The ‘Will of the People’ or Willed by Elites? Candidate Rhetoric and the Mobilization of Populist Citizens in Latin America and Europe

By

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Introduction

Statement of the Problem

Worldwide, millions of people are supporting political candidates who promise to upend "politics as usual." Frequently referred to as "populists,"[1] their election to power has become increasingly common: citizens have recently elected populists into power in Greece, Italy, Mexico, the United States, Poland, Hungary, and Brazil, among others. While the proposals of these candidates vary, the content of their messages are often similar: promote the core populist agenda of pitting the virtuous people against the villainous elites (Hawkins et al. 2018). Despite populists' recent electoral victories, we know relatively little about the communication that these candidates engage in to appeal to individuals (i.e., their communication strategy)[2] and how receptive individuals are to this communication.

Existing scholarship offers a range of theoretical answers to this question, but relatively few systematic empirical analyses. There is ample reason to expect that populist frames,[3] in particular, affect individuals' attitudes and behaviors, as several experimental (Bos et al. 2019; Busby et al. 2019; Hameleers et al. 2017; Hameleers and Schmuck 2017; Wirz 2018) and non-experimental (Bobba 2019; Bobba and Roncarolo 2018) studies have shown. One of the chief theoretical aims of my dissertation is to evaluate whether this argument holds in a comparative setting—is there a strategic advantage to using populist rhetoric? Existing studies have so far

[1] Defined as "a unique set of ideas, one that understands politics as a Manichean struggle between a reified will of the people and a conspiring elite" (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, 3).
[2] While most scholarship focuses either on what candidates say (ideas) or how they communicate (style), I situate my research among recent studies that examine both (Bracciale and Martella 2017; Ernst et al. 2019). I refer to this combination of ideas and style as an actor's communication strategy.
[3] Defined as the meaning embedded into a message by a political actor in order to encourage the listener to interpret an event or situation from a particular non-neutral perspective.

only answered this question in a limited way. Despite what we know about the power of populist communication, we still do not know *how* powerful it is when compared to other available discursive strategies.

My dissertation is motivated by these two theoretical gaps. First, from an overarching perspective, there is a comparative shortage of communication-centric explanations for populism's appeal. There are, of course, several explanations for why populism appeals to people. I focus on populist communication (in particular, frames) because previous research suggests that frames are essential in explaining populist outcomes. Yet, frames remain underexplored outside of experimental settings. We know considerably more about the contextual conditions under which populists are successful. A common perspective is that citizens elect populist candidates as a response to certain national contexts like poor economic conditions, the perceived threat of immigration, and/or crises of representation (Arzheimer 2009; Castanho Silva 2018; March and Rommerskirchen 2015). However, we know less about the communication strategies populist candidates engage in and how it contributes to their success under these conditions. My dissertation contributes to our understanding of the agency of candidates through an examination of the interplay between candidate messaging and individual responsiveness to these messages.

The second gap is that communication is generally evaluated as either populist or not populist (Casero-Ripollés et al. 2017; Ernst et al. 2019; Mazzoleni and Bracciale 2018). For example, Casero-Ripollés et al. (2017) find that 51.9% of Podemos's (Spain's leftist populist party) Tweets use populist frames—but what about the other 48.1%? Existing studies such as this one demonstrate that populism accounts for barely over half of a populist candidate's communication strategy. Thus, we do not yet know how the populist communication strategy is

adopted *relative* to other available strategies, to what extent, and by whom? In other words, we do not know what *else* populists are doing with the majority of their frames to try and accomplish their goals because our understanding of populist communication is limited by viewing populism in isolation. As a response to this lacuna, I situate populist rhetoric in a broader comparative framework, examining it as one discursive strategy among many. More concretely, I compare populist rhetoric to pluralist, technocratic, and neutral messages.

Theoretical Framework

To address these gaps, I situate my research within framing theory, which offers an essential perspective on how people respond to the content of elites' (in this case, candidates') messages. The core of framing theory is intuitive: how actors convey messages can alter how people engage with the message (Nabi 2003). Though applied across disciplines, framing theory is particularly well-researched in the context of political actors engaging in framing to impact some group of individuals to accomplish goals like engagement, mobilization, or participation (Snow and Benford 1988, 198).

Scholars have provided considerable evidence that the strategic use of frames affects individuals' attitudes, preferences, and behaviors in the context of campaigns (Druckman et al. 2017; Druckman and Holmes 2004; Klar et al. 2013). In this analysis, I seek to evaluate when framing effects translate into the mobilization of individuals on social media (Chong and Druckman 2007a, 118). I apply framing theory from two primary lenses: the sociology-dominant approach (Chapter 2), drawing from scholars like Snow and Benford (1988), and the psychology-dominant approach (Chapter 3), drawing from scholars such as Chong and Druckman (2007, 2011) and Druckman (2011).

The first chapter of my dissertation offers an introduction to populist communication and the ways that different political actors communicate in online settings. This chapter relies on two strands of literature: studies that focus on what content candidates communicate and studies that focus on how the content is communicated—the communication style. Chapters 2 and 3 of my dissertation are closely related and focus on the relationship between candidate rhetoric and online engagement (liking or re-Tweeting a candidate's message). Chapter 2 examines this relationship at the master frame or discursive strategy level (populism, pluralism, technocracy, and neutral). Chapter 3 examines the same relationship at the disaggregated frame level (the individual components that make up each master frame).

Empirical Strategy

I use framing theory to develop a novel classification schema of candidate rhetoric that permits substantive comparisons between what is unique about populism and what is unique about other ways of viewing the relationship between the people and the elites. I account for two competing discursive strategies: pluralism and technocracy, as well as a neutral category. By situating populist rhetoric in a broader context, my research informs us about the relative effects of populist messages compared to pluralist or technocratic messages in different contexts and across different types of candidates. To assess the relative impact of different messages, I disaggregate the components of each discursive strategy into individual rhetorical frames. I derive the frames from a combination of existing studies, survey measures, and qualitative research of candidates' communication styles and content. In total, I identified thirteen frames: three populist, four pluralist, three technocratic, and three that are neutral.

I apply this schema of frames to a self-collected dataset of candidates' campaign Tweets. I chose to focus on social media because it extends our understanding of candidate

communication into comparatively new yet vital territory (Dimitrova et al. 2014; Gil de Zúñiga 2012; Zamora Medina and Zurutuza Muñoz 2014), complementing existing studies on speeches, television, and other forms of traditional communication (Hawkins et al. 2018; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). Social media also provided an ideal venue to study populist communication: according to several scholars, the structure of social media is particularly conducive to the way that many populist candidates prefer to communicate with their supporters—directly and unmediated by "gatekeepers" (Barr 2009; Enli and Rosenberg 2018). Finally, from a scholarly standpoint, social media represent a competitive real-world environment that uses actual candidate messages and actual individual behavior, which is important to ground our understanding of experimental studies of candidate rhetoric.

I analyze Tweets as the unit of analysis due to the 280-character limit, which facilitates the classification of tweets as a fragment of discourse with one or at most two frames. My sample covers five national-level campaigns where at least one populist candidate ran in 2018 and 2019: Italy, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Spain. For each country, I evaluate a random sample of the Tweets of all candidates that pass a 10% vote share threshold (consistent with Corrales 2008 and Van Kessel 2015). In total, my study examines eighteen candidates: eight populists and ten non-populists for a total of N=1,777 Tweets. With the assistance of trained multi-lingual undergraduate research assistants, I classify Tweets using a manual textual analysis method developed in the psychology literature called holistic grading, which focuses on the underlying meaning of the text and not just the literal meaning (Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2018).

Chapter Summaries

My first dissertation chapter explores the different communication strategies of populist and non-populist candidates. I assess these strategies by looking at the way that candidates convey their messages (i.e., their discursive strategies) and the content of their messages (i.e., what are they talking about and why?). In other words, I evaluate what candidates emphasize during their campaigns based on how much they talk about different categories of content and how this differs depending on whether a candidate is a populist or not. I offer two key takeaways about the populist communication strategy. First, two aspects that we associate with populism—the use of populist ideas and a negative rhetorical style—form minority campaign tactics (35-40%) for all but one candidate, underscoring the importance of looking at the broader populist communication strategy. Second, my analysis underscores the importance of taking a candidate-by-candidate approach to account for within-group diversity. Although there are broad group similarities between populists, there is also considerable heterogeneity that differentiates populists from one another.

The second chapter of my dissertation asks whether there is a strategic advantage to using populist communication compared to rival discursive strategies, including pluralism, technocracy, and neutral campaign rhetoric. While a growing number of studies define populism as a discursive frame (Aslanidis 2015; Hawkins et al. 2018; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017), thereby applying framing theory to the *definition* of populism, I advance our understanding of populism's appeal by applying specific, often overlooked elements of framing theory to populism's *underlying narrative*. I find that, regardless of whether a candidate is considered to be a populist or not, using populist rhetoric is associated with higher online engagement across eighteen candidates/parties in five European and Latin American cases (Spain, Italy, Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia). The most important contribution of this research is that it moves the

field towards a more comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of populist frames and how they work in competitive campaign environments.

In my final chapter, I try to understand the kinds of non-populist communication that might compete with populism. To do so, I create a classification schema of the different types of frames that make up each discursive strategy that I explored in Chapter 2. For example, populism is generally understood to contain three separate frames: anti-elitism, identification with "the people," and a dualistic worldview. In this chapter, I examine these frames individually while also developing the corresponding frames for pluralism, technocracy, and neutral rhetoric. I then evaluate each of these frames (thirteen total) from the perspective of online engagement. I apply a version of framing theory that suggests that frames that are available, accessible, and applicable to individuals will produce stronger framing effects. I argue that frames that exhibit three characteristics fit these criteria: frames that use populist rhetoric, frames that are less cognitively demanding, and frames that evoke emotions. Although my research upholds the strategic advantage of populism that I find in Chapter 2, this chapter suggests that populism's advantage is seemingly surmountable compared to frames that are not cognitively demanding or frames that evoke emotions. A unique contribution of this chapter is that it affirms the existence of framing effects in campaigns while identifying the generalizable content of the messages that produce these framing effects.

Contributions

My dissertation research encourages scholars to take a holistic approach to populism by considering how individuals receive populist messages compared to other available discursive strategies that are, in most cases, used more frequently than populism. Through a rhetorical analysis that uses a self-collected and classified database of campaign Tweets, my dissertation

incorporates a broader range of candidates (populists and non-populists across two regions and five countries) and, most importantly, a more extensive range of rhetoric. As a result, my findings further our understanding of what kind of populist messages foster engagement among online citizens.

Of the contributions I make in my dissertation, I highlight two in particular. The first contribution is theoretical: my framework builds on existing studies of framing theory to narrow in on what it is about populism that is attracting prospective voters. In doing so, I advance the study of populist frames into new territory that is fundamentally comparative, which allows me to identify the narrative elements that make up the populist discursive strategy and to theorize about why these elements lead to higher engagement than the narrative elements making up the other discursive strategies I identify. The second contribution is methodological: my study is one of the few to measure populism on Twitter, and the only one to incorporate additional worldviews, offering a substantive basis by which we can assess the impact of populist messages on the public.

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I. What's in the Rest of the Populist Playbook? The Populist Communication Strategy in Comparative Perspective

Abstract: Populism has captured the world's attention, especially during election campaigns where the starkness of populist messages come into sharper focus. Despite the prevalence of this kind of rhetoric, we still do not know how populist communication is adopted *relative* to other available discursive frames. In addressing this lacuna, I evaluate two research questions: how is the populist communication strategy used relative to other strategies, and what does the "rest" of the populist communication strategy look like? To assess these questions, I measure different elements of communication strategies (including both content and style) in the Tweets of national-level candidates in five countries: Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Italy, and Spain (N=1,577). Looking at communication strategies in this way points us away from easy stereotypes of populist style as always negative and instead opens up the possibility that populists use a mix of ideas and styles in their overall strategy.

Introduction

Effective communication is a requirement for political actors to succeed. Whether their goal is office-seeking, vote-seeking, or policy-seeing, politicians have to communicate in a way that appeals to potential voters to accomplish their goals. The widespread accessibility of social media has made communicating a more critical task than ever, particularly during elections (Dimitrova et al. 2014; Gil de Zúñiga 2012; Zamora Medina and Zurutuza Muñoz 2014). Although there are many different ways of communicating available to politicians, populism has captured the world's attention, especially during campaigns where the starkness of populist messages come into sharper focus.

Recent literature has shown that the way that populists communicate may help to explain their appeal (Bartels 2017; Hameleers et al. 2018; Hawkins et al. 2018). However, existing scholarship tends to evaluate political communication as either populist or not populist (Ernst et al. 2019; Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2018; Mazzoleni and Bracciale 2018). As a result, these studies do not give us a sense of what other kinds of messages (aka discursive frames) actors are using beyond populist ones and how this affects actors' overall approach to communication. For example, Casero-Ripollés et al. (2017) find that 51.9% of Podemos's (Spain's leftist populist

party) Tweets use a populist frame—but what about the other 48.1%? We do not yet know what *else* populist actors are doing to try and accomplish their communication goals and how this compares to what non-populists are doing because our understanding is limited by viewing populist communication in isolation. Without a more complete understanding of populist actors' complete rhetorical profile, we cannot fully understand their appeal with voters.

While most populism scholarship focuses either on what actors say (the ideas they communicate, Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2018; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011) or how they communicate (their rhetorical style, Bracciale and Martella 2017; Ernst et al. 2019; Mazzoleni and Bracciale 2018), this research is situated among a few recent studies that examine both (Bracciale and Martella 2017; Ernst et al. 2019) as a way to expand our understanding of what populist communication entails. I refer to this combination as an actor's communication strategy.[4] This paper investigates two related questions in this broad agenda: how is the populist communication strategy used relative to other ways of communicating, and what does the rest of the populist communication strategy look like?

I anticipate that what populist actors say, the ideas that distinguish them from other candidates, will carry over into their rhetorical style, particularly in the use of negative language and attacking opponents. The core of the populist frame is a tension between elites and the people (Hawkins et al. 2018; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013), a tension that is inherently negative. However, I also expect to find some common ground between populist and non-populist actors when the former is engaging with alternative discursive frames more commonly associated with liberal democracy or with campaigns more broadly. To test the *ideological*

[4] There is no direct link between communication strategy and the view of populism in general as a political strategy (see, e.g., Weyland 2001). Rather, "[populist] communication strategy" is synonymous with "[populist] communication." I add "strategy" because I believe it offers greater conceptual clarity.

aspect of these expectations, the paper focuses on the big picture way that candidates talk about the relationship between the elites and the people, and with issues. To gauge how rhetorical *style* differs between candidates, the paper assesses the ways that candidates convey messages, including their use of negative campaign tactics, the emotional content of their messages, and the functions of their messages.

More concretely, these different aspects of communication are measured in a random sample of the Tweets of eighteen national-level candidates who pass a 10% vote threshold in Italy, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Spain (N=1,577). Social media platforms like Twitter play a central role in modern campaigns (Dimitrova et al. 2014; Zamora Medina and Zurutuza Muñoz 2014). Twitter is generally viewed as the preferred platform of political and media elites, which has dual benefits of high visibility and widespread Twitter usage among politicians (Mazzoleni and Bracciale 2018). Scholars have also provided evidence that candidates set the media's agenda with their posts (Enli 2017; Graham et al. 2014), offering additional incentives for candidates to utilize Twitter in their campaigns. Populist actors in particular are thought to benefit from this form of direct communication as it bypasses journalistic gatekeeping (Barr 2009; Gerbaudo 2018).

Unsurprisingly, the results reveal notable differences between the populist communication strategy and the strategies of non-populist actors in the sample. Aside from the obvious, that the populist actors in the sample use more populist frames than the non-populist actors, the former group also prioritizes issues of corruption in the cases examined—but not immigration. Stylistically, populist actors tend towards generalities rather than concrete policy proposals, use more negative language, and are more prone to attacking opponents. These results suggest that the ideas that populist actors espouse (which are typically the sole criterion to

determine whether actors are populist or not) have downstream effects on the way that these actors communicate more broadly—the differences between populist and non-populist actors also pervade the way that the message is conveyed, affecting their overall communication strategy.

Populist actors are more than just their populist ideas, though—populist frames constitute a minority strategy (35-40%) for all but one candidate (Lega of Italy). This finding, in particular, underscores the importance of looking beyond the populist discursive frame at the "rest" of the populist communication strategy. When not "speaking populism," the other seven populist actors in this sample often behave similarly to ten non-populist actors: they typically prioritize some combination of technocratic and neutral discourse (though rarely pluralist discourse), and spend much of their time talking about the campaign and mobilizing supporters. These results leave us with a contradiction: on the one hand, populist actors do seem to have a unique communication strategy that includes both what they say and how they say it. On the other hand, this strategy makes up a minority of their communication. How can we reconcile this inconsistency?

Looking at communication strategies more broadly reveals more about the "rest" of the populist playbook. The findings suggest that there is a core communication strategy across candidates that revolves around encouraging motivation and enthusiasm as well as candidates' ability to solve society's problems. A typical communication strategy for these cases contains this core campaign component, plus a preferred discursive frame (a populist frame for populist candidates and a predominantly technocratic frame for non-populist candidates), plus individual variation for each candidate (Aalberg and Vreese 2017, 2). Observing communication strategies in this way points us away from easy stereotypes of populist style as always negative. Rather, the results suggest that populists use a mix of ideas and styles in their overall strategy, yet remain

defined by their minority strategies of populist ideas and negative communication style given that these features sharply distinguish them from their mainstream counterparts.

Theoretical Framework

Recently, scholars have examined how and what candidates choose to convey on social media and what this information tells us about their broader strategies. The majority of these studies are aimed at identifying attributes of populist communication in particular. Ideologically, most scholars tend to view populism as the culmination of three core ideas: identification with the people, an antagonistic relationship with elites, and a third category that varies, but generally entails ostracizing some outgroup (Bobba 2019; Bracciale and Martella 2017; Ernst et al. 2019; Hawkins et al. 2018). Several scholars have identified the presence or absence of these core ideas in social media posts, particularly Facebook and Twitter (see, e.g., Bobba 2019; Bobba and Roncarolo 2018; Casero-Ripollés et al. 2017; Ernst et al. 2017, 2019; Zulianello et al. 2018). These studies contextualize both *how much* populist content political actors use, while also identifying *what kind* of populist content they are using and how often.

These studies provide the baseline for how this paper approaches the first part of a candidate's communication strategy: the ideas they promote in their online communication. Where my study diverges is in also classifying the non-populist ideas candidates use to give us a better sense of the "rest" of the populist communication strategy. By only examining populist content, scholars' inferences are limited to just the populist or not-populist content an actor uses. The goal of this paper is to describe what this non-populist component looks like for populist actors.

The other major aspect of a communication strategy is the communication style. Recurring themes in the literature include negativity (Blassnig et al. 2019; Gerstlé and Nai 2019; Van Kessel and Castelein 2016; Waisbord and Amado 2017) and emotionality (Busby et al.

2018; Hameleers and Schmuck 2017; Rico et al. 2017). Other aspects of the populist style are murky. For example, Ernst et al. (2019) evaluate sociability as an element of style, while Bracciale and Martella (2017) evaluate four elements: stagecraft, register, topic, and function. Regardless of the exact operationalization of style, this paper abides by Ernst et al.'s (2019, 10) assertion that "populist ideology and style elements are considered inextricably intertwined, but scholars need to keep them analytically distinct and analyze them with separate empirical measures." This distinction enhances our understanding of the populist communication strategy while also leading to a more explicit empirical approach.

Scholars have advanced the discussion of the populist style considerably in recent years, expanding our understanding of what stylistic elements of populism are used most frequently and by whom. However, like studies focusing on the ideological content, the majority of these studies limit their analysis to the populist style. Studies such as Bracciale and Martella (2017) and Ernst et al. (2019) show us the intricacies of how populist communicate across different platforms and different party types. Where this paper diverges from these studies is in my analysis of the communication style of populists when they are not using stylistic attributes associated with the populist style—how else they communicate, and what this means for their overall communication strategies. To examine the communication style, I evaluate a message's issue, function, emotionality (tone), and negative campaigning. In keeping with a communications-centered approach (rather than an actor-centered one), the message (Tweet) is the unit of analysis. The relationships between these concepts is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1.1: Concept Map



The hypotheses primarily test of how the populist communication strategy is used relative to other strategy. This approach provides a stronger theoretical backbone for what to expect from each group of actors (populist and non-populist), before turning to the "rest" of the populist communication strategy in the results and discussion sections.

Ideological Underpinnings

I use "ideological underpinnings" broadly to indicate how candidates see the political world and their relationship to it. The two ways that I examine ideology (discursive frames and issues) reflect the way that the literature defines populism either in terms of the relationship between the people and the elites (Aslanidis 2015; Hawkins et al. 2018) or candidates' stances on particular issues (for example, those who define populism according to its position on nativism, including Inglehart and Norris 2016 and Mudde 2007).

I start by evaluating the way that political actors view the relationship between the people and the elites.[5] At its core, a frame is defined as "the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles a speaker uses to relay information" Chong and Druckman (2007a, 100). In this study, the

[5] Other conceptions of frames are possible, such as nationalism or liberal-conservatism. I chose this conception of a frame because it corresponds to a core definition of populism as a discursive frame (Aslanidis 2015).

frames in question conceive of the relationship between the people and the elites differently. I identify three substantive frames that have different conceptions of the people versus the elites: populism, pluralism, and technocracy (Akkerman et al. 2014; Caramani 2017). In this study, populism is defined as "a unique set of ideas, one that understands politics as a Manichean struggle between a reified will of the people and a conspiring elite" (Hawkins et al. 2018, 3).

Pluralism and technocracy were chosen as rival discursive frames because they view the relationship between the people and the elites differently than populism and are among the most common discursive frames in democracies today (Akkerman et al. 2014; Caramani 2017; Hawkins et al. 2012). Pluralism advocates for power to be shared among diverse interests (Akkerman et al. 2014, 1327; Caramani 2017, 62). Technocracy, meanwhile, combines conceptualizations of both technocracy and elitism[6] to view the relationship between the people and the elites as one in which elites should be in charge of doing what is best for the people, not representing the "will of the people" as populism does. In other words, technocracy prioritizes the power of expertise (broadly defined) and the ability to deliver outcomes (Caramani 2017, 55 & 66). I also examine a neutral category, which refers to ambiguous language that does not contain enough information about the nature of the sovereign community to consider it as belonging to any discursive frame. In other words, it represents the absence of a frame.

We know from existing scholarship that, by definition, populists use more non-populist frames (Aslanidis 2015). But what about non-populists? I expect that populist actors, when not using populist discursive frames, will use technocratic and neutral frames, but less pluralistic ones due to an incompatibility with the compromise inherent in a pluralist worldview and the

[6] Existing studies do not utilize technocracy and elitism as separate categories. For example, Akkerman et al. (2014) measure elitism in surveys not only as a moralistic distinction between "the people" and the elite (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 152), a conception in line with elitism, but also as important business leaders or independent experts, which is in line with technocracy.

dualistic worldview of populism (**H_1**). I also anticipate that non-populists will rely on technocracy and pluralism in place of populism because these frames are regularly associated with liberal democracy (**H_2**), with the caveat that pluralism is likely to be less frequently used at this stage in the electoral process given the presumed vote-maximizing goals of actors at this stage (in contrast to the post-election phase where, at least in parliamentary systems, actors are often incentivized to seek coalitions to maximize their effect on policies).

Another critical barometer of how actors see the political world and how they prioritize that worldview above other is the issues or policies that an actor talks about most often. I employ twelve issue categories (Table) that capture common topics that are central to political debates. They are adapted and simplified from Casero-Ripollés et al. (2017) and overlap with Bracciale and Martella (2017) and Graham et al. (2014). Examples and descriptions are available in Appendix A.3.[7]

Table 1.1: Issues

Economy
Social policy
Culture, media, and sport
Science, technology, the environment, and infrastructure
Terrorism, crime, and insecurity
Foreign affairs
Corruption and democratic regeneration
Political strategy in office
Campaign organization and strategy
Immigration
Regional politics
No subject/other

Existing literature suggests that populists often fixate on a few issues. Studies of right-wing populists, in particular, have affirmed the connection between populism and attitudes towards immigration (Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2017; Schumacher and Rooduijn 2013),

[7] Appendices are located in a supplementary file: https://www.dropbox.com/s/143ovk1j2xwrxgy/Supplementary%20File_The%20Populist%20Communication%20Strategy.pdf?dl=0

even defining populism as a particular issue stance against immigrants (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Mudde 2007). Corruption is also widely mentioned, particularly on the left (Castanho Silva 2018; Ziller and Schübel 2015). Accordingly, I evaluate the expectation that populist candidates are more likely to focus on issues of immigration and corruption than non-populists (**H_3**). I do not have strong expectations about the issues that non-populist actors will use more often given heterogeneity across actors, and consider this question better suited to an actor-by-actor analysis.

Rhetorical Style

Whereas actors' ideological underpinnings express favorability to particular worldviews or issues, actors' rhetorical style refers to how the candidates are conveying their ideas. I evaluate style using three measures: functions, emotionality (tone), and negative campaigning. The Tweet's function refers to what the speaker is trying to accomplish—the Tweet's purpose. I utilize eight function categories, also adapted and simplified from Casero-Ripollés et al. (2017). Examples and descriptions are available in Appendix A.4.

Table 1.2: Functions

Agenda and organization of political actions
Electoral program
Management of political achievements
Criticizing opponents
Participation and mobilization
Personal life, manners, or protocol
Entertainment or humor
Others

Several scholars have suggested that the populist communication style uses simple, often vague language (Bischof and Senninger 2018; Mazzoleni and Bracciale 2018; Oliver and Rahn 2016), especially as it relates to core issue positions. I extend this logic to the Tweet's function. I

anticipate that non-populists will talk about their electoral program more than populists ($\mathbf{H_{4a}}$),[8] while purely campaign functions like agenda and organization of political actions and participation and mobilization will be similar across candidate types ($\mathbf{H_{4b}}$). Although a simplification, the logic of my hypotheses is that campaign messages are conducive to simple, straightforward language, while issue positions are not.

Next, I measure emotionality by looking at the tone of a message—do candidates use predominantly positive, neutral, or negative language in a given message? I use tone as an approximation of emotionality based on the assumption that language is correlated with emotions. Examples are available in Appendix A.5. A vast body of literature has found that populists capitalize on negative emotions, especially fear or anger (Bobba 2019; Rico et al. 2017; Wirz 2018). Accordingly, I anticipate that populists will use more negative language and non-populists will use more positive/neutral language ($\mathbf{H_5}$).

The final measure of style that I examine is negative campaigning. In line with Gerstlé and Nai (2019, 2), I view negative campaigning as the "extent competing candidates attack their rivals instead of promoting their own programme." I measure negativity based on the criticizing opponents (a function category). I anticipate that populists will be more likely to criticize their opponents than non-populists ($\mathbf{H_6}$) (Gerstlé and Nai 2019; Van Kessel and Castelein 2016).

Research Design

The hypotheses are evaluated using a random sample of the rhetoric for all candidates/parties that received at least 10% of the vote in Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Spain, and Italy. Each case had at least one candidate that political observers commonly referred to as a

[8] Electoral program is defined as when an actor talks about their future program proposals. The "electoral program" function differs from the issue category in that the latter identifies the topical theme (what does the Tweet talk about) while the former refers to what the perceived purpose is of the Tweet—in this case, it is to talk about the candidate's electoral plans once in office, regardless of the particular content of those plans.

"populist" actor in 2018 or early 2019. These cases represent understudied cases of populism, particularly in Europe, expanding our understanding of how populism is used across different contexts. Although these cases have notable differences, they vary in both the ratio of populist to non-populist messages that candidates used as well as the degree of electoral success that populist and non-populist candidates experienced. Twitter use in these countries is also similar, with 5-8% of each country's population.[9] Finally, these cases reflect regional diversity and balance on the number of candidates meeting the selection criteria (nine in each region).

While I see the differences between regions as a theoretical strength, I attempt to account for some of these differences by focusing on the candidates' Tweets in Latin America and the parties' Tweets in Europe. This decision reflects significantly different institutions that affect the way individuals cast votes. In Spain and Italy, both parliamentary systems, individuals cast votes for parties. In the Latin American countries with presidential systems, individuals vote directly for candidates. As a result, I expect that parties produce more campaign content in Europe, making parties a better comparison for Latin American candidates. A descriptive comparison of European party leaders' and parties' Twitter behavior supports this assumption. For example, Pedro Sánchez of PSOE Tweeted 6.8 times per day on average during the campaign versus PSOE's average of 32.6 (Appendix D).

I classify who is and is not a populist according to four expert surveys (the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Survey, the Global Party Survey, and the Populism and Political Parties Expert Survey) and one speech analysis database (the Global Populism Database).

[9] Italy: 5.46% as of March 2018; Mexico: 19.45% in August 2018 (this number dropped precipitously post-election, and is at 7.47% as of August 2019); Brazil: 5.48% in October 2018; Colombia: 6.8% in June 2018; Spain: 6.2% in April 2019. Data from the country pages at https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/.

These datasets ensure external validity and adequate coverage of the candidates in this sample. Candidates are classified as "populist" if the majority of these datasets considered the candidates to be at least "somewhat populist" and "non-populist" otherwise, for a total of nine populist actors and nine non-populist ones (

Table). Details are available in Appendix B. I go against existing data for Cs of Spain, who received one partial populist votes and two non-populist votes. I opt to include Cs as populist upon a qualitative examination of their Tweets that suggested populist tendencies. The sample contains 80 Tweets for each of the nine non-populist actors and 100 Tweets for each of the nine populist actors,[10] randomly sampled during the campaign for a total of N=1,577 Tweets.[11] Re-Tweets are excluded from the analysis as they do not constitute rhetoric written by the candidate. In the table and subsequent figures, blue text indicates a populist candidate and black text indicates a non-populist candidate.[12]

[10] Two parties did not meet the minimum number of Tweets. FI, and MS5. FI was sampled at 80 Tweets (the non-populist amount) as the existing classification information available at the time the study was conducted indicated that FI was not-populist. Since then, later datasets indicated that FI was considered a populist by a majority of indicators, thus they are coded as populist here. For FI, I included Tweets where the party *re-Tweeted* the party leader's (Silvio Berlusconi) Tweets. Though this was not done for other cases, it is consistent with other parties who, instead of re-Tweeting leader's Tweets (as FI did), simply use the same Tweet between candidate. MS5 is sampled at 77 Tweets total, representing their entire universe of Tweets during the campaign. I also collected separate Tweets from the party leader for a robustness check, which is why I did not combine the MS5 with Luigi Di Maio's Tweets.
[11] Official campaign periods are hard to pin down in many countries. I selected campaign dates that reflected the official kickoff of the campaign marked by the first major campaign event, and ended either the day before the election, or a few days before in certain cases that observe a few days of non-campaigning (aka "reflection periods"). The campaign periods covered in this analysis are: 1) Italy: 12/27/2017 (when Parliament was dissolved) – 3/3/2018; 2) Colombia: 3/11/2018 (when primaries were held) – 6/16/2018 (excluding the 1st round election day, 5/27/2018); 3). Mexico: 3/30/2018 – 6/27/2018; 4) Brazil: 7/20/2018 (registration for parties' candidates opened) – 10/27/208 (excluding the 1st round election day, 10/7/2018); 5) Spain: 2/15/2019 (snap elections were called) – 4/26/2019. Two candidates, Ciro Gomes of Brazil and Sergio Fajardo of Colombia did not make it to the 2nd round; thus, their campaign period ended the day before the 1st round election in these countries.
[12] Additional candidate information is provided in Appendix C, which contains the Twitter output of these candidates, how they use Twitter interactively (in terms of hashtags, mentions, and links), and how the public responds to these candidates on Twitter (in terms of likes, re-tweets, and followers).

Table 1.3: Sampled Candidates

Country	*Candidate/Party*	*Vote Share*
COL	Duque (Democratic Center)	54.0% (2nd); 39.1% (1st)
	Petro (Progressivists Movement)	41.8% (2nd); 25.1% (1st)
	Fajardo (Citizen Compromise)	23.7% (1st)
MEX	López Obrador (AMLO) (Morena)	53.2%
	Anaya (PAN)	22.3%
	Meade (PRI)	16.4%
BRZ	Jair Bolsonaro (PSL)	55.1% (2nd); 46.0% (1st)
	Haddad (PT)[13]	44.9% (2nd); 29.3% (1st)
	Gomes (PDT)	12.5% (1st)
IT	M5S (leader: Luigi Di Maio)	32.2%
	Lega (leader: Matteo Salvini)	17.7%
	PD (leader: Matteo Renzi)	18.9%
	FI (leader: Silvio Berlusconi)	13.9%
ESP	Podemos (leader: Pablo Iglesias)	14.3%
	PP (leader: Pablo Casado)	16.7%
	PSOE (leader: Pedro Sanchez)	28.7%
	Cs (leader: Albert Rivera)	15.8%
	Vox (leader: Santiago Abascal)	10.3%

Four research assistants (RAs) and the author coded the Tweets. Tweets were de-identified to mask the actor's identity and party. The intercoder reliability for the sample, presented using Krippendorff's alpha, ranges from .60 to .70.[14]

Results

I evaluate two possible ways that candidates' communication strategies differ: their ideological content and communication style. Two graphs are presented per measure: a pooled analysis comparing the strategies of populist and non-populist candidates with p-values to indicate statistically significant group means, followed by a candidate-by-candidate breakdown to account for within-group heterogeneity.

Ideological Underpinnings

[13] In Brazil, Fernando Haddad was not the official candidate of the PT party until 9/11/2018; prior to that date, Lula da Silva was the official candidate and Haddad was his running mate. Haddad became the official candidate when Lula was denied the ability to remain a candidate after the Supreme Electoral Court ruled against him on corruption charges. 13/50 Tweets in the Haddad sample take place before the Lula ruling, though Haddad was actively campaigning as Lula's running mate prior to 9/11/2018, thus these Tweets are still included in the final sample.
[14] Intercoder reliability information is presented in Appendix B.2. Additional information on the coding procedures are available in Appendix E.1.

The first ideological aspect evaluated is the discursive frame. Consistent with extant literature, Figure shows a clear and statistically significant difference in the use of populist communication between candidate types. When not "speaking populism," populist actors rely predominantly on neutral rhetoric followed by technocratic language, and lastly, pluralistic language (supporting H_1). Non-populist candidates use technocratic and, to a lesser extent, pluralistic frames more often than their populist counterparts (loosely supporting H_2). The two candidate types do not use neutral rhetoric at a significantly different rate.

Figure 1.2: Discursive Frames by Candidate Type



Figure displays the percentage of discursive frames used by each candidate. Lega is the only actor in the sample to use predominantly populist messages. Most other populists use between 25-40%,[15] which is a substantively important finding—while distinctive in their use of populist communication, populist candidates are not monolithic in their use of frames. This

[15] Figure also calls into question whether FI should be classified as a populist. As a party, FI uses populism in only 6% of their Tweets. In contrast, the other eight candidates that existing databases consider to be populist (including Cs) regularly use populist frames.

finding reiterates the need to consider what other frames these candidates are using—the "rest" of the populist communication strategy. Take AMLO for example. A typical populist Tweet for AMLO looks like, *"The power mafia is on the verge of a nervous breakdown, it has not worked for them or the dirty war will work for them. Whatever they do, we do not stop growing…"*[16] However, AMLO uses considerably more neutral Tweets than populist ones. Another typical AMLO frame, this time a neutral one, looks quite different: *"The people are happy and counting the days for the first of July. Look at the participation and enthusiasm in San Juan del Rio, Queretaro."*

Figure 1.3: Discursive Frame by Candidate/Party



Next, I examine the issues that candidates talk about most often in their campaigns. Figure conditionally supports **H**$_3$: populists monopolize issues of corruption and immigration.

[16] Where "typical" is determined based on the average number of likes a Tweet receives.

However, a closer examination reveals that except for Lega, populists do not mention immigration often. This finding may be due in part to this issue lacking salience in Latin America and having only two right-wing populist actors in the sample. I also find that non-populists talk more about the economy, social policy, and culture/sport than populists. By and large, though, campaign organization is candidates' go-to issue, accounting for 46% of populist and 47% of non-populist Tweets (consistent with Graham et al. 2014 and Zamora Medina and Zurutuza Muñoz 2014). How candidates Tweet about their campaigns is virtually indistinguishable across the candidate types. Although candidate types differ on several key issues, campaign environments serve as an equalizer in some ways and seem to form the core of nearly all candidates' communication strategy when it comes to the ideas they promote.

Figure 1.4: Issues by Candidate Type



The candidate-by-candidate examination of issues in Figure shows how much Lega talks about immigration relative to other candidates.[17] Even Vox, who is generally seen as taking a hard stance on immigration, only explicitly references immigration in 3% of their Tweets. Corruption, meanwhile, shows considerably more variation. MS5 stands out by mentioning corruption in over one-quarter of their Tweets, followed by Petro. This finding appears to be driven in part by populists' tendency towards anti-elite messages. For example, the following MS5 Tweet about corruption also attacks another candidate: *"Berlusconi paid the Cosa Nostra, let's let the world know! Mr Berlusconi paid the mafia association 'Cosa Nostra', millions of Italians are really outraged by all this."*

Figure 1.5: Issue by Candidate/Party



[17] When I exclude Lega from the sample, the difference between populists and non-populists regarding this issue does not attain statistical significance, supporting the contention that Lega is driving the immigration finding.

Non-populists also mention this issue semi-regularly, including Fajardo and Anaya, but tend to do so without directly criticizing opponents. Anaya for example, Tweets messages like *"...I propose that the General and Anticorruption Prosecutor's Offices be autonomous and independent; that the general rule stops being that the corrupt one gets away with it and that now it is: the one who does it, pays it."* Unlike MS5's Tweet, Anaya tends to focus on anti-corruption policies rather than accusing other elites of corrupt acts. On the remaining six issues, populists and non-populists do not differ significantly.

Rhetorical Style

To examine candidates' style, I start with the function of a message. **H_{4a}** expected that non-populists would talk about their electoral programs more than populists, a finding that is supported in Figure 1.6. **H_{4b}** stated that the two candidate types would be similar regarding functions that were vague in nature, namely campaign agendas and participation/mobilization.

Figure 1.6: Function by Candidate Type



This hypothesis is only partially supported—there is a statistically significant difference between populists' and non-populists' use of the campaign agenda function, although it is worth

pointing that the difference is not particularly meaningful. However, consistent with my expectation, both candidate types encourage participation and mobilization frequently, in about 30% of their Tweets. Like the issue campaign organization above, candidates' use of the participation and mobilization function are virtually indistinguishable across candidate type.

The finding that non-populist candidates spend considerably more time discussing their electoral program is driven at least in part by Duque (62%) and Anaya (43%). In contrast, populist candidates like AMLO, Vox, MS5, Lega, and Petro discuss their electoral program in only 9-14% of their Tweets, providing a more substantive interpretation to **H_{4a}**. A notable exception among populists is Podemos, who dedicates nearly one-third of their Tweets to their electoral program, again demonstrating heterogeneity within candidate types.

Figure 1.7: Function by Candidate/Party



In my evaluation of the emotionality or tone of candidate's messages, I find support for **H_5** in **Error! Reference source not found.**: populists are considerably more likely to use a negative tone than non-populists. At the same time, non-populist candidates are more likely to use both neutral and positive language compared to populists. Despite these differences, populist candidates use a predominantly negative tone in only one-third of their messages (consistent with Van Kessel and Castelein 2016). This finding is suggestive that a purely negative approach is not sustainable throughout an entire campaign—even though populists draw more on negative language than non-populists, they choose to balance it out with a majority of neutral and positive messages. A candidate-by-candidate approach offers additional insight into this finding.

Figure 1.8: Tone/Emotionality by Candidate Type



Error! Reference source not found. presents the percentage of positive, neutral, and negative rhetoric that each candidate uses. While this finding is consistent with the conception that populists frequently incite negative emotions in particular (Bobba 2019; Rico et al. 2017; Wirz 2018), that turns out to be only part of the picture. Lega is the only actor in the sample to use a negative tone in the majority of their messages (63%). There is considerable variation

between candidates, especially populist ones. Some populists like AMLO and Bolsonaro use more positive than negative language and use some of the most positive language in the sample. Others, like Podemos, Vox, and Cs use positive and negative language approximately equally. Finally, a third group (Lega, Petro, MS5) fit more closely with a narrow interpretation of **H_5**, using a negative tone in a majority of their Tweets. Although my findings demonstrate that populist candidates on average use more negative language than non-populist candidates, H_5 also points us away from resorting to easy stereotypes of the populist style as always negative.

Figure 1.9: Tone by Candidate/Party



The final stylistic element I examine is negative campaigning. The most direct manifestation of this concept is through the "criticizing opponents" function examined above.

Figure above demonstrates that populists criticize their opponents more consistently than their non-populist counterparts, consistent with **H_6**. Of the eight functions I examine, populists criticize their opponents in nearly 33% of their Tweets, while non-populists do the same in only 14% of theirs. Figure above presents relatively clear candidate-by-candidate evidence of this pattern. The range varies from a low of 16% to 58%, Lega once again cementing itself as the most populist by this measure. Notably, a few non-populist candidates engage in routine attacks on the opposition, especially PP (25%). As with the ideological underpinnings of candidates' messages, actors' communication style highlights differences between candidate types as well as considerable intra-group heterogeneity: although there is a generalizable populist communication strategy, candidates utilize this strategy quite differently.

Conclusions

Citizens have elected populists into power in countries as far-ranging as the United States, Mexico, and Brazil, to Italy, Poland, Hungary, and Greece, to name a few. Throughout these campaigns, and in populist communication more broadly, it is well-established that populist candidates have a distinctive way of communicating. However, we are still expanding our understanding of the populist communication strategy and how this marks populists as different than other candidates, particularly during electoral campaigns and on social media. To assess candidates' communication strategies, this paper considers the content of candidates' messages (ideas) and the way that candidates convey their messages (style). This study contributes to our understanding of the populist communication strategy by examining two questions: what characterizes the populist communication strategy, and what does this characterization tell us about the populist communication strategy relative to other discursive strategies?

The results reveal stark differences in the way that populist and non-populist actors communicate. Whereas populist actors unsurprisingly favor populist discursive frames, non-populists draw on the other frames, chiefly technocracy and neutral ones. Actors also differ in the issues they prioritize. For example, populists are more likely to talk about corruption, while non-populists are more likely to talk about the economy, social policy, and cultural issues. Similarly, there are substantive differences in how actors convey their messages, particularly the amount of negative language that they use and how often they attack the opposition. At the same time, populists' use of negative language occurs in only one-third of their Tweets on average. These qualifying findings are suggestive that our view of populist communication, if limited to ideas alone, is incomplete: how actors convey their ideas is also critical to advance our understanding of actors' overall communication strategies.

When populist candidates are not employing the ideas or style that make up the populist communication strategy, they often do what non-populist candidates do—spread messages of encouragement to support their candidacy and provide reasons why they are the best option to fix society's ills. In other words, even though populist candidates have a predominant worldview about the people versus the elites, use more negative language, and attack elites more, they also mix and match ideas and styles to form their overall communication strategy. As a result, while there are notable similarities among the populist candidates especially, each candidate has a unique strategy that is only partially generalizable. Candidates stand out for different reasons—Lega, for being the most negative and most "populist," but also candidates like AMLO and Bolsonaro for utilizing a large number of positive messages in addition to negative ones. Overall, these findings suggest that communications strategies cannot rely entirely on negative messaging

that criticizes opponents—candidates have to offer hope for the future and show that they will solve problems.

Discussion

There are, of course, limitations inherent in these analyses. Chief among them is the scope of the sample: with eight populist actors, I cannot generalize to a wider populist communication strategy beyond the cases and actors examined here. However, I see theoretical promise in the implications of this study. Despite the differences across regions, countries, actors, political leanings, and electoral results (populists were elected into power in Mexico, Brazil, and Italy, but not in Spain or Colombia), I find discernable patterns that support the broader populist literature, which finds that the ideas (and, in this case, style) of populism travel across cases (see, e.g., Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2018). More concretely, the conception of populism as a set of ideas or as a discursive frame (Aslanidis 2015; Hawkins et al. 2018) seems to find merit in these data, to which these results further suggest that such ideas also affect how an actor communicates (affirming scholars such as Bracciale and Martella 2017; Ernst et al. 2019; Mazzoleni and Bracciale 2018).

The same conclusion is true for the non-populist actors. With a larger sample size, it would be possible to generalize among specific party families or party status (such as incumbent versus challenger parties), but I refrain from making widespread generalizations about the "non-populist communication strategy" due to obvious variation that cannot be exploited fully with the data at hand. While the primary theoretical contribution of this research is in encouraging scholars to add specificity to what "non-populist" communication looks like, future research could investigate a more complete picture of what these other communication strategies might look like—for example, what does a pluralistic or technocratic communication strategy entail, and are such strategies effective in generating support for [non-populist] actors? While this

sample does not contain sufficient cases to address these questions, it is theoretically relevant as a potential way to bolster or at least understand liberal democracy as it confronts ongoing challenges from populism and other polarizing worldviews.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Theory Expansion

A.1 Examples of the kinds of messages found in each **master frame** category

Master Frame	"Strong" example	"Moderate" example
Populism	"We are not against the businessmen, we are against the ill-gotten wealth, the one that they obtain overnight, under the protection of public power, corrupt politicians and influence peddlers" (AMLO, MEX) "For the first time a candidate who represents the citizens and not the politicking that always stole dreams from Colombia, disputes the power. Let us not lose the historic opportunity for change and to send garbage to corruption. Just an X to make history." (Petro, COL)	"While some of them only make noise, from Podemos we work on concrete proposals to serve people: - Recover the bank's bailout. - Education 0 to 3 years universal and free. - Green Horizon Plan. And much more ..." (Podemos, ESP) "Ignore these bad news by saying that we want to recreate the CPMF. Does not proceed. They want to panic because they are panicking about our chance to win. Nobody can take any more taxes, we are aware of this." (Bolsonaro, BRZ)
Pluralism	"'Political problems are resolved with dialogue, in Spain there is no need for a reconquest, there is no need to bring soldiers to Catalonia, reconciliation is needed.'" (Podemos, ESP) "We want an inclusive, non-exclusionary Spain, which treats its people well and seeks justice and well-being. A fair country that makes us proud to be Spanish and Spanish." (PSOE, ESP)	"The images that you will see refer to episodes that occurred in the last year. Racism, intolerance, regurgitations of authoritarianism are not relegated only to the past. But all of us who abhor that time and these repetitions, we do not forget." (PD, IT) "It is absolutely unacceptable that, in our country, 7 out of 10 women have suffered some type of violence; that doing the same job, with the same training, earn 30% less than men. That is going to end when I am President." (Anaya, MEX)
Technocracy	"We have 3 concrete approaches to end corruption: that in Mexico there are no 'untouchables'; eliminate the use of cash in the Government; and have a completely autonomous and independent Public Prosecutor's Office and an Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office." (Anaya, MEX) "One of the key points of our program is less taxes for families and businesses. We will succeed in the Flat Tax, a single rate for all of 23% which will guarantee real economic growth, new jobs and a revival of investments." (FI, IT)	"To combat unemployment, Brazil needs confidence and security. Investors do not trust Brazil, thousands of companies closed due to violence, high taxes, bureaucracy, corruption and crisis, all inherited from the PT. We will change that picture. We will be the government of employment!" (Bolsonaro, BRZ) "There are so many differences between us and the right, this is one of the most relevant: new record in the recovery of tax evasion in Italy, exceeded 20 billion in 2017. To find out more" (PD, IT)
Neutral	"Good morning Barranquilla. Today we start at @udeatlantico, we will share with students and show that with education we can" (Fajardo, COL) "We have come a long way together and we are one step away from the Great Dream, to change our country! We look forward to seeing you all for the last stage of the Rally for Italy, Friday #2marzo at Piazza del Popolo in Rome!" (MS5, IT)	

A.2 Examples of the kinds of messages found in each **frame** category

The Tweets represented in this table are meant to be representative of each category. Selection was determined based on 1) strength of the frame, as determined by the coders (either "moderate" or "strong;" and 2) "strong" frames are those that garnered more likes/re-Tweets within that category of frame, while "moderate" frames attracted comparatively fewer likes/re-Tweets. Tweets are presented in quotations as direct statements from the candidates, but with links and hashtags removed for presentation purposes.

Master frame	Frame	"Strong" example	"Moderate" example
Populism	Pro-people	"We are going to win the first day of July and we are not going to fail the town [el pueblo]. Power only makes sense, and becomes a virtue, when it is placed at the service of others." (AMLO, MEX)	"In this campaign, we are committed to listening twice as much as we talked about. That is why my government will be the true government of the people, in which the needs of the citizens will be resolved." (Anaya, MEX)
	Anti-elite	"We are not against the businessmen, we are against the ill-gotten wealth, the kind that they obtain overnight, under the protection of public power, corrupt politicians and influence peddlers" (AMLO, MEX)	"In his 'speech to the voters of tomorrow' (minors, starting with his three children) @matteorenzi launches the challenge to 'professionals of fear'. Read more on @democratica_web" (PD, IT)
	Dispositional blame attribution	"The social emergency is the product of decisions or political indecisions. The disaster of Mocoa showed the forgetfulness of the State of the climatic Change… the corruption and the hidroituango the forgetfulness to construct a democracy where to the people decide…" (Petro, COL)	"The general secretary of the EFDD lies to The Republic: now, she apologizes to you…" (MS5, IT)
Pluralism	Compromise	"In #PorMexicoAlFrente we propose the first coalition government for Mexico. It's a very profound change, it means moving from an all-powerful President to a President who is accountable to citizens and Congress" (Anaya, MEX)	"We support Romano Prodi's proposal for a European investment plan based on education, health and housing. On Europe, clarity, seriousness and concreteness against the divisions and the confusing ideas of the right." (PD, IT)
	Inclusivity	"We are with the Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities of Colombia In the #DiaDeLaAfrocolombianidad, we reiterate our commitment to their development and the guarantee of their rights, based on the premise 'Your knowledge, my knowledge, our knowledge'. Here we summarize them." (Fajardo, COL)	"Here what we need is solidarity, but we must speak clearly about what happened in Venezuela. We have to welcome our Venezuelan brothers and defend democracy, institutions and freedoms." (Duque, COL)
	Legalistic view of democracy	"Receiving a party representing a large part of the Mayors of Brazil and seeking to know the problems of the elect who live closer to the population! Watch a little of what was said at the meeting…" (Bolsonaro, BRZ)	'We move forward with our citizen conversations, we do not stop traveling the country and look at the eyes. Very good welcome in Envigado. Thanks to all those who move with #LaFuerzaDeLaEsperanza." (Fajardo, COL)

	Situational blame attribution	"We express our solidarity with the families of the victims of the Pioltello railway tragedy this morning. Such episodes should no occur anymore. There is a serious emergency linked to the situation of the infrastructure in our country, which must be urgently addressed" (M5S, IT)	"We have to overcome informality, because it is making the health system, the pension system and the viability of public finances untenable" (Duque, COL)
Technocracy	Appealing to elites/experts	"I am very grateful for the support of @beto_cardenasj, the first PAN governor in the history of #Jalisco. Your support honors me and commits me to continue fighting to recover the peace that Mexicans deserve." (Anaya, MEX)	"The government party in Poland Law and Justice wishes VOX electoral success. VOX strengthens alliances to defend the only possible Europe, based on respect for the sovereignty of its States and Christian cultural roots" (VOX, ESP)
	Candidate experience	"I share my editorial in the Dallas Morning News @dallasnews about the capacity and the level of dialogue that the next President of Mexico should have in his relations with the United States, at all levels:" (Meade, MEX)	"Di Maio is not what the Five Stars really have in mind as a prime minister. He has never worked and is not even a graduate. #Matrix" (FI, IT)
	Future output	"In order to have transparency in the use of public resources, we will create a digital platform that, using blockchain technology, allows us to follow its course. Citizens will know exactly what money is allocated to, what it is used for and where it ends." (Anaya, MEX)	"States are also not reporting security. We need to federalize some crimes, since some criminal organizations act at national level. #DebateAparecida" (Cs, ESP)
Neutral	Candidate traits	"'As a good teacher, Fajardo is seen as convinced and patient, perhaps certain that changes take time but arrive, without haste, without manipulation, without buying consciences, a sowing that I hope the fertile electoral harvest he hopes for." (Fajardo, COL)	"I am like good wine, by aging I improve, and now I am perfect." (FI, IT)
	Campaign Enthusiasm	"We are a few hours away from announcing to all of Colombia a message that impels us not to give up, to not stop dreaming about the future of this land. Your vote is your heart building a great Colombia, free and in peace We can achieve it together!" (Petro, COL)	"Only two weeks to go before the election campaign ends. Help us spread the #program PD. Talk about it at home, with your family, with friends and neighbors. On #4March we decide the future of Italy" (PD, IT)
	Information	"I invite you to the Azteca Stadium at the close of the campaign. The festival will start from 5 in the afternoon. See you there." (AMLO, MEX)	"Saturday, September 1 to 12, we will land in Rio Branco / AC. Thank you for your presence." (Bolsonaro, BRZ)

A.3 Examples of the kinds of messages found in each **issue** category

Unlike the rhetorical categories, the issue and function categories are more self-explanatory, so I only present one example, as well as a more detailed explanation of what each category includes.

Issue	Description	Example
Economy	Tweets including subjects such as jobs, unemployment, salaries, deficit, public spending, debt, crisis, taxes, entrepreneurship, contracts, self-employed people, agricultural policy, and so on. This is a somewhat narrow category that should refer explicitly to the economic realm.	"+ 1 million jobs # since February 2014, of which + 53% on permanent contracts. Highest employment rate since the #Istat time series exists. # Youth unemployment at the lowest levels of the last 5 years."
Social Policy	Tweets including subjects such as pensions, health, education, the welfare state, poverty, social justice, equality/inequality (including gender-based violence), housing, immigration, childbirth, drug rehabilitation, and so on. This is a broader category that encompasses some economic-adjacent issues (inequality, welfare) that affect people.	"To those under a certain income threshold, it could be an increase of 1000 euros a month for each dependent child, the State pays the necessary sum to arrive at a dignified life. The sum may vary depending on the area of the country where you live."
Culture, Media, and Sport	Tweets including subjects related to cultural industries (cinema, literature, art, mainstream media, social media, etc.) and sport.	"The State must support our athletes! - The recognition of athletes like Carolina Marin, Saul Craviotto or Lydia Valentin cannot be a miracle. It must be guaranteed!"
Science, Technology, the Enviroment, and Infrastructure	Tweets including subjects related to research and development, network infrastructure (such as fiber optic, ADSL, or Wi-Fi), transportation infrastructure (railway, airports, roads, etc.), pollution, flora and fauna protection, climate change, and so forth.	"The planned future: the environment above all National event for the presentation of the # Environmental Program of the 5 Star MoVement."
Terrorism, Crime, and Insecurity	Tweets related to terrorism in all its forms and crime/criminal activity or general concerns about insecurity.	"I will work hand in hand with the mayor of #Cali so that we can stop the exponential growth of many crimes in the city."
Foreign Affairs	Tweets alluding to the European Union, the United States, international relations, or other parts of the world.	"The United States also needs #Mexico. In my government, we are going to put all the negotiation issues on the table, and we will defend our country firmly on all fronts."
Corruption and democratic regeneration	Tweets including subjects concerning political corruption and/or democratic aspects that need to be renewed or removed, like changes in electoral law, putting an end to the establishment and the privileges of the political class, and so on.	"The PSOE has given a secret order to the ministries not to execute 50% of the budget. They bring us the cuts through the back door. It is the same as Montoro did and it means recovering the austerity policy of the PP. That is not the Spain you want."
Political Strategy in Office	Tweets including subjects concerning the intention of the **candidate if they were to win office** (i.e., not specific to the campaign period itself). For example, forming a certain type of government or possible (or impossible) government pacts/coalitions in the future. Additionally, if the candidate Tweets about multiple issue positions (the economy and social positions), classify it as political strategy.	"Do you want to know all our government plan and know why so many people think that it is the most realistic, complete and successful proposal for Colombia? Here they find it complete. Read it and tell us what you think"
Campaign Organization and Strategy	Tweets including subjects concerning the candidate **during the campaign period**. This can include questionnaires, surveys, information,	"In a week we will have an appointment with democracy. We will consolidate an arduous work that has taken me to travel the whole country, transmit my proposals

	analysis, and assessment of electoral results, or Tweets referring to the action of voting. It can also refer to Tweets about the running of the campaign and the organization of events, like rallies, meetings, political events, and media appearances by the candidates (more specific), or Tweets exalting the importance of party unity and exhorting sympathizers to join the party and earn victory (more broadly).	and contrast capacity, preparation, honesty and responsibility with the other projects. With your vote, we will win" "Follow the first debate of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic."
Immigration	Tweets about the topic of immigration	"Salvini at Tgcom24: 'Islam is a danger, stop at every presence'" "Elections 2018, Salvini defends Fontana on the immigration issue"
Regional politics	Tweets relating to political subdivisions such as particular regions, states, etc. Note: this should not be used whenever a candidate talks about a particular city; it is more about the distribution of power within a country, such as the secession movement in Catalonia, Spain, or urban vs. rural politics.	"Mr. Sanchez, in Catalonia there are already enough competitions; what we need is that the people who manage them do so with loyalty to the Constitution." "In our program we propose formulas to improve the model of territorial organization. We want all Spaniards and Spaniards to enjoy the same rights, wherever they live."
No subject or other	Tweets that do not have a defined subject or that include expressions of courtesy (acknowledgments, etc.) or Tweets referring to the personal life of political agents. Tweets that cannot be placed in the above categories.	"I share this song, 'Cuidame tu', by Teresita Fernandez, played by Beatriz." "Happy Children's Day!"

A.4 Examples of the kinds of messages found in each **function** category

Function	Description	Example
Agenda and organization of political actions (including media appearances)	Tweets containing information on specific campaign actions in which the time and place are specified. **This should take place either in the near future, or be in progress at the time the Tweet is sent**. Tweets sharing links to a journalistic interview or TV show.	"This afternoon there is debate in the SBT. Do not miss it!" "Follow the first debate of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic." "Today at 7:00 pm there is an interview with Cyrus live on @recordtvoficial. Watch it!"
Electoral program	Tweets on future political proposals or program proposals. This should be somewhat specific—not just vague intonations of making the country better.	"We have to increase competitiveness throughout the country. I propose to lower the VAT at the border and implement a National Infrastructure Plan to achieve prosperity in all states." "One of the key points of our program is less taxes for families and businesses. We will succeed in the Flat Tax, a single rate for all of

		23% which will guarantee real economic growth, new jobs and a revival of investments."
Management of political achievements	Tweets extolling or praising the achievements of the party and/ or leader. This could also include things like endorsements or responses to polls/early election predictions.	"Congratulations @diegosinhue! In #DebateGuanajuatense you showed that with responsible proposals, in this state we will continue to make good governments for the people. We will win!" "Thanks to Podemos, jobs are created and energy is saved, taking care of the planet."
Criticizing opponents	Tweets containing direct or indirect attacks on other candidates, political parties, other leaders (past or present) or other ideologies more broadly.	"Lopez Obrador is not change, it's just the opposite. Directly giving contracts to your friends is called corruption." "He was supposed to think about the Italians, but he thought only of himself. #Berlusconi spent 3,339 days in the government of the country and focused exclusively on his own affairs"
Participation and mobilization	Tweets aimed directly at increasing support/votes **during the campaign**. This can include the mention of general campaign events (we were in XX city this morning), but the reference should be somewhat vague. Followers would not know where to go or what type of event based just on this Tweet alone (in contrast to function 1). Specific manifestation: requesting financial donations, encouraging people to vote for the candidate/party, or mobilizing volunteers. General manifestation: Tweets that contain inspirational messages about the campaign, or Tweets reinforcing the party values and containing concepts that identify the party, its ideology, or its values.	"<3 Vote for a big censure of corruption, inequality and political confrontation. Let's say it loud, very loud, voting for the Socialist Party. We are very close." "The second round opens up a golden opportunity: to win this election, an eye on the debate." "We are 15 days from the end of the campaign and the mood of the people is growing as if it would burst with happiness. Never in Ticul or Chetumal had we held such emotional and large meetings during the week."
Personal life/ backstage or Manners/Protocol	Tweets where particularly the leaders show or talk about things from their private lives (leisure, hobbies, sport, etc.) or from backstage at political events or from the campaign. Tweets of thanks, sympathy, greetings, special occasions, and so on.	"Anyway at home, near my family in the warmth of our home! No better feeling! Thank you all for the expressions of affection that I could see on the way back and all over Brazil! A big hug to everyone!" "We continue with concern the fire in the cathedral of Notre Dame, in Paris. Let us hope that there will be no victims and that the firefighters will suffocate the fire, preserving this enormous jewel of heritage"
Entertainment or Humor	Tweets encouraging community building around the party or the leader with an entertainment-based focus, or Tweets containing memes, jokes, or other humorous resources.	"Nothing better than ending Sunday with a good movie ... Defeating the dark side machines, you can!"
Others	Tweets that cannot be placed in the above categories	

A.5 Examples of the kinds of messages found in each **tone** category

Tone	Examples
Positive	"It's amazing how people are responding. Never have so many citizens participated as now in favor of real change. Look at Manzanillo." "I want to tell the country that I am honored that Dr. @ MoralesViviane gives us her support. With @mluciaramirez we are proposing a project for all Colombians, based on legality, entrepreneurship and equity, where we all fit."
Neutral	"Conference with the international press. We are talking about climate change, fossil progressivism, new progressivism, anti-drug policy, the Venezuelan situation and the Middle East, which will be the new foreign policy of Colombia." "We have to eliminate the unnecessary expenses of the State. As president I will face the evasion; I will encourage investment and the formal hiring of workers, and I will contribute to improve their salaries."
Negative	"The real alliance: a scam to the Italians It passes a final majority report in the banks Commission thanks to 6 parliamentarians of the center-right who, upon leaving, reduce the quorum. Here is an advance from the government of mess-makers for which Renzi and Berlusconi work" "# SanchezMentiroso has been demonstrating for nine months that he lies more than he talks. Inside video"

Appendix B: Validity

B.1: Classification of Populists and Non-Populists

To determine which actors are populist and not populist, I compare five existing measures of populism: The Global Populism Database, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Survey, the Populist and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA), the and the Global Party Survey.

The Global Populism Database (GPD) classifies how populist a candidate is based on speeches, ranking candidate and politicians' scores along a 0-2 scale with four classification benchmarks: not populist (0-0.49); somewhat populist (0.5-0.99); populist (1-1.49); very populist (1.5-2).[18] Note that the GPD classifies political candidates/actors only, not parties. Every political actor in the analysis was evaluated by at least one of these comparative data sets.

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) relies on the opinion of political experts. In 2017, CHES asked experts to classify parties according to two dimensions: the people versus the elite and the salience of anti-elite rhetoric, each on a 0-10 scale with 0 indicating a non-populist perception of this party, and 10 indicating a populist response.[19] For ease of interpretation, I use the following classification benchmarks in my data set: not populist (0-2.49); somewhat populist (2.5-4.99); populist (5-7.49); and very populist (7.5-10). Not all parties/candidates are present in each data set.

The Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Survey (NEGex) also relies on political experts for elections between 2016-2018. NEGex asks experts to rate candidates on three populist dimensions: identification with the people, respect for opponents (which I refer to as anti-elite), and simplicity of the message.[20] Note that NEGex classifies political candidates/actors only, not parties. I impose the following cut-off points that are based on the answer choices of experts: not populist (all scores are below 3.0), somewhat populist (only one element of populism exceeds 3.0), and populist (at least two elements of populism exceed 3.0).

[18] More information can be found at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/06/how-we-combed-leaders-speeches-to-gauge-populist-rise; the data can be found at https://populism.byu.edu/Pages/Data.

[19] The people versus elites question asks: "Some political parties take the position that "the people" should have the final say on the most important issues, for example, by voting directly in referendums. At the opposite pole are political parties that believe that elected representatives should make the most important political decisions. Where do the parties fall on this dimension?" The anti-elite rhetoric question asks: "Next, we would like you to think about the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric for a party. How important was the anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric to the parties in their public stance?" Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2017 Codebook: www.chesdata.eu.

[20] The surveys ask experts: *And how would you say that the following statements apply to {candidate}? In your opinion, {candidate} might be someone who...1)* Identifies with common people, 2) Uses informal style, popular language, and 3) Uses anti-establishment/elite rhetoric. The answer choices are 0-4, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The scores presented are averages from all experts that evaluated a particular actor. Data and documentation can be found at https://www.alessandro-nai.com/negex-data.

The Global Party Survey (GPS) (conducted in 2019) is also based on the judgments of political experts. According to its codebook,[21] "The core measure operationalizing the minimalist conceptualization of populist rhetoric, treated as antithetical to pluralist rhetoric, uses the following measure:

"Parties can also be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric.

POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail.

By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power.

Where would you place each party on the following scale? 0 Strongly favors pluralist rhetoric…10 Strongly favors populist rhetoric"

Although the GPS contains separate measures for different components of populism, I rely on the single measure based on how it is treated in the codebook as the overarching measurement of populist discourse. This measure is demarcated into four categories: strongly populist, moderately populist, moderately pluralist, and strongly pluralist.

The **Populist and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA)** is an expert survey that was conducted in 2018 and evaluates "250 parties on key attributes related to populism, political style, party ideology, and party organization in 28 European countries."[22] To determine whether a party is considered populist or not, I used the "populist" variable, which is described as:

"Variable based on the factor regression scores of the following items: 'manichean', 'indivisble', 'generalwill', 'peoplecentrism', and 'antielitism'."

Like some of the above datasets, I impose artificial benchmarks for a general comparison in order to infer whether a party leans populist or not. This exercise is meant to serve as a general comparison exercise and not as a precise classification of the authors' data.

FI is somewhat more puzzling: in this sample, FI uses only 8% populist frames. This result is consistent with Bobba and Roncarolo (2018), who classify only 8.1% of FI's Tweets as populist. The divergence could be a product of the enigmatic figure of Berlusconi, who may appear populist without using a significant amount of populist frames. It is also worth noting that Berlusconi just makes the "somewhat populist" benchmark of The Global Populism database.

[21] The codebook and related materials are accessible at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/WMGTNS/2WNIVR&version=2.1.
[22] Per the codebook, which can be accessed here: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/8NEL7B

Leader:	AMLO (MEX)	Anaya (MEX)	Meade (MEX)	Duque (COL)	Petro (COL)	Fajardo (COL)	Bolsonaro (BRZ)	Haddad (BRZ)	Gomes (BRZ)
Speech Results (Hawkins)	Very populist (1.6)	Somewhat populist (.60)	Not populist (.01)	Not populist (.075)	Somewhat populist (.95)	Not populist (.0375)	Somewhat populist (.5)	*Not rated*	*Not rated*
NEGex (Nai)— pro-people, anti-elite, simple messaging	Populist (3.91, 3.73, 3.82)	Not populist (0.83, 1.17, 1.25)	*Not rated*	Not populist (1.33, 2.57, 1.0)	Populist (3.88, 3.88, 3.88)	*Not rated*	Populists (2.33, 3.13, 3.33)	Not populist (2.75, 2.13, 2.63)	Not populist (2.6, 2.8, 2.6)
Global Party Survey (2019)	Very populist	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	Very populist	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	Very Populist	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	*Not rated*
THIS STUDY	**Populist (3/3)**	**Not populist (2/3)**	**Not populist (2/2)**	**Not populist (2/3)**	**Populist (2/2)**	**Not populist (1/1)**	**Populist (3/3)**	**Not populist (2/2)**	**Not Populist (1/1)**

Leader:	FI (IT)	M5S (IT)	PD (IT)	LN (IT)	PSOE (ESP)	Vox (ESP)	PP (ESP)	Podemos (ESP)	C's (ESP)
Speech Results (Hawkins)	Somewhat populist (.5) **Berlusconi	Populist (1.15) **Di Maio	Not populist (.1) ** Renzi	Populist (1.05) ** Salvini	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	*Not rated*
NEGex (Nai)—anti-elite, pro-people, simple messaging	Not populist (2.22, 2.89, 1.44) **Berlusconi	Somewhat populist (2.60, 2.80, 3.0) **Di Maio	Somewhat populist (1.71, 3.57 1.71,) ** Renzi	Populist (3.38, 3.5, 3.38) ** Salvini	Not populist	Populist (2.79, 3.29, 3.29) **Santiago Abascal	Not Populist (1.36, 2.21, 0.4) **Pablo Casado	*Not rated*	*Not rated*
CHES (people vs. elites; anti-elite salience)	Somewhat populist (3.75; 3.61)	Very populist (9.75; 10)	Not populist (2.75; 2.46)	Very populist (7.83; 7.85)	Not populist/ somewhat populist (3.5; 2.1)	*Not rated*	Not populist (.78; 1)	Very populist (8.78; 8.64)	Somewhat populist (3.65; 5.38)
Global Party Survey (2019)	Very populist **rated as a coalition	Very populist	Very pluralist (not populist)	Very populist **rated as a coalition	Moderately pluralist	Very populist	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	Moderately populist	Moderately pluralist

			**rated as a coalition		(not populist)				(not populist)
POPPA	Populist 5.6/10	Populist 9.45/10	Not populist 2.1/10	Populist 8.6/10	Not populist 2.55/10	*Not rated*	Not populist 2.74/10	Populist 7.8/10	Not populist 3.26/10
THIS STUDY	**Populist (3/4)**	**Populist (5/5)**	**Not populist (4/5)**	**Populist (5/5)**	**Not populist (4/4)**	**Populist (2/2)**	**Not populist (4/4)**	**Populist (3/3)**	**Not populist (2/3)**

B.2: Intercoder Reliability

	Coder 1 (author)	Coder 2	Coder 3	Coder 4	Coder 5	Total
Number of Tweets coded	498	188	1,099	850	494	
Agreement with final MASTER FRAME	.76	.45	.67	.65	.71	.65
Agreement with final FRAME	.77	.44	.65	.60	.68	.62
Agreement with final ISSUE	.96	.73	.78	.57	.66	.68
Agreement with final FUNCTION	.92	.71	.75	.65	.66	.69
Agreement with final TONE	.90	.62	.69	.52	.56	.60

Notes:

Intercoder reliability is computed using Krippendorff's alpha

Appendix C: Twitter Use Comparison

In addition to my primary analyses, I consider how candidates use Twitter. Several scholars have found that populism is more engaging on Twitter compared to non-populist messages, where engaging refers to more "likes" or "re-Tweets" (Bobba 2019; Bobba and Roncarolo 2018; Cassell nd). It is possible that such differences are the result of populists using Twitter differently than non-populists. However, if Twitter use is similar among candidate types (as previous scholarship suggests), then there is an additional motivation for examining populists' communication strategies. I briefly consider this puzzle by examining each candidate's output (the average number of Tweets per day during the campaign period), their interactivity (the percentage of Tweets that contain mentions (@), hashtags (#), or links),[23] and the public's response (their average number of likes, re-Tweets, and followers) in

[23] Expressed as a percentage of the sampled Tweets.

Table . In the table, blue text indicates a populist candidate and black text indicates a non-populist candidate.

Table C.1: Candidate Twitter Use & Descriptive Statistics

Country	*Candidate/Party*	*Vote Share*	*OUTPUT*	*INTERACTIVITY*			*PUBLIC RESPONSIVENESS*		
			Tweets per Day	*@*	*#*	*Link*	*Followers*	*Likes*	*Re-Tweets*
COL	Duque (Democratic Center)	53.98% (2nd); 39.14% (1st)	14.4	24%	92%	68%	831,000	1,369	720
	Petro (Progressivists Movement)	41.81% (2nd); 25.09% (1st)	6.2	15.7%	11.4%	30%	3,390,000	4,863	5,239
	Fajardo (Citizen Compromise)	23.73% (1st)	10.2	26%	90%	90%	1,420,000	1,430	463
MEX	López Obrador (AMLO) (Morena)	53.19%	1.4	0%	1.4%	98.6%	5,390,000	15,853	6,133
	Anaya (PAN)	22.27%	5.2	22%	88%	66%	755,000	2,534	1,019
	Meade (PRI)	16.4%	6	20%	72%	72%	1,430,000	3,325	1,802
BRZ	Jair Bolsonaro (PSL)	55.13% (2nd); 46.03% (1st)	7.8	12.9%	1.4%	60%	4,120,000	23,617	5,363
	Haddad (PT)	44.87% (2nd); 29.28% (1st)	14.5	8%	66%	46%	1,420,000	6,899	1,585
	Gomes (PDT)	12.47% (1st)	16.3	7%	84%	80%	641,000	2,295	404
IT	M5S (leader: Luigi Di Maio)	32.22%	1.1	40%	52.9%	55.7%	655,000	5402	309
	Lega (leader: Matteo Salvini)	17.69%	21.8	0%	8.6%	95.7%	63,200	21	11
	PD (leader: Matteo Renzi)	18.9%	2.3	48%	30%	40%	395,000	343	169
	FI (leader: Silvio Berlusconi)	13.94%	1.9	24%	76%	60%	1,934	131	60
ESP	Podemos (leader: Pablo Iglesias)	14.31%	21	55.7%	58.6%	94.5%	1,390,000	565	382
	PP (leader: Pablo Casado)	16.68%	22.3	82%	56%	90%	709,000	290	198
	PSOE (leader: Pedro Sanchez)	28.7%	32.6	80%	94%	82%	682,000	223	159
	Cs (leader: Albert Rivera)	15.84%	31.2	85.7%	90%	85.7%	525,000	161	115
	Vox (leader: Santiago Abascal)	10.26%	9.7	62.9%	37.1%	92.9%	225,000	2,327	1,135

* The average number of followers as of early 2019 (not at the time of the election).

I find that populists and non-populists use Twitter differently, but not in consistently meaningful ways. For example, non-populists Tweet more than populists, but while statistically significant, the result is not substantively meaningful: populists Tweet on average 11.95 per day and non-populists 13.75 per day. These results are highly susceptible to between-candidate variation, with some (AMLO, MS5) producing only about 1 Tweet per day, while others (PSOE, Cs) Tweet up to 30 times per day. The same can be said for interactivity. Although there are significant differences in how actors interact with their followers on Twitter, there is no consistent pattern: populists do not universally engage with followers more (or less) frequently than non-populists—populists use more links while non-populists use more hashtags and mentions.

These results affirm that the public responds more often to populist candidates on average along all three measures of public responsiveness when comparing the group means.[24] Taken together, these results are suggestive that something other than (or in addition to) output or interactivity is driving the public's responsiveness to populism.

Table C.2: Group Means

	Category	Non-Populist Group Mean	Populist Group Mean	Difference
Output	# of Tweets	13.75	11.95	p<.01
Interactivity	Mentions	0.37	0.31	p<.01
	Hashtags	0.73	0.37	p<.01
	Links	0.70	0.77	p<.01
Public Responsiveness	Likes	2,175.98	5,879.6	p<.01
	Re-Tweets	767.6	2,340.0	p<.01
	Followers	92,033	1,821,365	p<.01

[24] Although more complicated empirical tests are available, such as regression analyses, such approaches extend beyond the scope of this study.

Appendix D: Comparing European Party Leaders to Parties

D.1: Behavior of Parties and Party Leaders on Twitter

Country	*Candidate/Party*	*Campaign Tweets per Day*	No. of Followers*	Avg Likes	Avg. Re-Tweets	% Re-Tweets of party messages**
IT	**M5S**	1.1	655,000	540	309	NA
	Leader: Luigi Di Maio	1.5		1,139	538	25/127 (19.6%)
	Lega	21.8	63,200	21	10.7	NA
	Leader: Matteo Salvini	8		695	217	*Not available*
	PD	2.3	395,000	343	169	NA
	Leader: Matteo Renzi	2.6		1,259	371	8/177 (4.5%)
	FI	1.9	1,934	131	60	NA
	Leader: Silvio Berlusconi	*Not available*		*Not available*	*Not available*	*Not available*
ESP	**Podemos**	21	1,390,000	565	382	NA
	Leader: Pablo Iglesias	4		2,416	1,123	42/320 (13%)
	PP	22.3	709,000	290	198	NA
	Leader: Pablo Casado	7.3		856	450	179/691 (26%)
	PSOE	32.6	682,000	223	159	NA
	Leader: Pedro Sanchez	6.8		1,360	578	44/517 (8.5%)

	Cs	31.2	525,000	156	115	NA
	Leader: Albert Rivera	4.6		1,727	378	53/375 (14.1%)
	Vox	9.7	225,000	2,327	1,135	NA
	Leader: Santiago Abascal	3.8		5,254	2,578	293/556 (52.7%) 352/615* (57.2%)

Notes:

The likes/re-Tweets is the average for the universe of Tweets during the campaigns for the party leaders, and the average for the sample of Tweets for parties

Lega's likes/re-Tweets are based on a sample of 50, not the universe of Tweets

* As explained in Appendix B, the number of followers was collected in March 2019, not at the time of the campaign. See Appendix B for additional details.

** BEFORE re-tweets were removed from the sample; the campaign Tweets per day does not reflect any re-Tweets

***(Abascal) represents 352 Tweets of Vox party accounts (including Vox for young people, Vox for specific regions, and mostly from "Vox noticias")

I do not include a comparative number of followers for party leaders because it would not be comparable to the parties, which was collected in March of 2019

D.2: Comparing a subsample of candidates and parties descriptively

To evaluate the comparability of European parties and party leaders, I examine a subsample of European parties and their party leaders (Renzi/PD, MS5/Di Maio, PSOE/Sanchez, and Vox/Abascal) to assess whether my focus on European parties is appropriate.[25] I opted to include one populist and one non-populist in both Italy and Spain. For the populists, I examine MS5 and Vox because previous studies have provided some insights on the comparison between parties and party leaders for both Podemos (Casero-Ripollés 2017) and Lega (Bobba 2019; Bobba and Roncarolo 2018). For the non-populists, I included the incumbent/"establishment" leader: Pedro Sanchez (PSOE) and Matteo Renzi (PD). I include 50 Tweets for each of these four leaders. An

[25] See Appendix D.3 for an explanation of the subsample case selection.

important divergence from the full sample is that I skipped the de-identification procedure for the coders, thus RAs were exposed to the identity of the speaker if media was attached.

I find that, among the two populist party leaders I examine, one leader uses marginally more populist content (Vox) than their party, while the other (MS5) uses less. Generally speaking, parties and their leaders use broadly similar percentages of populist, pluralist, technocratic, and neutral rhetoric as demonstrated in the two below graphs. Combined with the rationale provided in the paper for the appropriateness of comparing Latin American candidates with European parties, these results presented here provide an additional basis for that claim: that party leaders and parties in Europe adopt broadly similar campaign strategies.

Master Frame Comparison



Frame Comparison



Appendix E: Codebook

Overview

This coding manual is part of a broader project to evaluate presidential candidates' discourse on Twitter during their campaigns in Latin America and Europe. The main task you will be performing is coding different kinds of messages (i.e., frames) that candidates use.

Frames are a rhetorical device that speakers (in this case, politicians) use to communicate their ideas with a particular lens around them. For the purposes of this analysis, a frame is defined as a political actor imbedding meaning into a message by encouraging the listener to interpret an event or situation from a particular non-neutral perspective. Essentially, a frame is a way for politicians to convey information to their followers in a particular way.

This study looks to classify all the possible frames used by presidential candidates. While frames are the main topic of interest for this research project, there are also several other dimensions I'll be asking you to code.

Coding

Coding will take place in Redcap. The coding unit is a single Tweet. The Tweets will be "de-identified" to the extent possible; that is, ideally, you would not know which candidate sent the Tweet. In reality, however, that is not always possible—many Tweets mention specific cities or candidate names directly that will make it impossible not to know who is speaking (at the very least, what country they are from).

Furthermore, to code the Tweets, it may be necessary to view the media attached to the Tweet which will require you looking at the Tweet on twitter, thus exposing you to the speaker's identity. The primary concern is not that you know who is Tweeting, but that **even if you have previous knowledge of these candidates or countries more broadly, it is important to evaluate every single Tweet individually and without bias**. To help with this, the Tweets will be randomized between candidates and across dates.

The importance of looking at the media of the Tweet cannot be overstated: for example, one Tweet read:

"266: the number of jobs that Andres Manuel created as Head of Government."

From this alone, it is challenging if not impossible to understand if the speaker considers this a lot of jobs or not. However, if you navigate to the Tweet to see the image, you can clearly see that the speaker (in this case, Jose Antonio Meade of Mexico) considers 266 to be a very low number.

266: el número de empleos que creó Andres Manuel como Jefe de Gobierno.

Translate Tweet

It also helps to look at the hashtags: those that refer to cities or locations could help you determine this is a campaign event (which helps you classify the function of the Tweet), while others may help you determine which frame to use.

What will be Coded (per Tweet)

Each Tweet will be coded according to 8 dimensions, each of which will be described below.

1) the master frame;

2) the relevant actors;

3) the sub-frame;

4) the difficulty in classifying the sub-frame;

5) the perceived strength of the frame;

6) the issue that the Tweet addresses; and

7) the function of the Tweet

8) whether the frame used positive, negative, or neutral language;

Some coding categories are dependent on your answers to previous coding categories. For example, the actor, master frame, sub-frame, difficulty classifying the sub-frames, and strength of the sub-frame are categories that are dependent on one another. For these categories, coding each Tweet in a particular sequence may make the identification of subsequent categories easier. However, sticking to a specific order is not absolutely critical. You may jump between categories as you decide on the proper categories. Other categories (the presence of positive or negative language, the issue, and the function of the Tweet) are independent: to code these categories, you only need the Tweet itself because your answer to these categories is not dependent on your answer to other categories. Below is a brief description of each category.

How to Code the Tweets

Before you start coding the Tweets, it is critical to **read for subtext or, stated differently, to take a holistic view of the Tweet,** rather than taking the Tweet at face value. What is the candidate saying between the lines? **Consider the Tweet as a whole before you start coding**, before breaking it into the constituent parts required by the coding categories.

Tweets can only be 280 characters; such short texts mean the sub-frames may not be immediately clear, but by reading for subtext, taking the "spirit" of the Tweet as a whole into consideration, and *then* coding each category, you should have arrived at your conclusions systematically. Reading the text as a whole will specifically help you determine the master frame, the first coding category.

1) Master Frames

Master frames represent the highest level of aggregation. Conceptually, master frames refer to how people see the world in terms of who should hold power (Caramani 2017). There are 4 coding options for this category.

Master Frame	**Who holds power (and who doesn't)?**

1 = Type A: views the political world as a <u>divide between two groups</u>: "the people," who are understood to be virtuous and comprise a majority of the population, and "the elites," who are vilified for their self-interest and lack of representation of what the people want ("the will of the people"). **Explanation:** The antagonism comes from the idea that power legitimately stems from "the people," but "the elites" have taken this power and do not represent the "will" of "the people." Thus, "the people" and "the elites" are engaged in a struggle for power, and that struggle is inherently moral in nature. This type views the political world in terms of a virtuous group (the people) that has been wronged by the enemy group (the elites).	The people should hold power (over the elites)
2 = Type B: advocates for <u>power to be shared</u>: diverse interests are given voice, particularly from minority groups. **Explanation:** This emphasizes a more equitable form of power sharing. Some of the "key features and institutional structures that are intrinsic to [Type A]" include "compromise, mediating institutional bodies, and procedures that ensure, most notably, minority rights" (Akkerman et al. 2014, 1327). This type "sees political conflicts as struggles against impersonal forces rather than against diabolical groups and individual" (Busby et al. forthcoming, 2), in contrast to Type B.	Power is shared; at the very least, diverse interests are given voice (note: power does not have to be shared *equally*)
3 = Type C: prioritizes the <u>power of expertise</u>. Emphasizes practical applications and outcomes rather than ideals and focuses on the ability to deliver these outcomes. **Explanation:** Type C emphasizes practical applications and outcomes rather than ideals and focuses on the ability to deliver outcomes (generally because of experience) held by those delivering the outcomes. The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on narrow, particular issues. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion. The discourse avoids a conspiratorial (moral) tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority.	Those that can deliver favorable outcomes (specifically refers to politicians)
4 = Neutral: Master frames are those that do not fall into any of the above categories. Often, they cannot be classified into another master frame because they are missing a critical component of these other frames. **Explanation:** this is a "catch-all" category for frames that cannot in and of themselves be classified into just one of the above master frames. This is usually due to ambiguity—neutral frames can apply to a number of different world views, and this ambiguity necessitates its own category. Note that a neutral master frame does not imply that there is no bias, judgment, or moral component. These components are just not enough in and of themselves to indicate a master frame that fits into Types A-C above.	

<u>2) the relevant actors;</u>

This category refers to *who* the Tweet references (implicitly or explicitly): who is the one that is doing the action? Who is the one receiving it? Determining the actor will help to determine the precise frame. These are broad categories, and as a result, multiple interpretations exist. Which interpretation to choose may be in part derived from the master frame.

Once you've determined the master frame, identifying the actors will help you to determine the sub-frame.

Actor	**Interpretation 1**	**Interpretation 2**
"the people"	**1** = the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. When using this classification, note that it should refer to the entire body of the candidate's supporters: all those he considers to be "the people." If only a sub-set (such as, for example, teachers, students, members of a particular town mentioned by name, then the appropriate classification is other, and to specify which group the speaker is referring to) *Explicit signifiers:* "el pueblo," "la gente," "Americans [or other nationality]," "the people" – this could also refer to specific townspeople ("the people of Merida") at campaign stops along the way *Implicit signifiers:* "we," "us"	**2** = Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. *explicit signifiers:* "citizens," "Mexicans [or other nationality]," "the people" *Implicit signifiers:* "we," "us" *Example:* "In this campaign, we are committed to listening twice as much as we talk. That is why my government will be the true government of the people [los ciudadanos in Spainsh], in which the needs of the citizens will be resolved. While this might seem like interpretation 1, it refers to citizens in terms of their will
"the elite" (This most often applies to political elites)	**3** = The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Depending on the context, political elites who are part of "the establishment" are often the primary target of politicians. *Explicit signifiers:* "the establishment," "the politicians," specific names of parties, other candidates, or individuals *Implicit signifiers:* "them," "they,"	**4** = The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. Calling out an opponent for their poor performance could fall under this category—calling them evil or implying they intentionally harmed people would fall under Interpretation 1. *Explicit signifiers*: referring to other parties, or "incumbents" *Implicit signifiers:* "they," "them"
Other (usually, an in-group or out-group)	**6** = Generally refers to a specific [out] group (such as immigrants, or a particular ethnicity or race), but it does not necessarily explicitly identify this group (it	**7** = This may include reference to specific groups, generally in a positive sense of inclusivity and diversity. Since there is no romanticized notion

	may just be implied). The out-group does not necessarily have to be citizens of the country; it could be foreign entities (such as the United States). The important distinction is not the explicit identification of a group, but the implication that this group does not belong to "the people." *Explicit signifiers:* Referencing a specific group identity *Implicit signifiers:* "they," "them"	of "the people," there is usually no out-group. In essence, an in-group refers to any subset of the overall population of the people as described in actor category 2 (the people, interpretation B). *Explicit signifiers*: Referencing a specific group identity (indigenous people, for example), students, teachers, members of a specific town *Implicit signifiers*: "They," "them"
The candidate, their party, or members of their party	**8** = This can refer to the candidate themselves, their party or party coalition, or other members campaigning under their party/coalition for other positions (not the presidency) *Signifiers:* "I," "we," name of party or other party officials	
The opposition	**9** = This includes any and all opposition candidates and their parties, and prominent members of the opposition parties (such as party figureheads, like former presidents) *Signifiers: name of party or other party official, name of candidate, references to other candidates/parties*	
No actors	**10** = Some frames will not have actors	
The media	**11 =** The media. This could refer to specific media personalities or media channels, radio stations, etc.	

There may be more than one actor per Tweet: if so, determine which is the primary actor and which is the secondary actor. In doing so, consider who is the Tweet really about? Who is the actor doing the action (primary actor), versus who is receiving the action (secondary actor)? This is most often true when the actors include the candidate and some group of constituents. Is the Tweet specifically about the candidate and what the candidate hopes to achieve, or is the Tweet directed at a specific population they hope to serve? For example:

"We are going to shield the border so that US weapons do not enter Mexico and do not kill our people."	This Tweet references both we (the candidate/their party), and "our people". The primary actor would be the candidate, while the secondary would be the people.
Between the fracking to extract oil and the fumigation with glyphosate that will be from Colombia's water? I proposed that water is a priority for human consumption and food production and therefore there will be neither fracking nor glyphosate.	The primary actor would be the candidate, and there is no secondary actor. **Note that it's not just about the order in which the actors appear, but which actor the Tweet is really revolving around**--this one is about the candidate's position, which he is juxtaposing against the opposition's position; but even had the Tweet mentioned the opposition first, if the focus was on the candidate's proposal, then the candidate is still the primary actor.

3) Sub-frames

Sub-frames are the different ways in which the master frames manifest in rhetoric. Because the above master frames represent overarching worldviews, often they appear in partial form. **The sub-frame should match with the master frame it is nested under**: if you select Type A as a master frame, the sub-frames available are 1-3; if you select Type B, the options are sub-frames 4-7; Type C, 8-10; and neutral, 11-13. If you have a mis-match between the master and the sub-frame, go back to step 1 and re-evaluate the Tweet as a whole and see if either the master frame or the sub-frame is incorrect. If you are still stuck, flag it and we will go over it as a group.



Master Frame	Subframe	Explanation	Example (s)
Type A	1 = Pro-"the people"	when a politician talks "in the name of 'the people', referring primarily to its will" (Cranmer 2011) The idea that the candidate is the "true representative" of the people (Engesser et al 2017) Puts the people's problems "at the core of the political agenda" (Casero-Ripolles et al. 2017, 990). The people are often characterized as hard-working (Engesser et al 2017)	If only for the will of the people we could say 'this rice has already been cooked', but we must prepare ourselves to face any fraud attempt. That's why I ask you to help defend the vote and democracy. We continue to collect the feelings and wisdom of the people. We are going to win the first day of July and we are not going to fail the people. Power only makes sense, and becomes a virtue, when it is placed at the service of others
	2 = Anti-Elite	• Attacking anything that is "business as usual" or "how things have always been done." This is a pure and general form of anti-elitism, where "a political actor criticizes elites, such as political adversaries, the state, or the media" (Cranmer 2011, 293). It does not necessarily call out a specific elite actor, but it may.	In Tapachula, on the border of Mexico with Guatemala, I reaffirmed the commitment to banish corruption and govern with austerity. **There will be no gasolinazos**. **The Reformation, as emblem of the conservative press, fifi, is not able to rectify when it defames**, as it did yesterday with the supposed payment of MORENA of 58 million. In their code

			of ethics, the truth does not matter, but the interests and ideology they represent. Better we are free.
	3 = Dispositional blame attribution	• Blaming some specified group of people for a particular failure-- allows actors to place the onus on particular elites or groups of people (such as immigrants) for specific failures (real or perceived) and for knowingly exploiting the interests of the people. • Implies that elites/others knowingly exploited the interests of the people (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, 7). This frame identifies political actors with agency.	Those responsible for the Hidroituango disaster after the genocide of the town of Ituango are two: Álvaro Uribe Vélez and Luis Alfredo Ramos: the complete degradation of the traditional political class of Antioquiapic. The PSOE has given a secret order to the ministries not to execute 50% of the budget. They bring us the cuts through the back door. It is the same as Montoro did and it means recovering the austerity policy of the PP. That is not the Spain you want. IN THE COUNTRY OF THE RAPES COMMITTED BY IMMIGRANTS He refused the stalker's advances
Type B	4 = Emphasis on compromise or cooperation	• Stresses the importance or benefits of working with other groups or coalitions in the *political* arena • This frame may include references to coalition building, for example, or other references to governing with multiple groups.	The future is for everyone! Today I celebrate that the @MovimientoMIRA party supports our country project. We continue forming a coalition that will motivate Colombians so that class hatred no longer exists and so that from the differences we can build a better country.
	5 = Inclusivity	• The discourse will emphasize the importance of the inclusion of groups, particularly those that are marginalized or disadvantaged. Rather than emphasizing a power sharing arrangement (like the above frame), it may simply mean giving these people a voice in some (often general or vague) capacity or listening to a group of people. More broadly, discourse may emphasize unity.	**We have a historical duty and commitment to our indigenous communities; As President, I will protect the rights of this population and we will work together to overcome their social backwardness.**
	6 = Legalistic view of democracy	• Viewing democracy as the majority of votes (this is in contrast to the Type A frame of a romanticized "will" of the people). • Tweets in this sub-frame may emphasize the duty to represent what the majority of the country wants (i.e., what 51% of the country wants, rather than what the group "the people" per Interpretation A want), or representing the country (or some subgroup) as a whole by meeting their usually broad, undefined needs (wherein specific needs being met would indicate an output sub-frame). Tweets in this category may reference	More and more citizens are joining this project of future and certainty, which will result in **free, reasoned and conscious votes**. From now on I thank you. We will win! During the next three months, every week I will visit a family in their home. This time I visited Ana Laura, who invited me to eat with her husband and children. I want to listen to them and know what they think, leave me your

		listening to the people, but not acting on their will (which would indicate subframe 1)	messages and comments to be able to know them.
	7= Situational blame attribution	• Situational frames tend to blame corruption/failed representation on "systemic causes such as globalization or technological change, and it tends to criticize rather than demonize political opponents" (Busby et al forthcoming, 8)	Mafia security has been broken in Medellin. Security does not depend on the number of deaths of young people. The Orion operation has failed. The wild posters of Mexico are taken to Medellin. I propose to integrate the youths to the university, the knowledge, the art and the Power
Type C	8 = Appealing to elites or experts	• Deference to the expertise or opinions of organizations or actors outside the candidate or their party who have particular expertise (for example, government agencies or NGOs). This could include endorsements by actors outside the political party (but the endorsement should be described in a non-moralistic way). • Appealing to a select group of individuals based on some attribute that they have, such as intelligence, wealth, or experience, operating on the belief that these individuals deserve particular influence. Endorsements by specific elite groups could be considered this type.	Fourteen entities commented on our environmental proposal. They evaluated these five criteria: water, climate change, deforestation, land use planning and new development models. I am touched by the support of Peter Singer, world-class philosopher, environmentalist and animalist. Peace with nature, respect for the animal, the other for us, for what is different from us, is the basis for humanity to live on the planet.
	9 = Candidate experience	• refers to the candidate's unique ability to perform the job (or the opposition's inability to do so) • Appealing to prior or current performance or particular attributes of the candidate or their party. This could take the form of talking about specific policy achievements, their years of experience in a position, their particular expertise on a subject area, their credibility in general, etc. It can also include announcing a cabinet or other appointment. This is the positive usage of this frame. • The negative usage would be calling out an opponent/party because they lack experience or more broadly, they lack credibility.	Faced with a complex and uncertain global environment, Mexico needs a President with **proven international experience**. With the United States there is no room for improvisation. Here my editorial published today in the Arizona Republic
	10 = Future output	• the projected output of a candidate—what is the candidate going to deliver if elected? • With few exceptions, this category refers to promised policy outcomes, though it can also refer to positive consequences of electing the candidate or negative consequences of electing the opposition • This frame can be used positively (as in the case of appealing to particular issues the candidate supports) or negatively (where the candidate criticizes his/her opponents for a particular issue stance)	In order to have transparency in the use of public resources, we will create a digital platform that, using blockchain technology, allows us to follow its course. Citizens will know exactly what money is allocated to, what it is used for and where it ends.
Neutral	11 = Candidate traits or characteristics	• focuses on attributes or reputational considerations. Tweets where candidates are portrayed as "honest" or "hardworking" (as	I'm the only candidate from the Northeast. I need to defend my people!

		examples) are incorporated into this category, as are tweets that describe specific actions taken during the campaign (things like "candidate X did action Y").	They file in a complaint that they had made against me saying that my titles are false or I put falsehoods on my page of my life. My studies are what I said. 'As a good teacher, Fajardo is seen as convinced and patient, perhaps certain that changes take time but arrive, without haste, without manipulation, without buying consciences, a sowing that I hope the fertile electoral harvest he hopes for.'
	12 = Campaign enthusiasm	rhetoric that conveys hope or excitement, or general motivation for the election Emotions such as hope or excitement are not in themselves indicative of a particular worldview, *especially during the course of an election in which candidates hope to inspire positive emotions among their supporters/try to gain new supporters*. You will likely encounter many motivational frames that aim to drum up support for their candidacy, but to be considered a specific master frame, the emotions must be used with another frame.	We are 15 days from the end of the campaign and **the mood of the people is growing as if it would burst with happiness**. Never in Ticul or Chetumal had we held such emotional and large meetings during the week.
	13 = Presentation of facts	This discourse is purely factual: it presents information, but does not impose a particular frame.	Another intense day of campaign: We talked with members of the Mexican Business Council; we present the environmental agenda in Zacatelco with Josefa González Blanco; We were in Apizaco and in Xalapa, Veracruz, accompanying Cuitláhuac García, our candidate for governor. I invite you to follow our press conference…

<u>3.1) For subframe 10 (output) only</u>

If you selected subframe 10 when you are coding, this is a follow up question that will be asked. Because this sub-frame can take many forms, please select one of the following options that best describes the output the speaker is talking about.

1 = Mention of a broad group of issues or a proposal, but not a specific issue	Extremely vague (if a policy is identified, there is no information provided about it)	"Look at our issue policies"
2 = Identification of a specific issue but not necessarily the intended outcome	Not fully specified: Policy X is identified, but Outcome Y is not	"If elected, I will enact policy X" (ex: if elected, I will reduce taxes on the middle class)

3 = Expressing a desired outcome but not the specific steps/policy to get there	Not fully specified: Outcome Y identified, but the specific policy X is not (i.e., it is not clear what steps the speaker will take to achieve the outcome)	" I want to improve/enact outcome Y" (ex: I want to improve education, health, etc.)
4 = Identification of a specific issue *and* the intended outcome	Fully specific: Policy X and the subsequent Outcome Y are identified	" I will enact policy X to accomplish outcome Y" (ex: I will enact a country-wide minimum wage to reduce income inequality in the countryside)
5 = Not applicable	Subframe chosen in the above section is not 10, output	

4) the **difficulty in classifying the frame**;

This is a self-reported measure of how difficult it was to identify the frame you selected. There are 3 possible values for this category:

0 = easy	Little to no uncertainty: actors were clearly identified; only one sub-frame seemed to apply
1 = somewhat challenging	some uncertainty: There were multiple possible frames, but one frame or sub-frame stood out
2 = very challenging	high level of uncertainty: There were multiple possible frames, and no frame clearly stood out as the predominant one

5) the **perceived strength** of the frame;

How close does this frame come in representing the *master frame*? This coding category requires you to read the Tweet for subtext and focus on 1) whether the critical elements from each master frame are present, and 2) whether these elements are mixed in with elements from other master frames or not.

2 = Strong. Comes extremely close to the **ideal master frame**, expressing all or nearly all of the elements of the master frame, and has nearly elements that could be considered to represent a different master frame (if these other elements are present.	Example(s): According to the survey of 'Saba' we grew after the debate. **They could not cheat us and that's why the dirty war intensifies**. Everything will be useless, nothing and **no one can stop the longing of millions of Mexicans for a change**. (Type C master frame, contains references to both the people and the elites) **The future is for everyone**! Today I celebrate that the @MovimientoMIRA party supports our country project. We

	continue forming a coalition that will **motivate Colombians so that class hatred no longer exists and so that from the differences we can build a better country** (Type B master frame, references both power sharing and the moral element of class hatred)
1 = Moderate. A Tweet in this category is **moderately reflects the master frame by including** some but perhaps not all identifiable elements of this master frame, and either does not use these elements consistently or tempers them by including elements from other master frames.	Example: **We continue to collect the feelings and wisdom of the people**. In the morning we were in Tequila, Jalisco, and in the afternoon in Compostela, Nayarit (Type C master frame, but also has informational elements, and doesn't reference the elites) My agenda is social, cultural and environmental. I am committed to the protection of the swamps and the páramos. I want all Colombians to protect the environment (Type D master frame, talks about a particular issue but it is vague in terms of referring to particular outputs or ways to achieve this)
0 = Neutral. A Tweet in this category is considered **neutral**: it uses few if any elements tied to specific master frames, or they cancel each other out. (Note: if you coded the master frame neutral or informational, this category should also be 0)	Example: Sunday full of joy in eastern Antioquia. On the street with young people who have already lived how #LaFuerzaDeLaEsperanza can transform society. We know that #SePuede govern with decency. See you in Marinilla, El Carmen and San Antonio de Pereira (neutral master frame, could be used with any master frame—nothing in it to indicate how power would be shared)

6) The issue that the Tweet addresses;[26]

What is the main topic of the Tweet? These categories are meant to be broad, but there are categories for "no issue" or "other" just in case a Tweet mentions something that does not fit easily into one of the following descriptions.

Subjects	**Description**	**Example**
1 = Economy	Tweets including subjects such as jobs, unemployment, salaries, deficit, public spending, debt, crisis, taxes, entrepreneurship, contracts, self-employed people, agricultural policy, and so on. This is a somewhat narrow category that should refer explicitly to the economic realm.	"+ 1 million jobs # since February 2014, of which + 53% on permanent contracts. Highest employment rate since the #Istat time series exists. # Youth unemployment at the lowest levels of the last 5 years."
2 = Social policy	Tweets including subjects such as pensions, health, education, the welfare state, poverty,	"To those under a certain income threshold, it could be an increase of

[26] This category is adapted from Casero-Ripollés, Sintes-Olivella, and Franch (2017), but adapted for a smaller number of categories.

	social justice, equality/inequality (including gender-based violence), housing, immigration, childbirth, drug rehabilitation, and so on. This is a broader category that encompasses some economic-adjacent issues (inequality, welfare) that affect people.	1000 euros a month for each dependent child, the State pays the necessary sum to arrive at a dignified life. The sum may vary depending on the area of the country where you live."
3 = Culture, media, and sport	Tweets including subjects related to cultural industries (cinema, literature, art, mainstream media, social media, etc.) and sport.	"The State must support our athletes! - The recognition of athletes like Carolina Marin, Saul Craviotto or Lydia Valentin cannot be a miracle. It must be guaranteed!"
4 = Science, technology, the environment, and infrastructure	Tweets including subjects related to research and development, network infrastructure (such as fiber optic, ADSL, or Wi-Fi), transportation infrastructure (railway, airports, roads, etc.), pollution, flora and fauna protection, climate change, and so forth.	"The planned future: the environment above all National event for the presentation of the # Environmental Program of the 5 Star MoVement."
5 = Terrorism, crime, and insecurity	Tweets related to terrorism in all its forms and crime/criminal activity or general concerns about insecurity.	"I will work hand in hand with the mayor of #Cali so that we can stop the exponential growth of many crimes in the city."
6 = Foreign affairs	Tweets alluding to the European Union, the United States, international relations, or other parts of the world.	"The United States also needs #Mexico. In my government, we are going to put all the negotiation issues on the table, and we will defend our country firmly on all fronts."
7 = Corruption and democratic regeneration	Tweets including subjects concerning political corruption and/or democratic aspects that need to be renewed or removed, like changes in electoral law, putting an end to the establishment and the privileges of the political class, and so on.	"The PSOE has given a secret order to the ministries not to execute 50% of the budget. They bring us the cuts through the back door. It is the same as Montoro did and it means recovering the austerity policy of the PP. That is not the Spain you want."
8 = Political strategy in office	Tweets including subjects concerning the intention of the **candidate if they were to win office** (i.e., not specific to the campaign period itself). For example, forming a certain type of government or possible (or impossible) government pacts/coalitions in the future. Additionally, if the candidate Tweets about multiple issue positions (the economy and social positions), classify it as political strategy.	"Do you want to know all our government plan and know why so many people think that it is the most realistic, complete and successful proposal for Colombia? Here they find it complete. Read it and tell us what you think"

9 = Campaign organization and strategy	Tweets including subjects concerning the candidate **during the campaign period**. This can include questionnaires, surveys, information, analysis, and assessment of electoral results, or Tweets referring to the action of voting. It can also refer to Tweets about the running of the campaign and the organization of events, like rallies, meetings, political events, and media appearances by the candidates (more specific), or Tweets exalting the importance of party unity and exhorting sympathizers to join the party and earn victory (more broadly).	"In a week we will have an appointment with democracy. We will consolidate an arduous work that has taken me to travel the whole country, transmit my proposals and contrast capacity, preparation, honesty and responsibility with the other projects. With your vote, we will win" "Follow the first debate of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic."
10 = Immigration	Tweets about the topic of immigration	"Salvini at Tgcom24: 'Islam is a danger, stop at every presence'" "Elections 2018, Salvini defends Fontana on the immigration issue"
11 = Regional politics	Tweets relating to political subdivisions such as particular regions, states, etc. Note: this should not be used whenever a candidate talks about a particular city; it is more about the distribution of power within a country, such as the secession movement in Catalonia, Spain, or urban vs. rural politics.	"Mr. Sanchez, in Catalonia there are already enough competitions; what we need is that the people who manage them do so with loyalty to the Constitution." "In our program we propose formulas to improve the model of territorial organization. We want all Spaniards and Spaniards to enjoy the same rights, wherever they live."
12 = No subject or Other	Tweets that do not have a defined subject or that include expressions of courtesy (acknowledgments, etc.) or Tweets referring to the personal life of political agents. Tweets that cannot be placed in the above categories.	"I share this song, 'Cuidame tu', by Teresita Fernandez, played by Beatriz." "Happy Children's Day!"

7) the function of the Tweet;[27]

[27] This category is adapted from Casero-Ripollés, Sintes-Olivella, and Franch (2017), but adapted for a smaller number of categories.

What is the candidate trying to accomplish? Like the issue category, the possible functions are generalizable categories, with a residual category if needed.

Function	**Description**	**Example**
1 = Agenda and organization of political actions (including media appearances)	Tweets containing information on specific campaign actions in which the time and place are specified. **This should take place either in the near future, or be in progress at the time the Tweet is sent**. Tweets sharing links to a journalistic interview or TV show.	"This afternoon there is debate in the SBT. Do not miss it!" "Follow the first debate of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic." "Today at 7:00 pm there is an interview with Cyrus live on @recordtvoficial. Watch it!"
2 = Electoral program	Tweets on future political proposals or program proposals. This should be somewhat specific—not just vague intonations of making the country better.	"We have to increase competitiveness throughout the country. I propose to lower the VAT at the border and implement a National Infrastructure Plan to achieve prosperity in all states." "One of the key points of our program is less taxes for families and businesses. We will succeed in the Flat Tax, a single rate for all of 23% which will guarantee real economic growth, new jobs and a revival of investments."
3 = Management of political achievements	Tweets extolling or praising the achievements of the party and/ or leader. This could also include things like endorsements or responses to polls/early election predictions.	"Congratulations @diegosinhue! In #DebateGuanajuatense you showed that with responsible proposals, in this state we will continue to make good governments for the people. We will win!" "Thanks to Podemos, jobs are created and energy is saved, taking care of the planet."
4 = Criticizing opponents	Tweets containing direct or indirect attacks on other candidates, political parties, other leaders (past or present) or other ideologies more broadly.	"Lopez Obrador is not change, it's just the opposite. Directly giving contracts to your friends is called corruption." "He was supposed to think about the Italians, but he thought only of himself. #Berlusconi spent 3,339 days in the

		government of the country and focused exclusively on his own affairs"
5 = Participation and mobilization	Tweets aimed directly at increasing support/votes **during the campaign**. This can include the mention of general campaign events (we were in XX city this morning), but the reference should be somewhat vague. Followers would not know where to go or what type of event based just on this Tweet alone (in contrast to function 1). Specific manifestation: requesting financial donations, encouraging people to vote for the candidate/party, or mobilizing volunteers. General manifestation: Tweets that contain inspirational messages about the campaign, or Tweets reinforcing the party values and containing concepts that identify the party, its ideology, or its values.	"<3 Vote for a big censure of corruption, inequality and political confrontation. Let's say it loud, very loud, voting for the Socialist Party. We are very close." "The second round opens up a golden opportunity: to win this election, an eye on the debate." "We are 15 days from the end of the campaign and the mood of the people is growing as if it would burst with happiness. Never in Ticul or Chetumal had we held such emotional and large meetings during the week."
6 = Personal life/ backstage or Manners/Protocol	Tweets where particularly the leaders show or talk about things from their private lives (leisure, hobbies, sport, etc.) or from backstage at political events or from the campaign. Tweets of thanks, sympathy, greetings, special occasions, and so on.	"Anyway at home, near my family in the warmth of our home! No better feeling! Thank you all for the expressions of affection that I could see on the way back and all over Brazil! A big hug to everyone!" "We continue with concern the fire in the cathedral of Notre Dame, in Paris. Let us hope that there will be no victims and that the firefighters will suffocate the fire, preserving this enormous jewel of heritage"

7 = Entertainment or Humor	Tweets encouraging community building around the party or the leader with an entertainment-based focus, or Tweets containing memes, jokes, or other humorous resources.	"Nothing better than ending Sunday with a good movie ... Defeating the dark side machines, you can!"
8 = Others	Tweets that cannot be placed in the above categories	

8) whether the frame used positive, negative, or neutral language;

Does the candidate use mostly positive, neutral, or negative language? When considering this, think of the overall tone of the message, as well as the particular words used.

1 = predominantly positive language	"It's amazing how people are responding. Never have so many citizens participated as now in favor of real change. Look at Manzanillo." "I want to tell the country that I am honored that Dr. @ MoralesViviane gives us her support. With @mluciaramirez we are proposing a project for all Colombians, based on legality, entrepreneurship and equity, where we all fit."
0 = neutral language,[28] or equally positive and negative	"Conference with the international press. We are talking about climate change, fossil progressivism, new progressivism, anti-drug policy, the Venezuelan situation and the Middle East, which will be the new foreign policy of Colombia." "We have to eliminate the unnecessary expenses of the State. As president I will face the evasion; I will encourage investment and the formal hiring of workers, and I will contribute to improve their salaries."
-1 = predominantly negative language	"The real alliance: a scam to the Italians It passes a final majority report in the banks Commission thanks to 6 parliamentarians of the center-right who, upon leaving, reduce the quorum. Here is an advance from the

[28] The use of the word "neutral" here is different than how it was used for neutral master frame. Here, neutral means there is no strong bias in the language.

	government of mess-makers for which Renzi and Berlusconi work" "# SanchezMentiroso has been demonstrating for nine months that he lies more than he talks. Inside video"

9) A brief description of why you coded the Tweet the way you did

You'll be coding many Tweets, so this brief description should provide justification about any items that required a judgment call. Since we will review each Tweet for discrepancies, this will help us to make the final determination about which code is most appropriate.

Examples:

- I coded this as a Type B master frame because it emphasized power sharing and inclusion of voice--2 strong indicators of this type. I also coded it as an issue-based subframe because it talks about the specific proposals of students.
- This was a neutral tweet that simply encouraged voters to vote for the candidate by using positive emotions and a reified sense of history. While there seems to be a vague reference to Type B, it's ultimately not enough to classify it as a master frame other than neutral (it's only vaguely implied, whereas the neutral subframes are fairly strong).
- I coded this tweet as Type C 'trust in experience' because the candidate was talking about the woman he chose for his VP and the personal qualities and accomplishments that make her qualified. I put the issue as campaign organization and the function as participation and mobilization because they are explaining a new, important member of the campaign and hoping support increases because of her.
- I coded this tweet as Type A 'pro people' because the party was lauding young people for their support and implying that young people are being driven to the party because it represents their ideals (patriotism, roots, etc). I put the issue as campaign organization and the function as participation and mobilization because the party was showing the support they have already gotten from the youth and explaining why they have that support in an effort to attract even more supporters.

Troubleshooting

What if there are multiple (sub)frames?

It is possible that more than one frame will be present in a single Tweet. Most often, that is going to be some reference to the people and the elite. There is a designated frame for this category: sub-frame #4, the people versus the elites. However, it is possible that there will be multiple frames in a Tweet. If that is the case, select a primary frame *and* a secondary frame. If you are unsure which frame is primary and which is secondary, designate the primary frame based on which frame the candidate devotes more attention. If for example there are 2 sentences about anti-elite, and only 1 sentence or a passing

comment about an out-group, select the proper sub-frame for the anti-elite sentiment as the primary frame.

What if there are multiple issues referenced?

At times, Tweets (especially longer ones) will contain references to more than one issue (such as the economy and the environment, for example). If that is the case, the chances are that there is a deeper meaning behind the issues—the Tweet may mention multiple issues for strategic reasons (i.e., the real "issue" is political strategy

II. The Power of Populism: The Effectiveness of Populist Rhetoric in Generating Online Engagement

Abstract: Worldwide, people are supporting populist candidates who promise to upend "politics as usual." But despite what we know about the power of populist communication, we still do not know *how* powerful it is when compared to other available discursive frames. In particular, we lack evidence on how individuals respond to populist content across contexts, particularly in online settings, which have become increasingly important to the spread of political ideas. This paper compares the populist discursive frame to alternative frames including pluralism, technocracy, and neutral discourse. I argue that campaign messages containing populism will generate more engagement on Twitter due to their narrative structure, which I claim resonates more in the contexts examined. To test this argument, I collected social media data capturing the campaign rhetoric of 18 candidates (populist and non-populist) across 5 cases: Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Italy, and Spain (N=1,577). I find that citizens on Twitter engage with components of the populist discursive frame more than other evaluated frames. I analyze this result further by examining a theoretical mechanism derived from populism's narrative structure, negative valence. I find that negativity partially explain populism's appeal, while populists' perceived credibility does not have a significant effect, suggesting that it is the content of populist messages driving the results.

Introduction

Populism has attracted considerable attention as a phenomenon that can corrode democratic institutions, curb the rule of law, and centralize executive power (Galston 2018; Huber and Schimpf 2016; Puddington and Roylance 2017). Yet despite recent electoral victories in countries like the United States, Mexico, Brazil, Italy, Hungary, and Poland (to name a few), we know relatively little about how receptive individuals are to the *content* of populist messages (i.e., populist frames), especially across contexts, candidates, and communication platforms. There is ample reason to expect that populist frames affect individuals' attitudes and behaviors, as several experimental (Bos et al. 2019; Busby et al. 2019; Hameleers et al. 2017; Hameleers and Schmuck 2017; Wirz 2018) and non-experimental studies (Bobba 2019; Bobba and Roncarolo 2018) have shown. Yet despite what we learned from these studies about the power of

populist communication, we still do not know *how* powerful it is when compared to other available discursive frames.

To address this gap, I investigate whether individuals engage with populist communication more or less than three alternative discursive frames commonly found in liberal democracies: pluralism, technocracy, and neutral rhetoric.[29] I test this question using social network sites (SNSs)—communication platforms that play a central role in modern campaigns (Dimitrova et al. 2014; Gil de Zúñiga 2012; Zamora Medina and Zurutuza Muñoz 2014). Unlike traditional forms of communication, SNSs include opportunities for communicative behavior by the audience who can not only listen to candidates' messages, but also actively register their approval by liking a message and/or retweeting it—actions that I refer to as online engagement. While existing scholarship examines either elites' SNS use (Bright et al. 2017; Cameron et al. 2016) or individuals' use (Bode and Dalrymple 2016; Lupu et al. 2019), we rarely look at their interaction—how individuals respond to candidates' content in a real-world setting (though see Bobba 2019; Bobba and Roncarolo 2018 for exceptions). This is a missed opportunity given that SNSs come with built-in indicators of individual receptivity.

I argue that individuals are more likely to engage with populist messages compared to the alternative discursive frames based on the concept of resonance. Resonance represents how well an audience receives a frame (see, e.g., Snow and Benford 1988), and by extension, can be used as a baseline for whether or not individuals choose to engage with particular frames. I identify underlying theoretical aspects of the populist narrative that might resonate more than alternative frames and thus lead to higher engagement. I then use these underlying mechanisms to test

[29] These discursive frames reflect politicians' understanding of the relationship between the people and the elites. Other conceptions of frames are possible, such as issue positions, but extend beyond the scope of the paper.

two non-rival mechanisms that could help to explain the effectiveness of populist frames. First, and following from my theory on narrative structure, several scholars argue that populist messages rely heavily on negative emotions, which resonate with individuals and lead to more engagement (Rico et al. 2017; Wirz et al. 2018). An alternative explanation is that populist candidates are perceived as more credible because of certain character traits (rather than the content of their messages). For example, several scholars have pointed to populists' "no holds barred" communication style (Barr 2009; Enli 2017; Enli and Rosenberg 2018).

I apply my theory to five national campaigns where at least one populist candidate ran in 2018 and 2019: Italy, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Spain. I evaluate a random sample of Tweets, a prominent SNS that is favored by elites, for the eighteen candidates that pass a 10% vote threshold (N=1,577). I find that citizens on Twitter engage with populist frames more than pluralistic, technocratic, or neutral frames. The differences are substantively large—populism is between 20.9 and 29.9% more engaging depending on the measure of engagement and the discursive frame that populism is compared to. I find that negativity is partially responsible for populism's effectiveness (particularly for retweets), suggesting that negativity might act as a mediating factor in people's reception of populist content. However, I find that the capacity for populist discourse to elicit engagement is not driven by whether the candidate is a populist or not. Rather, the power of populism lies in the content of its rhetoric.

The most important contribution of this research is that it moves the field towards a more comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of populist frames relative to other frames common in liberal democracies. While a growing number of studies define populism as a discursive frame (Aslanidis 2015; Hawkins et al. 2018; Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2017), thereby applying framing theory to the *definition* of populism, I advance our understanding of populism's

appeal by applying specific elements of framing theory to populism's *underlying narrative*. In doing so, I also contribute empirically to studies of framing theory by identifying the strength of competing frames (i.e., framing effects) using actual candidate messages and individuals' behavioral responses to those messages. I do so by leveraging underutilized measures of individuals' engagement with political content on social media—likes and retweets—to evaluate the communication feedback loop between political actors and individual behavior on SNSs.

Theoretical Framework

To evaluate whether populist rhetoric provides a strategic advantage during campaigns, I situate populism within framing theory. The core claim of framing theory is intuitive: how messages are conveyed can alter how people engage with the message's content (Nabi 2003). Chong and Druckman (2007a, 100) define a frame as "the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles a speaker uses to relay information." In this study, I emphasize both the speaker and the listener. Thus, I define a frame as the meaning embedded into a message by a political actor in order to encourage the listener to interpret an event or situation from a particular non-neutral perspective. Scholars have provided considerable evidence that the strategic use of frames affects individuals' attitudes, preferences, and behaviors in the context of campaigns (see, e.g., Druckman et al. 2017; Klar et al. 2013).

More concretely, scholars have applied framing theory to the study of populism as a way to define populism, classify populist rhetoric, and isolate the effect of populist frames on attitudes and behaviors. One prominent perspective is that populism is a set of ideas (frames) that are present in discourse (Aslanidis 2015). Using this definition, scholars identify political actors who use populist rhetoric (populists) and candidates that do not (non-populists), generally assigning these actors a score that represents how populist they are (Hawkins and Castanho Silva 2018; Rooduijn and Pauwels 2011). Scholars have built on this work by classifying the different

kinds of populist frames in politicians' communication and the frequency with which these frames are used (Casero-Ripollés et al. 2017; Cranmer 2011; Ernst et al. 2017). Several scholars have also experimentally tested the effects of particular populist frames to determine how different frames yield different outcomes. Such studies find that populist frames can change how individuals evaluate and engage with certain issues (Bos et al. 2019), their expression of populist and exclusionary attitudes (Hameleers and Schmuck 2017; see also Wirz 2018), and their vote choice (Busby et al. 2019; Hameleers et al. 2018), to name a few possible outcomes.

I build on these studies by evaluating how individuals engage with populist messages relative to other discursive frames, including pluralism, technocracy, and a neutral category. Existing studies demonstrate why this is a worthwhile pursuit: Casero-Ripollés et al. (2017) find that 51.9% of Spain's left-wing populist party's (Podemos) Tweets use populist frames—but what about the other 48.1%? Without looking beyond a populist-or-not dichotomy of frames, we cannot accurately assess how powerful populist rhetoric is. These alternative discursive frames provide different conceptualizations about the relationship between the people and the elites. This conceptualization of rhetoric mirrors the field's growing convergence on populism representing a discursive frame (Aslanidis 2015), in particular, "a unique set of ideas, one that understands politics as a Manichean struggle between a reified will of the people and a conspiring elite" (Hawkins et al. 2018, 3).

Pluralism and technocracy were chosen as rival discursive frames because they view the relationship between the people and the elites differently than populism and are among the most common in democracies today (Akkerman et al. 2014; Caramani 2017; Hawkins et al. 2012). Pluralism advocates for power to be shared among diverse interests (Akkerman et al. 2014, 1327; Caramani 2017, 62). Technocracy, meanwhile, combines conceptualizations of both technocracy

and elitism[30] to view the relationship between the people and the elites as one in which elites should be in charge of doing what is best for the people, not representing the "will of the people" as populism does. In other words, technocracy prioritizes the power of expertise (broadly defined) and the ability to deliver outcomes (Caramani 2017, 55 & 66). I also examine a neutral category, which refers to ambiguous language that does not contain enough information about the nature of the sovereign community to consider it as belonging to any discursive frame.[31]

Applying Framing Theory to the Populist Narrative

Previous work on framing resonance offers a blueprint for understanding how different discursive frames affect online engagement. A frame resonates when the message "strikes a responsive chord" with the target audience (Snow and Benford 1988, 198) or when a speaker's discourse "align[s] with the worldviews of their audiences" (McDonnell et al. 2017, 2). In other words, resonance represents the receipt of the frame by the target audience in a way that accomplishes the actor's goals (in this case, engagement). I hypothesize that three underlying attributes of the populist discursive frame's narrative increase the likelihood that these messages will resonate with individuals compared to the alternative discursive frames I examine.

First, in a seminal article on framing, Snow and Benford (1988) argue that frames are more likely to resonate and subsequently mobilize individuals when they accomplish three "core tasks:" diagnosing a problem and identifying its cause, prescribing a solution, and containing a "call to action." Populism accomplishes Benford and Snow's (1988) "core tasks" by offering a clear diagnosis of the problem (the elites are self-serving and corrupt, a sentiment that has been growing in global popularity), prognosis (return more power to "the people" or their

[30] Existing studies do not utilize technocracy and elitism as separate categories. For example, Akkerman et al. (2014) measure elitism in surveys not only as a moralistic distinction between "the people" and the elite (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 152), a conception in line with elitism, but also as important business leaders or independent experts, which is in line with technocracy.

[31] See Appendix A.3 for examples of each discursive frame.

representative, who have been mistreated), and motivation (elect me and I will change the status quo). Not only do populists accomplish this goal, but they do so in a simple and straightforward manner (see, e.g., Bischof and Senninger 2018; Bracciale and Martella 2017; and Oliver and Rahn 2016) that stands in contrast to the status quo. Given that each case in my sample contains a populist actor, "guilt by association" with the status quo is presupposed to be a common (and credible) narrative.

In contrast, pluralism and technocracy operate from a defensive position given that the existing status quo is, in most places, associated with some combination of technocracy and pluralism. As a result, their diagnoses and prognoses are less clear, limiting their ability to resonate. Neutral discourse, on the other hand, does not suffer from the status quo association but does lack a clear narrative structure—the solution (elect the candidate) is clear, but the problem is not. While elements of other discursive frames are attractive (everyone wants more and better output, in line with the technocratic solution), alternative discursive frames lack the simple and credible narrative of populism inherent in the prognostic-diagnostic-motivational scheme.

The second narrative attribute that could lead to higher engagement stems from the diagnostic narrative element in Snow and Benford's (1988) theory. McDonnell et al. (2017, 6) contend that frames will resonate if they can solve a "puzzle in action" for the audience with a relatively novel solution—one that is neither too familiar nor completely unheard of. Populism's solution of returning power and representation to "the people" optimizes cognitive distance in that most mainstream candidates do not propose such a solution, yet the solution is familiar enough to people to be understood, thereby increasing its resonance. In contrast, the pluralistic and technocratic solutions are far more familiar, erring towards the obvious, and thus not able to strike a chord in the same way that the populist narrative does. In other words, technocracy and

pluralism are again likely to suffer from guilt by association with the status quo, this time because the status quo is overly familiar.

A final element working for the populist discursive frame is that populism is salient—it is actively available in individuals' consciousness (Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman 2011). For populism to be successful, Busby et al. (2019, 2) argue that individuals "require a context that makes their populist disposition salient," with Castanho Silva (2018) and Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018) identifying failures of representation as necessary and in many cases sufficient to activate populist attitudes. Populism is assumed to be salient in the examined contexts as each country in the sample has at least one populist actor who attained at least 10% of the national vote share.

Based on these attributes, I suggest that populism's underlying narrative is more resonant in the cases examined and thus is more likely to generate engagement than pluralism, technocracy, and neutral rhetoric. Although difficult to test directly, these three aspects of populism's narrative structure are possible to test by proxy through the concept of negative valence. While a simplification of populism's overall narrative structure, negative emotions effectively capture populism's narrative move to cut through the advantage of the status quo by portraying politics as simple and straightforward (underlying mechanism 1), in particular, blaming elites for failures of representation (underlying mechanism 2) in a climate that is sympathetic to the message (underlying mechanism 3). Scholars have consistently demonstrated a deep connection between populism and negativity (see, e.g., (Engesser et al. 2017; Ernst et al. 2019; Gerstlé and Nai 2019; Rico et al. 2017), so much so that I argue that the essence of the populist narrative is inherently a negative worldview attacking elites. This expectation does not

preclude positivity among populists; rather, it suggests that negativity towards elites forms the core of the populist message and that this core is primarily responsible for driving engagement.

Research Design

To assess my argument, I evaluate a random sample of the rhetoric for all actors that received at least 10% of the vote in five countries across Latin America and Europe: Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Spain, and Italy. The difference in political systems tests the growing consensus that the core of populist rhetoric is generalizable across countries (Hawkins et al. 2018)—and extends that logic to see whether citizens' *responses* to that rhetoric also translate. Scholars such as Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2017) and Andreadis et al. (2018) have demonstrated that people across countries hold broadly similar populist attitudes, which can be activated by populist candidates (Hawkins et al. 2018). Given that each case has a populist actor, it stands to reason that people may engage similarly with populist messages across and within these regions. If supported, this comparison would tell us more about the impact that the populist discursive frame has on online engagement across widely different contexts.

Case Selection

Each case had at least one candidate that political observers commonly referred to as a "populist" actor in 2018 or early 2019 (an imperfect way to account for global context insofar as the global climate is generally similar at a similar point in time).[32] This criterion was particularly relevant given that salience plays a critical role in my theory. The subset of possible Latin American cases was small.[33] Europe provided several potential cases. I selected Spain and Italy because these countries had both a left-wing and right-wing populist party. This attribute not

[32] The Tweets span the period of late December 2017 through April 2019 (16 months).
[33] Costa Rica satisfied the populist criteria, but I opted not to include this case due to the particular combination of populism and evangelism that the populist candidate (Fabricio Alvarado) displayed, which I felt limited the generalizability of this case. El Salvador had an anti-elite candidate (Nayib Bukele), but existing accounts did not support this candidate as being populist.

only provides interesting within-case comparisons, it also contributes to our understanding of left-wing populism in Europe, a phenomenon that is comparatively understudied.

Although these cases have notable differences, they vary in both the ratio of populist to non-populist messages that candidates used as well as the degree of electoral success that populist and non-populist candidates experienced. Twitter use in these countries is also similar, with 5-8% of each country's population.[34] Finally, these cases reflect regional diversity and balance on the number of candidates meeting the selection criteria (nine in each region). The sample contains 80 Tweets for each of the nine non-populist actors and 100 Tweets for each of the nine populist actors,[35] randomly sampled during the campaign for a total of N=1,577 Tweets.[36] Retweets are excluded from the analysis as they do not constitute rhetoric written by the candidate. In the table and subsequent figures, blue text indicates a populist actor and black

[34] Italy: 5.46% as of March 2018; Mexico: 19.45% in August 2018 (this number dropped precipitously post-election, and is at 7.47% as of August 2019); Brazil: 5.48% in October 2018; Colombia: 6.8% in June 2018; Spain: 6.2% in April 2019. Data from the country pages at https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/.

[35] Two parties did not meet the minimum number of Tweets: FI, and MS5. For FI, I included Tweets where the party *retweeted* the party leader's (Silvio Berlusconi) Tweets. This approach is consistent with other parties who, instead of retweeting leader's Tweets (as FI did), simply use the same Tweet between candidate. MS5 is sampled at 77 Tweets total, representing their entire universe of Tweets during the campaign. I collected separate Tweets from the party leader for a robustness check, which is why I did not combine the MS5 with Luigi Di Maio's Tweets.

[36] Official campaign periods are hard to pin down in many countries. I selected campaign dates that reflected the official kickoff of the campaign marked by the first major campaign event, and ended either the day before the election, or a few days before in certain cases that observe a few days of non-campaigning. The campaign periods covered in this analysis are: 1) Italy: 12/27/2017 (when Parliament was dissolved) – 3/3/2018; 2) Colombia: 3/11/2018 (when primaries were held) – 6/16/2018 (excluding the 1st round election day, 5/27/2018); 3). Mexico: 3/30/2018 – 6/27/2018; 4) Brazil: 7/20/2018 (registration for parties' candidates opened) – 10/27/208 (excluding the 1st round election day, 10/7/2018); 5) Spain: 2/15/2019 (snap elections were called) – 4/26/2019. Two candidates, Ciro Gomes of Brazil and Sergio Fajardo of Colombia did not make it to the 2nd round; thus, their campaign period ended the day before the 1st round election in these countries.

text indicates a non-populist actor.[37] As Table 2.1 shows, there is considerable variation in likes and retweets both across and within candidates.[38]

While I see the differences between regions as a theoretical strength, I attempt to account for some of these differences by focusing on the candidates' Tweets in Latin America and the parties' Tweets in Europe. This decision reflects significantly different institutions that affect the way individuals cast votes. In Spain and Italy, both parliamentary systems, individuals cast votes for parties. In the Latin American countries with presidential systems, individuals vote directly for candidates. As a result, I expect that parties produce more campaign content in Europe, making parties a better comparison for Latin American candidates. A descriptive comparison of European party leaders' and parties' Twitter behavior supports this assumption. For example, Pedro Sánchez of PSOE Tweeted 6.8 times per day on average during the campaign versus PSOE's average of 32.6 (Appendix D.2).

Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Actors Evaluated

Country	*Actor*	*Vote Share*	Avg Likes	Std. Dev.	Avg. Retweets	Std. Dev.
COL	Duque (Democratic Center)	54.0 % (2nd)	1,290	1,539	675	905
	Petro (Progressivists Movement)	41.8% (2nd);	4,165	9,369	5,837	4,246
	Fajardo (Citizen Compromise)	23.7% (1st)	1,697	1,731	544	583
MEX	López Obrador (AMLO) (Morena)	53.2%	15,601	6,125	5,965	2,353

[37] I classify who is and is not a populist according to four existing datasets: three expert surveys (the Chapel Hill Expert Survey—CHES, the Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Survey, and the Global Party Survey) and one based on speech analysis (the Global Populism Database). I classify candidates as "populist" if the majority of these datasets considered the candidates to be somewhat or very populist and "non-populist" otherwise. Full details are available in Appendix A.3. I go against the existing data in only one instance: FI of Italy. I do so because I evaluate FI as a party, not the party leader (Silvio Berlusconi) or as a coalition. While existing accounts generally view Berlusconi as populist, FI is not necessarily a populist party. Bobba and Roncarolo (2018), for example, classify only 8.1% of FI's Tweets as populist (making the "not populist" designation more appropriate). I also include Cs of Spain as a populist party—this was the only actor in the sample that had an even split of populist/non-populist in the existing data sets. However, my data indicate that Cs falls on the lower end of populism, thus I opt to include them as populist.

[38] I log-transformed both likes and retweets due to a positive skew towards lower values—50% of "likes" are below 800 with an average of 4,055 and a high value of 91,000, while the average number of retweets in the sample is approximately 1,500 despite a high value of 21,000.

	Anaya (PAN)	22.3%	2,686	3,252	1,161	1,877
	Meade (PRI)	16.4%	3,085	1,995	1,704	875
BRZ	Jair Bolsonaro (PSL)	55.1% (2nd)	26,809	22,042	6,200	5,483
	Haddad (PT)[39]	44.9% (2nd)	8,072	14,439	1,970	4,086
	Gomes (PDT)	12.5% (1st)	1,931	2,470	351	502
IT	M5S (Luigi Di Maio)	32.2%	549	305	317	194
	Lega (Matteo Salvini)	17.7%	20	14	11	10
	PD (Matteo Renzi)	18.9%	332	262	164	134
	FI (Silvio Berlusconi)	13.9%	143	175	61	78
ESP	Podemos (Pablo Iglesias)	14.3%	567	575	377	339
	PP (Pablo Casado)	16.7%	285	370	191	267
	PSOE (Pedro Sanchez)	28.7%	203	198	149	122
	Cs (Albert Rivera)	15.8%	178	240	127	142
	Vox (Santiago Abascal)	10.3%	2,510	1,809	1,243	869

Party institutionalization also differs significantly across these regions, with Europe having entrenched parties that persist across elections and, more importantly, across party leaders, suggesting that parties are an appropriate focal point. In comparison, Latin American parties are often formed as electoral vehicles for particular candidates. Latin American candidates also change parties more frequently, supporting a candidate-centric view for this region. I evaluate potential concerns with comparing party leaders in Latin America and parties in Europe in Appendices D.3-D.4.[40]

Communication Platform: Twitter

I chose Twitter over other SNSs because it is the preferred platform of elites, making it an ideal venue to study candidate rhetoric—every actor in the sample has a public Twitter

[39] In Brazil, Fernando Haddad was not the official candidate of the PT party until 9/11/2018; prior to that date, Lula da Silva was the official candidate and Haddad was his running mate. Haddad became the official candidate when Lula was denied the ability to remain a candidate after the Supreme Electoral Court ruled against him on corruption charges. 13/50 Tweets in the Haddad sample take place before the Lula ruling, though Haddad was actively campaigning as Lula's running made prior to 9/11/2018, thus these Tweets are still included in the final sample.

[40] I evaluate a subsample of European parties and their party leaders to assess whether my focus on European parties is appropriate. I find that parties and their leaders use broadly similar percentages of populist, pluralist, technocratic, and neutral rhetoric. When examining the subsample of four parties included in the broader sample versus their party leaders in Appendix D.4, the magnitude of populism's engagement advantage is larger compared to pluralism, technocracy, and neutral rhetoric compared to the findings of the full model.

account, a key feature compared to other SNSs. Twitter is widely used by politicians presumably because it can alter outcomes that political actors are interested in, such as engagement and participation (Boulianne 2015; Gil de Zúñiga 2012). Scholars have established that Tweets can set the media's agenda with their posts (Enli 2017; Graham et al. 2014), as Donald Trump regularly demonstrates. Tweets also appear to be relatively consistent with actors' overall communication strategies."[41]

Existing studies also provide reasons to expect a relationship between candidate rhetoric and engagement. While Twitter users are not representative of the broader population, they (especially those consuming and producing political content) are disproportionately more likely to be active participants in politics (Bode and Dalrymple 2016; Lupu et al. 2019). This characteristic makes Twitter users a particularly appealing population to study because their behavior has the potential to have an outsized influence on political outcomes.[42] Several studies have shown that using Twitter for political purposes is a precursor to various forms of participation, such as vote choice or participation in protests (Boulianne 2015; Scherman et al. 2015; Skoric et al. 2016; Valenzuela et al. 2018). Twitter also promotes information diffusion and network mobilization (Barbera et al. 2015; Vaccari et al. 2015). Hosch-Dayican et al. (2016) find that some politically active Twitter users actively campaign on behalf of candidates (Hosch-

[41] Candidates regularly Tweet summarized versions of their longer Facebook posts. I also find that the actors that regularly using populist communication on Twitter significantly overlap with the actors that experts identify as "populist," including the four datasets outlined in footnote 10; see Appendix B.1 for additional information.

[42] Social media users in general and Twitter users specifically tend to be whiter, more educated, younger, and male (Lupu et al. 2019). In particular, scholars have started pointing out the differences between social media users who actively post/receive political content and those that use social media for other purposes, finding that the former group is more interested in politics, has higher political knowledge, and is more likely to vote than the overall population (Bode and Dalrymple 2016; see also Wojcik 2019). However, representativeness is not necessarily a concern unless one tries to generalize beyond the population of interest. A potentially greater threat to inference is if Twitter users are more likely to engage with populist messages than other kinds of messages, thus biasing the results. While more research is needed, previous research has shown that populist supporters tend to be less educated and more economically insecure (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Spruyt et al. 2016), in stark contrast to the traits that characterize Twitter users.

Dayican et al. 2016), while Barbera et al. (2015, 6) argue that spreading messages about protests on Twitter is as "critical in increasing the reach of protest messages and generating online content at levels that are comparable to core participants" (see also Scherman et al. 2015 and Valenzuela et al. 2018).

DV: Online Engagement

I evaluate likes and retweets as measures of online engagement. For individuals, online engagement reflects an enthusiastic response to particular messages. Unlike traditional forms of media, this register of enthusiasm or approval is direct—individuals are not passive consumers of content, but active participants in the political world who can instantly register their approval or disapproval with the click of a button. Online engagement also represents an endorsement of content by the individual—these actions occur in a public sphere, thus spreading the message to one's network, which can have downstream consequences for information diffusion and network mobilization. According to Pew Research Center (Wojcik 2019), the most prolific Twitter users in the US have an average of 387 followers, which means each retweet or like can be seen by up to that many people. Magnified on a scale of tens of thousands of likes or retweets, a single well-crafted tweet could reach millions of people.

For elites, while it would be easy to assume that actors' top priority is to turn online engagement into votes, not all actors have the same goals (or at the very least, they prioritize them differently). Some actors may be seeking votes, others media attention, and others a way to set the political agenda. Online engagement can also be an end goal in and of itself in that it offers a quantifiable measure of a Twitter account's success. It is not uncommon for candidates in my sample to brag about their social media following, or even to directly appeal to users for likes and retweets. For example, Salvini tweeted "LET US SEE THE STRENGTH OF OUR COMMUNITY! PLEASE "LIKE" IT NOW AT THE NEW OFFICIAL PAGE." Likes and

retweets are a form of social media currency (the most common one being an actor's number of followers)—currency that appears to be valued by political leaders for its own sake.

Methods for Analyzing Engagement

Four research assistants (RAs) and the author coded the Tweets. Tweets were de-identified to mask the actor's identity and party. In some cases, the RAs needed to view the media attached to the Tweet to accurately code it, thus exposing the candidate's identity. Media that met this standard include threads or consecutive Tweets (Graham et al. 2014), short videos, news articles, links to longer posts, and infographics.[43]

I utilize OLS regression to evaluate the relationship between discursive frames and online engagement. The dependent variables are the logged number of likes and retweets, respectively, received by each Tweet (the unit of analysis). I include candidate fixed effects to control for idiosyncratic differences between actors.[44] Additionally, I account for several features of a Tweet that could affect engagement. In line with previous studies, I incorporate dichotomous variables for whether a Tweet contains hashtags, mentions (use of the "@" referencing another user), and links to additional content (Bobba and Roncarolo 2018; Zamora Medina and Zurutuza Muñoz 2014). I expect the presence of these interactive components to increase engagement because they encourage participants to view additional content.

Results

Accounting for the oversample of populist candidates through weighting, the sample contains 19% populist, 11% pluralist, 33% technocratic, and 36% neutral frames. Figure 1 ranks

[43] About 1/3 of the Tweets in this sample contained relevant media that may have (though did not necessarily) revealed the speaker's identity.

[44] See Appendix B for details on candidate fixed effects. The findings are also robust to hierarchical linear model clustered at the candidate level with random slopes and random intercepts (Appendix D.1). With more cases, a hierarchical model with Tweets nested in candidates nested in countries would be appropriate, but given the small N of these bin sizes, such a model would not be reliable. I also evaluate country fixed effects instead of candidate fixed effects (Appendix C.1.C).

each candidate in terms of the percentage of Tweets that are classified as populist while also indicating the percentages of pluralist, technocratic, and neutral frames. Figure 1 dispels the notion that populist actors exclusively or even primarily employ populist rhetoric, highlighting the need to focus on the other discursive frames that actors draw from. Besides Lega, no other actor uses a majority of populist frames—even actors who are seen as quintessential populists such as Podemos, MS5, and AMLO use only 30-36% populist frames. The latter two candidates actually use more neutral frames than populist ones. Additionally, these results provide minimal evidence of a populist "zeitgeist" phenomenon where non-populist candidates jump on the populist rhetoric bandwagon (Mudde 2004; see also Mazzoleni and Bracciale 2018). While there is some cross-over, non-populist candidates use few populist frames compared to their populist counterparts.

With few exceptions, populists on Twitter use fewer pluralistic and technocratic messages than non-populists ($p<.01$ each). The range of pluralistic messages is 1-17% for populists and 5-28% for non-populists. Meanwhile, non-populists like Duque and PD use a majority of technocratic frames. Duque, in particular, frequently referenced his issue proposals, a typical example of a technocratic Tweet. While there is considerable variation between candidates, the data reveal notable differences between populists and non-populists.

Figure 2.1: Type of Rhetoric Used by Candidates/Parties



Table 2.1 provides conditional support for the theoretical claim of this paper, that the use of populist frames generates more engagement compared to other discursive frames. Populism represents the base category, so negative coefficients indicate less engagement compared to populist frames. In the pooled model, a pluralist message is between 26.6% and 29.5% less engaging than a populist message, a technocratic message is 23.6% to 25.2% less engaging, and a neutral message is 21.3% to 29.5% less engaging. Contrary to expectations, the use of @ (mentions) and media links are associated with lower levels of engagement, while the use of hashtags is not statistically significant. However, there are interesting differences across cases.

Table 2.2: OLS regression of Retweets and Likes on Discursive frames Relative to Populism

	Full Model		Latin America		Europe	
	Likes	**Retweets**	**Likes**	**Retweets**	**Likes**	**Retweets**
Discursive frames (Populism as base)						
Pluralism	-0.31***	-0.35***	-0.50***	-0.45***	-0.04	-0.15
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)
	[-26.6%]	*[-29.5%]*	*[-39.3%]*	*[-36.2%]*	*[-3.9%]*	*[-13.9%]*
Technocracy	-0.27***	-0.29***	-0.45***	-0.36***	-0.12	-0.22**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)
	[-23.6%]	*[-25.2%]*	*[-36.2%]*	*[-30.2%]*	*[-1.1%]*	*[-19.7%]*
Neutral	-0.24***	-0.35***	-0.22**	-0.29***	-0.24**	-0.38***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.09)
	[-21.3%]	*[-29.5%]*	*-[19.7%]*	*[-25.2%]*	*[-21.3%]*	*[-31.6%]*
Controls						
Mentions	-0.21***	-0.30***	-0.27***	-0.37***	-0.15*	-0.24***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Hashtags	0.06	0.04	-0.51***	-0.42***	0.42***	0.35***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Media Link	-0.36***	-0.24***	-0.43***	-0.34***	-0.18*	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Constant	10.11***	9.09***	10.21***	9.18***	5.92***	5.60***
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.15)
Observations	1,576	1,576	780	780	796	796
R-squared	0.80	0.80	0.62	0.65	0.67	0.72

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Fixed effects are included but not presented. Full model results are available in Appendix C. Relative magnitudes are presented in brackets and are calculated using the formula $100[e^{\beta} - 1]$ to interpret the logged dependent variable as a percentage difference compared to the base category, populism.

Most obviously, the Latin American cases more closely approximate the pooled model. A country-by-country analysis (Appendices C.1.A and C.1.B) reveals that Colombia and Mexico adhere most closely to the main model, while Brazil only displays an advantage for populism over technocracy, and only for retweets. This finding could be attributable to Bolsonaro's unique strategy, mixing both religion and pro-military sentiment in a blend of right-wing populism, which is historically less common in the region. It may be that for Bolsonaro, these other kinds

of content are more engaging than populism—they are more novel than populism is in this particular case. Meanwhile, Petro and AMLO are both left-wing populists, which has tended to be more common among populists in the region. They also use more populist frames—Petro doubles the percentage of populist frames that Bolsonaro uses in the sample.

The European cases generally display similar tendencies to the pooled model, especially as it relates to the comparative advantage of populist rhetoric over neutral rhetoric, as well as technocratic rhetoric for retweets. A country-by-country analysis shows that populism is particularly engaging in Spain but not in Italy.[45] This finding is interesting given that the two Italian populist parties, Lega and MS5, received a higher vote share than the two Spanish populist parties, Vox and Podemos (Table 2.1). One possible explanation for this contradiction is the age of populist parties matters—Vox was founded in 2013 (but did not become a significant electoral force until 2019, going from <.5% to 10% of the national vote) and Podemos in 2014. In contrast, Lega has been around since 1991 and MS5 since 2009. The longer the party is around, the more likely it is that the solution they propose becomes commonplace, which could affect whether the message resonates with people. Further research is needed on the receptivity of populist content over time. There are also, of course, factors unique to each of these countries that are not captured in the analysis that could help to explain this result.

The most intriguing finding from the regional analysis is that populism does not show the same advantage over pluralistic language in Europe as it does in Latin America, raising the possibility that pluralism may be an effective counter to populist rhetoric in these countries. A convenient starting point for why pluralism performs better in Spain and Italy than it does in

[45] Full model results by country are presented in Appendices C.1.A and C.1.B. Populism cannot be statistically distinguished from any alternative frames in Italy for likes and only from neutral rhetoric for retweets, while there is a significant effect in Spain for technocracy and neutral messages for both likes and retweets.

Colombia, Mexico, and Brazil is the different institutional configuration. It seems plausible that the "winner take all" system of the Latin American countries is less conducive to the inclusive message, at least during elections, and may even be disincentivizing. However, there are also other factors at work. A holistic view of the data suggests that the subject matter of pluralist Tweets also varies across regions. In the Latin American cases, tweets promoting respect and dignity for Mexicans (especially as it relates to US-Mexico relations) are among the most liked/retweeted pluralist messages, while in Colombia (especially in Fajardo's campaign), incorporating the voices of young people is a recurring theme. Meanwhile, in Spain, the most engaging pluralist Tweets were those promoting a feminist worldview (dominated primarily by PSOE, as well as Podemos to a lesser extent). This cursory examination suggests that, along with institutional incentivization structures, certain narrative elements of pluralism may be more engaging than others, and that the use of these more engaging elements may explain why pluralism is more effective on competing with populism in certain contexts.[46]

Mechanism: Emotive Content of the Frames

Returning to the main findings of the model, what is it about populist content that produces this association? My theory suggests that negative valence may act as a simple, though effective proxy for the underlying narrative structure of populism that, in turn, amplifies the engagement potential of populist messages. Except for Lega, a party that takes a strong stance against immigrants, Tweets that perform especially well seem to fall into two main non-rival categories. The first group is a negative attack on some group of elites, indicated in red text below. The second group is often more positive in tone, indicated in green text, referencing the people either implicitly, such as "we" or "you" or explicitly such as "people," "citizens," or

[46] Appendix A.7 shows that Italian actors use pluralist messages far less than any other country—only 5.7% of the sample, compared to the average of 11% in the sample as a whole.

"voters" of a particular country. The most engaging Tweets often do both simultaneously. For example, one of Petro's most retweeted messages is where he calls out both the elites and the power of the people:

> "The biggest coalition of my candidacy is with **you**. Today **society** has the great power of a single X *[referring to the physical act of placing an "X" for the desired candidate on the ballot]* on June 17, to send to hell **all the political corruption in Colombia**. This is the second opportunity of **the races** *[marginalized individuals]* sentenced to 100 years of loneliness of violence." (Petro)

Similarly, take the following two highly liked messages:

> "*@[party official]* has defended in Brussels what **millions of Spaniards** think. Soon we will have MEPs who will defend in the European Parliament our identity and sovereignty against **the separatists, progressives, globalist bureaucrats and supremacists of the hembrismo."** (Vox)

> "This is PODEMOS: Every minute of our work has been dedicated to defending the interests of **those who do not have the telephone number of the bank or of the big construction companies**." (Podemos)

Both reference "the people" (explicitly for Vox, implicitly for Podemos) while also identifying who "the people" are pitted against, from Vox's cocktail of offenders to Podemos's mention of economic elites.

There are also several examples who exclusively use negative language. Consider the following examples of highly liked/retweeted messages:[47]

> "The **old politics** is at sunset. Only the last pale rays remain that still delude the **aficionados of leaders and smaller leaders of top-down, pyramidal structures**. On 4 March, together, **we** can change the history of this country." (MS5)

> "**We** are not against the businessmen, we are against the ill-gotten wealth, the one that they obtain overnight, under the protection of public power, **corrupt politicians and influence peddlers"** (AMLO)

To test this observation further, I look at the valence (positive, negative, or neutral) of a given Tweet as a proxy for the evocation of emotions. Of the negative Tweets in the sample (N=391), populist messages account for 69.3%. A Wald test confirms that populism is distinguishable from all other world views in terms of negative language ($p<.01$). When I add an indicator for negative tone versus positive or neutral tone (Table 2.3), I find that negativity is

[47] For additional examples, see Appendix A.4.

largely, but not completely responsible for populism's appeal, supporting existing literature (Bobba 2019; Rico et al. 2017; Wirz 2018). Populism is marginally more engaging than pluralistic and technocratic frames for likes ($p<.1$), but loses statistical significance for retweets.[48] While more modest, the relative magnitudes for likes are still nontrivial: -18.8% (pluralism) and -15.4% (technocracy), both significant at $p<.1$.

Table 2.3: Main Model with Negative Valence

	Likes (Logged)	**Retweets** (Logged)
Discursive frames (Populism as base)		
Pluralism	-0.21*	-0.12
	(0.11)	(0.10)
Technocracy	-0.17*	-0.07
	(0.09)	(0.08)
Neutral	-0.12	-0.10
	(0.09)	(0.08)
Valence		
Negative Tone (1=negative, 0=else)	0.16**	0.35***
	(0.08)	(0.07)
Controls		
Mentions	-0.21***	-0.29***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Hashtags	0.07	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Media Link	-0.36***	-0.23***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	9.99***	8.83***
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Observations	1,577	1,577
R-squared	0.80	0.80

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

These findings offer preliminary (though inconclusive) evidence that the populist narrative is fundamentally negative and that this negativity is at least partially responsible for people's engagement with populist content.[49] More precisely, the core populist narrative—pitting

[48] Interestingly, individuals are more willing to retweet negative messages regardless of content, but more discerning when it comes to liking a message.

[49] The types of populist messages used by non-populists are fairly similar to those used by populists: they attack the opposition in a way that demonizes the elites and elevates the people, indicating that negativity is not unique to populist actors, but rather seems to be a product of populist content. Of the 68 populist frames in the sample used by non-populists, 48 were negative in tone (71%), compared to 80.6% for populists using populist frames.

the people against the elites—is particularly engaging, but solely attacking elites is sufficient to inspire engagement. It also implies that rhetoric, including both content and style, appears to be a credible driver of engagement.

Alternative Explanation: Candidate Credibility/Authenticity

Another possibility that is not directly tied to the populist narrative structure is that being a populist candidate confers credibility to an actor, leading to a boost in engagement not because of content, but because of shared characteristics across populist actors. This assumption is based on the idea that the direct way that populists communicate creates a bond with individuals (Barr 2009). Enli and Rosenberg (2018, 9) describe populists' overall strategy as geared towards "construct[ing] authenticity," which the authors associate with a strategic advantage.

To test this possibility empirically, I split the sample into populist and non-populist candidates to evaluate the relative magnitudes of using populist frames compared to other discursive frames in Table 4. I find that populist content is between 30.2% to 45.1% more engaging than other frames for non-populist actors compared to 18.9% to 29.5% for populist actors. However, these findings should be interpreted with caution: of the 355 populist frames, only 68 (19.7%) were used by non-populists. In Appendix C.3, I add an interaction term between candidate type and an indicator for populist frames (compared to all other frames combined) to the model presented in Figure 2. The results show that both types of candidates receive a boost when using a populist message, underscoring the results in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4: Relative Magnitudes Compared to a Populist Frame

Model	Pluralism	Technocracy	Neutral
Pooled sample (N=1,577) ***(as shown in Figure 2)***	-26.9%*** (likes) -29.5%*** (retweets)	-23.6%*** -25.2%***	-20.9%*** -29.9%***
Non-populist candidates only (N=800)	-45.1%*** (likes) -36.9%** (retweets)	-38.1%*** -30.2%**	-36.9%*** -22.9%
Populist candidates only (N=776)	-14.8% (likes) -16.2% (retweets)	-19.7%*** -18.9%**	-22.1*** -29.5%***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;
Indicates a statistically significant difference from the base category (populism)

Standard errors and full regression results are reported in Appendix C.5.

One possible explanation for this finding is that Twitter users engage more with a frame that is atypical for the candidate (Bail 2016). A more likely explanation for why we do not see more apparent differences between candidate types, and one that is consistent with my theoretical argument, is that the content of populist messages matters more for resonance (and by extension, engagement) than whether or not the actor is characterized as a populist candidate. However, additional research is needed.

Discussion

Although populism is highly prevalent in elections worldwide, we know little about how individuals respond to populist content during campaigns. To address this lacuna, I investigate whether the populist discursive frame is associated with higher online engagement compared to alternative discursive frames commonly used in liberal democracies, including pluralism, technocracy, and neutral discourse. I evaluate these alternatives using novel measures of online engagement, likes and retweets, which offer an untapped way to measure mass media effects that impact both individual behaviors as well as the success of an actors' social media campaign.

I theorize that populism is strategically advantageous for engagement based on framing theory. In particular, I hypothesize that the populist discursive frame resonates more than the alternative conceptualizations of the people versus the elites based on its narrative structure. I find tentative support for this claim. In a pooled model, populist content is associated with higher likes and retweets across all alternative discursive frames. I then turn to the data to identify and evaluate what it is about the populist message that is effective, finding that the narrative of the people versus the elites and negative attacks against elites, in particular, appear to be driving the findings, while an actor's identity as a populist does not.

What do we learn about populism from these results? First, my findings highlight the generalizability of populist rhetoric across eighteen actors spanning five countries, two regions, and the left-right political spectrum. With the exception of Lega, actors tend to employ the populist discursive frame similarly across contexts. Thus, these results add to the growing body of scholarship that argues for a core conceptualization of populism as the people versus the elites rather than a left- or right-specific interpretation (see, e.g., Hawkins et al. 2018). Second, I illustrate the importance of context in determining which discursive frames are more effective in competing with populism. In Mexico, Colombia, and Spain, citizens seem particularly susceptible to populism, while in Brazil and Italy, populism displays only limited advantages and only for retweets. These results defy easy classification: populism performed well in Mexico (AMLO), but Bolsonaro also won in Brazil, where the model did not perform as well. In Europe, Spain showed a stronger associated advantage for populism, yet the populist parties in Italy (Lega, MS5) received more votes than in Spain. While I suspect that these differences are partially attributable to the way that actors communicate, further research combining receptivity to content with a deeper contextual analysis would be insightful in explaining these differences.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

A.1 Average Likes by Discursive Frame

Discursive frame	% of sample (unweighted)	Avg. Likes	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Populism	20.36%	4,805	10,239	2	115,650
Pluralism	10.91%	2,983	5,889	1	50,251
Technocracy	33.48%	2,732	8,477	1	107,410
Neutral	35.26%	4,992	10,747	1	91,000

A.2 Average Retweets by Discursive Frame

Discursive frame	% of sample (unweighted)	Avg. Retweets	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Populism	20.36%	2,281	3,530	2	26,056
Pluralism	10.91%	1,100	1,831	3	12,340
Technocracy	33.48%	1,101	2,576	1	33,211
Neutral	35.26%	1,698	3008	2	21,000

A.3 Examples of Tweets falling under each discursive frame

The Tweets below are meant to show representative examples of the range of Tweets that fit under each discursive frame. Readers interested in the decision-making process to determine each discursive frame are directed to the codebook in Appendix E.1.

Discursive Frame	"Higher" fit examples	"Lower" fit examples
Populism	For the first time a candidate who represents the citizens and not the politicking that always stole dreams from Colombia, disputes the power. Let us not lose the historic opportunity for change and to send garbage to corruption. Just an X to make history.	We are not against the businessmen, we are against the ill-gotten wealth, the one that they obtain overnight, under the protection of public power, corrupt politicians and influence peddlers
Pluralism	We want an inclusive, non-exclusionary Spain, which treats its people well and seeks justice and well-being. A fair country that makes us proud to be Spanish and Spanish.	Political problems are resolved with dialogue, in Spain there is no need for a reconquest, there is no need to bring soldiers to Catalonia, reconciliation is needed.'
Technocracy	I share my editorial in the Dallas Morning News @dallasnews about the capacity and the level of dialogue that the next President of Mexico should have in his relations with the United States, at all levels.	One of the key points of our program is less taxes for families and businesses. We will succeed in the Flat Tax, a single rate for all of 23% which will guarantee real economic growth, new jobs and a revival of investments."

Neutral	We have come a long way together and we are one step away from the Great Dream, to change our country! We look forward to seeing you all for the last stage of the Rally for Italy, Friday #2marzo at Piazza del Popolo in Rome!	Good morning Barranquilla. Today we start at @udeatlantico, we will share with students and show that with education, we can

A.4 Schema Validation

To determine which actors are populist and not populist, I compare five existing measures of populism: The Global Populism Database, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Survey, the Populist and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA), the and the Global Party Survey.

The Global Populism Database (GPD) classifies how populist a candidate is based on speeches, ranking candidate and politicians' scores along a 0-2 scale with four classification benchmarks: not populist (0-0.49); somewhat populist (0.5-0.99); populist (1-1.49); very populist (1.5-2).[50] Note that the GPD classifies political candidates/actors only, not parties. Every political actor in the analysis was evaluated by at least one of these comparative data sets.

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) relies on the opinion of political experts. In 2017, CHES asked experts to classify parties according to two dimensions: the people versus the elite and the salience of anti-elite rhetoric, each on a 0-10 scale with 0 indicating a non-populist perception of this party, and 10 indicating a populist response.[51] For ease of interpretation, I use the following classification benchmarks in my data set: not populist (0-2.49); somewhat populist (2.5-4.99); populist (5-7.49); and very populist (7.5-10). Not all parties/candidates are present in each data set.

The Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Survey (NEGex) also relies on political experts for elections between 2016-2018. NEGex asks experts to rate candidates on three populist dimensions: identification with the people, respect for opponents (which I refer to as anti-elite), and simplicity of the message.[52] Note that NEGex classifies political candidates/actors only, not parties. I impose the following cut-off points that are based on the answer choices of experts: not populist (all scores are below 3.0), somewhat populist (only one element of populism exceeds 3.0), and populist (at least two elements of populism exceed 3.0).

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[50] More information can be found at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/06/how-we-combed-leaders-speeches-to-gauge-populist-rise; the data can be found at https://populism.byu.edu/Pages/Data.

[51] The people versus elites question asks: "Some political parties take the position that "the people" should have the final say on the most important issues, for example, by voting directly in referendums. At the opposite pole are political parties that believe that elected representatives should make the most important political decisions. Where do the parties fall on this dimension?" The anti-elite rhetoric question asks: "Next, we would like you to think about the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric for a party. How important was the anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric to the parties in their public stance?" Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2017 Codebook: www.chesdata.eu.

[52] The surveys ask experts: *And how would you say that the following statements apply to {candidate}? In your opinion, {candidate} might be someone who...1)* Identifies with common people, 2) Uses informal style, popular language, and 3) Uses anti-establishment/elite rhetoric. The answer choices are 0-4, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The scores presented are averages from all experts that evaluated a particular actor. Data and documentation can be found at https://www.alessandro-nai.com/negex-data.

The Global Party Survey (GPS) (conducted in 2019) is also based on the judgments of political experts. According to its codebook,[53] "The core measure operationalizing the minimalist conceptualization of populist rhetoric, treated as antithetical to pluralist rhetoric, uses the following measure:

"Parties can also be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric.

POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail.

By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power.

Where would you place each party on the following scale? 0 Strongly favors pluralist rhetoric…10 Strongly favors populist rhetoric"

Although the GPS contains separate measures for different components of populism, I rely on the single measure based on how it is treated in the codebook as the overarching measurement of populist discourse. This measure is demarcated into four categories: strongly populist, moderately populist, moderately pluralist, and strongly pluralist.

The **Populist and Political Parties Expert Survey (POPPA)** is an expert survey that was conducted in 2018 and evaluates "250 parties on key attributes related to populism, political style, party ideology, and party organization in 28 European countries."[54] To determine whether a party is considered populist or not, I used the "populist" variable, which is described as:

"Variable based on the factor regression scores of the following items: 'manichean', 'indivisble', 'generalwill', 'peoplecentrism', and 'antielitism'."

Like some of the above datasets, I impose artificial benchmarks for a general comparison in order to infer whether a party leans populist or not. This exercise is meant to serve as a general comparison exercise and not as a precise classification of the authors' data.

FI is somewhat more puzzling: in this sample, FI uses only 8% populist frames. This result is consistent with Bobba and Roncarolo (2018), who classify only 8.1% of FI's Tweets as populist. The divergence could be a product of the enigmatic figure of Berlusconi, who may appear populist without using a significant amount of populist frames. It is also worth noting that Berlusconi just makes the "somewhat populist" benchmark of The Global Populism database.

[53] The codebook and related materials are accessible at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/WMGTNS/2WNIVR&version=2.1.
[54] Per the codebook, which can be accessed here: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/8NEL7B

Leader:	AMLO (MEX)	Anaya (MEX)	Meade (MEX)	Duque (COL)	Petro (COL)	Fajardo (COL)	Bolsonaro (BRZ)	Haddad (BRZ)	Gomes (BRZ)
Speech Results (Hawkins)	Very populist (1.6)	Somewhat populist (.60)	Not populist (.01)	Not populist (.075)	Somewhat populist (.95)	Not populist (.0375)	Somewhat populist (.5)	*Not rated*	*Not rated*
NEGex (Nai)— pro-people, anti-elite, simple messaging	Populist (3.91, 3.73, 3.82)	Not populist (0.83, 1.17, 1.25)	*Not rated*	Not populist (1.33, 2.57, 1.0)	Populist (3.88, 3.88, 3.88)	*Not rated*	Populists (2.33, 3.13, 3.33)	Not populist (2.75, 2.13, 2.63)	Not populist (2.6, 2.8, 2.6)
Global Party Survey (2019)	Very populist	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	Very populist	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	Very Populist	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	*Not rated*
THIS STUDY	**Populist (3/3)**	**Not populist (2/3)**	**Not populist (2/2)**	**Not populist (2/3)**	**Populist (2/2)**	**Not populist (1/1)**	**Populist (3/3)**	**Not populist (2/2)**	**Not Populist (1/1)**

Leader:	FI (IT)	M5S (IT)	PD (IT)	LN (IT)	PSOE (ESP)	Vox (ESP)	PP (ESP)	Podemos (ESP)	C's (ESP)
Speech Results (Hawkins)	Somewhat populist (.5) **Berlusconi	Populist (1.15) **Di Maio	Not populist (.1) ** Renzi	Populist (1.05) ** Salvini	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	*Not rated*
NEGex (Nai)—anti-elite, pro-people, simple messaging	Not populist (2.22, 2.89, 1.44) **Berlusconi	Somewhat populist (2.60, 2.80, 3.0) **Di Maio	Somewhat populist (1.71, 3.57 1.71,) ** Renzi	Populist (3.38, 3.5, 3.38) ** Salvini	Not populist	Populist (2.79, 3.29, 3.29) **Santiago Abascal	Not Populist (1.36, 2.21, 0.4) **Pablo Casado	*Not rated*	*Not rated*
CHES (people vs. elites; anti-elite salience)	Somewhat populist (3.75; 3.61)	Very populist (9.75; 10)	Not populist (2.75; 2.46)	Very populist (7.83; 7.85)	Not populist/ somewhat populist (3.5; 2.1)	*Not rated*	Not populist (.78; 1)	Very populist (8.78; 8.64)	Somewhat populist (3.65; 5.38)
Global Party Survey (2019)	Very populist **rated as a coalition	Very populist	Very pluralist (not populist)	Very populist **rated as a coalition	Moderately pluralist	Very populist	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	Moderately populist	Moderately pluralist

			**rated as a coalition		(not populist)				(not populist)
POPPA	Populist 5.6/10	Populist 9.45/10	Not populist 2.1/10	Populist 8.6/10	Not populist 2.55/10	*Not rated*	Not populist 2.74/10	Populist 7.8/10	Not populist 3.26/10
THIS STUDY	**Populist (3/4)**	**Populist (5/5)**	**Not populist (4/5)**	**Populist (5/5)**	**Not populist (4/4)**	**Populist (2/2)**	**Not populist (4/4)**	**Populist (3/3)**	**Not populist (2/3)**

A.5: Representative Examples of the Most Liked & Retweeted Tweets of Populist Candidates

Populist Candidate	Popular Liked Messages	Popular Retweeted Messages
Lega (IT)	WAITING TO PAY THE PENSIONS ... **Mohamed M.** *[an immigrant]* with precedents for theft, robbery, violation of the law	"It is difficult to be accepted by Europeans and Americans, due to the number of **my compatriots** *[immigrants]* held in Prison. Stay at home *[in Nigeria]!*" *[quoting the Nigerian president]*
Petro (COL)	**The citizens** are ready to debate with **the corrupt politicking** represented in Duque *[opposition candidate]*. Just tell me day and time. A hug to **all Colombia that wants change**!	The biggest coalition of my candidacy is with **you**. Today **society** has the great power of a single X *[referring to the physical act of placing an "X" for the desired candidate on the ballot]* on June 17, to send to hell **all the political corruption in Colombia**. This is the second opportunity of **the races** *[marginalized individuals]* sentenced to 100 years of loneliness of violence.
Vox (ESP)	@Ortega_Smith *[party official]* has defended in Brussels what **millions of Spaniards** think. Soon we will have MEPs who will defend in the European Parliament our identity and sovereignty against **the separatists, progressives, globalist bureaucrats and supremacists of the hembrismo**	On April 28, your vote to VOX will be the biggest zasca to **progressive media**
Podemos (ESP)	"We wanted to make a program of strict application of the articles of the Spanish Constitution that protects **people**, inviting the self-styled constitutionalists to discuss with us their application."	This is PODEMOS: "Every minute of our work has been dedicated to defending the interests of **those who do not have the telephone number of the bank or of the big construction companies**".
MS5 (IT)	The **old politics** is at sunset. Only the last pale rays remain that still delude the **aficionados of leaders and smaller leaders of top-down, pyramidal structures**. On 4 March, together, **we** can change the history of this country	The **center-right** lasted 24 hours: **@matteosalvinimi** *[opposition candidate]* will you continue to make fun of the **voters**?
AMLO (MEX)	We finished the tour of the border, in addition to reaffirming our position in relation to the United States, we announced our projects to turn Mexico into an economic powerhouse with work, justice and peace. Never again will **young people** be forgotten.	We are not against the businessmen, we are against the ill-gotten wealth, the one that they obtain overnight, under the protection of public power, **corrupt politicians and influence peddlers**
Cs (ESP)	There were electoral debates despite the obstacles of **Sanchez** *[incumbent PM]*! Luckily, democracy won. "Rosa Maria Mateo should resign because public television is not from Sanchez, it belongs to **all Spaniards"**	@BalEdmundo "I am a public servant unjustly dismissed by **the Sanchez government** for fulfilling my obligation: to work honestly for our country as a State lawyer" #RiveraUne
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	Ignore this bad news saying that we want to recreate the CPMF. Do not proceed. **They** want you to panic because **they** are panicking about our chance to win. Nobody can take any more taxes, we are aware of this. Good evening **everyone**!	There are several signs that indicate that a government has authoritarian bias. Alliance with dictatorships, media control, disarmament of citizens, rigging of institutions and corruption as a way to nullify powers are examples, and all are present in the **PT** *[opposition party]*. We repudiate all this!

Note: Author's clarifying comments presented in *[ ]*. Links removed for presentation purposes.

A.6: Percentage of negative, neutral, and positive language by discursive frame

Discursive frame	**Negative**	**Neutral**	**Positive**	**% of Sample (weighted)**
Populism	78.8%	9.9%	11.3%	18.9%
Pluralism	8.6%	53.5%	37.8%	11.1%
Technocracy	11.4%	59.6%	29.0%	34.5%
Neutral	6.8%	40.8%	52.3%	35.5%

A.7: Percentage of each discursive frame by country

Discursive frame	**Mexico**	**Colombia**	**Brazil**	**Italy**	**Spain**
Populism	13.5% (35)	19.6% (51)	10.8% (28)	30.0% (95)	23.2% (107)
Pluralism	15.8% (41)	13.5% (35)	10.4% (27)	5.7% (18)	11.1% (51)
Technocracy	27.3% (71)	40.4% (105)	30.0% (78)	37.2% (118)	31.9% (147)
Neutral	43.6% (113)	26.5% (69)	48.9% (127)	27.1% (86)	33.7% (155)

Appendix B: Statistical Assumptions

The main assumption in this analysis is the use of candidate fixed effects to capture candidate differences. I use candidate fixed effects to control for the possibility that 1) the populist candidates have more followers and thus more likes, 2) populist candidates simply generate more engagement, and 3) candidates Tweet at different frequencies. Candidate fixed effects are employed as a catch-all category for the multitude of differences that could occur between candidates across the political spectrum in two distinct regions. Fixed effects are an imperfect way to get around data constraints in trying to measure theoretically relevant aspects of candidate differences, while also theoretically capturing more than one particular candidate attribute.

The number of followers was considered as an alternative. However, this measure has drawbacks, notably in terms of data availability. An ideal measure would capture the number of followers for each individual Tweet. However, to my knowledge, that is not a metric that is obtainable except in real-time, and the data in this analysis were obtained after the elections were complete. The second-best option would be to have an accurate measure of the number of followers immediately before the election results are released. The idea behind the urgency is that I suspect is that follower counts after the elections take place favor the winners. From a theoretical standpoint, I can see it being the case that once a candidate loses, there is at least a minor wave of losing followers, while the winner would get additional followers they might not have had during the campaign. Unfortunately, I only have the follower count as of the time the research was beginning in earnest, in March of 2019. Thus, the follower counts I have were collected 6-12 months after the initial elections, which is problematic if my assertion about post-election winner's bias is correct.

The below graph demonstrates that there is a strongly positive relationship between the magnitude of the candidate fixed effects and candidates' number of followers. The graph represents the relationship for retweets, using the main model in the paper (Figure 2) which includes each individual discursive frame (with populism as the base), candidate fixed effects, and controls for mentions, hashtags, and media links. AMLO is used as the reference category because AMLO has the highest number of followers and generates more likes than all other candidates at statistically distinguishable levels. The correlation between the number of followers and candidate fixed effects is .76. This correlation indicates that incorporating fixed effects in the main model of interest does a good job of capturing the number of

followers, in addition to other aspects that differentiate candidates from one another. Given the data limitations noted above, I opt to include fixed effects instead of followers.



Appendix C: Full Regression Results

C.1: Full model corresponding to Figure 2

	Likes (Logged)	**Retweets** (Logged)
Discursive frames (Populism as base)		
Pluralism	-0.31***	-0.35***
	(0.10)	(0.09)
Technocracy	-0.27***	-0.29***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Neutral	-0.24***	-0.35***
	(0.07)	(0.07)
Candidate Fixed Effects (AMLO as base)		
Anaya (MEX)	-2.03***	-1.90***
	(0.16)	(0.15)
Meade (MEX)	-1.69***	-1.24***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Duque (COL)	-2.85***	-2.51***
	(0.16)	(0.15)
Petro (COL)	-1.95***	-0.37***
	(0.14)	(0.13)
Fajardo (COL)	-2.55***	-2.69***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Podemos (ESP)	-3.66***	-3.00***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
PP (ESP)	-4.23***	-3.63***
	(0.16)	(0.15)
PSOE (ESP)	-4.39***	-3.58***
	(0.16)	(0.15)
Cs (ESP)	-4.74***	-3.98***

	(0.16)	(0.15)
Vox (ESP)	-1.98***	-1.67***
	(0.14)	(0.13)
M5S (IT)	-3.54***	-3.08***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Lega (IT)	-6.90***	-6.64***
	(0.14)	(0.13)
PD(IT)	-3.99***	-3.63***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
FI (IT)	-5.82***	-5.27***
	(0.16)	(0.15)
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.13	-0.38***
	(0.14)	(0.13)
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.84***	-2.16***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Gomez (BRZ)	-2.65***	-3.43***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Controls		
Mentions	-0.21***	-0.30***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Hashtags	0.06	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Media Link	-0.36***	-0.24***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	10.11***	9.09***
	(0.12)	(0.11)
Observations	1,576	1,576
R-squared	0.80	0.80

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C.1.A: Likes, region and country-by-country breakdown

While the results are stronger for both likes and retweets in Latin America compared to Europe, there does not appear to be a regional trend of populism being effective *only* in the Latin American countries considered. This finding provides preliminary empirical evidence that individual (online) behavior is generalizable across cases, regions, and the political ideological spectrum. To briefly summarize these findings, the Latin American region more closely approximates the pooled model results. However, the European cases do display similar tendencies, especially as it relates to the comparative advantage of populist rhetoric over neutral rhetoric in particular, as well as technocratic rhetoric for retweets. That said, populism does not show the same advantage over pluralistic language in Europe, which is a substantively interesting finding.

At the country level, the pooled model does not fit the Italian case as well as the others. The only significant finding in this case is that populist rhetoric is associated with more engagement compared to neutral rhetoric, but only when the dependent variable is retweets. Meanwhile, Colombia's results have much higher magnitudes than the full model, an intriguing finding given that the populist in that election (Petro) lost the election in the second round.

Overall, these findings provide interesting variation that suggests that the comparative effectiveness of discursive frames at generating engagement depends in part on context. The pooled results show that, on average and within this sample, populism is associated with more engagement compared to all other examined discursive frames. In individual countries, populism may not be more effective than every alternative. This finding could provide interesting grounds for future research that combines the study of framing effects with the role of context—for example, what discursive frames are most effective at competing with populism in different countries?

Region (Likes as DV)

	(1) Full Model	(2) Latin America	(3) Europe
Discursive frames (Populism as base)			
Pluralism	-0.31***	-0.50***	-0.04
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.14)
Technocracy	-0.27***	-0.45***	-0.12
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.10)
Neutral	-0.24***	-0.22**	-0.24**
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Candidate Fixed Effects			
AMLO (MEX)	*Base*		
Anaya (MEX)	-2.03***	-1.45***	
	(0.16)	(0.16)	
Meade (MEX)	-1.69***	-1.24***	
	(0.15)	(0.15)	
Duque (COL)	-2.85***	-2.21***	
	(0.16)	(0.17)	
Petro (COL)	-1.95***	-1.90***	
	(0.14)	(0.13)	
Fajardo (COL)	-2.55***	-2.00***	
	(0.15)	(0.16)	
Podemos (ESP)	-3.66***		
	(0.15)		
PP (ESP)	-4.23***		-0.54***
	(0.16)		(0.15)
PSOE (ESP)	-4.39***		-0.83***
	(0.16)		(0.15)
Cs (ESP)	-4.74***		-1.17***
	(0.16)		(0.14)

Vox (ESP)	-1.98***		1.81***
	(0.14)		(0.14)
M5S (IT)	-3.54***		0.31**
	(0.15)		(0.16)
Lega (IT)	-6.90***		-2.94***
	(0.14)		(0.16)
PD(IT)	-3.99***		-0.14
	(0.15)		(0.16)
FI (IT)	-5.82***		-2.13***
	(0.16)		(0.16)
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.13	0.17	
	(0.14)	(0.13)	
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.84***	-1.46***	
	(0.15)	(0.15)	
Gomez (BRZ)	-2.65***	-2.14***	
	(0.15)	(0.16)	
Controls			
Mentions	-0.21***	-0.27***	-0.15*
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Hashtags	0.06	-0.51***	0.42***
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Media Link	-0.36***	-0.43***	-0.18*
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Constant	10.11***	10.21***	5.92***
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.17)
Observations	1,576	780	796
R-squared	0.80	0.62	0.67

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Country-by-Country, Likes

	(1) Full Model	(2) Mexico	(3) Colombia	(4) Brazil	(5) Italy	(6) Spain
Discursive frames						
(Populism as base)						
Pluralism	-0.31***	-0.30**	-0.63***	-0.53	0.01	-0.13
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.18)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.16)
Technocracy	-0.27***	-0.18	-0.61***	-0.38	0.06	-0.29**
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.27)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Neutral	-0.24***	-0.05	-0.39**	-0.15	-0.06	-0.41***
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.26)	(0.17)	(0.12)
Candidate Fixed Effects						
AMLO (MEX)	*Base*					
Anaya (MEX)	-2.03***	-1.68***				
	(0.16)	(0.12)				
Meade (MEX)	-1.69***	-1.45***				
	(0.15)	(0.11)				
Duque (COL)	-2.85***					
	(0.16)					
Petro (COL)	-1.95***		0.38**			
	(0.14)		(0.19)			
Fajardo (COL)	-2.55***		0.25*			
	(0.15)		(0.14)			
Podemos (ESP)	-3.66***					
	(0.15)					
PP (ESP)	-4.23***					-0.51***
	(0.16)					(0.14)
PSOE (ESP)	-4.39***					-0.71***
	(0.16)					(0.15)
Cs (ESP)	-4.74***					-1.11***
	(0.16)					(0.13)

Vox (ESP)	-1.98***					1.79***
	(0.14)					(0.14)
M5S (IT)	-3.54***					
	(0.15)					
Lega (IT)	-6.90***				-3.12***	
	(0.14)				(0.19)	
PD(IT)	-3.99***				-0.48**	
	(0.15)				(0.19)	
FI (IT)	-5.82***				-2.53***	
	(0.16)				(0.18)	
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.13					
	(0.14)					
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.84***			-1.46***		
	(0.15)			(0.21)		
Gomez (BRZ)	-2.65***			-2.07***		
	(0.15)			(0.24)		
Controls						
Mentions	-0.21***	-0.27***	0.15	-0.83***	-0.21	-0.10
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.15)	(0.10)
Hashtags	0.06	-0.24**	-0.37**	-0.82***	0.55***	0.29***
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.17)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.10)
Media Link	-0.36***	-0.17**	-0.60***	-0.50***	-0.32**	0.11
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Constant	10.11***	9.82***	8.02***	10.45***	6.15***	5.80***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.19)
Observations	1,576	260	260	260	336	460
R-squared	0.80	0.78	0.37	0.56	0.65	0.58

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C.1.B: Retweets, region and country-by-country breakdown

Region, Retweets

	(1) Full Model	(2) Latin America	(3) Europe
Discursive frames (Populism as base)			
Pluralism	-0.35***	-0.45***	-0.15
	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Technocracy	-0.29***	-0.36***	-0.22**
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Neutral	-0.35***	-0.29***	-0.38***
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.09)
Candidate Fixed Effects			
AMLO (MEX)	*Base*		
Anaya (MEX)	-1.90***	-1.46***	
	(0.15)	(0.17)	
Meade (MEX)	-1.24***	-0.91***	
	(0.14)	(0.16)	
Duque (COL)	-2.51***	-2.03***	
	(0.15)	(0.18)	
Petro (COL)	-0.37***	-0.36***	
	(0.13)	(0.14)	
Fajardo (COL)	-2.69***	-2.27***	
	(0.14)	(0.16)	
Podemos (ESP)	-3.00***		
	(0.14)		
PP (ESP)	-3.63***		-0.60***
	(0.15)		(0.13)
PSOE (ESP)	-3.58***		-0.65***
	(0.15)		(0.13)

Cs (ESP)	-3.98***		-1.04***
	(0.15)		(0.12)
Vox (ESP)	-1.67***		1.44***
	(0.13)		(0.12)
M5S (IT)	-3.08***		0.10
	(0.14)		(0.14)
Lega (IT)	-6.64***		-3.39***
	(0.13)		(0.14)
PD(IT)	-3.63***		-0.41***
	(0.14)		(0.14)
FI (IT)	-5.27***		-2.19***
	(0.15)		(0.14)
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	-0.38***	-0.38***	
	(0.13)	(0.13)	
Haddad (BRZ)	-2.16***	-1.89***	
	(0.14)	(0.16)	
Gomez (BRZ)	-3.43***	-3.05***	
	(0.14)	(0.16)	
Controls			
Mentions	-0.30***	-0.37***	-0.24***
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)
Hashtags	0.04	-0.42***	0.35***
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Media Link	-0.24***	-0.34***	-0.01
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	9.09***	9.18***	5.60***
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.15)
Observations	1,576	780	796
R-squared	0.80	0.65	0.72

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Country-by-Country, Retweets

	(1) Full Model	(2) Mexico	(3) Colombia	(4) Brazil	(5) Italy	(6) Spain
Discursive frames						
(Populism as base)						
Pluralism	-0.35***	-0.38***	-0.63***	-0.29	-0.34	-0.17
	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.41)	(0.28)	(0.17)
Technocracy	-0.29***	-0.07	-0.45**	-0.79**	-0.10	-0.29**
	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.18)	(0.34)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Neutral	-0.35***	-0.21*	-0.37*	-0.51	-0.34**	-0.40***
	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.32)	(0.15)	(0.13)
Candidate Fixed Effects						
AMLO (MEX)	*Base*					
Anaya (MEX)	-1.90***	-1.70***				
	(0.15)	(0.15)				
Meade (MEX)	-1.24***	-1.06***				
	(0.14)	(0.13)				
Duque (COL)	-2.51***					
	(0.15)					
Petro (COL)	-0.37***		1.71***			
	(0.13)		(0.25)			
Fajardo (COL)	-2.69***		-0.24			
	(0.14)		(0.18)			
Podemos (ESP)	-3.00***					
	(0.14)					
PP (ESP)	-3.63***					-0.68***
	(0.15)					(0.16)
PSOE (ESP)	-3.58***					-0.60***
	(0.15)					(0.17)
Cs (ESP)	-3.98***					-1.06***
	(0.15)					(0.15)
Vox (ESP)	-1.67***					1.31***

	(0.13)					(0.15)
M5S (IT)	-3.08***					
	(0.14)					
Lega (IT)	-6.64***				-3.45***	
	(0.13)				(0.17)	
PD(IT)	-3.63***				-0.49***	
	(0.14)				(0.17)	
FI (IT)	-5.27***				-2.37***	
	(0.15)				(0.16)	
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	-0.38***					
	(0.13)					
Haddad (BRZ)	-2.16***			-1.17***		
	(0.14)			(0.30)		
Gomez (BRZ)	-3.43***			-1.74***		
	(0.14)			(0.33)		
Controls						
Mentions	0.04	-0.21*	-0.00	-1.02***	0.33**	0.19*
	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Hashtags	-0.24***	-0.14	-0.64***	-0.41**	-0.00	0.23
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.13)	(0.16)
Media Link	9.09***	8.95***	6.95***	9.00***	5.63***	5.47***
	(0.11)	(0.14)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.18)	(0.21)
Constant	0.04	-0.21*	-0.00	-1.02***	0.33**	0.19*
	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Observations	1,576	170	170	170	240	310
R-squared	0.80	0.79	0.69	0.57	0.76	0.53

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C.1.C: Full model with candidate fixed effects compared to using country fixed effects (Likes and Retweets)

	(1) Main Model Candidate FE Likes	(2) Alt. Model Country FE Likes	(3) Main Model Candidate FE Retweets	(4) Alt. Model Country FE Retweets
Discursive frames (Populism as base)				
Pluralism	-0.31***	-0.54***	-0.35***	-0.62***
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.13)
Technocracy	-0.27***	-0.49***	-0.29***	-0.56***
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Neutral	-0.24***	-0.21**	-0.35***	-0.38***
	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Candidate Fixed Effects (AMLO as base)				
Anaya (MEX)	-2.03***		-1.90***	
	(0.16)		(0.15)	
Meade (MEX)	-1.69***		-1.24***	
	(0.15)		(0.14)	
Duque (COL)	-2.85***		-2.51***	
	(0.16)		(0.15)	
Petro (COL)	-1.95***		-0.37***	
	(0.14)		(0.13)	
Fajardo (COL)	-2.55***		-2.69***	
	(0.15)		(0.14)	
Podemos (ESP)	-3.66***		-3.00***	
	(0.15)		(0.14)	
PP (ESP)	-4.23***		-3.63***	
	(0.16)		(0.15)	

PSOE (ESP)	-4.39***		-3.58***	
	(0.16)		(0.15)	
Cs (ESP)	-4.74***		-3.98***	
	(0.16)		(0.15)	
Vox (ESP)	-1.98***		-1.67***	
	(0.14)		(0.13)	
M5S (IT)	-3.54***		-3.08***	
	(0.15)		(0.14)	
Lega (IT)	-6.90***		-6.64***	
	(0.14)		(0.13)	
PD(IT)	-3.99***		-3.63***	
	(0.15)		(0.14)	
FI (IT)	-5.82***		-5.27***	
	(0.16)		(0.15)	
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.13		-0.38***	
	(0.14)		(0.13)	
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.84***		-2.16***	
	(0.15)		(0.14)	
Gomez (BRZ)	-2.65***		-3.43***	
	(0.15)		(0.14)	
Country Fixed Effects (Mexico as base)				
Colombia		-1.23***		-0.77***
		(0.12)		(0.12)
Spain		-2.51***		-2.04***
		(0.12)		(0.12)
Italy		-4.15***		-3.98***
		(0.12)		(0.11)
Brazil		-0.25**		-0.99***
		(0.12)		(0.12)
Controls				
Mentions	-0.21***	-0.11	-0.30***	-0.17**

	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.09)
Hashtags	0.06	-0.61***	0.04	-0.73***
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Media Link	-0.36***	-0.63***	-0.24***	-0.69***
	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Constant	10.11***	9.57***	9.09***	8.97***
	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Observations	1,576	1,576	1,576	1,576
R-squared	0.80	0.58	0.80	0.53

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Model

C.2: Full model with the inclusion of negative tone (Mechanism 1, corresponding to Table 2)

Valence is operationalized as a dummy variable for negative language/tone versus non-negative (a pooled category including positive and neutral language).

	Likes	**Re-Tweets**
	(Logged)	(Logged)
Discursive strategies (Populism as base)		
Pluralism	-0.21*	-0.12
	(0.11)	(0.10)
Technocracy	-0.17*	-0.07
	(0.09)	(0.08)
Neutral	-0.12	-0.10
	(0.09)	(0.08)
Valence		
Negative Tone (1=negative, 0=else)	0.16**	0.35***
	(0.08)	(0.07)
Candidate Fixed Effects (AMLO as base)		
Anaya (MEX)	-2.04***	-1.92***

	(0.16)	(0.15)
Meade (MEX)	-1.71***	-1.29***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Duque (COL)	-2.86***	-2.53***
	(0.16)	(0.15)
Petro (COL)	-1.96***	-0.40***
	(0.14)	(0.13)
Fajardo (COL)	-2.55***	-2.70***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Podemos (ESP)	-3.66***	-3.00***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
PP (ESP)	-4.25***	-3.67***
	(0.16)	(0.15)
PSOE (ESP)	-4.41***	-3.63***
	(0.16)	(0.15)
Cs (ESP)	-4.76***	-4.02***
	(0.16)	(0.14)
Vox (ESP)	-1.99***	-1.68***
	(0.14)	(0.13)
M5S (IT)	-3.56***	-3.13***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Lega (IT)	-6.93***	-6.70***
	(0.14)	(0.13)
PD(IT)	-4.00***	-3.64***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
FI (IT)	-5.85***	-5.32***
	(0.16)	(0.15)
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.12	-0.41***
	(0.14)	(0.13)
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.86***	-2.19***
	(0.15)	(0.14)
Gomez (BRZ)	-2.65***	-3.44***
	(0.15)	(0.14)

Controls		
Mentions	-0.21***	-0.29***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Hashtags	0.07	0.06
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Media Link	-0.36***	-0.23***
	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	9.99***	8.83***
	(0.13)	(0.13)
Observations	1,576	1,576
R-squared	0.80	0.80

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C.3: Full model with interaction term between populist frame and candidate type (Mechanism 2)

Populist Frame is operationalized as either a populist discursive frame or all other frames (pluralism, technocracy, and neutral). Populist Candidate is operationalized as a candidate that uses populist rhetoric regularly (8/18 candidates per Figure 1) versus non-populist candidates (10/18 candidate). Dichotomous coding was selected for ease of interpretation and to test the hypothesis of interest. Importantly, this model does not control for candidate fixed effects (and cannot, due to collinearity with candidate type). Accordingly, I control for the candidate's number of followers instead. Further discussion on these two measures is provided in Appendix B.

	Likes	**Retweets**
	(Logged)	(Logged)
Populist Candidate	-0.60***	-0.27***
	(0.10)	(0.09)
Populist Frame	0.24	0.41*
	(0.23)	(0.21)
Populist Candidate#Populist	-0.26	-0.31
Frame	(0.25)	(0.24)
Controls		
Followers	0.00***	0.00***

	(0.00)	(0.00)
Mentions	-0.25***	-0.08
	(0.08)	(0.08)
Hashtags	0.38***	0.39***
	(0.09)	(0.08)
Media Link	-0.46***	-0.50***
	(0.09)	(0.08)
Constant	5.62***	4.79***
	(0.11)	(0.10)
Observations	1,577	1,577
R-squared	0.51	0.52

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The following graphs are presented as additional evidence to Table 4, and visualize the results in the above table.





These graphs demonstrate that both types of candidates receive a boost when using a populist message, suggesting that the content of the populist message is more important than the messenger. Stated differently, the confidence intervals overlap, which means that I fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in engagement between populists and non-populists using a populist frame.

C4: Split sample of full model (**without** negative tone) by populist and non-populist candidate (Mechanism 2)

	(1) Full Model (Likes)	(2) Full Model (Retweets)	(3) Populists (Likes)	(4) Populists (Retweets)	(5) Non-Populists (Likes)	(6) Non-Populists (Retweets)
Discursive frames (Populism as base)						
Pluralism	-0.31***	-0.35***	-0.16	-0.15	-0.60***	-0.46**
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.17)	(0.19)
Technocracy	-0.27***	-0.29***	-0.22***	-0.21**	-0.48***	-0.36**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Neutral	-0.24***	-0.35***	-0.25***	-0.35***	-0.46***	-0.26
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.17)
Candidate Fixed Effects						
AMLO (MEX)	*Base*					
Anaya (MEX)	-2.03***	-1.90***				
	(0.16)	(0.15)				
Meade (MEX)	-1.69***	-1.24***			0.64***	0.33**
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.15)	(0.17)
Duque (COL)	-2.85***	-2.51***			-0.60***	-0.81***
	(0.16)	(0.15)			(0.15)	(0.16)
Petro (COL)	-1.95***	-0.37***	-1.81***	-0.25*		
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)		
Fajardo (COL)	-2.55***	-2.69***			-0.79***	-0.51***
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.15)	(0.17)
Podemos (ESP)	-3.66***	-3.00***	-3.70***	-3.02***		
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)		
PP (ESP)	-4.23***	-3.63***			-1.78***	-2.20***
	(0.16)	(0.15)			(0.16)	(0.18)
PSOE (ESP)	-4.39***	-3.58***			-1.71***	-2.35***
	(0.16)	(0.15)			(0.16)	(0.17)

Cs (ESP)	-4.74***	-3.98***	-4.77***	-3.98***		
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.16)		
Vox (ESP)	-1.98***	-1.67***	-1.98***	-1.64***		
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)		
M5S (IT)	-3.54***	-3.08***	-3.45***	-2.99***		
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)		
Lega (IT)	-6.90***	-6.64***	-6.90***	-6.63***		
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)		
PD(IT)	-3.99***	-3.63***			-1.82***	-2.04***
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.16)	(0.18)
FI (IT)	-5.82***	-5.27***			-3.40***	-3.82***
	(0.16)	(0.15)			(0.15)	(0.17)
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.13	-0.38***	0.22*	-0.31**		
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)		
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.84***	-2.16***			-0.31**	0.14
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.15)	(0.17)
Gomez (BRZ)	-2.65***	-3.43***			-1.53***	-0.61***
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.15)	(0.17)
Controls						
Mentions	-0.21***	-0.30***	-0.25***	-0.38***	-0.24***	-0.19**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Hashtags	0.06	0.04	0.13	0.11	-0.00	0.01
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Media Link	-0.36***	-0.24***	-0.11	-0.01	-0.39***	-0.53***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Constant	10.11***	9.09***	9.85***	8.85***	7.49***	8.31***
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.19)	(0.21)
Observations	1,576	1,576	776	776	800	800
R-squared	0.80	0.80	0.88	0.87	0.60	0.63

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C4.A: Split sample of full model (**without** negative tone) by populist and non-populist candidate interpreted as relative magnitudes

Relative Magnitudes Compared to a Populist Frame

Model	Pluralism	Technocracy	Neutral
Pooled sample (N=1,577) (as shown in Figure 2)	-26.9%*** (likes) -29.5%*** (retweets)	-23.6%*** -25.2%***	-20.9%*** -29.9%***
Non-populist candidates only (N=800)	-45.1%*** (likes) -36.9%** (retweets)	-38.1%*** -30.2%**	-36.9%*** -22.9%
Populist candidates only (N=776)	-14.8% (likes) -16.2% (retweets)	-19.7%*** -18.9%**	-22.1*** -29.5%***

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1;

C.5: Split sample of full model (**with** negative tone) by populist and non-populist candidate (Mechanism 2, corresponding to Table 4)

	(1) Full Model (Likes)	(2) Full Model (Retweets)	(3) Populists (Likes)	(4) Populists (Retweets)	(5) Non-Populists (Likes)	(6) Non-Populists (Retweets)
Discursive frames						
(Populism as base)						
Pluralism	-0.21*	-0.12	-0.14	0.03	-0.38**	-0.32
	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.20)
Technocracy	-0.17*	-0.07	-0.20*	-0.03	-0.27*	-0.23
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Neutral	-0.12	-0.10	-0.22**	-0.16	-0.23	-0.13
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Valence						
Negative Tone	0.16**	0.35***	0.03	0.26***	0.40***	0.24**
(1=negative, 0=else)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.12)
Candidate Fixed Effects						
AMLO (MEX)	*Base*					
Anaya (MEX)	-2.04***	-1.92***				

	(0.16)	(0.15)				
Meade (MEX)	-1.71***	-1.29***			0.62***	0.31*
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.15)	(0.17)
Duque (COL)	-2.86***	-2.53***			-0.60***	-0.81***
	(0.16)	(0.15)			(0.15)	(0.16)
Petro (COL)	-1.96***	-0.40***	-1.81***	-0.29**		
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)		
Fajardo (COL)	-2.55***	-2.70***			-0.78***	-0.50***
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.15)	(0.17)
Podemos (ESP)	-3.66***	-3.00***	-3.70***	-3.02***		
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)		
PP (ESP)	-4.25***	-3.67***			-1.80***	-2.22***
	(0.16)	(0.15)			(0.16)	(0.18)
PSOE (ESP)	-4.41***	-3.63***			-1.74***	-2.36***
	(0.16)	(0.15)			(0.16)	(0.17)
Cs (ESP)	-4.76***	-4.02***	-4.77***	-4.01***		
	(0.16)	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.16)		
Vox (ESP)	-1.99***	-1.68***	-1.98***	-1.65***		
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.13)		
M5S (IT)	-3.56***	-3.13***	-3.46***	-3.04***		
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.14)		
Lega (IT)	-6.93***	-6.70***	-6.90***	-6.68***		
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)		
PD(IT)	-4.00***	-3.64***			-1.80***	-2.03***
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.16)	(0.17)
FI (IT)	-5.85***	-5.32***			-3.43***	-3.84***
	(0.16)	(0.15)			(0.15)	(0.17)
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.12	-0.41***	0.21*	-0.34***		
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.12)		
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.86***	-2.19***			-0.31**	0.14
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.15)	(0.17)
Gomez (BRZ)	-2.65***	-3.44***			-1.52***	-0.60***
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.15)	(0.17)

Controls						
Mentions	-0.21***	-0.29***	-0.24***	-0.37***	-0.23***	-0.19**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Hashtags	0.07	0.06	0.13	0.12	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Media Link	-0.36***	-0.23***	-0.11	-0.04	-0.35***	-0.51***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Constant	9.99***	8.83***	9.83***	8.68***	7.19***	8.13***
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.23)
Observations	1,576	1,576	776	776	800	800
R-squared	0.80	0.80	0.88	0.87	0.61	0.63

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix D: Robustness Checks

D.1: Discursive frame results using HLM with robust standard errors (corresponds to Figure 2)

	(1) Full Model (Likes)	(2) Full Model (Retweets)	(3) HLM Model (Likes)	(4) HLM Model (Retweets)
Discursive frames (Populism as base)				
Pluralism	-0.31***	-0.35***	-0.31***	-0.35***
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)
Technocracy	-0.27***	-0.29***	-0.27***	-0.29***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Neutral	-0.24***	-0.35***	-0.24**	-0.35***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.12)
Candidate Fixed Effects				
AMLO (MEX)	*Base*			
Anaya (MEX)	-2.03***	-1.90***	-2.03***	-1.90***
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.19)
Meade (MEX)	-1.69***	-1.24***	-1.69***	-1.24***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.15)
Duque (COL)	-2.85***	-2.51***	-2.85***	-2.51***
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.25)	(0.20)
Petro (COL)	-1.95***	-0.37***	-1.95***	-0.37***
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Fajardo (COL)	-2.55***	-2.69***	-2.55***	-2.69***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.22)	(0.18)
Podemos (ESP)	-3.66***	-3.00***	-3.66***	-3.00***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.18)	(0.15)
PP (ESP)	-4.23***	-3.63***	-4.23***	-3.63***

	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.18)	(0.16)
PSOE (ESP)	-4.39***	-3.58***	-4.39***	-3.58***
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.25)	(0.22)
Cs (ESP)	-4.74***	-3.98***	-4.74***	-3.98***
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.24)	(0.21)
Vox (ESP)	-1.98***	-1.67***	-1.98***	-1.67***
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.11)
M5S (IT)	-3.54***	-3.08***	-3.54***	-3.08***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Lega (IT)	-6.90***	-6.64***	-6.90***	-6.64***
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.04)	(0.04)
PD(IT)	-3.99***	-3.63***	-3.99***	-3.63***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.11)
FI (IT)	-5.82***	-5.27***	-5.82***	-5.27***
	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.21)	(0.16)
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.13	-0.38***	0.13***	-0.38***
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.84***	-2.16***	-1.84***	-2.16***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.13)
Gomez (BRZ)	-2.65***	-3.43***	-2.65***	-3.43***
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.16)
Controls				
Mentions	-0.21***	-0.30***	-0.21*	-0.30***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Hashtags	0.06	0.04	0.06	0.04
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.24)	(0.19)
Media Link	-0.36***	-0.24***	-0.36***	-0.24**
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.10)
Constant	10.11***	9.82***	10.11***	9.08***
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)

Observations	1,576	1,576	1,576	1,576
R-squared	0.80	0.78	0.37	0.56
Number of Groups			18	18

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

D.2: Comparing European parties to their party leaders

Country	*Candidate/Party*	*Campaign Tweets per Day*	No. of Followers*	Avg Likes	Avg. Retweets	% Retweets of party messages**
IT	**M5S**	1.1	655,000	540	309	NA
	Leader: Luigi Di Maio	1.5		1,139	538	25/127 (19.6%)
	Lega	21.8	63,200	21	10.7	NA
	Leader: Matteo Salvini	8		695	217	*Not available*
	PD	2.3	395,000	343	169	NA
	Leader: Matteo Renzi	2.6		1,259	371	8/177 (4.5%)
	FI	1.9	1,934	131	60	NA
	Leader: Silvio Berlusconi	*Not available*		*Not available*	*Not available*	*Not available*
ESP	**Podemos**	21	1,390,000	565	382	NA
	Leader: Pablo Iglesias	4		2,416	1,123	42/320 (13%)
	PP	22.3	709,000	290	198	NA

	Leader: Pablo Casado	7.3		856	450	179/691 (26%)
	PSOE	32.6	682,000	223	159	NA
	Leader: Pedro Sanchez	6.8		1,360	578	44/517 (8.5%)
	Cs	31.2	525,000	156	115	NA
	Leader: Albert Rivera	4.6		1,727	378	53/375 (14.1%)
	Vox	9.7	225,000	2,327	1,135	NA
	Leader: Santiago Abascal	3.8		5,254	2,578	293/556 (52.7%) 352/615* (57.2%)

Notes:

The likes/retweets is the average for the universe of Tweets during the campaigns for the party leaders, and the average for the sample of Tweets for parties

Lega's likes/retweets are based on a sample of 50, not the universe of Tweets

* As explained in Appendix B, the number of followers was collected in March 2019, not at the time of the campaign. See Appendix B for additional details.

** BEFORE retweets were removed from the sample; the campaign Tweets per day does not reflect any retweets

***(Abascal) represents 352 Tweets of Vox party accounts (including Vox for young people, Vox for specific regions, and mostly from "Vox noticias")

I do not include a comparative number of followers for party leaders because it would not be comparable to the parties, which was collected in March of 2019

D.3: Comparing a subsample of candidates and parties descriptively

I evaluate a subsample of party leaders. I opted to include one populist and one non-populist in both Italy and Spain. For the populists, I opted to examine MS5 and Vox because previous studies have provided some insights on the comparison between parties and party leaders for both Podemos (Casero-Ripollés 2017) and Lega (Bobba 2019; Bobba and Roncarolo 2018). For the non-populists, I included the incumbent/“establishment” leader: Pedro Sanchez (PSOE) and Matteo Renzi (PD). I include 50 Tweets

for each of these four leaders. An important divergence from the full sample is that I skipped the de-identification procedure for the coders, thus RAs were exposed to the identity of the speaker if media was attached.



D.4: Model specifications comparing a subset of leaders and parties

Models 3 and 4 include ONLY the subsample of party leaders, including Renzi (PD), Sanchez (PSOE), Di Maio (M5S), and Abascal (Vox). Models 5 and 6 include ONLY those four parties (not the nine European parties included in the full sample).

	(1) Full Model (Likes)	(2) Full Model (Retweets)	(3) Party Leaders (Likes)	(4) Party Leaders (Retweets)	(5) Parties (Likes)	(6) Parties (Retweets)
Discursive frames (Populism as base)						

Pluralism	-0.31***	-0.35***	-0.11	-0.18	-0.14	-0.25
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.16)	(0.15)
Technocracy	-0.27***	-0.29***	-0.28*	-0.32**	-0.06	-0.16
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Neutral	-0.23***	-0.35***	-0.49***	-0.67***	-0.09	-0.25**
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.10)
Candidate Fixed Effects						
AMLO (MEX)	*Base*					
Anaya (MEX)	-2.03***	-1.90***				
	(0.16)	(0.15)				
Meade (MEX)	-1.69***	-1.24***				
	(0.15)	(0.14)				
Duque (COL)	-2.85***	-2.51***				
	(0.16)	(0.15)				
Petro (COL)	-1.95***	-0.37***				
	(0.14)	(0.13)				
Fajardo (COL)	-2.55***	-2.69***				
	(0.15)	(0.14)				
Podemos (ESP)	-3.66***	-3.00***				
	(0.15)	(0.14)				
PP (ESP)	-4.23***	-3.63***				
	(0.16)	(0.15)				
PSOE (ESP)	-4.39***	-3.58***				
	(0.16)	(0.15)				
Cs (ESP)	-4.74***	-3.98***				
	(0.15)	(0.15)				
Vox (ESP)	-1.98***	-1.67***			2.43***	1.94***
	(0.14)	(0.13)			(0.12)	(0.11)
M5S (IT)	-3.54***	-3.08***			1.01***	0.64***
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.13)	(0.12)
Lega (IT)	-6.90***	-6.64***				

	(0.14)	(0.13)				
PD(IT)	-3.99***	-3.63***			0.58***	0.13
	(0.15)	(0.14)			(0.13)	(0.12)
FI (IT)	-5.82***	-5.27***				
	(0.16)	(0.15)				
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.13	-0.39***				
	(0.14)	(0.13)				
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.84***	-2.16***				
	(0.15)	(0.14)				
Gomez (BRZ)	-2.65***	-3.43***				
	(0.15)	(0.14)				
Sanchez (PSOE)			1.19***	1.32***		
			(0.17)	(0.15)		
Abascal (VOX)			-0.09	0.01		
			(0.16)	(0.14)		
Di Maio (MS5)			0.07	-0.29**		
			(0.15)	(0.13)		
Renzi (PD)			1.19***	1.32***		
			(0.17)	(0.15)		
Controls						
Mentions	-0.21***	-0.30***	-0.49***	-0.41***	-0.24***	-0.30***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Hashtags	0.06	0.05	-0.25**	-0.20*	0.07	0.09
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Media Link	-0.36***	-0.24***	0.06	0.14	0.06	0.10
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Constant	-0.21***	-0.30***	-0.49***	-0.41***	-0.24***	-0.30***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Observations	1,577	1,577	200	200	337	337
R-squared	0.80	0.80	0.52	0.65	0.69	0.65

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix E: Coding Information

E.1: Coding Procedures

Four research assistants (RAs) and the author coded the Tweets. I attempted to decrease bias and therefore enhance validity by limiting the information that the RAs received. I did not tell the RAs what concepts the master frames represented. I described the master frames in-depth in the codebook, but labeled them as "Type A," "Type B," "Type C," and "Neutral." While it is likely that the RAs recognized some of the conceptual underpinnings of the master frames, I put this procedure in place to ensure that no particular discursive frame was privileged.

Tweets were classified in a three-stage procedure. First, the Tweets were translated and **de-identified,** which included masking the candidate's identity, party, and date of the Tweet.[55] De-identification was carried out by the author or one trained multi-lingual RA. All Tweets were then randomized across candidates but within countries for language purposes. In some cases, the RAs needed to view the media attached to the Tweet to accurately code it, thus exposing the candidate's identity. Media that met this standard include threads or consecutive Tweets (Graham et al. 2014), short videos, news articles, links to longer posts, and infographics.[56] The inclusion of non-text in the coding decision is an important divergence from some studies (see, e.g., Bobba and Roncarolo 2018), and was made on the basis that non-text offer important contextual clues. Media that did not meet this standard (and were removed) include photos of the speaker or the crowd or images that duplicated the text of the Tweet. Next, **independent classification by two RAs** took place. RAs provided detailed explanations to justify their classification, which I factored into the final coding decision.[57] The intercoder reliability for the entire sample, presented using Krippendorff's alpha, is .65 (Krippendorff 2018).[58]

E.2: Intercoder Reliability Statistics

[55] Tweets were presented in their original language and in English using Google Translate. One undergraduate coder fluently spoke all three languages in this study and assisted in correcting the Google translations.
[56] About 1/3 of the Tweets in this sample contained relevant media that may have (though did not necessarily) revealed the speaker's identity.
[57] Consistent with Graham et al. (2014, 7), if RAs perceived multiple frames, they "were trained to use a set of rules and procedures for identifying the primary/dominant function and/or topic."
[58] The codebook is presented in Appendix E.2. Intercoder reliability information is presented in Appendix E.1.

	Coder 1 (author)	Coder 2	Coder 3	Coder 4	Coder 5	Total
Number of Tweets coded	498	188	1,099	850	494	
Agreement with final DISCURSIVE FRAME	.76	.45	.67	.65	.71	.70

Notes:

Intercoder reliability is computed using Krippendorff's alpha

E.3: Codebook

Overview

This coding manual is part of a broader project to evaluate presidential candidates' discourse on Twitter during their campaigns in Latin America and Europe. The main task you will be performing is coding different kinds of messages (i.e., frames) that candidates use.

Frames are a rhetorical device that speakers (in this case, politicians) use to communicate their ideas with a particular lens around them. For the purposes of this analysis, a frame is defined as a political actor imbedding meaning into a message by encouraging the listener to interpret an event or situation from a particular non-neutral perspective. Essentially, a frame is a way for politicians to convey information to their followers in a particular way.

This study looks to classify all the possible frames used by presidential candidates. While frames are the main topic of interest for this research project, there are also several other dimensions I'll be asking you to code.

Coding

Coding will take place in Redcap. The coding unit is a single Tweet. The Tweets will be "de-identified" to the extent possible; that is, ideally, you would not know which candidate sent the Tweet. In reality, however, that is not always possible—many Tweets mention specific cities or candidate names directly that will make it impossible not to know who is speaking (at the very least, what country they are from).

Furthermore, to code the Tweets, it may be necessary to view the media attached to the Tweet which will require you looking at the Tweet on twitter, thus exposing you to the speaker's identity. The primary concern is not that you know who is Tweeting, but that **even if you have previous knowledge of these candidates or countries more broadly, it is important to evaluate every single Tweet individually and without bias**. To help with this, the Tweets will be randomized between candidates and across dates.

The importance of looking at the media of the Tweet cannot be overstated: for example, one Tweet read:

"266: the number of jobs that Andres Manuel created as Head of Government."

From this alone, it is challenging if not impossible to understand if the speaker considers this a lot of jobs or not. However, if you navigate to the Tweet to see the image, you can clearly see that the speaker (in this case, Jose Antonio Meade of Mexico) considers 266 to be a very low number.

It also helps to look at the hashtags: those that refer to cities or locations could help you determine this is a campaign event (which helps you classify the function of the Tweet), while others may help you determine which frame to use.

What will be Coded (per Tweet)

Each Tweet will be coded according to 8 dimensions, each of which will be described below.

1) the discursive frame;

2) the relevant actors;

3) the sub-frame;

4) the difficulty in classifying the sub-frame;

5) the perceived strength of the frame;

6) the issue that the Tweet addresses; and

7) the function of the Tweet

8) whether the frame used positive, negative, or neutral language;

Some coding categories are dependent on your answers to previous coding categories. For example, the actor, discursive frame, sub-frame, difficulty classifying the sub-frames, and strength of the sub-frame are categories that are dependent on one another. For these categories, coding each Tweet in a particular sequence may make the identification of subsequent categories easier. However, sticking to a specific order is not absolutely critical. You may jump between categories as you decide on the proper categories. Other categories (the presence of positive or negative language, the issue, and the function of the Tweet) are independent: to code these categories, you only need the Tweet itself because your answer to these categories is not dependent on your answer to other categories. Below is a brief description of each category.

How to Code the Tweets

Before you start coding the Tweets, it is critical to **read for subtext or, stated differently, to take a holistic view of the Tweet,** rather than taking the Tweet at face value. What is the candidate saying between the lines? **Consider the Tweet as a whole before you start coding**, before breaking it into the constituent parts required by the coding categories.

Tweets can only be 280 characters; such short texts mean the sub-frames may not be immediately clear, but by reading for subtext, taking the "spirit" of the Tweet as a whole into consideration, and *then* coding each category, you should have arrived at your conclusions systematically. Reading the text as a whole will specifically help you determine the discursive frame, the first coding category.

1) Discursive frames

Discursive frames represent the highest level of aggregation. Conceptually, discursive frames refer to how people see the world in terms of who should hold power (Caramani 2017). There are 4 coding options for this category.

Discursive frame	**Who holds power (and who doesn't)?**
1 = Type A: views the political world as a divide between two groups: "the people," who are understood to be virtuous and comprise a majority of the population, and "the elites," who are vilified for their self-interest and lack of representation of what the people want ("the will of the people"). **Explanation:** The antagonism comes from the idea that power legitimately stems from "the people," but "the elites" have taken this power and do not represent the "will" of "the people." Thus, "the people" and "the elites" are engaged in a struggle for power, and that struggle is inherently moral in nature. This type views the political world in terms of a virtuous group (the people) that has been wronged by the enemy group (the elites).	The people should hold power (over the elites)
2 = Type B: advocates for power to be shared: diverse interests are given voice, particularly from minority groups.	Power is shared; at the very least, diverse

Explanation: This emphasizes a more equitable form of power sharing. Some of the "key features and institutional structures that are intrinsic to [Type A]" include "compromise, mediating institutional bodies, and procedures that ensure, most notably, minority rights" (Akkerman et al. 2014, 1327). This type "sees political conflicts as struggles against impersonal forces rather than against diabolical groups and individual" (Busby et al. forthcoming, 2), in contrast to Type B.	interests are given voice (note: power does not have to be shared *equally*)
3 = Type C: prioritizes the power of expertise. Emphasizes practical applications and outcomes rather than ideals and focuses on the ability to deliver these outcomes. **Explanation:** Type C emphasizes practical applications and outcomes rather than ideals and focuses on the ability to deliver outcomes (generally because of experience) held by those delivering the outcomes. The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on narrow, particular issues. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion. The discourse avoids a conspiratorial (moral) tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority.	Those that can deliver favorable outcomes (specifically refers to politicians)
4 = Neutral: Discursive frames are those that do not fall into any of the above categories. Often, they cannot be classified into another discursive frame because they are missing a critical component of these other frames. **Explanation:** this is a "catch-all" category for frames that cannot in and of themselves be classified into just one of the above discursive frames. This is usually due to ambiguity—neutral frames can apply to a number of different world views, and this ambiguity necessitates its own category. Note that a neutral discursive frame does not imply that there is no bias, judgment, or moral component. These components are just not enough in and of themselves to indicate a discursive frame that fits into Types A-C above.	

2) the relevant actors;

This category refers to *who* the Tweet references (implicitly or explicitly): who is the one that is doing the action? Who is the one receiving it? Determining the actor will help to determine the precise frame. These are broad categories, and as a result, multiple interpretations exist. Which interpretation to choose may be in part derived from the discursive frame.

Once you've determined the discursive frame, identifying the actors will help you to determine the sub-frame.

Actor	Interpretation 1	Interpretation 2
"the people"	**1** = the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than	**2** = Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts

	letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. When using this classification, note that it should refer to the entire body of the candidate's supporters: all those he considers to be "the people." If only a sub-set (such as, for example, teachers, students, members of a particular town mentioned by name, then the appropriate classification is other, and to specify which group the speaker is referring to) *Explicit signifiers:* "el pueblo," "la gente," "Americans [or other nationality]," "the people" – this could also refer to specific townspeople ("the people of Merida") at campaign stops along the way *Implicit signifiers:* "we," "us"	and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. *explicit signifiers:* "citizens," "Mexicans [or other nationality]," "the people" *Implicit signifiers:* "we," "us" *Example:* "In this campaign, we are committed to listening twice as much as we talk. That is why my government will be the true government of the people [los ciudadanos in Spainsh], in which the needs of the citizens will be resolved. While this might seem like interpretation 1, it refers to citizens in terms of their will
"the elite" (This most often applies to political elites)	**3** = The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Depending on the context, political elites who are part of "the establishment" are often the primary target of politicians. *Explicit signifiers:* "the establishment," "the politicians," specific names of parties, other candidates, or individuals *Implicit signifiers:* "them," "they,"	**4** = The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. Calling out an opponent for their poor performance could fall under this category—calling them evil or implying they intentionally harmed people would fall under Interpretation 1. *Explicit signifiers*: referring to other parties, or "incumbents" *Implicit signifiers:* "they," "them"
Other (usually, an in-group or out-group)	**6** = Generally refers to a specific [out] group (such as immigrants, or a particular ethnicity or race), but it does not necessarily explicitly identify this group (it may just be implied). The out-group does not necessarily have to be citizens of the country; it could be foreign entities (such as the United States). The important distinction is not the explicit identification of a group, but the implication that this group does not belong to "the people." *Explicit signifiers:* Referencing a specific group identity *Implicit signifiers:* "they," "them"	**7** = This may include reference to specific groups, generally in a positive sense of inclusivity and diversity. Since there is no romanticized notion of "the people," there is usually no out-group. In essence, an in-group refers to any subset of the overall population of the people as described in actor category 2 (the people, interpretation B). *Explicit signifiers*: Referencing a specific group identity (indigenous people, for example), students, teachers, members of a specific town *Implicit signifiers*: "They," "them"
The candidate, their party, or	**8** = This can refer to the candidate themselves, their party or party coalition, or other members	

members of their party	campaigning under their party/coalition for other positions (not the presidency) *Signifiers:* "I," "we," name of party or other party officials	
The opposition	**9** = This includes any and all opposition candidates and their parties, and prominent members of the opposition parties (such as party figureheads, like former presidents) *Signifiers: name of party or other party official, name of candidate, references to other candidates/parties*	
No actors	**10** = Some frames will not have actors	
The media	**11 =** The media. This could refer to specific media personalities or media channels, radio stations, etc.	

There may be more than one actor per Tweet: if so, determine which is the primary actor and which is the secondary actor. In doing so, consider who is the Tweet really about? Who is the actor doing the action (primary actor), versus who is receiving the action (secondary actor)? This is most often true when the actors include the candidate and some group of constituents. Is the Tweet specifically about the candidate and what the candidate hopes to achieve, or is the Tweet directed at a specific population they hope to serve? For example:

"We are going to shield the border so that US weapons do not enter Mexico and do not kill our people."	This Tweet references both we (the candidate/their party), and "our people". The primary actor would be the candidate, while the secondary would be the people.
Between the fracking to extract oil and the fumigation with glyphosate that will be from Colombia's water? I proposed that water is a priority for human consumption and food production and therefore there will be neither fracking nor glyphosate.	The primary actor would be the candidate, and there is no secondary actor. **Note that it's not just about the order in which the actors appear, but which actor the Tweet is really revolving around**--this one is about the candidate's position, which he is juxtaposing against the opposition's position; but even had the Tweet mentioned the opposition first, if the focus was on the candidate's proposal, then the candidate is still the primary actor.

<u>3) Sub-frames</u>

Sub-frames are the different ways in which the discursive frames manifest in rhetoric. Because the above discursive frames represent overarching worldviews, often they appear in partial form. **The sub-frame should match with the discursive frame it is nested under**: if you select Type A as a discursive frame, the sub-frames available are 1-3; if you select Type B, the options are sub-frames 4-7; Type C, 8-10; and neutral, 11-13. If you have a mis-match between the master and the sub-frame, go back to step 1 and re-evaluate the Tweet as a whole and see if either the discursive frame or the sub-frame is incorrect. If you are still stuck, flag it and we will go over it as a group.



Discursive frame	Subframe	Explanation	Example (s)
Type A	1 = Pro-"the people"	when a politician talks "in the name of 'the people', referring primarily to its will" (Cranmer 2011) The idea that the candidate is the "true representative" of the people (Engesser et al 2017) Puts the people's problems "at the core of the political agenda" (Casero-Ripolles et al. 2017, 990). The people are often characterized as hard-working (Engesser et al 2017)	If only for the will of the people we could say 'this rice has already been cooked', but we must prepare ourselves to face any fraud attempt. That's why I ask you to help defend the vote and democracy. We continue to collect the feelings and wisdom of the people. We are going to win the first day of July and we are not going to fail the people. Power only makes sense, and becomes a virtue, when it is placed at the service of others
	2 = Anti-Elite	Attacking anything that is "business as usual" or "how things have always been done." This is a pure and general form of anti-elitism, where "a political actor criticizes elites, such as political adversaries, the state, or the media" (Cranmer 2011, 293). It does not necessarily call out a specific elite actor, but it may.	In Tapachula, on the border of Mexico with Guatemala, I reaffirmed the commitment to banish corruption and govern with austerity. **There will be no gasolinazos**. **The Reformation, as emblem of the conservative press, fifi, is not able to rectify when it defames**, as it did yesterday with the supposed payment of MORENA of 58 million. In their code of ethics, the truth does not matter, but the interests and ideology they represent. Better we are free.
	3 = Dispositional blame attribution	Blaming some specified group of people for a particular failure-- allows actors to place the onus on particular elites or groups of people (such as immigrants) for specific failures (real or perceived) and for knowingly exploiting the interests of the people. Implies that elites/others knowingly exploited the interests of the people (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, 7). This frame identifies political actors with agency.	Those responsible for the Hidroituango disaster after the genocide of the town of Ituango are two: Álvaro Uribe Vélez and Luis Alfredo Ramos: the complete degradation of the traditional political class of Antioquiapic. The PSOE has given a secret order to the ministries not to execute 50% of the

			budget. They bring us the cuts through the back door. It is the same as Montoro did and it means recovering the austerity policy of the PP. That is not the Spain you want. IN THE COUNTRY OF THE RAPES COMMITTED BY IMMIGRANTS He refused the stalker's advances
Type B	4 = Emphasis on compromise or cooperation	Stresses the importance or benefits of working with other groups or coalitions in the *political* arena This frame may include references to coalition building, for example, or other references to governing with multiple groups.	The future is for everyone! Today I celebrate that the @MovimientoMIRA party supports our country project. We continue forming a coalition that will motivate Colombians so that class hatred no longer exists and so that from the differences we can build a better country.
	5 = Inclusivity	The discourse will emphasize the importance of the inclusion of groups, particularly those that are marginalized or disadvantaged. Rather than emphasizing a power sharing arrangement (like the above frame), it may simply mean giving these people a voice in some (often general or vague) capacity or listening to a group of people. More broadly, discourse may emphasize unity.	**We have a historical duty and commitment to our indigenous communities; As President, I will protect the rights of this population and we will work together to overcome their social backwardness.**
	6 = Legalistic view of democracy	Viewing democracy as the majority of votes (this is in contrast to the Type A frame of a romanticized "will" of the people). Tweets in this sub-frame may emphasize the duty to represent what the majority of the country wants (i.e., what 51% of the country wants, rather than what the group "the people" per Interpretation A want), or representing the country (or some subgroup) as a whole by meeting their usually broad, undefined needs (wherein specific needs being met would indicate an output sub-frame). Tweets in this category may reference listening to the people, but not acting on their will (which would indicate subframe 1)	More and more citizens are joining this project of future and certainty, which will result in **free, reasoned and conscious votes**. From now on I thank you. We will win! During the next three months, every week I will visit a family in their home. This time I visited Ana Laura, who invited me to eat with her husband and children. I want to listen to them and know what they think, leave me your messages and comments to be able to know them.
	7= Situational blame attribution	Situational frames tend to blame corruption/failed representation on "systemic causes such as globalization or technological change, and it tends to criticize rather than demonize political opponents" (Busby et al forthcoming, 8)	Mafia security has been broken in Medellin. Security does not depend on the number of deaths of young people. The Orion operation has failed. The wild posters of Mexico are taken to Medellin. I propose to integrate the youths to the university, the knowledge, the art and the Power
Type C	8 = Appealing to elites or experts	Deference to the expertise or opinions of organizations or actors outside the candidate or their party who have particular expertise (for example, government agencies	Fourteen entities commented on our environmental proposal. They evaluated these five criteria: water, climate

		or NGOs). This could include endorsements by actors outside the political party (but the endorsement should be described in a non-moralistic way). Appealing to a select group of individuals based on some attribute that they have, such as intelligence, wealth, or experience, operating on the belief that these individuals deserve particular influence. Endorsements by specific elite groups could be considered this type.	change, deforestation, land use planning and new development models. I am touched by the support of Peter Singer, world-class philosopher, environmentalist and animalist. Peace with nature, respect for the animal, the other for us, for what is different from us, is the basis for humanity to live on the planet.
	9 = Candidate experience	refers to the candidate's unique ability to perform the job (or the opposition's inability to do so) Appealing to prior or current performance or particular attributes of the candidate or their party. This could take the form of talking about specific policy achievements, their years of experience in a position, their particular expertise on a subject area, their credibility in general, etc. It can also include announcing a cabinet or other appointment. This is the positive usage of this frame. The negative usage would be calling out an opponent/party because they lack experience or more broadly, they lack credibility.	Faced with a complex and uncertain global environment, Mexico needs a President with **proven international experience**. With the United States there is no room for improvisation. Here my editorial published today in the Arizona Republic
	10 = Future output	the projected output of a candidate—what is the candidate going to deliver if elected? With few exceptions, this category refers to promised policy outcomes, though it can also refer to positive consequences of electing the candidate or negative consequences of electing the opposition This frame can be used positively (as in the case of appealing to particular issues the candidate supports) or negatively (where the candidate criticizes his/her opponents for a particular issue stance)	In order to have transparency in the use of public resources, we will create a digital platform that, using blockchain technology, allows us to follow its course. Citizens will know exactly what money is allocated to, what it is used for and where it ends.
Neutral	11 = Candidate traits or characteristics	focuses on attributes or reputational considerations. Tweets where candidates are portrayed as "honest" or "hardworking" (as examples) are incorporated into this category, as are tweets that describe specific actions taken during the campaign (things like "candidate X did action Y").	I'm the only candidate from the Northeast. I need to defend my people! They file in a complaint that they had made against me saying that my titles are false or I put falsehoods on my page of my life. My studies are what I said. 'As a good teacher, Fajardo is seen as convinced and patient, perhaps certain that changes take time but arrive, without haste, without manipulation, without buying consciences, a sowing that I hope the fertile electoral harvest he hopes for.'
	12 = Positive emotions (hope,	rhetoric that conveys hope or excitement, or general motivation for the election Emotions such as hope or excitement are not in themselves indicative of a particular worldview,	We are 15 days from the end of the campaign and **the mood of the people is growing as if it would burst with happiness**. Never in Ticul or Chetumal

	excitement, motivation)	*especially during the course of an election in which candidates hope to inspire positive emotions among their supporters/try to gain new supporters*. You will likely encounter many motivational frames that aim to drum up support for their candidacy, but to be considered a specific discursive frame, the emotions must be used with another frame.	had we held such emotional and large meetings during the week.
	13 = Presentation of facts	This discourse is purely factual: it presents information, but does not impose a particular frame.	Another intense day of campaign: We talked with members of the Mexican Business Council; we present the environmental agenda in Zacatelco with Josefa González Blanco; We were in Apizaco and in Xalapa, Veracruz, accompanying Cuitláhuac García, our candidate for governor. I invite you to follow our press conference…

3.1) For subframe 10 (output) only

If you selected subframe 10 when you are coding, this is a follow up question that will be asked. Because this sub-frame can take many forms, please select one of the following options that best describes the output the speaker is talking about.

1 = Mention of a broad group of issues or a proposal, but not a specific issue	Extremely vague (if a policy is identified, there is no information provided about it)	"Look at our issue policies"
2 = Identification of a specific issue but not necessarily the intended outcome	Not fully specified: Policy X is identified, but Outcome Y is not	"If elected, I will enact policy X" (ex: if elected, I will reduce taxes on the middle class)
3 = Expressing a desired outcome but not the specific steps/policy to get there	Not fully specified: Outcome Y identified, but the specific policy X is not (i.e., it is not clear what steps the speaker will take to achieve the outcome)	" I want to improve/enact outcome Y" (ex: I want to improve education, health, etc.)
4 = Identification of a specific issue *and* the intended outcome	Fully specific: Policy X and the subsequent Outcome Y are identified	" I will enact policy X to accomplish outcome Y" (ex: I will enact a country-wide minimum wage to reduce income inequality in the countryside)
5 = Not applicable	Subframe chosen in the above section is not 10, output	

4) the **difficulty in classifying the frame**;

This is a self-reported measure of how difficult it was to identify the frame you selected. There are 3 possible values for this category:

0 = easy	Little to no uncertainty: actors were clearly identified; only one sub-frame seemed to apply
1 = somewhat challenging	some uncertainty: There were multiple possible frames, but one frame or sub-frame stood out
2 = very challenging	high level of uncertainty: There were multiple possible frames, and no frame clearly stood out as the predominant one

5) the **perceived strength** of the frame;

How close does this frame come in representing the *discursive frame*? This coding category requires you to read the Tweet for subtext and focus on 1) whether the critical elements from each discursive frame are present, and 2) whether these elements are mixed in with elements from other discursive frames or not.

2 = Strong. Comes extremely close to the **ideal discursive frame**, expressing all or nearly all of the elements of the discursive frame, and has nearly elements that could be considered to represent a different discursive frame (if these other elements are present.	Example(s): According to the survey of 'Saba' we grew after the debate. **They could not cheat us and that's why the dirty war intensifies**. Everything will be useless, nothing and **no one can stop the longing of millions of Mexicans for a change**. (Type C discursive frame, contains references to both the people and the elites) **The future is for everyone**! Today I celebrate that the @MovimientoMIRA party supports our country project. We continue forming a coalition that will **motivate Colombians so that class hatred no longer exists and so that from the differences we can build a better country** (Type B discursive frame, references both power sharing and the moral element of class hatred)
1 = Moderate. A Tweet in this category is **moderately reflects the discursive frame by including** some but perhaps not all identifiable elements of this discursive frame, and either does not use these elements consistently or tempers them by including elements from other discursive frames.	Example: **We continue to collect the feelings and wisdom of the people**. In the morning we were in Tequila, Jalisco, and in the afternoon in Compostela, Nayarit (Type C discursive frame, but also has informational elements, and doesn't reference the elites) My agenda is social, cultural and environmental. I am committed to the protection of the swamps and the páramos. I want all Colombians to protect the environment (Type D discursive frame, talks about a particular issue but

	it is vague in terms of referring to particular outputs or ways to achieve this)
0 = Neutral. A Tweet in this category is considered **neutral**: it uses few if any elements tied to specific discursive frames, or they cancel each other out. (Note: if you coded the discursive frame neutral or informational, this category should also be 0)	Example: Sunday full of joy in eastern Antioquia. On the street with young people who have already lived how #LaFuerzaDeLaEsperanza can transform society. We know that #SePuede govern with decency. See you in Marinilla, El Carmen and San Antonio de Pereira (neutral discursive frame, could be used with any discursive frame—nothing in it to indicate how power would be shared)

6) The issue that the Tweet addresses;[59]

What is the main topic of the Tweet? These categories are meant to be broad, but there are categories for "no issue" or "other" just in case a Tweet mentions something that does not fit easily into one of the following descriptions.

Subjects	**Description**	**Example**
1 = Economy	Tweets including subjects such as jobs, unemployment, salaries, deficit, public spending, debt, crisis, taxes, entrepreneurship, contracts, self-employed people, agricultural policy, and so on. This is a somewhat narrow category that should refer explicitly to the economic realm.	"+ 1 million jobs # since February 2014, of which + 53% on permanent contracts. Highest employment rate since the #Istat time series exists. # Youth unemployment at the lowest levels of the last 5 years."
2 = Social policy	Tweets including subjects such as pensions, health, education, the welfare state, poverty, social justice, equality/inequality (including gender-based violence), housing, immigration, childbirth, drug rehabilitation, and so on. This is a broader category that encompasses some economic-adjacent issues (inequality, welfare) that affect people.	"To those under a certain income threshold, it could be an increase of 1000 euros a month for each dependent child, the State pays the necessary sum to arrive at a dignified life. The sum may vary depending on the area of the country where you live."
3 = Culture, media, and sport	Tweets including subjects related to cultural industries (cinema, literature, art, mainstream media, social media, etc.) and sport.	"The State must support our athletes! - The recognition of athletes like Carolina Marin, Saul

[59] This category is adapted from Casero-Ripollés, Sintes-Olivella, and Franch (2017), but adapted for a smaller number of categories.

		Craviotto or Lydia Valentin cannot be a miracle. It must be guaranteed!"
4 = Science, technology, the environment, and infrastructure	Tweets including subjects related to research and development, network infrastructure (such as fiber optic, ADSL, or Wi-Fi), transportation infrastructure (railway, airports, roads, etc.), pollution, flora and fauna protection, climate change, and so forth.	"The planned future: the environment above all National event for the presentation of the # Environmental Program of the 5 Star MoVement."
5 = Terrorism, crime, and insecurity	Tweets related to terrorism in all its forms and crime/criminal activity or general concerns about insecurity.	"I will work hand in hand with the mayor of #Cali so that we can stop the exponential growth of many crimes in the city."
6 = Foreign affairs	Tweets alluding to the European Union, the United States, international relations, or other parts of the world.	"The United States also needs #Mexico. In my government, we are going to put all the negotiation issues on the table, and we will defend our country firmly on all fronts."
7 = Corruption and democratic regeneration	Tweets including subjects concerning political corruption and/or democratic aspects that need to be renewed or removed, like changes in electoral law, putting an end to the establishment and the privileges of the political class, and so on.	"The PSOE has given a secret order to the ministries not to execute 50% of the budget. They bring us the cuts through the back door. It is the same as Montoro did and it means recovering the austerity policy of the PP. That is not the Spain you want."
8 = Political strategy in office	Tweets including subjects concerning the intention of the **candidate if they were to win office** (i.e., not specific to the campaign period itself). For example, forming a certain type of government or possible (or impossible) government pacts/coalitions in the future. Additionally, if the candidate Tweets about multiple issue positions (the economy and social positions), classify it as political strategy.	"Do you want to know all our government plan and know why so many people think that it is the most realistic, complete and successful proposal for Colombia? Here they find it complete. Read it and tell us what you think"

9 = Campaign organization and strategy	Tweets including subjects concerning the candidate **during the campaign period**. This can include questionnaires, surveys, information, analysis, and assessment of electoral results, or Tweets referring to the action of voting. It can also refer to Tweets about the running of the campaign and the organization of events, like rallies, meetings, political events, and media appearances by the candidates (more specific), or Tweets exalting the importance of party unity and exhorting sympathizers to join the party and earn victory (more broadly).	"In a week we will have an appointment with democracy. We will consolidate an arduous work that has taken me to travel the whole country, transmit my proposals and contrast capacity, preparation, honesty and responsibility with the other projects. With your vote, we will win" "Follow the first debate of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic."
10 = Immigration	Tweets about the topic of immigration	"Salvini at Tgcom24: 'Islam is a danger, stop at every presence'" "Elections 2018, Salvini defends Fontana on the immigration issue"
11 = Regional politics	Tweets relating to political subdivisions such as particular regions, states, etc. Note: this should not be used whenever a candidate talks about a particular city; it is more about the distribution of power within a country, such as the secession movement in Catalonia, Spain, or urban vs. rural politics.	"Mr. Sanchez, in Catalonia there are already enough competitions; what we need is that the people who manage them do so with loyalty to the Constitution." "In our program we propose formulas to improve the model of territorial organization. We want all Spaniards and Spaniards to enjoy the same rights, wherever they live."
12 = No subject or Other	Tweets that do not have a defined subject or that include expressions of courtesy (acknowledgments, etc.) or Tweets referring to the personal life of political agents.	"I share this song, 'Cuidame tu', by Teresita Fernandez, played by Beatriz." "Happy Children's Day!"

	Tweets that cannot be placed in the above categories.	

7) the function of the Tweet;[60]

What is the candidate trying to accomplish? Like the issue category, the possible functions are generalizable categories, with a residual category if needed.

Function	**Description**	**Example**
1 = Agenda and organization of political actions (including media appearances)	Tweets containing information on specific campaign actions in which the time and place are specified. **This should take place either in the near future, or be in progress at the time the Tweet is sent**.	"This afternoon there is debate in the SBT. Do not miss it!"
		"Follow the first debate of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic."
	Tweets sharing links to a journalistic interview or TV show.	"Today at 7:00 pm there is an interview with Cyrus live on @recordtvoficial. Watch it!"
2 = Electoral program	Tweets on future political proposals or program proposals. This should be somewhat specific—not just vague intonations of making the country better.	"We have to increase competitiveness throughout the country. I propose to lower the VAT at the border and implement a National Infrastructure Plan to achieve prosperity in all states."
		"One of the key points of our program is less taxes for families and businesses. We will succeed in the Flat Tax, a single rate for all of 23% which will guarantee real economic growth, new jobs and a revival of investments."

[60] This category is adapted from Casero-Ripollés, Sintes-Olivella, and Franch (2017), but adapted for a smaller number of categories.

3 = Management of political achievements	Tweets extolling or praising the achievements of the party and/ or leader. This could also include things like endorsements or responses to polls/early election predictions.	"Congratulations @diegosinhue! In #DebateGuanajuatense you showed that with responsible proposals, in this state we will continue to make good governments for the people. We will win!" "Thanks to Podemos, jobs are created and energy is saved, taking care of the planet."
4 = Criticizing opponents	Tweets containing direct or indirect attacks on other candidates, political parties, other leaders (past or present) or other ideologies more broadly.	"Lopez Obrador is not change, it's just the opposite. Directly giving contracts to your friends is called corruption." "He was supposed to think about the Italians, but he thought only of himself. #Berlusconi spent 3,339 days in the government of the country and focused exclusively on his own affairs"
5 = Participation and mobilization	Tweets aimed directly at increasing support/votes **during the campaign**. This can include the mention of general campaign events (we were in XX city this morning), but the reference should be somewhat vague. Followers would not know where to go or what type of event based just on this Tweet alone (in contrast to function 1). Specific manifestation: requesting financial donations, encouraging people to vote for the candidate/party, or mobilizing volunteers. General manifestation: Tweets that contain inspirational messages about the campaign, or Tweets reinforcing the	"<3 Vote for a big censure of corruption, inequality and political confrontation. Let's say it loud, very loud, voting for the Socialist Party. We are very close." "The second round opens up a golden opportunity: to win this election, an eye on the debate." "We are 15 days from the end of the campaign and the mood of the people is growing as if it would burst with happiness. Never in Ticul or Chetumal had we held such emotional and large meetings during the week."

	party values and containing concepts that identify the party, its ideology, or its values.	
6 = Personal life/ backstage or Manners/Protocol	Tweets where particularly the leaders show or talk about things from their private lives (leisure, hobbies, sport, etc.) or from backstage at political events or from the campaign. Tweets of thanks, sympathy, greetings, special occasions, and so on.	"Anyway at home, near my family in the warmth of our home! No better feeling! Thank you all for the expressions of affection that I could see on the way back and all over Brazil! A big hug to everyone!" "We continue with concern the fire in the cathedral of Notre Dame, in Paris. Let us hope that there will be no victims and that the firefighters will suffocate the fire, preserving this enormous jewel of heritage"
7 = Entertainment or Humor	Tweets encouraging community building around the party or the leader with an entertainment-based focus, or Tweets containing memes, jokes, or other humorous resources.	"Nothing better than ending Sunday with a good movie ... Defeating the dark side machines, you can!"
8 = Others	Tweets that cannot be placed in the above categories	

8) whether the frame used positive, negative, or neutral language;

Does the candidate use mostly positive, neutral, or negative language? When considering this, think of the overall tone of the message, as well as the particular words used.

1 = predominantly positive language	"It's amazing how people are responding. Never have so many citizens participated as now in favor of real change. Look at Manzanillo." "I want to tell the country that I am honored that Dr. @ MoralesViviane gives us her support. With @mluciaramirez we are proposing a project for all Colombians, based on legality, entrepreneurship and equity, where we all fit."

0 = neutral language,[61] or equally positive and negative	"Conference with the international press. We are talking about climate change, fossil progressivism, new progressivism, anti-drug policy, the Venezuelan situation and the Middle East, which will be the new foreign policy of Colombia." "We have to eliminate the unnecessary expenses of the State. As president I will face the evasion; I will encourage investment and the formal hiring of workers, and I will contribute to improve their salaries."
-1 = predominantly negative language	"The real alliance: a scam to the Italians It passes a final majority report in the banks Commission thanks to 6 parliamentarians of the center-right who, upon leaving, reduce the quorum. Here is an advance from the government of mess-makers for which Renzi and Berlusconi work" "# SanchezMentiroso has been demonstrating for nine months that he lies more than he talks. Inside video"

9) A brief description of why you coded the Tweet the way you did

You'll be coding many Tweets, so this brief description should provide justification about any items that required a judgment call. Since we will review each Tweet for discrepancies, this will help us to make the final determination about which code is most appropriate.

<u>Examples:</u>

I coded this as a Type B discursive frame because it emphasized power sharing and inclusion of voice--2 strong indicators of this type. I also coded it as an issue-based subframe because it talks about the specific proposals of students.

This was a neutral tweet that simply encouraged voters to vote for the candidate by using positive emotions and a reified sense of history. While there seems to be a vague reference to Type B, it's ultimately not enough to classify it as a discursive frame other than neutral (it's only vaguely implied, whereas the neutral subframes are fairly strong).

[61] The use of the word "neutral" here is different than how it was used for neutral Discursive Frame. Here, neutral means there is no strong bias in the language.

I coded this tweet as Type C 'trust in experience' because the candidate was talking about the woman he chose for his VP and the personal qualities and accomplishments that make her qualified. I put the issue as campaign organization and the function as participation and mobilization because they are explaining a new, important member of the campaign and hoping support increases because of her.

I coded this tweet as Type A 'pro people' because the party was lauding young people for their support and implying that young people are being driven to the party because it represents their ideals (patriotism, roots, etc). I put the issue as campaign organization and the function as participation and mobilization because the party was showing the support they have already gotten from the youth and explaining why they have that support in an effort to attract even more supporters.

Troubleshooting

What if there are multiple (sub)frames?

It is possible that more than one frame will be present in a single Tweet. Most often, that is going to be some reference to the people and the elite. There is a designated frame for this category: sub-frame #4, the people versus the elites. However, it is possible that there will be multiple frames in a Tweet. If that is the case, select a primary frame *and* a secondary frame. If you are unsure which frame is primary and which is secondary, designate the primary frame based on which frame the candidate devotes more attention. If for example there are 2 sentences about anti-elite, and only 1 sentence or a passing comment about an out-group, select the proper sub-frame for the anti-elite sentiment as the primary frame.

What if there are multiple issues referenced?

At times, Tweets (especially longer ones) will contain references to more than one issue (such as the economy and the environment, for example). If that is the case, the chances are that there is a deeper meaning behind the issues—the Tweet may mention multiple issues for strategic reasons (i.e., the real "issue" is political strategy

III. When 'Following' the Leader Inspires Action: Individuals' Receptivity to Discursive Frame Elements on Social Media

Abstract: How political actors convey information–that is, the discursive frames they use–can alter individuals' attitudes, preferences, and behaviors, especially during campaigns. Although scholars have shown that discursive frames using populist rhetoric evoke particularly strong reactions, we do not yet know how the individual elements that make up the populist frame, like anti-elitism or pro-people, fare relative to other ways of seeing the political world or what kinds of messages engage individuals *beyond* populist ones. In this paper, I evaluate the effectiveness of thirteen frame elements in stimulating online engagement. I derive frame elements not only from populism, but from competing discursive frames, including technocracy, pluralism, and neutral rhetoric. I find support for my argument that frame elements using populist rhetoric, are less cognitively demanding, and evoke emotions produce observable framing effects. To test my argument, I evaluate campaign Tweets from 18 actors in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Italy, and Spain (N=1,577). My findings affirm the existence of framing effects in campaigns while identifying the generalizable content of the messages that produce these framing effects, as well as identifying the type of message content that most effectively competes with populist frame elements in this sample.

Introduction

How political actors convey information–that is, the rhetorical frames they use–can alter individuals' attitudes, preferences, and behaviors, especially during campaigns (Druckman et al. 2017; Druckman and Holmes 2004; Klar et al. 2013). Frames using elements of populist rhetoric seem to evoke especially strong reactions, including increasing animosity towards outgroups (Wirz et al. 2018) and political cynicism (Rooduijn et al. 2017). Similarly, a growing body of experimental studies demonstrates that populist frames are associated with increased populist attitudes and support for populist actors (Bos et al. 2019; Busby et al. 2018; Hameleers et al. 2018; Hameleers and Schmuck 2017). Yet, research on how individuals respond to populist communication remains relatively scarce (Aalberg and de Vreese 2016), especially when examining non-traditional forms of communication such as social media. In particular, we do not yet know how elements of populist frames fare relative to elements of other frames in online settings—which produce framing effects and which do not.

In this paper, I evaluate the effectiveness of thirteen frame elements in stimulating online engagement. These elements represent the disaggregated ideas constituting four discursive frames: populism, pluralism, technocracy, and a neutral category.[62] For example, scholars generally view the populist discursive frame as containing three elements: the people, the elites, and an us-versus-them mentality (Bobba 2019; Bracciale and Martella 2017; Ernst et al. 2019; Hawkins et al. 2018). I evaluate candidates' frame elements and individuals' responses to those elements on social media—platforms that play a central role in modern campaigns (Dimitrova et al. 2014; Gil de Zúñiga 2012; Zamora Medina and Zurutuza Muñoz 2014). Unlike traditional forms of communication like speeches or television, social media include opportunities for communicative behavior by the audience who can not only passively listen to candidates' messages (Aalberg and de Vreese 2016, 4), but also actively register their approval by liking a message and passing the message along by retweeting it—actions that I refer to as online engagement. This dynamic creates a feedback loop between the individual and the political actor that can inform and shape both individuals' and actors' behavior. To my knowledge, there are only two studies that examine the relationship between populist frames and online engagement: Bobba (2019) and Bobba and Roncarolo (2018). While these studies contribute to the nascent literature on online engagement, we do not yet know which messages engage individuals when we consider a broader range of frames beyond populist ones.

To address this gap, I apply a theory of framing effects to identify the kinds of messages that should increase a frame element's strength and, by extension, produce observable framing effects. Based on extant literature, I argue that messages that use populist rhetoric, are less cognitively demanding, and evoke emotions will produce the strongest framing effects. I apply

[62] These discursive frames reflect politicians' understanding of the relationship between the people and the elites. Other conceptions are possible, such as issue positions, but extend beyond the scope of this study.

my theory to five national campaigns with at least one populist actor in 2018 and 2019: Italy, Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and Spain. I evaluate a random sample of Tweets for the eighteen candidates and parties (actors) that pass a 10% vote threshold (N=1,577). My theoretical expectations are generally supported: framing elements that possess the above characteristics are associated with higher engagement compared to elements that lack these characteristics.

This study offers several contributions. First, I expand our understanding of the link between populism and framing theory by theorizing why populist framing elements may produce stronger framing effects than their non-populist counterparts. The populist frame elements I examine meet all three of my hypotheses' criteria: they blame elites for the people's problems, are cognitively easy, and use more emotional content on average than other types of frames. Further, my research takes a critical step towards identifying how establishment politicians can even the rhetorical playing field by using similarly strong frame elements from other discursive frames that also meet my hypothesized criteria, including expressions of campaign enthusiasm or references to candidate traits (both elements of the neutral discursive strategy). Second, my research affirms the existence of framing effects in campaigns while identifying the generalizable content of the messages that produce these framing effects. This contribution is particularly significant because my study occurs outside of a controlled experimental setting, demonstrating that even in messy campaign environments, framing effects are discernable.

Theoretical Framework

Framing theory offers a perspective on how people respond to messages. The core of framing theory is intuitive: how actors convey messages can alter how people engage with the message (Nabi 2003). Chong and Druckman (2007a, 100) define a frame as "the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles a speaker uses to relay information." For this study, I emphasize

both of the relevant actors (the speaker and the listener) inherent in my relationship of interest. Thus, I define a frame as the meaning embedded into a message by a political actor to encourage the listener to interpret an event or situation from a non-neutral perspective. Frame elements represent the disaggregated components of discursive frames—returning to the populist example, a populist frame contains three frame elements: pro-people, anti-elite, and a Manichean outlook (Hawkins et al. 2018). Scholars have provided considerable evidence that the strategic use of frames affects individuals' attitudes, preferences, and behaviors in election campaigns (Druckman et al. 2017; Druckman and Holmes 2004; Klar et al. 2013). How political actors' frames influence individuals is referred to as a framing effect (Chong and Druckman 2007b, 109). In this analysis, I seek to evaluate how framing mobilizes individuals on social media.

To develop my argument, I draw primarily on populist framing studies (in particular, Akkerman et al. 2014; Caramani 2017; Hawkins et al. 2012) because framing-oriented literature for other discursive frames is sparse. For example, Casero-Ripollés et al. (2017) find that 51.9% of Podemos's (Spain's leftist populist party) Tweets use populist elements—but if populist actors use only a slim majority of populist frame elements, what other elements are they using, and which of these elements are effective at generating engagement?

To address these questions, I specify how populist frame elements engage individuals relative to other available discursive frames commonly used by politicians. These discursive frames provide different conceptualizations of who the sovereign community is (Jenne 2016)—who the ingroup is and whether that community is more inclusive (pluralism, technocracy) or exclusive (populism). This conceptualization of rhetoric mirrors the field's relative convergence on populism representing a discursive frame (Aslanidis 2015; Busby et al. 2019), in particular, "a

unique set of ideas, one that understands politics as a Manichean struggle between a reified will of the people and a conspiring elite" (Hawkins et al. 2018, 3).

Pluralism and technocracy were chosen as rival discursive frames because they view the relationship between the people and the elites differently than populism and are among the most common in democracies today (Akkerman et al. 2014; Caramani 2017; Hawkins et al. 2012). Pluralism advocates for power to be shared among diverse interests (Akkerman et al. 2014, 1327; Caramani 2017, 62) "through compromise and consensus" (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 152). Technocracy, meanwhile, combines conceptualizations of both technocracy and elitism[63] to view the relationship between the people and the elites as one in which elites should be in charge of doing what is best for the people, not representing the "will of the people" as populism does. In other words, technocracy prioritizes the power of expertise (broadly defined) and the ability to deliver outcomes (Caramani 2017, 55 & 66). I also examine a neutral category, which refers to ambiguous language that does not contain enough information about the nature of the sovereign community to consider it as belonging to any discursive frame.

I disaggregate these discursive frames into their corresponding frame elements to identify which particular messages are generating engagement. The final schema I propose contains thirteen unique frame elements, derived from a combination of existing studies, codebooks (Hawkins 2019), theoretical studies, and survey measures.

[63] Existing studies do not utilize technocracy and elitism as separate categories. For example, Akkerman et al. (2014) measure elitism in surveys not only as a moralistic distinction between "the people" and the elite (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013, 152), a conception in line with elitism, but also as important business leaders or independent experts, which is very much in line with technocracy.

Figure 3.1: Schema of Frame Elements



Populist Frame Elements

I incorporate three populist frame elements: "pro-people," "anti-elite," and "dispositional blame attribution."[64] These elements correspond to the ideational theory's three necessary and sufficient elements of populism (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018).[65] The first populist frame element, (1) "pro-people," indicates that the candidate speaks in the name of the people (Cranmer 2011). The (2) "anti-elite" frame element refers to rhetoric where "a political actor criticizes elites, such as political adversaries, the state, or the media" (Cranmer 2011, 293). The (3) "dispositional blame attribution" element blames particular elites or groups of people (such as immigrants) for specific failures and for knowingly exploiting the interests of the people (Busby et al. 2019; Hameleers et al. 2017; Hameleers and Schmuck 2017).

[64] I refer to Manichean discourse as dispositional blame attribution, but the underlying sentiment behind these two concepts, as they are used here, is similar. In both of these frames, one group is blaming another group, implicitly creating an "us versus them" dichotomy.

[65] Existing studies focus on anywhere from four to six frame elements, but in earlier iterations of this project, I found that other frames either were biased towards right-wing populism, occurred extremely infrequently (less than 1% of the sample), or were not distinct from the three final frame elements used in the study. For example, Casero-Ripollés et al. proposes a single frame for "the people," Engesser et al. (2017) two frames ("sovereignty of the people" and "advocacy for the people"), and Cranmer (2011) three frames ("advocacy for," "accountability to," and "the legitimacy of the people"). All three articles include a frame for "attacking the elite" and "exclusion of outgroups." Engesser et al. proposes a frame that invokes "the heartland;" Casero-Ripollés et al. a frame for "narrative of a crisis," and Cranmer a frame for "homogeneity or threat."

Pluralist Frame Elements

To develop the pluralistic frame elements, I use Akkerman et al. (2014) as a jumping-off point, supplemented with information from Hawkins (2019) to flesh out the descriptions. Akkerman et al. (2014) use two survey questions to measure pluralism:

> PLU1 In a democracy it is important to make compromises among differing viewpoints.
> PLU2 It is important to listen to the opinion of other groups.

PLU1 maps onto (4) "emphasis on compromise or cooperation," which stresses the importance of working with other groups or coalitions in the political arena. I use PLU2 to develop (5) "inclusivity," which focuses on the inclusion of diverse, marginalized, or disadvantaged groups.

Finally, and drawing on Hawkins (2019) and Caramani (2017), I include two additional frame elements. (6) "Legalistic view of democracy" is based on a conception of "the people" that does not romanticize "the people," viewing them instead in a neutral, democratic way. The final pluralistic frame element is (7) "situational blame distribution," which places blame on situational factors outside of specific elites' control such as macro-level context instead of individual actors or specific groups (Busby et al. 2019, 8).

Technocratic Frame Elements

I derive the technocratic frame elements largely from Akkerman et al. (2014), who pose the following three questions to measure elitism.

> **E1** Politicians should lead rather than follow the people.
> **E2** Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to successful business people.
> **E3** Our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to independent experts

I omit a unique element for E1 because it does not uniquely characterize elitism, and I combine E2 and E3 into the frame element (8) "appealing to elites or experts." This element appeals to a select group of individuals based on some attribute that they have, such as intelligence, wealth,

or experience, operating on the belief that these individuals deserve particular influence. Next, (9) "Candidate experience" refers to the candidate's unique ability to perform the job based on their particular expertise or experience, or the lack of experience of an opposition candidate. In line with Caramani (2017), (10) "future output" refers to promised policy outcomes.

Neutral Frame Elements

The final category describes frame elements that fall under the umbrella of neutral rhetoric. *(*11) "Candidate traits" focuses on attributes or reputational considerations, for example, portraying candidates as "honest" or "hardworking." (12) "Campaign enthusiasm" includes rhetoric that conveys motivation to vote or excitement for the upcoming election. The final frame element, (13) "information," contains factual information, most often about upcoming campaign events. Examples of the range of Tweets that fall into each category are presented in Appendix A.4. These thirteen frame elements represent the independent variable in this analysis.

Online Engagement on Social Media

I evaluate likes and retweets as measures of online engagement, a multifaceted concept that represents different things to different audiences. For individuals, online engagement reflects a direct register of enthusiasm or approval—individuals are not passive consumers of content, but active participants in the political world who can instantly register their approval or disapproval with the click of a button. Online engagement also represents an endorsement of content by the individual—these actions occur in a public sphere, thus spreading the message to one's network, which can have downstream consequences for information diffusion and network mobilization. According to Pew Research Center (Wojcik 2019), the most prolific Twitter users in the US have an average of 387 followers, which means each retweet or like can be seen by up

to that many people. Magnified on a scale of tens of thousands of likes or retweets, a single well-crafted tweet could reach millions of people.

For elites, online engagement can represent an end goal in and of itself in that it offers a quantifiable measure of a Twitter account's success. It is not uncommon for candidates in my sample to brag about their social media following, or even to directly appeal to users for likes and retweets. For example, Salvini tweeted "LET US SEE THE STRENGTH OF OUR COMMUNITY! PLEASE "LIKE" IT NOW AT THE NEW OFFICIAL PAGE." Likes and retweets are a form of social media currency (the most common one being an actor's number of followers)—a currency that appears to be valued by political leaders for its own sake.

Of the available social media platforms, I elected to study engagement on Twitter because it is the preferred platform of political and media elites, making it an ideal venue to study candidate rhetoric—every actor in the sample has a public Twitter account, a key feature compared to other social media platforms. Twitter is widely used by politicians presumably because it can alter outcomes that political actors are interested in, such as engagement and participation (Boulianne 2015; Gil de Zúñiga 2012). Scholars have established that Tweets can set the media's agenda with their posts (Enli 2017; Graham et al. 2014), as Donald Trump regularly demonstrates. Tweets also appear to be relatively consistent with actors' overall communication strategies—candidates regularly Tweet summarized versions of their longer Facebook posts."[66]

While Twitter users are not representative of the broader population, they (especially those consuming and producing political content) are disproportionately more likely to actively

[66] I also find that the actors that regularly using populist communication on Twitter significantly overlap with the actors that experts identify as "populist," including the four datasets outlined in footnote 10; see Appendix B.1 for additional information.

participate in politics (Bode and Dalrymple 2016; Lupu et al. 2019). This characteristic makes Twitter users a particularly appealing population to study because their behavior has the potential to have an outsized influence on political outcomes.[67] Several studies have shown that using Twitter for political purposes is a precursor to various forms of participation, such as vote choice or participation in protests (Boulianne 2015; Scherman et al. 2015; Skoric et al. 2016; Valenzuela et al. 2018). Twitter also promotes information diffusion and network mobilization (Barbera et al. 2015; Vaccari et al. 2015) through actions such as campaign on behalf of candidates (Hosch-Dayican et al. 2016) and spreading the message about protests (Barbera et al. 2015, 6; see also Scherman et al. 2015 and Valenzuela et al. 2018).

Hypotheses

Scholars have posited several non-rival explanations for when frames (and by extension, frame elements) produce framing effects, including frame strength, whether the communication environment is competitive, and individual predispositions (Chong and Druckman 2007b). My research question directly speaks to frame strength, while the observational design of my study precludes control over the competitive environment[68] or individual characteristics.[69]

[67] Social media users in general and Twitter users specifically tend to be whiter, more educated, younger, and male (Lupu et al. 2019). In particular, scholars have started pointing out the differences between social media users who actively post/receive political content and those that use social media for other purposes, finding that the former group is more interested in politics, has higher political knowledge, and is more likely to vote than the overall population (Bode and Dalrymple 2016; see also Wojcik 2019). However, representativeness is not necessarily a concern unless one tries to generalize beyond the population of interest. A potentially greater threat to inference is if Twitter users are more likely to engage with populist messages than other kinds of messages, thus biasing the results. While more research is needed, previous research has shown that populist supporters tend to be less educated and more economically insecure (Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Spruyt et al. 2016), in stark contrast to the traits that characterize Twitter users.

[68] Framing effects can be attenuated when individuals are exposed to multiple competing messages (Chong and Druckman 2007).

[69] Several scholars have demonstrated that individual predispositions are strongly associated with framing effects (see, e.g., Chong and Druckman 2007a, Kam and Simas 2010).

In general, scholars conclude that the stronger a frame/frame element, the more likely a framing effect will occur (Chong and Druckman 2007b, 2007a; Druckman 2007, 2010). These scholars show that frame strength is a particularly important consideration in determining whether a framing effect will occur—strong frames/elements are more likely to produce a framing effect than weak frames (Druckman 2007) and more likely to persist in competitive communication environments (Chong and Druckman 2007a). It stands to reason that if I detect framing effects, they will constitute comparatively strong frame elements given the naturally-occurring and arguably maximally competitive environment of campaigns.[70]

I hypothesize that three non-rival characteristics of certain frame elements will produce framing effects and thus be associated with higher levels of engagement: populist frame elements (H_1), frame elements that are not cognitively demanding (H_2), and frame elements that evoke emotions (H_3). These hypotheses are derived from existing literature and summarized in part in Chong and Druckman's (2007b, 111) explanation of strong frames:

> "Strong frames…can be built around exaggerations and outright lies playing on the fears and prejudices of the public *[H_3]*. Strong frames often rest on symbols, endorsements, and links to partisanship and ideology *[H_1]*, and may be effective in shaping opinions through heuristics rather than direct information about the substance of a policy *[H_2]*."

[70] Why framing effects occur is widely debated. The accessibility perspective (Chong and Druckman 2007b; Druckman 2007, 2011; Zaller 1992) argues that frames are more likely to produce framing effects when they are available, accessible, and applicable to individuals. An alternative perspective is that framing effects occur because they are more important than other considerations (see, e.g., Nelson et al. 1997). Intuitively, this approach suggests that individuals weigh more important considerations differently than less important ones, where framing effects occur when the frame aligns with an important consideration. A related perspective suggests that framing effects occur when frames resonate with individuals (McDonnell et al. 2017; Snow and Benford 1988), arguing that resonance (which I consider a proxy for framing effects) occur when a narrative structure which diagnoses a problem, prescribes a solution, and contains a call to action. Outside of an experimental design, it is difficult to ascertain which of these theoretical mechanisms is at play. For the purposes of my analysis, I focus predominantly on what makes for a strong frame among the four discursive strategies (and subsequent thirteen frames) I investigate rather than why strong frames produce framing effects. To make my argument, I draw most heavily on the accessibility perspective as that has the most associated information on frame strength.

First, I anticipate that populist frame elements generate comparatively high levels of engagement compared to all other elements in the sample (**H_1**). A growing body of literature has demonstrated that populist frame elements shape individuals' attitudes and behaviors. In experimental studies, Hameleers et al. (2017) and Busby et al. (2019) conclude that populist frames that blame elites for the problems of the people (dispositional blame attribution) are associated with an increase in populist attitudes and support for populist actors (see also Hameleers and Schmuck 2017 and Wirz 2018). Bos et al. (2019) reach a similar conclusion, finding that anti-elite identity frames, in particular, persuade prospective voters in fifteen European countries. Outside of experimental settings, Bobba (2019) and Bobba and Roncarolo (2018) find that populist Tweets (compared to non-populist Tweets) generate more likes than non-populist ones.

Although these scholars identify different theories for why populist frame elements are disproportionately influential, what they have in common is that populist frame elements are differentiated from non-populist ones based on the way that they blame or ostracize others—whether it be immigrants (Wirz 2018), elites (Busby et al. 2019; Hameleers et al. 2017), or both. This tendency to blame elites for exploiting "the people" provides a clear cause of the people's suffering—government failures—in contexts where elites have not performed adequately. Each country in the sample has at least one populist actor who attained at least 10% of the national vote share, which strongly implies that the populist message is both "sensible" and strong in these countries (i.e., there is some government failure).

Second, I expect that less cognitively demanding frame elements will produce comparatively strong framing effects compared to more demanding frame elements (**H_2**). This hypothesis is related to the vast body of scholarship that finds that heuristics aid individuals in

processing complex information, where a heuristic aid is a cognitive shortcut that enables individuals to make political judgments without (or in place of) extensive political knowledge (Brader et al. 2012; Converse 1964; Rahn 1993; Sniderman et al. 1991). In particular, I home in on the simplicity or complexity of the content being communicated—simple ideas will make it easier for individuals to identify with the frame element, thus producing stronger framing effects. Additional support for this hypothesis is derived from scholars like Bischof and Senninger (2018), who find that the use of simplistic language is associated with individuals being better able to identify the ideological placement of populist parties in particular (see also Bracciale and Martella 2017; Oliver and Rahn 2016).

Third, I theorize that frame elements that evoke emotions will have a stronger association with engagement than elements using neutral language (**H_3**) (Chong and Druckman 2007b; McDonnell et al. 2017). Scholars demonstrate that emotions motivate and persuade individuals to participate in politics in different ways (Brader 2005; Valentino et al. 2011). In a similar vein, a growing body of literature hypothesizes that populism in particular is persuasive because it relies on negative emotions like fear and anxiety (Rico et al. 2017; Seawright 2010; Wirz 2018). However, positive emotions have also been shown to impact outcomes akin to engagement (Gerstlé and Nai 2019), so I incorporate both positivity and negativity in my analysis. These studies suggest that an emotionalized tone increases the likelihood that a frame element will produce a framing effect (see, e.g., Chong and Druckman 2007b).

I assess each hypothesis by comparing the high- and low-fit frame elements to one another (rather than to the sample as a whole) as I seek to determine whether the presence of the hypothesized characteristics impacts engagement. For H_1, I include the three frame elements that make up the populist discursive frame. For H_2, I identify frame elements that rely on messages

that do not require information-based judgments, appealing instead to value-based considerations that are less cognitively demanding. "Anti-elite" and "dispositional blame attribution" (both populist frame elements) focus on a dichotomous view of the world, simplifying the cognitive demand of these messages. Meanwhile, "candidate traits" and "appealing to experts" (a neutral and technocratic frame element, respectively) both promote superficial recognition over substantive knowledge. Lastly, H_3 includes frame elements that consistently capitalize directly on positive or negative language—at least 75% of the coded tweets for a given frame element must be positive or negative rather than neutral.[71] The frame elements that meet the criteria include "anti-elite" (89% negative), "dispositional blame attribution" (89% negative), and "campaign enthusiasm" (93% positive). Meanwhile, frame elements with a significant percentage (50%) of neutral rhetoric account for the low-fit elements.

Table 3.1: Summary of Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Positive Examples (High fit)	Negative Examples (Low fit)
H_1: Populism	- Pro-"the people" (populist) - Anti-Elite (populist) - Dispositional Blame Attribution (populist)	- All other frame elements
H_2: Less cognitively demanding	- Anti-Elite (populist) - Dispositional Blame Attribution (populist) - Candidate traits (neutral) - Appealing to experts (technocracy)	- Output (technocratic) - Candidate experience (technocratic)
H_3: Evoking emotions (positive or negative)	- Anti-Elite (populist) - Dispositional Blame Attribution (populist) - Campaign Enthusiasm (neutral)	- Output (technocratic) - Information (neutral) - Compromise (pluralist) - Legalistic view (pluralist)

Research Design

To assess which frame elements generate higher online engagement, I evaluate a random sample of the rhetoric for all actors that received at least 10% of the vote in five countries across Latin America and Europe: Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, Spain, and Italy. The differences in

[71] The language variable is trichotomous: positive, neutral, or negative and is based on the RAs' interpretation of the overall tone of the message. See Appendix A.3 for additional information.

political systems test the growing consensus that the core of populist rhetoric is generalizable across countries (Hawkins et al. 2018)—and extends that logic to see whether citizens' *responses* to that rhetoric also translate. Given that each case has a populist actor, it stands to reason that people may engage similarly with populist messages across and within these regions (see, e.g., Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2017 and Andreadis et al. 2018).

Case Selection

I chose the five causes because each had at least one candidate that political observers commonly referred to as "populist" in 2018 or early 2019.[72] The subset of possible Latin American cases was fairly small.[73] In Europe, I selected Spain and Italy because these countries each had both a left-wing and right-wing populist party. This attribute not only provides interesting within-case comparisons, it also contributes to our understanding of left-wing populism in Europe, a phenomenon that is comparatively understudied. Although these cases have notable differences, they vary in both the ratio of populist to non-populist messages that candidates used as well as the degree of electoral success that populist and non-populist actors experienced. Twitter use in these countries is also similar, with 5-8% of each country's population.[74] Finally, the cases reflect a balance on the number of candidates meeting the selection criteria (nine in each region).

[72] The Tweets span the period of late December 2017 through April 2019 (16 months).
[73] Costa Rica satisfied the populist criteria, but I opted not to include this case due to the particular combination of populism and evangelism that the populist actor (Fabricio Alvarado) displayed, which strongly limited the generalizability of this case. El Salvador had a strongly anti-elite candidate (Nayib Bukele), but existing accounts did not support this candidate as being populist.
[74] Italy: 5.46% as of March 2018; Mexico: 19.45% in August 2018 (this number dropped precipitously post-election, and is at 7.47% as of August 2019); Brazil: 5.48% in October 2018; Colombia: 6.8% in June 2018; Spain: 6.2% in April 2019. Data from the country pages at https://gs.statcounter.com/social-media-stats/.

Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Candidates Evaluated

Country	*Candidate/Party*	*Vote Share*	Avg Likes	Std. Dev.	Avg. Re-Tweets	Std. Dev.
COL	Duque (Democratic Center)	54.0% (2nd); 39.1% (1st)	1,290	1,539	675	905
	Petro (Progressivists Movement)	41.8% (2nd); 25.1% (1st)	4,165	9,369	5,837	4,246
	Fajardo (Citizen Compromise)	23.7% (1st)	1,697	1,731	544	583
MEX	López Obrador (AMLO) (Morena)	53.2%	15,601	6,125	5,965	2,353
	Anaya (PAN)	22.3%	2,686	3,252	1,161	1,877
	Meade (PRI)	16.4%	3,085	1,995	1,704	875
BRZ	Jair Bolsonaro (PSL)	55.1% (2nd); 46.0% (1st)	26,809	22,042	6,200	5,483
	Haddad (PT)[75]	44.9% (2nd); 29.3% (1st)	8,072	14,439	1,970	4,086
	Gomes (PDT)	12.5% (1st)	1,931	2,470	351	502
IT	M5S (leader: Luigi Di Maio)	32.2%	549	305	317	194
	Lega (leader: Matteo Salvini)	17.7%	20	14	11	10
	PD (leader: Matteo Renzi)	18.9%	332	262	164	134
	FI (leader: Silvio Berlusconi)	13.9%	143	175	61	78
ESP	Podemos (leader: Pablo Iglesias)	14.3%	567	575	377	339
	PP (leader: Pablo Casado)	16.7%	285	370	191	267
	PSOE (leader: Pedro Sánchez)	28.7%	203	198	149	122

[75] In Brazil, Fernando Haddad was not the official candidate of the PT party until 9/11/2018; prior to that date, Lula da Silva was the official candidate and Haddad was his running mate. Haddad became the official candidate when Lula was denied the ability to remain a candidate after the Supreme Electoral Court ruled against him on corruption charges. 13/50 Tweets in the Haddad sample take place before the Lula ruling, though Haddad was actively campaigning as Lula's running made prior to 9/11/2018, thus these Tweets are still included in the final sample.

	Cs (leader: Albert Rivera)	15.8%	178	240	127	142
	Vox (leader: Santiago Abascal)	10.3%	2,510	1,809	1,243	869

The sample contains 80 Tweets for each of the nine non-populist actors and 100 Tweets for each of the nine populist actors,[76] randomly sampled during the campaign for a total of

[76] Two parties did not meet the minimum number of Tweets. FI, and MS5. FI was sampled at 80 Tweets (the non-populist amount) as the existing classification information available at the time the study was conducted indicated that FI was not-populist. Since then, later datasets indicated that FI was considered a populist by a majority of indicators, thus they are coded as populist here. For FI, I included Tweets where the party *re-Tweeted* the party

N=1,577 Tweets.[77] Retweets are excluded from the analysis as they do not constitute rhetoric written by the candidate. In the table and subsequent figures, blue text indicates a populist actor, and black text indicates a non-populist actor.[78] As Table 2 shows, there is considerable variation in likes and retweets both across and within candidates.[79]

Because of the significantly different institutions that affect the way individuals cast votes, I evaluate the *candidates'* Tweets in Latin America and the *parties'* Tweets in Europe. In Spain and Italy, both parliamentary systems, individuals cast votes for parties. In the Latin American countries surveyed here, all three countries have presidential systems where individuals vote directly for candidates. As a result, I expect that parties produce more campaign content in Europe, making parties a better comparison for Latin American candidates. A descriptive comparison of European party leaders' and parties' Twitter behavior supports this

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leader's (Silvio Berlusconi) Tweets. Though this was not done for other cases, it is consistent with other parties who, instead of re-Tweeting leader's Tweets (as FI did), simply use the same Tweet between candidate. MS5 is sampled at 77 Tweets total, representing their entire universe of Tweets during the campaign. I also collected separate Tweets from the party leader for a robustness check, which is why I did not combine the MS5 with Luigi Di Maio's Tweets.

[77] Official campaign periods are hard to pin down in many countries. I selected campaign dates that reflected the official kickoff of the campaign marked by the first major campaign event, and ended either the day before the election, or a few days before in certain cases that observe a few days of non-campaigning (aka "reflection periods"). The campaign periods covered in this analysis are: 1) Italy: 12/27/2017 (when Parliament was dissolved) – 3/3/2018; 2) Colombia: 3/11/2018 (when primaries were held) – 6/16/2018 (excluding the 1st round election day, 5/27/2018); 3). Mexico: 3/30/2018 – 6/27/2018; 4) Brazil: 7/20/2018 (registration for parties' candidates opened) – 10/27/208 (excluding the 1st round election day, 10/7/2018); 5) Spain: 2/15/2019 (snap elections were called) – 4/26/2019. Two candidates, Ciro Gomez of Brazil and Sergio Fajardo of Colombia did not make it to the 2nd round; thus, their campaign period ended the day before the 1st round election in these countries.

[78] I classify who is and is not a populist according to four existing datasets: three expert surveys (the Chapel Hill Expert Survey—CHES, the Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Survey—NEGex, and the Global Party Survey—GPS) and one based on speech analysis (the Global Populism Database—GPD). I used four datasets to ensure external validity as well as adequate coverage of the actors in this sample. I classify candidates as "populist" if the majority of these datasets considered the candidates to be somewhat or very populist and "non-populist" otherwise. Full details are available in Appendix A.3. I go against the existing data in only one instance: FI of Italy. I do so because I evaluate FI as a party, not the party leader (Silvio Berlusconi) or as a coalition. While existing accounts generally view Berlusconi as populist, FI is not necessarily a populist party. Bobba and Roncarolo (2018), for example, classify only 8.1% of FI's Tweets as populist (making the "not populist" designation more appropriate). I also include Cs of Spain as a populist party—this was the only actor in the sample that had an even split of populist/non-populist in the existing data sets. However, my data indicate that Cs falls on the lower end of populism, thus I opt to include them as populist.

[79] I log-transformed both likes and re-Tweets due to a positive skew towards lower values—50% of "likes" are below 800 with an average of 4,055 and a high value of 91,000, while the average number of re-Tweets in the sample is approximately 1,500 despite a high value of 21,000.

assumption—European parties Tweet considerably more than their leaders in the majority of cases. For example, Pedro Sánchez of PSOE Tweeted 6.8 times per day on average during the campaign versus PSOE's average of 32.6 (see Appendix B.4). Relatedly, party institutionalization differs significantly across these regions, with Europe having entrenched parties that persist across elections and, more importantly, across party leaders, suggesting that parties are an appropriate focal point. In comparison, Latin American parties are often formed as electoral vehicles for particular candidates, and candidates also change parties not infrequently, supporting a candidate-centric view for this region.

To assess whether comparing party leaders in Latin America and parties in Europe is appropriate, I evaluate a subsample of European parties and their party leaders (Renzi/PD, MS5/Di Maio, PSOE/Sánchez, and Vox/Abascal).[80] Overall, I find that parties and their leaders use similar percentages of populist, pluralist, technocratic, and neutral rhetoric. Additionally, when examining the subsample of four parties included in the broader sample versus their party leaders, I find that the results presented in the main model are broadly consistent and, if anything, are downwardly biased compared to alternate specifications with party leaders. As a final consideration, I provide the main results broken down by each region in Appendices D.1 to D.6. While there are some interesting differences, the hypothesis test results hold in both regions separately as in the pooled sample.

Coding Procedures and Reliability

Four research assistants (RAs) and the author coded the Tweets. RAs were blind to identifying information and coded Tweets independently. In some cases, the RAs needed to view the media attached to the Tweet to accurately code it, thus exposing the candidate's identity.

[80] See Appendix D.3 for an explanation of the subsample case selection, and Appendices B.5 and B.6 for the results.

Media that met this standard include threads or consecutive Tweets (Graham et al. 2014; Welp and Ruth 2017), short videos, news articles, links to longer posts, and infographics.[81] Media that did not meet this standard (and were removed) include photos of the speaker or the crowd or images that duplicated the text of the Tweet. The intercoder reliability for the entire sample, presented using Krippendorff's alpha, is .66 for the discursive frame level and .63 for the frame element level.[82]

Method for Analyzing Engagement

I utilize Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to evaluate the relationship between frame elements and online engagement. I include candidate fixed effects to control for candidate-by-candidate differences (Appendix B.3). Additionally, I control for several features of a Tweet that could affect individuals' propensity to engage with the message, including dichotomous variables for whether a Tweet contains hashtags, mentions, and links to additional content (Bobba and Roncarolo 2018; Welp and Ruth 2017; Zamora Medina and Zurutuza Muñoz 2014). In line with these studies, I expect the presence of these interactive components to increase engagement because they encourage participants to view additional content.

Results

Accounting for the oversample of populist actors through weighting, the sample contains 19% populist, 11% pluralist, 33% technocratic, and 36% neutral frame elements. I approach the results section by first presenting descriptive results on the classification of candidate frame elements before evaluating how people engage with these different elements.

Part 1: Classification

[81] About 1/3 of the Tweets in this sample contained relevant media that may have (though did not necessarily) revealed the speaker's identity.
[82] See Appendix F.1 for a detailed discussion of the coding procedures.

Figure 3.2 displays the percentage of each frame element in the sample. The technocratic element "output" is the most used frame element, with 17.6% of all Tweets in the dataset, followed by the neutral frame element "campaign enthusiasm" with 15.5% of Tweets. These findings reveal what candidates see as important to get elected—solving society's issues by promising to deliver certain outcomes and by the purest form of campaigning—requesting votes and other forms of support. In contrast, all four pluralistic frame elements are rarely used (less than 5% each). This result suggests that pluralist frame elements are not prioritized in these cases, a potentially concerning finding for scholars of liberal democracy in light of how much more often populist frame elements are used by comparison.

More generally, the data reflect a wide range of elements used, both across and within candidates: no frame element represents more than 20% of the sample. This finding suggests that communication in these countries is made up of a combination of discursive frames. Another implication of this finding is that, even though all cases have a populist candidate, the political environment is such that populist content is not necessarily privileged, at least in frequency: it is one strategy among many, and one that is used less frequently than elements from either technocracy or neutral discursive frames.

Figure 3.2: Percentage of Frame Elements Used in the Sample



Figure 3.3 supports this claim from a different perspective by revealing which frame elements individual candidates are using, ordered from those using the most populist elements to those using the least. Mixing frame elements is not just a country-level phenomenon. Candidates do not just stick to one discursive frame or even one frame element within a discursive frame—most employ different elements spanning all four discursive frames. Aside from Duque's reliance on "output" (51%), no candidate uses even a majority of a single element. Figure 4 also highlights how populist frame elements are concentrated primarily in a few actors—the "populist" candidates (those in blue text in the below figure). In general, the actors that use the most populist discursive frame elements line up with whom experts view as "populist" actors.

Figure 3.3: Frames used by Candidate/Party



More generally, these data can be used to draw conclusions about individual candidates. Duque and FI were sometimes portrayed as populist in the media, but these data show these actors use comparatively few populist frame elements (6%). Other candidates that are seen as quintessential populists like Bolsonaro, MS5, and AMLO use a minority of populist frame elements (though, more than their non-populist counterparts, to be sure). More broadly, these data reveal important information about candidates' campaign strategies by showing how much time they dedicate to different frame elements. For example, while some candidates prioritize conveying issue positions (ranging from 5% for MS5 and AMLO to 51% for Duque), others focus more on the campaign by motivating supporters (ranging from 3% for PP to 36% for

Fajardo) or informing followers of campaign events (ranging from 2% for Petro to 29% for Gomes). The information we get from looking at a candidate's rhetorical strategy *beyond* their use of populism forms a more complete picture of how a candidate tries to mobilize and engage their followers and thus facilitates a more productive comparison between candidates.

Part 2: Engagement

The benefit of examining online engagement is that it can tell us which of these frame elements are "working" by identifying the elements that are associated with the most likes and retweets. Table 4 presents OLS regressions of frame elements on likes (a) and retweets (b). Model 1 represents a suppressed intercept model.[83] For ease of interpretation, each coefficient represents the average number of likes and retweets a given frame element receives compared to the base candidate, AMLO.[84] Both models control for mentions, hashtags, and links, as well as candidate fixed effects. Full regression results are available in the appendix.

Model 1 demonstrates that "anti-elite" frame elements garner the most likes and retweets of any element examined. This finding likely reflects the context of these cases: Hawkins et al. (2018) suggest that populist messages must be salient to mobilize or engage individuals, and such messages are primarily salient where elites have misbehaved or performed poorly. Nonetheless, this result tells us how powerful the anti-elite narrative is in such contexts, which are increasingly widespread. The other populist frame elements ("dispositional blame attribution" and "pro-people") perform comparatively well, particularly in retweets (column 4), but they fall short of the "anti-elite" element. Of the populist frame elements, "anti-elite"

[83] The model tests whether the average number of likes/re-Tweets for each frame is zero. Given that the average number of likes is 4,055 and the number of re-Tweets 1,544, it is unsurprising that every frame is statistically differentiable from 0. In contrast, Model 2 tests whether the average number of likes/re-Tweets for each frame is different than that of the *information* frame.

[84] AMLO is chosen as the reference candidate because he attracts the most re-Tweets and second most likes.

elements are what do the work in engaging individuals. Neutral frame elements also perform well—better than most populist ones—especially when the dependent variable is likes (column 1). In Model 1a, the neutral frame elements "campaign enthusiasm" and "candidate traits" generate the second and third most likes, respectively (column 2). Technocratic elements are, on average, less engaging than most neutral or populist ones except for "appealing to elites or experts." Meanwhile, pluralistic frame elements consistently fall in the bottom half of the data.[85]

The substantive differences between frame elements are modest but noteworthy considering the parameters of the study. These messages are delivered in a competitive communication environment where individuals are simultaneously exposed to different frame elements of different intensities (compared to a controlled experimental setting) across two different regions and eighteen different actors. Thus, the primary utility of Model 1 is demonstrating the plausible presence of framing effects and the identification of what constitutes a strong frame element. Model 2 and the hypothesis tests delve deeper into what these framing effects might mean for online engagement.

Model 2 provides a deeper understanding of the differences between frame elements by using the "information" element as a base. All other features of the model remain the same. The "information" frame is an ideal base category because it is the absence of a frame element: it provides information rather than encouraging a particular perspective. The results of Model 2 are

[85] Coupled with the low prevalence with which actors used these frame elements, there seems to be agreement between actors opting not to use pluralistic messages and, when they do, individuals not engaging with these elements as often. One possible explanation for this finding is that pluralist elements are more conducive to forming a government (in the case of parliamentary systems) and governing more broadly, with less utility during a campaign when each actor is attempting to maximize their individual support at the polls. This explanation is especially applicable to the "emphasis on compromise" element, which specifically refers to compromise in the political sphere. However, the elements of "inclusivity," "legalistic view of democracy," and "situational blame attribution" are less obviously temporally bound. An alternate possibility is one that depends on context: in Appendix D, which breaks down the findings by region, pluralist messages actually perform slightly better in Europe than they do in Latin America. Thus, it may not be a temporal story but one of institutional differences, with parliamentary systems more favorable to pluralism than presidential ones.

presented as relative magnitudes and should be interpreted as how much a given frame element generates more likes/retweets compared to "information" messages.[86] Model 2 demonstrates quantifiable differences in engagement between "information" frames elements and substantive ones, from a low of +32.3% ("legalistic view of democracy" in column 3) to a high of +142.5% ("anti-elite" in column 6). Accordingly, Model 2 suggests that using some element is better than not using one in terms of generating engagement. Like Model 1, Model 2 also demonstrates the presence of framing effects and how competitive frame elements are for engagement.

Table 3.3: Suppressed Intercept Model of Likes & Re-Tweets

Frame	(1) Likes (Model 1.a)	(2) Likes Ranking (Model 1.a)	*(3) Compared to "Info" (Model 2.a)*	(4) Re-Tweets (Model 1.b)	(5) Re-Tweets Ranking (Model 1.b)	*(6) Compared to "Info" (Model 2.b)*
POPULISM: Pro-people	9,972 (159)	6	+88.9%***	8,919 (149)	4	+94.2%***
Anti-elite	10,141 (127)	1	+123.7%***	9,140 (120)	1	+142.5%***
Dispositional blame attribution	9,852 (153)	8	+67.5%***	8,884 (144)	5	+87.6%***
PLURALISM: Compromise	9,703 (181)	10	+44.3%**	8,656 (170)	11	+49.3%***
Inclusivity	9,786 (154)	9	+56.8%***	8,689 (145)	10	+54.3%***
Legalistic view of democracy	9,616 (173)	12	+32.3%*	8,696 (162)	9	+55.6%***
Situational blame attribution[87]	10,005 (299)	5	+95.2%**	8,959 (281)	3	+102.4%***
TECHNOCRACY: Appealing to elites/experts	10,009 (170)	4	+96.0%***	8,840 (159)	7	+79.7%***
Candidate experience	9,876 (131)	7	+71.6%***	8,853 (123)	6	+81.8%***
Future output	9,620 (124)	11	+32.8%***	8,639 (117)	12	+46.8%***
NEUTRAL: Candidate traits	10,072 (138)	2	+108.7%***	9,102 (129)	2	+133.3%***
Campaign enthusiasm	10,046 (118)	3	+103.4%***	8,835 (111)	8	+78.8%***
Information	9,336 (129)	13	Base Frame	8,255 (121)	13	Base Frame
Observations	**1,577**			**1,577**		

Candidate fixed effects included but not presented

[86] Relative magnitudes are calculated using the formula $100[e^{\beta} - 1]$ to interpret the logged dependent variable as a percentage difference compared to the base category, populism.

[87] Because of the small number of frames in this category (11), the results for situational blame attribution should be interpreted with caution, especially as it pertains to its comparative rank.

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: In models 1a and 1b, significance indicators are removed because every coefficient is significantly different from 0 likes/retweets at p<.01.

Although these models tell us what kinds of frame elements are associated with higher likes and retweets, they do not tell us about the attributes of frame elements that may be responsible for fostering online engagement. I hypothesized that three potential groups of frame elements would generate comparatively high engagement. First, **H_1** anticipated that populist frame elements generated high engagement. I find support for this hypothesis (p<.1 for likes and p<.01 for retweets). Combined with Models 1 and 2, these results are suggestive that criticizing elites in a context in which elites have failed to meet citizens' expectations in some way is a powerful communication tool when it comes to engagement. Certainly, the other populist frame elements matter too—but anti-elite content forms the core of the populist discursive frame.

Meanwhile, **H_2** predicted that less cognitively demanding frame elements would generate higher engagement compared to frame elements that were more cognitively demanding. I find support for this hypothesis: the four high-fit elements generate more likes and retweets on average than the two low-fit elements. Moreover, I can reject the null hypothesis that the mean engagement (likes and retweets) of these groups are equal at p<.01. In essence, this finding speaks to a longstanding debate about how individuals consume political information. This particular hypothesis test comes down in favor of individuals as maximizing shortcuts and avoiding more demanding content in favor of more easily processible messages.

Turning to **H_3**, I predicted that frame elements that evoke emotions would generate higher engagement. Recall that the elements in the high fit category are those that use at least 75% positive or negative language, while those in the low fit category are those that use at least 50% neutral frames. I find support for this hypothesis: frame elements that have a distinctly

positive *or* negative valence generate more engagement than those that use a majority of neutral frame elements (significant at p<.01).[88] Although this finding could, in part, be interpreted to reinforce the notion of negativity bias, it may also identify a way to compete with campaign negativity—with campaign positivity. Although there are limits to pooling high and low fit elements, these results shed light on three of the potential mechanisms at work.

Discussion

Existing studies have demonstrated that populist rhetoric has wide-ranging effects for online engagement (Bobba 2019; Bobba and Roncarolo 2018) as well as offline attitudes (Rooduijn et al. 2017; Wirz et al. 2018). What is missing from these and other studies is an examination of how populism engages individuals relative to other ways of seeing the political world, like pluralism, technocracy, and neutral campaign rhetoric, and what it is about populism (which framing elements of the overall discursive strategy) are comparatively engaging. Populism is most often examined in isolation, masking considerable variation between these other discursive frames both in terms of what kinds of rhetoric candidates are using and how that other rhetoric engages individuals online. To evaluate this gap, I break down these four discursive strategies into their individual frame elements and evaluate which elements produce framing effects and which do not.

I theorize that strong frame elements will generate the highest online engagement. In particular, I identify three attributes of frame elements that are associated with frame strength: populist content, cognitive simplicity, and emotional content. My application of framing theory

[88] This finding also holds when I test frames capitalizing on positive emotions or negative emotions separately (not pooled) against the low-fit category. It also holds if, instead of focusing on particular frame elements, I focus on the predominant tone of the individual Tweets themselves (whether they are negative, neutral, or positive). The group means of Tweets with emotive content are significantly higher than the group means for neutral Tweets for both likes and re-Tweets, significant at p<.01. I present the frames results at it is more consistent with the objective of my hypotheses—to identify the particular aspects of frames that are associated with higher engagement.

is important because, while we know framing effects exist, we know less about whether and how they are identifiable outside controlled settings. I apply this theoretical framework to five recent campaigns in Europe and Latin America to identify which frame elements have the strongest framing effects in competitive campaign communication environments.

I provide two key empirical takeaways. First, candidates use a wide range of rhetoric, incorporating all four discursive frames and many of the available thirteen frame elements. In short, candidates are not monolithic in their rhetoric, and looking at the spectrum of rhetoric they use provides valuable insight into their campaigns. Second, my results indicate that frame elements that contain populist elements, are not cognitively demanding, and evoke emotions foster higher levels of engagement than elements lacking these attributes. An important implication of my results is that for candidates who do not use populist frame elements, technocratic and neutral frame elements appear to be the best bet for competing with populism—pluralist frame elements do not muster the same degree of engagement in this sample. Whether or not this finding persists beyond the election period is an interesting question for future research. If non-populists can begin to identify particular frame elements that best convey their overall narrative and foster engagement, they may stand a better chance at evening the rhetorical playing field.

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Appendix

Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics

A.1 Average Likes by Frame Element

Discursive frame	Frame Element	% of frames	Avg. Likes	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Populism	Pro-people	3.8%	6,201	15,874	5	115,560
	Anti-elite	10.6%	6,271	10,611	2	61,017
	Dispositional blame attribution	6.0%	1,428.2	4,269	4	36,041
	Total Populist frames	***20.4%***	***4,845***	***10,723***	***2***	***115,650***
Pluralism	Compromise	2.5%	2,572	4,882	6	26,000
	Inclusivity	4.7%	2,662	6,610	54	50,231
	Legalistic view of democracy	3.1%	4,815	9,975	1	55,399
	Situational blame attribution	0.7%	1,669	2,360	183	7,382
	Total Pluralist frames	***10.9%***	***82,899***	***6,114***	***1***	***50,231***
Technocracy	Appealing to elites/experts	3.6%	5,033	9,337	33	45,788
	Candidate experience	11.5%	3,208	12,075	1	107,410
	Future output	18.1%	2,083	5,342	1	48,309
	Total Technocratic frames	***33.5%***	***2,894***	***8,992***	***1***	***107,410***
Neutral	Candidate traits	7.5%	4,955	12,178	10	82,627
	Campaign enthusiasm	15.5%	7,662	13,394	3	91,000
	Information	12.4%	2,937	6,663	1	55,238
	Total Neutral frames	***35.3%***	***5,438***	***11,391***	***1***	***91,000***

A.2 Average Re-Tweets by Frame Element

Discursive frame	Frame Element	% of frames	Avg. Re-Tweets	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Populism	Pro-people	3.8%	2,887	4,203	7	26,056
	Anti-elite	10.6%	2,940	4,004	3	20,000
	Dispositional blame attribution	6.0%	1,077	2,094	2	9,700
	Total Populist frames	***20.4%***	***2,273***	***3,676***	***2***	***26,056***
Pluralism	Compromise	2.5%	1,272	1,894	3	8,400
	Inclusivity	4.7%	864	1,775	23	12,340
	Legalistic view of democracy	3.1%	1,749	2,933	4	15,433
	Situational blame attribution	0.7%	967	1,108	56	3,200
	Total Pluralist frames	***10.9%***	**1,137**	**1,896**	**3**	**12,340**
Technocracy	Appealing to elites/experts	3.6%	1,742	2,297	15	8,694
	Candidate experience	11.5%	1,071	3,427	1	33,211
	Future output	18.1%	1,055	2,103	1	14,000
	Total Technocratic frames	***33.5%***	***1,160***	***2,723***	***1***	***32,111***
Neutral	Candidate traits	7.5%	2,831	4,423	5	21,000

	Campaign enthusiasm	15.5%	2,310	3,178	3	19,175
	Information	12.4%	907	1,735	2	8,604
	Total Neutral frames	***35.3%***	***1,835***	***3,172***	***2***	***21,000***

A.3 Cross Tab of Tone (Valence) and Frame Element (H_3)

Bold text indicates frame elements that met the criteria for inclusion into **H_3**, either as high-fit examples (red text) or low-fit (orange text).

Discursive Frame	***Frame Element***	***Negative (%)***	***Neutral (%)***	***Positive (%)***	***Number of frames in the sample***
Populism	Pro-people	33.33	18.33	48.33	60
	Anti-elite	**89.2**	7.2	3.6	167
	Dispositional blame	**88.4**	11.6	0	95
Pluralism	Compromise	0	**60**	40	40
	Inclusivity	8.1	*46*	46	74
	Legalistic view of dem	2	**63.3**	34.7	49
	Situational Blame	72.7[89]	27.3	0	11
Technocracy	Appealing to elites/experts	1.8	*43.9*	54.4	57
	Candidate experience	22	*40.7*	37.4	182
	Future output	7.4	**73.3**	19.3	285
Neutral	Candidate traits	32.3	*48.3*	19.5	118
	Campaign enthusiasm	.4	7.4	**92.2**	244
	Information	0	**79**	21	195

Although the cutoff was made at 50% for neutral frame elements for H3, if I lower the cutoff to 40% (thereby including the four frame elements in italisized text in the table above, inclusivity, appealing to elites/experts, candidate experience, and candidate traits) as "low-fit" examples, the finding still holds at $p<.01$.

A.4 Examples of the kinds of messages found in each frame element category

The Tweets represented in this table are meant to be representative of each category. Selection was determined based on 1) strength of the frame, as determined by the RAs (either "moderate,"

[89] Situational blame is not included in the hypothesis due to the low N (11 frames). However, the finding is robust to its inclusion.

i.e., “weak” for the purposes of this table, or “strong;” and 2) “strong” frame elements are those that garnered more likes/re-Tweets within that category of frame, while “weak” frame elements attracted comparatively fewer likes/re-Tweets. Tweets are presented in quotations as direct statements from the candidates, but with links and hashtags removed for presentation purposes.

Discursive Frame	Frame Element	“Strong” example	“Weak” example
Populism	Pro-people	“We are going to win the first day of July and we are not going to fail the town [el pueblo]. Power only makes sense, and becomes a virtue, when it is placed at the service of others.” (AMLO, MEX)	“In this campaign, we are committed to listening twice as much as we talked about. That is why my government will be the true government of the people, in which the needs of the citizens will be resolved.” (Anaya, MEX)
	Anti-elite	“We are not against the businessmen, we are against the ill-gotten wealth, the kind that they obtain overnight, under the protection of public power, corrupt politicians and influence peddlers” (AMLO, MEX)	“In his 'speech to the voters of tomorrow' (minors, starting with his three children) @matteorenzi launches the challenge to 'professionals of fear'. Read more on @democratica_web” (PD, IT)
	Dispositional blame attribution	“The social emergency is the product of decisions or political indecisions. The disaster of Mocoa showed the forgetfulness of the State of the climatic Change… the corruption and the hidroituango the forgetfulness to construct a democracy where to the people decide…” (Petro, COL)	“The general secretary of the EFDD lies to The Republic: now, she apologizes to you…” (MS5, IT)
Pluralism	Compromise	“In #PorMexicoAlFrente we propose the first coalition government for Mexico. It's a very profound change, it means moving from an all-powerful President to a President who is accountable to citizens and Congress” (Anaya, MEX)	“We support Romano Prodi's proposal for a European investment plan based on education, health and housing. On Europe, clarity, seriousness and concreteness against the divisions and the confusing ideas of the right.” (PD, IT)
	Inclusivity	“We are with the Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities of Colombia In the #DiaDeLaAfrocolombianidad, we reiterate our commitment to their development and the guarantee of their rights, based on the premise 'Your knowledge, my knowledge, our knowledge'. Here we summarize them.” (Fajardo, COL)	“Here what we need is solidarity, but we must speak clearly about what happened in Venezuela. We have to welcome our Venezuelan brothers and defend democracy, institutions and freedoms.” (Duque, COL)
	Legalistic view of democracy	“Receiving a party representing a large part of the Mayors of Brazil and seeking to know the problems of the elect who live closer to the population! Watch a little of what was said at the meeting…” (Bolsonaro, BRZ)	‘We move forward with our citizen conversations, we do not stop traveling the country and look at the eyes. Very good welcome in Envigado. Thanks to all those who move with #LaFuerzaDeLaEsperanza.” (Fajardo, COL)
	Situational blame attribution	“We express our solidarity with the families of the victims of the Pioltello railway tragedy this morning. Such episodes should no occur anymore. There is a serious	“We have to overcome informality, because it is making the health system, the pension system and the viability of public finances untenable” (Duque, COL)

		emergency linked to the situation of the infrastructure in our country, which must be urgently addressed" (M5S, IT)	
Technocracy	Appealing to elites/experts	"I am very grateful for the support of @beto_cardenasj, the first PAN governor in the history of #Jalisco. Your support honors me and commits me to continue fighting to recover the peace that Mexicans deserve." (Anaya, MEX)	"The government party in Poland Law and Justice wishes VOX electoral success. VOX strengthens alliances to defend the only possible Europe, based on respect for the sovereignty of its States and Christian cultural roots" (VOX, ESP)
	Candidate experience	"I share my editorial in the Dallas Morning News @dallasnews about the capacity and the level of dialogue that the next President of Mexico should have in his relations with the United States, at all levels:" (Meade, MEX)	"Di Maio is not what the Five Stars really have in mind as a prime minister. He has never worked and is not even a graduate. #Matrix" (FI, IT)
	Future output	"In order to have transparency in the use of public resources, we will create a digital platform that, using blockchain technology, allows us to follow its course. Citizens will know exactly what money is allocated to, what it is used for and where it ends." (Anaya, MEX)	"States are also not reporting security. We need to federalize some crimes, since some criminal organizations act at national level. #DebateAparecida" (Cs, ESP)
Neutral	Candidate traits	"'As a good teacher, Fajardo is seen as convinced and patient, perhaps certain that changes take time but arrive, without haste, without manipulation, without buying consciences, a sowing that I hope the fertile electoral harvest he hopes for." (Fajardo, COL)	"I am like good wine, by aging I improve, and now I am perfect." (FI, IT)
	Campaign Enthusiasm	"We are a few hours away from announcing to all of Colombia a message that impels us not to give up, to not stop dreaming about the future of this land. Your vote is your heart building a great Colombia, free and in peace We can achieve it together!" (Petro, COL)	"Only two weeks to go before the election campaign ends. Help us spread the #program PD. Talk about it at home, with your family, with friends and neighbors. On #4March we decide the future of Italy" (PD, IT)
	Information	"I invite you to the Azteca Stadium at the close of the campaign. The festival will start from 5 in the afternoon. See you there." (AMLO, MEX)	"Saturday, September 1 to 12, we will land in Rio Branco / AC. Thank you for your presence." (Bolsonaro, BRZ)

A.5: Descriptive Statistics for Actors Evaluated (Corresponds to Table 2)

Country	*Candidate/Party*	*Vote Share*	*Campaign Tweets per Day*	No. of Followers[90]	Avg Likes	Std. Dev.	Avg. Re-Tweets	Std. Dev.
COL	Duque (Democratic Center)	54.0% (2nd); 39.1% (1st)	14.4	831,000	1,290	1,539	675	905

[90] The average number of followers as of early 2019. See Appendix B for a longer discussion.

	Petro (Progressivists Movement)	41.8% (2nd); 25.1% (1st)	6.2	3,390,000	4,165	9,369	5,837	4,246
	Fajardo (Citizen Compromise)	23.7% (1st)	10.2	1,420,000	1,697	1,731	544	583
MEX	López Obrador (AMLO) (Morena)	53.2%	1.4	5,390,000	15,601	6,125	5,965	2,353
	Anaya (PAN)	22.3%	5.2	755,000	2,686	3,252	1,161	1,877
	Meade (PRI)	16.4%	6	1,430,000	3,085	1,995	1,704	875
BRZ	Jair Bolsonaro (PSL)	55.1% (2nd); 46.0% (1st)	7.8	4,120,000	26,809	22,042	6,200	5,483
	Haddad (PT)[91]	44.9% (2nd); 29.3% (1st)	14.5	1,420,000	8,072	14,439	1,970	4,086
	Gomes (PDT)	12.5% (1st)	16.3	641,000	1,931	2,470	351	502
IT	M5S (leader: Luigi Di Maio)	32.2%	1.1	655,000	549	305	317	194
	Lega (leader: Matteo Salvini)	17.7%	21.8	63,200	20	14	11	10
	PD (leader: Matteo Renzi)	18.9%	2.3	395,000	332	262	164	134
	FI (leader: Silvio Berlusconi)	13.9%	1.9	1,934	143	175	61	78
ESP	Podemos (leader: Pablo Iglesias)	14.3%	21	1,390,000	567	575	377	339
	PP (leader: Pablo Casado)	16.7%	22.3	709,000	285	370	191	267
	PSOE (leader: Pedro Sánchez)	28.7%	32.6	682,000	203	198	149	122
	Cs (leader: Albert Rivera)	15.8%	31.2	525,000	178	240	127	142
	Vox (leader: Santiago Abascal)	10.3%	9.7	225,000	2,510	1,809	1,243	869

[91] In Brazil, Fernando Haddad was not the official candidate of the PT party until 9/11/2018; prior to that date, Lula da Silva was the official candidate and Haddad was his running mate. Haddad became the official candidate when Lula was denied the ability to remain a candidate after the Supreme Electoral Court ruled against him on corruption charges. 13/50 Tweets in the Haddad sample take place before the Lula ruling, though Haddad was actively campaigning as Lula's running made prior to 9/11/2018, thus these Tweets are still included in the final sample.

Appendix B: Validity

B.1: Schema Validation

To determine which actors are populist and not populist, I compare four existing measures of populism: The Global Populism Database, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, the Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Survey, and the Global Party Survey.

The Global Populism Database (GPD) classifies how populist a candidate is based on speeches, ranking candidate and politicians' scores along a 0-2 scale with four classification benchmarks: not populist (0-0.49); somewhat populist (0.5-0.99); populist (1-1.49); very populist (1.5-2).[92] Note that the GPD classifies political candidates/actors only, not parties. Every political actor in the analysis was evaluated by at least one of these comparative data sets.

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) relies on the opinion of political experts. In 2017, CHES asked experts to classify parties according to two dimensions: the people versus the elite and the salience of anti-elite rhetoric, each on a 0-10 scale with 0 indicating a non-populist perception of this party, and 10 indicating a populist response.[93] For ease of interpretation, I use the following classification benchmarks in my data set: not populist (0-2.49); somewhat populist (2.5-4.99); populist (5-7.49); and very populist (7.5-10). Not all parties/candidates are present in each data set.

[92] More information can be found at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/06/how-we-combed-leaders-speeches-to-gauge-populist-rise; the data can be found at https://populism.byu.edu/Pages/Data.

[93] The people versus elites question asks: "Some political parties take the position that "the people" should have the final say on the most important issues, for example, by voting directly in referendums. At the opposite pole are political parties that believe that elected representatives should make the most important political decisions. Where do the parties fall on this dimension?" The anti-elite rhetoric question asks: "Next, we would like you to think about the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric for a party. How important was the anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric to the parties in their public stance?" Chapel Hill Expert Survey 2017 Codebook: www.chesdata.eu.

The Negative Campaigning Comparative Expert Survey (NEGex) also relies on political experts for elections between 2016-2018. NEGex asks experts to rate candidates on three populist dimensions: identification with the people, respect for opponents (which I refer to as anti-elite), and simplicity of the message.[94] Note that NEGex classifies political candidates/actors only, not parties. I impose the following cut-off points that are based on the answer choices of experts: not populist (all scores are below 3.0), somewhat populist (only one element of populism exceeds 3.0), and populist (at least two elements of populism exceed 3.0).

The Global Party Survey (GPS) (conducted in 2019) is also based on the judgments of political experts. According to its codebook,[95] "The core measure operationalizing the minimalist conceptualization of populist rhetoric, treated as antithetical to pluralist rhetoric, uses the following measure:

> *"Parties can also be classified by their current use of POPULIST OR PLURALIST rhetoric.*
> *POPULIST language typically challenges the legitimacy of established political institutions and emphasizes that the will of the people should prevail.*
> *By contrast, PLURALIST rhetoric rejects these ideas, believing that elected leaders should govern, constrained by minority rights, bargaining and compromise, as well as checks and balances on executive power.*
> *Where would you place each party on the following scale? 0 Strongly favors pluralist rhetoric…10 Strongly favors populist rhetoric"*

Although the GPS contains separate measures for different components of populism, I rely on the single measure based on how it is treated in the codebook as the overarching measurement of

[94] The surveys ask experts: *And how would you say that the following statements apply to {candidate}? In your opinion, {candidate} might be someone who...1)* Identifies with common people, 2) Uses informal style, popular language, and 3) Uses anti-establishment/elite rhetoric. The answer choices are 0-4, from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The scores presented are averages from all experts that evaluated a particular actor. Data and documentation can be found at https://www.alessandro-nai.com/negex-data.

[95] The codebook and related materials are accessible at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/WMGTNS/2WNIVR&version=2.1.

populist discourse. This measure is demarcated into four categories: strongly populist, moderately populist, moderately pluralist, and strongly pluralist.

FI is somewhat more puzzling: in this sample, FI uses only 8% populist frames. This result is consistent with Bobba and Roncarolo (2018), who classify only 8.1% of FI's Tweets as populist. The divergence could be a product of the enigmatic figure of Berlusconi, who may appear populist without using a significant amount of populist frames. It is also worth noting that Berlusconi just makes the "somewhat populist" benchmark of The Global Populism database.

Leader:	AMLO (MEX)	Anaya (MEX)	Meade (MEX)	Duque (COL)	Petro (COL)	Fajardo (COL)	Bolsonaro (BRZ)	Haddad (BRZ)	Gomes (BRZ)
Speech Results (Hawkins)	Very populist (1.6)	Somewhat populist (.60)	Not populist (.01)	Not populist (.075)	Somewhat populist (.95)	Not populist (.0375)	Somewhat populist (.5)	*Not rated*	*Not rated*
NEGex (Nai)— pro-people, anti-elite, simple messaging	Populist (3.91, 3.73, 3.82)	Not populist (0.83, 1.17, 1.25)	*Not rated*	Not populist (1.33, 2.57, 1.0)	Populist (3.88, 3.88, 3.88)	*Not rated*	Populists (2.33, 3.13, 3.33)	Not populist (2.75, 2.13, 2.63)	Not populist (2.6, 2.8, 2.6)
Global Party Survey (2019)	Very populist	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	Very populist	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	Very Populist	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	*Not rated*
THIS STUDY	**Populist (3/3)**	**Not populist (2/3)**	**Not populist (2/2)**	**Not populist (2/3)**	**Populist (2/2)**	**Not populist (1/1)**	**Populist (3/3)**	**Not populist (2/2)**	**Not Populist (1/1)**

Leader:	FI (IT)	M5S (IT)	PD (IT)	LN (IT)	PSOE (ESP)	Vox (ESP)	PP (ESP)	Podemos (ESP)	Cs (ESP)
Speech Results (Hawkins)	Somewhat populist (.5) **Berlusconi	Populist (1.15) **Di Maio	Not populist (.1) ** Renzi	Populist (1.05) ** Salvini	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	*Not rated*	*Not rated*
NEGex (Nai)—anti-elite, pro-people, simple messaging	Not populist (2.22, 2.89, 1.44) **Berlusconi	Somewhat populist (2.60, 2.80, 3.0) **Di Maio	Somewhat populist (1.71, 3.57 1.71,) ** Renzi	Populist (3.38, 3.5, 3.38) ** Salvini	Not populist	Populist (2.79, 3.29, 3.29) **Santiago Abascal	Not Populist (1.36, 2.21, 0.4) **Pablo Casado	*Not rated*	*Not rated*
CHES (people vs. elites; anti-elite salience)	Somewhat populist (3.75; 3.61)	Very populist (9.75; 10)	Not populist (2.75; 2.46)	Very populist (7.83; 7.85)	Not/somewhat populist (3.5; 2.1)	*Not rated*	Not populist (.78; 1)	Very populist (8.78; 8.64)	Somewhat populist (3.65; 5.38)
Global Party Survey (2019)	Very populist **rated as a coalition	Very populist	Very pluralist (not populist) **rated as a coalition	Very populist **rated as a coalition	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	Very populist	Moderately pluralist (not populist)	Moderately populist	Moderately pluralist (not populist)
THIS STUDY	**NOT Populist (1/3)**	**Populist (4/4)**	**Not populist (3/4)**	**Populist (4/4)**	**Not populist (3/3)**	**Populist (2/2)**	**Not populist (3/3)**	**Populist (2/2)**	**Populist (1/2)**

B.2: Intercoder Reliability

	Coder 1 (author)	Coder 2	Coder 3	Coder 4	Coder 5	Total
Number of Tweets coded	498	188	1,099	850	494	
Agreement with final DISCURSIVE FRAME	.76	.45	.67	.65	.71	.65
Agreement with final FRAME ELEMENT	.77	.44	.65	.60	.68	.62

Notes: Intercoder reliability is computed using Krippendorff's alpha

B.3: Statistical Assumptions

The main assumption in this analysis is the use of candidate fixed effects to capture candidate differences. I use candidate fixed effects to control for the possibility that 1) the populist actors have more followers and thus more likes, 2) populist actors simply generate more engagement, and 3) candidates Tweet at different frequencies. Candidate fixed effects are employed as a catch-all category for the multitude of differences that could occur between candidates across the political spectrum in two distinct regions. Fixed effects are an imperfect way to get around data constraints in trying to measure theoretically relevant aspects of candidate differences, while also theoretically capturing more than one particular candidate attribute.

The number of followers was considered as an alternative. However, this measure has drawbacks, notably in terms of data availability. An ideal measure would capture the number of

followers for each individual Tweet. However, to my knowledge, that is not a metric that is obtainable except in real-time, and the data in this analysis were obtained after the elections were complete. The second-best option would be to have an accurate measure of the number of followers immediately before the election results are released. The idea behind the urgency is that I suspect is that follower counts after the elections take place favor the winners. From a theoretical standpoint, I can see it being the case that once a candidate loses, there is at least a minor wave of losing followers, while the winner would get additional followers they might not have had during the campaign. Unfortunately, I only have the follower count as of the time the research was beginning in earnest, in March of 2019. Thus, the follower counts I have were collected 6-12 months after the initial elections, which is problematic if my assertion about post-election winner's bias is correct.

The below graph demonstrates that there is a strongly positive relationship between the magnitude of the candidate fixed effects and candidates' number of followers. The graph represents the relationship for re-Tweets, using the main model in the paper (Figure 2) which includes each individual discursive frame (with populism as the base), candidate fixed effects, and controls for mentions, hashtags, and media links. AMLO is used as the reference category because AMLO has the highest number of followers and generates more likes than all other candidates at statistically distinguishable levels. The correlation between the number of followers and candidate fixed effects is .76. This correlation indicates that incorporating fixed effects in the main model of interest does a good job of capturing the number of followers, in addition to other aspects that differentiate candidates from one another. Given the data limitations noted above, I opt to include fixed effects instead of followers.


Candidate Fixed Effects Magnitude
(AMLO as Base)
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
Bolsonaro (BRZ)
AMLO (MEX)
Meade (MEX)
Haddad (BRZ)
Vox (ESP)
Anaya (MEX)
Petro (COL)
Fajardo (COL)
Gomes (BRZ)
Duque (COL)
MS5 (IT)
Podemos (ESP)
PD (IT)
PP (ESP)
PSOE (ESP)
Cs (ESP)
FI (IT)
Lega (IT)
0
2000000
4000000
6000000
Number of Followers

B.4: Comparing European parties to their party leaders

Country	*Candidate/Party*	*Campaign Tweets per Day*	No. of Followers*	Avg Likes	Avg. Re-Tweets	% Re-Tweets of party messages**
IT	**M5S**	1.1	655,000	540	309	NA
	Leader: Luigi Di Maio	1.5		1,139	538	25/127 (19.6%)
	Lega	21.8	63,200	21	10.7	NA
	Leader: Matteo Salvini	8		695	217	*Not available*
	PD	2.3	395,000	343	169	NA
	Leader: Matteo Renzi	2.6		1,259	371	8/177 (4.5%)
	FI	1.9	1,934	131	60	NA
	Leader: Silvio Berlusconi	*Not available*		*Not available*	*Not available*	*Not available*
ESP	**Podemos**	21	1,390,000	565	382	NA
	Leader: Pablo Iglesias	4		2,416	1,123	42/320 (13%)
	PP	22.3	709,000	290	198	NA
	Leader: Pablo Casado	7.3		856	450	179/691 (26%)
	PSOE	32.6	682,000	223	159	NA
	Leader: Pedro Sanchez	6.8		1,360	578	44/517 (8.5%)
	Cs	31.2	525,000	156	115	NA
	Leader: Albert Rivera	4.6		1,727	378	53/375 (14.1%)
	Vox	9.7	225,000	2,327	1,135	NA
	Leader: Santiago Abascal	3.8		5,254	2,578	293/556 (52.7%) 352/615* (57.2%)

Notes:

- The likes/re-Tweets is the average for the universe of Tweets during the campaigns for the party leaders, and the average for the sample of Tweets for parties
- Lega's likes/re-Tweets are based on a sample of 50, not the universe of Tweets
- * As explained in Appendix B, the number of followers was collected in March 2019, not at the time of the campaign. See Appendix B for additional details.

- ** BEFORE re-tweets were removed from the sample; the campaign Tweets per day does not reflect any re-Tweets
- ***(Abascal) represents 352 Tweets of Vox party accounts (including Vox for young people, Vox for specific regions, and mostly from "Vox noticias")
- I do not include a comparative number of followers for party leaders because it would not be comparable to the parties, which was collected in March of 2019

B.5: Comparing a subsample of candidates and parties descriptively

I evaluate a subsample of party leaders. I opted to include one populist and one non-populist in both Italy and Spain. For the populists, I opted to examine MS5 and Vox because previous studies have provided some insights on the comparison between parties and party leaders for both Podemos (Casero-Ripollés 2017) and Lega (Bobba 2019; Bobba and Roncarolo 2018). For the non-populists, I included the incumbent/"establishment" leader: Pedro Sanchez (PSOE) and Matteo Renzi (PD). I include 50 Tweets for each of these four leaders. An important divergence from the full sample is that I skipped the de-identification procedure, thus RAs were exposed to the identity of the speaker if media was attached.



B.6: Model specifications comparing a subset of leaders and parties

Because of the size of the subsample (200 Tweets from party leaders), I opt not to run a full model comparing parties to their leaders. Such a model would be overspecified with 13 frame categories, several of which have single digit bin sizes, and thus would not be an appropriate test of the assumptions I make. Instead, I present two alternate specifications.

In Specification 1, I examine Model 2a from the main analysis (where information is used as the base category) compared to a model where I include the party leaders **in addition to** the parties themselves—that is, I add an additional 200 cases from the 4 party leaders I sampled.

In Specification 2, I examine Model 2a from the main analysis with a model in which I replace the four parties with corresponding subsampled party leaders (PSOE, Vox, PD, and M5S) with their party leaders (Sanchez, Abascal, Renzi, and Di Maio).

If my assumption is correct, that parties are a more conservative choice, then these alternate specifications should perform similarly (if not better) compared to the main model. While a simplistic comparison, that is what I find below. Avoiding comparing the different models too closely given the different data and subsequent variation in the DV, I note two comparisons. First, including party leaders does not change the level of statistical significance—no frame loses its significance when party leaders are included or when party leaders replace their parties. Second, the coefficients in the alternate models are, in most cases, marginally higher. These alternate specifications are suggestive that the models presented in the main analyses are conservative and thus if anything, downplay the findings.

Specification 1: including the subsample of party leaders (Sanchez of PSOE, Abascal of Vox, Renzi of PD, and Di Maio of M5S) in addition to the 18 candidates/parties in the main analysis.

	Model	Full Model Likes	Likes with Party Leaders	Full Model RTs	RTs with Party Leaders
Discursive Frames	**Frame Elements**				
Populism	Pro-People	0.636***	0.676***	0.664***	0.701***
		(0.141)	(0.130)	(0.132)	(0.122)
	Anti-Elite	0.805***	0.835***	0.886***	0.916***
		(0.102)	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.087)
	Disp. Blame	0.516***	0.582***	0.629***	0.704***
		(0.125)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.107)
Pluralism	Compromise	0.367**	0.367**	0.401***	0.398***
		(0.164)	(0.151)	(0.154)	(0.141)
	Inclusivity	0.450***	0.510***	0.434***	0.500***
		(0.129)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.110)
	Legalistic View	0.280*	0.309**	0.442***	0.470***
		(0.151)	(0.142)	(0.142)	(0.133)
	Sit. Blame	0.669**	0.697**	0.705***	0.734***
		(0.290)	(0.281)	(0.273)	(0.263)
Technocracy	Elites/Experts	0.673***	0.697***	0.586***	0.607***
		(0.142)	(0.133)	(0.134)	(0.125)
	Cand. Experience	0.540***	0.539***	0.598***	0.606***
		(0.098)	(0.087)	(0.092)	(0.081)
	Output	0.284***	0.325***	0.384***	0.424***
		(0.090)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.076)
Neutral	Cand. Traits	0.736***	0.747***	0.847***	0.840***
		(0.110)	(0.100)	(0.103)	(0.094)
	Campaign enthusiasm	0.710***	0.718***	0.581***	0.586***
		(0.092)	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.078)
	Information	BASE	BASE	BASE	BASE
	Candidates				
	Anaya (MEX)	-1.943***	-1.901***	-1.846***	-1.817***
		(0.154)	(0.148)	(0.145)	(0.139)
	Meade (MEX)	-1.580***	-1.539***	-1.174***	-1.143***
		(0.149)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.135)
	Duque (COL)	-2.728***	-2.689***	-2.435***	-2.411***
		(0.158)	(0.151)	(0.148)	(0.142)
	Petro (COL)	-1.949***	-1.937***	-0.392***	-0.385***
		(0.138)	(0.133)	(0.129)	(0.125)
	Fajardo (COL)	-2.579***	-2.536***	-2.730***	-2.698***
		(0.151)	(0.145)	(0.142)	(0.136)
	Podemos (ESP)	-3.535***	-3.505***	-2.925***	-2.912***
		(0.144)	(0.139)	(0.136)	(0.130)
	PP (ESP)	-4.128***	-4.080***	-3.596***	-3.566***
		(0.156)	(0.150)	(0.147)	(0.141)
	PSOE (ESP)	-4.311***	-4.248***	-3.556***	-3.515***
		(0.161)	(0.154)	(0.151)	(0.144)
	Cs (ESP)	-4.657***	-4.607***	-3.945***	-3.917***
		(0.153)	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.137)
	Vox (ESP)	-1.963***	-1.936***	-1.678***	-1.662***
		(0.138)	(0.134)	(0.130)	(0.125)
	M5S (IT)	-3.443***	-3.405***	-3.020***	-2.995***

	(0.149)	(0.144)	(0.140)	(0.135)
Lega (IT)	-6.796***	-6.813***	-6.577***	-6.598***
	(0.138)	(0.133)	(0.130)	(0.125)
PD(IT)	-3.940***	-3.904***	-3.614***	-3.593***
	(0.152)	(0.146)	(0.142)	(0.137)
FI (IT)	-5.693***	-5.644***	-5.181***	-5.145***
	(0.153)	(0.147)	(0.144)	(0.138)
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.138	0.152	-0.382***	-0.371***
	(0.133)	(0.129)	(0.125)	(0.121)
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.784***	-1.744***	-2.144***	-2.111***
	(0.149)	(0.143)	(0.140)	(0.134)
Gomes (BRZ)	-2.529***	-2.483***	-3.334***	-3.298***
	(0.150)	(0.145)	(0.141)	(0.136)
Sanchez (PSOE)		-2.523***		-2.363***
		(0.167)		(0.157)
Abascal (VOX)		-1.311***		-1.073***
		(0.159)		(0.149)
Di Maio (MS5)		-2.594***		-2.390***
		(0.159)		(0.149)
Renzi (PD)		-2.502***		-2.743***
		(0.169)		(0.158)
Controls				
Mentions	-0.203***	-0.225***	-0.282***	-0.290***
	(0.062)	(0.057)	(0.058)	(0.054)
Hashtags	0.026	-0.016	0.016	-0.017
	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.053)
Media Link	-0.327***	-0.302***	-0.191***	-0.169***
	(0.060)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.053)
Constant	9.336***	9.293***	8.255***	8.216***
	(0.129)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(0.114)
Observations	1,577	1,777	1,577	1,777
R-squared	0.809	0.804	0.808	0.804

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Specification 2: Replacing MS5, PSOE, Vox, and PD with their party leaders (leaving the result of the sample unchanged, thus, the other 5 European parties are still included). Information is again used as the base category.

	Model	Full Model Likes	Likes Swapping Party Leaders For Parties	Full Model RTs	RTs Swapping Party Leaders for Parties
Discursive Frames	**Frame Elements**				
Populism	Pro-People	0.636***	0.756***	0.664***	0.799***
		(0.141)	(0.156)	(0.132)	(0.145)
	Anti-Elite	0.805***	0.893***	0.886***	0.946***
		(0.102)	(0.110)	(0.095)	(0.103)
	Disp. Blame	0.516***	0.679***	0.629***	0.783***
		(0.125)	(0.134)	(0.117)	(0.125)
Pluralism	Compromise	0.367**	0.372**	0.401***	0.389**
		(0.164)	(0.170)	(0.154)	(0.159)
	Inclusivity	0.450***	0.602***	0.434***	0.577***
		(0.129)	(0.139)	(0.121)	(0.130)
	Legalistic View	0.280*	0.355**	0.442***	0.512***
		(0.151)	(0.158)	(0.142)	(0.147)
	Sit. Blame	0.669**	0.644**	0.705***	0.733**
		(0.290)	(0.328)	(0.273)	(0.306)
Technocracy	Elites/Experts	0.673***	0.775***	0.586***	0.676***
		(0.142)	(0.149)	(0.134)	(0.139)
	Cand. Experience	0.540***	0.560***	0.598***	0.624***
		(0.098)	(0.103)	(0.092)	(0.096)
	Output	0.284***	0.336***	0.384***	0.440***
		(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.084)	(0.088)
Neutral	Cand. Traits	0.736***	0.889***	0.847***	0.978***
		(0.110)	(0.119)	(0.103)	(0.112)
	Campaign enthusiasm	0.710***	0.732***	0.581***	0.583***
		(0.092)	(0.097)	(0.086)	(0.091)
	Information	BASE	BASE	BASE	BASE
	Candidates				
	Anaya (MEX)	-1.943***	-1.936***	-1.846***	-1.842***
		(0.154)	(0.159)	(0.145)	(0.149)
	Meade (MEX)	-1.580***	-1.560***	-1.174***	-1.159***
		(0.149)	(0.154)	(0.140)	(0.144)
	Duque (COL)	-2.728***	-2.716***	-2.435***	-2.432***
		(0.158)	(0.163)	(0.148)	(0.153)
	Petro (COL)	-1.949***	-2.005***	-0.392***	-0.440***
		(0.138)	(0.141)	(0.129)	(0.132)
	Fajardo (COL)	-2.579***	-2.552***	-2.730***	-2.705***
		(0.151)	(0.156)	(0.142)	(0.145)
	Podemos (ESP)	-3.535***	-3.511***	-2.925***	-2.921***
		(0.144)	(0.150)	(0.136)	(0.140)
	PP (ESP)	-4.128***	-4.088***	-3.596***	-3.576***
		(0.156)	(0.163)	(0.147)	(0.152)
	PSOE (ESP)	-4.311***		-3.556***	
		(0.161)		(0.151)	
	Cs (ESP)	-4.657***	-4.628***	-3.945***	-3.930***
		(0.153)	(0.160)	(0.144)	(0.149)

Vox (ESP)	-1.963***		-1.678***	
	(0.138)		(0.130)	
M5S (IT)	-3.443***		-3.020***	
	(0.149)		(0.140)	
Lega (IT)	-6.796***	-6.841***	-6.577***	-6.625***
	(0.138)	(0.142)	(0.130)	(0.133)
PD(IT)	-3.940***		-3.614***	
	(0.152)		(0.142)	
FI (IT)	-5.693***	-5.674***	-5.181***	-5.168***
	(0.153)	(0.158)	(0.144)	(0.148)
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.138	0.123	-0.382***	-0.395***
	(0.133)	(0.137)	(0.125)	(0.128)
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.784***	-1.796***	-2.144***	-2.152***
	(0.149)	(0.153)	(0.140)	(0.143)
Gomes (BRZ)	-2.529***	-2.492***	-3.334***	-3.301***
	(0.150)	(0.155)	(0.141)	(0.145)
Sanchez (PSOE)		-2.521***		-2.358***
		(0.179)		(0.167)
Abascal (VOX)		-1.335***		-1.094***
		(0.168)		(0.157)
Di Maio (MS5)		-2.602***		-2.397***
		(0.168)		(0.158)
Renzi (PD)		-2.513***		-2.749***
		(0.181)		(0.170)
Controls				
Mentions	-0.203***	-0.239***	-0.225***	-0.302***
	(0.062)	(0.072)	(0.057)	(0.067)
Hashtags	0.026	-0.002	-0.016	-0.014
	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.056)	(0.065)
Media Link	-0.327***	-0.393***	-0.302***	-0.238***
	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.062)
Constant	9.336***	-0.239***	9.293***	-0.302***
	(0.129)	(0.072)	(0.122)	(0.067)
Observations	1,577	1,440	1,577	1,440
R-squared	0.809	0.810	0.804	0.813

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

B.7: Hypothesis tests with European party leaders

	H1 (populism)	H2 (cognitive difficulty)	H3 (emotions)	H3 (negative emotions only)	H3 (positive emotions only)
Full Sample (N=1,577)	p<.10 likes; p<.01 re-Tweets	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)
European Parties (N=337)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)
Party Leaders (N=200)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)

Where European parties denotes the subset of parties for which I evaluate party leaders, including MS5, Vox, PD, and PSOE.

Appendix C: Regression Models

C.1: Full Model Corresponding to Table 3, Model 1a and 1b

Suppressed intercept model where the coefficients represent the logged average number of likes/re-Tweets. Significance indicates that the coefficient is statistically differentiable from 0 likes/re-Tweets.

	Model	**(1a) Favorites (Logged)**	**(2b) Re-Tweets (Logged)**
Master Frames	**Frame Elements**		
Populism	Pro-People	9.972***	8.919***
		(0.159)	(0.149)
	Anti-Elite	10.141***	9.140***
		(0.127)	(0.120)
	Disp. Blame	9.852***	8.884***
		(0.153)	(0.144)
Pluralism	Compromise	9.703***	8.656***
		(0.181)	(0.170)
	Inclusivity	9.786***	8.689***
		(0.154)	(0.145)
	Legalistic View	9.616***	8.696***
		(0.173)	(0.162)
	Sit. Blame	10.005***	8.959***
		(0.299)	(0.281)
Technocracy	Elites/Experts	10.009***	8.840***
		(0.170)	(0.159)
	Cand. Experience	9.876***	8.853***
		(0.131)	(0.123)
	Output	9.620***	8.639***
		(0.124)	(0.117)
Neutral	Cand. Traits	10.072***	9.102***
		(0.138)	(0.129)
	Campaign enthusiasm	10.046***	8.835***
		(0.118)	(0.111)
	Information	9.336***	8.255***
		(129)	(121)
	Candidates		
	Anaya (MEX)	-1.943***	-1.846***
		(0.154)	(0.145)
	Meade (MEX)	-1.580***	-1.174***
		(0.149)	(0.140)
	Duque (COL)	-2.728***	-2.435***
		(0.158)	(0.148)
	Petro (COL)	-1.949***	-0.392***
		(0.138)	(0.129)

Fajardo (COL)	-2.579***	-2.730***
	(0.151)	(0.142)
Podemos (ESP)	-3.535***	-2.925***
	(0.144)	(0.136)
PP (ESP)	-4.128***	-3.596***
	(0.156)	(0.147)
PSOE (ESP)	-4.311***	-3.556***
	(0.161)	(0.151)
Cs (ESP)	-4.657***	-3.945***
	(0.153)	(0.144)
Vox (ESP)	-1.963***	-1.678***
	(0.138)	(0.130)
M5S (IT)	-3.443***	-3.020***
	(0.149)	(0.140)
Lega (IT)	-6.796***	-6.577***
	(0.138)	(0.130)
PD(IT)	-3.940***	-3.614***
	(0.152)	(0.142)
FI (IT)	-5.693***	-5.181***
	(0.153)	(0.144)
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.138	-0.382***
	(0.133)	(0.125)
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.784***	-2.144***
	(0.149)	(0.140)
Gomez (BRZ)	-2.529***	-3.334***
	(0.150)	(0.141)
Controls		
Mentions	-0.203***	-0.282***
	(0.062)	(0.058)
Hashtags	0.026	0.016
	(0.062)	(0.058)
Media Link	-0.327***	-0.191***
	(0.060)	(0.056)
Constant	-0.203***	-0.282***
	(0.062)	(0.058)
Observations	1,577	1,577
R-squared	0.982	0.981

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

C.2: Full Model Corresponding to Table 3, Model 2a and 2b

Relative magnitudes are calculated using the formula $100[e^{\beta} - 1]$ to interpret the logged dependent variable as a percentage difference compared to the base category, "information." The 2nd and 4th columns of results above correspond exactly to Table 3. The 1st and 3rd columns are the regression coefficients used to calculate the magnitudes in columns 2 and 4.

	Model	(2a) Favorites (Logged)	(2a) % More Engaging	(2b) Re-Tweets (Logged)	(2b) % More Engaging
Discursive Frames	**Frame Elements**				
Populism	Pro-People	0.636***	+88.9%***	0.664***	+94.2%***
		(0.141)		(0.132)	
	Anti-Elite	0.805***	+123.7%***	0.886***	+142.5%***
		(0.102)		(0.095)	
	Disp. Blame	0.516***	+67.5%***	0.629***	+87.6%***
		(0.125)		(0.117)	
Pluralism	Compromise	0.367**	+44.3%**	0.401***	+49.3%***
		(0.164)		(0.154)	
	Inclusivity	0.450***	+56.8%***	0.434***	+54.3%***
		(0.129)		(0.121)	
	Legalistic View	0.280*	+32.3%*	0.442***	+55.6%***
		(0.151)		(0.142)	
	Sit. Blame	0.669**	+95.2%**	0.705***	+102.4%***
		(0.290)		(0.273)	
Technocracy	Elites/Experts	0.673***	+96.0%***	0.586***	+79.7%***
		(0.142)		(0.134)	
	Cand. Experience	0.540***	+71.6%***	0.598***	+81.8%***
		(0.098)		(0.092)	
	Output	0.284***	+32.8%***	0.384***	+46.8%***
		(0.090)		(0.084)	
Neutral	Cand. Traits	0.736***	+108.7%***	0.847***	+133.3%***
		(0.110)		(0.103)	
	Campaign enthusiasm	0.710***	+103.4%***	0.581***	+78.8%***
		(0.092)		(0.086)	
	Information	BASE	BASE	BASE	BASE
	Candidates				
	Anaya (MEX)	-1.943***		-1.846***	
		(0.154)		(0.145)	
	Meade (MEX)	-1.580***		-1.174***	
		(0.149)		(0.140)	
	Duque (COL)	-2.728***		-2.435***	
		(0.158)		(0.148)	
	Petro (COL)	-1.949***		-0.392***	
		(0.138)		(0.129)	
	Fajardo (COL)	-2.579***		-2.730***	
		(0.151)		(0.142)	
	Podemos (ESP)	-3.535***		-2.925***	
		(0.144)		(0.136)	
	PP (ESP)	-4.128***		-3.596***	
		(0.156)		(0.147)	
	PSOE (ESP)	-4.311***		-3.556***	
		(0.161)		(0.151)	
	Cs (ESP)	-4.657***		-3.945***	
		(0.153)		(0.144)	
	Vox (ESP)	-1.963***		-1.678***	
		(0.138)		(0.130)	

M5S (IT)	-3.443***	-3.020***
	(0.149)	(0.140)
Lega (IT)	-6.796***	-6.577***
	(0.138)	(0.130)
PD(IT)	-3.940***	-3.614***
	(0.152)	(0.142)
FI (IT)	-5.693***	-5.181***
	(0.153)	(0.144)
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.138	-0.382***
	(0.133)	(0.125)
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.784***	-2.144***
	(0.149)	(0.140)
Gomes (BRZ)	-2.529***	-3.334***
	(0.150)	(0.141)
Controls		
Mentions	-0.203***	-0.282***
	(0.062)	(0.058)
Hashtags	0.026	0.016
	(0.062)	(0.058)
Media Link	-0.327***	-0.191***
	(0.060)	(0.056)
Constant	9.336***	8.255***
	(0.129)	(0.121)
Observations	1,577	1,577
R-squared	0.809	0.808

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix D: Regional Results

D.1: Model 1a by region, Likes

The below table represents a **suppressed intercept model for LIKES as the DV**. However, the European coefficients will look different because the base candidate in the full sample is AMLO. For the European models, I selected Podemos as the base candidate. As with the full model, note that situational blame attribution contains only 11 frames, thus its ranking should be considered with caution.

	Model	**(1a) Full model, Likes (Logged)**	**Full Model Rank**	**(2a) Europe only, Likes (Logged)**	**Europe Rank**	**(2b) Latin America only, Likes (Logged)**	**(2b) Latin America Rank**
Discursive Frames	**Frame Elements**						
Populism	Pro-People	9.972*** (0.159)	6	5.919*** (0.200)	9	10.306*** (0.223)	1
	Anti-Elite	10.141*** (0.127)	1	6.185*** (0.184)	4	10.203*** (0.144)	3
	Disp. Blame	9.852*** (0.153)	8	5.893*** (0.195)	10	10.049*** (0.232)	5
Pluralism	Compromise	9.703*** (0.181)	10	6.040*** (0.285)	5	9.625*** (0.206)	12
	Inclusivity	9.786*** (0.154)	9	5.946*** (0.210)	8	9.779*** (0.190)	7
	Legalistic View	9.616*** (0.173)	12	5.599*** (0.301)	12	9.718*** (0.184)	9
	Sit. Blame	10.005*** (0.299)	5	6.801*** (0.495)	1	9.687*** (0.347)	10
Technocracy	Elites/Experts	10.009*** (0.170)	4	6.364*** (0.311)	2	9.962*** (0.183)	6

	Cand. Experience	9.876***	7	6.015***	6	9.763***	8
		(0.131)		(0.175)		(0.161)	
	Output	9.620***	11	5.733***	11	9.657***	11
		(0.124)		(0.162)		(0.137)	
Neutral	Cand. Traits	10.072***	2	6.008***	7	10.262***	2
		(0.138)		(0.191)		(0.165)	
	Campaign enthusiasm	10.046***	3	6.262***	3	10.063***	4
		(0.118)		(0.193)		(0.124)	
	Information	9.336***	13	5.334***	13	9.597***	13
		(.128)		(.178)		(.148)	
	Candidates						
	Anaya (MEX)	-1.943***				-1.481***	
		(0.154)				(0.163)	
	Meade (MEX)	-1.580***				-1.236***	
		(0.149)				(0.153)	
	Duque (COL)	-2.728***				-2.223***	
		(0.158)				(0.170)	
	Petro (COL)	-1.949***				-1.925***	
		(0.138)				(0.136)	
	Fajardo (COL)	-2.579***				-2.089***	
		(0.151)				(0.159)	
	Podemos (ESP)	-3.535***		BASE			
		(0.144)					
	PP (ESP)	-4.128***		-0.608***			
		(0.156)		(0.149)			
	PSOE (ESP)	-4.311***		-0.901***			
		(0.161)		(0.150)			
	Cs (ESP)	-4.657***		-1.229***			
		(0.153)		(0.141)			
	Vox (ESP)	-1.963***		1.625***			
		(0.138)		(0.141)			
	M5S (IT)	-3.443***		0.190			
		(0.149)		(0.155)			
	Lega (IT)	-6.796***		-3.040***			
		(0.138)		(0.158)			
	PD(IT)	-3.940***		-0.268*			
		(0.152)		(0.158)			
	FI (IT)	-5.693***		-2.160***			
		(0.153)		(0.154)			

Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.138		0.163
	(0.133)		(0.128)
Haddad (BRZ)	-1.784***		-1.501***
	(0.149)		(0.152)
Gomes (BRZ)	-2.529***		-2.121***
	(0.150)		(0.157)
Controls			
Mentions	-0.203***	-0.107	-0.291***
	(0.062)	(0.082)	(0.092)
Hashtags	0.026	0.319***	-0.458***
	(0.062)	(0.081)	(0.096)
Media Link	-0.327***	-0.159*	-0.418***
	(0.060)	(0.096)	(0.074)
Observations	1,577	797	780
R-squared	0.982	0.971	0.989

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

D.2: Model 1b by region, Re-Tweets

The below table represents a **suppressed intercept model for RE-TWEETS** as the DV. However, the European coefficients will look different because the base candidate in the full sample is AMLO. For the European models, I selected Podemos as the base candidate. As with the full model, note that situational blame attribution contains only 11 frames, thus its ranking should be considered with caution.

Model	**(1a) Full model, RTs (Logged)**	**Full Model Rank**	**(2a) Europe only, RTs (Logged)**	**Europe Rank**	**(2b) Latin America only, RTs (Logged)**	**(2b) Latin America Rank**

Discursive Frames	**Frame Elements**						
Populism	Pro-People	8.919***	4	5.497***	9	9.295***	2
		(0.149)		(0.173)		(0.229)	
	Anti-Elite	9.140***	1	5.856***	2	9.195***	3
		(0.120)		(0.160)		(0.148)	
	Disp. Blame	8.884***	5	5.622***	5	8.888***	5
		(0.144)		(0.168)		(0.238)	
Pluralism	Compromise	8.656***	11	5.612***	6	8.622***	12
		(0.170)		(0.247)		(0.211)	
	Inclusivity	8.689***	10	5.493***	10	8.712***	11
		(0.145)		(0.182)		(0.195)	
	Legalistic View	8.696***	9	5.376***	11	8.820***	9
		(0.162)		(0.261)		(0.189)	
	Sit. Blame	8.959***	3	5.990***	1	8.893***	4
		(0.281)		(0.429)		(0.356)	
Technocracy	Elites/Experts	8.840***	7	5.816***	3	8.849***	7
		(0.159)		(0.269)		(0.187)	
	Cand. Experience	8.853***	6	5.600***	8	8.821***	8
		(0.123)		(0.152)		(0.165)	
	Output	8.639***	12	5.315***	12	8.776***	10
		(0.117)		(0.141)		(0.141)	
Neutral	Cand. Traits	9.102***	2	5.606***	7	9.425***	1
		(0.129)		(0.165)		(0.169)	
	Campaign enthusiasm	8.835***	8	5.687***	4	8.886***	6
		(0.111)		(0.167)		(0.128)	
	Information	8.254 ***	13	4.915***	13	8.495***	13
		(0.121)		(0.154)		(.152)	
	Candidates						
	Anaya (MEX)	-1.846***				-1.525***	
		(0.145)				(0.168)	
	Meade (MEX)	-1.174***				-0.943***	
		(0.140)				(0.157)	
	Duque (COL)	-2.435***				-2.092***	
		(0.148)				(0.174)	
	Petro (COL)	-0.392***				-0.391***	
		(0.129)				(0.139)	
	Fajardo (COL)	-2.730***				-2.371***	
		(0.142)				(0.163)	

Podemos (ESP)	-2.925***	BASE	
	(0.136)		
PP (ESP)	-3.596***	-0.678***	
	(0.147)	(0.129)	
PSOE (ESP)	-3.556***	-0.726***	
	(0.151)	(0.130)	
Cs (ESP)	-3.945***	-1.106***	
	(0.144)	(0.122)	
Vox (ESP)	-1.678***	1.278***	
	(0.130)	(0.122)	
M5S (IT)	-3.020***	-0.011	
	(0.140)	(0.134)	
Lega (IT)	-6.577***	-3.501***	
	(0.130)	(0.137)	
PD(IT)	-3.614***	-0.531***	
	(0.142)	(0.137)	
FI (IT)	-5.181***	-2.219***	
	(0.144)	(0.134)	
Bolsonaro (BRZ)	-0.382***		-0.383***
	(0.125)		(0.131)
Haddad (BRZ)	-2.144***		-1.969***
	(0.140)		(0.156)
Gomes (BRZ)	-3.334***		-3.039***
	(0.141)		(0.161)
Controls			
Mentions	-0.282***	-0.202***	-0.362***
	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.095)
Hashtags	0.016	0.254***	-0.357***
	(0.058)	(0.070)	(0.098)
Media Link	-0.191***	0.009	-0.305***
	(0.056)	(0.083)	(0.076)
Observations	1,577	797	780
R-squared	0.981	0.974	0.985

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

D.3: Model 2a by region, Likes

Where the "Informational" subframe is the base category.

	Model	**(2a) Full model, Likes (Logged)**	**(2a.1) Europe only, Likes (Logged)**	**(2a.2) Latin America only, Likes (Logged)**
Discursive Frames	**Frame Elements**			
Populism	Pro-People	0.636***	0.585***	0.708***
		(0.141)	(0.179)	(0.230)
	Anti-Elite	0.805***	0.851***	0.606***
		(0.102)	(0.140)	(0.143)
	Disp. Blame	0.516***	0.559***	0.452**
		(0.125)	(0.153)	(0.227)
Pluralism	Compromise	0.367**	0.706***	0.027
		(0.164)	(0.264)	(0.202)
	Inclusivity	0.450***	0.612***	0.181
		(0.129)	(0.182)	(0.178)
	Legalistic View	0.280*	0.265	0.121
		(0.151)	(0.292)	(0.175)
	Sit. Blame	0.669**	1.467***	0.090
		(0.290)	(0.486)	(0.348)
Technocracy	Elites/Experts	0.673***	1.030***	0.365**
		(0.142)	(0.279)	(0.166)
	Cand. Experience	0.540***	0.681***	0.165
		(0.098)	(0.128)	(0.151)
	Output	0.284***	0.399***	0.060
		(0.090)	(0.126)	(0.124)
Neutral	Cand. Traits	0.736***	0.674***	0.664***
		(0.110)	(0.150)	(0.157)
	Campaign enthusiasm	0.710***	0.928***	0.465***
		(0.092)	(0.193)	(0.117)
	Information	Base	Base	Base
	Candidates			
	Anaya (MEX)	-1.943***		-1.481***
		(0.154)		(0.163)
	Meade (MEX)	-1.580***		-1.236***
		(0.149)		(0.153)
	Duque (COL)	-2.728***		-2.223***
		(0.158)		(0.170)
	Petro (COL)	-1.949***		-1.925***
		(0.138)		(0.136)
	Fajardo (COL)	-2.579***		-2.089***
		(0.151)		(0.159)
	Podemos (ESP)	-3.535***	BASE	
		(0.144)		
	PP (ESP)	-4.128***	-0.608***	
		(0.156)	(0.149)	
	PSOE (ESP)	-4.311***	-0.901***	

		(0.161)	(0.150)	
	Cs (ESP)	-4.657***	-1.229***	
		(0.153)	(0.141)	
	Vox (ESP)	-1.963***	1.625***	
		(0.138)	(0.141)	
	M5S (IT)	-3.443***	0.190	
		(0.149)	(0.155)	
	Lega (IT)	-6.796***	-3.040***	
		(0.138)	(0.158)	
	PD(IT)	-3.940***	-0.268*	
		(0.152)	(0.158)	
	FI (IT)	-5.693***	-2.160***	
		(0.153)	(0.154)	
	Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.138		0.163
		(0.133)		(0.128)
	Haddad (BRZ)	-1.784***		-1.501***
		(0.149)		(0.152)
	Gomes (BRZ)	-2.529***		-2.121***
		(0.150)		(0.157)
	Controls			
	Mentions	-0.203***	-0.107	-0.291***
		(0.062)	(0.082)	(0.092)
	Hashtags	0.026	0.319***	-0.458***
		(0.062)	(0.081)	(0.096)
	Media Link	-0.327***	-0.159*	-0.418***
		(0.060)	(0.096)	(0.074)
	Constant	9.336***	5.334***	9.597***
		(0.129)	(0.178)	(0.148)
	Observations	1,577	797	780
	R-squared	0.982	0.69	0.631

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

D.4: Model 2a by region, Re-Tweets

Where the “Informational” subframe is the base category.

	Model	**(2a) Full model, RTs (Logged)**	**(2a.1) Europe only, RTs (Logged)**	**(2a.2) Latin America only, RTs (Logged)**
Discursive Frames	**Frame Elements**			
Populism	Pro-People	0.664***	0.582***	0.799***
		(0.132)	(0.155)	(0.236)
	Anti-Elite	0.886***	0.941***	0.699***
		(0.095)	(0.122)	(0.147)

	Disp. Blame	0.629***	0.707***	0.392*
		(0.117)	(0.132)	(0.233)
Pluralism	Compromise	0.401***	0.697***	0.127
		(0.154)	(0.228)	(0.208)
	Inclusivity	0.434***	0.578***	0.217
		(0.121)	(0.157)	(0.183)
	Legalistic View	0.442***	0.461*	0.324*
		(0.142)	(0.253)	(0.179)
	Sit. Blame	0.705***	1.075**	0.398
		(0.273)	(0.421)	(0.357)
Technocracy	Elites/Experts	0.586***	0.901***	0.353**
		(0.134)	(0.241)	(0.171)
	Cand. Experience	0.598***	0.685***	0.326**
		(0.092)	(0.111)	(0.155)
	Output	0.384***	0.400***	0.281**
		(0.084)	(0.109)	(0.128)
Neutral	Cand. Traits	0.847***	0.691***	0.929***
		(0.103)	(0.130)	(0.161)
	Campaign enthusiasm	0.581***	0.772***	0.391***
		(0.086)	(0.128)	(0.120)
	Information	Base	Base	Base
	Candidates			
	Anaya (MEX)	0.799***		-1.525***
		(0.236)		(0.168)
	Meade (MEX)	0.699***		-0.943***
		(0.147)		(0.157)
	Duque (COL)	0.392*		-2.092***
		(0.233)		(0.174)
	Petro (COL)	0.127		-0.391***
		(0.208)		(0.139)
	Fajardo (COL)	0.217		-2.371***
		(0.183)		(0.163)
	Podemos (ESP)	0.324*	BASE	
		(0.179)		
	PP (ESP)	0.398	-0.678***	
		(0.357)	(0.129)	
	PSOE (ESP)	0.353**	-0.726***	
		(0.171)	(0.130)	
	Cs (ESP)	0.326**	-1.106***	
		(0.155)	(0.122)	
	Vox (ESP)	0.281**	1.278***	
		(0.128)	(0.122)	
	M5S (IT)	0.929***	-0.011	
		(0.161)	(0.134)	
	Lega (IT)	0.391***	-3.501***	
		(0.120)	(0.137)	
	PD(IT)	0.799***	-0.531***	
		(0.236)	(0.137)	
	FI (IT)	0.699***	-2.219***	
		(0.147)	(0.134)	
	Bolsonaro (BRZ)	0.392*		-0.383***
		(0.233)		(0.131)
	Haddad (BRZ)	0.127		-1.969***
		(0.208)		(0.156)
	Gomes (BRZ)	0.217		-3.039***

	(0.183)		(0.161)
Controls			
Mentions	-0.282***	-0.202***	-0.362***
	(0.058)	(0.071)	(0.095)
Hashtags	0.016	0.254***	-0.357***
	(0.058)	(0.070)	(0.098)
Media Link	-0.191***	0.009	-0.305***
	(0.056)	(0.083)	(0.076)
Constant	8.255***	4.915***	8.496***
	(0.121)	(0.154)	(0.152)
Observations	1,577	797	780
R-squared	0.808	0.743	0.662

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

D.5: Hypothesis tests by region

The below table corresponds to the hypotheses laid out in Table 2. The hypothesis tests are the high-fit frames versus the low-fit frames (not the high-fit frames versus all other frames).The tests represent t-tests of the group means of the high- and low-fit frames against the null hypothesis, that the group means are not statistically differentiable from one another. As the below table demonstrates, the main results hold in both regions for all three hypotheses.

	H1 (populism)	**H2 (cognitive difficulty)**	**H3 (emotions)**	**H3 (negative emotions only)**	**H3 (positive emotions only)**
Full Sample (N=1,577)	p<.10; p<.01	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)
Europe (N=997)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)
Latin America (N=780)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)	p<.01 (both)

Appendix F: Codebook

F.1: Coding Procedures

Four research assistants (RAs) and the author coded the Tweets. I attempted to decrease bias and therefore enhance validity by limiting the information that the RAs received. I did not tell the RAs what concepts the master frames represented. I described the master frames in-depth in the codebook, but labeled them as "Type A," "Type B," "Type C," and "Neutral." While it is likely that the RAs recognized some of the conceptual underpinnings of the master frames, I put this procedure in place to ensure that no particular worldview was privileged.

Tweets were classified in a three-stage procedure. First, the Tweets were translated and **de-identified,** which included masking the candidate's identity, party, and date of the Tweet.[96] Contextual clues were then inserted into the text in place of identifying information. For example, the name of an opposition candidate was replaced with "opposition candidate." De-identification was carried out by the author or one trained multi-lingual RA. All Tweets were then randomized across candidates but within countries for language purposes. In some cases, the RAs needed to view the media attached to the Tweet to accurately code it, thus exposing the candidate's identity. Media that met this standard include threads or consecutive Tweets (Graham et al. 2014; Welp and Ruth 2017), short videos, news articles, links to longer posts, and infographics.[97] The inclusion of non-text in the coding decision is an important divergence from some studies (see, e.g., Bobba and Roncarolo 2018), and was made on the basis that non-text offer important contextual clues. Media that did not meet this standard (and were removed) include photos of the speaker or the crowd or images that duplicated the text of the Tweet. In the latter instance, the de-identifiers provided a short description of the media without revealing the speaker's identity.

Next, **independent classification by two RAs** took place.[98] RAs provided detailed explanations to justify their classification, which I factored into the final coding decision.[99] The intercoder reliability for the entire sample, presented using Krippendorff's alpha, is .66 for the worldview level and .63 for the frame level. Acceptable levels of reliability generally range between .6 and .8 (Krippendorff 2018).

[96] Tweets were presented in their original language and in English using Google Translate. One undergraduate coder fluently spoke all three languages in this study and assisted in correcting the Google translations.

[97] About 1/3 of the Tweets in this sample contained relevant media that may have (though did not necessarily) revealed the speaker's identity.

[98] Where one coder was blind to the speaker's identity and one coder (either the multilingual undergraduate or the author) did have knowledge of the speaker's identity due to the de-identification process. However, de-identification was conducted first and then coding of the de-identified sample at random, so it is unlikely that re-identifiers retained enough information to alter their decisions in a significant way. In my experience as both a de-identifier and coder, I relied primarily on the de-identified clues rather than recalling the specific details of the speaker.

[99] Consistent with Graham et al. (2014, 7), if RAs perceived multiple frames, they "were trained to use a set of rules and procedures for identifying the primary/dominant function and/or topic (e.g. the function comprising of the most characters)" (where "functions" in this case apply specifically to frames). In these instances, RAs also recorded the secondary frame, which are available in the data but not analyzed in the present study.

Lastly, the Tweets were subject to **final review by the author**. I reviewed the two coding decisions and relied on a combination of the RAs' explanations and meetings with the RAs to make the final coding determination in the case of disagreements. Rarely, I overrode two RAs who were in agreement in favor of what I deemed a more accurate interpretation. This outcome occurred when the coders misunderstood the nature of the message due to blinding of the information in Step 1. In making the final determination, I reviewed the full Tweet (unblinded), allowing me to review media and contextual clues that the RAs may have missed due to deidentification.

F.2: Full Codebook

Overview

This coding manual is part of a broader project to evaluate presidential candidates' discourse on Twitter during their campaigns in Latin America and Europe. The main task you will be performing is coding different kinds of messages (i.e., frames) that candidates use.

Frames are a rhetorical device that speakers (in this case, politicians) use to communicate their ideas with a particular lens around them. For the purposes of this analysis, a frame is defined as a political actor imbedding meaning into a message by encouraging the listener to interpret an event or situation from a particular non-neutral perspective. Essentially, a frame is a way for politicians to convey information to their followers in a particular way.

This study looks to classify all the possible frames used by presidential candidates. While frames are the main topic of interest for this research project, there are also several other dimensions I'll be asking you to code.

Coding

Coding will take place in Redcap. The coding unit is a single Tweet. The Tweets will be "de-identified" to the extent possible; that is, ideally, you would not know which candidate sent the Tweet. In reality, however, that is not always possible—many Tweets mention specific cities or candidate names directly that will make it impossible not to know who is speaking (at the very least, what country they are from).

Furthermore, to code the Tweets, it may be necessary to view the media attached to the Tweet which will require you looking at the Tweet on twitter, thus exposing you to the speaker's identity. The primary concern is not that you know who is Tweeting, but that **even if you have previous knowledge of these candidates or countries more broadly, it is important to evaluate every single Tweet individually and without bias**. To help with this, the Tweets will be randomized between candidates and across dates.

The importance of looking at the media of the Tweet cannot be overstated: for example, one Tweet read:

"266: the number of jobs that Andres Manuel created as Head of Government."

From this alone, it is challenging if not impossible to understand if the speaker considers this a lot of jobs or not. However, if you navigate to the Tweet to see the image, you can clearly see that the speaker (in this case, Jose Antonio Meade of Mexico) considers 266 to be a very low number.

266: el número de empleos que creó Andres Manuel como Jefe de Gobierno.

Translate Tweet

It also helps to look at the hashtags: those that refer to cities or locations could help you determine this is a campaign event (which helps you classify the function of the Tweet), while others may help you determine which frame to use.

What will be Coded (per Tweet)

Each Tweet will be coded according to 8 dimensions, each of which will be described below.

1) the discursive frame;

2) the relevant actors;

3) the frame element;

4) the difficulty in classifying the sub-frame;

5) the perceived strength of the frame;

6) the issue that the Tweet addresses; and

7) the function of the Tweet

8) whether the frame used positive, negative, or neutral language;

Some coding categories are dependent on your answers to previous coding categories. For example, the actor, master frame, sub-frame, difficulty classifying the sub-frames, and strength of the sub-frame are categories that are dependent on one another. For these categories, coding each Tweet in a particular sequence may make the identification of subsequent categories easier. However, sticking to a specific order is not absolutely critical. You may jump between categories as you decide on the proper categories. Other categories (the presence of positive or negative language, the issue, and the function of the Tweet) are independent: to code these categories, you only need the Tweet itself because your

answer to these categories is not dependent on your answer to other categories. Below is a brief description of each category.

How to Code the Tweets

Before you start coding the Tweets, it is critical to **read for subtext or, stated differently, to take a holistic view of the Tweet,** rather than taking the Tweet at face value. What is the candidate saying between the lines? **Consider the Tweet as a whole before you start coding**, before breaking it into the constituent parts required by the coding categories.

Tweets can only be 280 characters; such short texts mean the sub-frames may not be immediately clear, but by reading for subtext, taking the "spirit" of the Tweet as a whole into consideration, and *then* coding each category, you should have arrived at your conclusions systematically. Reading the text as a whole will specifically help you determine the master frame, the first coding category.

1) Discursive Frames

Discursive frames represent the highest level of aggregation. Conceptually, master frames refer to how people see the world in terms of who should hold power (Caramani 2017). There are 4 coding options for this category.

Discursive Frame	**Who holds power (and who doesn't)?**
1 = Type A: views the political world as a divide between two groups: "the people," who are understood to be virtuous and comprise a majority of the population, and "the elites," who are vilified for their self-interest and lack of representation of what the people want ("the will of the people"). **Explanation:** The antagonism comes from the idea that power legitimately stems from "the people," but "the elites" have taken this power and do not represent the "will" of "the people." Thus, "the people" and "the elites" are engaged in a struggle for power, and that struggle is inherently moral in nature. This type views the political world in terms of a virtuous group (the people) that has been wronged by the enemy group (the elites).	The people should hold power (over the elites)
2 = Type B: advocates for power to be shared: diverse interests are given voice, particularly from minority groups. **Explanation:** This emphasizes a more equitable form of power sharing. Some of the "key features and institutional structures that are intrinsic to [Type A]" include "compromise, mediating institutional bodies, and procedures that ensure, most notably, minority rights" (Akkerman et al. 2014, 1327). This type "sees political conflicts as struggles against impersonal forces rather than against diabolical groups and individual" (Busby et al. 2019, 2), in contrast to Type B.	Power is shared; at the very least, diverse interests are given voice (note: power does not have to be shared *equally*)

3 = Type C: prioritizes the power of expertise. Emphasizes practical applications and outcomes rather than ideals and focuses on the ability to deliver these outcomes. **Explanation:** Type C emphasizes practical applications and outcomes rather than ideals and focuses on the ability to deliver outcomes (generally because of experience) held by those delivering the outcomes. The discourse does not frame issues in moral terms or paint them in black-and-white. Instead, there is a strong tendency to focus on narrow, particular issues. The discourse will emphasize or at least not eliminate the possibility of natural, justifiable differences of opinion. The discourse avoids a conspiratorial (moral) tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority.	Those that can deliver favorable outcomes (specifically refers to politicians)
4 = Neutral: Master frames are those that do not fall into any of the above categories. Often, they cannot be classified into another master frame because they are missing a critical component of these other frames. **Explanation:** this is a "catch-all" category for frames that cannot in and of themselves be classified into just one of the above master frames. This is usually due to ambiguity—neutral frames can apply to a number of different world views, and this ambiguity necessitates its own category. Note that a neutral master frame does not imply that there is no bias, judgment, or moral component. These components are just not enough in and of themselves to indicate a master frame that fits into Types A-C above.	

2) the relevant actors;

This category refers to *who* the Tweet references (implicitly or explicitly): who is the one that is doing the action? Who is the one receiving it? Determining the actor will help to determine the precise frame. These are broad categories, and as a result, multiple interpretations exist. Which interpretation to choose may be in part derived from the master frame.

Once you've determined the master frame, identifying the actors will help you to determine the sub-frame.

Actor	**Interpretation 1**	**Interpretation 2**
"the people"	**1** = the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the "voluntad del pueblo"; however, the speaker ascribes a kind of unchanging essentialism to that will, rather than letting it be whatever 50 percent of the people want at any particular moment. Thus, this good majority is romanticized, with some notion of the common man (urban or rural) seen as the embodiment of the national ideal. When using this classification, note that it should refer to the entire body of the candidate's supporters: all those he considers to be "the	**2** = Democracy is simply the calculation of votes. This should be respected and is seen as the foundation of legitimate government, but it is not meant to be an exercise in arriving at a preexisting, knowable "will." The majority shifts and changes across issues. The common man is not romanticized, and the notion of citizenship is broad and legalistic. *explicit signifiers:* "citizens," "Mexicans [or other nationality]," "the people" *Implicit signifiers:* "we," "us" *Example:* "In this campaign, we are committed to listening twice as much as we talk. That is why

	people." If only a sub-set (such as, for example, teachers, students, members of a particular town mentioned by name, then the appropriate classification is other, and to specify which group the speaker is referring to) *Explicit signifiers:* "el pueblo," "la gente," "Americans [or other nationality]," "the people" – this could also refer to specific townspeople ("the people of Merida") at campaign stops along the way *Implicit signifiers:* "we," "us"	my government will be the true government of the people [los ciudadanos in Spainsh], in which the needs of the citizens will be resolved. While this might seem like interpretation 1, it refers to citizens in terms of their will
"the elite" (This most often applies to political elites)	**3** = The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Crucially, the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Depending on the context, political elites who are part of "the establishment" are often the primary target of politicians. *Explicit signifiers:* "the establishment," "the politicians," specific names of parties, other candidates, or individuals *Implicit signifiers:* "them," "they,"	**4** = The discourse avoids a conspiratorial tone and does not single out any evil ruling minority. It avoids labeling opponents as evil and may not even mention them in an effort to maintain a positive tone and keep passions low. Calling out an opponent for their poor performance could fall under this category—calling them evil or implying they intentionally harmed people would fall under Interpretation 1. *Explicit signifiers*: referring to other parties, or "incumbents" *Implicit signifiers:* "they," "them"
Other (usually, an in-group or out-group)	**6** = Generally refers to a specific [out] group (such as immigrants, or a particular ethnicity or race), but it does not necessarily explicitly identify this group (it may just be implied). The out-group does not necessarily have to be citizens of the country; it could be foreign entities (such as the United States). The important distinction is not the explicit identification of a group, but the implication that this group does not belong to "the people." *Explicit signifiers:* Referencing a specific group identity *Implicit signifiers:* "they," "them"	**7** = This may include reference to specific groups, generally in a positive sense of inclusivity and diversity. Since there is no romanticized notion of "the people," there is usually no out-group. In essence, an in-group refers to any subset of the overall population of the people as described in actor category 2 (the people, interpretation B). *Explicit signifiers*: Referencing a specific group identity (indigenous people, for example), students, teachers, members of a specific town *Implicit signifiers*: "They," "them"
The candidate, their party, or members of their party	**8** = This can refer to the candidate themselves, their party or party coalition, or other members campaigning under their party/coalition for other positions (not the presidency) *Signifiers:* "I," "we," name of party or other party officials	
The opposition	**9** = This includes any and all opposition candidates and their parties, and prominent members of the opposition parties (such as party figureheads, like former presidents)	

	Signifiers: name of party or other party official, name of candidate, references to other candidates/parties	
No actors	**10** = Some frames will not have actors	
The media	**11 =** The media. This could refer to specific media personalities or media channels, radio stations, etc.	

There may be more than one actor per Tweet: if so, determine which is the primary actor and which is the secondary actor. In doing so, consider who is the Tweet really about? Who is the actor doing the action (primary actor), versus who is receiving the action (secondary actor)? This is most often true when the actors include the candidate and some group of constituents. Is the Tweet specifically about the candidate and what the candidate hopes to achieve, or is the Tweet directed at a specific population they hope to serve? For example:

"We are going to shield the border so that US weapons do not enter Mexico and do not kill our people."	This Tweet references both we (the candidate/their party), and "our people". The primary actor would be the candidate, while the secondary would be the people.
Between the fracking to extract oil and the fumigation with glyphosate that will be from Colombia's water? I proposed that water is a priority for human consumption and food production and therefore there will be neither fracking nor glyphosate.	The primary actor would be the candidate, and there is no secondary actor. **Note that it's not just about the order in which the actors appear, but which actor the Tweet is really revolving around**--this one is about the candidate's position, which he is juxtaposing against the opposition's position; but even had the Tweet mentioned the opposition first, if the focus was on the candidate's proposal, then the candidate is still the primary actor.

3) Frame Elements (aka sub-frames)

Sub-frames are the different ways in which the master frames manifest in rhetoric. Because the above master frames represent overarching worldviews, often they appear in partial form. **The sub-frame should match with the master frame it is nested under**: if you select Type A as a master frame, the sub-frames available are 1-3; if you select Type B, the options are sub-frames 4-7; Type C, 8-10; and neutral, 11-13. If you have a mis-match between the master and the sub-frame, go back to step 1 and re-evaluate the Tweet as a whole and see if either the master frame or the sub-frame is incorrect. If you are still stuck, flag it and we will go over it as a group.



Discursive Frame	Subframe	Explanation	Example (s)
Type A	1 = Pro-"the people"	when a politician talks "in the name of 'the people', referring primarily to its will" (Cranmer 2011) The idea that the candidate is the "true representative" of the people (Engesser et al 2017) Puts the people's problems "at the core of the political agenda" (Casero-Ripolles et al. 2017, 990). The people are often characterized as hard-working (Engesser et al 2017)	If only for the will of the people we could say 'this rice has already been cooked', but we must prepare ourselves to face any fraud attempt. That's why I ask you to help defend the vote and democracy. We continue to collect the feelings and wisdom of the people. We are going to win the first day of July and we are not going to fail the people. Power only makes sense, and becomes a virtue, when it is placed at the service of others
	2 = Anti-Elite	Attacking anything that is "business as usual" or "how things have always been done." This is a pure and general form of anti-elitism, where "a political actor criticizes elites, such as political adversaries, the state, or the media" (Cranmer 2011, 293). It does not necessarily call out a specific elite actor, but it may.	In Tapachula, on the border of Mexico with Guatemala, I reaffirmed the commitment to banish corruption and govern with austerity. **There will be no gasolinazos**. **The Reformation, as emblem of the conservative press, fifi, is not able to rectify when it defames**, as it did yesterday with the supposed payment of MORENA of 58 million. In their code of ethics, the truth does not matter, but the interests and ideology they represent. Better we are free.
	3 = Dispositional blame attribution	Blaming some specified group of people for a particular failure-- allows actors to place the onus on particular elites or groups of people (such as immigrants) for specific failures (real or perceived) and for knowingly exploiting the interests of the people. Implies that elites/others knowingly exploited the interests of the people (Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018, 7). This frame identifies political actors with agency.	Those responsible for the Hidroituango disaster after the genocide of the town of Ituango are two: Álvaro Uribe Vélez and Luis Alfredo Ramos: the complete degradation of the traditional political class of Antioquiapic. The PSOE has given a secret order to the ministries not to execute 50% of the budget. They bring us the cuts through the back door. It is the same as

			Montoro did and it means recovering the austerity policy of the PP. That is not the Spain you want. IN THE COUNTRY OF THE RAPES COMMITTED BY IMMIGRANTS He refused the stalker's advances
Type B	4 = Emphasis on compromise or cooperation	Stresses the importance or benefits of working with other groups or coalitions in the *political* arena This frame may include references to coalition building, for example, or other references to governing with multiple groups.	The future is for everyone! Today I celebrate that the @MovimientoMIRA party supports our country project. We continue forming a coalition that will motivate Colombians so that class hatred no longer exists and so that from the differences we can build a better country.
	5 = Inclusivity	The discourse will emphasize the importance of the inclusion of groups, particularly those that are marginalized or disadvantaged. Rather than emphasizing a power sharing arrangement (like the above frame), it may simply mean giving these people a voice in some (often general or vague) capacity or listening to a group of people. More broadly, discourse may emphasize unity.	**We have a historical duty and commitment to our indigenous communities; As President, I will protect the rights of this population and we will work together to overcome their social backwardness.**
	6 = Legalistic view of democracy	Viewing democracy as the majority of votes (this is in contrast to the Type A frame of a romanticized "will" of the people). Tweets in this sub-frame may emphasize the duty to represent what the majority of the country wants (i.e., what 51% of the country wants, rather than what the group "the people" per Interpretation A want), or representing the country (or some subgroup) as a whole by meeting their usually broad, undefined needs (wherein specific needs being met would indicate an output sub-frame). Tweets in this category may reference listening to the people, but not acting on their will (which would indicate subframe 1)	More and more citizens are joining this project of future and certainty, which will result in **free, reasoned and conscious votes**. From now on I thank you. We will win! During the next three months, every week I will visit a family in their home. This time I visited Ana Laura, who invited me to eat with her husband and children. I want to listen to them and know what they think, leave me your messages and comments to be able to know them.
	7= Situational blame attribution	Situational frames tend to blame corruption/failed representation on "systemic causes such as globalization or technological change, and it tends to criticize rather than demonize political opponents" (Busby et al 2019, 8)	Mafia security has been broken in Medellin. Security does not depend on the number of deaths of young people. The Orion operation has failed. The wild posters of Mexico are taken to Medellin. I propose to integrate the youths to the university, the knowledge, the art and the Power
Type C	8 = Appealing to elites or experts	Deference to the expertise or opinions of organizations or actors outside the candidate or their party who have particular expertise (for example, government agencies or NGOs). This could include endorsements by actors	Fourteen entities commented on our environmental proposal. They evaluated these five criteria: water, climate change, deforestation, land use planning and new development models.

		outside the political party (but the endorsement should be described in a non-moralistic way). Appealing to a select group of individuals based on some attribute that they have, such as intelligence, wealth, or experience, operating on the belief that these individuals deserve particular influence. Endorsements by specific elite groups could be considered this type.	I am touched by the support of Peter Singer, world-class philosopher, environmentalist and animalist. Peace with nature, respect for the animal, the other for us, for what is different from us, is the basis for humanity to live on the planet.
	9 = Candidate experience	refers to the candidate's unique ability to perform the job (or the opposition's inability to do so) Appealing to prior or current performance or particular attributes of the candidate or their party. This could take the form of talking about specific policy achievements, their years of experience in a position, their particular expertise on a subject area, their credibility in general, etc. It can also include announcing a cabinet or other appointment. This is the positive usage of this frame. The negative usage would be calling out an opponent/party because they lack experience or more broadly, they lack credibility.	Faced with a complex and uncertain global environment, Mexico needs a President with **proven international experience**. With the United States there is no room for improvisation. Here my editorial published today in the Arizona Republic
	10 = Future output	the projected output of a candidate—what is the candidate going to deliver if elected? With few exceptions, this category refers to promised policy outcomes, though it can also refer to positive consequences of electing the candidate or negative consequences of electing the opposition This frame can be used positively (as in the case of appealing to particular issues the candidate supports) or negatively (where the candidate criticizes his/her opponents for a particular issue stance)	In order to have transparency in the use of public resources, we will create a digital platform that, using blockchain technology, allows us to follow its course. Citizens will know exactly what money is allocated to, what it is used for and where it ends.
Neutral	11 = Candidate traits or characteristics	focuses on attributes or reputational considerations. Tweets where candidates are portrayed as "honest" or "hardworking" (as examples) are incorporated into this category, as are tweets that describe specific actions taken during the campaign (things like "candidate X did action Y").	I'm the only candidate from the Northeast. I need to defend my people! They file in a complaint that they had made against me saying that my titles are false or I put falsehoods on my page of my life. My studies are what I said. 'As a good teacher, Fajardo is seen as convinced and patient, perhaps certain that changes take time but arrive, without haste, without manipulation, without buying consciences, a sowing that I hope the fertile electoral harvest he hopes for.'
	12 = Campaign enthusiasm	rhetoric that conveys hope or excitement, or general motivation for the election Emotions such as hope or excitement are not in themselves indicative of a particular worldview, *especially during the course of an election in which candidates hope to inspire positive emotions among*	We are 15 days from the end of the campaign and **the mood of the people is growing as if it would burst with happiness**. Never in Ticul or Chetumal had we held such emotional and large meetings during the week.

		their supporters/try to gain new supporters. You will likely encounter many motivational frames that aim to drum up support for their candidacy, but to be considered a specific master frame, the emotions must be used with another frame.	
	13 = Presentation of facts	This discourse is purely factual: it presents information, but does not impose a particular frame.	Another intense day of campaign: We talked with members of the Mexican Business Council; we present the environmental agenda in Zacatelco with Josefa González Blanco; We were in Apizaco and in Xalapa, Veracruz, accompanying Cuitláhuac García, our candidate for governor. I invite you to follow our press conference…

3.1) For subframe 10 (output) only

If you selected subframe 10 when you are coding, this is a follow up question that will be asked. Because this sub-frame can take many forms, please select one of the following options that best describes the output the speaker is talking about.

1 = Mention of a broad group of issues or a proposal, but not a specific issue	Extremely vague (if a policy is identified, there is no information provided about it)	"Look at our issue policies"
2 = Identification of a specific issue but not necessarily the intended outcome	Not fully specified: Policy X is identified, but Outcome Y is not	"If elected, I will enact policy X" (ex: if elected, I will reduce taxes on the middle class)
3 = Expressing a desired outcome but not the specific steps/policy to get there	Not fully specified: Outcome Y identified, but the specific policy X is not (i.e., it is not clear what steps the speaker will take to achieve the outcome)	" I want to improve/enact outcome Y" (ex: I want to improve education, health, etc.)
4 = Identification of a specific issue *and* the intended outcome	Fully specific: Policy X and the subsequent Outcome Y are identified	" I will enact policy X to accomplish outcome Y" (ex: I will enact a country-wide minimum wage to reduce income inequality in the countryside)
5 = Not applicable	Subframe chosen in the above section is not 10, output	

4) the **difficulty in classifying the frame**;

This is a self-reported measure of how difficult it was to identify the frame you selected. There are 3 possible values for this category:

0 = easy	Little to no uncertainty: actors were clearly identified; only one sub-frame seemed to apply
1 = somewhat challenging	some uncertainty: There were multiple possible frames, but one frame or sub-frame stood out
2 = very challenging	high level of uncertainty: There were multiple possible frames, and no frame clearly stood out as the predominant one

5) the **perceived strength** of the frame;

How close does this frame come in representing the *master frame*? This coding category requires you to read the Tweet for subtext and focus on 1) whether the critical elements from each master frame are present, and 2) whether these elements are mixed in with elements from other master frames or not.

2 = Strong. Comes extremely close to the **ideal master frame**, expressing all or nearly all of the elements of the master frame, and has nearly elements that could be considered to represent a different master frame (if these other elements are present.	Example(s): According to the survey of 'Saba' we grew after the debate. **They could not cheat us and that's why the dirty war intensifies**. Everything will be useless, nothing and **no one can stop the longing of millions of Mexicans for a change**. (Type C master frame, contains references to both the people and the elites) **The future is for everyone**! Today I celebrate that the @MovimientoMIRA party supports our country project. We continue forming a coalition that will **motivate Colombians so that class hatred no longer exists and so that from the differences we can build a better country** (Type B master frame, references both power sharing and the moral element of class hatred)
1 = Moderate. A Tweet in this category is **moderately reflects the master frame by including** some but perhaps not all identifiable elements of this master frame, and either does not use these elements consistently or tempers them by including elements from other master frames.	Example: **We continue to collect the feelings and wisdom of the people**. In the morning we were in Tequila, Jalisco, and in the afternoon in Compostela, Nayarit (Type C master frame, but also has informational elements, and doesn't reference the elites) My agenda is social, cultural and environmental. I am committed to the protection of the swamps and the páramos. I want all Colombians to protect the environment (Type D master frame, talks about a particular issue but it is vague in terms of referring to particular outputs or ways to achieve this)

0 = Neutral. A Tweet in this category is considered **neutral**: it uses few if any elements tied to specific master frames, or they cancel each other out. (Note: if you coded the master frame neutral or informational, this category should also be 0)	Example: Sunday full of joy in eastern Antioquia. On the street with young people who have already lived how #LaFuerzaDeLaEsperanza can transform society. We know that #SePuede govern with decency. See you in Marinilla, El Carmen and San Antonio de Pereira (neutral master frame, could be used with any master frame—nothing in it to indicate how power would be shared)

6) The issue that the Tweet addresses;[100]

What is the main topic of the Tweet? These categories are meant to be broad, but there are categories for "no issue" or "other" just in case a Tweet mentions something that does not fit easily into one of the following descriptions.

Subjects	**Description**	**Example**
1 = Economy	Tweets including subjects such as jobs, unemployment, salaries, deficit, public spending, debt, crisis, taxes, entrepreneurship, contracts, self-employed people, agricultural policy, and so on. This is a somewhat narrow category that should refer explicitly to the economic realm.	"+ 1 million jobs # since February 2014, of which + 53% on permanent contracts. Highest employment rate since the #Istat time series exists. # Youth unemployment at the lowest levels of the last 5 years."
2 = Social policy	Tweets including subjects such as pensions, health, education, the welfare state, poverty, social justice, equality/inequality (including gender-based violence), housing, immigration, childbirth, drug rehabilitation, and so on. This is a broader category that encompasses some economic-adjacent issues (inequality, welfare) that affect people.	"To those under a certain income threshold, it could be an increase of 1000 euros a month for each dependent child, the State pays the necessary sum to arrive at a dignified life. The sum may vary depending on the area of the country where you live."
3 = Culture, media, and sport	Tweets including subjects related to cultural industries (cinema, literature, art, mainstream media, social media, etc.) and sport.	"The State must support our athletes! - The recognition of athletes like Carolina Marin, Saul Craviotto or Lydia Valentin cannot be a miracle. It must be guaranteed!"

[100] This category is adapted from Casero-Ripollés, Sintes-Olivella, and Franch (2017), but adapted for a smaller number of categories.

4 = Science, technology, the environment, and infrastructure	Tweets including subjects related to research and development, network infrastructure (such as fiber optic, ADSL, or Wi-Fi), transportation infrastructure (railway, airports, roads, etc.), pollution, flora and fauna protection, climate change, and so forth.	"The planned future: the environment above all National event for the presentation of the # Environmental Program of the 5 Star MoVement."
5 = Terrorism, crime, and insecurity	Tweets related to terrorism in all its forms and crime/criminal activity or general concerns about insecurity.	"I will work hand in hand with the mayor of #Cali so that we can stop the exponential growth of many crimes in the city."
6 = Foreign affairs	Tweets alluding to the European Union, the United States, international relations, or other parts of the world.	"The United States also needs #Mexico. In my government, we are going to put all the negotiation issues on the table, and we will defend our country firmly on all fronts."
7 = Corruption and democratic regeneration	Tweets including subjects concerning political corruption and/or democratic aspects that need to be renewed or removed, like changes in electoral law, putting an end to the establishment and the privileges of the political class, and so on.	"The PSOE has given a secret order to the ministries not to execute 50% of the budget. They bring us the cuts through the back door. It is the same as Montoro did and it means recovering the austerity policy of the PP. That is not the Spain you want."
8 = Political strategy in office	Tweets including subjects concerning the intention of the **candidate if they were to win office** (i.e., not specific to the campaign period itself). For example, forming a certain type of government or possible (or impossible) government pacts/coalitions in the future. Additionally, if the candidate Tweets about multiple issue positions (the economy and social positions), classify it as political strategy.	"Do you want to know all our government plan and know why so many people think that it is the most realistic, complete and successful proposal for Colombia? Here they find it complete. Read it and tell us what you think"

9 = Campaign organization and strategy	Tweets including subjects concerning the candidate **during the campaign period**. This can include questionnaires, surveys, information, analysis, and assessment of electoral results, or Tweets referring to the action of voting. It can also refer to Tweets about the running of the campaign and the organization of events, like rallies, meetings, political events, and media appearances by the candidates (more specific), or Tweets exalting the importance of party unity and exhorting sympathizers to join the party and earn victory (more broadly).	"In a week we will have an appointment with democracy. We will consolidate an arduous work that has taken me to travel the whole country, transmit my proposals and contrast capacity, preparation, honesty and responsibility with the other projects. With your vote, we will win" "Follow the first debate of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic."
10 = Immigration	Tweets about the topic of immigration	"Salvini at Tgcom24: 'Islam is a danger, stop at every presence'" "Elections 2018, Salvini defends Fontana on the immigration issue"
11 = Regional politics	Tweets relating to political subdivisions such as particular regions, states, etc. Note: this should not be used whenever a candidate talks about a particular city; it is more about the distribution of power within a country, such as the secession movement in Catalonia, Spain, or urban vs. rural politics.	"Mr. Sanchez, in Catalonia there are already enough competitions; what we need is that the people who manage them do so with loyalty to the Constitution." "In our program we propose formulas to improve the model of territorial organization. We want all Spaniards and Spaniards to enjoy the same rights, wherever they live."
12 = No subject or Other	Tweets that do not have a defined subject or that include expressions of courtesy (acknowledgments, etc.) or Tweets referring to the personal life of political agents.	"I share this song, 'Cuidame tu', by Teresita Fernandez, played by Beatriz." "Happy Children's Day!"

	Tweets that cannot be placed in the above categories.	

7) the function of the Tweet;[101]

What is the candidate trying to accomplish? Like the issue category, the possible functions are generalizable categories, with a residual category if needed.

Function	**Description**	**Example**
1 = Agenda and organization of political actions (including media appearances)	Tweets containing information on specific campaign actions in which the time and place are specified. **This should take place either in the near future, or be in progress at the time the Tweet is sent**. Tweets sharing links to a journalistic interview or TV show.	"This afternoon there is debate in the SBT. Do not miss it!" "Follow the first debate of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic." "Today at 7:00 pm there is an interview with Cyrus live on @recordtvoficial. Watch it!"
2 = Electoral program	Tweets on future political proposals or program proposals. This should be somewhat specific—not just vague intonations of making the country better.	"We have to increase competitiveness throughout the country. I propose to lower the VAT at the border and implement a National Infrastructure Plan to achieve prosperity in all states." "One of the key points of our program is less taxes for families and businesses. We will succeed in the Flat Tax, a single rate for all of 23% which will guarantee real economic growth, new jobs and a revival of investments."

[101] This category is adapted from Casero-Ripollés, Sintes-Olivella, and Franch (2017), but adapted for a smaller number of categories.

3 = Management of political achievements	Tweets extolling or praising the achievements of the party and/ or leader. This could also include things like endorsements or responses to polls/early election predictions.	"Congratulations @diegosinhue! In #DebateGuanajuatense you showed that with responsible proposals, in this state we will continue to make good governments for the people. We will win!" "Thanks to Podemos, jobs are created and energy is saved, taking care of the planet."
4 = Criticizing opponents	Tweets containing direct or indirect attacks on other candidates, political parties, other leaders (past or present) or other ideologies more broadly.	"Lopez Obrador is not change, it's just the opposite. Directly giving contracts to your friends is called corruption." "He was supposed to think about the Italians, but he thought only of himself. #Berlusconi spent 3,339 days in the government of the country and focused exclusively on his own affairs"
5 = Participation and mobilization	Tweets aimed directly at increasing support/votes **during the campaign**. This can include the mention of general campaign events (we were in XX city this morning), but the reference should be somewhat vague. Followers would not know where to go or what type of event based just on this Tweet alone (in contrast to function 1). Specific manifestation: requesting financial donations, encouraging people to vote for the candidate/party, or mobilizing volunteers. General manifestation: Tweets that contain inspirational messages about the campaign, or Tweets reinforcing the	"<3 Vote for a big censure of corruption, inequality and political confrontation. Let's say it loud, very loud, voting for the Socialist Party. We are very close." "The second round opens up a golden opportunity: to win this election, an eye on the debate." "We are 15 days from the end of the campaign and the mood of the people is growing as if it would burst with happiness. Never in Ticul or Chetumal had we held such emotional and large meetings during the week."

	party values and containing concepts that identify the party, its ideology, or its values.	
6 = Personal life/ backstage or Manners/Protocol	Tweets where particularly the leaders show or talk about things from their private lives (leisure, hobbies, sport, etc.) or from backstage at political events or from the campaign. Tweets of thanks, sympathy, greetings, special occasions, and so on.	"Anyway at home, near my family in the warmth of our home! No better feeling! Thank you all for the expressions of affection that I could see on the way back and all over Brazil! A big hug to everyone!" "We continue with concern the fire in the cathedral of Notre Dame, in Paris. Let us hope that there will be no victims and that the firefighters will suffocate the fire, preserving this enormous jewel of heritage"
7 = Entertainment or Humor	Tweets encouraging community building around the party or the leader with an entertainment-based focus, or Tweets containing memes, jokes, or other humorous resources.	"Nothing better than ending Sunday with a good movie ... Defeating the dark side machines, you can!"
8 = Others	Tweets that cannot be placed in the above categories	

8) whether the frame used positive, negative, or neutral language;

Does the candidate use mostly positive, neutral, or negative language? When considering this, think of the overall tone of the message, as well as the particular words used.

1 = predominantly positive language	"It's amazing how people are responding. Never have so many citizens participated as now in favor of real change. Look at Manzanillo." "I want to tell the country that I am honored that Dr. @ MoralesViviane gives us her support. With @mluciaramirez we are proposing a project for all Colombians, based on legality, entrepreneurship and equity, where we all fit."

0 = neutral language,[102] or equally positive and negative	"Conference with the international press. We are talking about climate change, fossil progressivism, new progressivism, anti-drug policy, the Venezuelan situation and the Middle East, which will be the new foreign policy of Colombia." "We have to eliminate the unnecessary expenses of the State. As president I will face the evasion; I will encourage investment and the formal hiring of workers, and I will contribute to improve their salaries."
-1 = predominantly negative language	"The real alliance: a scam to the Italians It passes a final majority report in the banks Commission thanks to 6 parliamentarians of the center-right who, upon leaving, reduce the quorum. Here is an advance from the government of mess-makers for which Renzi and Berlusconi work" "# SanchezMentiroso has been demonstrating for nine months that he lies more than he talks. Inside video"

9) A brief description of why you coded the Tweet the way you did

You'll be coding many Tweets, so this brief description should provide justification about any items that required a judgment call. Since we will review each Tweet for discrepancies, this will help us to make the final determination about which code is most appropriate.

<u>Examples:</u>

I coded this as a Type B master frame because it emphasized power sharing and inclusion of voice--2 strong indicators of this type. I also coded it as an issue-based subframe because it talks about the specific proposals of students.

This was a neutral tweet that simply encouraged voters to vote for the candidate by using positive emotions and a reified sense of history. While there seems to be a vague reference to Type B, it's ultimately not enough to classify it as a master frame other than neutral (it's only vaguely implied, whereas the neutral subframes are fairly strong).

[102] The use of the word "neutral" here is different than how it was used for neutral master frame. Here, neutral means there is no strong bias in the language.

I coded this tweet as Type C 'trust in experience' because the candidate was talking about the woman he chose for his VP and the personal qualities and accomplishments that make her qualified. I put the issue as campaign organization and the function as participation and mobilization because they are explaining a new, important member of the campaign and hoping support increases because of her.

I coded this tweet as Type A 'pro people' because the party was lauding young people for their support and implying that young people are being driven to the party because it represents their ideals (patriotism, roots, etc). I put the issue as campaign organization and the function as participation and mobilization because the party was showing the support they have already gotten from the youth and explaining why they have that support in an effort to attract even more supporters.

Troubleshooting

What if there are multiple (sub)frames?

It is possible that more than one frame will be present in a single Tweet. Most often, that is going to be some reference to the people and the elite. There is a designated frame for this category: sub-frame #4, the people versus the elites. However, it is possible that there will be multiple frames in a Tweet. If that is the case, select a primary frame *and* a secondary frame. If you are unsure which frame is primary and which is secondary, designate the primary frame based on which frame the candidate devotes more attention. If for example there are 2 sentences about anti-elite, and only 1 sentence or a passing comment about an out-group, select the proper sub-frame for the anti-elite sentiment as the primary frame.

What if there are multiple issues referenced?

At times, Tweets (especially longer ones) will contain references to more than one issue (such as the economy and the environment, for example). If that is the case, the chances are that there is a deeper meaning behind the issues—the Tweet may mention multiple issues for strategic reasons (i.e., the real "issue" is political strategy