classes who fled the political violence and sought better economic opportunities abroad (Collier and Gamarra 2001; Aysa-Lastra 2007).

The second wave of Colombian emigration started in the late 1970s and continued until mid-1990s (Collier and Gamarra 2001). All socioeconomic classes departed during this period, with increased numbers coming from the middle and upper classes, and, like in the first wave, those departing were mainly young men accompanied by their families (Collier and Gamarra 2001). While Colombia, in contrast to its neighbors in Latin America, did not have an economic crisis during this time, the main driver of out-migration was the significant increase in drug-related violence and threats to personal security (Collier and Gamarra 2001).

The third wave of Colombian emigration started in the mid-1990s and was characterized by a marked increase in the middle, upper-middle, and upper-class emigrants who sought to flee violence (and threats of violence) as well as pursue better economic opportunities abroad (Collier and Gamarra 2001). In general, Colombians have migrated to the U.S. and Venezuela, but more recently, Colombians are seeking new lives in Canada, Spain, the U.K., Italy, France, Germany and Belgium (Bermudez 2011). Within Latin America, Colombians have moved to Ecuador, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru, and Bolivia (Jokisch 2014; DANE 2008). According to the Colombian Census in 2005, about 4.1 million Colombians lived abroad and anywhere from half a million to two million, depending on estimates, lived in the United States (DANE 2008; Aysa-

Lastra 2007). Colombian Census numbers indicate that, besides the U.S., Spain, Venezuela, Ecuador, Canada, and Panama are the countries with the largest number of Colombians abroad (DANE 2008).

Once Colombians are abroad, the general pattern for employment is based on socioeconomic characteristics (Collier and Gamarra 2001). Those who are lower class and lower middle class tend to be employed in manufacturing, service, or agriculture while those in the higher classes (from the first and second waves of migration) tend to be employed as professionals, in businesses, or in education (Collier and Gamarra 2001). The trends are somewhat different for those in the higher classes who migrated during the third wave as they tend to drop in socioeconomic status once they arrive due to difficulties in successfully transitioning their careers abroad either due to licensing, language, or financial barriers (Collier and Gamarra 2001).

Colombians were the first Latin Americans to have the opportunity to vote from abroad (de Acosta 2007). They have casted their ballots in-person at consulates abroad since 1962 in both presidential and legislative elections (IDEA 2007; de Acosta 2007).

1.4.4 Ecuador

Ecuador, like Brazil and Peru, has been both an immigrant receiving and sending country, but on a somewhat different timeline than these other two countries. While Ecuador received few immigrants over the course of the 19th and early 20th centuries, starting in the 1960s, more than half a million Colombians fled domestic and drug-related violence to settle in Ecuador (Minteguiaga and Carmel 2020). More recently, starting in 2014, almost a quarter of a million

Venezuelans have settled in Ecuador to find better economic opportunities (Minteguiaga and Carmel 2020).

Ecuadorians started leaving in the 1960s and 1970s and settled in Venezuela, the U.S., and Canada (Sánchez Bautista 2020). A second wave of emigration stared in the early 1980s and those departing left mainly for the U.S. while a third wave left around the turn of the millennium, due to an economic and political crisis, and departed to Spain, the U.S., the U.K., and Italy (Jokisch 2014; Sánchez Bautista 2020; Minteguiaga and Carmel 2020). About 1.5 to 2 million Ecuadorians, out of a population of about 15.7 million people, moved abroad between 1999 and 2005 (Jokisch 2014; Sánchez Bautista 2020; Minteguiaga and Carmel 2020). Since the mid-2000s, emigration has slowed with those departing mainly seeking to join expatriate family in Spain, the U.S., and Italy (Jokisch 2014). Also worth noting is that the global financial crisis in the late 2000s triggered a wave of return migration where around 64,000 Ecuadorians returned home (Jokisch 2014; Sánchez Bautista 2020; Minteguiaga and Carmel 2020).

According to census numbers collected between 2005 and 2013, there were over 450,000 Ecuadorians in Spain, over 425,000 in the U.S., over 90,000 in Italy, about 25,000 in Venezuela, 19,000 in Chile, and just over 10,000 in Colombia (Jokisch 2014). At least among Ecuadorians in the U.S. as of 2013, the median age is 41 years old, about 28% have a high school diploma (32% have less than a high school education), and about15% have a bachelor's degree or higher (Jokisch 2014). According to Ecuadorian data from 2008, the vast majorities of the Ecuadorians living abroad in Spain, Italy, and other countries also had a high school education or less (FLASCO 2008). The median income was over $47,000 and the poverty rate for that group was over 16% (Jokisch 2014).

Ecuadorians were granted the right to vote from abroad in 2002 and implemented in the 2006 election (Sánchez Bautista 2020). Ecuadorians are allowed to vote in-person from a consulate abroad for president and for members of the Constituent Assembly (IDEA 2007; Sánchez Bautista 2020).

1.4.5 Peru

Peru, like Brazil, had been a country of immigration for much of the 19th and 20th centuries (Durand 2010; Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010). Peru had high levels of internal migration since the 1950s and the military dictatorships that lasted from the mid-1960s until 1980 made it very hard for Peruvians to leave (Durand 2010). Starting in the 1980, when Peru became a democracy, and experienced the dual shocks of economic liberalism and leftist political terrorism, many also saw the opportunity to leave (Durand 2010). The economic and political situation in Peru continued to deteriorate under the García, Fujimori, and Toledo administrations (Durand 2010). According to data collected by the Peruvian government, those who left Peru in the late 1990s constitute about 16% of those abroad, those who left in the first few years of the new millennium are about 25% of Peruvians abroad, and those who have left since 2006 are about 35% of Peruvians abroad (OIM 2013). Among those surveyed by the Peruvian government, 40% said they left due to economic reasons, 20% for family reasons, and about 12% migrated due to unemployment (OIM 2013).

The main areas of destination for Peruvian emigrants are the U.S., Latin America and the Caribbean (including Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Argentina, and Chile), Canada, Japan, Australia, and most of Europe (including Spain and Italy) (Durand 2010). There is some differentiation as to what type of emigrant goes where as students tend to pursue

educational opportunities while those pursuing economic opportunities tended to go to the U.S., Ecuador, and Venezuela (before the economic collapse there) (Durand 2010). Those Peruvians who can claim Japanese, Italian, or Spanish ancestry have an easier time obtaining visas and eventually becoming naturalized in those countries (Durand 2010). Based on government data collected from 2007-2010, a little less than 800,000 Peruvians live abroad with an almost equal split of a quarter of a million people each living in the U.S. and Canada, Latin America, and Europe (OIM 2013). The remaining population is split between Asia (~32,000) and Africa and Oceania (~4,000) (OIM 2013).

Among those who have moved abroad, scholars have estimated that slightly more women than men are part of the Peruvian diaspora (Durand 2010). In terms of age, while the Peruvian diaspora is like other diasporas in terms of it being generally younger, there is a high level of those who decide to leave after the age of 50 (Durand 2010; OIM 2013). Looking at education, Peruvians tend to move abroad with, on average, about 12 years of schooling, more than other Latin American diasporas (Durand 2010). Peruvians moving abroad tend to be married (~50%) and about 40% are single (Durand 2010; OIM 2013). Turning to the institutional side, Peruvians have been allowed to participate in-person from abroad since 1980 and may vote in presidential and legislative elections as well as legislative referenda (IDEA 2007).

All of these countries taken together present a broad swath of reasons for departure, various waves of emigration over time, characteristics of the diaspora, and expatriate voting arrangements, which allow for a detailed study of expatriate voting across Latin America. Now that I have established the cases of interest, I will establish the motivations, puzzles, and research questions for this study.

1.5 Motivations, Puzzles, and Research Questions

The first research question of this project concerns the motivations for migration—What factors motivate an individual to leave, particularly when the costs for establishing a life elsewhere can be high (Portes and Rumbaut 2006)? While this question informs the potential reasons for departure, it also serves as a first step for understanding those who actually do migrate.

Many scholars have put forth theories, particularly focusing on migration from Latin America (see, as just a small sample, Canache et al. 2013; Donato and Sisk 2015; Ryo 2013; Sladkova 2007; Stanley 1987). Better economic opportunities have been the traditionally theorized motivations of migration as individuals seek better paying jobs abroad to accumulate wealth back home (see, among many others, Lundquist and Massey 2005; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002). Other theories posited to drive migration include a fear or victimization of crime and/or violence (see, among others, Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010), a dissatisfaction with aspects of the world around them, whether that is that high levels of corruption (see, among others, Poprawe 2015; Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks 2013; Cooray and Schneider 2014) or poorly functioning democracies (see, among others, Hiskey, Montalvo, and Orcés 2014; Hirschman 1978).

In addition, the "cumulative effects" or "friends and family effects" first outlined by Myrdal (1957) and expanded by Massey et al. (1998) highlights how migration is perpetuated and increases within certain communities (Fussell and Massey 2004). In non-urban areas, members of a community gain knowledge about the migration process and resources from friends and family abroad (Massey et al. 1998; Fussell and Massey 2004). As a result, those who are contemplating migration have lower costs to migration because their social network has

provided both information and material assistance for the trip as well as their arrival (Massey et al. 1998; Fussell and Massey 2004). This movement of people perpetuates the flow of information and resources back to the home community and the home community changes its own socioeconomic institutions to promote more international migration, which promotes an ever-stronger cycle in favor of migration over time (Massey et al. 1998; Fussell and Massey 2004). Finally, socioeconomic and sociodemographic effects are also considered drivers of an individual's likelihood of migration (Massey 1987). Since migration requires resources, it is not generally the poorest of the poor who end up migrating (Massey et al 1998; Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Other life-cycle characteristics have also been found to be important factors in emigration intentions with younger, unmarried men from rural areas with no children traditionally being among those most likely to migrate (Massey 1987). By measuring all of these effects, this will help deepen the understanding of voting patterns from abroad.

This decision that can have long-term consequences and may not be easily reversible, so understanding the reasons behind this decision are critical for providing a basis for the subsequent analyses. Understanding more about who is thinking about emigration (and their participation patterns, explored in subsequent chapters), serves as an important contribution because it deepens our knowledge about the characteristics and political behavior of those who actually made the decision to emigrate. Are they particularly sensitive to issues that influenced their decision to leave such as economics or crime or are they more likely to be influenced by sociodemographic factors or partisanship? Or, is it some sort of combination of those factors? Since the expatriate voting data explored in Chapter 3 does not include individual characteristics, understanding these motivations beforehand can help illuminate the migrant population abroad.

The second research question of this project speaks to one of the standard questions in voting behavior research – "Who votes, why, and on what basis?" – but is applied to two understudied populations of potential voters: those considering migration and expatriates who have already left. Understanding who votes and on what basis they make their decision has long been one of the central questions for scholars of democratic systems of government. Indeed, the study of voting behavior stands as one of the principal endeavors of both American and Comparative Politics. Despite the abundance of research on this question, we know very little about the voting behavior of the tens of millions of individuals around the world who either have made the decision to leave, but have not yet left, or live outside of their country of origin but still retain the right to cast a vote in their native country's national elections. This research question can both deepen our understanding of the diaspora abroad and learn more about the political behavior patterns of the increasing number of citizens who want to leave their country of origin.

We know very little about the political behavior of those who have indicated that they want to migrate within the next three years, but have not yet left. Kapur refers to the potential impact "waiting to leave" can have on one's political behavior as the "prospective channel" of migration's influence (Kapur 2010). One question raised in this and other work is why would those thinking about leaving consider participation given the high costs of voting (Blais 2000) and the limited returns (if they leave before the victorious candidate takes office) (Hirschman 1970; 1978)? Finally, by understanding the political behaviors of the potential migrant population, we may gain a better sense of the actual migrant population for which I do not have individual data. So, for example, is this group of potential migrants comparatively more educated and wealthier than those who decide to stay? If so, that could indicate that those who migrated have sufficient resources to participate at the ballot box (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003).

It is unclear whether potential migrants would be more or less likely to vote before departure based on the literature. On the one hand, those who live in communities of high migration are less likely to participate at the national level because the support from remittances ties them to relatives abroad more closely than the national government (Goodman and Hiskey 2008). So, if any of the locals are considering migration, then they also might be less likely to vote in national elections, while still maintaining an interest in local politics and events (Goodman and Hiskey 2008). On the other hand, individuals who are considering migration may have a higher risk tolerance that might make them more likely to participate (Kam 2012). I thus pitch these two rival hypotheses against one another in order to discern the political behavior patterns of those waiting to leave.

Second, for those expat communities that are granted voting rights, it is equally unclear why they would expend the effort to cast a vote, and on what basis they would make their electoral decision, when many are abroad for years. The costs of voting domestically are high (Blais 2000). For expatriates, this cost is even higher for two reasons. First, expatriates who have to travel to a consulate to vote are likely travelling further than they would have if they were back home in their country of origin and voting at their local polling place. Second, the costs for expatriates to become informed about ballot issues may be more difficult than for voters based domestically, depending on the information environment. In addition, migrants tend to be removed from many of the domestic factors that typically drive vote choice such as economic considerations. Thus, while we may have a fairly clear understanding of who votes, why, and on what basis for citizens living in their home country, we know very little about the answers to these questions for those individuals living beyond the borders of their home country. And in an increasingly borderless world characterized by the movement of people and ideas, identifying the

political behaviors and motivations of migrants is essential for developing a fuller understanding of the political processes taking place in high migration countries around the world. While this study proposes just one of many potential ways to understand migrants as political actors, offering by no means the last word on understanding this expatriate population, my hope is that it expands our understanding of this growing population around the world.

With these questions as the motivating puzzles driving this research project, the central goal of this project is to understand the political behavior of a distinct, but increasingly common, citizen of many developing democracies around the world – the migrant. I focus my analysis on Latin America, a region that over the past 35 years has undergone a significant shift toward more democratic political systems, while at the same time witnessing unprecedented rates of emigration and a concurrent expansion of expatriate voting rights across many countries in the region (Kapur 2010; Smith 2005; Hiskey, Montalvo, and Orcés 2014; IDEA 2007). In the context of these unprecedented changes, the region offers significant cross-national variation in the quality of democracy, the intensity and depth of migration networks, and the scope of expatriate voting laws countries in the region have. Capitalizing on this intra-regional variation, a primary aim of this project is to push forward our understanding of how these broader trends and variations in democracy, emigration patterns, and expatriate voting rights have influenced the ways in which the millions of Latin American emigrants participate in and influence their home country political processes.

1.6 Roadmap for the Project

The rest of this project will proceed as follows. First, Chapter 2 will analyze the various propositions put forth by scholars to explain the primary drivers of migration through analysis of

the correlates of emigration intentions across Latin America and the Caribbean as well as in five specific countries—Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. Sociodemographic indicators such as age, marital status, and gender, along with whether an individual receives remittances are strongly correlated with whether an individual considers migrating abroad within the next three years. While personal experiences with crime or corruption victimization as well as individual evaluations of the economy and a country's democratic system are significant, the effect is not uniform across the cases of analysis and the effect sizes are not as great as they are with the sociodemographic and remittance indicators. As a result, while these individual experiences and evaluations do matter, the big drivers of emigration intention seem to come down to individual characteristics. These results help to clarify the voting behavior of migrants by demonstrating that, prior to departure, many potential migrants are highly motivated by sociodemographic factors and economic ties to those abroad and these factors may be strongly related to whether and how migrants participate once abroad. Since the expatriate voting data do not include individual characteristics, understanding the motivations for migration can help shed light on the reasons behind votes cast from abroad.

The third chapter examines whether those considering migration are any different than their compatriots with intentions to stay in terms of their likelihood of past participation in the most recent election and future intended participation in upcoming national elections. Again, the analysis is at the regional level and for the five countries of interest. The models also control for traditional resource-related indicators related to participation as well as indicators highlighted in recent studies about how different factors may promote or suppress participation. While there is no difference between these two groups in terms of the likelihood of future participation, those who intend to migrate are less likely to have participated in previous elections. In addition, these

findings also go against some of the recent scholarship on how various factors may actually boost participation. The findings tend to show that, at least in these cases, these experiences tend to suppress the likelihood of participation.

Finally, in Chapter 4, I will apply one of Powell and Whitten's (1993) retrospective voting models on expatriate voting results from five different countries over several waves of elections as well as economic indicators for each country in which votes were cast from abroad to see whether and how expatriate voters use economic conditions in both their country of residence and country of origin to determine whether to punish or reward the incumbent party in their country of origin. While I find that those voting from abroad do have the ability to compare the economic conditions in both their home countries and country of residence, but it is somewhat limited. When the model includes previous vote share, the role of partisanship or political attachment for expatriates provides a lot the explanatory power for expatriate vote choice abroad. After these chapters, in the Conclusion, I will review the findings, propose several avenues for expansion of these analyses, and explore some of the broader applications and implications of these findings.

CHAPTER 2

Looking to Leave: Governance and Migration Across the Americas

2.1 Introduction

The need to understand why individuals choose to move abroad is never far from the front pages of the news. Whether it is Spanish officials working to control the flow of Moroccan migrants seeking economic opportunities in the Canary Islands in Spain (Eastaugh 2021), U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris leading a task force to address the root causes of emigration from Central America (Ordoñez 2021b) or Mexican border agents attempting to turn back Hondurans fleeing gang violence (Burnett 2021), understanding and ameliorating the drivers of migration remains a leading issue for policy makers around the world.

Though it is clearly a question that has widespread policy implications, identifying who potential migrants are – their demographic, socioeconomic, behavioral, and attitudinal profiles – and establishing why they are leaving is for this project an essential step in the larger effort to understanding the electoral behavior of actual migrants. Lacking systematic data collection on the characteristics of the myriad diasporas around the world, a "second-best" approach to gleaning the political profiles of actual migrant populations entails examining these factors among those who have not yet emigrated, but who have indicated they have plans to. Thus, my goals in this chapter are two-fold. First, I do hope to contribute to our understanding of the drivers of migration across the Americas through a more comprehensive analysis of this question across the region. Secondly, though, I want to establish a "potential migrant profile" that will

help inform my subsequent analyses of the voting patterns of selected migrant populations over the past twenty years.

For this first empirical chapter, then, I consider what factors influence an individual's plans concerning emigration. We know the vast majority of citizens across Latin America *do not* emigrate, so empirically identifying those socioeconomic, behavioral, and attitudinal characteristics of the relatively few individuals who do plan on leaving their home country will help in defining the extant migrant populations living in countries around the world.

Making the decision to leave is an important one and generally not done lightly. It is also a decision that takes resources—both tangible and intangible—and generally is a product of many factors and motivations. Choosing to leave may be driven in large part due to a dissatisfaction with one's daily life or it may be a product of the current political situation within a given country. This desire to migrate can also be in part a function of an individual's pre-existing connection to others abroad or whether they simply have the lack of connections to their home countries to make it easier to move their lives abroad. Much of the previous research has focused only on a limited number of these factors. But that leaves open the question of whether one of these factors has more influence than others on a person's decision to leave or, importantly, whether some interaction of two or more factors gives us greater leverage in understanding the decision.

Also left underexplored are the cross-national, and often times intranational, differences in the drivers of migration that make migrants leaving Nicaragua in the 1980s due to political reasons, for example, fundamentally distinct in many ways, from Nicaraguans leaving in recent years for primarily economic reasons. Given all of the different reasons to want to leave, it is useful to have a systematic evaluation of the theoretically relevant factors that have been

established in the literature to influence an individual's decision to move abroad. This chapter will do just that, focusing on respondents from twenty-one countries across the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region. Over this chapter, I examine how emigration intentions typically are not merely the product of one single area of dissatisfaction, be it crime victimization, economic dissatisfaction, or corruption victimization, among others, but rather reflect an array of individual characteristics and experiences that go far and beyond one single, precipitating event.

In carrying out this analysis I seek to contribute to the existing literature by examining the various categories of factors that can influence an intent to depart such as crime victimization, economic evaluations, corruption victimization, individual political factors, and individual characteristics. Many previous studies (outlined in the Theory section), focus on just one particular indicator. This analysis evaluates many of these indicators to see how they may be correlated with emigration intention and what the sizes of the various effects might be region-wide and for specific countries. In addition, I also explore the attitudinal correlates of those making plans to leave, including their evaluations of democracy and trust in elections, as a first step toward understanding the political profiles of potential migrants, a topic I more fully address in Chapter 4.

This study first analyzes the LAC region as a whole and then homes in on the potential migrant profiles of the five countries that serve as the case studies of migrant political behavior in subsequent chapters—Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. By giving a sense of what factors may motivate emigration intentions in these countries, we can begin to better understand the electoral behavior of those who have already left their country and participate in their country's electoral politics from afar.

We know from previous research on both potential and actual migrants that personal characteristics, such as existing connections with migrants (as measured through such items as receipt of remittances), and sociodemographic factors, such as age, marital status, and gender, tend to have fairly stable and predictable relationships with the decision to leave one's country (e.g., Massey et al. 1998). An individual's daily life experiences and perceptions, including being victimized by crime or corruption, economic evaluations and conditions, assessments of their country's political system, and personal political characteristics can all be significant to varying degrees across the cases under study, but tend to be secondary to the usual demographic suspects of age, gender, marital status, education, and household income. It is possible that any one of these experiential or evaluation indicators may push an individual into considering migration, but we must begin with identifying the demographic profiles of these potential migrants before exploring the role that their daily life experiences and context play in the decision.

The next section will review various theories related to the drivers of emigration and posit the related hypotheses for this study. I will then outline the data used as well as the cases that will be examined. After explaining the results for all of the cases, I will conclude with a discussion of the implications of these analyses for my subsequent exploration of migrant electoral behavior while living abroad.

2.2 Theory

While there are a number of different extant theories related to the drivers of migration in Latin America (see, as just a small sample, Canache et al. 2013; Donato and Sisk 2015; Ryo 2013; Massey et al. 1998; Sladkova 2007; Stanley 1987), the following section will outline six

different categories of factors highlighted by scholars in work on why an individual might decide to leave her country of origin. The first pertains to individual security, such as crime victimization and one's feelings of insecurity. The second group of variables relates to one's economic situation, or at least her perceptions of that situation. A third concerns governance issues that address the extent to which one's government is adequately carrying out its functions in an effective and transparent manner. Commonly used indicators of these governance issues include corruption perceptions and/or victimization. A fifth group of indicators often posited to correlate with, if not cause, the emigration decision relate to one's views toward democracy and her political institutions, with the proposition being that when one loses faith in her system of government, her consideration of emigration as a life option becomes more likely. An associated set of factors concerns one's feelings of efficacy within that system – when one feels as if they can make a difference in their political system they arguably are less likely to consider leaving. The final set of factors, and typically the most determinative, include an individual's own characteristics—particularly the degree to which they are connected to an existing migration network. Indicators for these factors include whether one receives remittances from someone living abroad, along with their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics.

Receiving remittances is important in two ways for this study. First, the financial resources can improve the recipient's life domestically and potentially fund future migration. Second, receiving remittances also means that the individual has a strong connection to someone abroad, which could have other effects on migration. By knowing someone abroad, communicating with them, and receiving financial support, this may lower information costs that would make any future migration easier for the remittance recipient (i.e., the "friends and family" effect from Massey et al. (1998)).

2.2.1 Crime Victimization and Intention to Migrate

Departing one's country of origin due to violence and insecurity, particularly in Latin America, has been well-documented over the past century. Just a cursory review highlights the many instances of migration due to violence in the region. In Haiti, violence by governments against its citizens has been a long-time driver of immigration to the United States, at least from the 1960s and through the present day (Wood et al. 2010; Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010; Shellman and Stewart 2007). The Cuban Revolution in 1959 drove many Cuban elites to Florida (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Wood et al. 2010; Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010). Repression from right-wing military dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay in the 1960s and 1970s drove many in the opposition with sufficient resources to flee their countries of origin (Skidmore 2010). Armed conflict, kidnapping, and other violence in Colombia over the past several decades has triggered a wave of emigration from that country (Morrison and Pérez 1994; Silva and Massey 2015). In addition, civil wars in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala in the late 1970s and 1980s triggered waves of refugees fleeing violence (Stanley 1987; Morrison and May 1994). More recently, in the mid-2010s, violence, high levels of insecurity, and government incompetence or actual criminal complicity spurred more departures from Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras, in an effort to seek safety and security, particularly in the United States (Hiskey et al. 2018).

Despite this long history of violence-induced emigration from the region, scholars have only recently begun to focus on these non-economic forces driving individuals from their homes. Migration, particularly to the United States, has become an important element in the survival strategies of many living in the region (Wood et al. 2010; Sanchez 2006). Wood, et al. (2010),

for example, found that those who stated that they or a family member had been a victim of crime in the previous 12 months were 30% more likely "to have seriously considered the possibility of leaving their home country and moving their family to the United States compared to those who did not report that a family member had been victimized," even after controlling for factors at the individual and national level (Wood et al. 2010, 18).

In more recent years, an increasing number of works have identified a substantial role for insecurity and crime victimization in the emigration decision of many in Latin America, particularly those in the northern Central American countries. Looking specifically at Honduras and El Salvador, Hiskey et al. (2018) find that respondents reporting being victimized by crime one or more times in the previous twelve months, are more than ten to fifteen percent likely to declare an intention to emigrate. Silva and Massey (2015) find that as violence increases in Colombia (based on a factor score), the likelihood that the head of household left for their first international trip increases by 23% for every point increase in the violence factor score. From these works as well as numerous qualitative studies we have abundant support for the proposition that crime victimization and insecurity can be important factors in a person's desire to emigrate which can help to shed light on the population that has departed and those who have yet to leave.

2.2.2 Economic Evaluations and Intention to Migrate

While violence or being the victim of crime may be one important "push factor" in an individual's decision to leave, lack of economic opportunity is the "push factor" that has received most attention in both academic and policymaking circles. Dating back to neo-classic understandings of migration as simply a product of wage differentials to more recent

explanations based on household economic strategies (e.g., Massey et al. 1993), economic based reasons for migration have been most prevalent among scholars, often focused on exclusively.

With the rise in political and economic volatility over the past three decades however, scholars have slowly begun to focus a bit more on the idea of mixed migration flows that highlight the complex mosaic of motives that can drive migration. In the case of El Salvador, for example, political and economic reasons for emigration have been found to be very much intertwined since violence can both influence a household's economic situation (e.g., through extortion) as well as its sense of security. Lunquist and Massey (2005) find that, among those who left Nicaragua due to the Contra War, economic factors pushed migrants to both the United States and Costa Rica. For those departing Nicaragua primarily due to security concerns, they were more likely to end up in the United States, an effect separate from economic motivations (Lundquist and Massey 2005). Looking at El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, Stinchcomb and Herschberg (2014) highlight how poor economic conditions (as measured by poverty levels, unemployment rate, high levels of economic inequality, lack of economic growth, and the deficiency of access to jobs) along with lack of state capacity to supply minimal services or resources leads to social exclusion, "which is far more destructive than poverty or inequality per se" (14). This bleak outlook has been a strong driver of out-migration in the region for quite some time (Stinchcomb and Herschberg 2014). While economic evaluations may be separated from political considerations when it comes to determining a person's likelihood to migrate, it is perhaps more accurate to include both economics and politics in any analysis (see, for example, Hiskey et al. 2016; Hiskey, Malone, and Orcés 2014). By including these economic evaluations, it explains why individuals are considering leaving and may clarify why those who have already sought a new life elsewhere.

2.2.3 Corruption Victimization and Intention to Migrate

Another "push factor" found to drive migration is a country's level of corruption, and particularly, an individual's experience with it. When corruption is pervasive, and when an individual comes face to face with it, this can alter one's economic outlook, shape her views of the government's ability to fulfill its basic obligations, and potentially heighten her sense of insecurity as agents of the state become yet another set of predatory actors. As corruption has links to both micro and macroeconomic outcomes, it is important to include it in analysis related to emigration (Poprawe 2015; Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks 2013; Cooray and Schneider 2014). In an analysis of 111 countries from 1985 to 2000, Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks (2013) find that higher corruption levels at the national level promotes migration among those with skills. The authors find that higher levels of corruption lower the returns of education, which is most important to whether high-skilled workers decide to seek employment abroad (Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks 2013). According to the authors, since corruption slows economic growth, increases unemployment, increases inequality, and prevents social mobility, highly educated individuals are more likely to consider migration (Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks 2013). If someone with a lot of education were to go live in a country with less corruption, that person could achieve more from their investment in their education than if they were to stay in their home country (Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks 2013).

Cooray and Schneider (2014) find that this relationship between corruption and migration also holds for workers with middle and lower levels of education. This finding is somewhat attenuated because the effect on emigration is found only for initial levels of corruption, with it

dissipating at higher levels of corruption (Cooray and Schneider 2014). This could be due to the lower levels of economic resources for individuals living in countries with extremely high levels of corruption as these also tend to be countries with low levels of economic development (Cooray and Schneider 2014). Looking at bilateral migration data for 230 countries, Poprawe (2015) finds migration patterns that suggest individuals leave countries where there is high corruption to those countries with lower levels of corruption. Since corruption hinders an economy's wealth, economic growth, and the level of investment in addition to introducing red tape and other bureaucratic costs for workers (Poprawe 2015). These factors make a citizen's calculus related to departure much more favorable (Poprawe 2015). Other research has also found that being a victim of corruption also makes an individual more likely to say they will move abroad within the next three years (see, for instance, Hiskey, Montalvo, and Orcés 2014). Therefore, including indicators for corruption victimization can explain motivations for departure among those who are intending to leave as well as those who have already left.

2.2.4 Trust in Democracy, Democratic Institutions, and Intention to Migrate

In addition to crime victimization, economic evaluations, and corruption victimization, scholars have also examined the role of one's views toward democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic processes as attitudinal correlates with the desire to migrate. Here the theoretical focus is on the ways in which one's views of these political factors may provide insight into their sense of a lack of political opportunity or satisfaction with the domestic political environment that may in turn also serve as a "push factor" for migration to another country. As Hiskey, Montalvo, and Orcés (2014) find in Latin America, using AmericasBarometer data, even when controlling for crime victimization, corruption victimization, economic situations, and

socioeconomic factors, among others, variables that measure the perception of governmental efficacy and satisfaction with democracy are significant factors in explaining why someone might consider moving abroad in the next three years. Basing their argument on Hirschman (1978), democracies provide "political public goods," which can include protection of human rights and other democratic liberties. These "democratic public goods" serve as enticements to citizens and may make them less likely to want to leave a democracy, holding all else equal (Hiskey, Montalvo, and Orcés 2014; Hirschman 1978).

During the initial stages of the economic and democratic transition in Romania after the fall of communism, Sandu and De Jong found that "migration is, to a significant degree, a search for places with greater market and democracy opportunities" (1996, 450). As Sandu and De Jong (1996) encountered, those who had high levels of democratic values were more likely to want to move, all else being equal, to areas that were perceived to be more democratic so that the values of the democratically-minded individual matched the values of their new place of residence. Given these results, in addition to crime victimization, economic outlook, and corruption victimization, it is important to include indicators related to democracy in an analysis of migration to see whether those political evaluations also serve as push factors for finding a new place to build a life.

Another consideration is that those who migrate internationally have the ability to compare their own domestic institutions and political systems with those of other countries. In Britain, migrants have higher levels of satisfaction in government performance than those born there (Maxwell 2010). The underlying theoretical argument is that since migrants left their country of origin for a better life, "regardless of their difficulties, migrants will then have positive evaluations about host society institutions" (Maxwell 2010, 103). For those who remain

in their country of origin, the concept of social remittances, whereby those abroad send back ideas and behaviors, in addition to money back to their hometowns, is useful for understanding how those living at home may begin to compare their domestic governmental institutions to those abroad (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). As a result of migration and social remittances, those who stay learn more about the systems in place elsewhere from those who have left. Thus, we may expect these comparisons to manifest themselves most strongly among individuals related to migrants, and, subsequently, for those comparisons to contribute to one's thoughts about emigration. Among Mexicans, Crow and Pérez-Armendáriz (2010) find that those who had friends or family abroad had decreased levels of satisfaction with democracy, but were more likely to participate (non-electorally) in politics than their counterparts with no migrant connections. Córdova and Hiskey (2015) report that those who have strong connections to those living abroad in stable democracies are more likely to participate in local politics (and political parties) than those without those same relationships. Such activities among family members of migrants may in turn heighten their dissatisfaction with the system to the point where they too consider leaving.

Looking specifically at trust in elections, Carreras and İrepoğlu (2013) find, using AmericasBarometer data, that, in Latin America, "citizens who perceive that the elections are fair are more likely to go to the polls" (614). If people perceive that an election is unfair, then it reduces voters' willingness to participate (Carreras and İrepoğlu 2013). As a result, if the "rules of the game," in terms of an election, are not fair, then, by extension, why might someone remain subject to that political system? Would they at least consider departure to a country where their political voice might be heard, assuming they have the means to leave? The analysis here can be

used to build on the theory that analyzes the role that trust in one's political system and democracy have in fueling a decision to migrate to another country.

I do not see any of these attitudinal variables as causal, per se, in fact, it is these types of variables that would be most open to the possibility of endogeneity. Once an individual makes plans to leave their country origin, then her evaluations of domestic conditions would likely worsen as a way to, in some ways, justify the decision to exit. An increasingly unfavorable evaluation of conditions at home would also lower the level of cognitive dissonance once that decision is taken to leave. While I examine these indicators for any correlational effect, they are not necessarily causal, but still need to be controlled for in the model and examined for any correlational effects on emigration intention. Indeed, if we have an understanding of what is correlated with emigration intentions, we gain purchase on understanding what factors may have been correlated with the departure of those who have already left.

2.2.5 Individual Political Characteristics and Intention to Migrate

Turning to another set of political attitudes, it is useful to understand the role that one's perception of her political voice and the responsiveness of the political system may play in the emigration decision as well. Internal efficacy is defined as an individual's ability to understand the political issues of the day and participate in politics while external efficacy captures the belief that one can make a difference in politics and that politicians will be responsive to her political voice (Niu and Zhao 2018; González-Ferrer 2011). These two indicators may work in different directions with respect to their relationship with the emigration decision.

In an analysis of locals and migrants in urban China, Niu and Zhao (2018) find that those with "high levels of external efficacy tend to trust the government, while high levels of internal

efficacy are linked to low levels of political trust" (57). Internal migrants in China must conform to a household registration policy that is usually inherited from one generation to the next and is difficult to change (Niu and Zhao 2018). Without household registration in the place where one lives, migrants are deprived of their full social, economic, and political rights (Niu and Zhao 2018). Among those with high internal efficacy, such as urban migrants, their lack of ability to participate in local politics may lead to frustration and disappointment and a lack of political trust (Niu and Zhao 2018).

This frustration, particularly among those with high levels of internal efficacy, may spur individuals to consider migrating to an area where their political voice can be heard. Would this same relationship apply in an international context? Since this model will already control for indicators of political trust, as mentioned earlier, it would be useful for building theory to see whether there is a separate effect for efficacy (both internal and external). In addition, it is worth examining whether this same relationship between frustration among high internal efficacy individuals holds in Latin America, and whether such frustration may be related to those expressing plans to leave their home country.

Conversely, for external efficacy, those who believe the government or politicians are responsive to their interests, may have confidence in their political voice being heard, and, are more likely trusting of the government. This sense of trust in one's system and belief in its responsiveness may work to dissuade one from considering emigration as a life option. As a result, those individuals with high levels of external efficacy may be less likely to want to migrate abroad than their counterparts with lower levels of belief that their government is responsive. Again, for all of these variables, the subsequent analyses will provide us with an

improved understanding not only of who is most likely to consider emigration but also, arguably, of the profiles and political behavior patterns of actual migrants, explored later on in this project.

2.2.6 Individual Characteristics and Intention to Migrate

Finally, in addition to all of the theoretical lines of inquiry listed above, many personal factors need to be included in a study of emigration intentions. These factors highlight an individual's level of connection to his or her country of origin as well as serve as controls for the analysis. There are two main categories explored in this set of factors—receiving remittances from someone abroad and the "usual suspects" of sociodemographic factors that have long been strongly associated with actual migration behavior.

Those who receive remittances from abroad may be more likely to consider migration due to a few reasons. First, those who receive remittances are already very connected to an actual migrant (Hiskey, Montalvo, and Orcés 2014; Massey et al. 1998). This link provides not only economic resources that could assist in migration, but also information advantages that serve to lower the costs of a potential journey (Hiskey, Montalvo, and Orcés 2014; Massey et al. 1998; van Dalen, Groenewold, and Fokkema 2005). All of these factors associated with one's connection to a pre-existing migration network are consistently strong predictors of emigration intentions.

Second, receiving money from remittances may literally lower the cost of migration by providing economic resources to make a trip possible for someone who is considering leaving (van Dalen, Groenewold, and Fokkema 2005; Piracha and Saraogi 2017). This money may also serve as a signal that those who have left have found financial success abroad and therefore contribute to increased interests among those back home to consider departure (van Dalen,

Groenewold, and Fokkema 2005; Piracha and Saraogi 2017). As a further consideration, the money sent as remittances could be redeployed once migrants arrive to support them as they try to find a job in their new country of residence.

Moving to other sociodemographic characteristics, migrants who decide to seek a better life in another country are usually not the poorest of the poor in their home countries, primarily because of the need for the resources that allow one to emigrate (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). In addition, those who are most likely to emigrate tend to have, on average, higher levels of education than their compatriots who decide to stay in their countries of origin (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Without these relatively high levels of human and economic capital, potential migrants will have little chance of financing their journey or finding a job once they arrive (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Martin and Zürcher 2008). Personal factors such as urban or rural residence, age, gender, marital status, and one's family characteristics also have long been considered important determinants of a person's propensity to migrate (Massey 1987). Younger, unmarried men from rural areas with no children traditionally have been among those most likely to migrate (Massey 1987). As a result, including these socioeconomic and demographic characteristics are essential to understanding the complex array of factors driving migration across Latin America.

These variables also provide value in giving a proxy for the analysis of actual migrants in Chapter 4 of this project. By understanding which variables are correlated with intention to exit, we gain purchase on the variety of factors that may be at play among those who have already departed, what was important in their motivations for leaving, and how those factors may influence their relationship and political behavior in relation to their country of birth. Since I do

not have that information for the diasporas explored in Chapter 4, building that theory and understanding is essential here.

2.3 Hypotheses

Based on the theories outlined above, this paper will analyze several hypotheses. Grounded in the theories related to victim of crime, the first hypothesis for this analysis is:

H1a: If someone has been a victim of crime, then they are more likely to declare intentions to migrate.

H1b: The higher an individual's fear of crime in her neighborhood, the more likely she is to declare intentions to migrate.

Turning towards the theories related to the economic evaluations, there are two hypotheses, one for personal and one for national economic evaluations:

H2a: The more positive one's personal economic evaluations are, the less likely they are to report intentions to emigrate.

H2b: The more positive one's national economic evaluations are, the less likely they are to report intentions to emigrate.

For the theories related to corruption victimization, the following hypothesis will be evaluated:

H3: If a respondent has been a victim of corruption, then they are more likely to declare intentions to migrate.

Considering the theories on trust in democracy, democratic institutions, and democratic processes, the following hypothesis are included:

H4: The more trust an individual has in democracy, democratic institutions and processes, and elected leaders, the less likely that person will declare intentions to move abroad.

H5: The more trust an individual has in elections, the less likely that person will declare intentions to move abroad.

The theories related to individual political characteristics generate two hypotheses for evaluation:

H6: The higher the levels of external efficacy an individual has, the less likely it is that a person will want to move abroad.

H7: The higher the levels of internal efficacy an individual has, the more likely it is that a person will want to move abroad.

The final set of hypotheses related to individual characteristics are as follows:

H8: If an individual receives remittances, she is more likely to declare intentions to leave.

H9: The more wealth and more education an individual has, the more likely she is to declare intentions to leave.

H10: Younger, unmarried men from rural areas with no children are more likely to declare intentions to leave, as compared to older, married women from urban areas who have children.

2.4 Data

To evaluate all of these hypotheses, this chapter relies on AmericasBarometer surveys carried out every other year since 2004. These data are useful for this analysis for several reasons. First, they are drawn from nationally representative in-person surveys with complex weighting structures.[5] Second, they include questions that will tap into all of the theoretical

[5] For more information about the surveys, please visit https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/methods-practices.php.

concepts outlined above. Third, the data cover all of the countries included as case studies as well as a regional analysis of 21 countries in the Latin America and Carribean region (LAC21).[6] Fourth, the AmericasBarometer conducts surveys every two years from 2004 through 2019, providing temporal as well as spatial coverage. The determining factors as to whether a country-round is included is the most recent year for which both the dependent variable, the intention to migrate question, as well as an important independent variable, whether the respondent receives remittance, were included in the survey.[7]

Finally, while there might be an argument for using multilevel modeling (MLM) for this analysis, (see, for example, Hiskey, Montalvo, and Orcés 2014). I am not using MLM here, because based on the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) for the dependent variable, only about 7% of variance in the dependent variable is due to country-level differences.[8] Since the ICC is closer to 0% than 100%, I've opted not to incorporate second-level variables into the analysis.

2.4.1 Case Selection

[6] The LAC21 include the following countries that have been included (with a couple of exceptions) in the AmericasBarometer surveys since 2006. These countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In the 2018/19 round, surveys were not conducted in Venezuela, Haiti, and Guyana. In the 2006 round, Argentina was not included in the AmericasBarometer. In 2004, AmericasBarometer surveys were only conducted in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic. For the LAC21 countries, in the 2004 round, there were 22,933 responses. In 2006, that number was 32,985. The 2008 round had 35,481 responses while in 2010 there were 36,453 responses. In 2012, there were 34,120 responses. In 2014, that number was 33,446. For the 2016/17 wave, there were 34,376 responses and in the 2018/19 round, there were 28,042 responses.

[7] I am using the GM (20190910_SMALL).dta dataset and running the analysis on Stata13.

[8] If I were to do a three-level model where the country was the second-level of analysis and survey wave were the third level of analysis, only about 9% of the variance in the dependent variable is due to differences at these two levels, so, again, most of the variance in the dependent variable is due to variance at the individual level.

The analysis in this chapter offers both a comprehensive regional analysis as well as analysis for the five countries that serve as my case studies (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) in subsequent analyses of migrant voting patterns. The regional analysis provides an overview for the importance of these explanatory variables for outward migration from Latin America while the single country models will provide us with possible insights into the characteristics of the existing diasporas for these countries. Identifying and understanding the country-specific correlates of emigration intentions here aids in understanding what factors may be particularly salient in a particular diaspora and how this issue may affect their political behavior from abroad, which is explored in Chapter 3. For instance, if poor economic conditions are strongly correlated with intentions to migrate for a particular country, then those who have already left may be particularly attuned to those factors, and, as a result, this may influence their vote choice while abroad. Understanding which of these factors might matter for diaspora voting patterns can deepen our understanding of how factors related to migration can have lasting impacts on the political behavior of that country's migrant population.

In addition, all of these countries represent a wide range of the possible reasons that might influence emigration as explored earlier in the theoretical section. Brazil, over the course of the past few decades, has had difficulties with inflation and the economy as well as high levels of violence, especially in favelas around Rio de Janeiro (Skidmore 2010). Chile experienced hyperinflation in the early 1970s, an economic crash during the 1980s, and a return to democracy that still reserved power in the military (Callund 1999; Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010). Colombia had experiencing ongoing insecurity and violence as a result of both internal rebel groups and drug cartels (Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010). During the 1980s and 1990s, Ecuador experienced a volatile economy, which was coupled with some political instability

(Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010). Peru experienced both hyperinflation off and on from the 1970s through the 1990s, high levels of violence related to internal rebels in the 1980s, and a weakening of democratic institutions under Fujimori's presidency during the 1990s (Gomez 2005; Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010). Thus, knowing the role economic considerations play in one's emigration decision may highlight the role those economic considerations play in subsequent voting behavior after the migration journey has been completed.

2.4.2 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for this study asks individuals about their intention to migrate to live or work in another country in the next three years.[9] The response categories for this question are a simple "yes" or "no." For exact question wording, response categories, coding, and data availability by wave and country, please see the footnotes. To give a sense of the regional variation, below is a graphic of percentage of the respondents in each country that expressed an intention to migrate in the next three years for the 2018/19 round of the AmericasBarometer. This figure shows the high level of variation in the region with those who have intentions to move abroad over the next three years and the various cases included in this chapter span from high (Peru) to low (Chile) levels of this variable.

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[9] To measure intention to migrate, I use question **Q14** from the AmericasBarometer which reads as follows, "Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years? (1) Yes (2) No." The variable was recoded such that the "No" responses were coded as zero and the "Yes" responses as 1. The availability of this variable determines whether a country or wave is included in this analysis. As a result, the following country/years results are available upon request: Regional 2018/19, Regional 2016/17, Regional 2014, Regional 2012, Regional 2010, Regional 2008, Regional 2006, Regional 2004, Brazil 2018/19, Brazil 2016/17, Brazil 2014, Brazil 2012, Brazil 2010, Brazil 2008, Chile 2018/19, Chile 2016/17, Chile 2014, Chile 2012, Chile 2010, Chile 2008, Chile 2006, Colombia 2018/18, Colombia 2016/17, Colombia 2014, Colombia 2012, Colombia 2010, Colombia 2008, Colombia 2004, Ecuador 2018/19, Ecuador 2016/17, Ecuador 2012, Ecuador 2010, Ecuador 2008, Peru 2018/19, Peru 2016/17, Peru 2014, Peru 2012, Peru 2010, Peru 2008, and Peru 2006. I recognize that this is a noisy measure. I cannot determine what proportion of those who have intentions of leaving have actually left after three years. It may be that those who think about leaving and do not leave are substantively different from those who actually do leave. I cannot, however, account for this difference in the results.

Figure 2.1: Intentions to Migrate across Latin America and Caribbean Region by Country



2.4.3 Independent Variables

Given the number of hypotheses, there are several variables of interest. For the first set of hypotheses, I include a question that asks whether the respondent was the victim of crime within the last 12 months.[10] I also employ a variable that measures a respondent's sense of neighborhood (in)security as an additional measure of this concept of crime victimization.[11]

For the second set of hypotheses, I include one question that asks whether the national economic situation is better, worse, or the same as it was 12 months ago and another question that asks whether the respondent's personal economic situation is better, worse, or the same as it was 12 months ago.[12]

To evaluate the third set of theories, I include a variable which measures whether the respondent has been asked for a bribe over the past 12 months across a number of different interactions with officials (i.e., police, government employees, military, employers, municipal governments, courts, schools, health facility, or school).[13]

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[10] To measure victimization, I use two questions: **VIC1** and **VIC1EXT**. **VIC1** is used in the 2004-2008 rounds and **VIC1EXT** is used starting in the 2010 wave. **VIC1EXT** asks, "Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?" (Emphasis in the original.) **VIC1** asks, "Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?" The original coding for both of these variables is (1) Yes and (2) No. For purposes of this analysis, the "No" responses have been recoded as 0 and the "Yes" responses as 1. Between these two questions, this indicator is available for all rounds and all countries included in this chapter.

[11] To measure neighborhood insecurity, I use **AOJ11**, which asks, "Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe." I am using the alternate-coded version of this variable in the dataset where "Very safe" was coded as 0, "Somewhat safe" as 33.33333, "Somewhat unsafe" as 66.66666, and "Very unsafe" as 100. This indicator is available for all rounds and all countries included in this chapter.

[12] To measure national economic evaluation, I use the question **SOCT2**, which asks, "Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse." To measure personal economic evaluation, I use the question **IDIO2**, which asks, "Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse." For purposes of these analyses, I recoded both of these variables such that "Better" was coded as 100, "Same" as 50, and "Worse" as 0. These indicators are available for all countries and all rounds included in this analysis *except* Colombia in 2004.

[13] To measure whether a respondent is a victim of corruption, I use the variable **CORVIC** in the dataset. This variable includes various questions which measure corruption victimization. These items ask: "Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life... **EXC2.** Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? **EXC6.** In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a

To evaluate the hypotheses related to trust in democracy and democratic institutions, I include several questions. The first asks for the level of support for democracy as a form of government, as compared to all others. The second question asks about the level of satisfaction an individual has in the way democracy works in their question. The last question included asks for the level of trust the individual has in the country's elections with response options ranging from "A lot" to "Not at all."[14]

To measure the hypotheses related to personal political evaluations, I include a question about the respondent's level of external efficacy which asks how much they agree or disagree that those who govern the country are interested in what she thinks and another question which measures a respondent's level of internal efficacy, which asks how much they feel they understand the most important political issues of their country.[15]

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bribe? **EXC20.** In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe? **EXC11.** In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law? **EXC13.** In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months? **EXC14.** Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months? **EXC15.** In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe? **EXC16.** Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?" In the analysis here, respondents are coded as having been asked to pay a bribe if they responded affirmatively to any one or more of these questions. If they were asked to pay a bribe, the respondent is coded as 100 and if they were not asked for a bribe, they were coded as 0. This indicator is available for all waves and all countries included in this chapter.

[14] To measure support for democracy as a form of government, I use the question **ING4**, which asks, "Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?" This question is measured on a 1 to 7 scale where 1 indicates "Strongly disagree" and 7 means "Strongly agree." This indicator is available for all waves and countries included in the analysis for this chapter. To measure satisfaction with democracy in practice, I use question **PN4**, which asks, "In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in (country)? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied." I used the reverse-coded version of this variable in the dataset where "Very dissatisfied" is coded as 0, "Dissatisfied" is coded as 33.33333, "Satisfied" is coded as 66.66666, and "Very satisfied" is coded as 100. This indicator is available for all waves and countries included in this chapter. For some years and countries, this question is only asked of half the sample. To measure trust in elections, I used questions **B47** and **B47A**. **B47** was asked through 2010 and **B47A** was included starting in the 2012 round. **B47A**. is worded as follows, "To what extent do you trust elections in this country?" and **B47**. Is asked in the following manner, "To what extent do you trust elections?" These questions are both asked on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 representing "Not at all" and 7 meaning "A lot." This indicator is available for all countries and waves included here *except* Chile in 2006.

[15] To measure external efficacy, I use the question **EFF1**, which asks, "Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?" To measure internal efficacy, I use question **EFF2**, which is worded as follows, "You feel that you understand the most important

For the last set of hypotheses on how an individual's personal characteristics correlate to emigration intentions, I include several indicators. The first asks whether the respondent or someone in their household receives remittances from someone who lives abroad.[16] The second set of indicators measure socioeconomic or familial variables such as whether the respondent is married/partnered and whether she has children under 13 years of age living at home.[17] In addition, there are variables measuring age cohort, level of education, whether the respondent is

political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? Both of these questions are asked on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 representing "Strongly disagree" and 7 meaning "Strongly agree." These indicators are available for all waves and countries *except* the Regional 2006, Regional 2004, Chile 2006, Colombia 2004, and Peru 2006 waves and country analysis.

[16] To measure whether a responded receive remittances, I used question **Q10A**, which asks, **"**Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances (financial support), that is, economic assistance from abroad?" The response categories in the survey are (1) Yes and (2) No. For purposes of this analysis, I recoded the response options to "Yes" as 1 and "No" as 1. In the 2018/19 round, this question was not asked in Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Brazil. The other rounds and countries for which this question *is not available* are as follows: Brazil 2016/17, Chile 2016/17, Colombia 2016/17, Peru 2016/17, and Chile 2014.

[17] To measure whether a respondent is Married or partnered, I use the questions **Q11** and **Q11N**. **Q11** was used through the 2012 wave and **Q11N** was asked starting in the 2014 wave. **Q11** asks, "What is your marital status?" with the response options as follows: (1) Single, (2) Married, (3) Common law marriage, (4) Divorced, (5) Separated, and (6) Widowed. **Q11N** asks, "What is your marital status?" with the response options of (1) Single, (2) Married, (3) Common law marriage (Living together), (4) Divorced, (5) Separated, (6) Widowed, (7) Civil union **[Remove if it does not exist in the country]**. For purposes of this analysis, I recoded both variables into one dichotomous variable where 1 represents respondents who were married, in a common law marriage, or a civil union and 0 represents respondents who were single, divorce, separated, or widowed. This indicator is available for all years and all countries included in this chapter. To measure whether a respondent has children under 13 and living at home, I use the following questions, **Q12**, **Q12A**, **Q12B**, and **Q12BN**. **Q12** was asked starting in the 2004 round and was asked through the 2012 round. It is worded as follows: "Do you have children? How many?" **Q12A** was asked in 2008 and 2010 and is worded as follows, "[If has children] How many children live with you at the present time?" **Q12B** was asked in the 2012 round and is worded as follows, "How many of your children are under 13 years of age and live in this household?" **Q12BN** was asked starting in the 2014 round and is worded as follows "How many children under the age of 13 live in this household?" For purposes of this analysis, all of these variables were included in one dichotomous variable that is equal to 0 if the respondent has no children and 1 if the respondent has any children under 13 living at home. This indicator is available for all rounds and all countries included in this analysis.

female, the respondent's level of wealth, and whether the respondent lives in an urban area.[18,19] For purposes of this analysis, the summary statistics have been weighted using the weighting scheme in the AmericasBarometer surveys.[20] These weighting schemes do not change the number of observations, minimum or maximum values and may only changes the mean and standard deviation values. Full summary statistics for all cases examined here can be found in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 2.

2.5 Analysis

[18] To measure age, I use the variable **EDAD**, which is based on the questions asking the respondent's year or year of birth. **EDAD** is divided into six categories for age (15-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, and 66+). The categories have values of 1 to 6 with 1 being the youngest cohort and 6 being the oldest. This indicator is available for all years and countries included here. To measure education, I use the variable **EDR**, which is a recoded version of the variable **ED**, which asks, "How many years of schooling have you completed?" The variable **EDR** organizes those responses into four categories, "None," "Primary," "Secondary," and "Post-secondary." In terms of coding, "None" is equal to 0 and "Post-Secondary" is equal to 3. This indicator is available for all years and countries included here. To measure a respondent's gender, I use the variable **MUJER**, which is coded 1 if the respondent is female and 0 if the respondent is male. This indicator is available for all years and countries included in this analysis. To measure quintile of wealth, I use the variable **QUINTALL** included in the dataset which is made from the **R**-battery in the survey, which asks whether the respondent owns certain household goods and then divides respondents into five quintiles of wealth. This variable is measured on a 1 to 5 scale where 1 is the lowest quintile of wealth and 5 is the highest. For more information on how this variable is made, please see Córdova 2009 (https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en_v2.pdf). This indicator of wealth is available for all years and countries included in this chapter. To measure urban residence, I use the variable **URBAN** included in the dataset, which is made from the question **UR**, which uses the country's census definition to determine whether a respondent lives in an urban or rural area. The variable is given a value of 1 if a respondent lives in an urban area and a value of 0 for a rural area. This indicator is available for all years and countries included in this chapter.

[19] I have not included any measure of ethnicity or skin tone in this model because it is theoretically unclear as to what the relationship would be between those variables would be and migration intention. Would those who are white be more likely to stay because they believe themselves to be atop a country's racial hierarchy or would they be more likely to leave because they can claim European nationality, which would make departure and resettlement in another country much easier? If this study were to focus on just one country, I would have included such measures, but given the variety of countries examined, I have chosen not to include those variables.

[20] For more on the weighting scheme used for the AmericasBarometer datasets, please see the following *Methodological Note*: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IMN007en.pdf. For countries in which there are more than 1,500 responses, they are weighted as if they have 1,500 responses using the variable "weight1500" for the regional analysis. For individual country analysis, the weight variable is "wt," except in those instances where there were more than 1,500 responses.

The results for all the countries and rounds included are as follows in Table 2.1 with predicted probabilities outlined in Figures 2.2-2.7, which highlight the maximal effect of the independent variable (going from lowest to highest values).[21]

Table 2.1: Results

Variable	Regional 2018/19	Brazil 2014	Chile 2010	Colombia 2014	Ecuador 2018/19	Peru 2014
Victim of Crime *(H1A)*	0.356*** (0.043)	0.638*** (0.208)	0.299 (0.272)	0.087 (0.189)	0.326** (0.153)	0.179 (0.157)
Neighborhood Insecurity *(H1B)*	0.005*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)
Personal Econ. Evaluation *(H2A)*	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.003)	-0.005* (0.003)
National Econ. Evaluation *(H2B)*	-0.002** (0.001)	0.005* (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Victim of Corruption *(H3)*	0.004*** (0.000)	0.006** (0.003)	0.007* (0.004)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)
Democracy as Best Form of Government *(H4)*	-0.035*** (0.012)	0.014 (0.055)	-0.060 (0.075)	-0.068 (0.047)	-0.123** (0.051)	0.003 (0.058)
Satisfaction w/ Democracy *(H4)*	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.004)
Trust in Elections *(H5)*	-0.055*** (0.012)	0.056 (0.054)	-0.144** (0.071)	-0.143*** (0.053)	0.000 (0.041)	0.018 (0.052)
External Efficacy *(H6)*	0.002 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.052)	-0.082 (0.065)	0.125** (0.052)	0.025 (0.038)	0.051 (0.051)
Internal Efficacy *(H7)*	0.058*** (0.012)	0.132** (0.060)	0.069 (0.079)	0.084* (0.043)	0.073* (0.042)	0.037 (0.056)

[21] None of the pairwise correlations for these independent variables reaches above 0.37 and most are well under 0.10. I built this model using a stepwise method and only kept adding when the variables of interest that were added remained significant as well as the original variables in the model. I continued to include wealth, even though it was not significant to make sure the model was specified properly. The decision to emigrate is a complex one, and, as a result, requires a relatively large model to incorporate the factors that may go into that decision.

Receives Remittances *(H8)*	0.564*** (0.061)	1.486 (1.465)	1.988*** (0.631)	0.982*** (0.357)	1.197*** (0.295)	1.179*** (0.339)
Married/ Partnered *(H10)*	-0.307*** (0.039)	-0.866*** (0.200)	-0.624** (0.265)	-0.506*** (0.137)	-0.496*** (0.130)	-0.306* (0.171)
Has Children under 13 *(H10)*	-0.041 (0.040)	0.052 (0.199)	-0.512* (0.265)	0.061 (0.136)	-0.105 (0.125)	-0.050 (0.156)
Age Cohort *(H10)*	-0.456*** (0.015)	-0.490*** (0.078)	-0.373*** (0.084)	-0.416*** (0.062)	-0.399*** (0.049)	-0.486*** (0.055)
Level of Education *(H9)*	0.062* (0.032)	0.610*** (0.179)	0.921*** (0.236)	0.333*** (0.115)	0.142 (0.127)	0.190 (0.122)
Female *(H10)*	-0.402*** (0.038)	-0.720*** (0.170)	-0.638*** (0.222)	-0.271 (0.174)	-0.285** (0.128)	-0.315** (0.150)
Quintile of Wealth *(H9)*	-0.020 (0.015)	0.040 (0.071)	-0.049 (0.094)	0.068 (0.067)	0.050 (0.052)	0.084 (0.064)
Urban Residence *(H10)*	0.051 (0.044)	0.495 (0.327)	0.624 (0.589)	0.477* (0.276)	0.005 (0.138)	0.050 (0.213)
Constant	0.085 (0.149)	-2.620*** (0.745)	-1.827* (0.991)	-0.951** (0.456)	0.015 (0.458)	-0.684 (0.509)
N	17,199	1,369	1,632	1,315	1,422	1,193

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 2.2: Predicted Probabilities Regional 2018/19



Figure 2.3: Predicted Probabilities Brazil 2014



Figure 2.4: Predicted Probabilities Chile 2010



Figure 2.5: Predicted Probabilities Colombia 2014



Figure 2.6: Predicted Probabilities Ecuador 2018/19



Figure 2.7: Predicted Probabilities Peru 2014



These results indicate that demographic factors have a strong role in illustrating what this potential migrant population looks like and, more importantly, what characteristics the migrant population already abroad may exhibit. The elements that stand out across all cases for determining emigration intentions are whether a respondent is married and the person's age cohort (support for H10). Those who are considering leaving and, likely, those who have already left, are younger and have fewer familial connections at the time of their departure, which is in line with previous research. Those who are married/partnered are anywhere from 3% to 10% less likely to want to leave than their unpartnered counterparts. Individuals in the oldest age cohort are anywhere from 9% to 35% less likely to declare emigration intentions than those in the youngest cohort across all of these cases.

Other prominent sociodemographic indicators that are strongly correlated, in the vast majority of cases examined here, with emigration intentions include whether the individual receives remittances (H8) and gender (H10). These findings also support previous literature about migration, where those more likely to migrate already have a connection to the migrant network abroad and those contemplating departure are more likely to be male than female. With

respect to those who have already left, these results highlight their potential connections with previous migrants and the gender breakdown likely skewing toward males. If someone receives remittances, that person is anywhere from 11% to 28% more likely to want to move abroad (support for H8). This indicator is well and above some of the coefficients for some of the other variables of interest (e.g., crime victimization, economic evaluations, corruption victimization, etc.), indicating that this financial and information connection with others living abroad is a strong motivator for an individual to consider pursuing that same path. If a respondent is female, that person is 3% to 7% less likely to have a desire to leave (support for H10).

Looking more closely at the results, other patterns start to emerge as well across the region. Insecurity seems to be a reason for departure among several groups, including Brazilians, Ecuadorians, and the regional sample. As a result, those who are contemplating departure as well as those who have already left may be particularly sensitive to this issue. Being a victim of a crime makes respondents in the most recent regional sample, in the Brazil 2014 survey, and the most recent Ecuador results all 7% more likely to express emigration intentions (support for H1a). For the indicator of fear of crime in the neighborhood, only the samples taken in the 2018/19 wave reach any meaningful level of statistical significance. Those who are most fearful of crime in their local area across the whole region are 8% more likely to want to leave, as compared with those who feel the safest. In Ecuador, this figure is 10% (support for H1b). Taken together, both of these security factors are notable for having similar effect sizes, when statistically significant. These differences across the region could be due to

the fact that crime may be a more salient factor in determining a respondent's emigration intention in the 2018/19 wave.[22]

Turning towards the economic factors related to emigration intentions, personal economic evaluations, much more so than perceptions of the national economy, had a substantial effect on emigration intentions, with those expressing negative views of their economic situation more likely to report emigration intentions. As a result, those with intentions to leave and those who have already left may be particularly sensitive to fluctuations in their own economic situation which could be related to their desire to depart. Among those who have the best perception of their own situation, they are 7% less likely in the regional survey and 10% in Ecuador to say they wanted to leave, as compared to those who have the worst personal economic views. At the 90% level of significance, Peruvians in 2014 who feel the most positive about their economic conditions were 8% less likely to want to leave (support for H2a). These results are similar in size to the effects of crime victimization and neighborhood insecurity and in the regional and Ecuador samples. While an individual's economic situation matters in some of the cases presented here, it is not the primary driver of emigration intention.

The results for the national economy (H2b) were somewhat unexpected. The regional results from 2018/19 show, as anticipated, that those who have the most positive views of the national economy are 3% less likely to want to move abroad than those with the worst views, which is half the size of the effect of the personal economic evaluation (some support for H2b,

[22] In analyses done on all the countries studied here in the 2018/19 round, being the victim of a crime was statistically significant in the expected direction for all cases. Those rounds are not included here because the remittance recipient question was not included in Brazil, Colombia, Chile, or Peru for that wave of the survey. Results and predicted probabilities have been calculated for all waves and country years in which the dependent variable is available (the models for each may change due to the availability of the independent variables). Additional results are available by request.

but not among specific countries studied). For the five case studies, the only country for which this indicator had a significant coefficient (at the 90% level) was Brazil, but the direction was against expectations. In that case, those who think the national economy was doing well are about 5% *more* likely to want to move abroad, as compared with those of the dimmest evaluations of the national economy. The result for Brazil could possibly related to two factors. First, perhaps those who perceive the national economy to be doing well have the confidence or resources to want to relocate elsewhere in the world. Second, maybe there is a relative deprivation motivation whereby those who think the national economy is doing well believe that they are being left behind by the economy and wish to seek their fortune elsewhere in the world.

While corruption victimization is an important factor in a migration decision, the effect size is similar to that of both the security indicators and one's personal economic evaluation. Therefore, among those considering leaving and in those already abroad, corruption victimization is a key consideration related to emigration intention, but not necessarily as strong as some of the demographic factors mentioned earlier. Among those respondents who were victims of corruption, they are 7% more likely in both the regional and Brazil 2014 studies, as compared to their counterparts who were not asked for bribes, to express a desire to migrate abroad. For Peru in 2014 and Chile in 2010, at the 90% level of significance, victims of corruption are 5% more likely than non-victims to want to leave (which all provides support for H3).

As compared with security, economic, and corruption indicators, those indicators related to one's views of democracy and trust in her system were less consistently related to emigration intentions. These evaluations of democracy may not be as relevant to a person's well-being, and therefore less correlated with emigration intention than the more basic concerns of security and

economic stability. As a result, those already abroad may care about democratic evaluations, but may not be as important to their worldview as security, economics, and corruption. While the coefficients in the regional sample for both the indicators for support for democracy (as compared to all other systems) and satisfaction with the way democracy works in the respondent's country are statistically significant and in the expected direction, there is only one country for each variable where the relationship is statistically significant and in the expected direction, which provides somewhat weak support for H4. In Ecuador, those who strongly agree that democracy is the best form of government are 15% less likely to report a desire to leave, as compared with those who strongly disagree. For Colombia in 2014, those who are most satisfied with the way democracy works in their country are 13% less likely to want to leave, compared with those who are the least satisfied.

Turning to trust in elections, those who are the most trustful of elections were 6% less likely to want to migrate. For Chile and Colombia, this figure is 5% and 11%, respectively. For the remaining countries, the relationship does not reach any level of statistical significance and for Brazil in Peru are in the opposite direction than expected. In the regional sample, trust in elections has a greater effect size than corruption victimization or national economic evaluations. It is worth noting that the influence of this variable is in Colombia is statistically significant in the model of emigration intentions while, surprisingly, the measures of corruption victimization, security and economic conditions are not.

Moving to the measures of internal and external efficacy there are divergent results. While there is no support for the external efficacy hypothesis (H6), those who most understand the major political issues facing the country are also more likely to indicate emigration intentions (support for H7). This finding suggests that many of those who have already emigrated may be

particularly attuned to the political situation around them. It is unclear, however, whether that attention to political issues is related to events in their home country or those in their country of residence. This tension will be explored further in Chapter 3. In the regional sample, those who strongly agreed that they understand the most important political issues facing the country were more likely to express a desire to emigrate than those who reported that they did not understand the important political issues. In the case of Brazil in 2014, the difference between those two groups was 7%. So, again, the more internally efficacious, the more likely that person is to think about migration. At the 90% confidence level, those who feel the most internally efficacious in Colombia and Ecuador are 7% and 6%, respectively more likely to consider migration than those who were the least efficacious. This effect size is similar to that of the effect of the security, economic evaluation, and corruption variables explored earlier.

In addition to the sociodemographic variables mentioned earlier, a few more merit some additional attention. Higher levels of education, rather than wealth, are associated with intentions to leave, which may hint at higher levels of education of those already abroad. While wealth is not significant across any of the studied cases and the direction of the variable is not consistent across all cases, the effect of education with emigration intentions in Brazil, Chile, and Colombia is statistically significant with large effects. In Brazil, those with the most education are 15% more likely to consider migrating to another country, as compared to those with the least amount of education. In Chile, that figure was 10% and in Colombia it was 13%. All of these results support the idea that education, instead of wealth, plays a role in one's emigration decision calculus.

Finally, while female, age cohort, and marital status were strong predictors of emigration intention discussed at the start of this section, a couple of other demographic characteristics are

also included as a part of H10—urban residence and whether the respondent has children. These two particular variables do not provide support for the theoretically expected direction outlined in H10. The only instance in which urban residence even reaches statistical significance (at the 90% level) is for Colombia where those who live in urban areas are 6% *more* likely to consider migration. This is contrary to theoretical expectations and the direction of the coefficient for this and all other cases is in the same direction meaning that all those in urban areas in these studies were *more* likely to think about migration. While it was theoretically expected that having young children would make someone less likely to consider migration, that is not necessarily the case in these studies. Having children possibly gives parents a reason to pursue a better life elsewhere and does not necessarily tie them to their country of origin.

2.5.1 Understanding Diasporas Through Analysis of Emigration Intentions

Based on these results, what would a typical emigrant look like from each of these countries? There are likely close links in terms of characteristics between those with intentions to leave and those who have already left allowing us insight into this latter population.

The most typical migrant, based on these results, from the LAC region as a whole would be a young, unmarried male, who receives remittances from someone abroad. In addition, this young man would have been the victim of both crime and corruption within the previous year and feel insecure in his neighborhood. This individual would also have a poor perception of the national and his personal economic condition over the previous twelve months. The typical migrant from the LAC region would have, on average, lower levels in trust in democracy, as compared to other forms of government, lower levels of satisfaction with the way democracy works in his country of origin, and lower levels of trust in elections. This person also

understands the most important political issues facing the country. As a result, this potential LAC migrant could be characterized as both a migrant seeking better economic opportunities abroad and fleeing domestic insecurity and corruption.

From Brazil, the average migrant would be a young, well educated, unmarried man who had been both the victim of both crime and corruption in the previous year. In addition, this person would also have a greater understanding of the political issues facing Brazil. Therefore, Brazilian migrants may reflect the mixed forces that seem to be pushing individuals to consider emigration. Based on the history of Brazilian migration presented in the Introduction, these results seem to echo the prominent role that both economic and security issues have played in the country's recent past.

A typical Chilean migrant would be a young, well educated, unmarried man. As a result, Chilean migrants look much more like typical economic migrants seeking job opportunities abroad to match their educational qualifications. Chileans do not appear to be driven out of the country by crime or insecurity, as compared to other countries examined here. Given the history of the Chilean diaspora discussed in the Introduction, alongside the exile community that remain abroad from the Pinochet years, these results suggest a younger segment of this country's diaspora that has been largely driven by economic considerations.

The most likely migrant from Colombia would be a young, unmarried, well-educated individual from an urban setting who receives remittances. This young person would also have, on average, lower levels of satisfaction with how democracy functions in Colombia and lower trust in elections. Finally, this person would believe that politicians would be interested in what they think. Curiously, while current Colombian migration continues to be economically motivated, the role of violence at home as a reason to flee is not present in this analysis, which

presents a departure from the dual reasons for historical migration patterns. While economic opportunities abroad remain an important motivating factor for potential and actual Colombian migrants abroad, the role of insecurity may be less relevant currently than it was for previous cohorts of migrants from this country.

For Ecuador, the general profile for a migrant would be a young, unmarried man who receives remittances, has been the victim of a crime within the last year, and feels insecure in his neighborhood. This young man would also have had a poor evaluation of his own economic circumstances within the past year and lower levels of trust in democracy as a form of government. So, Ecuadorian migrants could be categorized as both economic migrants seeking better opportunities and as those fleeing local violence and insecurity. While the economic migration is in line with the historical analysis of Ecuadorian migration, the departures due to violence add a new dimension to the Ecuadorian diaspora.

Lastly, the Peruvian most likely to migrate would also be a young man who receives remittances. As with the Chilean diaspora, the Peruvian migrant profile seems to mirror a typical economic migrant, given the lack of violence or corruption as motivating factors for departure, which is in line with the previous literature on the reasons for Peruvians moving abroad.

In general, these results indicate that those who are considering migration are similar to those who have already left, in the countries included in this study. Overall, these results show that those who wish to leave are generally young, unmarried men who already have connections to a migrant network abroad through receiving remittances. Some may be departing due to negative experiences as a victim of crime, corruption victimization, or a lack of economic opportunities. In addition, this group seems to have higher levels of education and greater

dissatisfaction with democracy works (or does not) in their home countries. This information is useful to keep in mind as we explore actual migrant populations abroad later on in this project.

2.6 Conclusion

Based on these results, the indicators for likelihood of considering migration tend to fall along sociodemographic lines as well as whether an individual receives remittances. In all cases, older and married individuals are less likely to consider living in another country, as compared to their younger and single compatriots. In addition, an individual's gender and whether they receive remittances are strongly correlated with emigration intention (in all but one country for each indicator). The effect size for receiving remittances is usually the second largest in the models, after age, and the effect for gender is similar to the effect for marriage. These findings highlight how powerful a person's daily experiences and personal characteristics are in explaining emigration intentions. A young, unmarried man who receives remittances is far more likely to think about moving abroad than an older, married woman who does not receive remittances, holding all else constant.

Including all of these different variables in models of emigration intentions provides a more comprehensive view of who wants to leave, and why. Indeed, many of the factors influencing someone's intention to leave are already baked-in based on their personal characteristics (and whether they receive remittances), regardless of what happens to them out in the world. In many instances, it is the personal characteristics that make the big swing in the effect sizes that may tip someone in the direction of wanting to pursue a new life abroad. While crime victimization, economics, corruption victimization, and democratic evaluations are all

statistically significant to one degree or another across these cases, none of these individually present an overwhelming effect in the various analyses.

While these results aid in our understanding of what factors are associated with an intention to migrate, they also shed light on what characteristics may be present in the population already abroad. Since this diaspora population may be difficult to systematically evaluate, exploring emigration intentions can serve as a proxy for what those who have already left in terms of their sociodemographic, behavioral, and attitudinal characteristics. While a diaspora will change over time with various waves of migration, understanding some of these factors is crucial for an improved understanding of the political behavior of this hard to study population abroad.

Now that we understand what makes these individuals want to leave, it is important to evaluate their political participation profiles in order to determine the degree to which they may be more or less politically engaged than their counterparts who do not report plans to emigrate. This may also shed light on what factors may be at play for the political behavior of those already abroad. I will examine this relationship in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

Politics on the Way Out: Participation Patterns of Those Waiting to Exit

3.1 Introduction

Now that I have examined what factors influence the decision to depart, for this chapter, I evaluate the political participation patterns of those who are thinking about leaving to first better understand their degree of engagement with politics while having one foot out the door and second, to perhaps glean some insights into the political profile of those who have already left. Just as with Chapter 2, in which I wanted to understand the socioeconomic and demographic profiles of those intending to leave in part because of the potential insights these provide us for those who have already left, so too do I seek to understand the politics of those waiting to leave in order to better understand those who have already left. Do those with emigration intentions still feel connected to the body politic and continue their participation before departure or do they start to disengage from the political system and avoid the ballot box? This electoral participation can serve as an indicator of whether potential migrants have formed a habit of participating domestically and thus might be more likely to continue that behavior once they settle into a new country.

Specifically, I focus on the reported voting behavior of those with emigration intentions and compare them with those who have no such intentions. We know from Chapter 2 that individuals expressing plans to emigrate tend to be young, single, and male, and receive remittances. We also know from previous work that those seeking to emigrate tend to be more risk accepting than their counterparts (Canache et al. 2013). This latter characteristic in

particular suggests that perhaps these individuals also will be more willing to engage in politics, both through voting and other forms of participation.

In the course of analyzing these forms of political engagement I also include other factors related to electoral participation in Latin America such as crime victimization, economic evaluations, corruption victimization, trust in political institutions, political characteristics, and individual characteristics. One of the key findings from these analyses is that in most cases examined, those with intentions to migrate are *less* likely to have participated in previous elections, but there is no difference between these two groups in terms of their reported plans for future participation in their country's electoral process. I also find evidence that brings into question some of the recent findings (Bateson 2012; Bonifácio and Paulino 2015; Inman and Andrews 2009) of how crime victimization and corruption victimization are associated with an overall increase in participation. I do however find support for widely accepted theories relating participation to an individual's political attitudes and socioeconomic characteristics.

After reviewing the various strands of theory relevant to this analysis, I will outline the hypotheses for this study. I will then go through the cases, data, and variables used in this study before reviewing the results. I will conclude with a discussion of what these analyses add to our understanding of the pre-departure migrant experience specifically and, more importantly, what it might tell us about those who have already left.

3.2 Theory

The following section outlines the several theories supporting the analysis of this chapter. I will examine theories that are specific to either past or future electoral participation, how

migration may influence showing up at the polls, and then more general theories related to participation in Latin America and the Caribbean.

3.2.1 Theories about Past Electoral Participation

The standard literature related to political participation highlights that individuals require resources for participation, such as wealth, education, and time (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995; Scholzman, Verba, and Brady 2012). Therefore, those who are wealthier, more educated, more socially connected and older, as well as those who understand politics (internal efficacy), tend to participate more in electoral politics than those with fewer of these resources (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995; Scholzman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Blais 2000). In addition, married adults tend to vote more frequently than those who are unmarried (Polsby and Wildavsky 2004; Blais 2000). Therefore, given their centrality to understanding "who votes," it is important to include these socioeconomic and demographic characteristics in a study of voter participation.

In addition to individual characteristics, political parties can play an important role in mobilizing people to turn out to vote, particularly in established democracies (Rosenstone and Hansen 2003; Polsby and Wildavsky 2004). The strength of an individual's party affiliation, then becomes an important predictor of habitual voting and gives a structure to a voter's political paradigm and ideology (Polsby and Wildavsky 2004; Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960a). In newer democracies such as most of the cases under consideration here, party systems tend to be weaker and far fewer individuals report an affiliation of any sort to a particular party (Dalton and Weldon 2007). That said it is still necessary to include indicators for party affiliation and ideology in any analysis of voting behavior.

Besides party affiliation, one's level of interest in politics also has a very intuitive and typically strong relationship with voting specifically and political participation more generally. Those with a high level of interest in politics tend to know more about politics, be more likely to vote, and be more likely to participate in politics in ways other than voting (e.g., Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Powell 1986; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Prior 2010). Therefore, including a measure of political interest is useful for any study related to voting behavior.

3.2.2 Theories about Future Electoral Participation

This chapter also includes analysis of individuals' anticipated participation in future elections in order, again, to better understand the political participation profiles of those Latin American respondents most similar to the actual migrants studied in Chapter 4. In many ways, extant research on the prospects of voting in the future offer similar findings to work on the predictors of past voting behavior. For example, in a study of urban youth in the United States, Cohen and Chaffee (2014) found that, even after controlling for demographics and education, that knowledge of both American government and current events as well as self-efficacy were statistically significant predictors of an increased likelihood of future voting. Other studies have highlighted this idea that internal efficacy works to explain an individual's likelihood to participate in politics, broadly defined (see, for instance, Verba, Shlozman, and Brady 1995; Anduiza and San Martín 2011). Based on these findings, it is necessary to include indicators related to efficacy and paying attention to the news in this analysis, to test whether this theory remains applicable to this alternate population.

Looking at a study of recently enfranchised citizens who participated in the 1994 South African elections, de Kadt (2017) found that voters who had positive emotional states during an

election in the past will be more likely to participate in the future. Future voting habituation is therefore predicated on having had a positive state of mind while voting in the past (de Kadt 2017). Those who have negative experiences while voting may be less likely to participate in the future (de Kadt 2017). For the purposes of this analysis, I use one's level of trust in the electoral process as an indicator of these general positive or negative feelings they might have experienced in past elections. As a result, it makes sense that those who have trust in elections will be more likely to participate in upcoming elections (Birch 2010).

It is important to address the fact that individuals may over-report both past and future voting participation in surveys and, therefore, we will need to take the subsequent analyses with caution (Clausen 1968; Hanmer, Banks, and White 2014). This tendency for over-reporting is partly due to the social desirability pressures an individual faces when answering this type of question since they "recognize the importance of voting to citizenship and representative democracy, so when confronted with a turnout question in a survey context, they feel pressure to say they voted even when they did not" (Hanmer, Banks, and White 2014, 132). Alternatively, individuals may have simply forgotten whether they voted and often use the affirmative as a default response (Hanmer, Banks, and White 2014). Therefore, the results of these analyses may not reflect the true rate of voting among the various cases studied and the estimates of the related correlates may differ from what the results might be among a validated voting sample. That said, there is no inherent reason for these measurement issues to systematically affect the results of cross-national and individual country analyses. The extent to which these results comport with the abundant literature on voting behavior should further diminish concerns with these measurement problems.

While there are difficulties in measuring past and future voting, this should not be a deterrence from asking the question and testing the results found in the literature in a different survey population. The literature relating to past and future voting is useful in constructing the models examined in this chapter. These, however, are not the only applicable relationships to include. It is useful to examine the relationship between emigration intentions and electoral participation as well as how other experiences and attitudes may be related to participation.

3.2.3 Theories about Migration and Electoral Participation

Looking specifically at how theories related to migration and electoral participation are related to each other, there are several strands of literature to highlight. First, in communities where there are high levels of out-migration, there tend to be lower levels of formal political engagement at the national level alongside higher levels of local-level political engagement when compared with citizens living in low-migration communities (Goodman and Hiskey 2008). One possible explanation the authors hypothesize for this effect is because those who were most likely to participate in formal politics have already left because those who are risk-takers tend to both have a higher propensity to migrate and to participate in politics (Goodman and Hiskey 2008).[23] It is also worth noting that those who remain in high-migration communities do tend to be more engaged with local community organizations and politics (Goodman and Hiskey 2008). Those who would have engaged with politics at the national level have left, and, among those that remain, they are active in local community groups since they have come to rely on the economic support received through remittances instead of money sent to the community by

[23] For an analysis of risk propensity as it relates to economic voting among domestic voters, see Morgenstern and Zechmeister (2001).

national authorities (Goodman and Hiskey 2008). Those that remain and maintain close contact with their relatives abroad thus will most likely focus on local, not national politics. Therefore, since those who migrate might have been the most likely participants in politics, then those who express emigration intentions may also exhibit higher levels of political engagement at the national level when compared to their neighbors who do not have any plans to leave for another country.

While risk tolerance among migrants might work to promote participation, the trait of risk tolerance, generally, may not necessarily lead to more electoral participation. As Kam (2012), finds, in the United States, those who are more risk tolerant are neither more nor less likely to turn out for an election. Given this divergence in the literature, it may be worth examining this in a different regional context.

Looking at Colombian migrants who have already moved abroad, Escobar, Arana, and McCann (2015) found that one's voting record while still in Colombia was essential to understanding her voting behavior while living abroad. Therefore, understanding the participation patterns of those with emigration intentions may shed some light on the degree to which a country's diaspora has developed voting habits that they brought with them when migrating. In addition, this study of Colombian expats finds two characteristics that are important for both domestic and expatriate participation. First, those migrants with a high level of interest in home-country politics, in this case Colombia, tend to exhibit higher levels of participation while living abroad (Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2015). Second, the conventional resources model of voting behavior appears to hold for migrant voting behavior as well. An expatriate's level of resources (and the degree to which they feel settled in their new country of residence) is a strong predictor of voting behavior while living abroad, just as it is for domestic

voters (Escobar, Arana, ad McCann 2015). It is important to note that in studies of both Colombia and Mexico, the authors also found that time abroad, in and of itself, did not diminish electoral participation (Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2015; McCann, Escobar, and Arana 2019).

There are two possible ways emigration intentions might influence participation. On the one hand, we might expect people who express an intention to move abroad (particularly knowing that there is expatriate voting available), might be more willing to participate one last time before leaving. While participation involves resources, departure is not without its own costs (Hirschman 1970; Hirschman 1978). Given the costs to the state if many of its citizens choose to depart, the government may perhaps be willing to listen to an election demanding change and an individual may want to give the government one more chance to be responsive to their demands before making the final choice to leave (Hirschman 1978).

On the other hand, based on the results of Chapter 1, we might expect that those who answer that they have intentions to migrate abroad within the next three years are more dissatisfied with the political system (see, for instance, Hiskey, Montalvo, and Orcés 2014; Sandu and De Jong 1996). And, as a consequence, those who are less satisfied with the political system, have less trust in elections, and have a belief that politicians are not responsive to their beliefs may be less likely to participate in an election (see, for instance, Anduiza and San Marín 2011; Carreras and İrepoğlu 2013; Niu and Zhao 2018). As a result, one possible outcome is that those who wish to depart in the near future may also be more likely to withdraw from domestic politics while they wait to leave (Kapur 2010). In essence, this is what Kapur describes as the "prospect channel" whereby even the thought of emigration results in changes in personal behavior, ranging from educational attainment, identity formation, and engagement with the state, among other factors (Kapur 2010).

An additional aspect of the literature on migration and electoral participation to highlight is the role that family status plays in voting behavior. An abundance of work suggests that, all else equal, those with children are more likely to vote than those without (Wass et al. 2015). In a study of Finnish voters, for example, foreign-born voters with minor children and native spouses exhibited higher levels of voting than those without (Wass et al. 2015). The posited mechanism applies to most democratic societies where those with children tend to be more involved, and interact more, with the state in terms of such public services as education and health care, and, as a consequence, are more likely to engage with politics as well. While sometimes included in studies as a control, measuring whether an individual has children is a relevant factor in determining their likelihood of electoral participation.

Finally, the role of remittances is not to be underestimated in its relation to electoral participation. As explained in Chapter 1, those who receive financial remittances may also be receive new ideas about politics and political engagement from relatives abroad (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). These ideas, behaviors, identities, and social capital sent through social remittances do not necessarily have to be connected to movement of money; rather, those ideas can also be transferred through regular methods of communications (Levitt 1998). **S**ocial remittances can have various effects including altering patterns of political participation (Levitt 1998). In their study of Mozambique, Batista, Seither, and Vicente (2019) find that the more migrants an individual is in close contact with, the higher the level of political participation of the village, an effect size greater than just familial links to migrants. This finding seems to contradict Goodman and Hiskey (2008), so it is useful to examine the relationship between receiving remittances and political participation here. Given that this study, as well as Goodman and Hiskey's, focus on Latin America, there might be a closer correlation between receiving

remittances and lower participation, but the results may reveal otherwise. Before examining the data, I will review the last set of literature about how experiences and attitudes may be related to participation.

3.2.4 General Theories about Electoral Participation

Besides literature related to past participation, future participation, and migration and participation, there are several additional theoretically important factors that can affect voting behavior. These include crime victimization, economic conditions, corruption victimization, and one's attitudes toward the political system.

In addition to the research outlined in the last chapter about the link between crime victimization and migration, there is also a link between crime victimization and political participation, particularly in Latin America. As Bateson (2012) finds, individuals that report being victimized by crime tend to be more likely than non-victims (all else equal) to participate in politics. The mechanism Bateson posits is at work is the outlet political participation provides an individual dealing with the emotional consequences of being victimized by crime. In her study Bateson finds that the effect of being the victim of crime on the probability of participating in community politics is about equal to an individual who had five to ten additional years of education (Bateson 2012). This result is particularly evident for Latin America, while less significant for other regions of the world (Bateson 2012). As Bateson (2012) did not specifically evaluate electoral participation, but rather evaluated various forms of community-based participation, it is less established whether crime victims will turn out to vote at higher rates than their non-victim counterparts.

Though previous research (e.g., Seligson and Booth 2009) does not find convincing evidence of neighborhood effects between insecurity and political participation, it is worth examining the hypothesis outlined in Bateson's analysis that living in a high-crime area could cause an individual to become more active in politics. While Córdova (2019) found a positive effect of crime victimization on non-voting participation, echoing Bateson (2012), this result is conditioned on the situation in the neighborhood. In areas with high levels of gang activity, those who have been victimized by crime participate at the same levels as their neighbors who have not been victims of crime (Córdova 2019). On the other hand, in more secure neighborhoods, crime victims are much more likely to participate in nonelectoral activities than their counterparts who have not been victimized (Córdova 2019). Looking specifically at electoral participation, Córdova found that while "turnout rates are similar across neighborhoods with varying degrees of gang dominance, and victims and nonvictims are similarly inclined to vote" those who lived in areas with high levels of gang activity had difficulties turning out to vote (Córdova 2019, 215). Therefore, there may be a negative effect of crime and insecurity on electoral participation.

While the literature on economic voting is vast and will be explored more in Chapter 4 (see, for instance, Erikson, 1989; Powell and Whitten, 1993; Achen and Bartels 2016; Anderson, 2000; Anderson 2007; Duch and Stevenson, 2013; Lewis-Beck and Paldam, 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2008; Singer 2011), the role of economics in one's participation patterns is also relevant for this chapter. In fact, as Lacy and Burden (1999) argue, the scholarship on economic voting is similar to selecting based on the dependent variable because it ignores those who express their dissatisfaction with economic conditions by not even showing up to the polls. The literature is divided as to whether poor economic conditions decrease, increase, or have no effect

on turnout. Both Rosenstone (1982) and Weschle (2014) find that when the national economic conditions have worsened, turnout at the polls decreases. This relationship is found in both industrialized (Radcliff 1992) and developing countries (Pacek and Radcliff 1995; Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker 2009). Conversely, Schlozman and Verba (1979) and Lau (1985) find that voters are motivated to turn out at higher rates to express their dissatisfaction with poor economic conditions. This is particularly true for those who suffer from economic difficulties and believe the government is to blame (Arceneaux 2003). Among aggregate-level studies, most find no effect between economic condition and voter turnout, regardless of the geographic area examined (Arcelus and Meltzer 1975; Kostadinova 2003; Fauvelle-Aymar and Stegmaier 2008; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Blais and Dobrzynska 1998; Blais 2000; Blais 2006). Based on this literature, and given that this study is mainly focused on developing countries, for the purposes of this analysis, I will test whether good economic conditions increase turnout (and, by extension, whether poor economic conditions decrease participation).

The literature on corruption victimization and its effect on political participation is mixed. A good portion of the literature finds that those who are the victims of corruption are less likely to participate in electoral politics. Olsson (2014) found individuals who viewed the political system as corrupt were less likely to turn out to vote across 33 countries. In work focused on Italy, Giommoni (2017) found that those who were more exposed to corruption at the local level were less likely to turn out to vote because they were resigned to the political system as it operated and decided to not turnout.

On the other hand, in their study of democracy in Latin America, Booth and Seligson (2009) found that being asked for a bribe did not affect an individual's likelihood to vote. In an analysis of corruption victimization and its effects on participation in Latin America from 2004-

2012 using AmericasBarometer data, Bonifácio and Paulino (2015) found that being asked for a bribe by a public official actually increased the likelihood of an individual engaging in politics at relatively high levels. Inman and Andrews (2009) found similar results of increased participation being associated with corruption victimization in both an experiment and survey data from Senegal. As a result, including corruption victimization in this analysis will perhaps shed more light on this difference in the literature.

A third set of factors concerns the relationship between trust in democracy, one's domestic political institutions, and participation in politics. There is an abundance of studies that have found a strong positive relationship between trust/satisfaction with democracy and voter turnout (e.g., Grönlund and Setälä, 2007; Hadjar and Beck, 2010; Karp and Banducci, 2008; Powell, 1986). One more recent study, however, has found that over time higher levels of satisfaction with democracy are associated with declines in voter turnout across Europe (Ezrow and Xezonakis 2016). Finally, looking more specifically at presidential evaluations, Cebula (2005) found that approval of the incumbent president had a strong positive influence on voter turnout. Based on all of these various propositions and findings, I therefore include measures of trust in institutions, satisfaction in democracy, and presidential approval in the models below.

3.3 Hypotheses

Based on all the discussions above, the following hypotheses will be evaluated in this chapter:

H1: Those with intentions to migrate are more likely to have voted in the previous election, as compared to those with no emigration intentions.

H2: Those with intentions to migrate more likely to say that they will participate in the upcoming election, compared to those with no emigration intentions.

H3: Those who receive remittances are less likely to say that they have or will participate in an election, compared to those who do not receive remittances.

H4: Those who have been the victims of crime are more likely to vote in an election than those who have not been victims of crime.

H5: Those with better economic evaluations are more likely to participate in an election than those who do not.

H6: Those who have been victimized by corruption are more likely to participate in an election than those who have not.

H7: Those who have political affiliation, are interested in politics, pay attention to the news, have higher levels of political efficacy, and have higher levels of trust in democratic institutions, are more likely to participate, as compared to those without partisan affiliation, less interested in politics, do not pay attention to the news, have lower levels of political efficacy, and lower levels of trust in democratic institutions.

H8: Those who are older, wealthier, more educated, married, have children, are more likely to participate in an election as compared to those who are younger, poorer, less well educated, not married, and have no children.

3.4 Data

Given that my dependent variables for the ensuing analyses are dichotomous – whether or not someone reports voting in the past and/or plans to vote in the future – I rely on logistic regression. Since logit coefficients are not immediately interpretable for the size of the effects,

after each results table, I will include two figures to show the predicted probabilities for the maximal effect of each of the independent variables of interest for both of the dependent variables of this study.

For this analysis, I also use the AmericasBarometer survey data because I can take the same migration intention questions and have the same level of country and survey wave coverage from Chapter 2.[24] The one exception is that this chapter uses the 2008 survey in Chile, instead of the 2010 survey.[25] This dataset also has questions that tap into all the concepts outlined in the theoretical sections.[26] The determining factor as to whether a country-round is included is the most recent year in which the migration intention question and remittance recipient questions were included.

Finally, as previously noted in Chapter 2, while there might be an argument for using multilevel modeling (MLM) for this analysis, it does not make sense to do so here because the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) for both variables is less than 0.1, meaning that less than 10 percent of the variance of the dependent variable is due to differences among countries.[27] Since the ICC is closer to 0% than 100%, using MLM does not make much sense in this particular case.

3.4.1 Case Selection

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[24] For more information about the surveys, please visit https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/methods-practices.php.
[25] Due to how variables are included on the survey (whole or half sample), if I were to use the 2010 survey for Chile, there would only be about 400 responses. By using the 2008 survey, I get about 1,000 responses, but lose the Pays Attention to News question because it was not asked in that round. Results dating back to 2004 that include one or both dependent variables are available from the author upon request. Model specifications may vary based on question availability for the round in question.
[26] I am using the GM (20190910_SMALL).dta dataset and running the analysis on Stata13.
[27] The ICC for the past participation dependent variable is 0.039, meaning only 3.9% of the variance of that dependent variable is due to differences among countries. For the future participation dependent variable, only 8.4% of the variance is due to differences among countries.

As in Chapter 2, this chapter will carry out both a comprehensive regional analysis as well as models of each of my five individual countries. The regional analysis provides an overview of the role these variables play in electoral participation across much of Latin America.[28] I then conduct similar analyses of the five countries that serve as cases for this study and that will be the particular focus of Chapter 4: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. That way, it is possible to see the role that emigration intentions play in the decision to vote after controlling for the host of other factors included in this analysis.

3.4.2 Dependent Variables

The first of the two dependent variables for this study asks whether the respondent voted in the previous election. The response categories for this question are a simple "yes" or "no." The second dependent variable asks what the respondent would do if the election were held next week. The response categories for this variable have been recoded such that those who would not vote were coded as zero and those who would vote (regardless of party) or those who would cast a blank or null vote would be grouped together and coded as "1." This is to tap the concept of someone taking the effort to go out and participate, rather than stay home. For exact question

[28] The LAC21 include the following countries that have been included (with a couple of exceptions) in the AmericasBarometer surveys since 2006. These countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In the 2018/19 round, surveys were not conducted in Venezuela, Haiti, and Guyana. In the 2006 round, Argentina was not included in the AmericasBarometer. In 2004, AmericasBarometer surveys were only conducted in Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic. For the LAC21 countries, in the 2004 round, there were 22,933 responses. In 2006, that number was 32,985. The 2008 round had 35,481 responses while in 2010 there were 36,453 responses. In 2012, there were 34,120 responses. In 2014, that number was 33,446. For the 2016/17 wave, there were 34,376 responses and in the 2018/19 round, there were 28,042 responses.

wording, response categories, coding, and data availability by wave and country, please see the footnotes.[29]

The dependent variable measuring previous participation has a couple of issues that it is worth reviewing in advance of analyzing the results. First, there is a difference in time between when the survey was fielded for that particular round and when the previous election occurred.[30] That gap was as small as one year in the case of Ecuador and as many as 4 years in the cases of Brazil and Colombia. It could be more difficult for those respondents in Brazil and Colombia to recall whether they participated. Perhaps more importantly, there may be individuals who were not eligible to vote in the previous election, but who were old enough at the time to take the AmericasBarometer survey. In all of the specific countries examined here, except Brazil, the voting age is 18. In Brazil, the legal voting age is 16 and compulsory voting starts at 18. I reran the analyses in each of the five countries of interest and dropped only the cases for which the

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[29] To measure whether a respondent voted in the last election, I use the question **VB2** from the AmericasBarometer survey. The wording for **VB2** is as follows: **VB2.** Did you vote in the last presidential elections of (year of last presidential elections)? **[IN COUNTRIES WITH TWO ROUNDS, ASK ABOUT THE FIRST]** (1) Voted (2) Did not vote. For purposes of this analysis, the response options have been changed such that voting was recoded as "1" and not voting was recoded as zero. This variable is available for all rounds and all countries included in this chapter *except* for Peru 2010.
To measure whether someone is planning to vote the upcoming presidential election, I use the question **VB20**, which is worded as follows: **VB20.** If the next presidential elections were being held this week, what would you do? **[Read alternatives]** (1) Wouldn't vote (2) Would vote for the current (incumbent) candidate or party (3) Would vote for a candidate or party different from the current administration (4) Would go to vote but would leave the ballot/vote/ticket blank or would purposely cancel my vote. For purposes of this chapter, the response categories have been recoded such that those who wouldn't vote are given a value of zero and the remaining three categories (would vote for the incumbent, would vote for an opposition party, or would nullify their vote) are coded as 1. This is meant to show a similar value for those who make the effort to go to the polls, no matter what their political views. This question is available for all rounds and countries included in this analysis *except* the following waves/countries: Regional 2006, Regional 2004, Chile 2010, Chile 2006, Colombia 2010, Colombia 2004, and Peru 2006.
While I recognize that there is a lot of noise in these measures, my coding to just whether the individual showed up to vote represents a rough-cut measuring intention and follow-through with participation in an election.
[30] In Brazil, the data collected for the 2014 survey was collected in March and April of that year, so the most recent election was in October of 2010. In Chile, the most recent election before the 2008 survey round occurred at the end of 2005 and the start of 2006. In Colombia, the 2014 survey was in the field from March until May, so the most recent election was the one that took place in May and June of 2010. In Ecuador, the election before the 2018/19 round of data collection occurred in February and April of 2017. In Peru, while the 2014 survey was in the field from March through May, the most recent election had taken place in April and June 2011.

respondents were ineligible to vote due to their age, which meant that anywhere from less than 100 to more than 150 responses were dropped.[31] The results generally were that the effect sizes for age and education were smaller, but still remained significant. The rest of the results remained about the same for the five countries of interest.[32]

Second, there may be some additional temporal issues. While the previous election may have been several years ago, the questions regarding crime victimization and corruption victimization only ask about these incidents in the past twelve months. As a result, these victimizations cannot predict a past vote choice. Again, these results are showing correlation, rather than causation. It is also possible that these individuals may have been victims of crime before the twelve-month window opened and that experience could have also shaped their vote choice in that previous election. Given the lack of recent availability for the migration intention question for these questions, I think the comparability of these models and gaining our understanding about participation in relation to emigration intention for these countries remains useful. Also, given how young these populations are (about 20% of each sample is in the lowest age cohort), dropping too many cases does start to present real challenges for the model stability. It is worthwhile, however, to keep these issues in mind when reviewing the results.

3.4.3 Independent Variables

[31] I ran the models and dropped those who would have been ineligible because of their age to vote in the previous elections. The N of the models dropped anywhere from less than 100 to more than 150. In the case of Brazil, the model included here has an N of 1,165. When those were ineligible to have participated are dropped, the N is 1,033. For Chile, there are 1,032 respondents in the original model and 958 once ineligible voters are removed. In Colombia, the N drops from 1,097 to 914 when the youngest voters are removed. In the Ecuadorian case, the N drops from 1,322 to 1,155 when accounting for the minimum voting age. For Peru, the N drops from 977 to 867 when the youngest respondents who were ineligible to vote during the previous election are removed.

[32] These results are available upon request.

As in Chapter 2, there are several categories of independent variables and the question wording and coding are in the footnotes. The summary statistics for each of these cases can be found in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 3.[33] Given the first two hypotheses, the main independent variable of interest asks individuals about their intention to migrate to live or work in another country in the next three years.[34] The response categories for this question are "yes" or "no."

Controlling for the other factors that may relate to voter turnout, I include a question that asks whether the respondent was the victim of crime within the last 12 months[35] and another that measures a respondent's sense of neighborhood (in) security as an additional measure of fear of crime victimization.[36] To measure economic evaluations, I include one question that asks

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[33] Please note that while country controls are included in the regional analysis, they are not shown in the results or in the summary statistics table. The reference country is Mexico.

[34] To measure intention to migrate, I use question **Q14** from the AmericasBarometer which reads as follows, "Do you have any intention of going to live or work in another country in the next three years? (1) Yes (2) No." The variable was recoded such that the "No" responses were coded as zero and the "Yes" responses as 1. The availability of this variable determines whether a country or wave is included in this analysis. As a result, the following country/years are possible for this analysis: Regional 2018/19, Regional 2016/17, Regional 2014, Regional 2012, Regional 2010, Regional 2008, Regional 2006, Regional 2004, Brazil 2018/19, Brazil 2016/17, Brazil 2014, Brazil 2012, Brazil 2010, Brazil 2008, Chile 2018/19, Chile 2016/17, Chile 2014, Chile 2012, Chile 2010, Chile 2008, Chile 2006, Colombia 2018/18, Colombia 2016/17, Colombia 2014, Colombia 2012, Colombia 2010, Colombia 2008, Colombia 2004, Ecuador 2018/19, Ecuador 2016/17, Ecuador 2012, Ecuador 2010, Ecuador 2008, Peru 2018/19, Peru 2016/17, Peru 2014, Peru 2012, Peru 2010, Peru 2008, and Peru 2006. All of the non-2018/19 analyses are available upon request. I recognize that this is a noisy measure. I cannot determine what proportion of those who have intentions of leaving have actually left after three years. It may be that those who think about leaving and do not leave are substantively different from those who actually do leave. I cannot, however, account for this difference in the results.

[35] To measure victimization, I use two questions: **VIC1** and **VIC1EXT**. **VIC1** is used in the 2004-2008 rounds and **VIC1EXT** is used starting in the 2010 wave. **VIC1EXT** asks, "Now, changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months? That is, have you been a victim of robbery, burglary, assault, fraud, blackmail, extortion, violent threats or **any other type** of crime in the past 12 months?" (Emphasis in the original.) **VIC1** asks, "Now changing the subject, have you been a victim of any type of crime in the past 12 months?" The original coding for both of these variables is (1) Yes and (2) No. For purposes of this analysis, the "No" responses have been recoded as 0 and the "Yes" responses as 1. Between these two questions, this indicator is available for all rounds and all countries included in this chapter.

[36] To measure neighborhood insecurity, I use **AOJ11**, which asks, "Speaking of the neighborhood where you live and thinking of the possibility of being assaulted or robbed, do you feel very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe or very unsafe? (1) Very safe (2) Somewhat safe (3) Somewhat unsafe (4) Very unsafe." I am using the alternate-coded version of this variable in the dataset where "Very safe" was coded as 0, "Somewhat safe" as 33.33333,

whether the national economic situation is better, worse, or the same as it was 12 months ago and another question that asks whether the respondent's personal economic situation is better, worse, or the same as it was 12 months ago.[37] To measure corruption victimization, I include a variable which measures whether the respondent has been asked for a bribe over the past 12 months across a number of different interactions with officials (i.e., police, government employees, military, employers, municipal governments, courts, schools, health facility, or school).[38]

To measure trust in democracy and democratic institutions, I include several questions. The first asks for the respondent's level of approval of the president on a scale from very good to very bad. The second question asks for the level of support for democracy as a form of government, as compared to all other forms. The third question asks about the level of satisfaction an individual has in the way democracy works in their country. The last question

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"Somewhat unsafe" as 66.66666, and "Very unsafe" as 100. This indicator is available for all rounds and all countries included in this chapter.

[37] To measure national economic evaluation, I use the question **SOCT2**, which asks, "Do you think that the country's current economic situation is better than, the same as or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse." To measure personal economic evaluation, I use the question **IDIO2**, which asks, "Do you think that your economic situation is better than, the same as, or worse than it was 12 months ago? (1) Better (2) Same (3) Worse." For purposes of these analyses, I recoded both of these variables such that "Better" was coded as 100, "Same" as 50, and "Worse" as 0. These indicators are available for all countries and all rounds included in this analysis *except* Colombia in 2004.

[38] To measure whether a respondent is a victim of corruption, I use the variable **CORVIC** in the dataset. This variable includes various questions which measure corruption victimization. These items ask: "Now we want to talk about your personal experience with things that happen in everyday life... **EXC2.** Has a police officer asked you for a bribe in the last twelve months? **EXC6.** In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe? **EXC20.** In the last twelve months, did any soldier or military officer ask you for a bribe? **EXC11.** In the last twelve months, to process any kind of document in your municipal government, like a permit for example, did you have to pay any money above that required by law? **EXC13.** In your work, have you been asked to pay a bribe in the last twelve months? **EXC14.** Did you have to pay a bribe to the courts in the last twelve months? **EXC15.** In order to be seen in a hospital or a clinic in the last twelve months, did you have to pay a bribe? **EXC16.** Have you had to pay a bribe at school in the last twelve months?" In the analysis here, respondents are coded as having been asked to pay a bribe if they responded affirmatively to any one or more of these questions. If they were asked to pay a bribe, the respondent is coded as 100 and if they were not asked for a bribe, they were coded as 0. This indicator is available for all waves and all countries included in this chapter.

included asks for the level of trust the individual has in the country's elections with response options ranging from "A lot" to "Not at all."[39]

I also include items about a respondent's level of external and internal efficacy. For the former, the item asks how much the respondent agrees or disagrees that those who govern the country are interested in what she thinks, and for the latter the item asks how much they feel they understand the most important political issues of their country.[40]

To measure personal political characteristics, I use four indicators. For ideological self-placement, I include a question which asks individuals to place them self on a 1-10 left-right scale. I include a question that asks about an individual's level of political interest as well as an

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[39] To measure presidential approval, I used the question **M1**, which asks, "Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President NAME CURRENT PRESIDENT? (1) Very good (2) Good (3) Neither good nor bad (fair) (4) Bad (5) Very bad." I used the reverse-coded variable included in the dataset in which "Very bad" is coded as 0, "Bad" is coded as 25, "Neither good nor bad (fair) is coded as 50, "Good" is coded as 75, and "Very good" is coded as 100. This indicator is available for all waves and countries included in this chapter's analysis. To measure support for democracy as a form of government, I use the question **ING4**, which asks, "Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?" This question is measured on a 1 to 7 scale where 1 indicates "Strongly disagree" and 7 means "Strongly agree." This indicator is available for all waves and countries included in the analysis for this chapter. To measure satisfaction with democracy in practice, I use question **PN4**, which asks, "In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, satisfied, dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with the way democracy works in (country)? (1) Very satisfied (2) Satisfied (3) Dissatisfied (4) Very dissatisfied." I used the reverse-coded version of this variable in the dataset where "Very dissatisfied" is coded as 0, "Dissatisfied" is coded as 33.33333, "Satisfied" is coded as 66.66666, and "Very satisfied" is coded as 100. This indicator is available for all waves and countries included in this chapter. For some years and countries, this question is only asked of half the sample. To measure trust in elections, I used questions **B47** and **B47A**. **B47** was asked through 2010 and **B47A** was included starting in the 2012 round. **B47A**. is worded as follows, "To what extent do you trust elections in this country?" and **B47**. Is asked in the following manner, "To what extent do you trust elections?" These questions are both asked on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 representing "Not at all" and 7 meaning "A lot." This indicator is available for all countries and waves included here *except* Chile in 2006.

[40] To measure external efficacy, I use the question **EFF1**, which asks, "Those who govern this country are interested in what people like you think. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?" To measure internal efficacy, I use question **EFF2**, which is worded as follows, "You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement? Both of these questions are asked on a 1 to 7 scale with 1 representing "Strongly disagree" and 7 meaning "Strongly agree." These indicators are available for all waves and countries *except* the Regional 2006, Regional 2004, Chile 2006, Colombia 2004, and Peru 2006 waves and country analysis.

indicator for whether the respondent identifies with any political party. The fourth indicator measures with what frequency an individual pays attention to the news.[41]

The last set of indicators looks at how an individual's personal characteristics relate to their electoral participation. First, a question asks whether the respondent or someone in their household receives remittances from someone who lives abroad.[42] Next, I include measures

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[41] To measure political attributes, I use four indicators: ideological self-placement, political interest, political identification, and the extent to which respondents pay attention to the news. To measure ideological self-placement, I use the question, **L1**, which asks "Now, to change the subject.... On this card there is a 1-10 scale that goes from left to right. The number one means left and 10 means right. Nowadays, when we speak of political leanings, we talk of those on the left and those on the right. In other words, some people sympathize more with the left and others with the right. According to the meaning that the terms "left" and "right" have for you, and thinking of your own political leanings, where would you place yourself on this scale? Tell me the number." This variable is available for all years and countries included in this analysis. To measure political interest, I use the variable, **POL1**, which asks, "How much interest do you have in politics: a lot, some, little or none? (1) A lot (2) Some (3) Little (4) None." For this analysis, I use the recoded variable in the dataset, **POL1R**, which recodes the response categories so that higher values indicate higher levels of political interest. Those who said they had a lot of political interest were coded with values of 100, those with some political interest were given values of 66.6666, those with little political interest were given values of 33.3333, and those with no political interest were coded as 0. This variable is available for all waves and countries included in this chapter *except* for the Regional analysis in 2004 and the Colombian results of 2004.
To measure a respondent's political identification, I use the variable **VB10** which asks, "Do you currently identify with a political party? (1) Yes (2) No." I recoded this variable such that those who responded as not having a party identification were recoded as zero while those who answered in the affirmative remained coded as "1." This variable is available for all years and countries included in this analysis *except* for the following: Regional 2004, Chile 2006, and Colombia 2004.
To measure how much a respondent pays attention to the news, I use the variables **GI0N** and **GI0**. **GI0N** was asked in the 2018/19 round and **GI0** is available for the 2010 round through the 2016/17 round. **GI0N** is worded as follows, "About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? **[Read alternatives]**: (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) A few times a year (5) Never." **GI0** is worded as follows: "For statistical purposes, we would like to know how much information about politics and the country is known by the people... **GI0.** About how often do you pay attention to the news, whether on TV, the radio, newspapers or the internet? **[Read alternatives]**: (1) Daily (2) A few times a week (3) A few times a month (4) Rarely (5) Never." Both of these variables were included in one recoded variable where the original response categories were reordered such that the value "5" corresponds to respondents who pay daily attention to the news, "4" to those who pay attention to the news a few times a week, "3" to those who pay attention to the news a few times a month, "2" to those who rarely pay attention to the news, and "1" to those who never pay attention to the news. This variable is available for all waves and countries in this chapter *except* the following: Regional 2008, Regional 2006, Regional 2004, Brazil 2008, Chile 2008, Colombia 2008, Colombia 2004, Ecuador 2008, Peru 2008, and Peru 2006.

[42] To measure whether a responded receive remittances, I used question **Q10A**, which asks, **"**Do you or someone else living in your household receive remittances (financial support), that is, economic assistance from abroad?" The response categories in the survey are (1) Yes and (2) No. For purposes of this analysis, I recoded the response options to "Yes" as 1 and "No" as 1. In the 2018/19 round, this question was not asked in Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Brazil. The other rounds and countries for which this question *is not available* are as follows: Brazil 2016/17, Chile 2016/17, Colombia 2016/17, Peru 2016/17, and Chile 2014.

related to whether the respondent is married/partnered and whether she has children under 13 years of age living at home. Further information on socioeconomic and family characteristic variables (along with country controls), including the wording and question codes, can be found in the footnotes. In addition, I include variables measuring age cohort, level of education, gender, the respondent's level of wealth, and whether the respondent lives in an urban area.[43][44]

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[43] To measure whether a respondent is Married or partnered, I use the questions **Q11** and **Q11N**. **Q11** was used through the 2012 wave and **Q11N** was asked starting in the 2014 wave. **Q11** asks, "What is your marital status?" with the response options as follows: (1) Single, (2) Married, (3) Common law marriage, (4) Divorced, (5) Separated, and (6) Widowed. **Q11N** asks, "What is your marital status?" with the response options of (1) Single, (2) Married, (3) Common law marriage (Living together), (4) Divorced, (5) Separated, (6) Widowed, (7) Civil union **[Remove if it does not exist in the country]**. For purposes of this analysis, I recoded both variables into one dichotomous variable where 1 represents respondents who were married, in a common law marriage, or a civil union and 0 represents respondents who were single, divorce, separated, or widowed. This indicator is available for all years and all countries included in this chapter. To measure whether a respondent has children under 13 and living at home, I use the following questions, **Q12**, **Q12A**, **Q12B**, and **Q12BN**. **Q12** was asked starting in the 2004 round and was asked through the 2012 round. It is worded as follows: "Do you have children? How many?" **Q12A** was asked in 2008 and 2010 and is worded as follows, "[If has children] How many children live with you at the present time?" **Q12B** was asked in the 2012 round and is worded as follows, "How many of your children are under 13 years of age and live in this household?" **Q12BN** was asked starting in the 2014 round and is worded as follows "How many children under the age of 13 live in this household?" For purposes of this analysis, all of these variables were included in one dichotomous variable that is equal to 0 if the respondent has no children and 1 if the respondent has any children under 13 living at home. This indicator is available for all rounds and all countries included in this analysis. To measure age, I use the variable **EDAD**, which is based on the questions asking the respondent's year or year of birth. **EDAD** is divided into six categories for age (15-25, 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, 56-65, and 66+). The categories have values of 1 to 6 with 1 being the youngest cohort and 6 being the oldest. This indicator is available for all years and countries included here. To measure education, I use the variable **EDR**, which is a recoded version of the variable **ED**, which asks, "How many years of schooling have you completed?" The variable **EDR** organizes those responses into four categories, "None," "Primary," "Secondary," and "Post-secondary." In terms of coding, "None" is equal to 0 and "Post-Secondary" is equal to 3. This indicator is available for all years and countries included here. To measure a respondent's gender, I use the variable **MUJER**, which is coded 1 if the respondent is female and 0 if the respondent is male. This indicator is available for all years and countries included in this analysis. To measure quintile of wealth, I use the variable **QUINTALL** included in the dataset which is made from the **R**-battery in the survey, which asks whether the respondent owns certain household goods and then divides respondents into five quintiles of wealth. This variable is measured on a 1 to 5 scale where 1 is the lowest quintile of wealth and 5 is the highest. For more information on how this variable is made, please see Córdova (2009) (https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0806en_v2.pdf). This indicator of wealth is available for all years and countries included in this chapter. To measure urban residence, I use the variable **URBAN** included in the dataset, which is made from the question **UR**, which uses the country's census definition to determine whether a respondent lives in an urban or rural area. The variable is given a value of 1 if a respondent lives in an urban area and a value of 0 for a rural area. This indicator is available for all years and countries included in this chapter.

[44] I have not included any measure of ethnicity or skin tone in this model because it is theoretically unclear as to what the relationship would be between those variables would be and migration intention. Would those who are white be more likely to stay because they believe themselves to be atop a country's racial hierarchy or would they be more likely to leave because they can claim European nationality, which would make departure and resettlement in

For purposes of this analysis, the summary statistics have been weighted using the weighting scheme in the AmericasBarometer surveys.[45] These weighting schemes do not change the number of observations, minimum or maximum values and may only changes the mean and standard deviation values.

3.4.4 Descriptive Political Portrait of Those with Emigration Intentions

Before taking a look at the logistic regression results, it is a useful exercise to get a sense of the political profiles of those with intentions to migrate. By understanding those with emigration intentions in these cases, it amplifies our understanding of those who have already moved abroad. Table 1 presents a descriptive snapshot of some of the political ideology and political preferences of the countries examined in this chapter.

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another country much easier? If this study were to focus on just one country, I would have included such measures, but given the variety of countries examined, I have chosen not to include those variables.

[45] For more on the weighting scheme used for the AmericasBarometer datasets, please see Oscar Castorena's *Methodological Note* (https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IMN007en.pdf). For countries in which there are more than 1,500 responses, they are weighted as if they have 1,500 responses using the variable "weight1500" for the regional analysis. For individual country analysis, the weight variable is "wt."

Table 3.1: Emigration Intention Profile Statistics

Variable	Regional 2018/19	Brazil 2014	Chile 2008	Colombia 2014	Ecuador 2018/19	Peru 2014
Total Respondents	26,609	1,490	1,513	1,483	1,527	1,459
Total Expressing Migration Intentions (%)	7,7432 (27.93%)	228 (15.33%)	193 (12.76%)	306 (20.63%)	461 (30.19%)	333 (22.82%)
Among those with Emigration Intentions:						
Percent Identify with a Party	25.05%	24.75%	25.53%	32.13%	19.21%	22.53%
Percent of Party Identifiers who Support the Incumbent Party	--	47.76%	21.74%	10.99%	7.89%	18.18%
Mean Ideology (1=left; 10=right)	5.34	5.30	5.34	5.36	5.64	5.45
Percent Left (Ideology≤3)	25.87%	24.88%	19.63%	24.06%	18.92%	19.05%
Percent Right (Ideology≥8)	22.99%	23.65%	17.79%	23.31%	22.97%	18.71%
Percent Agree Government Should Reduce Inequality	71.23%	78.34%	89.42%	77.81%	69.72%	70.12%
Mean Political Tolerance Index Score (0=least tolerant; 100=most tolerant)	55.37	58.65	54.24	52.38	52.77	42.14

The percentage of respondents with emigration intentions varies from lowest in Chile in 2008 (12.76%) to the most in Ecuador in 2018/19 (30.19%). Looking specifically at those with emigration intentions who identify with a party, it ranges from a low of 19.21% in Ecuador in 2018/19 to a high of 32.13% in Colombia in 2014. As compared to the summary statistics for the population as a whole listed in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 3, those with emigration intentions have a higher percentage of partisan affiliation, in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Peru. In all cases, the rate of difference between those with emigration intentions and the population as a whole is only a few percentage points (generally in the 2-4% range, with only the difference in Colombia reaching traditional levels of statistical significance, $p<0.02$). For those with emigration intentions in the regional sample and in Ecuador, they have a lower percentage of party identification than the population as a whole, but, again, this difference is in the 2-4% range. So, for the most part, there are similar levels of partisan affiliation between those with emigration intentions and those without in these samples, which presents some evidence for those with emigration intentions being similar to their compatriots at least in this particular aspect of their political profiles.

Among those who both have emigration intentions and a party affiliation, there is a wide variance of whether those individuals assert an affiliation with the incumbent party. In many cases, these raw numbers are in the single digits. At the high end, about half of those with emigration intentions and partisanship in Brazil in 2014 identify with the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), which is, in real terms, about 25 respondents. At the opposite end of the spectrum, less than 8% of Ecuadorian respondents (6 individuals) in 2018/19 with both migration intentions and a reported partisan affiliation are supporters of the incumbent party, PAIS. As a result, there appears to be no strong pattern one way or the other as to whether those with

emigration intentions are connected with the incumbent party. Comparing those with emigration intentions to the population as a whole, there is a similar level of partisanship for the incumbent party in Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. Among Colombians as a whole, more than 20% of the population supports the incumbent figure, while that number is only around 11% for those Colombians with emigration intentions. So, with the exception of Colombia, those with emigration intentions are again similar to the population as a whole in terms of partisan affiliation with the incumbent political party.

In addition to partisanship, another measure of political behavior on which those with emigration intentions are similar to the population as a whole is ideology. The mean ideology score of those with emigration intentions is slightly lower than the population as a whole, as listed in the summary statistics charts in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 3 and this difference is statistically significant ($p<0.0065$). Among the rest of the countries, those with emigration intentions are slightly more liberal than their compatriots as a whole, but this difference is generally in the 0.1-0.2-point range. Colombia has a little less than a 0.5-point difference in ideology between the two groups, which is the only other difference to reach statistical significance ($p<.0.0010$). The only exception to this directionality is Ecuador where those with emigration intentions are slightly more right leaning than the population as a whole, but only by about 0.10 points. The mean ideology score for those with emigration intentions is slightly above the midpoint for all cases, so slightly more right leaning, but on the whole, relatively close to the middle. The distribution of ideological scores for those with emigration intentions is relatively balanced. Those at the extremes of the ideological spectrum are similar in size in all cases, so that no one country's diaspora is potentially overwhelmingly more left- or right-leaning. That means that, in most cases, well over 50% of those with emigration intentions are in

the middle categories of ideology (4-7). In sum, those with emigration intentions are not particularly more left- or right-leaning in their ideological placement than those in the population as a whole.

Another measure on which those with emigration intentions are similar to the population as a whole is whether individuals support strong policies to reduce inequality.[46] Robust supermajorities (over 66% in all cases and as high as 89% in Chile) of the respondents who report plans to leave agree that the government should implement strong policies to reduce inequality. These numbers are remarkably similar (within a couple of percentage points) to the level of support within the population as a whole and none of the differences are statistically significant. The lowest level of support (~68%) is in Ecuador and Peru while Chile has the highest level of support (~88%).

One measure of political attitudes on which those with emigration intentions do appear to differ from the population as a whole is political tolerance. The AmericasBarometer survey measures political tolerance through a series of questions asking whether those who are against the system of government should be allowed to participate in various political acts including voting, peacefully demonstrating, running for public office, and making speeches.[47] Those with

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[46] To measure whether respondents prefer policies to reduce inequality, I use **ROS4**, which asks: "The (Country) government should implement **strong** policies to reduce income inequality between the rich and the poor. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?" The response categories for this question range from 1=Strongly disagree to 7=Strongly agree. For purposes of this analysis, those who answered 5, 6, or 7 are coded as "agree."

[47] The questions measuring tolerance for civil rights for those who disagree with the system of government are as follows: "**D1**. There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, not just the current (incumbent) government but the system of government. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people's **right to vote**? Please read me the number from the scale: **[Probe: To what degree?] D2**. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to conduct **peaceful demonstrations** in order to express their views? Please read me the number. **D3**. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being permitted **to run for public office**? **D4**. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on television **to make speeches**?" The scale for each of these questions is as follows: Strongly disapprove=1 and Strongly approve=10. The variable (**tolr**) is a rescaled index of these questions with the values from 0-100.

emigration intentions have, on average, higher levels of political tolerance than the population as a whole. The difference generally is between 2 and 6 points and statistically significant in all cases, except for Peru. Peru is also differentiated by the fact that it is the only case where the mean level of tolerance is below the midpoint of 50 among those with emigration intentions. Also, in the case of Peru, there are virtually identical mean levels of tolerance (~42 points) between those with emigration intentions and for the population as a whole.

As a result, in these cases, with the exception of Peru, those with emigration intentions are generally more politically tolerant than their compatriots, which is about the only measure here on which there is a meaningful difference between the two groups. On the other indicators such as partisanship, ideology, and policy preferences for redistribution, those with emigration intentions are very similar to those without such desires. Given these similarities, do we see any differences in past participation or future participation intention among these two groups?

3.5 Analysis

3.5.1 Past Voting Results

The results for the past voting model can be found in Table 3.2, with the predicted probabilities displayed in Figures 3.1 to 3.6. The Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 3 includes

results for models limited to only those with emigration intentions (Table A3.7 and Figures A3.1-A3.6).[48,49]

Table 3.2: Past Voting Results

Variable	Regional 2018/19 Past Vote	Brazil 2014 Past Vote	Chile 2008 Past Vote	Colombia 2014 Past Vote	Ecuador 2018/19 Past Vote	Peru 2014 Past Vote
Intention to Migrate *(H1)*	-0.190*** (0.048)	-0.411* (0.215)	-0.605** (0.253)	0.031 (0.170)	0.073 (0.181)	-0.375* (0.219)
Victim of Crime *(H4)*	0.027 (0.052)	-0.106 (0.216)	0.022 (0.229)	0.028 (0.171)	0.114 (0.237)	-0.017 (0.193)
Neighborhood Insecurity *(H4)*	-0.001** (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)
Personal Econ. Evaluation *(H5)*	-0.002*** (0.001)	-0.004 (0.002)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.003 (0.004)
National Econ. Evaluation *(H5)*	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.002 (0.003)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)	-0.008** (0.004)
Victim of Corruption *(H6)*	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)
Presidential Approval	0.003*** (0.001)	0.003 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.001 (0.004)	0.005 (0.006)

[48] I also ran these models with just those reporting migration intentions. The results as well as the predicted probabilities can be found in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 3. The N is low in all cases (ranging from 151 in Chile to just over 4,000 in the regional sample), so the models are bit unstable. Similar to the models for the whole population, there are more statistically significant results in the previous voting intention models than in the future voting models. The reduced population size provides support for some of the hypotheses outlined above. The previous voting models support H3, H7, and H8. The future voting models only provide some modest support for H7 and H8. The full results can be found in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 3.

[49] None of the pairwise correlations for these independent variables reaches above 0.37 and most are well under 0.10. I built this model using a stepwise method and only kept adding when the variables of interest that were added remained significant as well as the original variables in the model. I continued to include corruption victimization because it remains theoretically useful and to make sure the model was specified properly. The decision to participate (whether previously or in the future) can be a complex one and, therefore, this model includes large number of independent variables to account for the different factors that may influence that decision.

(H7)						
Democracy as Best Form of Government ***(H7)***	-0.008 (0.014)	0.000 (0.046)	0.055 (0.048)	-0.015 (0.043)	0.019 (0.070)	-0.094 (0.070)
Satisfaction w/ Democracy ***(H7)***	-0.001 (0.001)	0.007* (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.008 (0.005)
Trust in Elections ***(H7)***	0.020 (0.013)	-0.109** (0.055)	0.097* (0.056)	-0.001 (0.049)	-0.085 (0.054)	-0.030 (0.060)
External Efficacy ***(H7)***	-0.030*** (0.012)	0.059 (0.043)	-0.052 (0.050)	0.019 (0.047)	-0.063 (0.060)	0.069 (0.074)
Internal Efficacy ***(H7)***	0.021 (0.014)	-0.043 (0.059)	-0.081 (0.052)	-0.018 (0.053)	-0.100 (0.076)	-0.016 (0.081)
Ideology ***(H7)***	0.013 (0.008)	0.005 (0.034)	0.032 (0.050)	-0.016 (0.026)	0.048 (0.042)	0.077 (0.057)
Political Interest ***(H7)***	0.004*** (0.001)	0.006* (0.003)	0.010*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Identifies with a Party ***(H7)***	0.587*** (0.057)	0.544*** (0.204)	0.851*** (0.246)	0.110 (0.179)	0.207 (0.257)	0.318 (0.292)
Pays Attention to News ***(H7)***	0.095*** (0.021)	0.116 (0.089)	--	-0.014 (0.077)	0.020 (0.101)	-0.140 (0.131)
Receives Remittances ***(H3)***	-0.201*** (0.070)	-1.398 (0.936)	-1.282** (0.557)	-0.493 (0.383)	-0.755* (0.391)	0.471 (0.604)
Married/ Partnered ***(H8)***	0.432*** (0.048)	1.245*** (0.189)	0.272 (0.213)	0.447*** (0.153)	0.871*** (0.257)	0.723** (0.283)
Has Children under 13 ***(H8)***	0.103** (0.050)	0.148 (0.174)	0.961*** (0.228)	0.439** (0.170)	-0.018 (0.204)	0.126 (0.225)
Age Cohort ***(H8)***	0.571*** (0.022)	0.667*** (0.096)	1.029*** (0.093)	0.766*** (0.076)	0.821*** (0.111)	0.861*** (0.143)
Level of Education ***(H8)***	0.444*** (0.036)	0.470** (0.183)	0.230 (0.167)	0.580*** (0.147)	1.266*** (0.165)	0.736*** (0.189)
Female ***(H8)***	0.191*** (0.042)	0.010 (0.145)	-0.410** (0.176)	0.129 (0.140)	0.240 (0.187)	-0.065 (0.208)

Quintile of Wealth *(H8)*	0.040** (0.016)	0.030 (0.063)	0.089 (0.092)	-0.051 (0.057)	-0.056 (0.053)	0.016 (0.078)
Urban Residence *(H8)*	-0.060 (0.053)	0.209 (0.266)	0.048 (0.285)	-0.545*** (0.174)	0.126 (0.210)	0.148 (0.273)
Constant	-2.081*** (0.187)	-2.978*** (0.852)	-3.824*** (0.748)	-2.648*** (0.577)	-2.666*** (0.757)	-1.192 (0.954)
N	14,400	1,165	1,032	1,097	1,322	977

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 3.1: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2018/19 Regional Round



Figure 3.2: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2014 Brazil



Figure 3.3: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2008 Chile



Figure 3.4: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2014 Colombia



Figure 3.5: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2018/19 Ecuador



Figure 3.6: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2014 Peru



3.5.2 Future Voting Results

The results for the future voting model are as follows in Table 3.3 with predicted probabilities outlined in Figures 3.7 to 3.12. The Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 3 includes results for models limited to only those with emigration intentions (Table A3.8 and Figures A3.7-A3.12).[50]

Table 3.3: Future Voting Results

Variable	Regional 2018/19 Future Vote	Brazil 2014 Future Vote	Chile 2008 Future Vote	Colombia 2014 Future Vote	Ecuador 2018/19 Future Vote	Peru 2014 Future Vote
Intention to Migrate *(H2)*	-0.013 (0.064)	0.072 (0.337)	-0.181 (0.266)	0.250 (0.223)	0.653 (0.511)	0.029 (0.435)
Victim of Crime *(H4)*	0.088 (0.070)	-0.293 (0.289)	-0.108 (0.199)	-0.422* (0.249)	0.593 (0.583)	0.726 (0.468)

[50] None of the pairwise correlations for these independent variables reaches above 0.37 and most are well under 0.10. I built this model using a stepwise method and only kept adding when the variables of interest that were added remained significant as well as the original variables in the model. It was also important to keep these models similar for comparisons across past and future participation.

Neighborhood Insecurity *(H4)*	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.003)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.008)
Personal Econ. Evaluation *(H5)*	0.000 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.003)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.005 (0.008)	0.008 (0.007)
National Econ. Evaluation *(H5)*	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)
Victim of Corruption *(H6)*	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.007 (0.006)	-0.007* (0.004)
Presidential Approval *(H7)*	0.001 (0.001)	0.014*** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.009* (0.005)	-0.009 (0.010)	0.011 (0.009)
Democracy as Best Form of Government *(H7)*	0.001 (0.017)	0.025 (0.069)	-0.008 (0.068)	0.008 (0.060)	0.186 (0.175)	0.259** (0.125)
Satisfaction w/ Democracy *(H7)*	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.015** (0.007)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.009)
Trust in Elections *(H7)*	0.105*** (0.017)	0.038 (0.071)	0.124* (0.071)	0.108 (0.070)	0.218 (0.158)	0.160 (0.115)
External Efficacy *(H7)*	-0.012 (0.014)	0.097 (0.059)	0.045 (0.061)	-0.033 (0.051)	-0.230** (0.109)	-0.242* (0.144)
Internal Efficacy *(H7)*	0.015 (0.016)	-0.123* (0.071)	0.031 (0.075)	0.066 (0.057)	-0.093 (0.145)	-0.274* (0.142)
Ideology *(H7)*	0.021** (0.010)	0.095* (0.051)	0.008 (0.046)	0.025 (0.040)	0.000 (0.073)	0.254*** (0.088)
Political Interest *(H7)*	0.015*** (0.001)	0.009** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.024*** (0.004)	-0.000 (0.007)	-0.000 (0.006)
Identifies with a Party *(H7)*	1.023*** (0.086)	1.553*** (0.467)	0.949*** (0.353)	0.930*** (0.242)	1.209 (0.739)	1.142* (0.636)
Pays Attention to News *(H7)*	0.086*** (0.025)	-0.129 (0.201)	--	0.208** (0.080)	-0.044 (0.225)	0.166 (0.178)
Receives Remittances *(H3)*	-0.009 (0.087)	-2.397** (1.008)	-0.143 (0.712)	-0.542 (0.435)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
Married/	0.055	0.225	-0.013	-0.248	0.867**	0.566

Partnered *(H8)*	(0.059)	(0.290)	(0.227)	(0.224)	(0.407)	(0.398)
Has Children under 13 *(H8)*	0.087 (0.058)	-0.159 (0.289)	0.568** (0.224)	-0.147 (0.198)	0.299 (0.538)	-0.575 (0.477)
Age Cohort *(H8)*	0.126*** (0.023)	-0.156* (0.088)	0.478*** (0.083)	0.265*** (0.065)	-0.050 (0.161)	-0.217 (0.136)
Level of Education *(H8)*	0.094** (0.044)	0.195 (0.237)	-0.107 (0.198)	0.248* (0.142)	0.098 (0.366)	0.533 (0.338)
Female *(H8)*	-0.178*** (0.053)	-0.255 (0.215)	0.193 (0.169)	-0.062 (0.228)	0.288 (0.478)	-0.043 (0.429)
Quintile of Wealth *(H8)*	0.026 (0.021)	-0.254*** (0.087)	0.004 (0.074)	0.068 (0.064)	-0.143 (0.180)	0.109 (0.184)
Urban Residence *(H8)*	0.068 (0.060)	-0.683 (0.545)	0.189 (0.380)	-0.669*** (0.224)	-0.080 (0.443)	-0.082 (0.507)
Constant	0.014 (0.250)	3.401*** (1.135)	-1.566** (0.686)	-1.990** (0.747)	3.203* (1.817)	0.100 (1.582)
N	13,706	1,002	895	1,055	1,229	850

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 3.7: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2018/19 Regional Round



Figure 3.8: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2014 Brazil



Figure 3.9: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2008 Chile



Figure 3.10: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2014 Colombia



Figure 3.11: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2018/19 Ecuador



Figure 3.12: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2014 Peru



Based on these results, in all but two of the cases examined (Colombia and Ecuador being the outliers, but with no statistical significance), those in Latin America and Caribbean with intentions to migrate are *less* likely to have voted in the previous election than those without emigration intentions (no support for H1). In these cases, it appears that those with emigration intentions seem already more likely to have disengaged from the political system in anticipation of settling somewhere abroad. This finding may be of particular concern to governing entities that want their citizens to stay and remain engaged in national politics. If individuals are already considering departure, they may be already lost to the national body politic. As a result, policymakers may want to consider addressing some of the issues outlined in Chapter 2 that highlight the reasons for migration and the need to address those expeditiously.

In addition, those in the LAC region and the specific countries of interest with desires to leave are like their fellow countrymen who wish to stay in terms of their likelihood of voting in the next election (no support for H2). Perhaps that future trip to the polls is just too far off for any citizen to have a strong idea about whether they will decide to vote.

Consistent with theories about communities experiencing migration (Goodman and Hiskey 2008), those in the regional, Chilean, and Ecuadorian samples who receive remittances are less likely to engage in national politics by having voted in the previous election (support for H3). It is only in Brazil where receiving remittances makes individuals less likely to vote in the future (despite Brazil's compulsory voting laws). Otherwise, receiving remittances has no statistically significant effect on future participation.

While controlling for other relevant theories for participation in Latin America, I find that, contrary to recent findings, being a victim of a crime has no effect on electoral participation, and in the couple of instances where those indicators are significant, feeling insecure makes individuals *less* likely to participate, either in the past or in the future (no support for H4). Also, in opposition to recent findings, those who are the victims of corruption are neither more nor less likely to vote in a previous or upcoming election, with one exception in Peru that works against expectations where those who have been asked for a bribe are less likely to vote in an upcoming election (no support for H6). Economic evaluations, either national or personal, are not a driver of participation, except in the regional sample and in Peru, where positive assessments of the individual and national economies, respectively are correlated with a *lower* likelihood that individuals voted in the past (no support for H5).

Indicators related to trust in democracy, democratic institutions, and efficacy were sometimes significant, but not always in the expected direction. Those who were the most conservative respondents were more likely to vote in the upcoming election than their most liberal counterparts, but only in a few cases. While some of these indicators were statistically significant, these experiential variables and measures of democracy were not on the whole strong drivers of either past or future participation, which provides mixed support for part of H7.

Political exposure also is an influential set of variables when it comes to participation. In many of these cases, political interest, belonging to a political party, and paying attention to the news are influential for both past and future participation in the regional results as well as several of the individual countries. As expected, those who are engaged politically either through interest, partisanship, or paying attention to the news are more likely to have voted or plan to participate in the electoral process, which supports H7.

Finally, personal characteristics still have an important effect on an individual's likelihood of electoral participation (support for H8). In line with expectations, those who are older across the region and in the individual countries are more likely to participate in past or future elections. The lone exception is that older people in Brazil is less likely to say that they will vote, which is likely due to the compulsory voting requirement expiring at age 70. Throughout the region and in the individual countries of study, being married, having children, and having a higher level of education are strong indicators of participating in the most recent election, all of which is consistent with expectations. The other sociodemographic considerations such as wealth, gender, urban residence are not as consistent across the region in terms of explaining participation. The fact that wealth is not a strong predictor goes against extant literature and merits further study. Taken together, again, as in Chapter 2, many of the variables correlated with participation can be in found in their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics rather than their political attitudes or experiences.

3.6 Conclusion

Given these results, we see a couple of notable patterns emerge. First, those with emigration intentions are less likely to have voted. Once individuals start thinking about leaving,

they have already disengaged from politics and making the effort to show up to the polls. Second, independent of the effect of emigration intention, those with the demographic characteristics cited in Chapter 2 which tend to correlate with emigration intentions are also less likely to have voted in the previous election. Namely, those who are young, unmarried, and receive remittances are less likely to have participated previously or to vote in a future election. In essence, these patterns indicate that the population more likely to move to another country is much less likely to vote. Since voting is a habit, the individuals with these characteristics are less likely to have established that ritual of going to the polls. Yet, we still see people moving abroad and participating in elections back home. Consequently, voting by expatriates presents a difficult case for testing traditional theories of voting behavior. Therefore, any relationship which supports the results found in the canonical voting behavior literature could be significant for future scholarship and shed light on to how this small but important group abroad expresses its political opinions from afar.

So, what may influence someone's vote choice while in a foreign country? While available election returns from abroad do not include sociodemographic information, these two chapters can inform our understanding about what these various diasporas might look like. Even though sociodemographic characteristics have a stronger effect on the likelihood of both migration and electoral participation, it is worth examining whether the experiences outside the home, be they related to security, economics, or corruption, do still have some correlation with voting behavior. Since economic information is widely available for all countries, Chapter 4 will investigate whether some of the traditional relationships examined between economic conditions and vote choice still hold for this difficult to study group. Given the differences among the population that intends to migrate and that this population tends not to be the most likely to vote,

do expatriates behave like their compatriots back home when considering how economic conditions might relate to their vote choice or is there something special about the experience of migration that changes their orientation to how they translate economic conditions to vote choice in elections in countries where they do not live? And, what does this tell us about the voting patterns of diasporas? Chapter 4 explores these relationships further.

CHAPTER 4

Crossing Borders and Casting Ballots: An Analysis of Expatriate Voting in Latin America

4.1 Introduction

According to the United Nations, the number of people living in a country other than the one in which they were born reached 281 million people in 2020 (more than 3.5 percent of the world's population), an increase of 85 million from 2000 and more than 100 million since 1990 (UN 2020; UN 2017; UN 2013). The focus of this chapter is on the voting behavior of these individuals in the electoral processes of their native countries.

Expatriate voting, as it is referred to, has become increasingly common around the world, with a growing number of immigrants being provided the opportunity to cast a ballot for their preferred candidate in elections taking place back home. As a recent example, the number of Canadians voting from abroad tripled from the 2015 to the 2019 general election (BBC 2019). Only now are scholars and other observers of these trends beginning to understand how these expat voters differ, if at all, from their domestic counterparts – despite growing evidence that expat voting patterns are indeed different from domestic voting patterns. For example, in a 2017 referendum in Turkey which resulted in an increased concentration of power for President Erdogan, the margin of victory for the "yes" vote was much larger among the expat electorate than it was for domestic voters (BBC 2017a), and yet we know relatively little about the drivers of these type of differences. Similarly, by many accounts the increased participation of expats in the second round of the 2009 and 2014 presidential elections in Romania proved decisive in determining the outcome of that election (Clej 2014). These examples underscore the

importance of devoting further effort to understanding on what basis those expats who decide to expend the effort to turn out to vote cast their ballot.

As I argued in both Chapters 2 and 3, an important first step in understanding the voting behavior of expats is to better understand who they are in socioeconomic and demographic terms and why they left their home country. An intuitive but illustrative supporting example of this proposition would be the very distinct groupings of the Nicaraguan diaspora. Those who fled the Sandinista regime in the 1980s and settled in the U.S. tended to be of a relatively high socioeconomic level and politically more conservative than those who chose to remain living under the Sandinistas. In contrast, the vast majority of the thousands of Nicaraguans currently living and working in Costa Rica are primarily on the lower end of socioeconomic measures and were driven to leave home primarily for economic reasons (Blyde, et al., 2020). Though expat voting for Nicaraguans is technically allowed, it has yet to be implemented in practical terms. If it were, however, we would expect these different contingents of the country's diaspora to exhibit very distinct patterns of electoral behavior based on their socioeconomic and demographic differences and the primary reasons they left their home country.

From Chapter 2 we learned that individuals declaring intentions to emigrate from Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) in general, as well as the five countries of interest for this study, tend to be young, single, male, and receive remittances. While other characteristics were correlated with emigration intentions, none of these rose to the level of substantive significance that the demographic and migration network factors exhibit. In Chapter 3, we found that those with emigration intentions are less likely turn out to vote than their non-migrant counterparts. In addition, independent of the effect of emigration intention, those who are young, single, and receive remittances are also less likely to engage in their country's electoral processes than those

without emigration intentions. As a result, we can plausibly surmise that those who do in fact emigrate may also be less likely to participate in their home countries' electoral processes from abroad. That said, the focus of this chapter is on those migrants who do choose to vote from abroad in an effort to understand the extent to which this segment of the expat community vote according to the dominant theories of voting behavior in the extant literature.

As a next step in exploring the voting behavior of expats, I now turn to an analysis of election returns from selected countries. The study of how and why foreign-born individuals vote in home-country elections, known as external, or expatriate, voting is a relatively new area of analysis (see: Mascitelli and Battiston 2009; Bauböck 2005; Calderón Chelius 2010; Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2014; Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2015). Further, the fact that expat voting is a recent phenomenon in many countries makes more difficult a long-term analysis of voting behavior (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). While scholars know a lot about what determines the vote choice for voters casting their ballot domestically, there is not a clear understanding of the process determining how an expatriate casts her vote and the potential impact this group of voters may have on politics in their country of origin.

There are a range of potential theoretical points of departure for understanding expat voting patterns. One possibility is that they will retain the partisan sympathies they developed prior to migration (Campbell et al. 1960; Rose and Mishler 1998). Thus, knowing the general partisan makeup of the migrant population should provide us insight into how they might vote once abroad. As seen in Table 2.1 in Chapter 2, among those with emigration intentions in the countries studied and who identify with a party, there is a wide range among support for the incumbent party. In 2014, close to half of Brazilians who both reported emigration intentions and were affiliated with a party supported the incumbent party, the Partido dos Trabalhadores

(PT). On the other end of the scale, among Ecuadorians in 2018/19 with those same characteristics, about 8% identified with the incumbent party, PAIS. Among the other countries examined, support for the incumbent party among those who both have emigration intentions and have a partisan affiliation varies from about 10% to 20%. Thus, we could evaluate whether those partisan affiliations hold among those individuals who have actually emigrated from their home countries.

Another approach would entail a retrospective voting perspective, with the driving assumption that even those individuals living abroad will generally cast their vote based on the past performance of the incumbent government rather than prospectively assessing the relative merits of the policy platforms of the competing candidates (e.g., Lenz 2012, Powell and Whitten 1993, Kiewiet and Rivers 1984, Markus 1988). The merits of this approach would be that expat voters would have a more plausible opportunity to develop general opinions on the performance of the incumbent than they might on the proposed policies that emerge during a campaign. The economic indicators that would help us evaluate this proposition are generally widely available and this model does not require inclusion of the individual characteristics of those abroad. More generally, we may be able to simply examine the vast body of research on domestic voting behavior in order to gain insights into how individuals living abroad will cast their ballot.

A third perspective might be referred to as a "transnational economic voting" theory which views the economic conditions of the migrant's host country, relative to those of her home country, as a driver of vote choice. In this scenario, an individual migrant's pocketbook and sociotropic economic evaluations would be based on their host country economic situation but serve as a metric on which to evaluate the incumbent government of their home country. I explore in further detail both of these potential drivers of expat voting below.

In this chapter, I opt to use as my point of departure the idea that expat voters will rely first on their assessment of the incumbent's performance in office, but that this assessment is conditioned in some ways by their host country economy. The research question I explore in depth in the following pages is the extent to which the economic conditions of an expatriate's country of residence shape her vote choice for country-of-origin elections? By extension, if economic conditions abroad do shape their votes, how does this process work? Do they consider the conditions in their countries of residence relative to their country of origin or is it more of a function of misplaced retrospection? By misplaced retrospection, I mean that the voter abroad makes her decision on how to cast her ballot in her home country election by solely rewarding or punishing the incumbent party back home based on the economic conditions she is experiencing abroad, therefore not rewarding or punishing the incumbent party for the actual conditions in her home country. She is voting retrospectively, but the economic conditions experienced and the politician on the ballot are not in the same country.

If the economic situation abroad shapes views which influence votes casts in systems back home, it represents a fundamental disconnect in how these voters reward or punish incumbent parties in their country of origin. If they do not take into consideration the economic conditions in their country of birth when they cast their ballot, then they are not able to accurately reward or punish incumbent parties, a situation that represents a further complication in our understandings of the basic connections between expat voters and elected officials that many view as the foundation of a democracy. We can add, then, the economic conditions of another country to the shark attacks and other such factors outside the control of politicians that scholars have found driving the vote choice in even the most established of democracies (Achen and Bartels 2016).

These questions will be explored within the context of various Latin American presidential elections within the last 15 years, focusing on the cases of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. This chapter takes its theoretical foundations and basic model from Powell and Whitten (1993), which initially examines the relationship between a governing political party's most recent vote share as a function of inflation, unemployment, growth of the gross domestic product (GDP) and the previous vote share the governing party received in the previous election. As I discuss in more detail below, the principal challenge I face in fully exploring these questions is the absence of individual-level data for the various expat communities I examine. Rather, the analyses presented below rely on aggregate data of election results and various economic indicators. As such, this chapter offers a first step in what will require much more work to fully understand the drivers of voting behavior among the world's many expat communities.

The chapter proceeds as follows—first; the relevant theory and concepts are explored. This section will review the literature relevant to economic voting, external voting by expatriates, and some germane considerations from the migration literature. Second, I will outline the hypotheses used in this study. The next section will describe the data used for both the quantitative and qualitative analyses for this research question. I then offer an overview of the specific variables I employ in modeling the voting patterns of migrant voters from the five countries under review. The results of the models then will be presented and discussed. I conclude with a discussion of the main findings and their implications.

4.2 Theory

This section will review two relevant literatures for this analysis: retrospective (performance) voting and the relevant migration literature that highlights the expected differences between populations living abroad and those living in the country of origin. When combined, these two distinct perspectives offer a way forward in understanding the phenomenon of expat voting behavior.

4.2.1 Performance Voting Theories

I begin with a consideration of the possibility that the voting calculus of expatriates is similar to that of their domestic counterparts. As such, it may be the case that that those voters casting ballots from abroad will be influenced by economic conditions in evaluating the incumbent government of their home country. Such a retrospective voting model has three components: (1) It is backward looking; (2) It focuses solely on the incumbent, and (3) The decision calculus is seen to be driven largely by the voters' perception of the economic conditions as managed by the incumbent government (Kiewiet and Rivers 1984). Proponents of this economic voting thesis view the minimal informational requirements it places on voters as one of its key strengths and this, in fact, applies well to both domestic voters and expatriates who likely would be less informed of the day-to-day performance of the incumbent government than their domestic counterparts. Lenz (2012) establishes that domestic voters are able better able to reward or punish incumbents based on economic performance to a greater extent than they can for policy preferences. So, even for voters abroad, it is plausible that they could better evaluate economic conditions back home, as compared to policy outcomes. Since the retrospective voting

model focuses on economic indicators, this minimalist model approach would seem to be applicable to voters abroad.

This would also make the model more applicable to voters of varying levels of education and political sophistication, and thus encompass the wide range of migrants living abroad. While this model requires little information, it is also based on the notion that voters will cast their ballot based on highly subjective and often-times misplaced views of what factors drive national economic conditions, what those conditions actually are, and who is in fact responsible (Achen and Bartels, 2016). This feature of the model then also is applicable to expat voting given the likely distorted view they might have of the national economic conditions of their home country. And though there is a debate in the economic voting literature on whether voters are driven more by evaluations of their own economic situations (pocketbook) or by the state of the national economy (sociotropic), most scholars do recognize the importance of national economic conditions as either direct or indirect drivers of the economic voting decision calculus (Powell and Whitten 1993; Kiewiet and Rivers 1984; Markus 1988).

This economic retrospective voting model is also prevalent in the comparative literature (see, among others Anderson 2000) and use a variety of measures to assess economic conditions. Strom and Lipset (1984) found some explanatory power in using inflation to explain incumbent losses while Lewis-Beck and Mitchell (1990) used both inflation and unemployment rates in their approach. Powell and Whitten (1993) use inflation, unemployment, and growth in GDP for their model, but found that contextual factors, such as previous vote share, had a larger effect size in relation to the incumbent party's vote share. These measurement choices will inform my analyses below.

Looking specifically at the literature on economic voting in Latin America, Lewis-Beck and Ratto (2013), Gélineau and Singer (2015), and Singer (2015) find that national economic evaluations are more important to vote choice than personal economic conditions. Singer (2015) argues that voters seem to consider "the degree to which government actors can reasonably be held accountable for economic outcomes" which gives greater weight to the national economic conditions when they are different from their personal experiences (64). This national economic retrospection is also present when the president's party is strong and there is limited international influence on the domestic economy (Singer 2015). As a result, it makes sense to assess national economic conditions in each of the expatriate's country of residence when it comes to assessing national-level vote returns.

In addition to economic indicators, political knowledge has been an important part of the literature, although it may not necessarily be a part of the model or analysis. Traditionally, those voters with low political knowledge or information tend to rely more on their personal economic conditions, as compared with the national economic circumstances, when determining governmental economic performance (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Fiorina 1981; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). More recently, however, Gomez and Wilson (2006) find that those with more political knowledge are more likely to use their pocketbook evaluations when deciding wither to vote for or against the incumbent government. They found these results across a variety of countries which included Canada, Hungary, Mexico, and Taiwan (Gomez and Wilson 2006). While I cannot test political sophistication given the available data, it is important to keep this factor in mind when considering the results.

Now that we have established the basics of the retrospective economic voting model, it is necessary to highlight some potential pitfalls with this literature. One key issue with applying

the economic voting model to expatriate voters is that these individuals in particular may not be good at assigning blame. A migrant worker, for example, may conflate the economic conditions of her host country, as she perceives them, with her evaluation of the economic performance of the incumbent government of her home country. That is, if she is driven by economic considerations that are a product of the host country economy, these may influence the electoral evaluation of her home country as well. While this may seem an illogical basis on which to cast one's vote, it in fact is not so different from the highly suspect factors that have been found to drive an individual's domestic vote choice, such as voters punishing incumbents for failing to contain droughts, floods, and shark attacks (Achen and Bartels, 2016).

Achen and Bartels (2016) call this "blind retrospection," whereby voters assign blame for something the government had absolutely no control over. When the voters "are in pain they are likely to kick the government, so long as they can justify doing so with whatever plausible cultural constructions are available to them" (118). In this particular analysis, the economic conditions of Country A are unlikely to be the direct responsibility of the government of Country B. Nevertheless, expatriates of Country B may well be dissatisfied with the economic conditions of Country A and want to express that sentiment. Voters of Country B who live abroad in Country A are casting the most likely only ballot available to them—the one in their country of birth. They may lash out at the ballot box to a government which is unlikely to have any influence on economic conditions, but is the only institution they have the power to hold responsible.

Other scholars have found similar patterns of behavior where voters cannot accurately ascribe blame to legislators for certain outcomes. For instance, Rogers (2016) found that the electoral fate of state legislators is linked to national political forces. In many cases, when the

president's party is unpopular, it means that state legislators of that same party are more likely to lose re-election (Rogers 2016). Therefore, state legislators have little control over their own electoral outcomes, despite whatever legislative victories they may have achieved during their terms (Rogers 2016). Due to the fact that a voter may be angry with the president, that could mean a state legislator who happens to be from the same party, may suffer electoral consequences over which they had no control. In addition, other seemingly irrelevant events may affect voters' vote choice (Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010). As Healy, Malhotra, and Mo (2010) found, the outcomes of college football games can have effects across the board on Election Day. If the local college football team wins in the days leading up to an election, then the incumbent party can expect a small increase in its vote share (Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010). Even though these politicians have no bearing on the performance of the football team, they may still reap electoral rewards based on this outside force. Voters may be in a good mood and happy to look more favorably on the incumbent party.

The problem with blind retrospection on democratic governance is that this process is "unlikely to provide much in the way of effective accountability" (Achen and Bartels 2016, 144). Voters who are unaware of the evidence and of the chain of causation, but who are told stories about who is responsible for their situation "will punish incumbents whenever their subjective well-being falls below some fixed standard, regardless of whether or not their pain is in fact traceable to the incumbents' policies" (Achen and Bartels 2016, 144). This provides little incentive to incumbent governments to actually do much in terms of meaningful policies to aid their population as they are continuously monitoring the election calendar and attempting to implement short-term policies to maximize their electoral success (Achen and Bartels 2016). Consequently, everyone in a democracy is worse off since "voters who cannot distinguish the

effects of shark attacks and droughts from the effects of tax policies and foreign wars are likely to experience more than their share of misguided tax policies and disastrous foreign wars" because of the policies of the leaders they do end up electing (Achen and Bartels 2016, 144). Now that we have reviewed the literature on retrospective voting, it is useful to examine how migrants may be substantively different from their counterparts back home before moving on to the analysis.

4.2.2 Theories Highlighting Differences of Migrants

A second literature that may help us better understand the expatriate vote choice can be found in work on the particular characteristics of migrants themselves. Expatriates are generally a self-selecting group and they tend to have relatively higher levels of education than their non-migrant counterparts and have some degree of household income stream. That is, in relative terms, migrants are not the poorest of the poor in their respective countries nor are they the least educated as the rhetoric surrounding migrants in receiving countries often portrays them (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). In addition, the decision to leave one's country often is an indication itself of dissatisfaction with the incumbent government (Hirschman 1970; 1978; Lawson 2003). Therefore, it is plausible that they are, in relative terms, more politically engaged and aware than their non-migrant counterparts. As seen in the analysis in Chapter 3, potential migrants are less politically engaged than the rest of the population while they are still in their home country. That said, these depressed levels of electoral engagement among those "waiting to leave" may be a product of what Kapur (2010) refers to as the "prospect channel" of migration's influence on home-country politics. From this perspective, those waiting to leave will disengage from politics prior to leaving as they make plans for a future outside of the country. We also know, based on

the findings in Chapter 2, that those with more education were more likely to want to move abroad, suggesting that the expat community at a minimum has the skill set typically associated with electoral engagement.

Research on the dynamics of expatriate voting is limited (Mascitelli and Battiston 2009, Bauböck 2005, Calderón Chelius 2010). Much of this literature deals with the theoretical implications of external voting and what the effects would be for strengthening democratic norms, with a particular focus on the emerging democracies of Latin America (Itzigsohn and Villacrés 2008). A number of scholars have focused on the case of Mexico that adopted external voting in 2006 (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). It was theorized that granting suffrage to Mexicans abroad would weaken the one-party dominance of the long-governing Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), since those Mexican living abroad at the time tended to be opponents of the PRI (Lawson 2003).

This focus on the partisan attachments that migrants brought with them from their home countries became one area of particular interest for scholars exploring the determinants of the expat vote (Boccagni 2011; Tintori 2011; Lafleur and Calderón Chelius 2011). Boccagni (2011) found that the political orientation among Ecuadorian emigrants is similar to that of their compatriots back home. Among Latin Americans who had acquired Italian citizenship and were living abroad, Tintori (2011) detected that their participation dropped significantly, possibly due to a lack of a partisan infrastructure that would motivate turnout. In the initial election in which Mexicans abroad were allowed to participate in 2006, Lafleur and Calderón Chelius (2011) observed that since political parties were prohibited from campaigning abroad, it appeared that individuals were liberated from the domestic Mexican structures that might have otherwise influenced their votes.

In studies that specifically focus on expatriate participation and vote choice, Escobar, Arana, and McCann (2014) find that for Colombians abroad, who were evaluating political candidates in the 2010 elections, opinions were formed in a similar manner to their compatriots back home. The authors found such factors as income, education, and religious affiliation (measures I cannot examine here) to be important predictors of vote choice, while the specific location of the respondents (five cities in the United States and Europe) did not emerge as significant (Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2014). There were no additional country of residence control statistics included in their model, however, suggesting that further analysis of potential receiving country determinants of expat voting is warranted.

In another study, these same authors found important spatial variations in the turnout rate for Colombian expatriates in the 2010 elections even after controlling for standard socioeconomic and demographic factors. Those living in Miami, London, and Madrid were less likely to vote in presidential elections than their counterparts in New York (Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2015). These findings are echoed in the turnout rates collected in Table A4.7.3 in the Dissertation Appendix for Chapter 4. Of the four countries included in the Escobar, Arana, and McCann (2015) study, Spain had the lowest voter turnout (15.69% in the first round and 13.80% in the second), the UK had the second lowest (24.10%/19.39%). As the authors highlight, this could be due to differences within each of these countries as to how easy or hard it is for expatriates to establish a life abroad and maintain connections with Colombia that would influence their likelihood to go out and vote when the opportunity presents itself abroad (Escobar, Arana, and McCann 2015). While I will not be analyzing this particular question in this project, it is an excellent path for future research.

In a study examining Mexican and Colombian expatriates from 2006 and 2010, respectively, McCann, Escobar, and Arana (2019), find that, even after living abroad for a long time, expatriates still retain a strong connection to politics back home (McCann, Escobar, and Arana 2019). This may be due to the fact that those who are stable in their new country of residence have the resources in terms of time and energy to devote to staying connected to politics back home (Guarnizo et al. 2003; Portes, Escobar, and Radford. 2007; Leal, Lee, and McCann. 2012). Consequently, it is still possible for those living abroad to effectively participate in politics in their country of origin, independent of the length of time they have resided abroad (McCann, Escobar, and Arana 2019).

Some scholarship, however, points to the fact that the amount of the remittances sent home over time declines the longer the emigrant lives abroad (Elbadawi and de Rezende Rocha 1992). This could be due to fewer potential remittance recipients at home resulting from additional emigration or the passing of elderly recipients (Carling 2008). Another possibility is that the connection the migrant has with their home community may weaken and that individual feels less of a need to send money "home" when they have established a life abroad (Carling 2008). This weakening bond with the home country and community could also manifest through voting in elections abroad. Perhaps the host country's economy matters more for an individual's voting behavior if he has lived there for a decade while an expatriate who only recently arrived might have stronger ties to their home country and thus might rely more heavily on evaluating those conditions when casting a vote. Again, while I cannot exactly determine, based on the data analyzed for this chapter, how long individuals have been abroad, it is worth keeping this in mind as we evaluate the results from the available data.

As suggested by these studies, it seems likely that many expatriates are able to keep an eye on politics back home while maintaining their lives in another country. By extension, they may also have the capability to take in to account their current economic situation abroad relative to the economic conditions in their country of origin. That may make expatriates fundamentally different from their compatriots back home who only have to focus on one set of political and economic circumstances. Therefore, expatriates may be both more transnational in their outlook and more sophisticated politically by holding the situations of both their country of birth and their country of residence in mind when making their vote choice. An adaptation of the retrospective voting model may help illustrate this ability. Powell and Whitten (1993), for example, examined not only the impact that one's absolute economic conditions had on vote choice but also the role of those economic conditions in relation to global economic conditions (Powell and Whitten 1993). While they found that the signs of the variables were in the expected direction, they did not achieve statistical significance (Powell and Whitten 1993).

The country-to-country comparison that I am positing, however, requires more effort on the part of the voter to know the economic conditions (or at least think they know) for both countries and be able to compare them, which may not be possible for all migrants, with various factors, such as education levels and length of time in the host country, potentially affecting this dynamic. What my data do provide, however, is variation along the dimension of host country economic conditions, with the expat communities of Brazil, for example, residing in numerous countries around the world. With the caveats in mind, I now proceed to a discussion of the specific hypotheses, the data I employ to evaluate these propositions, and a presentation of the analyses.

4.3 Hypotheses

From these theoretical perspectives, we can make two propositions related to the electoral decision of expatriate voters. The first can be referred to as the "blind retrospection hypothesis" in which I expect expatriate voters will consider recent economic conditions in their country of residence and punish or reward the incumbent presidential candidate accordingly. So, according to Hypothesis 1:

H1: The more positive the economic situation in the country of residence is, the more likely the expatriate voting bloc will favor the incumbent party (or more familiar candidate). [51]

The second hypothesis addresses the idea that expat voters will carry out a "comparative evaluation" of the economies in their country of residence and their country of origin:

H2: As the economic conditions of an expat voter's host country worsen in comparison to the conditions of her native country, the more likely she will be to support the incumbent government in her native country. Conversely, those expats living in areas that are doing better than their country of origin will be more likely to punish the incumbent party.

It might take a more sophisticated voter to understand the economic conditions in two countries and judge them relative to each other, thus ideally, I would be able to include the level of political knowledge as a potential contributing factor to this second proposed process. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, I do not have access to individual-level data of expat communities so must rely on aggregate analyses that are unable to assess the role of individual-level characteristics, so must rely on the assumption that in general, expat voters will have relatively high degrees of political awareness compared to their non-migrant counterparts.

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[51] I will explain in section 3.4.5 what I mean by "more familiar" candidate.

4.4 Data

In order to evaluate these hypotheses empirically, I have gathered data from a variety of sources including the election results of specific countries' presidential elections, various economic indicators from the World Bank, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems macro reports from Rounds 2, 3, and 4, and qualitative data from focus groups conducted in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Before reviewing these data sources in more detail, I will explain why the chosen countries are included in this analysis.

The data included in this chapter have several limitations. First, there is no individual level data of diasporas examined here. Therefore, I do not have specific demographic information about the individuals casting ballots and cannot include that in the model. Second, there are some countries in which diasporas are located for which I do not have available economic data. Third, the level of analysis is at the country-level based on where the diaspora is located. Powell and Whitten (1993) use 20 years of election returns by country and I mirror this in my adaptation of the model. Therefore, I will compare, for instance, the overall voting pattern of Brazilians in Ecuador, to Brazilians in the United Kingdom and how the groups in each of those countries respond collectively to the economic conditions under which they live. The number of cases in each model is based on the number of countries in which a particular diaspora is casting votes.

4.4.1 Case Selection

To test these hypotheses, I will use the expatriate votes cast in general elections from five countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. All of these countries have expatriate

voting, all allow for two-round presidential elections, and all have consulates around the world where expatriates can cast their votes, making a comparison among them feasible. vThat said, there is also variation across these cases with respect to the length of time expatriate participation data are available, although all have data within the last 15 years. Chile has had one election, Ecuador two, and Brazil, Colombia, and Peru each have had three elections during this time period. This allows for a step-wise examination of the Powell and Whitten (1993) model by adding in different independent variables for each country given the availability of electoral data to build the model. This variation also allows for a more comprehensive examination of the role economic performance over time plays in the voting patterns of the respective expatriate communities.

The electoral results are from twelve different presidential elections in these five countries. For Chile, only the 2017 presidential election is included because it was the first to allow for expatriate voting (Gobierno de Chile 2014). For Ecuador, the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections are included here. For Brazil, the three elections in this study include those conducted in 2010, 2014, and 2018. In Colombia, there were elections those same three years. The Peruvian elections included here were held in 2006, 2011, and 2016. While data are available by consulate, I have combined these data to produce total expatriate voting results of each of the countries.

4.4.2 Electoral Data

The results from all rounds of the presidential elections in Brazil from 2010, 2014, and 2018 were collected by the Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (Supreme Electoral Tribunal; TSE) and

made available online and on an app (TSE 2010, TSE 2014, TSE 2018).[52] In 2010, there were consulates in 86 countries where Brazilians cast ballots. In 2014, Brazilians voted at consulates in 89 countries and, in 2018, that number was 99. The results for Colombia for both rounds of the 2010, 2014, and 2018 elections were collected online from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (National Civil Registry; RNEC) (RNEC 2010a-b, RNEC 2014a-b, RNEC 2018a-b.).[53] In 2010, Colombians cast votes at consulates in 56 countries, in 2014, that number was 64, and, in 2018, that number was 69. The results of the Chilean election in 2017 were collected online from the Servicio Electoral de Chile (National Electoral Service of Chile; SERVEL) (Servicio Electoral de Chile 2017).[54] In Chile in 2017, the first time that expatriate voting was permitted, there were votes cast from consulates in 62 countries. The Ecuadorian analysis is based off the presidential elections in 2013 and 2017. The data were collected online from Centro Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Center; CNE) (CNE 2013; CNE 2017).[55] In 2013, Ecuadorians cast ballots at consulates in 47 countries. In 2017, that number was 45. For the Peruvian analysis, I include the 2006, 2011, and 2016 first and second round results of the presidential elections.[56] The data were collected online from Peru's Oficina Nacional de

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[52] For Brazil, the measures included are how many votes each candidate received, the number of valid votes, the number of blank votes, the number of null votes, the number of total votes, and the number of voters registered at each consulate. Summary statistics will follow later in the analysis.

[53] For Colombia, these data include the number of votes cast for each candidate in each round, the total number of votes cast for candidates, the number of blank votes, the number of valid votes, the number of null votes, the number of unmarked votes, the number of total votes of all types, and the number of registered electors in each consulate.

[54] In Chile, included in these data are the number of votes cast for each candidate in each round, the number of votes cast for candidates, the number of blank votes, the number of valid votes, the number of null votes, and the total number of all votes cast.

[55] The data were aggregated at the country level and includes the vote totals for each of the candidates, how many Ecuadorians are registered to vote in each country, the number of valid votes, the number of blank votes, the number of null votes, total number of votes cast, and the number of electors who were absent.

[56] The majority of the Peruvian raw data from 2006 and 2011 was most generously provided by Mollie Cohen, with the rest collected by the author. The author also double checked the 2006 and 2011 data with those records available online. The data include how many expatriates live in that country, how many voted, how many null votes were cast, how many blank votes were cast, how many valid votes were cast, and how many of the valid votes went to each of the candidates in each round of the presidential elections.

Procesos Electorales (National Office of Electoral Processes; ONPE) (ONPE 2016).[57] In 2006, Peruvians cast votes in 72 countries, with that number dropping to 67 in 2011 and increasing to 78 in 2016.

The number of votes cast, the number of individuals registered, and the turnout rates for each of these elections, where available, are listed in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 4, Section A4.7. I do not have turnout rates for Chile since I do not have the number of individuals registered per consulate. In 2017, more than 23,000 Chileans voted in the first round and more than 21,000 voted in the second round. In the most recent election in 2018, a little over 200,000 Brazilians voted from abroad and about half a million are registered at consulates around the world, which results in about a 40% turnout rate. Colombians have much lower rate of participation—20%. In 2018, a little more than a quarter million Colombians abroad, out of a registered 1.3 million, voted in the last election. For Ecuador, the turnout rate was above 35% in the 2017 elections, which means more than 130,000 Ecuadorians participated out of a population of more the 378,000 registered at worldwide consulates. Peruvians had a better turnout rate than even Brazilians in the 2016 elections. More than 44% of the more than 880,000 Peruvians registered at their local consulates voted, which means more than 380,000 ballots were cast in the second round of 2016.

4.4.3 Economic Data

[57] Any previous elections, e.g., Peru 2001, the only data available are the total vote counts. It is not possible to determine the vote totals for ballots cast abroad and those cast domestically.

In addition to the electoral data, I include economic data collected from the World Bank for the relevant years surrounding a country's presidential elections between 2005 and 2018 on unemployment, inflation, and the percentage GDP growth over the preceding year for each country in which expatriates cast votes, as available (World Bank 2019a-c). Some countries do not have certain measures listed, so there are a few cases lost in each wave of analysis. This is mainly due to the fact that accurate numbers cannot be accounted for by organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. As an example, Argentina "became a country without reliable numbers" during the administrations of Néstor Kirchner (2003-2007) and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (2007-2015), particularly when it came to official statistics on inflation, economic growth, and poverty (Reuters 2008). Likewise, under Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan government has hidden rising inflation rates as the economy collapses and shortages increase (The Economist 2015).

Depending on when the election is held during the calendar year, that will influence which year's economic data will be included in the model. Generally, voters have a short retrospective time-horizon of less than six months to form an evaluation of economic considerations related to vote choice (Achen and Bartels, 2016). As a result, elections conducted in the first part of the year will use the previous year's economic data while those held later in the year will use the current year's data.

4.4.4 Qualitative Data

In addition to the quantitative analysis, I supplement the findings with results from focus group interviews conducted in Buenos Aires, Argentina in July 2015 as well as data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) Macro Reports from Rounds 2, 3, and 4 in

Peru. For the focus group data, interviews were held with expats from Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Brazil.[58] Participants were recruited through a number of different avenues. The first involved joining multiple Facebook groups created for various national expatriate groups living in Buenos Aires after which I posted notices of the focus group meetings. A second method involved visits to various restaurants around Buenos Aires specializing in the cuisines of these countries of interest where I spoke with employees, explained my project, and left information about the meetings with them. I next visited the consulates for each of the countries and left information about the time, location, and purpose of the focus group meetings with consulate staff. Finally, I employed a snowball sampling approach by reaching out to various contacts made while in country and asking for contact information on any individuals they knew who may be interested and eligible for participation in the focus groups. The only expat community I was unable to conduct a focus group with were Peruvians due to limited numbers. Focus group discussions were held in a rented room at a community center, lasted approximately an hour, and covered a wide-range of topics including the reasons for immigrating to Argentina, the depth and breadth of contacts maintained with friends and family back home, and the degree of engagement with politics in their home country. These interviews allow us to combine the statistical analyses below with a more nuanced understanding of the drivers of expat voting behavior.

I rely on the CSES Macro Reports from Rounds 2, 3, and 4 in order to determine ideological placement of the parties in Peru given the instability of the party system (CSES 2006; CSES 2011; CSES 2016). The Macro Reports are completed by experts which provide

[58] The views of the Uruguayan expatriates are not included in this analysis because Uruguay does not yet have expatriate voting available. All focus groups lasted about an hour and all participants were compensated for their time and provided with refreshments. All translations (and any errors) are my own.

information regarding parties, their ideological placement, and general election information. In the case of Peru, the experts who completed the Macro Reports were also the principal investigators for the individual-level surveys that were conducted for each round of the CSES (CSES 2006; CSES 2011; CSES 2016).

4.4.5 Dependent Variables

There is a debate among scholars investigating the economic voting thesis as to whether a candidate's or party's vote share in a particular election or that party's inter-election change in vote share is best suited for use as a dependent variable in these analyses (see Powell and Whitten 1993). For my purposes, I have chosen to use the valid vote percentage received by a particular candidate as this will allow for analysis of more cases. [59] Using the party's inter-election change in vote share is predicated on party system stability over time, which is not present in all of these countries. The dependent variable for the Chile, Ecuador, and Brazil analyses is the percent of the valid vote (defined as the sum of blank votes and votes for candidates) for the incumbent party in the final round of the presidential elections in each of the countries where expatriates cast ballots. To aid in interpretation of the models, a 45% vote share would be coded as 45 instead of 0.45. Given party instability and alternations in the governing party, the dependent variables for Colombia and Peru required a slightly different measurement strategy that I address in the following pages.

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[59] I ran all these models limiting the number of cases to only those countries for which 50 or more total votes were cast in the second round of the election. The results in the Dissertation Appendix for Chapter 3, Section C. On the whole, in these models with a lower N, the results are either very similar or less statistically significant than in the models presented here with higher number of countries included. There are only one or two models for which there is a greater level of statistical significance in the models with the restricted in, as compared to the full N presented here.

For Chile, the dependent variable is the percent of the valid vote for the left-wing coalition candidate, Alejandro Guillier, in the second round of the 2017 presidential election. Due to term limits, the incumbent president, Michelle Bachelet, was prohibited from seeking an additional term and she, and her party, the Socialist Party of Chile, supported Guillier's candidacy (BBC 2017b). In the end, Guillier's lost the race to former President Sebastián Piñera, who won his second, non-consecutive term (BBC 2017b).

In Ecuador, the dependent variable is the percentage of valid votes received by the candidate for the incumbent party, PAIS (Patria Altiva y Soberana), Lenín Moreno, in the second round of the 2017 presidential election (BBC 2017c). Moreno was, at that time, a close ally of Rafael Correa, the outgoing president (BBC 2017c). Moreno won the election, beating the conservative candidate Guillermo Lasso (BBC 2017c).

For Brazil, the dependent variable is the is the percentage of valid votes received by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), a left-wing party, in the second round of the 2018 elections. The candidate for the incumbent party, the PT, was Fernando Haddad (Neuman 2018). The right-wing candidate, Jair Bolsonaro ultimately won that election (Neuman 2018).

The two remaining countries, Colombia and Peru, present a challenge in constructing a dependent variable not found in the other countries. In the case of Colombia, the incumbent party, the Partido de la U, did not reach the runoff of the 2018 elections (Bonces 2018), so there is no way to use the second-round vote in the model. Given the differences in party brands competing in the election,[60] and in an attempt to keep all three elections in the analysis, in this

[60] I considered various alternative operationalizations of this dependent variable. The main alternative would have been to use the percentage of the valid votes cast in the second round for Gustavo Petro, who was supportive of the peace agreement with the FARC, and therefore matched the views of the Partido de la U, led by Juan Manuel Santos (Otis and McCallister 2018). The problem, however, is the incumbent party, Partido de la U, did not endorse Petro's candidacy in the second round and issued a statement allowing party members to vote how they wished in the

case, the dependent variable is the percentage of valid votes cast in the first round of the election for Germán Vargas Lleras, who ran as a part of a coalition that included the Partido de la U (Bonces 2018).

The dependent variable for Peru also poses challenges for a couple of reasons. First, Peru does not have a stable multi-party system and incumbent candidates are barred in seeking a second consecutive term (CIA WorldFactbook 2019). In addition, in the 2016 election, the incumbent party did not field a candidate (Post 2016). I cannot, therefore use the incumbent vote percentage from either the first or second round of voting as the dependent variable. In addition, the two candidates who reached the runoff were right wing while the incumbent party was left wing (CSES 2016; CSES 2011). Both of the candidates who reached the runoff, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK) and Keiko Fujimori, had run in the previous election in 2011 and were therefore known to the general population (CSES 2016; CSES 2011). Keiko Fujimori had reached the runoff, but failed to win, the previous election in 2011, while Pedro Pablo Kuczynski did not (CSES 2011; CSES 2016; Livingstone 2011). Furthermore, Keiko Fujimori is the well-known daughter of a former president, Alberto Fujimori, had been First Lady after her parents' divorce, and held a seat in the national legislature (BBC 2011). However, she had not run for national office before the 2011 elections (BBC 2011). Kuczynski was formerly the energy and mining minister and served two stints as minister for economy and mining in the 2000s (BBC

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second round (Bonces 2018). If this model were to include Partido de la U's vote percentage in previous elections, it makes little sense to include it as a predictor of the vote percentage for another party. As a contrast, the other candidate who made the runoff, Ivan Duque, pledged to rewrite the peace accord that Santos had brokered and was therefore in opposition to Partido de la U (Otis and McCallister 2018). So, using either the valid vote percentage of either candidate in the runoff would not tap the underlying support for Partido de la U. As a result, keeping the dependent variable as the percentage of the vote cast for Germán Vargas Lleras is used for this analysis.

2016). While both candidates were known to the Peruvian voting age population, Keiko Fujimori was slightly more successful electorally, as compared to Pedro Pablo Kuczynski.

The dependent variable therefore for Peru will be the percentage of the valid vote received by Keiko Fujimori and her party, Fuerza Popular, the more familiar candidate, in the second round of the 2016 election. By "more familiar," I try to tap into the candidate brand and party brand by which voters can make retrospective evaluations.[61] In 2011, Fujimori's party was named Fuerza 2011, so there was some overlap in the name of the parties which would assist voters in making a retrospective evaluation (CSES 2011). By making this choice, I do lose the 2006 election since neither Fujimori nor anyone in a Fujimori-associate party ran in that year's election (CSES 2006). As a result of losing the 2006 election in this analysis, the Peruvian model will be similar wo the Ecuadorian model.

4.4.6 Independent Variables

Using Powell and Whitten's (1993) approach as a launching point, the independent variables I include for an assessment of the relationship economic conditions have with expat voting patterns are the unemployment, inflation, and GDP growth rates of both the origin country and the host country of an expat community for the year that most immediately precedes the origin country's presidential election. In Chile, for example, the economic data are from 2017 since the second round of the presidential elections were held in December of that year (BBC 2017b). For Ecuador, conversely, the economic data are from 2016 since the 2017 elections

[61] As an alternate configuration for the Peruvian model, I have included the 2011 and 2006 elections in the Dissertation Appendix for Chapter 3, Section B. The dependent variable for that model is the percentage of the valid received by Ollanta Humala in the 2011 election. Since he ran in 2006, but did not win, I can use vote total he received in 2006 as part of the model to tap underlying support for his candidacy (CSES 2006; CSES 2011).

were held in February (CNE 2013). The Peruvian elections occurred in the middle of the year (first round in April and second round in June), so it is up for debate as to whether data from the election year or the year before would be most appropriate (ONPE 2016). Given, however, the short time horizon of many voters when evaluating the economy (Achen and Bartels, 2016), I opted to use data from the election year (2016) for this case.[62] For Brazil, the economic data are from 2018 since the elections were held later in the year, with the second round coming in October (TSE 2018). For Colombia, I use economic data from 2018 since the elections were held during the second half of that year (RNEC 2018 a-b).

In order to capture the potential role the *relative* economic conditions play in voting patterns (host country vs. origin country), I include a dummy variable for whether each of the indicators is better (1) or worse (0) than those figures for their country of origin. Therefore, countries with a *lower* inflation rate, *lower* unemployment rate, and a *higher* GDP growth rate score a 1. This variable is dichotomous to reflect a general evaluation by the voters. They may not necessarily be sensitive to a small change in these statistics, but might have an overall sense whether the economic conditions are better or worse than in their home country. These variables are included to measure the relative economic evaluations of a country with regards to the conditions in their countries of origin (hypothesis 2). The economic statistics for each of the cases studied are provided in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1: Economic Data for Case Studies

Country	Year	Inflation Rate	Unemployment Rate	GDP Growth Rate

[62] I have collected data for the current and previous year for both Peru and Colombia's elections. In the Dissertation Appendix for Chapter 3, Section B, I run the models with the previous year's economic data as well as an average of the two years as robustness checks on the models for both countries.

Chile	2017	2.2%	7.0%	1.3%
Ecuador	2016	1.7%	4.6%	-1.2%
Brazil	2018	3.7%	12.0%	1.1%
Colombia	2018	3.2%	9.0%	2.7%
Peru	2016	3.6%	3.5%	4.0%

Due to variations in the availability of expatriate voting data, I employ two broad types of models for analysis. For Chile, for which I only have one year of expat voting data, I simply regress vote share on the economic indicators and the dummy variables. I will also include a second set of models that includes the percentage of valid votes in the first round for the socialist candidate as a predictor for this party's vote in the second round with the intuitive expectation that the first-round voting percentages will be fairly strong predictors of the second round.

For those countries with more than one round of available election data (all of them except Chile), I can more closely match Powell and Whitten's (1993) model and include incumbent vote share from the previous rounds in addition to the economic indicators to assess the extent to which economic indicators and party loyalty over time affects the outcome. While there is some discussion as to whether to use vote total or percentage for the previous party vote share (see Powell and Whitten 1993), I use vote percentage of valid votes for Ecuador, Peru, Brazil and Colombia to get at over time support for the party and/or candidate within the electorate abroad. This method also allows me to show the variation in vote share among countries regardless of the size of the size of expatriate communities. Therefore, the diaspora in each country is weighted equally, regardless of the number of people living there. In these cases, I regress vote share on those economic variables (both percentage and dummies) and the vote share for the incumbent party in the all rounds of the previous election(s). For Peru, I include previous vote shares for Keiko Fujimori's party in the model. Even though this is not the previous governing party vote share that Powell and Whitten (1993) use in their models, I

include vote percentage in both rounds for Keiko Fujimori because they might be tapping underlying support for the party, which would aid in the explanatory power of the model. Finally, there is no way to properly model previous percentage of the government's vote share because that model would be using one party's vote to predict that of another.

4.4.7 Summary Statistics

Since Chile only has only one year of elections available, this model will test whether economic variables help us understand the voting patterns of Chileans living abroad for that particular election. This model will determine whether a very basic version of the Powell and Whitten (1993) model works and, if so, which economic indicators have influence on vote outcomes in Chile. The summary statistics for the all the variables used in the analysis for Chile are listed in Table 4.2. These provide the mean and range of economic conditions across the 62 countries in which Chilean expat communities cast votes in 2017 (Servicio Electoral de Chile 2017; Achen and Bartels 2016).

Table 4.2: Chile Summary Statistics[63]

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	2017 Round 2 vote % for Socialists	62	0.0	95.4	52.6	22.8
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2017	59	0.2	29.5	3.2	4.3
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2017	62	1.1	27.7	6.8	4.8

[63] All values have been rounded to one decimal place. The only reason to go include two decimal places is if the value was 0.0x. For some countries, the World Bank did not have measures for those economic indicators for the year in question.

Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2017	60	0.8	7.8	3.2	1.8
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2017	59	0	1	0.6	0.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2017	62	0	1	0.7	0.5
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2017	60	0	1	0.9	0.3
Independent Variable	2017 Round 1 vote % for Socialists	62	0.0	62.8	22.87	13.7

Table 4.3 offers a similar set of summary statistics for the 45 countries with Ecuadorian expatriate communities which cast votes in their country's presidential elections.[64] There was only one round in the 2013 elections since Rafael Correa won outright in the first round (CNE 2013). The summary statistics for Ecuador are listed in Table 4.3. Since the election was held in early 2017, the economic data from 2016 are included in these analyses (CNE 2013; Achen and Bartels, 2016).

Table 4.3: Ecuador Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	2017 Round 2 vote % for PAIS	45	0	100	40.5	18.5
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2016	44	-0.5	254.9	8.9	38.1
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2016	46	0.1	26.5	6.6	4.6
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2016	44	-3.5	13.4	2.8	2.7

[64] The summary statistics and results for 2017 Ecuador and 2013 Ecuador done individually with no-lookback are included in the Dissertation Appendix in Chapter 3, Section B. Also, Ecuador has vote tallies for men and women, but not for vote counts by party.

Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2016	44	0	1	0.5	0.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2016	46	0	1	0.3	0.5
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2016	44	0	1	0.9	0.3
Independent Variable	2017 Round 1 vote % for PAIS	45	0	100	35.8	17.2
Independent Variable	PAIS vote % in the 2013 elections	47	25	100	63.9	16.5

Table 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics used for the Brazil models. This is the first of two models where the Powell and Whitten (1993) model can be expanded to include two rounds of incumbent party valid vote percent. Since the election was held in late 2018, the economic data from 2018 are included in these analyses (TSE 2018; Achen and Bartels, 2016).

Table 4.4: Brazil Summary Statistics[65]

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	2018 Round 2 vote % for PT	99	8.7	89.0	37.8	17.0
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2018	83	-0.2	20.2	3.4	2.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2018	97	0.1	27.4	6.9	5.0
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2018	94	-3.8	8.2	3.0	2.1
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2018	83	0	1	0.7	0.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2018	97	0	1	0.9	0.3

[65] Additional analyses for Brazil included in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 3, Section B.

Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2018	94	0	1	0.9	0.3
Independent Variable	2014 Round 1 vote % for PT	89	3.5	84.0	26.1	15.3
Independent Variable	2014 Round 2 vote % for PT	89	0	86.7	31.8	16.0
Independent Variable	2010 Round 1 vote % for PT	87	8.8	85.9	40.1	16.5
Independent Variable	2010 Round 2 vote % for PT	87	0	97.6	46.5	18.3

The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the Colombia models are in Table 4.5. In this case, the dependent variable for this analysis is the percent of the valid vote that Partido de la U received in the first round of the 2018 elections. The economic data from Colombia are from 2018 since the first and second rounds were held in the middle of that year (RNEC 2018a-b; Achen and Bartels, 2016).[66]

Table 4.5: Colombia Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	2018 Round 1 vote % for Partido de la U	69	0	18.8	2.9	3.7
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2018	61	-0.2	16.3	2.8	2.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2018	67	1.2	27.6	6.6	4.5
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2018	66	-4.9	8.2	2.8	2.3
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2018	61	0	1	0.7	0.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2018	67	0	1	0.8	0.4

[66] Additional analyses that include 2017 indicators and an average of the 2018 and 2017 indicators are in the Dissertation Appendix for Chapter 3, Section B.

Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2018	66	0	1	0.5	0.5
Independent Variable	2014 Round 1 vote % for Partido de la U	56	6.7	76.7	40.3	17.9
Independent Variable	2014 Round 2 vote % for Partido de la U	56	15.2	92.0	51.5	20.5
Independent Variable	2010 Round 1 vote % for Partido de la U	64	4.6	50.5	21.1	9.9
Independent Variable	2010 Round 2 vote % for Partido de la U	64	11.6	100	50.1	17.5

Table 4.6 presents the summary statistics for Peru.[67] In this case, the dependent variable and a few of the independent variables reflect the valid vote percentage for the non-incumbent party (Fuerza Popular and Fuerza 2011), as mentioned in Section 4.4.5. The economic data from Peru are from 2016 since the first and second rounds were held in the middle of that year (ONPE 2016; Achen and Bartels, 2016).[68]

Table 4.6: Peru Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	2016 Round 2 vote % for Fuerza Popular	72	0	81.5	34.2	17.6
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2016	74	-1.5	254.9	6.1	29.6
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2016	76	0.1	26.5	7.2	5.2

[67] The summary statistics and results for 2006 Peru, 2011 Peru, and 2016 Peru done individually and with no-lookback are included in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 3, Section B as well as some alternate models and relevant summary statistics are included in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 3, Section B.
[68] Additional analyses that include 2015 indicators and an average of the 2016 and 2015 indicators are in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 3, Section B.

Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2016	75	-6.0	7.1	2.4	2.3
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2016	74	0	1	0.8	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2016	76	0	1	0.2	0.4
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2016	75	0	1	0.2	0.4
Independent Variable	2011 Round 1 vote % for Fuerza 2011	64	0	51.7	17.4	11.6
Independent Variable	2011 Round 2 vote % for Fuerza 2011	64	7.3	100	65.6	17.0

4.5 Analysis

Given the continuous nature of the dependent variable, ordinary least squares regression will be used for all of these analyses. In order to test the model and determine whether the retrospective voting model helps us better understand expatriate voting, I begin with the Chilean case with a model of the single instance of expatriate voting allowed in 2017. I then move to the cases of Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil and Peru that allow for inclusion of previous economic and electoral trends in the analysis of expatriate voting patterns.

4.5.1 Chile Results

In order to determine the role economic factors play in the vote choice by expatriates during the 2017 Chilean elections, the models are as follows:

Model 1: Socialist vote % in the 2nd round of 2017=$\beta_0 + \beta_1$ Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + υ_i

Model 2: Socialist vote % in the 2nd round of 2017=$\beta_0 + \beta_1$ Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4Inflation dummy$_i$ + β_5Unemployment dummy$_i$ + β_6GDP Growth dummy$_i$ + υ_i

Table 4.7: Chile Economic Results

Variable	Chile 2017 Model 1	Chile 2017 Model 2
Inflation Rate	-0.19 (0.72)	0.79 (0.81)
Unemployment Rate	-0.20 (0.65)	-0.77 (0.97)
GDP Growth Rate	-3.22* (1.72)	-2.59 (1.83)
Inflation Dummy		18.71*** (6.57)
Unemployment Dummy		-6.62 (10.34)
GDP Dummy		-1.81 (10.92)
Constant	64.40*** (8.17)	58.80*** (18.47)
N	59	59
R^2	0.07	0.20
SER	22.34	21.23

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

In the first model, in Chile, as the inflation and unemployment rates increase in a voter's country of residence, the vote percentage for the incumbent (Socialist) party decreases, but neither of these estimates reach any traditional levels of statistical significance. This is in line with the directionality outlined in Hypothesis 1. For every point the GDP growth rate increases in a voter's country of residence, vote share for the incumbent (Socialist) party decreases by

3.22%. This is the only estimate to approach traditional levels of statistical significance ($p<0.10$), but runs against the expectations in Hypothesis 1. As a result of this model, there seems to be limited support for Hypothesis 1.

In the second model, which tests Hypothesis 2, when the inflation rate in the country of residence is lower than the Chilean rate, the vote percentage for the incumbent Socialist party increases by over 18 percentage points, which, besides being substantively significant, is the only statistically significant ($p<0.01$) result in the model. This runs counter to the expectations outlined in Hypothesis 2, however, which posits that those who live in areas that are doing better economically than their country of origin will be more likely to punish the incumbent party at the ballot box. This does, however, provide support to Hypothesis 1, since the voters are rewarding the incumbent party in their country of origin when their economic situation abroad is good. Given that Chile experienced hyperinflation in the early 1970s, that might explain voters' sensitivity to that particular economic indicator, but given the lack of individual-level data on the various expatriate populations (e.g., age, how long they have been abroad, reason for leaving, etc.) I cannot explore the potential impact of some of these factors on the expat vote choice (Callund 1999). The coefficient for the dummy variables for the unemployment rate and the GDP growth rate indicate that in countries where the unemployment rate is lower than the rate in Chile, and where the GDP growth rate is higher, the vote share for the Socialist party decreases, but these effects are not distinguishable from zero. While the directionality is consistent with Hypothesis 2, the lack of statistical significance offers little support to this hypothesis in the Chilean case. None of the continuous economic variables reach any level of statistical significance and the expected directionality for the inflation rate and the GDP growth rate is

opposite of what is expected in Hypothesis 1. The directionality for the coefficient on the unemployment rate variable is as expected as outlined in Hypothesis 1.

In addition to not providing robust support for either Hypothesis 1 or 2, Models 1 and 2 have a low R-squared and a high standard error of the regression, indicating that they do not do a good job of explaining vote share for the Socialist party among the Chilean expatriate community. In all likelihood, more socioeconomic and demographic data on the expat voters themselves are necessary to more fully understand their voting behavior. Nonetheless, these analyses offer a first step in efforts to understand the drivers of the decision calculus among individuals casting votes from afar.

The next step in this process is to include in the analysis results from previous elections to account for the role of the partisan leanings of the expatriate community and allow for an assessment of the stability (or lack thereof) of expat voting patterns over time. Presumably, adding prior voting patterns of this community to a model of current voting patterns will capture the baseline voting tendencies of this community. Therefore, I include in the models below the percent of the valid vote for the Socialist candidate in the first round of the election as another independent variable. These models and the results are the following:

Model 3: Socialist vote % in the 2nd round of 2017=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 Socialist vote % in the 1st round$_i$ + υ_i

Model 4: Socialist vote % in the 2nd round of 2017=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 Inflation dummy$_i$ + β_5 Unemployment dummy$_i$ + β_6 GDP Growth dummy$_i$ + β_7 Socialist vote % in the 1st round$_i$ + υ_i

Table 4.8: Chile Economic Results with Round One Valid Vote Percentage

Variable	Chile 2017 Model 3	Chile 2017 Model 4
Inflation Rate	-0.40 (0.55)	0.25 (0.61)
Unemployment Rate	0.09 (0.49)	-0.84 (0.72)
GDP Growth Rate	0.13 (1.41)	1.13 (1.47)
Inflation Dummy		15.10*** (4.90)
Unemployment Dummy		-10.93 (7.69)
GDP Dummy		-8.43 (8.15)
Round One Socialist Vote %	1.16*** (0.18)	1.13*** (0.17)
Constant	26.40*** (8.59)	34.87** (14.15)
N	59	59
R^2	0.47	0.57
SER	16.98	15.72

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

As expected, including the percent of the valid vote for the Socialist candidate in the first round of the election enhances the performance of the model fit and reduces the standard error of the regression. We see from the results for Model 3 in Table 4.7 that for every percentage point increase in the vote share of the Socialist candidate in the first round of voting, there is a 1.16% increase in voting for the Socialist candidate in the second round, which is the only statistically significant result in this model (p<0.01). The coefficients for the economic variables are neither substantively nor statistically significant in this model. The directionality on the coefficients for the inflation and GDP growth rate measures are as expected, but not that of the unemployment rate. As a result, there seems to be no evidence to support Hypothesis 1 in this particular case.

Looking at Model 4, once again we find that when the inflation rate in the country of residence is lower than in Chile, the vote percentage for the incumbent Socialist party increases

by over 15 percentage points, indicating a strong role for this variable in the model. Besides being substantively significant, the is the only economic variable to achieve statistical significance ($p<0.01$) in the model. As in the previous models, these results run counter to the expectations outlined in Hypothesis 2, which states that those who live in areas that are doing better economically than their country of origin will be more likely to punish the incumbent party at the ballot box. Again, as in Model 2, the inflation dummy variable in Model 4 does provide support to Hypothesis 1, since the voters are rewarding the incumbent party in their country of origin when their economic situation abroad is good.

Similar to Model 3, in Model 4, for every percentage point increase in voting for the Socialist candidate in the first round of voting, there is a 1.13% increase in the vote share for the Socialist candidate in the second round, which is the only other variable be statistically significant in this model ($p<0.01$). None of the other remaining economic variables or dummies reach any level of statistical significance. The directionality on the coefficients for the unemployment, GDP growth rate, unemployment dummy, and GDP dummy measures are as expected in the hypothesis, but not distinguishable from zero. The direction of the coefficient on the inflation rate variable runs counter to expectations, but is not distinguishable from zero, statistically. Again, there seems to be no support for Hypothesis 2 in Chile in 2017.

While there is little support for Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 in any of these models, including the Socialist party vote share in the first round in the second set of models significantly improves the explanatory power and model fit measures.[69] While economics may matter on occasion in Chile, partisanship has a greater effect on the electoral outcomes, as might be

[69] The mean variance inflation factor (VIF) for each of these models is under 2, therefore reducing the level of concern for multicollineary issues in the model.

expected. The one curious finding is that it seems that the expectations expressed in Hypothesis 1 are supported more with the dummy variables results. Perhaps expatriates are able to make a comparative analysis of their current economic conditions abroad, relative to conditions back in Chile and reward the incumbent Chilean party. This finding merits further examination in the cases which follow.

4.5.2 Economic and Vote Choice Results

In order to highlight and summarize these results across the region, I offer in Table 9 the results of one election cycle for each of the countries analyzed. Results for the remaining election years analyzed can be found in the Dissertation Appendix.

Table 4.9: Combined and Summarized Economic and Vote Choice Results

Variable	Ecuador 2017	Brazil 2018	Colombia 2018	Peru 2016
Inflation Rate	0.32 (0.50)	1.38* (0.73)	-0.21 (0.18)	0.78** (0.39)
Unemployment Rate	0.05 (0.24)	0.62 (0.62)	0.25* (0.12)	0.23 (0.25)
GDP Growth Rate	0.55 (0.63)	-0.16 (0.99)	0.27 (0.25)	0.08 (0.64)
Inflation Dummy	4.18 (3.09)	11.71** (5.53)	-2.24** (1.02)	
Unemployment Dummy	1.08 (2.72)	2.49 (9.63)	3.70** (1.57)	
GDP Dummy	-5.72 (7.28)	8.48 (7.21)	-0.68 (1.05)	
PAIS Vote % in Round 1 in 2017	0.94*** (0.09)			
PAIS Vote % in 2013	0.20** (0.09)			
PT Vote % in 2nd		0.05 (0.15)		

Round of 2010				
PT Vote % in 2nd Round of 2014		0.56*** (0.18)		
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 1 in 2010			0.16*** (0.04)	
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 1 in 2014			0.06** (0.02)	
2011 Round 1 vote % for Fuerza 2011				0.90*** (0.12)
2011 Round 2 vote % for Fuerza 2011				0.12 (0.09)
Constant	-4.98 (9.45)	-8.38 (15.51)	-5.77* (3.03)	7.83 (6.01)
N	40	69	48	54
R^2	0.89	0.32	0.43	0.66
SER	5.84	13.50	2.23	8.37

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Based on the results above, a number of trends stand out. First, the indicators for the inflation numbers are statistically significant for Brazil and Peru, but are both in the opposite direction than what was expected in Hypothesis 1. In both cases, for every one-point increase in inflation in the country of residence for Brazilian and Peruvian expatriates, the vote for the incumbent party increases by 1.38% and 0.78%, respectively. So as the situation gets worse for those living abroad, they seem to be more inclined to reward the incumbent party back home. This sensitivity to inflation in Brazil and Peru may be explained by their economic histories. Brazil's hyperinflation started in the 1970s and lasted on and off until the mid-1990s, suggesting that most Brazilians living abroad in the past fifteen years will at least have some familiarity with, and thus sensitivity to, periods of high inflation (Skidmore 2010). Peru also went through

periods of high inflation on-and-off starting in the 1970s and peaking in the early 1990s with inflation rates of over 7,000% (Gomez 2005).

The results from Colombia also challenge my initial expectations in Hypothesis 1, but in the area of unemployment rather than inflation. The results suggest that as the unemployment rate increases in a voter's country of residence, the vote share for the incumbent party increases by 0.25%, which is statistically significant, but substantively not very large. Again, it is curious that as the situation gets worse for Colombians living abroad, they are more likely to reward the incumbent party back home. Examining Colombia's economic history might give an explanation as to why the expatriate population may be particularly sensitive to unemployment. Colombia has experienced two peaks in its unemployment rates, particularly in urban areas, in the mid-1980s and again at the turn of the millennium (Medina, Núñez, and Tamayo 2013). In the mid-1980s, the unemployment rate in major cities varied between 13% and 15%, while from 1998 until about the mid-2000s, unemployment in urban areas spiked as high as 20% and was always more than 15% (Medina, Núñez, and Tamayo 2013). Other studies have found that there is a structural unemployment rate in Colombia over the past twenty years has been between 6.1% and 12.5% (Arango and Flórez 2016).

Looking at the dummy variables in each of these models, the economic factors that tend to emerge as significant are again inflation and unemployment rates in Brazil and Colombia. For the Brazil model, when the inflation rate in the country of residence is lower than it is in Brazil, the vote percentage for the incumbent PT increases by over 11 percentage points ($p<0.05$). This runs counter to the expectations outlined in Hypothesis 2, however, which postulates that those who live in areas that are doing better economically than their country of origin will be more likely to punish the incumbent party at the ballot box. But, as was the case in Chile, this does

support the relationship in Hypothesis 1 that voters abroad reward the incumbent party when they are doing well economically.

In Colombia, the coefficient for the inflation dummy variable shows that in countries where the inflation rate is lower than Colombia, the vote share for Partido de la U decreases by 2.24%, which is statistically significant ($p<0.05$) and is consistent with Hypothesis 2 which posits that voters living in areas that are doing better than the country of residence will punish the incumbent party. The coefficient on the unemployment dummy variable demonstrates that in countries that have lower unemployment rates than Colombia, the vote share for the incumbent party (Partido de la U) increases by 3.70% ($p<0.05$), which runs contrary to Hypothesis 2, but does support Hypothesis 1 since voters are rewarding incumbent parties for good economic conditions that voters happen to be experiencing outside of Colombia.

As mentioned earlier, economic history may be a useful tool in explaining why these particular indicators are significant. In addition to unemployment, Colombia also experienced levels of high inflation. Between the early 1970s and the early 1990s, Colombia had an inflation rate of 22-23% (Gómez, Uribe, and Vargas 2002). While that rate dropped throughout the 1990s, the inflation rate was still around 10% by the end of the decade (Gómez, Uribe, and Vargas 2002). As a result, it would make sense that Colombian expatriates might be responsive to these particular economic indicators, although, as mentioned before, I do not have individual-level demographic data for these individuals, know when the left Colombia, or their reason for departure, so I cannot make a more substantive connection between the economic indicators and electoral outcomes.

It is worth noting that the GDP growth rate or dummy variable do not reach any level of significance in these models. Perhaps this is due to the fact that this economic indicator matters

less in these particular expatriate communities or it is not felt as acutely as unemployment and inflation.

As seen in Table 9, previous vote share for the incumbent party clearly matters in all of these cases. These results are all in the expected direction and vary in size from the very small in parts of the model for Brazil and Colombia to the larger in Ecuador and Peru. It is worth noting that the only variables that reach statistical significance in the Ecuador model are the previous vote share variables. Economics matter for vote choice in some cases, but the lingering ties of partisan affiliation do bind expatriate voters to their parties back home.

For all of these cases, in terms of model fit, the R-squared indicators are particularly strong in Ecuador and Peru. Colombia has the lowest standard error of the regression of any of the models highlighted here.

4.5.3 Interview Data

While these quantitative results shed light on what may be going on at a national level among expatriates, what do individual voters say when asked what they think about when they cast their ballot? Using interviews conducted in July 2015 in Buenos Aires, Argentina, I try and provide a more nuanced view of what migrants consider before voting.

I talked with individuals who ranged from "twenty-something" undergraduate and graduate students to middle-aged professional adults who had lived in Argentina from anywhere from a few months to decades. Half of the participants were male and half were female. The participants from Ecuador, Colombia, Chile, and Brazil had all come to Argentina to study (either at the undergraduate or post-graduate level) and either established or intended to establish a life in Argentina once they had completed their studies. The free cost of undergraduate and

post-graduate education in Argentina was a big pull factor for the participants and, many cited the perceived social mobility in Argentine society that would allow them to create a secure financial future for themselves. The Uruguayan participants were middle-aged women, had married Argentine men, had grown children, and had been living in Argentina anywhere from 28 to 33 years, at that point.

One important aspect that united all of the interviewees was the importance they placed on social media for staying in contact with friends and family back home and keeping up with news and other events back home. As one Brazilian respondent said, "I still pay attention 100% to the news in Brazil...I left Brazil, but I didn't leave Brazil." Many of the respondents, and especially many in the Ecuadorian focus group, were making comparisons between life in Argentina and lamenting the cuisine and social norms they left behind, they did comment on the fever-pitch of politics in Argentina (it was in full campaign season at all levels of government during the time the focus groups were conducted) and how it was different from what they had experienced in Ecuador.

From these respondents, then, there is a consistent tendency to compare elements of their life in Argentina and life back home. Therefore, the proposition that expats will at least in part cast their vote on the basis of the comparison they make between their host country and their home country economic conditions finds support from the interviews. That said, when asked what might influence their vote in a presidential election, the economic conditions of host and origin countries did not seem to be at the forefront of their minds. Rather, for many respondents, the ideology or the platform of the candidates was the most important factor when deciding how to vote. Finally, though a small number of respondents reported having had cast an "expat vote" at the time of the interviews, it was not due to lack of interest. In many cases, they had still been

in their country of origin at the time of the most recent election, but many of them reported intentions to vote from abroad if they found themselves outside of their home country for the next election.

When it comes to describing how being an expatriate changes one's political perspectives, a Brazilian student said that "living abroad [means] seeing events back home with greater distance...it is like a mosaic. You can't see the whole image when you're close up. You have to be farther to see the bigger thing and see the representation and I think that's important. It's like you have a bigger perspective on things." In addition, he mentioned that being abroad "helps to open your eyes...[and allows for]...a comparison with your home." So, at least for this respondent, being an expatriate may not necessarily change what you think about when participating in politics, but rather changes one's perspective and viewpoints on politics and the surrounding world. As many of the Ecuadorians commented, their time abroad has been a period of growth and maturity since they are away from their families and have to deal with the world around them on their own. Therefore, it is plausible that their perspectives on the world around them have also grown and changed during their time abroad.

All of these factors tend to illustrate that there is something about moving abroad that changes a person and that may extend to their political lives as well. Clearly, there are many other mechanisms at work, besides economic factors, by which expatriates interact with the world around in them in their countries of residence and in their country of origin. While they do not seem to disconnect from events in their country of origin, they do still notice the differences from their new surroundings. Gaining a more systematic understanding of how these mechanisms may affect political choices is critical for advancing the study of expatriate voting.

4.6 Conclusion

Based on these results, there is some support for the blind retrospection hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), using the economic dummy variables in the case of inflation for both Chile and Brazil and for unemployment in Colombia, where the voters are rewarding the incumbent party in their country of origin when their economic situation abroad is good. The results appear to depend on a country's economic history and may not always work in the expected direction for the straight economic indicator variables. It may be that there has to be enough of a difference between the economic conditions of both countries (as highlighted by the blunt instrument of the dummy variable) so that the expatriate voter can first discern the difference in the economies and have the ability to act on that difference at the ballot box.

Using just the economic indicators lead to results that are contrary to expectations of Hypothesis 1. In Model 1 for Chile, for every point increase in the GDP growth rate in the country of residence, the vote share for the incumbent party drops by over 3% ($p<0.10$). In Brazil and Peru, the inflation rate indicator reaches statistical significance, but in the opposite direction than expected. Higher rates of inflation in a voter's country of residence seems to correlate with higher levels of support for the incumbent/well-known candidate. For Colombians abroad, the unemployment rate is significant for voters' evaluation of the incumbent, although it is not in the hypothesized direction. It is unclear why the effects are opposite of my expectations in so many of the countries. This could be due any number of factors, including a partisan/ideological difference between the incumbent administration and the expatriate communities in various countries or there are other economic indicators, not evaluated here, that are stronger influencers of vote choice.

The relative economic evaluation hypothesis (Hypothesis 2), which posits that the voters living in areas that are doing better than the country of residence will punish the incumbent party, has limited support. The only evidence for the relationship established in Hypothesis 2 is from the inflation dummy variable for Colombia, which is statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction. So, Colombians living in countries that have lower levels of inflation, as compared to Colombia, are more likely to punish the incumbent party.

On the other hand, in models for Chile, Brazil, and, with respect to the unemployment indicator, Colombia, the results for this relative retrospective hypothesis are significant but in the opposite direction than expected. At least for these voters, an evaluation of economic effects of their country of residence, relative to their home countries, is taking place, but merits further evaluation to examine whether partisanship or other economic effects may explain these effects. It is likely that the underlying reasoning behind Hypothesis 2 needs to be reevaluated in terms of how voters' evaluations of home country incumbents may be affected by relative differences in economic conditions between their host and home countries.

What is clear is that in almost all cases, when previous vote share for the party is included in these models across several countries in Latin America, those are statistically significant effects, albeit small, in some cases, that persist through at least one election cycle. Given these results, it is entirely possible that partisanship matters more for expatriate voters than economics when determining vote choice. Another explanation could be that perhaps economics only influence vote choice when there is a significant change, be it positive or negative, in a timeframe that would be relevant for an election decision.

Given the somewhat weak support for these hypotheses, it is entirely reasonable to consider the fact that the Powell and Whitten model may not apply to the expatriate voting

decision. This may be the case just for the emerging democracies of Latin America examined here, where such voting is still a relatively recent phenomenon or this may be a pattern evident across the many other expatriate communities around the world. There may need to be modification for what types of economic indicators are significant or if there are other issues (e.g., taxation, property rights, inheritance, etc.), which may be of more concern to voters abroad that should be included in these vote choice models. While not evaluated here, this would be a useful avenue for further inquiry. Finally, Powell and Whitten's models are now over twenty-five years old, and much has changed in Latin American and world politics over that time. As a result, there may need to be significant changes to the composition of these models to reflect the contemporary political situation.

On the other hand, as described in Chapter 3, those with emigration intentions, and, by extension, those abroad, are a hard case to study in relation to the traditional literature on voting behavior. Finding a weak relationship relative to these well-studied theories is therefore significant and merits further study. Expatriate voters are unlike those who tend to vote, as described by canonical behavior scholars, so finding any results that even vaguely mirror extant theories is meaningful and an important contribution to our understanding of who votes, why, and on what basis.

It seems that, at least in this analysis, expatriate voters tend to resemble regular, domestic voters in that they consider some economic conditions when making their vote choice, but that partisan affinity seems to matter more in influencing decisions at the ballot box. The importance of context and economic history in all of these countries should not be underestimated when analyzing the significance of certain indicators. As seen in the analysis, some expatriates are more sensitive to inflation while others are particularly attuned to the unemployment rate. While

patterns may develop over time, it is useful to remember that each election happens in its own unique time with a discrete set of events around it, and, though it is necessary to be aware of these broad patterns over time, this must not come at the expense of understanding how and why those particular, surrounding events matter for an electoral decision.

While the results presented here are thought-provoking, it is worth pointing out the limitations of this study. Due to the data, I am unable to get a better sense of possible alternative explanations such as party identification or how the voter identifies ideologically. It is also not possible to evaluate differences related to education, type of employment, or income. Finally, I do not know when the migrants left their country of origin or how long they have been in their current countries of residence, which would be important for understanding their political socialization in their country of origin and in their new countries of residence. All of these constraints should underscore very clearly that there is much work to be done on this topic and that results reported here are simply part of a first step toward understanding the voting behavior of the myriad expat communities around the world. The qualitative data included here may indicate paths forward for future researchers, but what remains clear is that more and more people are voting from abroad and this will remain an important issue for study in the years and decades ahead.[70]

[70] See Tables A4.7.1-A4.7.14 in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 4 for the number of votes cast, the number of voters registered, and turnout rates by election for Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

CHAPTER 5

5.1 Summary of Findings and Contributions

As examined throughout the previous chapters, the factors that shape the migration decision and the electoral decision are complex. The process of deciding to migrate to eventually participating in one's home country elections from abroad has different parts and various motivations driving it at the various junctures or decision points along the way. Understanding how these link together is crucial in furthering our understanding of the role that migrants, who make up nearly four percent of the world's population, play in the political processes of their home country, and the degree to which they behave politically in accordance with their stay-at-home counterparts. This study represents yet another step in our efforts to better answer some of these questions.

From Chapter 2, the largest effects on emigration intention are in sociodemographic features, such as age, marital status, gender, and also whether someone receives remittances from abroad. A younger, unmarried man who receives remittances is much more likely to consider migration than an older, married woman who does not receive financial assistance from abroad. Other effects, such as being the victim of a crime or corruption and evaluations of economy and the democratic system, do matter, to varying degrees across the countries studied here but in general it is these socioeconomic and demographic factors that appear to be most consistently associated with the decision to leave one's country. Those who have been the victims of crime or corruption are, on the whole, more likely to want to leave while those who have positive evaluations of the economy or the democratic system within a country are more likely to stay. While there are variations in effects by country and by year of the survey as to how salient certain issues might be to those considering migration, these results underscore the complexity

and multidimensional nature of the emigration decision. While certain individual characteristics can serve to identify the pool of potential migrants, the lived experiences of individuals within this pool might propel them to make that decision to go and seek a life abroad. These findings also inform our picture of what the migrant population abroad may already look like and gives a basis for understanding their political behavior from overseas.

From Chapter 3, we find that those thinking about migration are more likely to have already disengaged from voting in national elections, even while controlling for other factors related to participation. In addition, those with the sociodemographic characteristics of potential migrants are also less likely to engage in the electoral process than their counterparts who do not report intentions to emigrate. Individuals who have already made the decision to leave appear less willing to contribute to or engage with national political decisions. Potential migrants may be too occupied with their emigration plans, may have already "exited" domestic politics in psychological terms, or may simply think that their political opinion matters less and less as they inch closer to leaving their home country behind. This apparent tendency to disengage prior to leaving may suggest a population less likely to vote once settled abroad but we also know that those leaving their country behind tend to be have risk-accepting personalities (Canache, et al. 2013), a characteristic also associated with political participation. Thus, it remains an open question as to whether the results reported in Chapter 3 suggest lower or higher electoral participation among the many Latin American expat communities around the world. Though we have anecdotal and some empirical evidence that help us make sense of variations in voter turnout among these communities, due to the lack of systematic turnout data among the many communities I analyze in this study, I leave the question of variations in voter turnout for another

day. Rather, I focus on patterns of voting behavior among those who do decide to vote from abroad.

The expatriate voting analysis from Chapter 4 indicates that those voting from abroad do have the ability to compare the economic conditions in both their home countries and country of residence, but it is limited. The blind retrospection hypothesis (the more positive the economic situation in the country of residence is, the more likely the expatriate voting bloc will favor the incumbent party) has more support with the dummy indicators for inflation in both Chile and Brazil and the dummy indicator for unemployment in Colombia all being statistically significant. The comparative economic evaluation hypothesis (a situation where as the economic conditions of an expat voter's host country worsen in comparison to the conditions of her native country, the more likely she will be to support the incumbent government in her native country), only garnered support from the dummy inflation indicator for Colombia. Many of the straight economic indicators included in the models are statistically significant, but in the opposite direction as hypothesized. I posit, based on the countries analyzed, that one's experience with the economic history of her country may play a role in determining which particular indicators are salient when making a vote choice from abroad.

What is notable in these results is that when previous vote share is included in the model, those indicators are highly statistically significant in terms of how partisanship or past voting patterns influence vote choice for those living abroad. It may be that expatriate voters are similar to their compatriots back home in terms of the importance of partisan affiliation and the role economics plays in determining which party or candidate to vote for in a presidential election. While economic conditions may be important to both domestic and expatriate voters, there is some evidence, based on these findings, that if there is a substantial difference between the

economic indicators in the country of residence and the country of origin, then expatriates may be able to use that information to reward or punish incumbent governments. Expatriates could use these economic indicators in slightly different ways to inform their vote choice, as compared to domestic voters.

Given these results, what are we able to say with respect to the puzzles outlined in the Introduction? What factors motivate an individual to leave, particularly when the costs for establishing a life elsewhere can be high? Here the results highlight the importance of receiving remittances and sociodemographic factors such as age, marital status, and gender. This does not discount, however the importance of experiences or evaluations in determining intentions to leave. The second puzzle concerning the differences in electoral engagement between those with plans to leave their country and those with no such plans, we find that the former report voting less than the latter. Finally, in my attempt to better understanding voting patterns among expat communities, partisanship still seems to be an important factor in vote choice, while economic conditions in both the host and home country do seem to exert some influence on the vote choice in certain ways. First, a country's economic history may make certain economic indicators more salient for its expatriate population. Second, there seems to be some evidence that expatriates do consider the economy of their country of residence, and in one case, seems to make a comparison between both the economies of the country of origin and country of residence, when determining whether to vote for the incumbent party in elections back home.

These results contribute to the existing literature in several different ways. First, by examining a wide set of factors that may influence emigration intention, this builds a more comprehensive view of both the population considering leaving and the population that has already left. While we find that receiving remittances and sociodemographic features remain

strong predictors of that choice across Latin America, negative experiences with crime, economics, and corruption do correlate with an individual's likelihood of declaring intentions to migrate. By understanding these various characteristics, we can infer what diasporas may be particularly sensitive to when they contemplate their participation from abroad. Furthermore, given that these are generally under-studied countries when it comes to emigration intention, it is useful to know that the same factors that correlate with emigration intentions in places such as Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean are still at work in these five cases. That being said, it is notable that a country's political and economic history can influence which particular factors may matter more in terms of correlating with the decision to emigrate.

In addition, examining how those considering migration and whether they participate pre-departure contributes to the small, but growing area of literature related to the political behavior of those planning to emigrate but have not yet left. These results shed light on how and whether individuals considering migration think of themselves as part of the national body politic. If someone has already disengaged from politics before leaving, then by the time an individual may declare emigration intentions, it may be too late to change her mind and persuade her to participate in an election. So, interested policy makers and governments who wish to keep citizens from leaving and provide incentives for them to build a life in their country of origin may need to establish programs targeted at individuals with the characteristics of likely migrants to address their concerns and provide avenues for living a better life in their country of origin. By extension, this also highlights the likelihood of participating of those already abroad. If the chances of voting before departure are low, then it seems plausible that participation from abroad is similarly unlikely, so exploring the voting decisions of those among these communities who do actually cast a vote is a particularly difficult task given the unique, and largely unknown,

qualities of this population, particularly when analyzing their voting behavior based on traditional theories of voting behavior. As seen from the results in Chapter 4, given that we find significant results, this population of expatriate voters could present a rich population with which to expand the traditional literature on voting behavior.

Finally, this project seeks to contribute to the literature on expatriate voting by applying a retrospective voting model on data collected from five Latin American countries across several election waves. By applying a traditional voting model to a new group, it is possible to examine whether expatriate voters are fundamentally different than their compatriots back home in terms of what they consider to be influential on their votes at a macro-level. While partisan linkages still influence vote choice from abroad, it does seem that the migrant experience has an influence on the economic considerations of expatriates in how they determine whether to vote for the incumbent party back home. In addition, by including individual-level qualitative data from focus groups of expatriates within Latin America, this bolsters our understanding of how expatriates see themselves in relation to politics in their country of origin.

5.2 Avenues for Future Study

There are several paths forward to extend this research, but they generally fall into four main categories: additional emigration intention analyses, additional expatriate voting studies, studies of legislators representing expatriates in legislators back home, and longitudinal studies of migrants over time. First, as is always the case, it would be useful to gather the same data from different countries to see whether other individuals with emigration intentions act differently either in terms of what drives their emigration intentions or whether their participation is changed while they are considering departure. The AmericasBarometer data

allow for a number of different surveys in the same country over time and this analysis could be extended to other countries of interest across the region, assuming question availability.[71] Another benefit of extending the analysis of Chapter 2 using AmericasBarometer data would be that the concept of participation could be examined beyond the ballot box, ranging from protest behavior to community engagement. It would be useful to find out whether individuals considering migration have already checked out from those types of activities, as well.

The second category of extensions of this analysis is focused on the expatriate voting analysis. One alternative would be to test the model described in Chapter 3 on electoral results from other countries (either in Latin America or from other countries around the world) or on future waves from these current countries to see whether the findings hold in these different contexts. One additional extension of this analysis would be to include an indicator in the retrospective model as to whether the exchange rate between the country of birth and country of residence is favorable to those receiving remittances. Given the fluctuation of currencies, this indicator would have to rely on an annual or monthly average rate in the period leading up to a particular election. Such an approach would capture the potential electoral impact of variations in the value of remittances sent back by expat communities across time and space.

For a more ambitious extension of the expatriate analysis, there is already a guide for this in the Latino Immigrant National Election Study (LINES), carried out in 2012 (McCann and Jones-Correa 2016) and the 2010 Colombian expatriate exit polling outlined in Escobar, Arana, and McCann (2014). LINES is a survey of over 1,200 respondents and has questions related to

[71] As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, additional analyses were conducted that included all of the countries included in the AmericasBarometer project as well as for the five countries explored in-depth in this study. These analyses looked at data from different years than those presented here and in general painted a similar picture to that provided by the analyses in this study.

the determinants of participation (both foreign and domestic), political activity in the respondent's country of origin, and whether the respondent has participated in an election in their home country while living in the United States (McCann and Jones-Correa 2016). While this survey does not contain information about which candidates foreign-born Latinos voted for in home-country elections, at least for Mexican-born respondents, it is possible to determine partisanship among the PRI, PAN, and PRD parties (McCann and Jones-Correa 2016). The Colombian exit polling is notable in the breadth of where surveys took place across five locations within Colombia and in five major metropolitan areas abroad (Escobar, Arana, McCann 2014). While the researchers were unable to ask specifically about vote choice, they were able to include a broad range of additional questions (Escobar, Arana, McCann 2014). Since both studies ask about expatriate participation, these can be used as a guide for creating surveys in other countries (or regions) or for other expatriate communities which test theories related to participation, such as resources, partisanship, and whether (and how) economic considerations in either country factor into their vote decision. While this would be a large undertaking, any additional survey research could provide a useful comparison to these extant studies and contribute to a better understanding as to how expatriate voters may or may not be different from their compatriots back home.

The third broad category of future research on this topic would be to analyze the impact of expatriate voting on political outcomes. In addition to participation in presidential elections, some expatriates have the ability to vote for individual members of the legislative branch back home. Colombians abroad elect two representatives to serve in the legislature, providing yet another institutional variation in how expatriates can affect politics back home (IDEA 2007; Glickhouse and Keller 2012). Ecuadorians and Panamanians abroad also elect representatives to

the national legislature (IDEA 2007). In addition to looking at the roll call votes for these legislators, it would be possible to research what types of bills are cosponsored by legislators who represent expatriates and how those legislators represent their constituents in other countries (see Collyer 2014). Another option would be to examine the trajectory of legislative actions related to expatriate communities and their political rights. Do such bills survive the legislative process or not, and what are the drivers of support and opposition to such bills?

Finally, and perhaps the most ambitious study of all, the last category for future analysis would be to study potential migrants over time. That way, it would be possible to follow those with emigration intentions over time and see whether they actually move abroad, what considerations do they have pre-departure in terms of how they orient themselves politically to the state which they are leaving, and whether they choose to participate from abroad. This could be done through a panel study or in-depth interviews over time with a small group of individuals. Through this process, it would be possible to better understand the mechanisms at play in each of these decision processes. This would allow researchers to better identify and understand those who act on emigration intentions and those who ultimately do not. The time and resources to identify and follow these individuals over time may be more than what is feasible, but it would make a contribution to the migration literature. While some these paths for future research may be more difficult to follow than others, they could provide rich insights and theory building for achieving a deep understanding of the whole migration process across Latin America.

5.3 Broader Impact of the Research

The immediate implications for this research would be of interest for policymakers and governments of both sending and receiving countries. Those from sending countries could learn

more about the characteristics of their population abroad, while policymakers from receiving countries could learn more about why those individuals left their countries of birth and what issues may be of particular salience to them while living within a new environment. Interested politicians from migrant sending countries may wish to address certain "push" factors examined here, such as crime or corruption victimization or work to improve the democracy or economic situations domestically, if they are inclined to try and keep their citizens from departing for greener pastures elsewhere. Politicians in receiving countries could use these same findings to determine what programs might be useful to implement through targeted foreign aid if they may wish to slow the flow of individuals from certain countries or regions. As a recent case for this type of work, the task force led by Vice President Kamala Harris which seeks to address the root causes of emigration from Central America (Ordoñez 2021) has recently announced significant funding for organizations in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras which focus on "'long term development of the region, including efforts for economic opportunity, strengthening governance, combating corruption, and improving security'" (Keith 2021). An additional consideration is if certain countries are interested in attracting immigrants, these findings could help shape policies that might entice migrants such as the provision of basic levels of security, good governance, and an improved economy.

Turning towards the implications for expatriate voting, while this project is just a start, it is necessary to learn more about the reasons for expatriate votes and the people casting them as this population grows. Learning more about what determines the vote choice among expatriates and what outcomes voters could have on politics in their country of origin are necessary for broadening the literature on political behavior. Depending on the size of a country's expatriate community relative to the domestic population, in a close election the deciding vote could very

well be cast abroad. However, this is not the main reason for focusing on these voters. Politicians know little about this group and may consider tailoring their messages differently for constituents abroad than for those at home. Domestic governments and politicians may want to consider specific strategies on how to maintain connections with citizens abroad through social media or specific outreach and target messaging related to salient policies, like property rights, citizenship, and inheritance to this group.

There is also the normative issue of expatriate voting to consider. Should individuals be able to cast votes in more than one country? I think there are two perspectives to consider here. From the individual side, the main question to consider is where does that person see themselves living their life? Do they still see themselves as active members of the body politic back home? If so, then they should still have that right to vote in those elections. Or, do they want to have more of a voice in their adopted country? If so, then maybe they should participate in their country of residence when that option becomes available.

From the government side, those in power must decide whether they wish to maintain that connection with citizens abroad and whether they want to be held accountable for their actions and performance by those abroad. While it may be normatively good for democracy by expanding the franchise to a larger group of citizens, it is unclear whether it is theoretically beneficial for voters to participate in an election if they themselves will not be affected by the outcomes.

As seen in this project, the process of migration is multifaceted and it is important to consider what factors that go into the formation of an individual's choices about whether to leave, whether and how they participate before departure, and whether they take the time and effort to participate from abroad. Expatriate voting presents fundamental questions about

democracy, representation, and participation. This study makes a contribution to this relatively recent area of scholarship to enhance understanding of processes related to migration and democracy in which borders are crossed with much more ease and frequency than in the past and the diffusion of laws permitting ballots to be cast from abroad.

Democracy is no longer necessarily at work only within a country's borders. The increased technological ability to stay connected with politics back home may show that Tip O'Neill's famous quote, "all politics is local," has global implications for the study of voting, policymaking, and democracy for those living abroad.

DISSERTATION APPENDIX

CHAPTER 2

Table A2.1: 2018/19 Regional Summary Statistics[72]

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Intention to Migrate	27,763	0	1	0.28	0.45
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	28,002	0	1	0.24	0.43
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	27,563	0	100	49.29	33.64
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	27,810	0	100	37.13	36.16
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	27,553	0	100	27.54	34.68
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	28,028	0	100	18.70	38.99
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	27,086	1	7	4.75	1.73
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	26,953	0	100	43.95	26.49
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	27,595	1	7	3.73	1.98
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	26,088	1	7	3.64	2.02
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	25,990	1	7	4.21	1.78
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	21,654	0	1	0.12	0.32
Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	27,983	0	1	0.53	0.50
Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	27,964	0	1	0.57	0.49
Independent Variable	Age Cohort	28,026	1	6	2.92	1.61

[72] Please note that while country controls are included in the regional analysis, they are not shown in the results or in the summary statistics table. The reference country is Mexico.

Independent Variable	Level of Education	27,570	0	3	1.96	0.75
Independent Variable	Female	28,027	0	1	0.50	0.50
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	27,619	1	5	2.98	1.41
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	28,042	0	1	0.71	0.45

Table A2.2: 2014 Brazil Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Intention to Migrate	1,490	0	1	0.15	0.36
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	1,498	0	1	0.16	0.36
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	1,497	0	100	49.65	33.37
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	1,493	0	100	54.92	36.96
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	1,477	0	100	37.75	38.21
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	1,500	0	100	14.13	34.84
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	1,459	1	7	4.89	1.87
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	1,448	0	100	44.91	21.35
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	1,491	1	7	3.99	1.91
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	1,484	1	7	3.20	1.83
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	1,495	1	7	3.53	1.82
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	1,498	0	1	0.003	0.05
Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	1,500	0	1	0.56	0.50
Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	1,499	0	1	0.49	0.50
Independent Variable	Age Cohort	1,500	1	6	2.92	1.58
Independent Variable	Level of Education	1,498	0	3	1.72	0.69
Independent Variable	Female	1,500	0	1	0.50	0.50
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	1,498	1	5	3.22	1.41
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	1,500	0	1	0.87	0.33

Table A2.3: 2010 Chile Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Intention to Migrate	1,951	0	1	0.10	0.30
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	1,963	0	1	0.17	0.37
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	1,952	0	100	41.07	29.78
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	1,951	0	100	48.61	29.72
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	1,925	0	100	44.97	29.65
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	1,963	0	100	5.16	22.13
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	1,854	1	7	5.57	1.48
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	1,865	0	100	54.40	21.07
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	1,915	1	7	5.11	1.53
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	1,903	1	7	3.66	1.91
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	1,910	1	7	4.12	1.72
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	1,961	0	1	0.02	0.13
Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	1,957	0	1	0.53	0.50
Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	1,955	0	1	0.59	0.49
Independent Variable	Age Cohort	1,965	1	6	3.19	1.60
Independent Variable	Level of Education	1,961	0	3	2.11	0.66
Independent Variable	Female	1,965	0	1	0.51	0.50
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	1,965	1	5	3.12	1.42
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	1,965	0	1	0.87	0.33

Table A2.4: 2014 Colombia Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Intention to Migrate	1,483	0	1	0.21	0.40
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	1,494	0	1	0.20	0.40
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	1,495	0	100	45.64	32.11
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	1,493	0	100	54.09	36.89
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	1,485	0	100	31.52	33.45
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	1,496	0	100	13.03	33.68
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	1,425	1	7	5.28	1.64
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	1,432	0	100	42.36	22.55
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	1,477	1	7	3.02	1.71
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	1,475	1	7	2.68	1.84
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	1,475	1	7	3.76	1.86
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	1,493	0	1	0.03	0.18
Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	1,494	0	1	0.54	0.50
Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	1,492	0	1	0.61	0.49
Independent Variable	Age Cohort	1,495	1	6	2.72	1.54
Independent Variable	Level of Education	1,494	0	3	2.00	0.72
Independent Variable	Female	1,496	0	1	0.50	0.50
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	1,482	1	5	3.20	1.43
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	1,496	0	1	0.78	0.41

Table A2.5: 2018/19 Ecuador Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Intention to Migrate	1,527	0	1	0.30	0.46
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	1,531	0	1	0.29	0.45
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	1,526	0	100	55.42	31.65
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	1,529	0	100	29.92	32.24
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	1,525	0	100	21.05	30.08
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	1,529	0	100	26.55	44.18
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	1,512	1	7	4.59	1.51
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	1,502	0	100	43.19	26.28
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	1,527	1	7	3.97	1.77
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	1,525	1	7	3.81	1.93
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	1,510	1	7	4.26	1.58
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	1,533	0	1	0.06	0.23
Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	1,533	0	1	0.47	0.50
Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	1,532	0	1	0.61	0.49
Independent Variable	Age Cohort	1,524	1	6	2.78	1.63
Independent Variable	Level of Education	1,526	0	3	2.45	0.69
Independent Variable	Female	1,524	0	1	0.50	0.50
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	1,519	1	5	2.97	1.40
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	1,533	0	1	0.66	0.47

Table A2.6: 2014 Peru Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Intention to Migrate	1,459	0	1	0.23	0.42
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	1,492	0	1	0.31	0.46
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	1,495	0	100	57.03	28.38
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	1,477	0	100	50.00	33.38
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	1,481	0	100	41.22	34.83
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	1,500	0	100	26.40	44.09
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	1,434	1	7	4.75	1.62
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	1,432	0	100	44.27	20.55
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	1,417	1	7	3.75	1.66
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	1,459	1	7	3.31	1.61
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	1,458	1	7	3.75	1.56
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	1,494	0	1	0.04	0.19
Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	1,496	0	1	0.60	0.49
Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	1,487	0	1	0.61	0.49
Independent Variable	Age Cohort	1,500	1	6	2.92	1.53
Independent Variable	Level of Education	1,497	0	3	2.20	0.73
Independent Variable	Female	1,500	0	1	0.50	0.50
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	1,482	1	5	2.95	1.41
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	1,500	0	1	0.77	0.42

CHAPTER 3

Table A3.1: 2018/19 Regional Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Voted in Last Election	27,944	0	1	0.72	0.45
Dependent Variable	Voting in Next Election	25,986	0	1	0.83	0.37
Independent Variable	Intention to Migrate	27,763	0	1	0.28	0.45
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	28,002	0	1	0.24	0.43
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	27,563	0	1	49.29	33.64
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	27,810	0	100	37.13	36.16
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	27,553	0	100	27.54	34.68
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	28,028	0	100	18.70	38.99
Independent Variable	Presidential Approval	27,547	0	100	51.51	27.83
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	27,086	1	7	4.75	1.73
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	26,953	0	100	43.96	26.49
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	27,595	1	7	3.73	1.98
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	26,088	1	7	3.64	2.02
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	25,990	1	7	4.21	1.78
Independent Variable	Ideology	23,841	1	10	5.41	2.77
Independent Variable	Political Interest	27,121	0	100	36.95	34.82
Independent Variable	Identifies with a Party	27,786	0	1	0.26	0.44
Independent Variable	Pays Attention to News	27,907	1	5	4.34	1.06
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	21,654	0	1	0.12	0.32

Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	27,983	0	1	0.53	0.50
Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	27,964	0	1	0.57	0.49
Independent Variable	Age Cohort	28,026	1	6	2.92	1.61
Independent Variable	Level of Education	27,570	0	3	1.96	0.75
Independent Variable	Female	28,027	0	1	0.50	0.50
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	27,619	1	5	2.98	1.41
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	28,042	0	1	0.71	0.45

Table A3.2: 2014 Brazil Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Voted in Last Election	1,498	0	1	0.76	0.43
Dependent Variable	Voting in Next Election	1,256	0	1	0.88	0.33
Independent Variable	Intention to Migrate	1,490	0	1	0.15	0.36
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	1,498	0	1	0.15	0.36
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	1,497	0	100	49.65	33.37
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	1,493	0	100	54.92	36.96
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	1,477	0	100	37.75	38.21
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	1,500	0	100	14.13	34.84
Independent Variable	Presidential Approval	1,494	0	100	52.86	26.01
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	1,459	1	7	4.89	1.87
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	1,448	0	100	44.91	21.35
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	1,491	1	7	2.99	1.91
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	1,484	1	7	3.20	1.83
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	1,495	1	7	3.53	1.82
Independent Variable	Ideology	1,255	1	10	5.48	2.56
Independent Variable	Political Interest	1,497	0	100	29.86	30.04
Independent Variable	Identifies with a Party	1,494	0	1	0.22	0.42
Independent Variable	Pays Attention to News	1,500	1	5	4.58	0.82
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	1,498	0	1	0.003	0.05
Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	1,500	0	1	0.56	0.50

Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	1,499	0	1	0.49	0.50
Independent Variable	Age Cohort	1,500	1	6	2.92	1.58
Independent Variable	Level of Education	1,498	0	3	1.72	0.69
Independent Variable	Female	1,500	0	1	0.50	0.50
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	1,498	1	5	3.22	1.41
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	1,500	0	1	0.87	0.33

Table A3.3: 2008 Chile Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Voted in Last Election	1,506	0	1	0.69	0.46
Dependent Variable	Voting in Next Election	1,228	0	1	0.75	0.43
Independent Variable	Intention to Migrate	1,513	0	1	0.13	0.33
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	1,525	0	1	0.22	0.42
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	1,524	0	100	49.67	32.08
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	1,520	0	100	46.71	31.83
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	1,504	0	100	44.05	33.18
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	1,527	0	100	11.66	32.10
Independent Variable	Presidential Approval	1,507	0	100	55.03	20.06
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	1,444	1	7	5.17	1.60
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	1,446	0	100	48.57	21.17
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	1,487	1	7	4.64	1.65
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	1,478	1	7	3.62	1.81
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	1,458	1	7	3.96	1.74
Independent Variable	Ideology	1,224	1	10	5.54	2.15
Independent Variable	Political Interest	1,522	0	100	22.93	29.09
Independent Variable	Identifies with a Party	1,466	0	1	0.21	0.41
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	1,473	0	1	0.01	0.12
Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	1,525	0	1	0.56	0.50
Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	1,518	0	1	0.62	0.49

Independent Variable	Age Cohort	1,527	1	6	3.25	1.59
Independent Variable	Level of Education	1,509	0	3	2.04	0.65
Independent Variable	Female	1,527	0	1	0.59	0.49
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	1,519	1	5	2.84	1.30
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	1,527	0	1	0.86	0.35

Table A3.4: 2014 Colombia Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Voted in Last Election	1,475	0	1	0.61	0.49
Dependent Variable	Voting in Next Election	1,385	0	1	0.79	0.41
Independent Variable	Intention to Migrate	1,483	0	1	0.21	0.40
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	1,494	0	1	0.20	0.40
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	1,495	0	100	45.64	32.11
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	1,493	0	100	54.09	36.89
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	1,485	0	100	31.52	33.45
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	1,496	0	100	13.03	33.68
Independent Variable	Presidential Approval	1,484	0	100	50.89	21.66
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	1,425	1	7	5.28	1.64
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	1,432	0	100	42.36	22.55
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	1,477	1	7	3.02	1.71
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	1,475	1	7	2.68	1.84
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	1,475	1	7	3.76	1.86
Independent Variable	Ideology	1,260	1	10	5.83	2.66
Independent Variable	Political Interest	1,495	0	100	35.85	32.04
Independent Variable	Identifies with a Party	1,482	0	1	0.28	0.45
Independent Variable	Pays Attention to News	1,494	1	5	4.51	0.92
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	1,493	0	1	0.03	0.18
Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	1,494	0	1	0.54	0.50

Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	1,492	0	1	0.61	0.49
Independent Variable	Age Cohort	1,495	1	6	2.72	1.54
Independent Variable	Level of Education	1,494	0	3	2.00	0.72
Independent Variable	Female	1,496	0	1	0.50	0.50
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	1,482	1	5	3.20	1.43
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	1,496	0	1	0.78	0.41

Table A3.5: 2018/19 Ecuador Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Voted in Last Election	1,530	0	1	0.88	0.33
Dependent Variable	Voting in Next Election	1,496	0	1	0.98	0.15
Independent Variable	Intention to Migrate	1,527	0	1	0.30	0.46
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	1,531	0	1	0.29	0.45
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	1,526	0	100	55.42	31.65
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	1,529	0	100	29.92	32.24
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	1,525	0	100	21.05	30.08
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	1,529	0	100	26.55	44.18
Independent Variable	Presidential Approval	1,522	0	100	48.88	24.59
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	1,512	1	7	4.59	1.51
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	1,502	0	100	43.19	26.28
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	1,527	1	7	3.97	1.77
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	1,525	1	7	3.81	1.93
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	1,510	1	7	4.26	1.58
Independent Variable	Ideology	1,428	1	10	5.54	2.48
Independent Variable	Political Interest	1,530	0	100	35.88	31.71
Independent Variable	Identifies with a Party	1,525	0	1	0.23	0.42
Independent Variable	Pays Attention to News	1,531	1	5	4.45	0.89
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	1,533	0	1	0.06	0.23
Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	1,533	0	1	0.47	0.50

Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	1,532	0	1	0.61	0.49
Independent Variable	Age Cohort	1,524	1	6	2.78	1.63
Independent Variable	Level of Education	1,526	0	3	2.45	0.69
Independent Variable	Female	1,524	0	1	0.50	0.50
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	1,519	1	5	2.97	1.40
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	1,533	0	1	0.66	0.47

Table A3.6: 2014 Peru Summary Statistics

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Voted in Last Election	1,497	0	1	0.85	0.36
Dependent Variable	Voting in Next Election	1,331	0	1	0.95	0.22
Independent Variable	Intention to Migrate	1,459	0	1	0.23	0.42
Independent Variable	Victim of Crime	1,492	0	1	0.31	0.46
Independent Variable	Neighborhood Insecurity	1,495	0	100	57.03	28.38
Independent Variable	Personal Econ. Evaluation	1,477	0	100	50.00	33.38
Independent Variable	National Econ. Evaluation	1,481	0	100	41.22	34.83
Independent Variable	Victim of Corruption	1,500	0	100	36.40	44.09
Independent Variable	Presidential Approval	1,484	0	100	47.69	17.99
Independent Variable	Democracy as Best Form of Government	1,434	1	7	4.75	1.62
Independent Variable	Satisfaction w/ Democracy	1,432	0	100	44.27	20.55
Independent Variable	Trust in Elections	1,417	1	7	3.75	1.66
Independent Variable	External Efficacy	1,459	1	7	3.31	1.61
Independent Variable	Internal Efficacy	1,458	1	7	3.75	1.56
Independent Variable	Ideology	1,250	1	10	5.52	2.03
Independent Variable	Political Interest	1,491	0	100	29.06	29.39
Independent Variable	Identifies with a Party	1,477	0	1	0.19	0.39
Independent Variable	Pays Attention to News	1,453	1	5	4.55	0.81
Independent Variable	Receives Remittances	1,494	0	1	0.04	0.19
Independent Variable	Married/ Partnered	1,496	0	1	0.60	0.49

Independent Variable	Has Children under 13	1,487	0	1	0.61	0.49
Independent Variable	Age Cohort	1,500	1	6	2.92	1.53
Independent Variable	Level of Education	1,497	0	3	2.20	0.73
Independent Variable	Female	1,500	0	1	0.50	0.50
Independent Variable	Quintile of Wealth	1,482	1	5	2.95	1.41
Independent Variable	Urban Residence	1,500	0	1	0.77	0.42

Table A3.7: Past Voting Results: Only those with Emigration Intentions

Variable	Regional 2018/19 Past Vote	Brazil 2014 Past Vote	Chile 2008 Past Vote	Colombia 2014 Past Vote	Ecuador 2018/19 Past Vote	Peru 2014 Past Vote
Victim of Crime ***(H4)***	-0.013 (0.080)	0.304 (0.561)	-0.837 (0.569)	-0.006 (0.321)	0.399 (0.297)	-0.125 (0.388)
Neighborhood Insecurity ***(H4)***	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.016** (0.007)	-0.003 (0.006)	0.004 (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)
Personal Econ. Evaluation ***(H5)***	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.010** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	-0.007 (0.006)
National Econ. Evaluation ***(H5)***	-0.001 (0.001)	0.009 (0.006)	0.008 (0.007)	0.007 (0.006)	0.005 (0.006)	-0.004 (0.006)
Victim of Corruption ***(H6)***	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.005)	0.004 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.003)	0.002 (0.004)
Presidential Approval ***(H7)***	0.004** (0.002)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.009)	-0.003 (0.010)	0.004 (0.007)	0.007 (0.010)
Democracy as Best Form of Government ***(H7)***	-0.011 (0.024)	-0.146 (0.134)	0.026 (0.139)	-0.050 (0.090)	0.048 (0.095)	-0.054 (0.108)
Satisfaction w/ Democracy ***(H7)***	-0.001 (0.001)	0.014* (0.008)	-0.014 (0.012)	0.004 (0.007)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.022** (0.009)
Trust in Elections ***(H7)***	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.130)	0.156 (0.140)	0.026 (0.143)	-0.170** (0.075)	0.047 (0.103)
External Efficacy ***(H7)***	-0.041** (0.021)	0.094 (0.112)	-0.037 (0.101)	-0.059 (0.099)	-0.012 (0.097)	0.254** (0.113)
Internal Efficacy ***(H7)***	0.022 (0.024)	-0.128 (0.101)	0.011 (0.138)	0.007 (0.129)	0.025 (0.115)	-0.101 (0.134)
Ideology ***(H7)***	0.028* (0.014)	-0.060 (0.066)	0.121 (0.106)	-0.141** (0.054)	0.093 (0.073)	-0.014 (0.078)
Political Interest ***(H7)***	0.005*** (0.001)	0.010 (0.007)	0.015** (0.007)	0.005 (0.005)	0.001 (0.006)	0.015** (0.007)

Identifies with a Party ***(H7)***	0.662*** (0.099)	-0.218 (0.615)	0.401 (0.543)	0.595* (0.334)	-0.044 (0.494)	0.854 (0.521)
Pays Attention to News ***(H7)***	0.077** (0.036)	0.256 (0.270)	--	-0.166 (0.233)	0.130 (0.167)	-0.188 (0.236)
Receives Remittances ***(H3)***	-0.235** (0.100)	-1.556 (1.360)	-2.413*** (0.832)	-0.434 (0.616)	-0.953* (0.528)	0.563 (0.826)
Married/ Partnered ***(H8)***	0.293*** (0.085)	1.385** (0.587)	-0.114 (0.449)	1.057*** (0.384)	0.977** (0.432)	0.389 (0.561)
Has Children under 13 ***(H8)***	-0.006 (0.086)	-0.061 (0.400)	0.803 (0.479)	0.115 (0.374)	-0.207 (0.402)	-0.221 (0.437)
Age Cohort ***(H8)***	0.639*** (0.045)	1.206** (0.515)	0.969** (0.367)	0.901*** (0.242)	0.656*** (0.222)	0.928** (0.371)
Level of Education ***(H8)***	0.501*** (0.067)	0.836* (0.466)	-0.096 (0.494)	0.823** (0.368)	1.626*** (0.292)	0.666* (0.377)
Female ***(H8)***	0.261*** (0.076)	-0.266 (0.451)	-0.081 (0.426)	0.201 (0.352)	0.225 (0.307)	-0.369 (0.397)
Quintile of Wealth ***(H8)***	0.004 (0.028)	-0.187 (0.192)	0.412* (0.208)	-0.124 (0.122)	-0.114 (0.107)	0.208 (0.149)
Urban Residence ***(H8)***	-0.127 (0.091)	-0.564 (0.700)	2.670*** (0.925)	-0.066 (0.454)	-0.412 (0.388)	0.601 (0.452)
Constant	-2.118*** (0.341)	-2.981 (2.059)	-6.340** (2.942)	-1.621 (1.575)	-3.659** (1.565)	-2.208 (1.998)
N	4,023	188	141	241	412	252

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A3.1: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2018/19 Regional Round: Only those with Emigration Intentions



Figure A3.2: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2014 Brazil: Only those with Emigration Intentions



Figure A3.3: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2008 Chile: Only those with Emigration Intentions



Figure A3.4: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2014 Colombia: Only those with Emigration Intentions



Figure A3.5: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2018/19 Ecuador: Only those with Emigration Intentions



Figure A3.6: Predicted Probabilities for Past Voting for 2014 Peru: Only those with Emigration Intentions



For the models related to previous voting there is strong support for H8, which explores socioeconomic and demographic indicators as correlates of voting. In all cases, age is positively

correlated with having voted and is statistically significant such that the oldest age cohort is much more likely to have voted than the youngest. In terms of education, those with the highest levels of education are much more likely to have voted than the least educated. The results are positive and statistically significant in all cases, except Chile. Those who are married are much more likely to have voted (with a statistically significant effect size) in the regional sample, Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. There is some support for H3, which explores the relationship between receiving remittances and voting. In the regional sample, Chile, and Ecuador, those receiving remittances are much less likely to have voted in the most recently with an effect that is statistically significant.

There is some support for H7 in the models exploring previous participation for those with emigration intentions. Among those who are the most satisfied with democracy, those in Brazil are more likely (with a statistically significant effect size) to have voted than those who are the least satisfied in democracy. On the other hand, those in Peru who are the most satisfied with democracy were *less* likely to vote than their counterparts who were the least satisfied with democracy, which runs counter to expectations. There are similarly conflicting results for external efficacy. In the regional sample, those with the most external efficacy are *less* likely to have voted (with a statistically significant effect) than those with the least external efficacy, which goes against the directionality outlined in H7. In Peru, on the other hand, those with the highest levels of external efficacy are more likely to have voted than those with the least external efficacy (with a statistically significant effect). Those who are the most interested in politics in the regional sample, Chile, and Peru, are much more likely to have voted (with a statistically significant effect size) than those with the least politically interested. Those who identify with a

party are more likely to have voted (with a statistically significant effect) in both the regional sample and in Colombia.

Table A3.8: Future Voting Results: Only those with Emigration Intentions

Variable	Regional 2018/19 Past Vote	Brazil 2014 Past Vote	Chile 2008 Past Vote	Colombia 2014 Past Vote	Ecuador 2018/19 Past Vote	Peru 2014 Past Vote
Victim of Crime ***(H4)***	0.147 (0.116)	-0.703 (0.752)	0.161 (0.379)	-1.305*** (0.474)	168.177 (.)	1880.173 (.)
Neighborhood Insecurity ***(H4)***	0.001 (0.001)	-0.022** (0.010)	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.833 (.)	1.519 (.)
Personal Econ. Evaluation ***(H5)***	-0.001 (0.001)	0.004 (0.011)	-0.008 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.602 (.)	-1.635 (.)
National Econ. Evaluation ***(H5)***	0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.011)	0.014 (0.009)	0.009 (0.008)	-2.307 (.)	23.334 (.)
Victim of Corruption ***(H6)***	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.004)	-1.123 (.)	-14.589 (.)
Presidential Approval ***(H7)***	0.000 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.014)	0.007 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.010)	-2.198 (.)	43.650 (.)
Democracy as Best Form of Government ***(H7)***	0.029 (0.029)	0.161 (0.149)	-0.172 (0.160)	0.127 (0.116)	34.357 (.)	581.934 (.)
Satisfaction w/ Democracy ***(H7)***	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.039* (0.022)	-0.022 (0.014)	-0.017 (0.010)	1.526 (.)	-6.125 (.)
Trust in Elections ***(H7)***	0.102*** (0.029)	-0.027 (0.175)	-0.048 (0.172)	0.019 (0.199)	8.618 (.)	-245.245 (.)
External Efficacy ***(H7)***	-0.036 (0.024)	0.198 (0.197)	0.030 (0.119)	-0.022 (0.178)	7.748 (.)	63.991 (.)
Internal Efficacy ***(H7)***	0.024 (0.027)	-0.194 (0.191)	-0.257** (0.118)	-0.009 (0.152)	-28.658 (.)	-479.090 (.)
Ideology ***(H7)***	0.013 (0.018)	0.183 (0.112)	-0.023 (0.136)	-0.009 (0.152)	6.421 (.)	226.169 (.)
Political Interest ***(H7)***	0.015*** (0.002)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.031*** (0.010)	0.127 (0.104)	0.365 (.)	40.467 (.)

Identifies with a Party ***(H7)***	0.841*** (0.137)	0.596 (1.132)	2.036** (0.847)	0.825 (0.546)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Pays Attention to News ***(H7)***	0.085** (0.043)	0.338 (0.401)	--	0.246 (0.209)	14.585 (.)	108.687 (.)
Receives Remittances ***(H3)***	-0.045 (0.125)	0.221 (1.118)	-0.196 (1.210)	-0.482 (0.756)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Married/ Partnered ***(H8)***	0.157 (0.103)	-0.191 (0.913)	-0.012 (0.528)	-0.549 (0.499)	0.000 (.)	788.482 (.)
Has Children under 13 ***(H8)***	0.061 (0.108)	0.966 (0.830)	-0.740 (0.557)	0.066 (0.402)	46.272 (.)	-213.745 (.)
Age Cohort ***(H8)***	0.105** (0.052)	-0.287 (0.237)	0.576** (0.247)	0.732*** (0.257)	43.874 (.)	161.528 (.)
Level of Education ***(H8)***	0.104 (0.084)	1.508* (0.794)	-0.376 (0.443)	0.221 (0.448)	37.380 (.)	2466.057 (.)
Female ***(H8)***	-0.167* (0.097)	-0.884 (0.902)	-0.004 (0.626)	-0.581 (0.596)	-27.931 (.)	-326.502 (.)
Quintile of Wealth ***(H8)***	0.029 (0.036)	-0.934*** (0.325)	-0.208 (0.208)	0.129 (0.177)	-2.809 (.)	388.978 (.)
Urban Residence ***(H8)***	0.132 (0.105)	0.000 (.)	0.213 (1.597)	-0.106 (0.608)	0.000 (.)	-1289.063 (.)
Constant	0.168 (0.452)	1.949 (2.038)	3.148 (2.938)	-2.570 (2.263)	-47.861 (.)	-9159.330 (.)
N	3,870	148	137	236	134	164

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Figure A3.7: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2018/19 Regional Round: Only those with Emigration Intentions



Figure A3.8: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2014 Brazil: Only those with Emigration Intentions



Figure A3.9: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2008 Chile: Only those with Emigration Intentions



Figure A3.10: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2014 Colombia: Only those with Emigration Intentions



Figure A3.11: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2018/19 Ecuador: Only those with Emigration Intentions



Figure A3.12: Predicted Probabilities for Future Voting for 2014 Peru: Only those with Emigration Intentions



Looking at the models for future voting, there are fewer indicators that reach any meaningful level of statistical significance, as compared to the models for previous voting behavior. This is similar to the differences among the two categories of models for the population as a whole. The models for future voting provide some support for H7 and H8.

Those with the highest level of political interest are more likely to declare voting intentions for the upcoming elections, as compared to those with the lowest level of political interest, at a statistically significant level in the regional sample, Brazil, and Chile. Those who identify with a party are more likely to say they will vote, as compared with those who do not affiliate with a party, with a statistically significant effect size in the regional sample and in Chile. The sole indicator in support of H8, age, is statistically significant in the expected direction in the regional sample, Chile, and Colombia. In these cases, those in the oldest cohort were more likely to report a desire to vote in the future than those in the youngest group.

CHAPTER 4

A4.1 Ecuador Results

Ecuador is a case where we can add in the previous election results to more closely mirror the Powell and Whitten (1993) model. There was only one round of voting in Ecuador in 2013 since the incumbent party (PAIS) gathered more than 50% in the first round (CNE 2013). So, only one round is included. As a reminder, given that the elections were held in early 2017, the economic data from 2016 is included in these models. For the 2017 Ecuadorian elections, the models and the results are:

Model A1: PAIS vote % in the 2nd round of 2017=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 PAIS vote % in 2013$_i$ + υ_i

Model A2: PAIS vote % in the 2nd round of 2017=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 Inflation dummy$_i$ + β_5 Unemployment dummy$_i$ + β_6 GDP Growth dummy$_i$ + β_7 PAIS vote % in 2013$_i$ + υ_i

Table A4.1.1: Ecuador Economic Results with 2013 Valid Vote Percentage

Variable	Ecuador 2017 Model A1	Ecuador 2017 Model A2
Inflation Rate	-0.54 (0.67)	-0.01 (1.04)
Unemployment Rate	0.02 (0.44)	-0.25 (0.50)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.65 (1.10)	-0.43 (1.30)
Inflation Dummy		4.79 (6.42)
Unemployment Dummy		-4.38 (5.55)
GDP Dummy		-1.08 (15.09)
PAIS Vote % in 2013	0.64***	0.56***

	(0.15)	(0.17)
Constant	2.51	7.19
	(11.97)	(19.47)
N	40	40
R^2	0.46	0.49
SER	11.93	12.14

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

None of the economic variables in either of the models reach any level of statistical significance. In Model A1, the directionality on the coefficient for the inflation rate is as expected, but not distinguishable from zero. The direction of the coefficients for the unemployment and GDP growth rates run counter to expectations outlined in Hypothesis 1. In Model A2, the directionality on the coefficients for the inflation, unemployment, unemployment dummy, and GDP dummy measures are as expected, but not distinguishable from zero. The direction of the coefficients on the GDP growth rate and inflation dummy variables run counter to expectations, but are not differentiable from zero. As a result, neither of the models provide support for either Hypothesis 1 or 2.

Similar to the Model 3 and 4 results for Chile, the coefficients for the previous vote share variables in both Model A1 and A2 for Ecuador are statistically significant ($p<0.01$). In Model A1, for every percentage point increase in voting for the PAIS candidate in the 2013 election, there was a 0.64% increase in the vote share of the PAIS candidate in the second round in 2017. In Model A2, for every percentage point increase in the vote share of the PAIS candidate in the 2013 election, there was a 0.56% increase in voting for the PAIS candidate in the second round in 2017. Therefore, while substantively somewhat small, the importance of partisanship across election cycles in Ecuador is a meaningful predictor of vote choice.

There is one more way to build the model, given available data for Ecuador. That is to include, as in Model 3 and 4 for Chile, the percent of the valid vote for PAIS in the first round of the 2017 election as another independent variable. This will give an additional method to examine the strength of partisanship in comparison to economic conditions. These models and the results are the following:

Model A3: PAIS vote % in the 2nd round of 2017=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 PAIS vote % in the 1st round of 2017$_i$ + β_5 PAIS vote % in 2013$_i$ + υ_i

Model A4: PAIS vote % in the 2nd round of 2017=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 Inflation dummy$_i$ + β_5 Unemployment dummy$_i$ + β_6 GDP Growth dummy$_i$ + β_7 PAIS vote % in the 1st round of 2017$_i$ + β_8 PAIS vote % in 2013$_i$ + υ_i

Table A4.1.2: Ecuador Economic Results with 2017 Round One and 2013 Valid Vote Percentage

Variable	Ecuador 2017 Model A3	Ecuador 2017 Model A4
Inflation Rate	-0.10 (0.33)	0.32 (0.50)
Unemployment Rate	0.07 (0.21)	0.05 (0.24)
GDP Growth Rate	0.25 (0.54)	0.55 (0.63)
Inflation Dummy		4.18 (3.09)
Unemployment Dummy		1.08 (2.72)
GDP Dummy		-5.72 (7.28)
PAIS Vote % in Round 1 in 2017	0.93*** (0.09)	0.94*** (0.09)
PAIS Vote % in 2013	0.20** (0.08)	0.20** (0.09)
Constant	-6.51	-4.98

	(5.88)	(9.45)
N	40	40
R^2	0.88	0.89
SER	5.80	5.84

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

None of the economic variables in either Model A3 or A4 reach any level of statistical significance. In Model A3, the directionality on the coefficients for the inflation and GDP growth rates are as expected, but not distinguishable from zero. The direction of the coefficient for the unemployment rate runs counter to expectations outlined in Hypothesis 1, but not distinguishable from zero. In Model A4, the directionality on the coefficients for the GDP growth rate and GDP dummy measures are as expected, but not distinguishable from zero. The direction of the coefficients on the inflation rate, unemployment rate, inflation dummy, and unemployment dummy variables run counter to expectations, but, again, not able to be differentiated from zero. As a result, neither of the models support either Hypothesis 1 or 2.

Similar to the Model 3 and 4 results for Chile, the coefficients for the previous vote share variables in both Model A3 and A4 for Ecuador are all statistically significant (at least p<0.05). In Model A3, for every percentage point increase in the vote share of the PAIS candidate in the first round of the election in 2017, there was a 0.93% increase in the vote share of the PAIS candidate in the second round of the 2017 elections. For every percentage point increase in vote share of the PAIS candidate in the 2013 election, there was a 0.20% increase in the vote share for the PAIS candidate in the second round of the 2017 elections. In Model A4 the effects of these variables are either identical or nearly identical to those in Model A3. For every percentage point increase in the vote share of the PAIS candidate in the first round of the election in 2017, there was a 0.94% increase in the vote share of the PAIS candidate in the second round of the

2017 elections. For every percentage point increase in vote share of the PAIS candidate in the 2013 election, there was a 0.20% increase in the vote share for the PAIS candidate in the second round of the 2017 elections. Therefore, even though the effects for these variables are somewhat small, in both Models A3 and A4, more recent vote decisions have four times the effect as compared to choices made four years earlier.

The first two models for Ecuador have a similar R-squared to Models 3 and 4 for Chile but have a lower SER than any of the models for Chile.[73] The R-squared measures are much higher and model fit (SER) statistics are much lower for Models A3 and A4 for Ecuador, indicating better explanatory power. The concern for all of these models is that the coefficients are not statistically significant, indicating some instability in the model. Finally, while there is no support for either Hypothesis 1 or 2 in any of these models, for Ecuador, as in Chile, previous partisanship matters for explaining vote choice.

A4.2 Brazil Results

Brazil is the first of three cases for which I have three waves of election data available. It is also the only one of the three where the same incumbent party (the PT) reached the second round in each of those three years (2010, 2014, and 2018). As a reminder, since the elections were held in late 2018, the economic data from 2018 is included. For the Brazilian elections in 2018, the models are specified in the following ways:

Model A1: PT vote % in the 2nd round of 2018=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 PT vote % in the 2nd round of 2010$_i$ + β_5 PT vote % in the 2nd round of 2014$_i$ + υ_i

[73] The mean VIF for all models is under 2.

Model A2: PT vote % in the 2nd round of 2018=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 Inflation dummy$_i$ + β_5 Unemployment dummy$_i$ + β_6 GDP Growth dummy$_i$ + β_7 PT vote % in the 2nd round of 2010$_i$ + β_8 PT vote % in the 2nd round of 2014$_i$ + υ_i

Table A4.2.1: Brazil Economic Results with Two Waves of Previous Valid Vote Percentages

Variable	Brazil 2018 Model A1	Brazil 2018 Model A2
Inflation Rate	0.27 (0.53)	1.38* (0.73)
Unemployment Rate	0.31 (0.39)	0.62 (0.62)
GDP Growth Rate	0.22 (0.89)	-0.16 (0.99)
Inflation Dummy		11.71** (5.53)
Unemployment Dummy		2.49 (9.63)
GDP Dummy		8.48 (7.21)
PT Vote % in 2nd Round of 2010	0.02 (0.15)	0.05 (0.15)
PT Vote % in 2nd Round of 2014	0.53*** (0.18)	0.56*** (0.18)
Constant	16.73** (6.44)	-8.38 (15.51)
N	69	69
R^2	0.24	0.32
SER	13.96	13.50

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

None of the economic variables in Model A1 reach any level of statistical significance. In Model A1, the directionality on the coefficient for the GDP growth rate is as expected, but not distinguishable from zero. The direction of the coefficients for the inflation and unemployment rates run counter to expectations outlined in Hypothesis 1.

In Model A2, for every one-unit increase in the inflation rate in a voter's country of residence, the vote share for the incumbent party, the PT, increases by 1.38% ($p<0.10$), which runs counter to the expectations in Hypothesis 1. In addition, when the inflation rate in the country of residence is lower than it is in Brazil, the vote percentage for the incumbent PT increases by over 11 percentage points ($p<0.05$). This runs counter to the expectations outlined in Hypothesis 2, however, which postulates that those who live in areas that are doing better economically than their country of origin will be more likely to punish the incumbent party at the ballot box. This sensitivity to inflation in Model A2 may be explained by Brazil's experience with hyperinflation starting in the 1970s and lasting on and off until the mid-1990s, but since I do not know specifics about these expatriate voters (e.g., age, how long they have been abroad, reason for leaving, etc.), I cannot establish a more robust connection to explain the importance of this link between economics and vote choice at this time (Skidmore 2010). The direction of the coefficients on the unemployment dummy and the GDP growth rate dummy variables run counter to expectations, but are not distinguishable from zero in this case. As a result, neither of the models provide evidence for either Hypothesis 1 or 2 in Brazil with the 2018 election.

The coefficients for the previous vote share variables, the results are almost identical across models. In Model A1 and A2, for every percent increase in the vote share for the PT in the second round of the 2014 elections, the vote share for the PT in the second round of the 2018 elections increases by about 0.5% ($p<0.01$). The coefficients for the vote share for the PT in the second round in the 2010 elections is in the expected direction, but is substantively very small and not statistically significant. As a result, while partisanship appears to have a small, positive effect in Brazil over several election cycles, it seems to have a shelf life of no more than about four years.

Given that Brazil is the first case for which I have two waves of first and second round elections available, it is useful to examine these first rounds, when there are more party and candidate options available so that voters can express their true preference, to see whether the effects of the economic and vote choice differs from the previous models. The first-round models and results for Brazil in 2018 are as follows:

Model A3: PT vote % in the 2nd round of 2018=$\beta_0 + \beta_1$ Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 PT vote % in the 1st round of 2010$_i$ + β_5 PT vote % in the 1st round of 2014$_i$ + υ_i

Model A4: PT vote % in the 2nd round of 2018=$\beta_0 + \beta_1$ Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 Inflation dummy$_i$ + β_5 Unemployment dummy$_i$ + β_6 GDP Growth dummy$_i$ + β_7 PT vote % in the 1st round of 2010$_i$ + β_8 PT vote % in the 1st round of 2014$_i$ + υ_i

Table A4.2.2: Brazil Economic Results with Two Waves of First Round Previous Valid Vote Percentages

Variable	Brazil 2018 Model A3	Brazil 2018 Model A4
Inflation Rate	0.43 (0.59)	1.32 (0.82)
Unemployment Rate	0.40 (0.43)	0.99 (0.70)
GDP Growth Rate	0.69 (1.02)	0.20 (1.13)
Inflation Dummy		9.44 (6.26)
Unemployment Dummy		8.07 (10.47)
GDP Dummy		10.47 (8.10)
PT Vote % in 1st Round of 2010	0.22 (0.18)	0.28 (0.18)
PT Vote % in 1st	0.01	0.04

Round of 2014	(0.22)	(0.23)
Constant	22.28***	-9.46
	(7.15)	(17.35)
N	69	69
R^2	0.08	0.16
SER	15.40	15.08

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

None of the coefficients for any of the economic variables reach any level of statistical significance in either Model A3 or A4. Only the coefficient for the GDP growth rate variable is in the correct direction, as outlined in Hypothesis 1. As a result, there is no support for either Hypothesis 1 or 2 from these models.

Looking at the coefficients on the electoral variables, none of the PT vote percentage variables in either Model A3 or Model A4 reach any level of statistical significance (p<0.10). Based on these results, including the first-round results does not seem to give much explanatory power for the model, and, in fact, provides less explanatory power than including the second-round results.

The model fit and explanatory power measures for Models A1 and A2 are much better than those of Models A3 and A4. The R-squared values are about double in Models A1 and A2, as compared with Models A2 and A4 and the standard error of the regression for Model A1 and A2 is lower than what it is for Model A3 and A4.[74]

A4.3 Colombia Results

Another country which has three waves of elections available for analysis is Colombia. As a reminder, the DV here as changed for this analysis because the incumbent party did not

[74] The VIF for all models is under 2.25, indicating a lower risk of multicollinearity.

make it to the second round of the 2018 elections, so the first-round vote share is used here. As mentioned previously, the 2018 economic indicators are included because the elections were held in the middle of that year.[75] The models for the 2018 Colombian election and their results are:

Model A1: Partido de la U vote % in the 1st round of 2018=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate + β_2 Unemployment rate + β_3 GDP Growth rate + β_4 Partido de la U vote % in the 2nd round of the 2010 elections$_i$ + β_5 Partido de la U vote % in the 2nd round of the 2014 elections$_i$ + υ_i

Model A2: Partido de la U vote % in the 1st round of 2018=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate + β_2 Unemployment rate + β_3 GDP Growth rate + β_4 Inflation dummy + β_5 Unemployment dummy + β_6 GDP Growth dummy + β_7 Partido de la U vote % in the 2nd round 2010 of the elections$_i$ + β_8 Partido de la U vote % in the 2nd round of the 2014 elections$_i$ + υ_i

Table A4.3.1: Colombia Economic Results with Two Waves of Previous Valid Vote Percentages

Variable	Colombia 2018 Model A1	Colombia 2018 Model A2
Inflation Rate	0.06 (0.16)	-0.20 (0.20)
Unemployment Rate	0.08 (0.09)	0.24* (0.14)
GDP Growth Rate	0.11 (0.21)	0.09 (0.28)
Inflation Dummy		-2.80** (1.11)
Unemployment Dummy		3.07* (1.76)
GDP Dummy		-0.06 (1.22)

[75] Additional tests using the previous years' economic indicator and the average of the indicators for both years are in Section A4.5.

Partido de la U Vote % in Round 2 in 2010	0.10*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 2 in 2014	0.09*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)
Constant	-7.63** (2.92)	-7.65* (4.12)
N	48	48
R^2	0.27	0.41
SER	2.66	2.47

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

In Model A1, none of the economic variables reach any level of statistical significance and only the directionality of the GDP growth rate variable is in the expected direction, as outlined in Hypothesis 1. Combined, this gives virtually no support for Hypothesis 1 from this particular model.

In Model A2, as the unemployment rate in a voter's country of residence increases, the vote share for the incumbent party, Partido de la U, increases by 0.24%, which is statistically significant, but substantively not very large and in the opposite direction as expected from Hypothesis 1. The coefficient for the inflation dummy variable shows that in countries where the inflation rate is lower than Colombia, the vote share for Partido de la U decreases by 2.80%, which is statistically significant ($p<0.05$) and is consistent with Hypothesis 2 which posits that voters living in areas that are doing better than the country of residence will punish the incumbent party. The coefficient on the unemployment dummy variable demonstrates that in countries that have lower unemployment rates than Colombia, the vote share for the incumbent party (Partido de la U) increases by 3.07% ($p<0.10$), which runs contrary to Hypothesis 2. While none of the other economic variables reach any traditional level of statistical significance in Model A2, the directionality on the inflation rate, GDP growth rate, and the GDP growth rate dummy are in the expected directions. Taken together, in these models for Colombia for the

2018 elections, there appears to be virtually no statistical support for Hypothesis 1 and mixed support for Hypothesis 2, due to the difference in directionality of some of the variables.

Looking at the coefficients on the variables for the previous vote share variables, the results are almost identical across models. In Model A1 and A2, for every percent increase in the vote share for Partido de la U in the second round of both the 2014 and 2010 elections, the vote share for Partido de la U in the second round of the 2018 elections increases by about 0.1% ($p<0.01$). As a result, partisanship appears to have a small, positive effect in Colombia that can last at least eight years.

In terms of model fit, it is notable that this model has the lowest standard error of the regression of any of the models tested so far in this analysis and is very similar between Models A1 and A2. The R-squared improves dramatically between Model A1 and Model A2, but still only explains no more than 40% of the variance in the model.[76]

One additional way to expand this model would be to include the first-round valid vote percentages for Partido de la U in both 2010 and 2014. These models might illuminate to what extent partisan strength for Partido de la U supporters persists over three election cycles when voters can express their preferences among a wide variety of parties. The models and results are as follows:

Model A3: Partido de la U vote % in the 1st round of 2018=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate + β_2 Unemployment rate + β_3 GDP Growth rate + β_4 Partido de la U vote % in the 1st round of the 2010 elections$_i$ + β_5 Partido de la U vote % in the 1st round of the 2014 elections$_i$ + υ_i

Model A4: Partido de la U vote % in the 1st round of 2018=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate + β_2 Unemployment rate + β_3 GDP Growth rate + β_4 Inflation dummy + β_5 Unemployment dummy +

[76] The VIF for Model A1 is 1.40 and the VIF for Model A2 is 2.51, indicating a lower risk of multicollinearity.

β_6 GDP Growth dummy + β_7 Partido de la U vote % in the 1st round 2010 of the elections$_i$ + β_8 Partido de la U vote % in the 1st round of the 2014 elections$_i$ + υ_i

Table A4.3.2: Colombia Economic Results with Two Waves of First Round Previous Valid Vote Percentages

Variable	Colombia 2018 Model A3	Colombia 2018 Model A4
Inflation Rate	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.21 (0.18)
Unemployment Rate	0.05 (0.08)	0.25* (0.12)
GDP Growth Rate	0.16 (0.19)	0.27 (0.25)
Inflation Dummy		-2.24** (1.02)
Unemployment Dummy		3.70** (1.57)
GDP Dummy		-0.68 (1.05)
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 1 in 2010	0.17*** (0.04)	0.16*** (0.04)
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 1 in 2014	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)
Constant	-3.69** (1.45)	-5.77* (3.03)
N	48	48
R^2	0.40	0.43
SER	2.41	2.23

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

In Model A3, as in Model A1 for Colombia, none of the economic variables reach any level of statistical significance. The directionality of the inflation rate and the GDP growth rate variable are in the expected direction, as outlined in Hypothesis 1, but not statistically significant. Combined, this gives scant support for Hypothesis 1 from this particular model.

In Model A4, as the unemployment rate in a voter's country of residence increases, the vote share for the incumbent party, Partido de la U, increases by 0.25%, which is statistically significant, but substantively not very large and in the opposite direction as expected from Hypothesis 1. This is virtually the same effect size for this variable as found in Model A2 for Colombia.

The coefficient for the inflation dummy variable shows that in countries where the inflation rate is lower than Colombia, the vote share for Partido de la U decreases by 2.24%, which is statistically significant ($p<0.05$) and is consistent with Hypothesis 2 which posits that voters living in areas that are doing better than the country of residence will punish the incumbent party. The coefficient on the unemployment dummy variable demonstrates that in countries that have lower unemployment rates than Colombia, the vote share for the incumbent party (Partido de la U) increases by 3.70% ($p<0.05$), which runs contrary to Hypothesis 2. The effects of both the inflation dummy and the unemployment dummies are very similar in Models A2 and A4. While none of the other economic variables reach any traditional level of statistical significance in Model A4, the directionality on the inflation rate, GDP growth rate, and the GDP growth rate dummy are in the expected directions. Taken together, in these models for Colombia for the 2018 elections, there appears to be little statistical support for Hypothesis 1 and mixed support for Hypothesis 2, due to the difference in directionality of some of the variables.

The coefficients for the previous vote share variables are almost identical across models by election year. In Model A3 and A4, for every percent increase in the vote share for Partido de la U in the second round of the 2010 elections, the vote share for Partido de la U in the second round of the 2018 elections increases by about 0.17% ($p<0.01$). It is curious that the effect size from the 2010 elections is more than double the effect of the vote share for Partido de la U in the

second round of the 2014 elections, which is only 0.06% ($p<0.01$). While small, the effect of partisanship for Partido de la U in Colombia is statistically significant over at least a couple of election cycles.

Models A3 and A4 have even lower standard error of the regression than Models A1 and A2 and are similar to each other. The R-squared for Models A2 and A4 are also very close in value, but still only explains around 40% of the variance in the model.[77]

Examining Colombia's economic history might give an explanation as to why the expatriate population may be particularly sensitive to unemployment and inflation. Colombia has experienced two peaks in its unemployment rates, particularly in urban areas, in the mid-1980s and again at the turn of the millennium (Medina, Núñez, and Tamayo 2013). In the mid-1980s, the unemployment rate in major cities varied between 13% and 15%, while from 1998 until about the mid-2000s, unemployment in urban areas spiked as high as 20% and was always more than 15% (Medina, Núñez, and Tamayo 2013). Other studies have found that there is a structural unemployment rate in Colombia over the past twenty years has been between 6.1% and 12.5% (Arango and Flórez 2016).

In terms of Colombia's economic history in relation to inflation, between the early 1970s and the early 1990s, Colombia had an inflation rate of 22-23% (Gómez, Uribe, and Vargas 2002). While that rate dropped throughout the 1990s, the inflation rate was still around 10% by the end of the decade (Gómez, Uribe, and Vargas 2002). As a result, it would make sense that Colombian expatriates might be responsive to these particular economic indicators, although, as mentioned before, I do not have individual-level demographic data for these individuals, know

[77] The VIF for Model A3 is 1.10 and the VIF for Model A4 is 2.28, indicating a lower risk of multicollinearity.

when the left Colombia, or their reason for departure, so I cannot make a more substantive connection between the economic indicators and electoral outcomes.

While substantively small, the coefficients on all of the vote share variables in both models are statistically significant and basically the same effect size ($p<0.01$). As the vote share for the Partido de la U in the second round of either the 2010 or the 2014 elections, vote share for Partido de la U in the first round of the 2018 elections increases by about 0.08% or 0.09%. The effect size is almost the same for the vote share in 2010 and 2014, which is notable because, while small, this effect is persistent for eight years. This is perhaps indicative of the lasting strength of partisanship for Partido de la U.

A4.4 Peru Results

While three rounds of voting are available for Peru, only the 2016 and 2011 elections are included in this analysis. In addition, the dependent variable for Peru is the valid vote percentage for the non-incumbent party (Fuerza Popular and Fuerza 2011), due to the party instability in Peru, as mentioned in Section 3.4.5. The economic data from Peru are from 2016 since the first and second rounds were held in the middle of that year (ONPE 2016; Achen and Bartels, 2016). These models include both first and second round valid vote percentages for Fuerza 2011 as independent variables, since those are the only previous voting rounds that are possible to add to these models.[78] The models and results are as follows:

Model A1: Fuerza Popular vote % in 2nd Round of 2016=$\beta_0 + \beta_1$ Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 2011 Round 1 vote % for Fuerza 2011 +

[78] The correlation for these two variables is 0.41, much lower than for the other countries where only one round of previous voting was included in each model. As seen in the VIF measures previously, there is a lower risk of multicollinearity in these models.

β_5 2011 Round 2 vote % for Fuerza 2011 + υ_i

Model A2: Fuerza Popular vote % in 2nd Round of 2016=β_0 + β_1 Inflation rate$_i$ + β_2 Unemployment rate$_i$ + β_3 GDP Growth rate$_i$ + β_4 Inflation dummy$_i$ + β_5 Unemployment dummy$_i$ + β_6 GDP Growth dummy$_i$ + β_7 2011 Round 1 vote % for Fuerza 2011 + β_8 2011 Round 2 vote % for Fuerza 2011 + υi

Table A4.4.1: Peru Economic Results with Two Rounds of Previous Valid Vote Percentages

Variable	Peru 2016 Model A1	Peru 2016 Model A2
Inflation Rate	0.78**	0.55
	(0.39)	(0.78)
Unemployment Rate	0.23	0.12
	(0.25)	(0.29)
GDP Growth Rate	0.08	-0.54
	(0.64)	(0.86)
Inflation Dummy		-2.18
		(6.16)
Unemployment Dummy		-2.73
		(3.74)
GDP Dummy		4.82
		(4.26)
2011 Round 1 vote % for Fuerza 2011	0.90***	0.89***
	(0.12)	(0.12)
2011 Round 2 vote % for Fuerza 2011	0.12	0.12
	(0.09)	(0.11)
Constant	7.83	12.10
	(6.01)	(11.10)
N	54	54
R^2	0.66	0.67
SER	8.37	8.50

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

As seen in Model A1, for every percentage point increase in the inflation rate in a voter's country of residence, the vote share for Fuerza Popular in the second round of the 2016 election

increases by 0.78% ($p<0.05$). While substantively somewhat small, the effect of this variable does not hew to the slight modification made to Hypothesis 1, since Keiko Fujimori, at the top of the ticket for Fuerza Popular, was the more familiar candidate. In fact, the finding for the effect of the inflation rate runs counter to expectations outlined in Hypothesis 1 since the vote share for Fuerza Popular *increases* as the inflation rate increases. None of the other economic variables reach any traditional level of statistical significance in Model A1, while only the direction of the GDP is in the expected direction as per Hypothesis 1. As a result, there is no support for Hypothesis 1 as written in Model 1 for Peru, but given it is a two-party contest in the second-round election, an increase in the vote share for Fuerza Popular can conversely be interpreted as a decrease for the vote share for the incumbent party, which would provide some support for Hypothesis 1, as originally conceived.

The economic variables in Model A2 do not reach any level of statistical significance and the direction of the variables are only in the expected direction, according to Hypothesis 2, for the inflation dummy and the unemployment dummy. As a result, in this particular case, there is no support for Hypothesis 1 or 2 in Model A2.

Turning to the results for the vote choice variables, only the coefficient for the first-round vote share for Fuerza 2011 reaches statistical significance ($p<0.01$), with about the same effect size in Models A1 and A2. For every percentage increase in the vote share in the first round in the 2011 elections in a voter's country of residence, the vote share for Fuerza Popular increases by about 0.90%. This seems to show some level of strength in partisanship for Keiko Fujimori's parties over election waves.

Given Peru's economic history, the fact that there is some sensitivity among expatriate voters to the inflation rate makes some sense. Peru experienced high inflation on-and-off

starting in the 1970s and then through the 1980s and then hyperinflation of over 7,000% in the early 1990s (Gomez 2005). As outlined in Chile, Brazil, and Colombia, I do not have individual-level demographic data for these individuals, know when the left Colombia, or their reason for departure, so I cannot make a more substantive connection between the economic indicators and electoral outcomes.

Looking at model fit, the standard error of the regression scores for these models is in the middle of all the models included and very similar between Models A1 and A2. The R-squared is higher than average of the models included and is similar for Model A1 and Model A2 and explains about two thirds of the variance in the model.[79]

[79] The VIF for Model A1 is 1.25 and the VIF for Model A2 is less than 2.50, indicating a lower risk of multicollinearity.

A4.5 Additional Summary Statistics and Results of Original Data

Table A4.5.1: Summary Statistics for Brazil, 2010

The following tables reflect summary statistics and results for Brazil 2010, 2014, and 2018 with just economic information and no previous electoral data.

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	PT vote % in Round 2 of the 2010 elections	87	0.0	97.6	46.5	18.3
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2010	84	-2.4	28.2	4.1	4.2
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2010	85	0.4	24.7	7.9	4.7
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2010	83	-5.5	19.6	4.3	3.9
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2010	84	0	1	0.7	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2010	85	0	1	0.5	0.5
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2010	83	0	1	0.2	0.4

Table A4.5.2: Summary Statistics for Brazil, 2014

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	PT vote % in Round 2 of the 2014 elections	89	0.0	86.7	31.8	16.0
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2014	84	-1.5	62.2	3.6	7.2
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2014	87	0.2	25.3	7.9	5.5
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2014	87	-26.0	9.5	2.6	4.0
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2014	84	0	1	0.9	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2014	87	0	1	0.6	0.5
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2014	87	0	1	0.9	0.3

Table A4.5.3: Summary Statistics for Brazil, 2018

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	PT vote % in Round 2 of the 2018 elections	99	8.7	89.0	37.8	17.0
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2018	83	-0.2	20.2	3.4	3.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2018	97	0.1	27.4	6.9	5.0
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2018	94	-3.8	8.2	3.0	2.1
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2018	83	0	1	0.7	0.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2018	97	0	1	0.9	0.3
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate dummy 2018	94	0	1	0.9	0.3

Table A4.5.4: Single Year Models for Brazil 2010, 2014, and 2018

Dependent variable for all models is the second-round valid vote percentage for the PT in the year of the election listed.

Variable	Brazil 2010 Model B1	Brazil 2010 Model B2	Brazil 2014 Model B1	Brazil 2014 Model B2	Brazil 2018 Model B1	Brazil 2018 Model B2
Inflation Rate	0.20	-0.22	-0.09	0.04	0.49	1.05
	(0.44)	(0.64)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.52)	(0.75)
Unemployment Rate	0.87**	0.41	0.42	-0.02	0.31	0.63
	(0.39)	(0.56)	(0.29)	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.65)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.72	-1.49**	0.40	0.03	1.16	1.09
	(0.48)	(0.69)	(0.42)	(0.50)	(0.90)	(1.04)
Inflation Dummy		-2.65		4.09		6.08
		(5.85)		(5.63)		(5.79)
Unemployment Dummy		-6.43		-7.37		3.72
		(5.26)		(4.80)		(8.55)
GDP Dummy		11.18		9.47		2.86
		(6.85)		(5.93)		(7.96)
Constant	40.76***	52.39***	26.60***	23.94**	30.16***	16.24
	(4.76)	(10.05)	(3.23)	(9.61)	(4.91)	(15.11)
N	82	82	84	84	82	82
R^2	0.11	0.16	0.04	0.09	0.03	0.05
SER	16.11	16.02	14.82	14.66	15.85	15.98

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.5: Lookback Models for Brazil, 2014

The following two tables reflect elections for 2018 to 2014 and then for 2014 to 2010. See Table 4.4 in Chapter 4 and Table A4.5.2 for relevant summary statistics for these results. The dependent variable for all models is the second-round valid vote percentage for the PT in the year of the election listed.

Variable	Brazil 2014 Model B3	Brazil 2014 Model B4	Brazil 2014 Model B5	Brazil 2014 Model B6
Inflation Rate	-0.02 (0.16)	0.08 (0.20)	-0.10 (0.17)	-0.03 (0.21)
Unemployment Rate	-0.01 (0.22)	0.04 (0.31)	0.09 (0.23)	0.04 (0.33)
GDP Growth Rate	0.72** (0.29)	0.76** (0.36)	0.30 (0.30)	0.28 (0.37)
Inflation Dummy		3.28 (4.03)		2.60 (4.25)
Unemployment Dummy		0.75 (3.48)		-0.82 (3.65)
GDP Dummy		0.02 (4.88)		1.19 (5.15)
PT Vote % in 2nd Round of 2010	0.59*** (0.07)	0.59*** (0.08)		
PT Vote % in 1st Round of 2010			0.60*** (0.09)	0.60*** (0.09)
Constant	2.75 (3.82)	-1.61 (8.11)	6.80* (3.75)	4.15 (8.31)
N	77	77	77	77
R^2	0.48	0.49	0.43	0.43
SER	10.06	10.22	10.60	10.80

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.6: Lookback Models for Brazil, 2018

See Table 4.4 and Table A4.5.3 for relevant summary statistics for these results. The dependent variable for all models is the second-round valid vote percentage for the PT in the year of the election listed.

Variable	Brazil 2018 Model B3	Brazil 2018 Model B4	Brazil 2018 Model B5	Brazil 2018 Model B6
Inflation Rate	0.002 (0.51)	0.77 (0.67)	0.25 (0.56)	0.93 (0.75)
Unemployment Rate	0.27** (0.35)	0.97* (0.58)	0.32 (0.39)	1.01 (0.64)
GDP Growth Rate	0.19 (0.86)	-0.19 (0.97)	0.39 (0.95)	-0.10 (1.08)
Inflation Dummy		8.91 (5.39)		7.85 (6.03)
Unemployment Dummy		9.10 (8.45)		9.17 (9.37)
GDP Dummy		6.72 (6.96)		7.90 (7.72)
PT Vote % in 2nd Round of 2014	0.45*** (0.12)	0.48*** (0.11)		
PT Vote % in 1st Round of 2014			0.16 (0.15)	0.21 (0.15)
Constant	20.96*** (5.22)	-6.51*** (13.71)	29.20*** (5.38)	1.64 (15.26)
N	73	73	73	73
R^2	0.20	0.27	0.04	0.11
SER	13.88	13.55	15.21	15.02

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.7: Summary Statistics for Colombia, 2010

The following tables reflect summary statistics and results for Colombia 2010, 2014, and 2018 with just economic information and no previous electoral data.

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Partido de la U vote % in Round 2 of the 2010 elections	64	11.6	100.0	50.1	17.5
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2009	53	-2.1	48.0	4.2	7.8
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2010	53	-0.7	28.2	4.2	4.4
Independent Variable	Inflation rate average	53	-1.1	27.7	4.2	5.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2009	54	1.7	23.5	7.4	3.8
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2010	54	2.5	24.7	7.5	4.2
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate average	54	2.1	24.1	7.5	4.0
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2009	55	-8.3	10.1	-1.2	4.0
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2010	54	-5.5	13.1	4.3	3.4
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate average	54	-4.9	10.0	1.6	1.6
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2009	53	0	1	0.7	0.5
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2010	53	0	1	0.4	0.5
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy average	53	0	1	0.6	0.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2009	54	0	1	0.9	0.3
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2010	54	0	1	0.9	0.3
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy average	54	0	1	0.9	0.3

Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2009	55	0	1	0.2	0.4
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2010	54	0	1	0.4	0.5
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy average	55	0	1	0.3	0.5

Table A4.5.8: Summary Statistics for Colombia, 2014

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Partido de la U vote % in Round 2 of the 2014 elections	56	15.2	92.0	51.5	20.5
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2013	61	-2.4	40.6	3.9	5.7
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2014	60	-1.4	62.2	4.1	8.3
Independent Variable	Inflation rate average	60	-1.1	51.4	4.0	6.9
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2013	61	0.5	27.5	7.6	5.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2014	61	0.6	26.5	7.4	5.3
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate average	61	0.6	27.0	7.5	5.4
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2013	62	-5.9	14.0	2.7	3.1
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2014	62	-3.9	8.3	2.7	2.4
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate average	62	-3.7	9.4	2.7	2.5
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2013	61	0	1	0.4	0.5
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2014	60	0	1	0.6	0.5
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy average	60	0	1	0.5	0.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2013	61	0	1	0.8	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2014	61	0	1	0.7	0.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy average	61	0	1	0.7	0.4
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2013	62	0	1	0.3	0.4
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2014	62	0	1	0.2	0.4

Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy average	62	0	1	0.2	0.4

Table A4.5.9: Summary Statistics for Colombia, 2018

As a reminder, the dependent variable for these analyses is the percentage of the valid vote received by Partido de la U in the first round of the 2018 elections since the party did not make the runoff.

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	Partido de la U vote % in Round 1 of the 2018 elections	60	0	18.8	2.9	3.7
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2017	64	-0.5	29.5	3.2	4.3
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2018	61	-0.2	16.3	2.8	2.5
Independent Variable	Inflation rate average	60	0.1	13.7	2.9	2.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2017	67	1.1	27.7	6.7	4.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2018	67	1.3	27.4	6.4	4.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate average	67	1.2	27.6	6.6	4.5
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2017	64	-2.3	8.5	3.1	2.0
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2018	66	-4.9	8.2	2.8	2.3
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate average	64	-0.8	8.0	3.0	1.9
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2017	64	0	1	0.8	0.4
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2018	61	0	1	0.7	0.5
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy average	60	0	1	0.8	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2017	67	0	1	0.8	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2018	67	0	1	0.8	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy average	67	0	1	0.8	0.4

Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2017	64	0	1	0.8	0.4
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2018	66	0	1	0.5	0.5
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy average	64	0	1	0.6	0.5

Table A4.5.10: Single Year Models for Colombia, 2010

Dependent variable for all models is the second-round valid vote percentage for Partido de la U in the year of the election listed. Models B1 and B2 use the economic data from 2009 which was the year before the election. Models B3 and B4 use the economic data from 2010 which was the year of the election. Models B5 and B6 use an average of the economic data from 2009 and 2010.

Variable	Colombia 2010 Model B1 '09 Econ	Colombia 2010 Model B2 '09 Econ	Colombia 2010 Model B3 '10 Econ	Colombia 2010 Model B4 '10 Econ	Colombia 2010 Model B5 Average	Colombia 2010 Model B6 Average
Inflation Rate	0.12	-0.20	0.47	0.99	0.26	0.55
	(0.31)	(0.40)	(0.52)	(0.60)	(0.43)	(0.55)
Unemployment Rate	-0.20	0.14	-0.12	-0.44	-0.13	0.70
	(0.66)	(1.00)	(0.61)	(0.87)	(0.64)	(0.94)
GDP Growth Rate	0.44**	-0.14	0.79	0.44	0.82	1.90
	(0.60)	(0.99)	(0.71)	(1.18)	(0.77)	(1.33)
Inflation Dummy		-7.15		12.68**		4.43
		(6.82)		(5.84)		(6.49)
Unemployment Dummy		11.52		-4.24		12.64
		(13.21)		(11.05)		(11.62)
GDP Dummy		8.43		6.83		-6.53
		(9.32)		(7.99)		(8.54)
Constant	52.66***	43.19**	46.63***	44.32***	49.73***	28.76
	(5.34)	(18.77)	(6.84)	(15.44)	(5.75)	(17.38)
N	52	52	52	52	52	52
R^2	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.14	0.04	0.09
SER	16.69	16.79	16.48	16.16	16.54	16.65

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.11: Single Year Models for Colombia, 2014

Dependent variable for all models is the second-round valid vote percentage for Partido de la U in the year of the election listed. Models B1 and B2 use the economic data from 2013 which was the year before the election. Models B3 and B4 use the economic data from 2014 which was the year of the election. Models B5 and B6 use an average of the economic data from 2013 and 2014.

Variable	Colombia 2014 Model B1 '13 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B2 '13 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B3 '14 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B4 '14 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B5 Average	Colombia 2014 Model B6 Average
Inflation Rate	0.76*	0.87	0.84**	0.77*	0.83**	0.52
	(0.45)	(0.52)	(0.32)	(0.45)	(0.36)	(0.44)
Unemployment Rate	0.45	0.57	0.23	0.54	0.39	0.18
	(0.55)	(0.87)	(0.54)	(0.81)	(0.55)	(0.86)
GDP Growth Rate	2.05**	1.38	2.71**	2.88	2.54**	1.91
	(0.96)	(1.48)	(1.34)	(2.52)	(1.17)	(2.16)
Inflation Dummy		2.87		-3.38		-10.85
		(7.43)		(7.18)		(7.45)
Unemployment Dummy		3.27		4.88		-2.00
		(11.52)		(9.55)		(9.97)
GDP Dummy		7.71		-3.73		-4.72
		(9.65)		(11.34)		(10.65)
Constant	38.28***	32.98*	38.22***	34.83**	37.54***	50.09***
	(6.81)	(16.60	(7.58)	(15.13)	(7.27)	(16.25)
N	52	52	51	51	51	51
R^2	0.15	0.17	0.15	0.17	0.17	0.11
SER	18.88	19.35	18.87	19.35	18.70	18.79

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.12: Single Year Models for Colombia, 2018

Dependent variable for all models is the first-round valid vote percentage for Partido de la U in the year of the election listed. Models B1 and B2 use the economic data from 2017 which was the year before the election. Models B3 and B4 use the economic data from 2018 which was the year of the election. Models B5 and B6 use an average of the economic data from 2017 and 2018.

Variable	Colombia 2018 Model B1 '17 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B2 '17 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B3 '18 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B4 '18 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B5 Average	Colombia 2018 Model B6 Average
Inflation Rate	0.16	-0.06	0.47***	0.25	0.50***	0.28
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.24)	(0.18)	(0.27)
Unemployment Rate	-0.06	0.05	-0.05	0.15	-0.05	0.15
	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.15)
GDP Growth Rate	0.34	0.56**	0.29	0.17	0.34	0.58*
	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.32)
Inflation Dummy		-3.88***		-2.39*		-1.85
		(1.38)		(1.29)		(1.48)
Unemployment Dummy		2.71*		3.43*		3.34*
		(1.54)		(1.85)		(1.78)
GDP Dummy		-1.46		0.41		-1.19
		(1.34)		(1.26)		(1.22)
Constant	1.59	3.16	0.95	-0.78	0.66	-1.30
	(1.08)	(2.91)	(1.13)	(3.01)	(1.19)	(3.09)
N	63	63	59	59	59	59
R^2	0.10	0.27	0.16	0.26	0.18	0.27
SER	3.30	3.07	3.29	3.18	3.24	3.16

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.13: Lookback Models for Colombia, 2014 with Second Round Vote Percentage from 2010

The following two tables reflect elections for 2018 to 2014 and then for 2014 to 2010. See Table 4.5 in Chapter 4 and Table A4.5.8 for relevant summary statistics for these results. The dependent variable for all models is the second-round valid vote percentage for Partido de la U in the year of the election listed.

Variable	Colombia 2014 Model B7 '13 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B8 '13 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B9 '14 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B10 '14 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B11 Average	Colombia 2014 Model B12 Average
Inflation Rate	1.06*** (0.35)	1.21*** (0.40)	0.82*** (0.25)	0.90** (0.36)	0.89*** (0.28)	0.72** (0.35)
Unemployment Rate	-0.15 (0.44)	-0.47 (0.69)	-0.18 (0.42)	-0.15 (0.65)	-0.11 (0.44)	-0.30 (0.68)
GDP Growth Rate	1.00 (0.76)	0.69 (1.14)	2.02* (1.05)	2.52 (1.98)	1.59* (0.93)	1.34 (1.72)
Inflation Dummy		3.65 (5.68)		1.73 (5.71)		-5.93 (5.97)
Unemployment Dummy		-4.61 (8.92)		-0.01 (7.55)		-2.63 (7.89)
GDP Dummy		5.02 (7.40)		-1.81 (8.90)		-3.22 (8.43)
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 2 in 2010	-0.76*** (0.13)	-0.77*** (0.13)	-0.72*** (0.13)	-0.73*** (0.14)	-0.72*** (0.13)	-0.70*** (0.13)
Constant	83.44*** (9.33)	97.57*** (15.88)	80.22*** (9.53)	78.03*** (14.35)	80.56*** (9.59)	87.83*** (14.75)
N	52	52	51	51	51	51
R^2	0.51	0.52	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.52
SER	14.52	14.81	14.69	15.17	14.61	14.87

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.14: Lookback Models for Colombia, 2014 with First Round Vote Percentage from 2010

See Table 4.5 in Chapter 4 and Table A4.5.8 for relevant summary statistics for these results.

The dependent variable for all models is the second-round valid vote percentage for Partido de la U in the year of the election listed.

Variable	Colombia 2014 Model B13 '13 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B14 '13 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B15 '14 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B16 '14 Econ	Colombia 2014 Model B17 Average	Colombia 2014 Model B18 Average
Inflation Rate	0.63 (0.52)	0.69 (0.62)	0.78** (0.37)	0.65 (0.51)	0.78* (0.42)	0.46 (0.50)
Unemployment Rate	0.44 (0.55)	0.69 (0.90)	0.24 (0.54)	0.60 (0.83)	0.39 (0.55)	0.21 (0.87)
GDP Growth Rate	2.01** (0.96)	1.29 (1.50)	2.65* (1.36)	2.64 (2.58)	2.51* (1.19)	1.86 (2.20)
Inflation Dummy		2.44 (7.52)		-3.93 (7.32)		-10.92 (7.54)
Unemployment Dummy		5.41 (12.24)		5.79 (9.81)		-1.54 (10.28)
GDP Dummy		7.66 (0.72)		-3.26 (11.48)		-4.56 (10.79)
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 1 in 2010	0.17 (0.32)	0.19 (0.35)	0.11 (0.32)	0.17 (0.33)	0.08 (0.32)	0.08 (0.33)
Constant	35.40*** (8.82)	27.32 (19.61)	36.14*** (9.56)	31.50* (16.66)	36.06*** (9.30)	48.28** (18.23)
N	52	52	51	51	51	51
R^2	0.17	0.17	0.16	0.17	0.17	0.22
SER	19.03	19.50	19.04	19.52	18.89	19.00

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.15: Lookback Models for Colombia, 2018 with Second Round Vote Percentage from 2014

See Table 4.5 in Chapter 4 and Table A4.5.9 for relevant summary statistics for these results. Dependent variable for all models is the first-round valid vote percentage for Partido de la U in the year of the election listed.

Variable	Colombia 2018 Model B7 '17 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B8 '17 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B9 '18 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B10 '18 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B11 Average	Colombia 2018 Model B12 Average
Inflation Rate	0.08	-0.04	0.14	-0.20	0.21	-0.03
	(0.10)	(-0.13)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.28)
Unemployment Rate	-0.04	0.02	0.01	0.16	-0.01	0.16
	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.15)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.08	0.14	0.11	0.22	0.01	0.39
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.36)
Inflation Dummy		-2.90**		-3.28***		-2.04
		(1.40)		(1.91)		(1.44)
Unemployment Dummy		2.19		3.11		3.07
		(1.58)		(1.91)		(1.89)
GDP Dummy		-1.43		-0.89		-1.77
		(1.58)		(1.28)		(1.27)
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 2 in 2014	0.04*	0.03	0.04*	0.04	0.04*	0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	1.06	3.02	0.08	-0.11	0.34	-1.20
	(1.52)	(3.61)	(1.49)	(3.42)	(1.55)	(3.75)
N	50	50	48	48	48	48
R^2	0.09	0.22	0.11	0.29	0.12	0.26
SER	2.89	2.76	2.89	2.68	2.88	2.75

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.16: Lookback Models for Colombia, 2018 with First Round Vote Percentage from 2014

See Table 4.5 in Chapter 4 and Table A4.5.9 for relevant summary statistics for these results. Dependent variable for all models is the first-round valid vote percentage for Partido de la U in the year of the election listed.

Variable	Colombia 2018 Model B13 '17 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B14 '17 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B15 '17 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B16 '18 Econ	Colombia 2018 Model B17 Average	Colombia 2018 Model B18 Average
Inflation Rate	0.07	-0.04	0.10	-0.24	0.18	-0.08
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.27)
Unemployment Rate	-0.06	0.01	0.003	0.15	-0.03	0.13
	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.15)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.15	0.06	0.12	0.24	-0.01	0.30
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.35)
Inflation Dummy		-2.89**		-3.25***		-2.22
		(1.34)		(1.16)		(1.39)
Unemployment Dummy		2.28		3.07		2.72
		(1.55)		(1.84)		(1.84)
GDP Dummy		-1.25		-0.98		-1.39
		(1.55)		(1.23)		(1.19)
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 1 in 2014	0.06**	0.05**	0.06**	0.06**	0.06**	0.05**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	1.25	2.62*	-0.07	-0.26	0.29	-0.44
	(1.36)	(3.39)	(1.37)	(3.18)	(1.42)	(3.44)
N	50	50	48	48	48	48
R^2	0.12	0.26	0.15	0.33	0.15	0.28
SER	2.85	2.71	2.83	2.61	2.82	2.71

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.17: Summary Statistics for Peru, 2006

For purposes of the summary statistics below and the analysis in Table A4.5.20, the dependent variable is the percentage of the valid vote that was cast for the APRA party in the second round of the 2006 elections. The incumbent party did not field a candidate in the election and APRA and the incumbent party occupy the same position on the ideological spectrum (CSES 2006).

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	APRA vote % in Round 2 of the 2006 elections	64	0	100	60.54	17.79
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2005	68	-0.3	16.0	4.6	3.9
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2006	68	0.2	13.7	4.7	3.4
Independent Variable	Inflation rate average	68	-0.1	14.9	4.7	3.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2005	69	1.4	23.8	7.8	3.9
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2006	69	1.2	22.6	7.1	3.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate average	69	1.3	23.2	7.4	3.7
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2005	72	-2.0	11.4	4.3	2.7
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2006	72	-1.4	12.7	5.1	2.6
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate average	72	-1.7	12.1	4.7	2.5
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2005	68	0	1	0.1	0.4
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2006	68	0	1	0.2	0.4
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy average	68	0	1	0.2	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2005	69	0	1	0.3	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2006	69	0	1	0.2	0.4

Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy average	69	0	1	0.3	0.4
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate dummy 2005	72	0	1	0.2	0.4
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate dummy 2006	72	0	1	0.2	0.4
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate dummy average	72	0	1	0.2	0.4

Table A4.5.18: Summary Statistics for Peru, 2011

As mentioned in the main text, there are two dependent variables for these additional analyses: One is the valid vote percentage received by Keiko Fujimori's party, Fuerza 2011, in the second round of the elections and the other is the valid vote percentage received by Ollanta Humala's party, Gana Perú, in the second round of the 2011. Both of these parties were represented in the 2006 elections, so I can include some previous vote round percentages.

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	2011 Round 2 vote % for Fuerza 2011	64	7.3	100	65.6	17.0
Dependent Variable	2011 Round 2 vote % for Gana Perú	64	0	92.0	32.9	16.9
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2010	65	-0.9	28.2	3.9	4.0
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2011	65	-0.3	53.2	5.6	7.2
Independent Variable	Inflation rate average	65	-0.5	30.5	4.8	5.1
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2010	66	0.6	24.7	7.8	4.2
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2011	66	0.7	24.6	7.8	4.6
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate average	66	0.7	24.7	7.8	4.3
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2010	66	-5.5	15.2	4.0	3.4
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2011	66	-9.1	11.3	3.2	3.0
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate average	66	-7.3	10.8	3.6	2.9
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2010	65	0	1	0.2	0.4
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2011	65	0	1	0.3	0.5
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy average	65	0	1	0.2	0.4

Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2010	66	0	1	0.1	0.3
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2011	66	0	1	0.1	0.3
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy average	66	0	1	0.1	0.3
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate dummy 2010	66	0	1	0.1	0.3
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate dummy 2011	66	0	1	0.1	0.3
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate dummy average	66	0	1	0.1	0.3
Independent Variable	2006 Round 1 vote % for Alianza por el futuro (Fujimori)	63	0	36.4	4.1	5.0
Independent Variable	2006 Round 1 vote % for Unión por el Perú (Humala)	63	0	56.3	11.0	9.0
Independent Variable	2006 Round 2 vote % for Unión por el Perú (Humala)	64	0	100	34.5	19.0

Table A4.5.19: Summary Statistics for Peru, 2016

For these analyses, I have included two dependent variables, the one that was included in the paper, the valid vote percentage for Fuerza Popular, Keiko Fujimori's party, in the second round of the 2016 elections and the valid vote percentage for Peruanos por el Kambio, the party of Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK), in the second round of the 2016 elections. Both of these candidates ran in the 2011 elections and I have included previous valid vote percentages for both in Tables A4.5.23-A4.5.25.

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	2016 Round 2 vote % for Fuerza Popular (Fujimori)	72	0	81.5	34.2	17.6
Dependent Variable	2016 Round 2 vote % for Peruanos por el Kambio (PPK)	72	17.7	100	65.1	17.7
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2015	74	-3.7	121.7	4.5	15.3
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2016	74	-1.5	254.6	6.1	29.6
Independent Variable	Inflation rate average	74	-2.3	188.3	5.3	22.1
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2015	76	0.2	26.1	7.4	5.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2016	76	0.1	26.5	7.2	5.1
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate average	76	0.2	25.9	7.3	5.3
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2015	76	-9.8	25.6	2.9	3.7
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2016	75	-6.0	7.1	2.4	2.3
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate average	75	-3.8	15.4	2.6	2.7
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2015	74	0	1	0.7	0.4

Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2016	74	0	1	0.8	0.4
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy average	74	0	1	0.7	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2015	76	0	1	0.1	0.3
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2016	76	0	1	0.2	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy average	76	0	1	0.2	0.4
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate dummy 2015	76	0	1	0.4	0.5
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate dummy 2016	75	0	1	0.2	0.4
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate dummy average	75	0	1	0.3	0.5
Independent Variable	2011 Round 2 vote % for Fuerza 2011	64	7.3	100	65.6	17.0
Independent Variable	2011 Round 1 vote % for Fuerza 2011	64	0	51.7	17.4	11.6
Independent Variable	2011 Round 1 vote % for Alianza por el Gran Cambio (PPK)	64	7.3	100	35.5	18.3

Table A4.5.20: Single Year Models for Peru, 2006

Variable	Peru 2006 Model B1 '05 Econ	Peru 2006 Model B2 '05 Econ	Peru 2006 Model B3 '06 Econ	Peru 2006 Model B4 '06 Econ	Peru 2006 Model B5 Average	Peru 2006 Model B6 Average
Inflation Rate	0.40	-0.05	0.77	0.67	0.52	0.44
	(0.57)	(0.62)	(0.70)	(0.81)	(0.66)	(0.75)
Unemployment Rate	-0.41	0.02	-0.33	0.35	-0.38	-0.06
	(0.56)	(0.69)	(0.62)	(0.76)	(0.59)	(0.75)
GDP Growth Rate	1.54*	2.95*	1.64	3.28**	1.83*	3.63**
	(0.91)	(1.51)	(0.99)	(1.42)	(1.02)	(1.66)
Inflation Dummy		-13.24**		-4.17		-2.34
		(6.24)		(5.75)		(6.12)
Unemployment Dummy		3.70		9.19		4.27
		(6.19)		(6.25)		(6.41)
GDP Dummy		-12.43		-14.54*		-14.43
		(9.21)		(8.24)		(9.69)
Constant	55.88***	52.11***	51.54***	39.95***	52.97***	44.12***
	(6.01)	(8.35)	(6.50)	(8.94)	(6.35)	(9.11)
N	61	61	61	61	61	61
R^2	0.07	0.18	0.10	0.05	0.09	0.15
SER	16.91	16.33	16.61	16.08	16.71	16.66

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.21: Single Year Models for Peru, 2011, with Fuerza 2011 as the Dependent Variable

Variable	Peru 2011 Model B1 '10 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B2 '10 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B3 '11 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B4 '11 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B5 Average	Peru 2011 Model B6 Average
Inflation Rate	0.41	0.22	-0.07	-0.25	0.02	-0.25
	(0.49)	(0.54)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.42)
Unemployment Rate	0.84	0.92	0.71	0.56	0.87	0.71
	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.50)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.56)
GDP Growth Rate	0.83	0.62	0.74	-0.48	1.02	0.51
	(0.63)	(0.88)	(0.79)	(0.96)	(0.81)	(0.99)
Inflation Dummy		-5.02		-10.98**		-9.86*
		(5.52)		(4.58)		(4.98)
Unemployment Dummy		4.28		2.00		-0.07
		(8.54)		(7.51)		(7.39)
GDP Dummy		0.97		9.55		3.94
		(9.97)		(0.03)		(9.08)
Constant	54.78***	56.30***	58.83***	67.51***	55.74***	62.19***
	(5.99)	(6.81)	(5.96)	(6.96)	(6.34)	(7.28)
N	61	61	61	61	61	61
R^2	0.07	0.09	0.04	0.16	0.05	0.12
SER	15.36	15.60	15.61	14.96	15.48	15.31

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.22: Single Year Models for Peru, 2011, with Gana Perú as the Dependent Variable

Variable	Peru 2011 Model B7 '10 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B8 '10 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B9 '11 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B10 '11 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B11 Average	Peru 2011 Model B12 Average
Inflation Rate	-0.37 (0.48)	-0.17 (0.53)	0.05 (0.28)	0.25 (0.30)	-0.02 (0.39)	0.29 (0.41)
Unemployment Rate	-0.83 (0.52)	-0.97* (0.55)	-0.69 (0.50)	-0.62 (0.52)	-0.86 (0.52)	-0.78 (0.55)
GDP Growth Rate	-1.00 (0.62)	-0.71 (0.86)	-0.85 (0.79)	0.29 (0.95)	-1.22 (0.80)	-0.70 (0.98)
Inflation Dummy		5.37 (5.41)		10.50** (4.54)		10.24** (4.90)
Unemployment Dummy		-7.51 (8.36)		-4.85 (7.45)		-2.61 (7.25)
GDP Dummy		-1.12 (9.77)		-9.49 (7.96)		-3.77 (8.92)
Constant	44.12*** (5.92)	42.93*** (0.67)	39.94*** (5.91)	32.48*** (6.90)	43.39*** (6.26)	37.43*** (7.15)
N	61	61	61	61	61	61
R^2	0.07	0.11	0.04	0.16	0.06	0.14
SER	15.17	15.28	15.47	14.84	15.29	15.04

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.23: Lookback Models for Peru, 2011, with Fuerza 2011 as the Dependent Variable with First Round Vote Percentage from 2006 for Alianza por el Futuro

Variable	Peru 2011 Model B13 '10 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B14 '10 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B15 '11 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B16 '11 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B17 Average	Peru 2011 Model B18 Average
Inflation Rate	0.41 (0.49)	0.41 (0.53)	0.74 (0.56)	0.47 (0.63)	0.51 (0.52)	0.24 (0.57)
Unemployment Rate	0.55 (0.55)	0.73 (0.57)	0.32 (0.53)	0.33 (0.58)	0.53 (0.55)	0.56 (0.60)
GDP Growth Rate	1.17* (0.63)	1.35 (0.93)	0.52 (0.79)	-0.42 (0.99)	1.21 (0.79)	1.11 (1.02)
Inflation Dummy		-3.01 (5.45)		-6.92 (5.13)		-6.98 (5.27)
Unemployment Dummy		9.95 (0.81)		4.58 (7.64)		4.44 (7.66)
GDP Dummy		-6.91 (10.22)		9.44 (8.07)		-1.39 (9.24)
2006 Round 1 vote % for Alianza por el futuro (Fujimori)	0.53 (0.40)	0.60 (0.42)	0.39 (0.40)	0.29 (0.41)	0.47 (0.40)	0.50 (0.42)
Constant	53.22*** (6.57)	51.33*** (7.60)	56.50*** (6.32)	62.34*** (8.28)	53.29*** (6.78)	55.91*** (8.49)
N	54	54	54	54	54	54
R^2	0.10	0.15	0.07	0.15	0.09	0.13
SER	14.64	14.71	14.83	14.65	14.69	14.80

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.24: Lookback Models for Peru, 2011, with Gana Perú as the Dependent Variable with Second Round Vote Percentage from 2006 for Unión por el Perú

Variable	Peru 2011 Model B19 '10 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B20 '10 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B21 '11 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B22 '11 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B23 Average	Peru 2011 Model B24 Average
Inflation Rate	-0.38	-0.32	-0.68	-0.49	-0.48	-0.20
	(0.48)	(0.52)	(0.55)	(0.62)	(0.52)	(0.57)
Unemployment Rate	-0.58	-0.81	-0.39	-0.49	-0.56	-0.61
	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.52)	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.58)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.96	-0.65	-0.46	0.40	-1.04	-0.65
	(0.61)	(0.85)	(0.79)	(0.97)	(0.78)	(0.98)
Inflation Dummy		3.04		5.42		6.52
		(5.31)		(5.05)		(5.09)
Unemployment Dummy		-14.05		-6.22		-5.72
		(8.58)		(7.46)		(7.47)
GDP Dummy		0.00		-10.68		-3.24
		(0.58)		(7.82)		(8.84)
2006 Round 2 vote % for Unión por el Perú (Humala)	0.14	0.12	0.15	0.10	0.13	0.11
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Constant	37.43***	38.61***	35.14***	33.21***	37.95***	35.76***
	(7.48)	(8.26)	(7.49)	(0.57)	(7.85)	(9.00)
N	56	56	56	56	56	56
R^2	0.10	0.16	0.09	0.16	0.10	0.15
SER	14.56	14.49	14.65	14.47	14.57	14.63

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.25: Lookback Models for Peru, 2011, with Gana Perú as the Dependent Variable with First Round Vote Percentage from 2006 for Unión por el Perú

Variable	Peru 2011 Model B25 '10 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B26 '10 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B27 '11 Econ	Peru 2011 Model B28 '11 Econ	Peru 2011 Model b29 Average	Peru 2011 Model B30 Average
Inflation Rate	-1.08**	-1.02**	-1.41***	-1.36**	-1.23***	-1.15**
	(0.42)	(0.45)	(0.46)	(0.53)	(0.45)	(0.50)
Unemployment Rate	0.01	-0.19	0.09	-0.11	0.00	-0.19
	(0.45)	(0.47)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.45)	(0.48)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.70	-0.65	-0.20	0.22	-0.67	-0.60
	(0.51)	(0.71)	(0.63)	(0.78)	(0.63)	(0.79)
Inflation Dummy		4.27		1.78		2.90
		(4.36)		(4.20)		(4.33)
Unemployment Dummy		-11.79		-8.75		-9.15
		(7.05)		(6.01)		(6.12)
GDP Dummy		4.36		-6.64		0.88
		(7.94)		(6.37)		(7.21)
2006 Round 1 vote % for Unión por el Perú (Humala)	1.40***	1.36***	1.43***	1.39***	1.40***	1.40***
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)
Constant	24.04***	24.74***	23.44***	24.57***	24.59***	25.54***
	(6.09)	(6.51)	(5.61)	(6.43)	(6.13)	(6.71)
N	54	54	54	54	54	54
R^2	0.39	0.45	0.42	0.46	0.41	0.44
SER	12.02	11.77	11.80	11.69	11.88	11.88

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.26: Single Year Models for Peru, 2016, with Fuerza Popular as the Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for these models is the valid vote percentage for Keiko Fujimori's Fuerza Popular in the second round of the 2016 elections.

Variable	Peru 2016 Model B1 '15 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B2 '15 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B3 '16 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B4 '16 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B5 Average	Peru 2016 Model B6 Average
Inflation Rate	0.15	0.26	1.47**	0.85	0.66	0.41
	(0.41)	(0.60)	(0.62)	(1.15)	(0.50)	(0.71)
Unemployment Rate	-0.41	-0.46	-0.27	-0.23	-0.31	-0.30
	(0.39)	(0.44)	(0.40)	(0.46)	(0.40)	(0.46)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.61	0.09	0.07	-1.06	-0.19	-0.41
	(1.00)	(1.74)	(0.96)	(1.28)	(1.05)	(1.57)
Inflation Dummy		-1.28		-5.45		-3.26
		(6.14)		(9.49)		(6.99)
Unemployment Dummy		-4.54		-0.24		0.91
		(7.65)		(6.22)		(6.43)
GDP Dummy		-4.17		9.64		1.03
		(7.53)		(7.14)		(7.31)
Constant	37.11***	38.46***	31.06***	37.55***	33.95***	37.14***
	(5.41)	(8.86)	(4.90)	(11.88)	(5.38)	(9.15)
N	66	66	66	66	66	66
R^2	0.03	0.05	0.09	0.12	0.05	0.05
SER	17.14	17.44	16.64	16.79	17.03	17.42

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.27: Single Year Models for Peru, 2016, with Peruanos por el Kambio as the Dependent Variable

The dependent variable for these models is the valid vote percentage for Pedro Pablo Kuczynski's Peruanos por el Kambio in the second round of the 2016 elections.

Variable	Peru 2016 Model B7 '15 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B8 '15 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B9 '16 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B10 '16 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B11 Average	Peru 2016 Model B12 Average
Inflation Rate	-0.13	-0.20	-1.43**	-0.73	-0.63	-0.35
	(0.41)	(0.61)	(0.62)	(1.16)	(0.51)	(0.72)
Unemployment Rate	0.42	0.48	0.27	0.25	0.32	0.31
	(0.40)	(0.45)	(0.40)	(0.46)	(0.40)	(0.46)
GDP Growth Rate	0.72	0.11	0.01	1.18	0.31	0.67
	(1.00)	(1.76)	(0.97)	(1.29)	(1.06)	(1.58)
Inflation Dummy		1.48		6.29		3.28
		(6.20)		(9.59)		(7.05)
Unemployment Dummy		4.84		0.50		-0.64
		(7.71)		(6.28)		(6.49)
GDP Dummy		3.70		-9.96		-1.98
		(7.60)		(7.21)		(7.38)
Constant	61.74***	60.00***	67.89***	60.37***	64.90***	61.48***
	(5.45)	(8.94)	(4.96)	(12.01)	(5.43)	(9.23)
N	66	66	66	66	66	66
R^2	0.04	0.05	0.09	0.12	0.05	0.05
SER	17.29	17.59	16.84	16.97	17.20	17.58

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.28: Lookback Models for Peru, 2016 with Fuerza Popular as the Dependent Variable and the Second Round Vote Percentage from Fuerza 2011

These models are the same as the ones presented in the paper, but just with one round of voting from 2011 instead of two. The dependent variable for these models is the valid vote percentage for Keiko Fujimori's Fuerza Popular in the second round of the 2016 elections.

Variable	Peru 2016 Model B13 '15 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B14 '15 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B15 '16 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B16 '16 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B17 Average	Peru 2016 Model B18 Average
Inflation Rate	0.81**	0.51	1.37**	1.29	1.07**	0.89
	(0.33)	(0.45)	(0.55)	(1.13)	(0.40)	(0.56)
Unemployment Rate	0.06	-0.21	0.04	-0.11	0.04	-0.08
	(0.40)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.41)	(0.35)	(0.40)
GDP Growth Rate	0.25	-0.26	-0.05	-0.87	-0.00	-0.55
	(0.88)	(1.48)	(0.93)	(1.25)	(0.93)	(1.30)
Inflation Dummy		-5.54		-0.88		-1.82
		(4.91)		(8.93)		(5.99)
Unemployment Dummy		-10.96		-4.80		-3.75
		(6.77)		(5.40)		(5.20)
GDP Dummy		1.09		6.04		3.38
		(5.60)		(6.16)		(5.45)
2011 Round 2 vote % for Fuerza 2011	0.51***	0.51***	0.46***	0.47***	0.50***	0.52***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.13)
Constant	-0.99	7.67	2.35	5.09	-0.43	2.64
	(8.76)	(10.90)	(8.64)	(16.02)	(8.67)	(12.07
N	54	54	54	54	54	54
R^2	0.31	0.36	0.27	0.30	0.31	0.32
SER	11.83	11.72	12.13	12.32	11.8	12.09

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.29: Lookback Models for Peru, 2016 with Fuerza Popular as the Dependent Variable and the First Round Vote Percentage from Fuerza 2011

These models are the same as the ones presented in the paper, but just with one round of voting from 2011 instead of two. The dependent variable for these models is the valid vote percentage for Keiko Fujimori's Fuerza Popular in the second round of the 2016 elections.

Variable	Peru 2016 Model B19 '15 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B20 '15 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B21 '16 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B22 '16 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B23 Average	Peru 2016 Model B24 Average
Inflation Rate	0.19	-0.09	0.66*	0.15	0.32	-0.15
	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.71)	(0.29)	(0.39)
Unemployment Rate	0.24	0.06	0.25	0.15	0.26	0.12
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.28)
GDP Growth Rate	0.30	0.34	0.23	-0.45	0.31	0.25
	(0.64)	(1.00)	(0.64)	(0.86)	(0.67)	(0.90)
Inflation Dummy		-8.61**		-4.81		-8.11*
		(3.33)		(5.75)		(4.11)
Unemployment Dummy		-6.50		-1.90		-1.29
		(4.66)		(3.68)		(3.61)
GDP Dummy		-0.99		5.26		0.09
		(3.85)		(4.25)		(3.85)
2011 Round 1 vote % for Fuerza 2011	0.98***	0.96***	0.97***	0.95***	0.97***	0.97***
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Constant	15.09***	24.92***	14.24***	21.24***	14.72***	23.55***
	(3.70)	(5.17)	(3.59)	(7.88)	(3.72)	(5.89)
N	54	54	54	54	54	54
R^2	0.63	0.69	0.65	0.66	0.63	0.66
SER	8.67	8.21	8.44	8.53	8.60	8.53

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.30: Lookback Models for Peru, 2016 with Peruanos por el Kambio as the Dependent Variable and the First Round Vote Percentage from Alianza por el Gran Cambio in 2011

The dependent variable for these models is the valid vote percentage for Pedro Pablo Kuczynski's Peruanos por el Kambio in the second round of the 2016 elections. He ran previously in 2011, but did not make the runoff, so only the first round is included here.

Variable	Peru 2016 Model B25 '15 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B26 '15 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B27 '16 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B28 '16 Econ	Peru 2016 Model B29 Average	Peru 2016 Model B30 Average
Inflation Rate	-0.66*	-0.47	-1.21**	0.37	-0.84*	-0.37
	(0.35)	(0.47)	(0.56)	(1.02)	(0.42)	(0.57)
Unemployment Rate	-0.11	-0.10	-0.14	-0.03	-0.14	-0.11
	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.37)	(0.41)
GDP Growth Rate	-1.04	-1.81	-0.72	-0.31	-0.94	-1.02
	(0.93)	(1.50)	(0.95)	(1.28)	(0.97)	(1.37)
Inflation Dummy		10.78**		14.78*		8.36
		(4.98)		(8.23)		(6.08)
Unemployment Dummy		-0.38		-1.63		-2.48
		(7.21)		(5.43)		(5.40)
GDP Dummy		3.79		-3.80		0.85
		(5.74)		(6.33)		(5.80)
2011 Round 1 vote % for Alianza por el Gran Cambio (PPK)	0.35***	0.35***	0.36***	0.37***	0.35***	0.36***
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.11)
Constant	56.83***	48.21***	56.72***	40.37***	56.98***	48.77***
	(5.65)	(7.70)	(5.58)	(11.01)	(5.69)	(8.85)
N	54	54	54	54	54	54
R^2	0.23	0.31	0.25	0.30	0.24	0.27
SER	12.57	12.29	12.44	12.37	12.52	12.61

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4.5.31: Summary Statistics for Ecuador, 2013

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	PAIS vote % in the 2013 elections	47	25	100	63.9	16.5
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2012	46	-0.7	21.1	4.2	3.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2012	47	0.5	24.8	7.0	4.8
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2012	47	-4.0	9.8	2.6	2.9
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2012	46	0	1	0.7	0.4
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2012	47	0	1	0.1	0.3
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2012	47	0	1	0.1	0.3

Table A4.5.32: Summary Statistics for Ecuador, 2017

Type of Variable	Variable	Observations	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Standard Deviation
Dependent Variable	2017 Round 2 vote % for PAIS	45	0	100	40.5	18.5
Independent Variable	Inflation rate 2016	44	-0.5	254.9	8.9	38.1
Independent Variable	Unemployment rate 2016	46	0.1	26.5	6.6	4.6
Independent Variable	GDP Growth rate 2016	44	-3.5	13.4	2.8	2.7
Independent Variable	Inflation dummy 2016	44	0	1	0.5	0.5
Independent Variable	Unemployment dummy 2016	46	0	1	0.3	0.5
Independent Variable	GDP growth rate dummy 2016	44	0	1	0.9	0.3
Independent Variable	2017 Round 1 vote % for PAIS	45	0	100	35.8	17.2
Independent Variable	PAIS vote % in the 2013 elections	47	25	100	63.9	16.5

Table A4.5.33: Single Year Models for Ecuador, 2013 and 2017

Variable	Ecuador 2013 Model B1	Ecuador 2013 Model B2	Ecuador 2017 Model B1	Ecuador 2017 Model B2
Inflation Rate	0.21 (0.73)	1.04 (1.02)	-0.48 (0.82)	0.26 (1.32)
Unemployment Rate	-0.03 (0.58)	0.02 (0.62)	0.69 (0.60)	-0.14 (0.66)
GDP Growth Rate	-1.88* (0.99)	-1.45 (1.24)	1.02 (1.05)	2.19* (1.17)
Inflation Dummy		10.92 (8.13)		9.33 (8.42)
Unemployment Dummy		-7.42 (7.97)		-14.17** (6.96)
GDP Dummy		-0.98 (9.48)		-16.65 (16.82)
Constant	67.61*** (61.13)	55.69*** (11.79)	33.51*** (6.05)	49.73** (20.02)
N	46	46	42	42
R^2	0.10	0.15	0.06	0.26
SER	15.95	16.09	17.94	16.58

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

A4.6 Additional Models with Cases Restricted to Countries in which More than 50 Total Votes Were Cast in the Second Round

Table A4.6.1: Chile Economic Results

Variable	Chile 2017 Model C1	Chile 2017 Model C2
Inflation Rate	-3.51 (2.45)	6.06 (4.09)
Unemployment Rate	1.20 (1.16)	1.07 (1.92)
GDP Growth Rate	-5.12** (2.41)	-5.04* (2.49)
Inflation Dummy		36.45** (13.15)
Unemployment Dummy		3.02 (13.22)
GDP Dummy		-0.41 (13.48)
Constant	70.17*** (13.34)	23.08 (28.45)
N	33	33
R^2	0.20	0.41
SER	19.83	18.03

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

As compared to the Chilean models in Chapter 3, in these models with the lower N, the GDP Growth Rate and Inflation Dummy are still statistically significant in the same directions, which are both contrary to expectations in H1 and H2. In C2, the GDP Growth rate variable is significant at the p<0.10, while the constant is not significant, which contrasts with Chile Model 2 in Chapter 4. Also, in C2, when the inflation rate in the country of residence is lower than the Chilean rate, the vote percentage for the incumbent Socialist party increases by over 36 percentage points, more than in Model 2 in Chapter 4. This runs counter to the expectations outlined in Hypothesis 2, however, which posits that those who live in areas that are doing better economically than their country of origin will be more likely to punish the incumbent party at the

ballot box. This does, however, provide support to Hypothesis 1, since the voters are rewarding the incumbent party in their country of origin when their economic situation abroad is good. As a result, neither of these models are all that much different from the results presented for the similar models for Chile in Chapter 4. So, reducing the analysis to only countries with larger voting populations has a minimal effect on the statistical and substantive effects of these models.

Table A4.6.2: Chile Economic Results with Round One Valid Vote Percentage

Variable	Chile 2017 Model C3	Chile 2017 Model C4
Inflation Rate	-1.93 (1.60)	2.03 (3.01)
Unemployment Rate	0.32 (0.76)	0.24 (1.37)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.48 (1.71)	-0.94 (1.95)
Inflation Dummy		15.98 (10.18)
Unemployment Dummy		0.25 (9.43)
GDP Dummy		-0.60 (9.60)
Round One Socialist Vote %	1.40*** (0.22)	1.23*** (0.24)
Constant	23.91** (11.19)	10.70 (20.40)
N	33	33
R^2	0.68	0.71
SER	12.79	12.84

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

As compared to Models 3 and 4 for Chile in Chapter 4, the results in Models C3 and C4 are less statistically significant. None of the economic variables reach any levels of significance. The role of the round one socialist vote has a similar effect, both statistically and substantively in all four comparable models. In model C4, the constant is not statistically significant, in contrast to Model 4 in Chapter 4. As a result, neither of these models are all that much different from the results presented for the similar models for Chile in Chapter 4. So, reducing the analysis to only countries with larger voting populations has a minimal effect on the statistical and substantive effects of these models.

Table A4.6.3: Brazil Economic Results with Two Waves of Previous Valid Vote Percentages

Variable	Brazil 2018 Model C1	Brazil 2018 Model C2
Inflation Rate	-0.18 (0.52)	0.93 (0.69)
Unemployment Rate	0.12 (0.37)	-0.11 (0.63)
GDP Growth Rate7.17	0.53 (0.98)	-0.20 (1.11)
Inflation Dummy		11.46* (6.08)
Unemployment Dummy		-5.72 (10.97)
GDP Dummy		4.67 (6.69)
PT Vote % in 2nd Round of 2010	0.34 (0.20)	0.27 (0.20)
PT Vote % in 2nd Round of 2014	0.42* (0.21)	0.54** (0.22)
Constant	7.17 (7.77)	-0.99 (15.67)
N	56	56
R^2	0.34	0.40
SER	11.99	11.79

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

In the case of Brazil, these models with a reduced N have less statistical significance, as compared to the models presented in Section A4.2 of this Dissertation Appendix. The inflation dummy is less statistically significant, and the level of statistical significance of the previous vote for the PT is lower in these models. The effect sizes are substantively similar, but otherwise Models C1 and C2 are not much different than the Brazilian models in Section A4.2.

Table A4.6.4: Brazil Economic Results with Two Waves of First Round Previous Valid Vote Percentages

Variable	Brazil 2018 Model C3	Brazil 2018 Model C4
Inflation Rate	0.19 (0.60)	0.89 (0.91)
Unemployment Rate	0.20 (0.42)	0.38 (0.73)
GDP Growth Rate	0.65 (1.18)	-0.32 (1.30)
Inflation Dummy		8.15 (7.19)
Unemployment Dummy		0.60 (12.83)
GDP Dummy		9.81 (7.71)
PT Vote % in 1st Round of 2010	0.48** (0.23)	0.48** (0.23)
PT Vote % in 1st Round of 2014	-0.06 (0.23)	0.02 (0.24)
Constant	15.01* (8.90)	-3.14 (19.28)
N	56	56
R^2	0.14	0.20
SER	13.74	13.66

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

As compared to the models in Table A4.2.2 in the Chapter 4 Dissertation Appendix, this is one of the few cases where the models with the reduced N have indicators that reach statistical significance. In Models C3 and C4, the previous PT vote share variables do reach statistical significance, as compared to the models with the larger N in Table A4.2.2.

Table A4.6.5: Colombia Economic Results with Two Waves of Previous Valid Vote Percentages

Variable	Colombia 2018 Model C1	Colombia 2018 Model C2
Inflation Rate	-0.00 (0.17)	-0.19 (0.21)
Unemployment Rate	0.09 (0.10)	0.24 (0.15)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.08 (0.25)	-0.02 (0.31)
Inflation Dummy		-2.40* (1.25)
Unemployment Dummy		3.06 (1.94)
GDP Dummy		-0.19 (1.27)
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 2 in 2010	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 2 in 2014	0.09*** (0.03)	0.08*** (0.03)
Constant	-5.31 (3.33)	-6.36 (4.38)
N	44	44
R^2	0.23	0.35
SER	2.65	2.54

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

While Model C1 is the same in terms of both substantive and statistical significance to the comparable model in Table A4.3.1 in the Dissertation Appendix, Chapter 4, Model C2 is less significant than the comparable original model. In Model C2, fewer of the economic indicators reach any meaningful level of statistical significance and the previous vote share indicators are also less statistically significant. As a result, these models with the lower N are either similar or provide a lower level of statistical significance than then models with the higher N.

Table A4.6.6: Colombia Economic Results with Two Waves of First Round Previous Valid Vote Percentages

Variable	Colombia 2018 Model C3	Colombia 2018 Model C4
Inflation Rate	-0.04 (0.16)	-0.21 (0.19)
Unemployment Rate	0.07 (0.09)	0.23 (0.14)
GDP Growth Rate	0.10 (0.23)	0.19 (0.28)
Inflation Dummy		-2.12* 1.12
Unemployment Dummy		3.29* (1.75)
GDP Dummy		0.52 (1.11)
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 1 in 2010	0.16*** (0.05)	0.15*** (0.05)
Partido de la U Vote % in Round 1 in 2014	0.06** (0.02)	0.06** (0.03)
Constant	-3.45** (1.66)	-5.08 (3.26)
N	44	44
R^2	0.35	0.46
SER	2.44	2.31

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

In this case for Colombia, Model C3 is the same as Model A3 from Table A4.3.2 from earlier in the Dissertation Appendix for Chapter 4. As was the case for Model C2, Model C4 is less significant than the comparable model, A4, in Table A4.3.2. Fewer variables reach the same level of statistical significance in C4 than in A4. As a result, these models with the lower N are either similar or provide a lower level of statistical significance than then models with the higher N.

Table A4.6.7: Ecuador Economic Results with 2013 Valid Vote Percentage

Variable	Ecuador 2017 Model C1	Ecuador 2017 Model C2
Inflation Rate	-0.26 (0.52)	1.12 (0.87)
Unemployment Rate	-0.74 (0.44)	-0.56 (0.46)
GDP Growth Rate	-1.31* (0.77)	-1.53* (0.87)
Inflation Dummy		8.57* (4.56)
Unemployment Dummy		5.00 (3.92)
GDP Dummy		8.66 (9.17)
PAIS Vote % in 2013	0.95*** (0.13)	0.96*** (0.13)
Constant	-9.99 (8.74)	-28.85** (13.19)
N	30	30
R^2	0.77	0.81
SER	6.81	6.62

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

In Models C1 and C2 for Ecuador, the GDP indicator is significant, but not in the expected direction, as compared to the comparable models in previous Table A4.1.1 in the Dissertation Appendix for Chapter 4. The GDP indicators for the models in Table A4.1.1 do not reach any meaningful level of statistical significance. The role of the previous vote share for the PAIS party has the same level of statistical significance as the comparable models, but the substantive effect is about 0.3 points higher in these models with the reduced N.

Table A4.6.8: Ecuador Economic Results with 2017 Round One and 2013 Valid Vote Percentage

Variable	Ecuador 2017 Model C3	Ecuador 2017 Model C4
Inflation Rate	-0.24 (0.35)	0.56 (0.57)
Unemployment Rate	-0.16 (0.32)	-0.02 (0.32)
GDP Growth Rate	-0.57 (0.53)	-0.72 (0.59)
Inflation Dummy		5.44* (3.03)
Unemployment Dummy		5.70** (2.56)
GDP Dummy		3.05 (6.05)
PAIS Vote % in Round 1 in 2017	0.63*** (0.11)	0.61*** (0.11)
PAIS Vote % in 2013	0.43*** (0.13)	0.49*** (0.12)
Constant	-5.01 (5.95)	-18.13* (8.80)
N	30	30
R^2	0.90	0.92
SER	4.58	4.31

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

Models C3 with the reduced N for Ecuador are similar in terms of statistical significance as the comparable models presented in Table A4.1.2 earlier in this Dissertation Appendix for Chapter 4. Model C4 has economic indicators that do reach some statistical significance, as compared to Model A4 presented earlier. However, these models are quite similar overall, and these models have about 10 fewer cases than the models presented in Section A4.1.

Table A4.6.9: Peru Economic Results with Two Rounds of Previous Valid Vote Percentages

Variable	Peru 2016 Model C1	Peru 2016 Model C2
Inflation Rate	0.18 (0.48)	0.03 (0.89)
Unemployment Rate	-0.18 (0.29)	-0.29 (0.32)
GDP Growth Rate	0.00 (0.63)	-0.63 (0.84)
Inflation Dummy		-0.34 (5.87)
Unemployment Dummy		-4.20 (5.33)
GDP Dummy		4.49 (4.16)
2011 Round 1 vote % for Fuerza 2011	1.24*** (0.18)	1.29*** (0.21)
2011 Round 2 vote % for Fuerza 2011	-0.03 (0.15)	-0.06 (0.16)
Constant	16.37* (8.67)	19.24 (11.60)
N	42	42
R^2	0.77	0.78
SER	6.83	6.93

* p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, standard errors in parentheses.

The results presented here are very similar to the results for Peru in Table A4.4.1 in this Dissertation Appendix for Chapter 4, despite the reduced N. There is a similar level of statistical significance for the previous Fuerza 2011 vote share, but there are no economic indicators that reach any meaningful level of statistical significance. The effect sizes are substantively similar among all of the models.

A4.7 Turnout Rates for Expatriate Voters by Country

Table A4.7.1: Turnout Rates for Brazilian Expatriate Voters by Country, 2014

I do not have sufficient data from 2010 to include turnout rates for Brazil since it does not include the number registered at each consulate or embassy. Also, I only have turnout information for Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

Country	Round 1 Total Votes	Round 1 Number Registered	Round 1 Turnout	Round 2 Total Votes	Round 2 Number Registered	Round 2 Turnout
Angola	99	214	46.26%	106	214	49.53%
Argentina	2,832	6,000	47.20%	2,817	6,001	46.94%
Australia	2,931	6,214	47.17%	2,923	6,215	47.03%
Austria	685	1,816	37.72%	674	1,817	37.09%
Belgium	1,526	3,091	49.37%	1,474	3,091	47.69%
Bolivia	1,286	2,338	55.00%	1,267	2,338	54.19%
Canada	7,319	12,902	56.73%	7,335	12,902	56.85%
Cape Verde	38	58	65.52%	35	58	60.34%
Chile	1,228	2,258	54.38%	1,231	2,258	54.52%
China	223	674	33.09%	288	674	42.73%
Colombia	402	984	40.85%	401	984	40.75%
Costa Rica	254	443	57.33%	252	443	56.88%
Cote d'Ivoire	54	74	72.97%	48	74	64.86%
Croatia	21	45	46.67%	19	45	42.22%
Cuba	102	323	31.58%	100	323	30.96%
Cyprus	23	44	52.27%	23	44	52.27%
Czech Republic	87	142	61.27%	84	142	59.15%
Denmark	396	823	48.12%	388	823	47.14%
Dominican Republic	194	364	53.30%	190	364	52.20%
East Timor	33	82	40.24%	35	82	42.68%
Ecuador	321	751	42.74%	307	751	40.88%
Egypt	49	126	38.89%	54	126	42.86%
El Salvador	97	155	62.58%	92	155	59.35%
Finland	216	437	49.42%	241	437	55.15%
France	3,346	8,784	38.09%	3,247	8,786	36.96%
French Guiana (France)	1,997	3,518	56.77%	1,859	3,518	52.84%
Germany	6,467	18,090	35.75%	5,977	18,094	33.03%
Greece	359	794	45.21%	352	794	44.33%

Guatemala	79	157	50.32%	78	157	49.68%
Guinea-Bissau	43	89	48.31%	39	89	43.82%
Guyana	84	196	42.86%	71	196	36.22%
Haiti	17	35	48.57%	18	35	51.43%
Honduras	122	200	61.00%	116	200	58.00%
Hong Kong (China)	123	216	56.94%	129	216	59.72%
Hungary	92	178	51.69%	77	178	43.26%
India	12	66	18.18%	19	66	28.79%
Indonesia	22	83	26.51%	18	83	21.68%
Iran	22	36	61.11%	20	36	55.56%
Ireland	283	624	45.35%	257	624	41.19%
Israel	207	627	33.01%	207	627	33.01%
Italy	7,037	21,104	33.34%	6,749	21,108	31.97%
Jamaica	9	47	19.15%	9	47	19.15%
Japan	22,941	37,600	61.01%	22,877	37,600	60.84%
Jordan	197	519	37.96%	208	519	40.08%
Kenya	37	70	52.86%	35	70	50.00%
Kuwait	16	69	23.19%	18	69	26.09%
Lebanon	899	2,300	39.09%	998	2,300	43.39%
Malaysia	35	82	42.68%	34	82	41.46%
Mexico	967	2,518	38.40%	979	2,518	38.88%
Morocco	17	43	39.53%	23	43	53.49%
Mozambique	295	614	48.05%	286	614	46.58%
Namibia	34	50	68.00%	32	50	64.00%
Netherlands	1,714	3,745	45.77%	1,672	3,746	44.63%
New Zealand	75	924	8.12%	67	924	7.25%
Nicaragua	64	106	60.38%	61	106	57.55%
Nigeria	18	53	33.96%	21	53	39.62%
Norway	393	1,172	33.53%	390	1,172	33.28%
Palestinian Territories	438	939	46.65%	447	939	47.60%
Panama	383	681	56.24%	372	681	54.63%
Paraguay	3,537	6,158	57.44%	3,524	6,058	58.17%
Peru	492	887	55.47%	512	888	57.66%
Philippines	30	89	33.71%	31	89	34.83%
Poland	54	146	36.99%	51	146	34.93%
Portugal	10,461	30,843	33.92%	10,526	30,844	34.13%
Qatar	143	269	53.16%	171	269	63.57%
Democratic Republic of the Congo	16	38	42.11%	19	38	50.00%
Romania	22	53	41.51%	21	54	38.89%
Russia	42	106	39.62%	40	106	37.74%

Saudi Arabia	15	81	18.52%	29	81	35.80%
Senegal	42	70	60.00%	36	70	51.43%
Serbia	24	48	50.00%	21	48	43.75%
Singapore	116	273	42.49%	115	273	42.12%
Slovenia	23	33	69.70%	20	33	60.61%
South Africa	248	597	41.54%	243	598	40.64%
South Korea	27	68	39.71%	26	68	38.24%
Spain	3,455	13,377	25.83%	3,278	13,379	24.50%
Suriname	709	2,311	30.68%	678	2,311	29.34%
Sweden	817	1,935	42.22%	185	1,935	9.56%
Switzerland	6,121	15,337	39.91%	6,386	15,335	41.64%
Taiwan	127	219	57.99%	115	219	52.51%
Thailand	54	102	52.94%	53	102	51.96%
Trinidad and Tobago	9	33	27.27%	7	33	21.21%
Tunisia	27	43	62.79%	26	43	60.47%
Turkey	45	98	45.92%	51	98	52.04%
United Arab Emirates	142	471	30.15%	162	471	34.39%
United Kingdom	6,190	16,882	36.67%	6,158	16,886	36.47%
Uruguay	1,234	2,163	57.05%	1,279	2,165	59.08%
United States of America	38,699	112,077	34.31%	39,929	112,086	35.62%
Venezuela	740	1,836	40.31%	735	1,836	40.03%
Total	142,921	353,330	40.45%	142,573	353,263	40.36%

Table A4.7.2: Turnout Rates for Brazilian Expatriate Voters, 2018

Country	Round 1 Total Votes	Round 1 Number Registered	Round 1 Turnout	Round 2 Total Votes	Round 2 Number Registered	Round 2 Turnout
Angola	166	342	48.54%	166	342	48.54%
Argentina	3,653	7,148	51.11%	3,604	7,131	50.54%
Australia	3,265	8,234	39.65%	3,235	8,234	39.29%
Austria	954	2,528	37.74%	927	2,526	36.70%
Bahamas	28	38	73.68%	24	38	63.16%
Belgium	2,001	3,995	50.09%	1,956	3,995	48.96%
Bolivia	1,632	3,046	53.58%	1,571	3,043	51.63%
Canada	12,783	22,043	57.99%	13,006	22,043	59.00%
Cape Verde	31	56	55.36%	34	56	60.71%
Chile	1,491	2,677	55.70%	1,491	2,677	55.70%
China	335	1,051	31.87%	372	1,051	35.39%
Colombia	490	1,179	41.56%	506	1,179	42.92%
Costa Rica	276	482	57.26%	276	482	57.26%
Cote d'Ivoire	33	68	48.53%	27	68	39.71%
Croatia	18	56	32.14%	16	56	28.57%
Cuba	27	107	25.23%	27	107	25.23%
Cyprus	29	52	55.77%	27	52	51.92%
Czech Republic	157	249	63.05%	155	249	62.25%
Denmark	663	1,318	50.30%	679	1,318	51.52%
Dominican Republic	229	409	55.99%	222	409	54.28%
East Timor	41	75	54.67%	43	75	57.33%
Ecuador	356	955	37.28%	368	955	38.53%
Egypt	55	137	40.15%	49	137	35.77%
El Salvador	79	157	50.32%	78	157	49.68%
Estonia	35	46	76.09%	40	46	86.95%
Finland	383	680	56.32%	370	680	54.41%
France	4,667	11,036	42.29%	4,654	11,035	42.17%
French Guiana (France)	1,690	3,640	46.43%	1,641	3,640	45.08%
Germany	9,179	25,254	36.35%	8,975	35,355	35.54%
Ghana	15	50	30.00%	15	50	30.00%
Greece	419	1,046	40.06%	407	1,046	38.91%
Guatemala	128	225	56.89%	130	225	57.78%
Guinea-Bissau	30	69	43.48%	28	69	40.58%
Guyana	83	287	28.92%	58	287	20.21%
Haiti	30	59	50.85%	30	59	50.85%

Honduras	82	213	38.50%	86	213	40.38%
Hong Kong (China)	312	564	55.32%	306	564	54.26%
Hungary	134	229	58.52%	121	229	52.84%
India	42	94	44.68%	32	94	34.04%
Indonesia	30	104	28.85%	27	104	25.96%
Iran	22	49	44.90%	30	49	61.22%
Ireland	1,112	2,111	52.68%	1,027	2,111	48.65%
Israel	541	2,095	25.82%	539	2,095	25.73%
Italy	8,629	25,458	33.90%	8,039	25,457	31.58%
Jamaica	21	94	22.34%	22	94	23.40%
Japan	32,263	60,692	53.47%	32,398	60,696	53.38%
Jordan	424	793	47.76%	381	793	48.05%
Kenya	32	67	53.68%	36	67	53.73%
Kuwait	51	95	53.68%	49	95	51.58%
Lebanon	2,368	4,416	53.62%	2,110	4,416	47.78%
Malaysia	61	128	32.72%	57	128	44.53%
Mexico	1,117	3,414	32.72%	1,054	3,414	30.87%
Morocco	33	69	47.83%	22	69	31.88%
Mozambique	297	675	44.00%	302	675	44.74%
Namibia	20	51	39.22%	21	51	41.18%
Nepal	24	36	66.67%	21	36	58.33%
Netherlands	2,243	4,835	46.39%	2,185	4,835	45.19%
New Zealand	349	1,856	18.80%	346	1,856	18.64%
Nicaragua	62	128	48.44%	69	128	53.91%
Nigeria	27	55	49.09%	22	55	40.00%
Norway	519	1,443	35.97%	511	1,443	35.41%
Oman	39	75	52.00%	40	75	53.33%
Palestinian Territories	622	1,204	51.66%	535	1,204	44.44%
Panama	607	1,057	57.43%	607	1,057	57.43%
Paraguay	4,496	7,515	59.83%	4,366	7,515	58.10%
Peru	611	1,139	53.64%	628	1,139	55.14%
Philippines	56	127	44.09%	49	127	38.58%
Poland	98	188	52.13%	89	188	47.34%
Portugal	13,421	39,097	34.33%	13,975	39,099	35.74%
Qatar	225	451	49.89%	212	451	47.01%
Democratic Republic of the Congo	19	32	59.38%	19	32	59.38%
Romania	25	53	47.17%	24	53	45.28%
Russia	46	123	37.40%	45	123	36.59%
Saudi Arabia	37	133	32.74%	38	133	28.57%
Senegal	60	99	60.61%	56	99	56.57%

Serbia	35	76	46.05%	31	76	40.79%
Singapore	260	439	59.23%	261	440	59.32%
Slovakia	47	60	78.33%	47	60	78.33%
Slovenia	34	44	77.27%	31	44	70.45%
South Africa	398	854	46.60%	401	854	46.96%
South Korea	65	105	61.90%	65	105	61.90%
Spain	6,044	20,750	29.13%	5,896	20,751	28.41%
Suriname	559	1,869	29.91%	531	1,869	28.41%
Sweden	1,269	2,726	46.55%	1,229	2,726	45.08%
Switzerland	8,420	19,657	42.83%	8,544	19,657	43.47%
Taiwan	243	528	46.02%	230	528	43.56%
Tanzania	15	35	42.86%	13	35	37.14%
Thailand	79	148	53.38%	77	148	52.03%
Trinidad and Tobago	34	95	35.79%	32	95	33.68%
Tunisia	26	45	57.78%	23	45	51.11%
Turkey	122	201	60.70%	108	201	53.73%
United Arab Emirates	762	1,749	43.57%	726	1,749	41.51%
Ukraine	25	46	54.35%	24	46	52.17%
United Kingdom	9,715	25,885	37.53%	9,145	25,885	35.33%
Uruguay	1,631	2,925	55.76%	1,693	2,925	57.88%
United States of America	55,826	159,887	34.92%	55,845	159,877	34.93%
Venezuela	490	1,847	26.53%	473	1,847	25.61%
Vietnam	16	39	41.03%	18	39	46.15%
Zambia	23	30	76.67%	20	30	66.67%
Total	202,766	499,891	40.56%	201,166	509,966	39.45%

Table A4.7.3: Turnout Rates for Colombian Expatriate Voters, 2010

I know the turnout rate for Denmark and Finland are odd; I have double checked the figures and still come up with those turnout rates.

Country	Round 1 Total Votes	Round 1 Number Registered	Round 1 Turnout	Round 2 Total Votes	Round 2 Number Registered	Round 2 Turnout
Argentina	1,357	2,859	47.46%	1,011	2,859	35.36%
Aruba	1,070	2,517	42.51%	1,052	2,517	41.80%
Australia	964	2,620	36.79%	752	2,620	28.70%
Austria	123	398	30.90%	105	398	26.38%
Belgium	331	1,004	32.97%	295	1,004	29.38%
Bolivia	172	546	31.50%	154	546	28.21%
Brazil	476	1,255	37.93%	419	1,255	33.39%
Canada	2,904	9,414	30.85%	2,263	9,414	24.04%
Chile	1,171	2,807	41.72%	942	2,807	33.56%
China	87	248	35.08%	70	248	28.23%
Costa Rica	2,033	6,350	32.02%	1,639	6,350	25.81%
Cuba	51	230	22.17%	40	230	17.39%
Curaçao	341	1,148	29.70%	326	1,148	28.40%
Cyprus	20	29	68.97%	14	29	48.28%
Denmark	13	10	130.00%	11	10	110.00%
Dominican Republic	535	1,558	34.34%	389	1,158	33.59%
Ecuador	4,567	15,915	28.70%	4,197	15,915	26.37%
Egypt	35	95	36.84%	27	95	28.42%
El Salvador	159	351	45.30%	133	351	37.89%
Finland	14	13	107.69%	12	13	92.31%
France	1,806	5,129	35.21%	1,432	5,129	27.92%
Germany	610	2,150	28.37%	487	2,150	22.65%
Greece	41	43	95.35%	34	43	79.07%
Guatemala	227	623	36.44%	211	623	33,87%
Honduras	103	378	27.25%	71	378	18.78%
India	9	67	13.43%	13	67	19.40%
Indonesia	22	33	66.67%	15	33	45.45%
Israel	103	606	17.00%	83	606	13.70%
Italy	594	3,309	17.95%	486	3,309	14.69%
Jamaica	62	203	30.54%	48	203	23.65%
Japan	164	761	21.55%	138	761	18.13%
Kenya	19	45	42.22%	18	45	40.00%
Lebanon	86	400	21.50%	114	400	28.50%
Malaysia	14	59	23.73%	10	59	16.95%
Mexico	951	2,888	32.93%	823	2,888	28.50%
Netherlands	257	1,089	23.60%	214	1,089	19.65%

Nicaragua	67	182	36.81%	50	182	27.47%
Norway	30	65	46.15%	22	65	33.85%
Panama	2,055	8,254	24.90%	1,747	8,254	21.17%
Paraguay	64	194	39.37%	56	194	28.87%
Peru	461	1,171	39.37%	398	1,171	33.99%
Philippines	26	49	53.06%	19	49	38.76%
Poland	29	74	39.19%	24	74	32.43%
Portugal	59	236	25.00%	45	236	19.07%
Puerto Rico	514	1,215	42.30%	431	1,215	35.47%
Russia	69	197	35.03%	57	197	28.93%
South Africa	35	147	23.81%	30	147	20.41%
South Korea	25	67	37.31%	22	67	32.84%
Spain	8,646	55,095	15.69%	7,605	55,095	13.80%
Sweden	156	507	30.77%	116	507	22.88%
Switzerland	528	1,733	30.47%	444	1,733	25.62%
Turkey	13	20	65.00%	14	20	70.00%
United Kingdom	1,711	7,101	24.10%	1,377	7,101	19.39%
Uruguay	112	290	38.62%	96	290	33.10%
United States of America	48,173	154,971	31.09%	45,464	154,971	29.34%
Venezuela	21,048	116,400	18.08%	17,805	116,400	15.30%
Total	105,312	415,118	25.37%	93,870	414,718	22.63%

Table A4.7.4: Turnout Rates for Colombian Expatriate Voters, 2014

I know the turnout rate for Ghana and Morocco are odd; I have double checked the figures and still come up with those turnout rates.

Country	Round 1 Total Votes	Round 1 Number Registered	Round 1 Turnout	Round 2 Total Votes	Round 2 Number Registered	Round 2 Turnout
Antigua and Barbuda	8	8	100.00%	7	8	87.50%
Argentina	2,241	5,771	38.83%	1,741	5,771	30.17%
Aruba	722	2,881	25.06%	824	2,881	28.60%
Australia	1,322	3,843	34.40%	1,094	3,843	28.47%
Austria	184	513	35.87%	187	513	36.45%
Belgium	429	1,402	30.60%	401	1,402	28.60%
Bolivia	182	695	26.19%	178	695	25.61%
Brazil	835	2,047	40.79%	683	2,047	33.37%
Canada	4,381	15,466	28.33%	4,478	15,466	28.95%
Chile	1,289	4,304	29.95%	1,207	4,304	28.04%
China	171	415	41.20%	151	415	36.39%
Costa Rica	1,769	7,400	23.91%	1,798	7,400	24.30%
Cuba	40	198	20.20%	35	198	17.68%
Curaçao	254	1,286	19.75%	276	1,286	21.46%
Cyprus	16	42	38.10%	14	42	33.33%
Denmark	31	58	53.45%	26	58	44.83%
Dominican Republic	435	1,710	25.44%	477	1,710	27.89%
Ecuador	4,450	21,324	20.87%	4,368	21,324	20.48%
Egypt	24	95	25.26%	22	95	23.16%
El Salvador	183	472	38.77%	185	472	39.19%
Finland	47	60	78.33%	36	60	60.00%
France	1,809	6,805	26.58%	1,767	6,805	25.97%
Germany	748	2,852	26.23%	685	2,852	24.02%
Ghana	19	17	111.76%	17	17	100.00%
Greece	18	49	36.73%	26	49	53.06%
Guatemala	262	706	37.11%	285	706	40.37%
Honduras	90	432	20.83%	90	432	20.83%
India	20	81	24.69%	16	81	19.75%
Indonesia	93	193	48.19%	82	193	42.49%
Ireland	52	98	53.06%	49	98	50.00%
Israel	94	744	12.63%	93	744	12.50%
Italy	683	4,720	14.47%	627	4,720	13.28%
Jamaica	46	287	16.03%	58	287	20.21%
Japan	98	776	12.63%	104	776	13.40%
Kenya	22	62	35.48%	20	62	32.26%

Lebanon	107	653	16.39%	96	653	14.70%
Malaysia	42	105	40.00%	45	105	42.86%
Mexico	1,165	4,129	28.22%	1,307	4,129	31.65%
Morocco	14	16	87.50%	18	16	112.50%
Netherlands	326	1,537	21.21%	310	1,537	20.17%
New Zealand	118	185	63.78%	106	185	57.30%
Nicaragua	83	214	38.79%	72	214	33.64%
Norway	33	105	31.43%	43	105	40.95%
Panama	1,869	10,473	17.85%	1,961	10,473	18.72%
Paraguay	72	258	27.91%	75	258	29.07%
Peru	1,010	2,721	37.12%	930	2,721	34.18%
Philippines	28	71	39.44%	21	71	29.58%
Poland	42	108	38.89%	40	108	37.04%
Portugal	93	332	28.01%	99	332	29.82%
Puerto Rico	325	1,196	27.17%	336	1,196	28.09%
Russia	64	246	26.02%	61	246	24.80%
South Africa	77	186	41.40%	67	186	36.02%
South Korea	37	97	38.14%	26	97	26.80%
Spain	7,754	80,641	9.62%	8,605	80,641	10.67%
Sweden	238	1,075	22.14%	262	1,075	24.37%
Switzerland	602	2,486	24.22%	594	2,486	23.89%
Thailand	32	52	61.54%	31	52	59.62%
Trinidad and Tobago	68	103	66.02%	59	103	57.28%
Turkey	46	72	63.89%	31	72	43.06%
United Arab Emirates	505	789	64.01%	441	789	55.89%
United Kingdom	1,742	8,850	19.68%	1,770	8,850	20.00%
Uruguay	147	388	37.89%	145	388	37.37%
United States of America	33,034	183,108	18.04%	40,119	183,108	21.91%
Venezuela	28,262	171,944	16.44%	31,504	171,944	18.32%
Total	101,002	559,952	18.04%	111,281	559,952	19.87%

Table A4.7.5: Turnout Rates for Colombian Expatriate Voters, 2018

Country	Round 1 Total Votes	Round 1 Number Registered	Round 1 Turnout	Round 2 Total Votes	Round 2 Number Registered	Round 2 Turnout
Algeria	8	3,615	0.22%	6	3,615	0.17%
Argentina	9,006	20,490	43.95%	7,644	20,490	37.31%
Aruba	2,366	8,000	29.58%	2,256	8,000	28.20%
Australia	7,857	21,831	35.99%	6,325	21,831	28.97%
Austria	560	4,554	12.30%	479	4,554	10.52%
Azerbaijan	18	3,622	0.50%	16	3,622	0.44%
Belgium	1,210	6,082	19.89%	1,119	6,082	18.40%
Belize	29	33	87.88%	23	33	69.70%
Bolivia	456	4,607	9.90%	412	4,607	8.94%
Brazil	2,225	18,755	11.86%	2,069	18,755	11.03%
Canada	15,994	58,226	27.47%	14,267	58,226	24.50%
Chile	8,149	25,893	31.47%	6,715	25,893	25.93%
China	472	15,203	3.10%	425	15,203	2.80%
Costa Rica	3,708	12,513	29.63%	3,451	12,513	27.58%
Cuba	229	3,963	5.78%	204	3,963	5.15%
Curaçao	753	5,441	13.84%	723	5,441	13.29%
Cyprus	25	56	44.64%	26	56	46.43%
Denmark	88	143	61.54%	89	143	62.24%
Dominican Republic	1,078	5,821	18.52%	1,001	5,821	17.20%
Ecuador	8,177	55,082	14.85%	7,675	55,082	13.93%
Egypt	39	3,751	1.04%	39	3,751	1.04%
El Salvador	240	4,122	5.82%	246	4,122	5.97%
Finland	146	3,813	3.83%	129	3,813	3.38%
France	5,629	18,524	30.39%	5,072	18,524	27.38%
Germany	3,139	12,875	24.38%	2,627	12,875	20.40%
Ghana	16	3,618	0.44%	14	3,618	0.39%
Greece	47	78	60.26%	43	78	55.13%
Guatemala	687	4,733	14.52%	616	4,733	13.02%
Honduras	222	4,112	5.40%	206	4,112	5.01%
India	20	3,670	0.54%	24	3,670	0.65%
Indonesia	41	3,674	1.12%	35	3,674	0.95%
Ireland	130	192	67.71%	111	192	57.81%
Israel	346	4,722	7.33%	325	4,722	6.88%
Italy	2,635	15,091	17.46%	2,247	15,091	14.89%
Jamaica	80	3,868	2.07%	78	3,868	2.02%
Japan	266	4,531	5.87%	243	4,531	5.36%
Kenya	31	3,670	0.84%	26	3,670	0.71%
Lebanon	101	4,444	2.27%	101	4,444	2.27%
Luxembourg	72	86	83.72%	64	86	74.42%
Malaysia	60	3,713	1.62%	53	3,713	1.43%

Mexico	5,724	23,531	24.33%	5,005	23,531	21.27%
Morocco	18	3,635	0.50%	21	3,635	0.58%
Netherlands	1,244	10,019	12.42%	1,098	10,019	10.96%
New Zealand	673	4,468	15.06%	600	4,468	13.43%
Nicaragua	137	3,894	3.52%	95	3,894	2.44%
Norway	192	3,908	4.91%	179	3,908	4.58%
Panama	6,731	32,232	20.88%	6,184	32,232	19.19%
Paraguay	212	3,997	5.30%	198	3,997	4.95%
Peru	2,325	11,665	19.93%	2,034	11,665	17.44%
Philippines	80	3,713	2.15%	66	3,713	1.78%
Poland	117	3,789	3.09%	111	3,789	2.93%
Portugal	318	4,213	7.55%	282	4,213	6.69%
Puerto Rico	736	5,034	14.62%	659	5,034	13.09%
Russia	174	4,095	4.25%	133	4,095	3.25%
Singapore	141	3,816	3.69%	128	3,816	3.35%
South Africa	113	3,810	2.97%	100	3,810	2.62%
South Korea	99	3,769	2.63%	99	3,769	2.62%
Spain	26,672	151,954	17.55%	24,799	151,954	16.32%
Sweden	649	5,506	11.79%	593	5,506	10.77%
Switzerland	1,926	7,954	24.21%	1,833	7,954	23.05%
Thailand	62	3,698	1.68%	44	3,698	1.19%
Trinidad and Tobago	97	3,806	2.55%	77	3,806	2.02%
Turkey	100	3,762	2.66%	68	3,762	1.81%
United Arab Emirates	1,214	5,466	22.21%	1,140	5,466	20.86%
United Kingdom	5,883	20,530	28.66%	5,345	20,530	26.04%
Uruguay	371	4,193	8.85%	323	4,193	7.70%
United States of America	112,326	354,748	31.66%	107,904	354,748	30.42%
Venezuela	35,037	304,008	11.53%	33,175	304,008	10.91%
Vietnam	31	3,641	0.58%	22	3,641	0.60%
Total	279,757	1,376,071	20.33%	259,539	1,376,071	18.86%

Table A4.7.6: Turnout Rates for Ecuadorian Expatriate Voters, 2013

Country	Total Votes	Number Registered	Turnout
Argentina	595	1,194	49.83%
Australia	75	256	29.30%
Austria	157	246	63.82%
Belgium	1,370	1,918	71.43%
Bolivia	79	248	31.85%
Brazil	128	291	43.99%
Canada	2,236	4,291	52.11%
Chile	1,577	3,361	46.92%
China	87	170	51.18%
Colombia	1,290	2,358	54.71%
Costa Rica	242	443	54.63%
Cuba	1,219	1,713	71.16%
Dominican Republic	157	267	58.80%
Egypt	7	27	25.93%
El Salvador	37	70	52.86%
France	841	1,731	48.58%
Germany	490	1,581	30.99%
Guatemala	70	149	46.98%
Honduras	129	344	37.50%
Hungary	16	41	39.02%
India	9	20	45.00%
Indonesia	7	13	53.85%
Israel	75	167	44.91%
Italy	24,665	43,663	56.49%
Japan	24	81	29.63%
Malaysia	17	28	60.71%
Mexico	258	456	56.58%
Netherlands	192	453	42.38%
Nicaragua	47	79	59.49%
Panama	151	283	53.36%
Paraguay	33	76	43.42%
Peru	430	732	58.74%
Poland	24	51	47.06%
Portugal	65	141	46.10%
Qatar	11	31	35.48%
Russia	97	302	32.12%
Singapore	5	6	83.33%
South Africa	10	18	55.56%
South Korea	29	60	48.33%
Spain	60,241	136,079	44.27%
Sweden	274	451	60.75%
Switzerland	831	1,559	53.30%

Turkey	4	5	80.00%
United Kingdom	1,598	2,911	54.90%
Uruguay	46	77	59.74%
United States of America	26,427	67,563	39.11%
Venezuela	6,683	9,749	68.55%
Total	133,055	285,753	46.56%

Table A4.7.7: Turnout Rates for Ecuadorian Expatriate Voters, 2017

Country	Round 1 Total Votes	Round 1 Number Registered	Round 1 Turnout	Round 2 Total Votes	Round 2 Number Registered	Round 2 Turnout
Argentina	692	1,481	46.73%	774	1,481	52.26%
Australia	96	395	24.30%	107	395	27.09%
Austria	188	374	50.27%	206	374	55.08%
Belarus	48	59	81.36%	50	59	84.75%
Belgium	1,297	2,628	49.35%	1,410	2,628	53.65%
Bolivia	69	367	18.80%	72	367	19.62%
Brazil	262	728	35.99%	274	728	37.64%
Canada	2,245	5,286	42.47%	2,596	5,286	49.11%
Chile	1,994	5,012	39.78%	2,277	5,012	45.43%
China	135	310	43.55%	116	310	37.42%
Colombia	1,339	3,497	38.29%	1,444	3,497	41.29%
Costa Rica	287	658	43.62%	261	658	39.67%
Cuba	182	1,127	16.15%	177	1,127	15.71%
Dominican Republic	154	370	41.85%	159	370	42.97%
Egypt	21	39	53.85%	18	39	46.15%
El Salvador	30	78	38.46%	28	78	35.90%
France	970	2,462	39.40%	1,094	2,462	44.44%
Germany	766	2,906	26.36%	799	2,906	27.49%
Guatemala	72	166	43.37%	69	166	41.57%
Honduras	150	524	28.63%	111	524	21.18%
Hungary	52	82	63.41%	53	82	64.63%
India	12	22	54.55%	11	22	50.00%
Indonesia	1	16	6.25%	1	16	6.25%
Iran	1	1	100.00%	1	1	100.00%
Israel	85	198	42.93%	74	198	37.37%
Italy	23,383	49,815	46.94%	24,223	49,815	48.63%
Japan	27	118	22.88%	26	118	22.03%
Malaysia	6	28	21.43%	8	28	28.57%
Mexico	356	819	43.47%	360	819	43.96%
Netherlands	323	870	37.13%	329	870	37.82%
Nicaragua	35	75	46.67%	36	75	48.00%
Panama	305	526	57.98%	314	526	59.70%
Paraguay	41	129	31.78%	46	129	35.66%
Peru	469	894	52.46%	490	894	54.81%
Qatar	13	54	24.07%	13	54	24.07%
Russia	142	438	32.42%	140	438	31.96%
South Africa	14	34	41.18%	13	34	38.24%
South Korea	77	180	42.78%	89	180	49.44%
Spain	57,180	168,414	33.95%	66,954	168,414	39.76%
Sweden	287	595	48.24%	290	595	48.74%

Switzerland	817	1,842	44.35%	914	1,842	49.62%
United Kingdom	2,347	4,825	48.64%	2,417	4,825	50.09%
Uruguay	85	171	49.71%	89	171	52.05%
United States of America	28,715	105,232	27.29%	32,509	105,232	30.89%
Venezuela	7,180	14,401	49.86%	6,976	14,401	48.44%
Total	132,950	378,246	35.14%	148,418	378,246	39.24%

Table A4.7.8: Turnout Rates for Peruvian Expatriate Voters, 2006

Country	Round 1 Total Votes	Round 1 Number Registered	Round 1 Turnout	Round 2 Total Votes	Round 2 Number Registered	Round 2 Turnout
Algeria	1	3	33.33%	1	3	33.33%
Argentina	51,406	67,027	76.69%	50,397	67,027	75.19%
Aruba	233	371	62.80%	242	371	65.23%
Australia	616	1,204	51.16%	585	1,204	48.59%
Austria	274	502	54.58%	256	502	50.99%
Belgium	1,132	1,428	79.27%	1,096	1,428	76.75%
Bolivia	2,679	3,626	73.88%	2,603	3,626	71.79%
Brazil	3,541	5,639	62.79%	3,402	5,639	60.33%
Canada	5,498	7,854	70.00%	5,273	7,854	67.14%
Chile	28,710	34,148	84.08%	28,271	34,148	82.79%
China	178	361	49.31%	143	361	39.61%
Colombia	1,447	2,210	65.48%	1,477	2,210	66.83%
Costa Rica	1,018	1,595	63.82%	969	1,595	60.75%
Cuba	488	562	86.83%	480	562	85.41%
Czech Republic	62	84	73.81%	54	84	64.29%
Denmark	111	222	50.00%	99	222	44.59%
Dominican Republic	277	435	63.68%	269	435	61.83%
Ecuador	1,551	2,002	77.47%	1,546	2,002	77.22%
Egypt	18	39	46.15%	16	39	41.03%
El Salvador	77	104	74.04%	71	104	68.27%
Estonia	4	6	66.67%	0	6	0.00%
Finland	78	145	53.79%	79	145	54.48%
France	2,709	4,186	64.72%	2,469	4,186	58.98%
French Guyana	0	205	0.00%	139	205	67.80%
Germany	2,603	5,862	44.40%	2,305	5,862	39.32%
Greece	100	164	60.98%	99	164	60.37%
Guatemala	180	299	60.20%	180	299	60.20%
Honduras	113	189	59.79%	116	189	61.38%
Hungary	63	86	73.26%	54	86	62.79%
Iceland	0	8	0.00%	0	8	0.00%
India	5	19	26.32%	5	19	26.32%
Indonesia	6	14	42.86%	6	14	42.86%
Iran	0	14	0.00%	0	14	0.00%
Israel	125	276	45.29%	135	276	48.91%
Italy	35,620	47,391	75.16%	34,032	47,391	71.81%
Jamaica	8	11	72.73%	8	11	72.73%
Japan	11,292	22,218	50.82%	11,839	22,218	53.29%
Lebanon	0	4	0.00%	0	4	0.00%

Luxembourg	64	91	70.33%	58	91	63.74%
Malaysia	8	10	80.00%	6	10	60.00%
Malta	0	1	0.00%	0	1	0.00%
Mexico	1,127	2,470	45.63%	1,165	2,470	47.17%
Monaco	0	2	0.00%	0	2	0.00%
Morocco	14	20	70.00%	13	20	65.00%
Netherlands	505	821	61.51%	433	821	52.74%
New Zealand	142	250	56.80%	126	250	50.40%
Nicaragua	104	158	65.82%	102	158	64.56%
Norway	33	75	44.00%	34	75	45.33%
Panama	1,158	1,555	74.47%	1,096	1,555	70.48%
Paraguay	741	1,016	72.93%	731	1,016	71.95%
Philippines	4	11	36.36%	6	11	54.55%
Poland	44	93	47.31%	37	93	39.78%
Portugal	79	135	58.52%	78	135	57.78%
Puerto Rico	303	458	66.16%	267	458	58.30%
Romania	11	24	45.83%	11	24	45.83%
Russia	259	430	60.23%	229	430	53.26%
Singapore	11	16	68.75%	7	16	43.75%
Slovakia	7	10	70.00%	7	10	70.00%
South Africa	34	89	38.20%	29	89	32.58%
South Korea	95	179	53.07%	91	179	50.84%
Spain	47,942	70,852	67.66%	48,032	70,852	67.79%
Sweden	682	1,153	59.15%	625	1,153	54.21%
Switzerland	2,459	3,778	65.09%	2,398	3,778	63.47%
Syria	0	5	0.00%	0	5	0.00%
Thailand	4	7	57.14%	4	7	57.14%
Tunisia	0	1	0.00%	0	1	0.00%
Turkey	5	6	83.33%	4	6	66.67%
United Kingdom	1,152	2,151	53.56%	1,064	2,151	49.47%
Ukraine	32	43	74.42%	27	43	62.79%
Uruguay	507	789	64.26%	484	789	61.34%
United States of America	70,028	140,153	49.97%	65,043	140,153	46.41%
Venezuela	10,932	20,482	53.37%	12,001	20,482	58.59%
Total	290,709	457,847	63.49%	282,924	457,847	61.79%

Table A4.7.9: Turnout Rates for Peruvian Expatriate Voters, 2011

Country	Round 1 Total Votes	Round 1 Number Registered	Round 1 Turnout	Round 2 Total Votes	Round 2 Number Registered	Round 2 Turnout
Algeria	6	10	60.00%	7	10	70.00%
Argentina	60,432	106,665	56.66%	56,253	106,665	52.74%
Aruba	331	620	53.39%	343	620	55.32%
Australia	1,340	2,836	47.25%	1,256	2,836	44.61%
Austria	317	644	49.22%	248	644	38.51%
Belarus	20	35	57.14%	20	35	57.14%
Belgium	1,336	2,067	64.63%	1,333	2,067	64.49%
Bolivia	3,227	4,816	67.01%	3,258	4,816	67.65%
Brazil	5,082	10,853	46.83%	4,765	10,853	43.90%
Bulgaria	7	25	28.00%	4	25	16.00%
Canada	7,509	12,916	58.14%	7,004	12,916	54.23%
Chile	49,768	63,945	77.83%	48,349	63,945	75.61%
China	130	465	27.96%	116	465	24.95%
Colombia	1,716	2,987	57.44%	1,681	2,987	56.28%
Costa Rica	1,088	2,039	53.36%	1,093	2,039	53.60%
Croatia	0	14	0.00%	0	14	0.00%
Cuba	743	1,227	60.55%	702	1,227	57.21%
Czech Republic	75	130	57.69%	59	130	45.38%
Denmark	81	399	20.30%	68	399	17.04%
Dominican Republic	502	795	53.14%	479	795	60.25%
Ecuador	2,106	3,171	66.41%	2,139	3,171	67.46%
Egypt	15	87	17.24%	15	87	17.24%
El Salvador	68	162	41.98%	77	162	47.53%
Finland	77	220	35.00%	72	220	32.73%
France	3,466	6,704	51.70%	2,255	6,704	33.64%
French Guyana	147	284	51.76%	151	284	53.17%
Germany	2,042	6,615	30.87%	1,679	6,615	25.38%
Greece	98	209	46.89%	88	209	42.11%
Guatemala	186	350	53.14%	192	350	54.86%
Honduras	99	194	51.03%	107	194	55.15%
Hungary	62	101	61.39%	58	101	57.43%
Indonesia	0	11	0.00%	0	11	0.00%
Iran	8	53	15.09%	8	53	15.09%
Ireland	16	50	32.00%	12	50	24.00%
Israel	209	714	29.27%	157	714	21.99%
Italy	47,887	75,206	63.67%	43,841	75,206	58.29%
Japan	11,054	30,245	36.55%	11,842	30,245	39.15%
Luxembourg	78	124	62.90%	87	124	70.16%

Malaysia	11	21	52.38%	10	21	47.62%
Mexico	1,388	3,689	37.63%	1,344	3,689	36.43%
Morocco	16	31	51.61%	13	31	41.94%
Netherlands	577	1,067	54.08%	480	1,067	44.99%
New Zealand	120	353	33.99%	112	353	31.73%
Nicaragua	109	181	60.22%	112	181	61.88%
Norway	40	270	14.81%	33	270	12.22%
Panama	1,408	2,311	60.93%	1,376	2,311	59.54%
Paraguay	772	1,324	58.31%	742	1,324	56.04%
Philippines	7	18	38.89%	6	18	33.33%
Poland	27	109	24.77%	17	109	15.60%
Portugal	85	216	39.35%	78	216	36.11%
Puerto Rico	414	707	58.56%	366	707	51.77%
Romania	30	66	45.45%	22	66	33.33%
Russia	161	407	39.56%	158	407	38.82%
Singapore	16	32	50.00%	15	32	46.88%
South Africa	36	134	26.87%	38	134	28.36%
South Korea	89	214	41.59%	74	214	34.58%
Spain	71,443	123,931	57.65%	64,827	123,931	52.31%
Sweden	916	1,930	47.46%	863	1,930	44.72%
Switzerland	2,821	5,395	52.29%	2,644	5,395	49.00%
Thailand	11	27	40.74%	6	27	22.22%
Tunisia	4	4	100.00%	4	4	100.00%
Turkey	0	7	0.00%	0	7	0.00%
United Kingdom	1,273	3,240	39.29%	1,098	3,240	33.89%
Ukraine	55	59	93.22%	53	59	89.83%
Uruguay	587	1,036	56.66%	573	1,036	55.31%
United States of America	102,256	240,620	42.50%	95,868	240,620	39.84%
Venezuela	16,563	28,767	57.58%	16,933	28,767	58.86%
Total	402,563	754,154	53.38%	377,683	754,154	50.08%

Table A4.7.10: Turnout Rates for Peruvian Expatriate Voters, 2016

As an interesting anecdote, in the second round of voting in Ireland, there was 100% turnout and all votes were nullified.

Country	Round 1 Total Votes	Round 1 Number Registered	Round 1 Turnout	Round 2 Total Votes	Round 2 Number Registered	Round 2 Turnout
Algeria	9	20	45.00%	7	20	35.00%
Andorra	67	120	55.83%	65	120	54.17%
Argentina	76,980	127,442	60.40%	66,338	127,442	52.05%
Aruba	374	667	56.07%	370	667	55.47%
Australia	1,994	4,477	44.54%	1,683	4,477	37.59%
Austria	360	859	41.91%	332	859	38.65%
Belarus	13	22	59.09%	13	22	59.09%
Belgium	1,495	2,438	61.32%	1,417	2,438	58.12%
Bolivia	3,738	6,072	61.56%	3,508	6,072	57.77%
Brazil	7,103	14,853	47.82%	6,056	14,853	40.77%
Canada	8,588	16,160	53.14%	7,314	16,160	45.26%
Chile	73,185	99,961	73.21%	64,244	99,961	64.27%
China	185	572	32.34%	153	572	26.75%
Colombia	2,003	3,707	54.03%	2,049	3,707	55.27%
Costa Rica	1,328	2,460	53.98%	1,273	2,460	51.75%
Croatia	5	20	25.00%	6	20	30.00%
Cuba	129	395	32.66%	83	395	21.01%
Czech Republic	72	145	49.66%	54	145	37.24%
Denmark	115	402	28.61%	103	402	25.62%
Dominican Republic	534	898	59.47%	489	898	54.45%
Ecuador	2,587	4,205	61.52%	2,582	4,205	61.40%
Egypt	15	35	42.86%	0	35	0.00%
El Salvador	84	157	53.50%	81	157	51.59%
Finland	108	289	37.37%	97	289	33.56%
France	3,986	8,310	47.97%	3,629	8,310	43.67%
French Guyana	326	479	68.06%	320	479	66.81%
Germany	2,784	7,718	36.07%	2,431	7,718	31.50%
Ghana	0	3	0.00%	0	3	0.00%
Greece	96	257	37.35%	90	257	35.0%
Guatemala	214	402	53.23%	207	402	51.49%
Haiti	5	5	100.00%	4	5	80.00%
Honduras	92	237	38.82%	87	237	36.71%
Hungary	60	106	56.60%	60	106	56.60%
India	41	41	100.00%	14	41	34.15%

Indonesia	0	12	0.00%	2	12	16.67%
Ireland	52	122	42.62%	122	122	100.00%
Israel	210	1,047	20.06%	171	1,047	16.33%
Italy	55,607	84,046	66.16%	48,149	84,046	57.29%
Japan	11,748	31,351	37.47%	10,692	31,351	34.10%
Jordan	0	10	0.00%	0	10	0.00%
Kuwait	2	3	66.67%	0	3	0.00%
Lebanon	7	12	58.33%	4	12	33.33%
Luxembourg	109	164	66.46%	108	164	65.85%
Macedonia	3	4	75.00%	2	4	75.00%
Malaysia	22	22	100.00%	5	22	22.73%
Mexico	1,555	4,573	34.00%	1,552	4,573	33.94%
Morocco	17	41	41.46%	9	41	21.95%
Netherlands	657	1,436	45.75%	578	1,436	40.25%
New Zealand	137	385	35.58%	133	385	34.55%
Nicaragua	100	175	57.14%	97	175	55.43%
Norway	49	233	21.03%	47	233	20.17%
Panama	1,618	2,749	58.86%	1,465	2,749	53.29%
Paraguay	825	1,491	55.33%	776	1,491	52.05%
Philippines	0	24	0.00%	6	24	25.00%
Poland	35	133	26.32%	31	133	23.31%
Portugal	117	303	38.61%	106	303	34.98%
Puerto Rico	298	741	40.22%	262	741	35.36%
Qatar	14	25	56.00%	14	25	56.00%
Romania	37	67	55.22%	31	67	46.27%
Russia	150	354	42.37%	124	354	35.03%
Saudi Arabia	2	6	33.33%	0	6	0.00%
Serbia	8	24	33.33%	6	24	25.00%
Singapore	29	50	58.00%	29	50	58.00%
South Africa	46	162	28.40%	40	162	24.69%
South Korea	127	260	48.85%	116	260	44.62%
Spain	66,708	128,243	52.02%	54,212	128,243	42.27%
Sweden	1,261	2,917	43.23%	1,111	2,917	38.09%
Switzerland	3,178	6,482	49.03%	2,815	6,482	43.09%
Thailand	13	38	34.21%	11	38	28.95%
Trinidad and Tobago	61	61	100.00%	3	61	4.92%
Turkey	16	72	22.22%	25	72	34.72%
United Arab Emirates	47	94	50.00%	38	94	40.43%
United Kingdom	1,141	3,692	30.90%	1,045	3,692	28.30%
Ukraine	39	76	51.32%	41	76	53.95%
Uruguay	774	1,230	62.93%	697	1,230	56.67%

United States of America	119,818	277,945	43.11%	83,986	277,945	30.22%
Venezuela	16,707	30,107	55.49%	15,704	30,107	52.16%
Vietnam	8	8	100.00%	4	8	50.00%
Total	472,027	884,924	53.34%	389,528	884,924	44.02%

Table A4.7.11: Turnout Rates for Male Ecuadorian Expatriate Voters, 2013

I know the turnout rate for the Dominican Republic is odd; I have double checked the figures and still come up with those turnout rates.

Country	Total Votes	Number Registered	Turnout
Argentina	293	592	49.49%
Australia	31	126	24.60%
Austria	54	90	60.00%
Belgium	477	672	70.98%
Bolivia	35	125	28.00%
Brazil	65	157	41.40%
Canada	1,080	2,075	52.05%
Chile	699	1,518	46.05%
China	53	94	56.38%
Colombia	634	1,181	53.68%
Costa Rica	120	215	55.81%
Cuba	553	780	70.90%
Dominican Republic	157	145	108.28%
Egypt	1	8	12.50%
El Salvador	19	35	54.29%
France	332	738	44.99%
Germany	182	564	32.27%
Guatemala	33	80	41.25%
Honduras	59	199	29.65%
Hungary	9	25	36.00%
India	3	9	33.33%
Indonesia	5	9	55.56%
Israel	16	43	37.21%
Italy	9,332	16,587	56.26%
Japan	14	43	32.56%
Malaysia	8	12	66.67%
Mexico	127	226	56.19%
Netherlands	62	160	38.75%
Nicaragua	29	47	61.70%
Panama	72	127	56.69%
Paraguay	18	47	38.30%
Peru	179	318	56.29%
Poland	18	39	46.15%
Portugal	33	63	52.38%
Qatar	5	17	29.41%
Russia	65	214	30.37%
Singapore	3	3	100.00%
South Africa	6	9	66.67%

South Korea	16	33	48.48%
Spain	27,616	63,846	43.25%
Sweden	135	225	60.00%
Switzerland	307	562	54.63%
Turkey	1	1	100.00%
United Kingdom	801	1,468	54.56%
Uruguay	21	32	65.63%
United States of America	15,405	39,076	39.42%
Venezuela	3,056	4,607	66.33%
Total	62,239	137,242	45.35%

Table A4.7.12: Turnout Rates for Female Ecuadorian Expatriate Voters, 2013

Country	Total Votes	Number Registered	Turnout
Argentina	302	602	50.17%
Australia	44	130	33.85%
Austria	104	156	66.67%
Belgium	896	1,246	71.91%
Bolivia	44	123	35.77%
Brazil	63	134	47.01%
Canada	1,155	2,216	52.12%
Chile	878	1,843	47.64%
China	34	76	44.74%
Colombia	656	1,177	55.73%
Costa Rica	122	228	53.51%
Cuba	667	933	71.49%
Dominican Republic	0	122	0.00%
Egypt	6	19	31.58%
El Salvador	18	35	51.43%
France	509	993	51.26%
Germany	308	1,007	30.59%
Guatemala	37	69	53.62%
Honduras	70	145	48.28%
Hungary	7	16	43.75%
India	6	11	54.55%
Indonesia	2	4	50.00%
Israel	59	124	47.58%
Italy	15,318	27,076	56.57%
Japan	10	38	26.32%
Malaysia	9	16	56.25%
Mexico	131	230	56.96%
Netherlands	130	293	44.37%
Nicaragua	18	32	56.25%
Panama	79	156	50.64%
Paraguay	15	29	51.72%
Peru	251	414	60.62%
Poland	6	12	50.00%
Portugal	32	78	41.03%
Qatar	6	14	42.86%
Russia	32	88	36.36%
Singapore	2	3	66.67%
South Africa	4	9	44.44%
South Korea	13	27	48.15%
Spain	32,591	72,233	45.12%
Sweden	139	226	61.50%
Switzerland	524	997	52.56%

Turkey	3	4	75.00%
United Kingdom	796	1,443	55.16%
Uruguay	25	45	55.56%
United States of America	11,016	28,487	38.67%
Venezuela	3,651	5,142	71.00%
Total	70,788	148,501	47.67%

Table A4.7.13: Turnout Rates for Male Ecuadorian Expatriate Voters, 2017

Country	Round 1 Total Votes	Round 1 Number Registered	Round 1 Turnout	Round 2 Total Votes	Round 2 Number Registered	Round 2 Turnout
Argentina	318	687	46.29%	359	687	52.26%
Australia	47	190	24.74%	48	190	25.26%
Austria	72	157	45.86%	79	157	50.32%
Belarus	28	35	80.00%	28	35	80.00%
Belgium	475	951	49.95%	489	951	51.42%
Bolivia	29	207	14.01%	32	207	15.46%
Brazil	146	415	35.18%	150	415	36.14%
Canada	1,066	2,522	42.27%	1,243	2,522	49.29%
Chile	890	2,280	39.04%	1,000	2,280	43.86%
China	72	156	46.15%	61	156	39.10%
Colombia	701	1,834	38.22%	767	1,834	41.82%
Costa Rica	145	322	45.03%	126	322	39.13%
Cuba	100	544	18.38%	93	544	17.10%
Dominican Republic	82	190	43.16%	85	190	44.74%
Egypt	8	16	50.00%	7	16	43.75%
El Salvador	13	37	35.14%	13	37	35.14%
France	389	1,056	36.84%	439	1,056	41.57%
Germany	295	1,162	25.39%	305	1,162	26.25%
Guatemala	32	84	38.10%	29	84	34.52%
Honduras	98	332	29.52%	68	332	20.48%
Hungary	27	47	57.45%	27	47	57.45%
India	5	11	45.45%	5	11	45.45%
Indonesia	1	11	9.09%	1	11	9.09%
Iran	1	1	100.00%	1	1	100.00%
Israel	15	54	27.78%	13	54	24.07%
Italy	8,843	18,962	46.64%	9,107	18,962	48.03%
Japan	15	64	23.44%	16	64	25.00%
Malaysia	3	13	23.08%	3	13	23.08%
Mexico	166	412	40.29%	168	412	40.78%
Netherlands	112	324	34.57%	111	324	34.26%
Nicaragua	20	44	45.45%	19	44	43.18%
Panama	149	252	59.13%	155	252	61.51%
Paraguay	23	83	27.71%	27	83	32.53%
Peru	197	377	52.25%	205	377	54.38%
Qatar	6	25	24.00%	6	25	24.00%
Russia	88	294	29.93%	88	294	29.93%
South Africa	6	18	33.33%	5	18	27.78%
South Korea	36	88	40.91%	45	88	51.14%
Spain	25,236	77,604	32.52%	29,588	77,604	38.13%
Sweden	147	296	49.66%	145	296	48.98%

Switzerland	297	667	44.53%	331	667	49.63%
United Kingdom	1,179	2,416	48.80%	1,232	2,416	50.99%
Uruguay	32	74	43.24%	37	74	50.00%
United States of America	16,381	60,101	27.26%	18,528	60,101	30.83%
Venezuela	3,231	6,836	47.26%	3,109	6,836	45.48%
Total	61,222	182,251	33.59%	68,393	182,251	37.53%

Table A4.7.14: Turnout Rates for Female Ecuadorian Expatriate Voters, 2017

Country	Round 1 Total Votes	Round 1 Number Registered	Round 1 Turnout	Round 2 Total Votes	Round 2 Number Registered	Round 2 Turnout
Argentina	374	794	47.10%	415	794	52.27%
Australia	49	205	23.90%	59	205	28.78%
Austria	116	217	53.45%	127	217	58.53%
Belarus	20	24	83.33%	22	24	91.67%
Belgium	822	1,677	49.02%	921	1,677	54.92%
Bolivia	40	160	25.00%	40	160	25.00%
Brazil	116	313	37.06%	124	313	39.62%
Canada	1,179	2,764	42.66%	1,353	2,764	48.95%
Chile	1,104	2,732	40.41%	1,277	2,732	46.74%
China	63	154	40.91%	55	154	35.71%
Colombia	638	1,663	38.36%	677	1,663	40.71%
Costa Rica	142	336	42.66%	135	336	40.18%
Cuba	82	583	14.07%	84	583	14.41%
Dominican Republic	72	180	40.00%	74	180	41.11%
Egypt	13	23	56.52%	11	23	47.83%
El Salvador	17	41	41.46%	15	41	36.59%
France	581	1,406	41.32%	655	1,406	46.59%
Germany	471	1,744	27.01%	494	1,744	28.33%
Guatemala	40	82	48.78%	40	82	48.78%
Honduras	52	192	27.08%	43	192	22.40%
Hungary	25	35	71.43%	26	35	74.29%
India	7	11	63.63%	6	11	54.55%
Indonesia	0	5	0.00%	0	5	0.00%
Iran	0	0	0.00%	0	0	0.00%
Israel	70	144	48.61%	61	144	42.36%
Italy	14,540	30,853	47.13%	15,116	30,853	48.99%
Japan	12	54	22.22%	10	54	18.52%
Malaysia	3	15	20.00%	5	15	33.33%
Mexico	190	407	46.68%	192	407	47.17%
Netherlands	211	546	38.64%	218	546	39.93%
Nicaragua	15	31	48.39%	17	31	54.84%
Panama	156	274	56.93%	159	274	58.03%
Paraguay	18	46	39.13%	19	46	41.30%
Peru	272	517	52.61%	285	517	55.13%
Qatar	7	29	24.14%	7	29	24.14%
Russia	54	144	37.50%	52	144	36.11%
South Africa	8	16	50.00%	8	16	50.00%
South Korea	41	92	44.57%	44	92	47.83%
Spain	31,944	90,810	35.18%	37,366	90,810	41.15%
Sweden	140	299	46.82%	145	299	48.49%

Switzerland	520	1,175	44.26%	583	1,175	49.62%
United Kingdom	1,168	2,409	48.48%	1,185	2,409	49.19%
Uruguay	53	97	54.64%	52	97	53.61%
United States of America	12,334	45,131	27.33%	13,981	45,131	30.98%
Venezuela	3,949	7,565	52.20%	3,867	7,565	51.12%
Total	71,728	195,995	36.60%	80.025	195,995	40.83%

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