

News Discourse, Political Awareness, and Lived Experience:
American Public Opinion on Immigration Across Racial Lines

By

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Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

DOCTOR IN PHILOSOPHY

in

Political Science

August 31, 2020

Nashville, Tennessee

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Dedication

To Timothy Paulsen, for always believing in me and even when I didn't

and

To the late Professor Tyler Dickovick, for introducing me to the world of political science

Acknowledgements

Graduate school was, to borrow Charles Dickens' words, the best of times and the worst of times. It was truly the age of wisdom. I loved the heated discussions in classes, meetings, and departmental talks. The scholarly passion for a wide array of topics among graduate students and faculty alike was galvanizing. I also developed fascination for studying public opinion and political communication which I eventually merged with my long-time interest in immigration attitude to produce this dissertation.

Unfortunately, it was also the season of darkness. The feeling of inadequacy tortured me. Compared to other graduate students, I always felt that I was not good enough, be it because of my methodological skills or understanding of the literature. I low-key believed that my acceptance into the program was some kind of administrative mistake and it was only a matter of time I will be found out. To this day, post-defense and everything, my imposter syndrome piques now and then. I guess old habits do die hard.

Despite this struggle, I do not regret having done the Ph.D. because of the supportive community of people that helped me survive and thrive. As they say, it is the friends we meet along the way that help appreciate the journey, right? First and foremost, I owe a great deal to my advisors, Cindy Kam and Liz Zechmeister. They showered me with all the support I needed to complete this dissertation: thoughtful advice, stern criticism, and heartwarming encouragement. I went from having no guidance during the first two years to having both of these formidable and kindhearted scholars as my mentors. I hope that someday I will be able to achieve a fraction of their intelligence and compassion.

I am also indebted to my other committee members, Efrén Pérez and Allison Anoll. Efrén's class on political psychology equipped me with the literature that helped enrich the theoretical foundation of my dissertation. Allison never failed to offer brilliant feedback for my work. This dissertation manuscript partly reflects her insight.

There are few graduate students for whom I would like to express gratitude. My cohort has a special place in my heart. Without Nicole Audette, Dave Conner, Spencer Hall, Sebastian Meyer, Michael Shepherd, and Adam Wolsky, I would not have survived the method sequence. I will always fondly look back on the time we taught Brenton that collective action can be overcome when facing an option to re-do the midterm together or fail the course.

SangEun Kim is the first close friend I made in graduate school. Upon her admission, she increased the number of Korean graduate students in the program by 100%. The 2018 Ed Sheeran concert was unforgettable because of her company. I will always cherish our study sessions at Starbucks and spontaneous trips to Korean and Indian restaurants.

Daniela Osorio Michel is ‘that extrovert who adopted you as friend’. She introduced me to Zumba, which is now my favorite workout. It was an honor to attend her and Alexis’ wedding in Bolivia in 2019.

Claire Evans is the best officemate and accountability buddy one could ask for. I could not have done the last year of graduate school without her camaraderie and competence in Stata. I am also eternally grateful that she made me get my wedding dress in time.

Obviously, there are people outside the program that I very much appreciate for their support. I would like to thank the University Counseling Center and its therapists—Shelby Reyes, Katherine Pedziwol, Kim Koon, LaToya Favre, and Viviana Grice—for their service. Without their help, I may have literally not lived to see this day.

Throughout graduate school, I was continuously reminded of my family’s unconditional love. My mom and my sister are my rock. Even with the Pacific Ocean between us, they made me feel connected. I have been living in the U.S now for longer than I have lived in Korea, so it is quite easy to feel ungrounded. However, my family has always provided me with a sense of belonging. Whenever I go visit them for holiday or they come to the U.S., they wordlessly remind me that they are my home base.

Among all these amazing people, there are two persons to whom I would like to dedicate this dissertation. One of them is Professor Tyler Dickovick. He was the first person who believed in my potential to become a social scientist. Even ALS could not quell his passion for teaching. He was an inspiration for not just me but hundreds of students. I hope that I made him proud. May he rest in peace.

Finally, saving the best for the last, there is Timothy Paulsen. Tim has supported me with every step of the way, even during the two years of long-distance relationship. He uprooted himself from Long Island and moved to Nashville for me. There is no version of this dissertation—be it a memo, the prospectus draft, or this manuscript—that he did not proofread. I do not know why God decided to bless me with this amazing human, but I very much intend to keep him.

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Introduction

Since the founding of the United States, immigration has been a focal point of political debate. Public opinion on immigration has fluctuated with the ebb and flow of nativist sentiment. The perceived implications of immigration for the prosperity, safety, and the American way of life led the public to oscillate between permissive and restrictive attitudes (Higham 1955). Be it Chinese in the mid-1800s, Irish during the Prohibition era, Italians and Jews in the early 20th century, or Latinos today, immigrants have frequently been the target of heated public discussion and momentous legislation (Gusfield 1963; Higham 1955; Junn and Masuoka 2013; Wong et al. 2011). Immigration as a historically prominent issue has retained its political salience today. Voters considered immigration one of the most important problems facing the nation during the 2016 presidential election (Pew 2016), and continue to do so in the lead up to the 2020 election (Greenwood 2019). All in all, these contentious, ongoing disputes illustrate that immigration has been an important political issue wielding a considerable influence over American public opinion.

Given the historical significance of immigration for public opinion, scholars have worked to identify what factors shape individuals' attitudes towards immigration. Largely focusing on whites' attitudes, they have found the economic (Borjas 1994; Citrin et al. 1997; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), cultural (Citrin et al. 1997; Hartman et al. 2014; Newman et al. 2012), and security (Igartua and Cheng 2009; McLaren and Johnson 2007; Merolla and Zechmeister 2009) aspects of immigration to affect individuals' views on the issue. Among these attributes, the perceived cultural consequences of immigration seem to predominate in influencing opinions (e.g. Chandler and Tsai 2001; Malhotra et al. 2013; Newman and Malhotra 2018; Sniderman et al. 2004). Other scholars also point to factors such as bias against Latinos (Pérez 2016; Valentino et al. 2013) and one's position in the racial hierarchy (Junn and Masuoka 2013) that also impact individuals' opinions regarding immigration.

Notwithstanding the invaluable contributions of these preceding works, the literature on individuals' immigration attitudes leaves many questions unanswered. In particular, because most existing works have focused on explaining whites' opinions as previously reviewed, we know little about how racial minorities assess the issue. This is an unfortunate gap in our knowledge considering the growing influence of minorities in the U.S. By 2045, the United

States is projected to become a minority majority nation (Frey 2018). The primary source for this demographic change is immigration, particularly from Asia and South and Central America (The Migration Policy Institute). Therefore, the issue is likely highly pertinent to both Asians and Latinos residing in the U.S. For black Americans, who make up the second largest minority in the U.S.¹, immigration may be regarded as a source of rising competition for limited resources (Gay 2006), or alternatively of potential allies for inter-group coalition (Junn and Masuoka 2013; Pérez n.d.). All things considered, as minority groups grow in voting and political power, it is imperative to understand how they evaluate immigration, an issue that holds both historical and group salience for them.

A few notable works have shown that minorities generally exhibit more permissive immigration attitudes than their white counterparts (e.g. Citrin and Sears 2014; Frasure-Yokley and Greene 2013; Junn and Masuoka 2013). However, how minorities form their opinions remains quite under-researched. Specifically, little investigation has been done into what attributes of immigration are pertinent for minorities' views. Do considerations of immigration that correlate with white's attitudes also predict minorities' opinions? Are there other aspects of the issue that are especially pertinent to minorities? In addition, are there individual traits that moderate the effects of these considerations on individuals' immigration attitudes?

My dissertation research project seeks to answer these questions. Each chapter builds upon the previous one to discover how racial groups vary in connecting assorted considerations of immigration to their opinions. In chapter 1, I conduct a content analysis of the news discourse on immigration originating from six news outlets that target a diverse audience. This enables me to examine what considerations of immigration are available to what extent for different racial groups. Using a variety of nationally representative survey data, I investigate how these considerations actually predict immigration attitude across racial lines in chapter 2. The last two chapters explore two types of individual differences that may moderate the associations between the considerations and individuals' immigration attitudes: political awareness (chapter 3) and lived experience of immigration (chapter 4). The latter focuses on Asians and Latinos who are likely to be immigrants or family members of recent immigrants. Finally, I conclude with discussing the limitations of my research and directions for future research.

¹“Quick Facts: United States”. *United States Census Bureau*. Web. <https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219>

Chapter 1.

Immigration Frames in the Information Environment: Discourse on Immigration across Mainstream and Minority News Sources

I. Introduction

The mass public, trying to grasp the world of public affairs beyond their experience, greatly relies on the news media to obtain political information (Lippmann 1922). In addition to the mainstream news media that seeks to inform the general public, there are many racial and ethnic minority news outlets that strive to interpret the news through the lens of their target audience. Since the antebellum period, the Black American press has provided discourses to fight the constant oppression faced by this group (Simmons 1998). For other minority groups, particularly those largely made up of immigrants, foreign language news media serves as an information source to both facilitate assimilation and sustain ingroup cohesion (Jeffres 2000; Lin and Song 2006; Viswanath and Arora 2003). In reporting the news, political and journalistic elites do not always provide all pertinent facts; instead, they focus on selective considerations of an issue (Lippmann 1922). Scholars refer to this practice as framing, the emphasis on particular aspects of a given issue while downplaying others (Chong and Druckman 2007). As a result of framing, “The information that reaches the public is never a full record...rather, a highly selective and stereotyped view” (Zaller 1992, pg.7).

When it comes to immigration, scholars have found that the discourse tends to revolve around certain aspects. These pertain to economic consequences (Abrajano et al. 2017), crime (Farris and Silber Mohamed 2018), race of immigrants (Valentino et al. 2013) and illegality (Pérez 2016). These frames in turn appear to influence individuals’ attitudes towards the issue (Brader et al. 2008; Haynes et al. 2016; Newman and Malhotra 2018; Pérez 2016). Though these studies have helped us better understand what considerations of immigration are available for the public, the scholarly investigation is far from complete. Specifically, we know little about the information environment regarding immigration in which racial minorities are immersed. Are the prominent frames of immigration identified by the previous research also available for racial minorities? And if so, to what degree? Also, are there other attributes that minority news outlets especially emphasize in reporting the issue?

In this chapter, I seek to answer these questions. To this end, I conduct a qualitative content analysis of immigration news from six news outlets: Fox News, CNN, Univision, China Press, Los Angeles Sentinel, and New York Amsterdam. In this attempt, I focus on three critical discourse moments when immigration was a prominent social issue. While some narratives commonly appeared across the six sources, others featured more heavily in certain outlets. Additionally, Black and Latino news platforms stand out as they frequently promote aspects related to racial discrimination and rights. The news sources also varied in how they evoked these considerations: some more often evoked in a positive tone, others, a negative tone. I conclude with the possible implications of these findings for public opinion on immigration.

My scholarly contribution in this chapter is twofold. First, I advocate and provide a more rigorous conceptualization of immigration frames. In particular, scholars have long treated race and culture synonymously (e.g. Brader et al. 2008; Newman and Malhotra 2018). I strive to disentangle these concepts and define them more rigorously. Second, I help expand the growing literature on what information regarding immigration is available for racial minorities in the U.S. Primarily analyzing Spanish language newspapers, a few existing works have examined the immigration news coverage for the Latino audience (e.g. Abrajano and Singh 2009; Branton and Dunaway 2008). However, this dissertation chapter is the first attempt to extend such an investigation to other minority groups as well, namely Black and Asian Americans.

II. State of the Literature on Frames of Immigration

Scholars have long been interested in what frames are available in the information environment precisely because they could influence public opinion. Frames operate by emphasizing certain aspects of a given issue while downplaying others (Chong and Druckman 2007). Those underscored considerations may come to be perceived as both relevant and important. A framing effect is said to occur when such “emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions” (Druckman and Nelson 2003, pg.730). In other words, drawing attention to discrete aspects of an issue may lead individuals to form certain evaluations. Previous works have shown that framing indeed shapes how individuals evaluate a variety of issues such as a hate group rally (Nelson et al. 1997; Chong and Druckman 2007b), welfare spending (Sniderman and Theriault 1999), and urban development at the cost of conservation (Chong and Druckman

2007b). In explaining how a framing effect occurs, scholars assert that framing temporarily increases the accessibilities (Higgins 1996; Higgins and King 1981) or importance (Nelson et al. 1997) of the considerations available in long-term memory, thereby making them influential for individuals' overall opinions.

Despite the richness of the literature on immigration frames reviewed earlier, there are comparatively fewer scholarly investigations into what considerations of immigration are available for racial minorities. A few relevant works have examined Spanish-language newspapers and found that Latinos are exposed to relatively more favorable coverage of immigration (Abrajano and Singh 2009; Branton and Dunaway 2008). Beyond this piece of knowledge, however, we know very little about the immigration narratives presented for minorities, let alone Latinos. In particular, our understanding in this matter as it pertains to Black and Asian Americans is limited since no systematic analysis exists. Consequently, we are still in dark when considering how much we know about the aspects of immigration available for minorities' opinions.

Addressing this gap in the literature is important due to the shifting demographics in the United States. By 2045, the U.S. is projected to become a minority majority nation (Frey 2018), the first major post-industrial society to do so (Deasy 2012). The primary source for this change is mass immigration. As minorities come to wield increasing political influence as voting blocks, it is critical to understand how they assess immigration as an issue given its saliency to their advancement. Although a growing number of studies have investigated Blacks, Asians and Latinos' views on immigration (e.g. Citrin and Sears 2014; Frasure-Yokley and Greene 2013; Junn and Masuoka 2013; Kinder and Kam 2009), the literature can benefit from further research. Specifically, as I previously noted, there remains the need to examine what attributes of immigration are pertinent for minorities' immigration attitudes. In this dissertation chapter, I aim to help narrow the gap in the literature by analyzing the considerations of immigration available in mainstream and racial minority news sources.

I focus on news discourse for its prominence in disseminating information. The news media constitutes a major source of political information for citizens (Lippmann 1922, Zaller 1992). Though there are certainly other routes such as grapevine and lived experience, which I will discuss in chapter 4, individuals nevertheless receive the dominant narratives from the news

media. Therefore, analyzing the news discourse on immigration will provide an important glimpse of the considerations brought to the public's attention.

Since the goal is to explore the considerations of immigration available to minorities, it is important to examine the news discourse from not only mainstream news sources but also minority news platforms, both of which minorities may access for political information. In the U.S., there are alternative news outlets for Blacks, Latinos, and Asians. As shown in Table 1.1A in the appendix, substantial proportions of minorities consume their corresponding ethnic news. This is especially true among foreign-born Asians and Latinos, majorities of whom utilize minority news sources to obtain information, whether exclusively or in addition to mainstream American news. There may be significant similarities and differences between the mainstream and minority news outlets in the considerations they accentuate; these variations may also impact their respective group's opinions.

In summary, scholars have extensively researched framing effects for their ability to influence public opinion. The news media, while not the only source of information, supplies major frames with which individuals evaluate issues. The literature on frames of immigration, despite its depth regarding whites' immigration attitudes, lacks a systematic comparison between different news sources targeting diverse racial groups. To address this gap, I design and conduct content analysis of immigration news stories from six news outlets.

III. Research Design

Having established the need to analyze the news discourse on immigration from both mainstream and minority news outlets, I now describe my research design. First, I discuss my corpus: the news sources to analyze. Second, I justify which period of news discourse to focus on. Then, I briefly explain the sampling process. Finally, I elaborate on my coding rules regarding the frames, tones, and coding sequence.

A. Corpus

In selecting the news sources for my content analysis, I set two criteria. First, I seek news sources that are influential for each racial group. Because I am interested in the considerations of immigration available for racial minorities, it is essential to analyze the dialogue from those prominent news sources that reach significant portions of their target groups. Second, the news

sources should be comparable in their medium as to reduce any idiosyncrasies affecting the comparison. For example, the variations between a minority newspaper and a mainstream radio news station (e.g. NPR) may be due to their different modes rather than the intentional framing choices. Thus, it is important that I take into account what to hold constant across my sources.

Considering these qualifications, I collect and analyze online news articles from the following six sources: CNN, Fox News, New York Amsterdam, Los Angeles Sentinel, China Press, and Univision. CNN and Fox News represent mainstream news outlets that the general public relies on to obtain information. They will serve as the baseline comparisons for how minority news outlets resemble and differ from the conventional news media in framing immigration. Both CNN and Fox News represent popular news platforms in the U.S. Among the top news providers, CNN.com ranked first with 137 million multi-platform unique visitors, and Fox News Digital second with 110 million (Business Wire 2020). Furthermore, CNN and Fox News have opposing ideological leanings which may cause them to frame immigration differently; on the political spectrum, CNN aligns left of the average American whereas Fox News aligns right (Pew 2016b). Considering the increasing ideological and partisan polarization over immigration (Daniller 2019), this contrast may translate into important variations in how the two news sources frame the issue. Thus, CNN and Fox News are prominent and ideologically contrasting mainstream news outlets whose framing of immigration forms a baseline from which to compare my other news sources.

The remaining four sources constitute the news outlets that racial minorities may access for alternative or additional information. Chinese and Latinos have consistently made up substantial shares of the immigrant population in the United States (Suro 1999, Takaki 1993); for each group, China Press and Univision respectively serve as one of the most influential minority news platforms for their target audience. Since its founding in 1990, China Press has been a major news source for overseas Chinese, especially those living in North America (Allen-Ebrahimian 2017; Duzhe 2001; Sun 2006). For Latinos, especially the foreign-born population, Univision represents a popular news source (The Latino Media Report 2019). It is important to note, however, that the online format is not their most popular medium: China Press is mostly consumed in newspaper format and Univision as TV news. I choose to analyze their discourse online in order to keep consistency across the news sources.

For Black Americans, choosing the corpus is a bit more complicated. Unlike other minority groups, Black Americans do not rely on a particular minority news outlet (The Media Insight Project 2014). Most Black news outlets also tend to be regionally based. This leads me to select two Black news outlets published in cities with divergent characteristics: Los Angeles and New York. While immigration is a salient issue in both LA and NY, Black Americans are greatly outnumbered by Hispanics in the former, but make up a roughly equal proportion in the latter.² This difference may translate into varying everyday experience with immigration which may render unique attributes of immigration important for Black residents in these cities. Therefore, analyzing the popular Black news sources from these locales—LA Sentinel and NY Amsterdam—may help examine a wide array of considerations of immigration available to Black Americans.

From these six news platforms, I collect and analyze online news articles on immigration. Since I am focusing on this particular medium, it is necessary to provide a quick summary of the use of online news. Though the majority of people still rely on TV news, they increasingly utilize the internet. In 2017, 43% of Americans in 2017 said that they often get news online; this estimate was only 7% lower than those who prefer TV news. Pew predicts that such reliance on internet news is likely to grow in the future (Bialik and Matsa 2017). Unfortunately, it is unknown how much traffic the minority news websites receive since no relevant data exists. As argued before, however, holding constant the medium helps improve the comparability across different news sources. Put simply, online news articles should be more similar to each other in many regards than to their counterparts in another form of news.

B. Critical Discourse Moments

From the six news outlets, I aim to examine the news articles published around a few critical discourse moments regarding immigration. A critical discourse moment refers to the time during which an issue attracts especially stimulating commentary in the public and news media (Chilton 1987). In other words, it is when a given issue attracts much attention and discussion from the general public and news media. In analyzing the news discourse on immigration, I focus on these

² United States Census 2018. Quick Facts United States.
<https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045218>

specific time periods rather than the entirety of immigration news coverage. I advocate this approach for two reasons.

First, limiting the time frame is more conducive to qualitative content analysis. The goal of my content analysis is to catalog the narratives about immigration available to the public beyond white Americans. As reviewed earlier, however, there is limited understanding of what narratives are present in minority news sources. Simply relying on the findings of existing studies might lead us to overlook the distinct aspects of immigration emphasized by minority news sources. For researchers facing this dilemma, Neuendorf offers the following advice:

“[when] existing theory or research literature cannot give a complete picture of the message pool, the researcher may...need to immerse himself or herself in the world of the message pool and conduct a qualitative scrutiny of a representative subset of the content to be examined. In this way, variables emerge from the message pool, and the investigator is well grounded in the reality of the message” (2002, pg. 103).

Per Neuendorf’s suggestion, I created my codebook based on a preliminary content analysis.³ In this attempt, I found it more suitable to limit the analysis to the news discourse around a few critical discourse moments since qualitatively analyzing each article requires much time-consuming effort. By focusing on a finite set of articles, I could assemble the frames to code more efficiently.


Second, the immigration frames accentuated during the critical discourse moments are likely more influential on attitudes due to their high accessibilities. When different considerations become available in memories, they may vary in their accessibilities: the “activation potential of available knowledge” (Higgins 1996, pg. 134). Put simply, certain considerations about immigration may be more easily recalled than others, thus more consequential for the resulting evaluation. One factor that determines this accessibility is the frequency of activation. The more often knowledge is activated, the more accessible it should become (Higgins and King 1981; Higgins et al. 1982). During a critical discourse moment, immigration is frequently discussed in the news media. The frames consistently emphasized during this period receive the most public attention, thereby becoming highly accessible in individuals’ memories. It follows then,

³ The preliminary content analysis was based on 10 randomly selected news articles from each news source and each critical discourse moment.

analyzing the immigration news discourse during these critical discourse moments will reveal which considerations may be especially important for immigration attitudes.

Based on these reasonings, I select three critical discourse moments since Trump’s inauguration on January 20, 2017. I restrict my timeline to the Trump Presidency in order to minimize any idiosyncrasies to his administration.⁴ In this selection process, I used Google Trends, which helps visualize how often a word or phrase was searched on Google over a given period relative to the peak point. Since a critical discourse moment is defined by the temporarily elevated prominence of an issue, I use these results as proxies for salience of immigration. Figure 1.1 visualizes the search frequencies for the keyword ‘immigration’.


Figure 1.1. Google Trends Result for ‘Immigration’ Since January 20, 2017



I also probe the search trend for the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA), the Obama era policy that Trump targeted from his campaign days. As shown in Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2, searches for ‘DACA’ peaked at a different time than for ‘immigration’. Despite this incongruity, I deem that given the importance of an anti-DACA message for Trump’s presidential campaign, it is an important immigration related issue to include in my analysis of immigration news discourse.

⁴ It is important to note that the survey data sets I analyze in later chapters precede the Trump Presidency. I believe that this discrepancy allowed me to speculate which considerations of immigration have been available for a while and which for a shorter period. However, when more current survey data becomes available, it will be worthwhile to repeat the analysis to see if and how those newer attributes also correlate with immigration attitudes across racial groups.

Figure 1.2. Google Trends Result for ‘DACA’ Since January 20, 2017



In Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2, there are three peaks, which signify the surge in searches for the two keywords. The three events centering around these dates are listed below.⁵

- January 27, 2017: Trump signed the Executive Order ‘Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States’, banning the entry of citizens from seven predominantly Muslim countries for 90 days and of Syrian refugees indefinitely.
- September 5, 2017: Trump announced the phasing out of DACA, an executive order by the Obama administration that allowed temporary residence and work permits to young immigrants with unlawful stays.
- June 20, 2018: Trump ordered an executive action to end the zero tolerance policy, which separated immigrant families detained at the Southern border.

As their descriptions make clear, all three critical discourse moments featured restrictive measures. Focusing on these events provides two advantages. First, each event posed varying implications for different racial groups. As Table 1.1 indicates, the policy changes promulgated impacted a diverse group of immigrants to varying degrees. The travel ban primarily targeted migrants from the Middle East and North Africa, whereas the other two events mostly affected those from South and Central America. However, the repeal of DACA also adversely impacted a

⁵ Although there is no data on how public opinion was changing during these exact periods, views on immigration became slightly more favorable between June 2016 and June 2018: a 7-percentage point increase in those who prefer more immigration and a 9-percentage drop in those who prefer less immigration (Gallup). One possible explanation for this shift that could be attributed to the news framing is the frequent mentions of the familial consideration during the latter two critical discourse moments; as I later discuss in the analysis section, it has an overwhelmingly positive tone.

substantial number of undocumented Black and Asian immigrants.⁶ Pooling the news discourse across the three critical discourse moments will enable collecting assorted attributes of immigration highlighted when the issue posed dissimilar implications for diverse individuals.

Table 1.1. Three Selected Critical Discourse Moments

Critical discourse moment	Description	Groups affected
January 26, 2017	Travel ban.	Citizens from the seven predominantly Muslim nations: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.
September 5, 2017	DACA termination.	Mostly Latinos (ethnic Mexicans particularly), but sizable recipients from Asia and the Caribbean.
June 20, 2018	Ending the separation of migration families at the Southern border.	Migrant families from the Northern Triangle of Central America.

Second, the three events garnered both support and criticism, one faction advocating a more sympathetic position, and the other, exclusionary. According to the literature on framing effects, distinct aspects of an issue are often emphasized in order to persuade the audience to support or oppose it. Sniderman and Theriault (1999), for example, find that individuals endorse increasing welfare spending when the issue is framed as providing the chance for the poor to get ahead, but oppose when it is framed as higher taxes. Similarly, Nelson et al. (1997) show that tolerance for KKK marches increases when the discussion centers around freedom of speech, whereas it declines when focusing instead on public safety. Analyzing how considerations are evoked through critical discourse moments may shed a light on whether and how often the same considerations are presented with contrasting tones for each group.

To summarize, my content analysis consists of the news stories centering around the three critical discourse moments. Specifically, I focus on the articles published by the six news outlets from a month prior to a month after each event. Next, I explain the sampling process.

⁶ Scott, Eugene. “‘Dreamers’ aren’t just coming from Latin America”. September 7, 2017. The Washington Post. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/09/07/dreamers-arent-just-coming-from-latin-america/>

C. Sampling

To create a sample of news articles to analyze, I first collect all online news articles published by the six news outlets during each critical discourse moment.⁷ I use LexisNexis for CNN articles, limiting my search to those containing the word “immigration”. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent archive for the remaining five news sources. For this reason, I manually assembled all articles published on their respective websites.⁸

I only include in my sample the news articles that invoked at least one frame. Those that merely mention the word ‘immigration’ without emphasizing any particular aspect were excluded. In addition, I primarily focus on the news articles that concern migration to the U.S. Unless the article draws a parallel with the U.S., news stories pertaining to immigration elsewhere in the world did not qualify.

After collecting all relevant news articles, I sampled which ones to analyze. If a news source has more than 30 news articles for a given critical discourse moment, I randomly selected 20. This was done primarily because of the time-exhaustive nature of a qualitative content analysis. Table 1.2 summarizes the total number of online news articles collected and sampled. As shown, LA Sentinel has comparatively fewer articles. Since my focus is to compare across the four racial/ethnic groups, I combine the two Black news sources for the analysis.

Table 1.2. Number of News Articles Per Source

News Source	Total collected (number sampled)			Total sampled
	Jan 27, 2017	Sep 5, 2017	June 20, 2018	
CNN	391 (20)	132 (20)	469 (20)	60
Fox News	417 (20)	100 (20)	348 (20)	60
China Press	30 (20)	25 (20)	59 (20)	60
Univision	182 (20)	202 (20)	345 (20)	60
LA Sentinel	8 (8)	6 (6)	6 (6)	20
NY Amsterdam	63 (20)	22 (22)	28 (28)	70

⁷ I had an undergraduate research assistant who collected and translated the China Press news articles. I double-checked the validity of her translation in each sampled article using the Google translator. I also utilized the Google translator when collecting Univision articles in Spanish.

⁸ It should be also noted that not all articles originate from the websites from which they are collected. Fox News, for instance, frequently posts articles written by the Associated Press; NY Amsterdam and Univision also often feature CNN articles on their platforms. I included such articles in my sample because these news sources chose to display and archive them, evidently wanting their readers to access the articles.

D. Coding Rule

I now turn to explain the three dimensions pertinent to coding the sampled news articles: the frames to code, tone of the frames, and the coding sequence.

a) Frames

First, I will discuss what frames I code. The appendix includes the entirety of my codebook. The codebook describes the conceptual definitions of each consideration and their associated keywords. Most of the frames are coded simply when these keywords appear. Modifiers like “illegal” and “undocumented” or races/ethnicities (e.g. “Asian”) and countries (e.g. “Mexico”) are coded when such terms appear. Other frames have multiple keywords. The “familial” frame, for instance, pertains to any reference related to families such as (grand)parents, child(ren), spouses, and relatives.

Other frames require more discretion as they are rather abstract in concept. These are the frames that are red, underlined, and bold in the codebook. Such frames include “culture”. As previously reviewed, existing studies have shown that various attributes of immigration influence whites’ opinions on the issue. In particular, emphasizing cultural consequences of immigration appears markedly effective at generating bias against immigrants (Malhotra et al. 2013; Sniderman et al. 2004). These works equate cultural consideration with ethnicity of immigrants (Brader et al. 2008; Newman and Malhotra 2018). Although culture and ethnicity often overlap, they are not identical. To date, scholars across multiple fields have not arrived at an authoritative definition of culture (for review, see Spencer-Oatey 2012). However, they do agree that culture pertains to distinct attitudes, values, and beliefs shared and learned within a group (Tylor 1871). Ethnicity, on the other hand, refers to the cultural group that is born into; within her ethnic group, she learns and practices her culture. An individual may speak Korean fluently but that does not necessarily mean that she is an ethnic Korean. In this way, culture and ethnicity are distinct concepts. Thus, treating the ethnicity of immigrants as a cultural aspect of immigration incorrectly conflates these two concepts.

In order to accurately operationalize cultural aspects of immigration, I identified several elements such as religion and language that constitute a culture. Some of them, however, call for more sophisticated discernment. One of the cultural frames concerns acculturation. This involves

not only the concrete practice of assimilation such as learning a new language, but also embracing the new culture. The excerpt below exemplifies the latter case.

"Young people protected by DACA have called Rhode Island home since they were children and have no significant connection to the land of their birth," said Maldonado, who co-directs the state's African-American and Latino Legislative Committee (Univision, June 18, 2018).

In this excerpt, cultural adaptation is accentuated in order to shed a positive light on immigrants, specifically the DACA beneficiaries. Recognizing this sentiment requires careful discretion.

Another culture frame that requires such judicious interpretation is cultural values. As I have mentioned before, culture includes values that characterize a group (Tylor 1871). Extending this definition, I deem a certain value as cultural only if it represents a group.

Liu also said that [a border wall] will not only waste billions of dollars, but also damage the fundamental freedom and equality enshrined in the US Constitution (China Press, January 26, 2017).

Have [immigrants] ever thought of losing their freedom and separation from your family once they get caught? (China Press, June 30, 2018).

...because the [travel] ban was opposed by the state government, the Federal Supreme Court, the American public, and the international community...for freedom and equality, Trump had to make some modifications to the ban (China Press, September 25, 2017).

Although all three excerpts mention freedom, I only regard the first as the culture frame. In the first quote, freedom is described as a fundamental principle in the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution defines American legal culture by dictating which behaviors, attitudes and values shall be considered lawful. Since freedom is portrayed as a principal element of the Constitution, and therefore of American legal culture, I consider the value as cultural in this case. In contrast, the second excerpt talks about freedom of individual immigrants rather than of a society. Since the value is not associated with a particular group, I do not code freedom as culture frame. The third example alludes to freedom as a universal value endorsed by both American society and the international community. There is no group mentioned that specially regards freedom as their

characteristic value. These examples show that discriminating between these frames necessitates refined analysis beyond a simple keyword search.

In short, I code for the various frames in the news articles published by the six news sources around the three critical discourse moments. Some of the frames require more attention than others due to their conceptual complexity.

b) Tone

Next, I discuss how I code the tone of each frame. When a frame appears, I code it as -1 (negative), 0 (neutral), or 1 (positive). A frame has positive tone when it provides a favorable account of immigration. It may also support/critique a permissive/restrictive immigration measure. A frame that serves the opposite purpose has a negative tone. When a frame espouses neither stances, it is considered as neutral. Below are sample frames of each type.

Table 1.3. Frame with Different Tones

Tone	Example	Frames coded
Positive	“The 450,000 health care <u>workers</u> of 1199SEIU are sickened by this administration’s inhumane and <u>racist</u> mistreatment of the immigrants who <u>form the rich fabric of our nation.</u> ” (LA Sentinel, July 5, 2018).	Economy (worker) Discrimination (racist) Benefit (form the rich fabric of our nation)
Neutral	“Trump is weighing his options on the protections for the nearly 800,000 young <u>undocumented</u> immigrants under DACA, which gave those who had come to the United States as <u>children</u> the chance to <u>work</u> and study” (CNN, August 31, 2017).	Modifier (undocumented) Familial (children) Economy (work)
Negative	“We <u>work</u> here and raise our <u>children</u> here but every day we see [border crossers, <u>drug smugglers</u>] and nothing changes” (Fox News, January 16, 2017).	Economy (work) Familial (children) Crime (drug)

Note that in each row of Table 1.3, all the underlined frames are assigned the same tone. However, it is not always the case that every frame that appeared together within a sentence is designated the same tone. Instead, I assign each frame its appropriate tone as illustrated below.

"We need to keep out every dangerous person who tries to come in this country, but to categorically brand people because of their religion or their background or country they're from is just not the way we should do things in America" (CNN, June 26,2018).

In this quote, Senator Dick Durbin mentions security concerns of immigration (dangerous) as a reason to uphold the travel ban. Yet he also evokes a cultural motive (religion) to ultimately oppose the policy. Accordingly, I assign a negative tone for the former frame and a positive tone for the latter.

Moreover, a frame may appear more than once with opposing tones; in this case, I discerned which position on the issue it ultimately promoted.

...despite claims from pro-illegal immigration advocates that the aliens pay significant off-setting taxes back to federal, state and local treasuries, the Federation for American Immigration Reform report tallied just \$19 billion, making the final hit to taxpayers about \$116 billion (Fox News, September 27, 2017).

In the quote above, an economic consideration (tax) is discussed to frame immigration favorably initially, then unfavorably. It is evident that the speaker essentially objects to immigration. Hence, I assign the economy frame a negative tone. Having explained what news frames of immigration I code and how I assign appropriate tone, I conclude this section by briefly sketching the coding sequence.

c) Coding Sequence

Coding consists of several steps. First, I judged whether a given sentence pertains to the issue of immigration. If not relevant, I moved onto the next sentence. For a qualifying sentence, I coded which frame appeared at least once. If there was no frame, it was skipped. Depending on its tone, I assigned each frame that appeared -1 (negative), 0 (neutral), or 1 (positive). I repeated this process until I reached the end of the given article. I code each article as a Qualtrics survey.⁹ My content analysis data was created as a collection of responses to each survey. In the following section, I will interpret some findings uncovered from analyzing the data.

IV. Analysis

In this section, I analyze and discuss some noteworthy findings from my content analysis. The six news sources vary in meaningful ways that provide new insights into the news framing of immigration. To preface the results, all six news outlets similarly accentuated those aspects related to the economy, culture, crime, security and family, although some narratives received more mentions than others depending on the news source. Still, these platforms differed, especially in the use of modifiers (undocumented vs. illegal) and the most frequently mentioned nationality/ethnicity. Moreover, minority news sources—in particular, those targeting Blacks and Latinos—discussed such aspects as rights and discrimination that are only mentioned infrequently in the mainstream news media. These interesting variations are also observed when looking at the overall tone in which each frame was evoked; some considerations consistently had either a positive or negative tone across the news outlets, while on other considerations the news sources diverged and espoused contrasting positions. I will further elaborate on the significance of these findings in the conclusion.

Before delving into analysis, I will explain the data structure. As you might recall, I coded the frames in each sentence within a given news article. I call this unit of coding the *relevant sentence*. By ‘relevant’, I mean that the sentence 1. is apropos of immigration, and 2. contains at

⁹The design for my Qualtrics survey is as follows: after asking for the unique ID of each news article, the survey inquires whether a given sentence evokes a particular frame. If the response is no, the survey moves on to ask whether there is another frame. If yes, it asks in what tone (positive, neutral, negative) the frame appears. This process is repeated for every frame listed in my codebook. After coding all frames within a sentence, the survey asks whether I have reached the end of the article. If the response is no because there are more sentences to code, the survey repeats this set of questions. There are a total of 75 blocks of these questions within the survey to ensure that all relevant sentences can be coded.

least one frame. Each relevant sentence represents an opportunity in which a frame could be evoked. The aggregate sum of all relevant sentences per news source then indicates the total number of times the source brought to the audience’s attention at least one aspect of immigration in framing the issue. Table 1.4 summarizes the total numbers of news articles and of relevant sentences across the articles by news source.

Table 1.4. Total Number of Relevant Sentences by News Source

News source	Number of articles	Number of relevant sentences
CNN	60	998
Fox News	60	679
China Press	60	1049
Univision	60	930
LA Sent. & NY Am.	90	1085

With this sample, I conduct the analysis in two parts. First, I investigate how the news sources resemble and differ in framing immigration. Second, I examine the distributions in tone of the frames. I will conclude with a discussion on the significance of my findings.


Part 1. Frame distributions

In this part of the analysis, I examine how distinct immigration frames vary in their frequencies across sources. The six news sources varied in which aspects of immigration they highlight. Even though I coded for a variety of frames, I do not comment on every one of them. I focus on those that 1. previous studies have noted as influential for individuals’ immigration attitudes, and that 2. exhibited noteworthy similarities and differences across the news sources. In this way, my work furthers our knowledge by identifying what findings are compatible, contradictory, or original within the literature.

To compare the prevalence of the frames across news sources, I estimate their relative frequencies: the percentage share of a frame’s appearances relative to the total number of relevant sentences within the news source. Every relevant sentence represents the opportunity for a frame to appear. Then, the proportion it is mentioned to this total indicates the extent to which it makes up the news source’s discourse on immigration.

First, I will focus on four *primary frames*: economy, culture, crime, and security. These are well-known factors shaping individuals’ immigration attitudes (e.g. Chandler and Tsai 2007; Brader et al. 2008), though the last two are generally treated as the same.¹⁰ Given their established prominence, I call them primary frames. I examine how extensively these four appear in the news discourse, both in the mainstream and minority news outlets in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3. Relative Frequencies of the Primary Frames



Overall, the six news sources highlight the four primary aspects in framing immigration. In Figure 1.3, all four considerations have relative frequencies of at least 5 percentage points in each news source. While these estimates may not appear impressive, they are substantially greater than the relative frequency (less than 1%) of many other frames such as “rule of law”.

¹⁰ Because terrorism and other security related concerns were especially salient during the travel ban, I distinguish between crime and security frames.

The universal presence of the four frames suggests that these considerations are available for not only white Americans who have been extensively studied, but also racial minorities.


This is not to say that the news sources are indistinguishable in how they evoke the four frames. China Press, for one, appears to emphasize economic considerations of immigration more often than other frames. This may be because the source often reports on policy changes in employment and investment visas that affect many Chinese immigrants, as exemplified below.

EB-5 investment immigration visa, which has been popular with Chinese in recent years, is still attractive to foreign investors. However, both parties are increasingly concerned with fraud and abuse, which have destroyed the initial purpose of the program (China Press, June 29, 2018).

Other news outlets, while frequently featuring economic considerations, do not display such a large discrepancy between the primary frames. This leads me to suspect that some considerations may be more pertinent among certain groups: in this case, economic aspects for Asians.

Besides the four primary frames, the aspects related to family also had a substantial presence in the news discourse. While the familial frame has not been as observable as the primary frames, more recent content analysis has found it frequently appears in the news discourse on immigration (Haynes et al. 2016). My preliminary content analysis also led me to believe that this aspect may have been made quite accessible during the three critical discourse moments.

Figure 1.4. Relative Frequencies of the Familial Frame




As shown in Figure 1.4, all six news sources frequently evoke the familial frame. Its relative frequencies are even higher than those of the four primary frames. This prevalence of the familial frame may reflect a broader pattern in the changing composition of immigrants to the U.S.: from unmarried Mexican men looking for jobs to families migrating together (Jordan 2019). Such an image may have become increasingly available for the public as well.

It should be noted that the frame’s frequent appearance is partly due to the critical discourse moment concerning family separation. However, the frame did also receive moderate mentions during the other two time periods. Further, other narratives— especially the culture and security frame during the travel ban—did not attain a similar level of pervasiveness in the news discourse. Therefore, considerations related to family may be greatly accessible to individuals when forming opinions on immigration.

A starker contrast between the news sources emerges when looking at how they use modifiers. Scholars have posited that using different modifiers may be consequential for immigration attitudes. Per Masuoka and Junn, discerning “illegal” and “legal” immigration draws attention “to the values of fairness, the importance of law, and protection of national

identity as justification for more punitive immigration policies” (2013, pg.159). Haynes et al. (2016) further predict that “undocumented” as an alternative term for illegal may not bring the value violations to mind. In addition, there is now an increasingly popular political slogan against the term illegal in describing immigrants, claiming that no human beings are illegal (e.g. Gambino 2015). To assess whether these modifiers do predict immigration attitude across racial groups, it is imperative to first examine the varying extents to which they are available for diverse individuals. Figure 1.5 summarizes the distributions of “legal”, “illegal”, and “undocumented” within my sample.¹¹

Figure 1.5. Relative Frequencies of Modifiers



¹¹ In Chinese, illegal is “非法”, and undocumented “无证”. In Spanish, illegal is “ilegal”, and undocumented “indocumentada” or “indocumentado”. For each sampled China Press and Univision news article, I double-checked for correct translation.

Looking at Figure 1.5, the six news outlets clearly vary in how they evoke different modifiers. First, legal is most infrequently mentioned as a modifier across all news sources. This is in line with Pérez (2016) that the mainstream news media distorts the public perception of immigration by downplaying the presence of legal immigrants. My content analysis reveals that this misrepresentation is available for minorities as well.

A clearer distinction emerges in how the news sources use undocumented and illegal. CNN and the two Black news platforms exhibit no partiality between the two modifiers. On the other hand, Fox News and China Press most frequently opt for illegal. In particular, the latter often distinguishes the Chinese immigration from the “illegal” kind as captured below.


Every time there is a rumor of amnesty for illegal immigrants, there are many Chinese who express their disapproval and think it is unfair to legal immigrants who have worked hard to queue. As a result, many Chinese have supported Trump's policy against illegal immigration (China Press, February 27, 2017).

In contrast to Fox News and China Press, Univision and the two Black news sources prefer the term undocumented. This seems especially true for the former, which evokes undocumented twice as often as illegal. The finding seems intuitive as it is a less offensive adjective for unauthorized immigrants like DACA recipients, many of whom are Latinos. That different news sources vary in what modifiers they prefer has been previously unknown as most existing studies analyzed the mainstream news discourse (e.g. Haynes et al. 2016; Pérez 2016). This variation may imply that certain modifiers are more available than others for different racial groups. As I will later discuss in part 2 of the analysis, illegal and undocumented also have opposing tones. Considering these findings, I speculate that whichever modifier is more available may predict immigration attitudes across diverse individuals, a possibility I will be testing in chapter 2.

Another interesting divergence between the news sources surfaces when examining the countries and ethnicities mentioned. Examining this pattern is important as it will help shed light on how individuals generally perceive immigrants. Figure 1.6 displays the finding.¹²

¹² Those that appeared in less than 1% of the relative sentences were omitted.

Figure 1.6. Relative Frequencies of Various Countries/Ethnicities ¹³



As with the modifiers, the news sources varied in which countries/ethnicities they featured most in covering immigration, though none of these frames were statistically different from each other within each news source. Preceding studies have found that the mainstream news media frequently spotlight immigration from Latin America, especially Mexico (e.g. Pérez 2016; Valentino et al. 2013). This seems to be the case in my sample as well with Mexico appearing in all of the six news platforms. In particular, Fox News and Univision mention Mexico in 7% of their relative sentences. This finding advances the possibility that Mexican immigration is perceived as very common among individuals across racial groups. In contrast to Mexico, Canada and Europe rarely receive a mention. This general absence may explain why individuals seldom associate Canada and Europe with immigration in the U.S (Brader et al. 2008).

¹³ These proportions might seem surprisingly small. Recall that the unit of analysis is relevant sentence. Within a given news article, the nationalities/ethnicities of immigrants were generally mentioned in only one or two sentences. In contrast, others like the four primary frames appeared several times throughout the article.

Notwithstanding the pervasive mentions of Mexico in the general news discourse, the news sources do show distinguishable patterns in what other countries and ethnicities they feature. This is especially true for minority news sources, which focus on those pertaining to their target audience's nationalities and ethnicities. Relative to other news outlets, LA Sentinel and NY Amsterdam frequently mention immigration from the Caribbean and Africa.

Likewise, on the issue of immigration, we must insert Haitians, continental Africans and other African immigrants in the considerations and conversations... it is on us to advance African interests in immigration and not accept or assent to its being simply a Latino issue (LA Sentinel, July 19, 2018).

...the immigration bills proposed by Congressional Republicans last week ends the diversity visa lottery program, whose recipients are typically from Africa, Asia and the Caribbean and fail to protect Dreamers (NY Amsterdam, June 28, 2018).


Similarly, China Press stands out with 9% of the relevant sentences about Asia. It should be noted that the source not only remarks on Chinese immigration, but also those from other Asian countries such as India. Univision, which largely appeals to a Latino audience, regularly mentions Mexico and Central America. Even in covering immigration from other countries, the Univision draws a parallel with Mexican and Central American immigration as illustrated below.

Efforts to stop illegal immigration at the border were not always concentrated on Latino immigrants from Mexico and Central American countries. There was a time when it was the Chinese who experienced immigration persecution. So much so that they came to disguise themselves as Mexicans to increase their chances of crossing into the United States from Mexico (Univision, September 1, 2017).

In short, the news platforms varied in what countries and ethnicities they feature. Across the news sources, Mexican immigration was prominently mentioned. It may be feasible that individuals of diverse racial groups all consider Mexican immigration as quite pervasive. However, minority news sources also feature other types of immigration that are relevant for their target audience. Although this finding may appear intuitive, it may suggest a consequential variation in views on immigration across racial groups. Namely, minorities might consider immigration of their respective groups as more common than generally assumed.

Finally, there are two considerations that are uniquely notable in the minority news sources, particularly those that target Blacks and Latinos: those pertaining to rights and discrimination. The distributions of these frames are captured in Figure 1.7 and Figure 1.8.

Figure 1.7. Relative Frequencies of the Right Frame




First, I will remark on the rights frame. As shown in Figure 1.7, LA Sentinel, NY Amsterdam, and Univision evoke the frame comparatively more often than the other three news sources. Then, their target groups of individuals might consider this aspect of immigration more relevant than other groups. Thus, this attribute of the issue might uniquely predict immigration attitudes among these two groups. A closer inspection of the articles from these sources reveals a subtle difference in how they evoke this frame. LA Sentinel and NY Amsterdam phrased it as more ideational entitlements such as human rights and civil rights.

Two City Council members introduced a resolution last Friday seeking to brand Los Angeles a “city of sanctuary” dedicated to “protecting the human rights of all our residents.” (LA Sentinel, September 14, 2017).

The U.S. judicial system reached the conclusion that Mr. Arpaio violated the civil, human, and constitutional rights of people of color through racial profiling and detention without legal authority, and that he should pay the consequences (NY Amsterdam, August 27, 2017).

Univision, on the other hand, presented the frame as concerning more concrete privileges. That is, the source frequently discussed the legal rights of immigrants, especially those facing deportation. This was mainly to inform rather than to present a normative argument. In this way, the Black and Latino news sources differ in how they conceptualized rights as it relates to immigration. Despite this dissimilarity, Blacks and Latinos might both regard this aspect of immigration as more pertinent for the issue and their attitudes than their counterparts do.

Figure 1.8. Relative Frequencies of the Discrimination Frame



As with the rights frame, the Black news platforms are also more inclined to accentuate discrimination when framing immigration as shown in Figure 1.8. The frame materialized as critiques of racism in various immigration issues.

“We know that White supremacy is prevalent in this nation, and how the law enforcement, Sheriff’s Department is another form of White supremacy, in ways of terrorizing and making it harder for people to thrive,” said Zack Mohamed, an organizer with the BAJI – the Black Alliance for Just Immigration, which does policy and advocacy work around Black migrants (LA Sentinel, August 10, 2017).

“Trump’s pardon of ex-Sheriff Arpaio is a cowardly and disgraceful act spurred by the same racism and anti-immigrant fervor on display in Charlottesville last week,” said Figueroa in a statement (NY Amsterdam, August 31, 2017).

Given the prominence of racial discrimination in Black American history, this framing choice among Black news sources is intriguing. It appears to be a distinctive attempt to increase the perception commonality between Black Americans and Latinos.

To summarize, the six news sources varied in what aspects of immigration they emphasize in framing the issue. They all extensively considered the economy, culture, crime, and security aspects of immigration. At the same time, the news sources exhibited compelling distinctions. While Fox News and China Press opt for illegal as their preferred modifier, Univision favored undocumented. The four minority news outlets also stood out by focusing on nations and ethnicities pertinent to their target audiences. Still yet, the sources targeting Black Americans and Latinos distinguished themselves by promoting those considerations related to discrimination and right. These similarities and dissimilarities in the news frames may have important consequences for individuals’ immigration attitudes. Namely, these considerations may be differently accessible to individuals across the diverse racial groups. These frames, while varying in their frequencies of appearances as analyzed here, also vary in their tone: the stances on immigration they promote. This will be the focus of the next analysis.


Part 2. Tone distributions

In highlighting assorted aspects of immigration, the news sources vary in which tone they assign to these frames. The tone of a frame refers to the attitude toward immigration promoted: favorable, neutral, or unfavorable. In this section, I inspect the distributions of tones among the frames whose relative frequencies I examined. To estimate the tone distribution, I compute what percentage share of its appearance within a news source is coded positive and negative,

respectively.¹⁴ Then, I compare these ratios across the news sources. As before, the analysis focuses on a select few frames that the past literature has highlighted and that yielded noteworthy results in my data. The aim of this approach is to identify any compatible, contradictory, or original findings within the literature.

First, I will elaborate on the tone distribution of the primary frames that concern the economic, cultural, crime, and security aspects of immigration. As a reminder, these are the considerations that previous studies have claimed to be influential for individuals' views on immigration. They also appeared extensively in all six news sources as I have noted in part I. Figure 1.9 displays the distributions.

Figure 1.9. Tone Distributions of the Primary Frames



¹⁴ I do not examine neutral tone in the analysis since I am mainly interested in how different considerations are evoked in the news discourse to support or oppose immigration.

Figure 1.9 reveals that the news outlets often assign different tones to the same consideration of immigration as in the case of the economy frame. Looking at the upper right panel, Fox News stands out as the only news outlet that most often refers to unfavorable economic narratives about immigration. Other news sources tend to highlight more positive economic aspects of immigration. This contradiction is evident in the following excerpts concerning DACA.

Legal arguments aside, the DACA program hurts American workers...Illegal immigration exacerbates these young Americans' struggles by increasing the number of people competing for a limited supply of lower-skilled and entry-level jobs. (Fox News, August 25, 2017).

Supporters for [DACA] argue that...the economic damage that could result from removing so many productive members of the work force. A Cato Institute study found that ending the program would cost billions. (Univision, October 5, 2017).

As illustrated above, economic concerns can be evoked in order to promote quite different positions on immigration policies. The economy frame, while widely featured across different news outlets, takes on a more critical connotation in conservative platforms like Fox News. It is not that other news sources do not ever present negative economic considerations of immigration. Rather, it is more common for them to put forward favorable economic narratives of immigration. Correspondingly, individuals subscribing to different news sources might view the economic aspects of immigration in different lights.

The crime and security frames also vary in their tone distributions across the news sources. In particular, the two Black news outlets more often evoke the frames in a positive tone. As shown in the bottom panels of Figure 1.9, most of the news sources evoke the frames in a negative tone. In particular, Fox News rarely assigns the frame a positive tone. In contrast, LA Sentinel and NY Amsterdam more often accentuate these two aspects of immigration in order to shed a more positive light on the issue. This contrast is illustrated by the following excerpts.

"The remarkable results of our officers and law enforcement partners highlight ICE's ongoing commitment to public safety...This operation focuses on the arrest of individuals convicted of serious crimes and are a threat to public safety" (Fox News, June 12, 2018).


Right now, federal immigration authorities are going after immigrants who have committed no crime, and tearing apart families who live and work and are raising the next generation in our communities... It endangers public safety by discouraging certain individuals from reporting gang behavior and other criminality to law enforcement (NY Amsterdam, August 24, 2017).

In these quotes, the different connotations about immigration regarding public safety and crime are clearly juxtaposed. I am not making the claim that individuals of other groups are unfamiliar with the positive crime and security frames of immigration. As shown in Figure 1.9, other news sources sometimes feature such favorable narratives. What I do suggest is that Black Americans who access the information environment specialized for their racial group might more readily associate crime and security considerations as reasons to support rather than oppose immigration.

In contrast to these three frames, cultural considerations of immigration are generally featured to give favorable accounts of immigration. This is shown in the upper left panel of Figure 1.9. Across the six news sources, the culture frame has greater proportions of positive tone. Even among Fox News articles, which feature comparatively more negative cultural frames than other news sources, positive cultural considerations overwhelm the negative ones. Then, individuals across different racial groups alike might perceive cultural considerations of immigration as favorable.

That the cultural narratives of immigration are more often used to support immigration seems to contradict the literature. As reviewed earlier, existing studies have argued the primacy of cultural threats in shaping restrictionist views (e.g. Malhotra et al. 2013). A potential reason for this inconsistency is the difference in how culture is conceptualized. Recall that scholars have treated culture as synonymous with ethnicities. Specifically, they assert that some immigrant groups pose more or less cultural threats: for example, Mexicans and Indians more than Canadians and Europeans (Brader et al. 2008; Malhotra et al.2013; Newman and Malhotra 2018). This association between certain immigrant groups and cultural threats might be the result of how nationalities and ethnicities are discussed rather than the culture frame per se. Recall from Figure 1.6 that the mention of Mexico is prevalent in the news discourse. Figure 1.10 visually shows how this frame is evoked across the news sources.

Figure 1.10. Tone Distribution of the Mexico Frame



Except for Univision, which mentions the frame significantly more often in a positive tone, Mexico as nationality or ethnicity appears with a negative undertone extensively throughout the news discourse. This prevalent negative portrayal of Mexican immigration and immigrants may explain why, at least among white Americans, individuals find Mexicans and their cultural elements (e.g. Mexican flag, Spanish language, etc.) particularly threatening (e.g. Brader et al. 2008; Newman and Malhotra 2018; Newman et al. 2012). Thus, it may be more accurate to say that anti-immigrant attitudes are grounded not in cultural threats but in racial or ethnic affect.

The conflating of ethnicity and culture may have partly resulted from the lack of knowledge on how cultural aspects of immigration are actually discussed in the news media. From my content analysis, I find the three most common cultural narratives as those pertaining to religion, assimilation, and national values.

"The necessary and decisive fight against terrorism in no way justifies a general suspicion against people of certain beliefs, in this case people of the Muslim faith or from a certain origin," Chancellor Angela Merkel said (CNN, January 19, 2017).

I am afraid that I will be taken by immigration law enforcement officers during class and will never return to continue my studies in the U.S. But I don't know any other home besides the United States because I was brought here when I was a baby (China Press, September 10, 2017).

The decision of the administration of President Trump to rescind DACA not only broke that promise, but undermined the values of our nation (Univision, September 15, 2017).


These three quotes illustrate that the cultural aspects featured in the news media not only differ from how they are conceptualized in the literature, but also tend to espouse favorable attitudes toward immigration. Therefore, I argue that the current literature misrepresents the cultural considerations of immigration on the basis of their conceptual definition and their manifestations in the popular news discourse.

In sum, the four primary frames identified as influential for individuals' immigration attitudes by previous research vary in how they are evoked. While some frames (economy, crime, and security) have diverging distributions depending on the news source, others (culture) show a more consistent, albeit unexpected, pattern.¹⁵ That favorable cultural narratives prevail is of particular interest given the primacy of cultural threats in the literature on immigration attitudes. I speculate that this incongruity is due to the under-conceptualization of culture by the previous studies.

¹⁵ One implication of this variation pertains to Zaller's (1992) one-sided vs. two-sided information flow. According to Zaller, the public opinion on a given issue likely converges when there are no conflicting messages about it (one-sided flow). When there are competing narratives (two-sided flow), opinions tend to diverge. This is primarily because of those who pay more attention to the elite discourse (i.e. politically aware citizens). These individuals are more likely to receive countervailing information about the issue, and thus are better able to resist the dominant message. Given their tone distributions, it seems reasonable to treat the economic, crime, and security frames as two-sided flows, and the culture frame, one-sided. For individuals who use multiple news sources, the economic, crime, and security considerations with opposing tones are likely available. Drawing on Zaller's logic, the associations between the positive economic, crime, and security attributes and favorable immigration attitude may be weaker for them than for their counterparts who rely on a single news outlet. On the other hand, the correlation between the positive cultural aspect—which dominates the general news discourse—and permissive immigration attitudes may be similar across individuals. Since I have no data on individuals' news consumption, however, I cannot test this hypothesis. Future research may benefit us by investigating this possibility.

The familial frame, which appears to an even greater extent than the four primary frames, resembles the culture frame with its overall positive undertone. Figure 1.11 shows its tone distribution across the six news sources.

Figure 1.11. Tone Distribution of the Familial Frame



According to Figure 1.11 the six news sources all seem to emphasize the familial considerations of immigration in favor of the issue. The narrative is usually used to induce sympathy for immigrants as shown below.

Like me, most African-American Democrats do not want to see the mass deportation of undocumented citizens and families broken up (LA Sentinel, February 1, 2017).

If the government adopts tougher immigration policies, it will not only affect these employees and their families, but technology companies that will find it harder to recruit and retain talent (China Press, September 1, 2017).

"When Virginia deployed these resources to the border, we expected that they would play a role in preventing criminals, drug runners and other threats to our security from crossing into the United States -- not supporting a policy of arresting families and separating children from their parents," Northam said in a statement (CNN, June 20, 2018).


On the whole, the considerations related to families tend to portray the issue favorably. For Fox News, however, the frame seems to have a more mixed use. The source distinguishes itself with relatively higher proportion of negative familial frames like the one below.

The swelling population of illegal immigrants and their kids is costing American taxpayers \$135 billion a year, the highest ever, driven by free medical care, education and a huge law enforcement bill, according to the most authoritative report on the issue yet (Fox News, September 27, 2017).

This finding implies that for those subscribing to conservative information sources like Fox News, the familial frame may represent both endorsement and criticism of permissive immigration. Generally speaking, however, individuals are likely to perceive family related considerations as reasons to support immigration.

Finally, I conclude with analyzing the tone distributions of the three modifiers: legal, illegal, and undocumented. In part 1 of the analysis, I showed how the news outlets differ in which modifiers—particularly, illegal vs. undocumented—they evoke more. To recap, Fox News and China Press frequently opt for illegal, whereas Univision favors undocumented; the other three news platforms exhibit no such partiality. Thus, their relative frequencies vary across the news sources. However, the modifiers seem to share relatively similar tones as shown in Figure 1.12.

Figure 1.12. Tone Distribution of Modifiers



According to Figure 1.12, the news sources seem similar to each other in how they evoke each modifier. Namely, legal and undocumented generally have positive undertones, while illegal insinuates more negative sentiment. This finding provides support for the speculation that undocumented may be perceived by the public as less disparaging than illegal in describing immigrants (Haynes et al. 2016). Given the variation in their mentions but similarities in distributions of their tone across the news sources, the modifiers may be intentionally chosen in framing immigration. In other words, different news sources might simply choose the modifiers with whose connotation they concur.

To summarize this section, news sources targeting diverse groups vary in how they evoke certain considerations to frame immigration. On the one hand, they differ in the tone with which they evoke the same aspects of immigration. Such is the case with the economy, crime, and security frames; the former has more negative overtones only among the Fox News articles, whereas the latter two paint a favorable portrayal of the issue only in the Black news platforms.

On the other hand, other frames show more consistent distributions of tone across the news sources. This is seen in the case of the culture and familial frames, both evoked in support of immigration in all six news sources. Still, other frames seem deliberately chosen among the alternatives to promote a stance in line with the news source. The terms illegal and undocumented as modifiers consistently carry negative and positive undertones respectively, across the news sources. Thus, the news outlets might be opting for whichever aligns better with their positions.

V. Discussion

In this chapter, I examined how various news outlets targeting individuals across different racial groups frame immigration. Existing studies have neglected to investigate what considerations of immigration may be accessible to racial minorities. To address these gaps in the literature, I conducted qualitative content analysis of the online news articles from six news sources published during three critical discourse moments. The news discourses around these time periods provide a variety of narratives that concern the contrasting positions on the issue and diverse racial groups in the U.S.

My content analysis revealed that there are both similarities and differences in how the six news sources frame immigration. The four primary frames—economic, culture, crime, and security aspects of immigration—were extensively featured in all news outlets. The familial frame also dominated the news discourse across the news sources. At the same time, the news sources also exhibited distinctions in evoking other frames. When choosing the modifier for describing unlawful immigration, Fox News and China Press opt for illegal, whereas Univision favors undocumented. The other three news sources exhibit no such pronounced preference for either term. In addition, the minority news outlets distinguished themselves by spotlighting the aspects of immigration that are often downplayed in the mainstream news. They prominently feature the nationalities and ethnicities pertinent to their target audience. In addition, the Black and Latino news platforms promote those considerations related to rights and discrimination more frequently than others.

The news sources also varied in how they evoked these frames. While some frames (economy, crime, and security) had diverging distributions in tone depending on the news source, others (culture, family, modifiers) demonstrated a more consistent pattern. This

illustrates that the news outlets may evoke varied sentiments toward immigration even when focusing on the same aspect of the issue. That favorable cultural narratives prevail in the general news discourse is of particular interest given the primacy of cultural threats in the literature on immigration attitudes. I argue that this incongruity may be due to the previous studies erroneously equating culture and ethnicity.

The similarities and differences in the availabilities of these considerations may impact immigration attitude to varying degrees. For instance, those related to the economy, culture, crime, security, and family that are commonly emphasized in diverse news outlets may similarly predict immigration attitudes across racial groups. On the other hand, the attributes that appear especially accessible to certain groups according to my content analysis may only correlate with opinions among those individuals. In the next chapter, I investigate this very possibility using public opinion survey data.

Chapter 2.

What Considerations Predict Immigration Attitudes across Racial Groups?

I. Introduction

In recent years, immigration has been one of the most salient political issues for the American public. Voters considered it one of the most prominent concerns facing the nation during the 2016 presidential election (Pew 2016b), and continue to do so in the lead up to the 2020 election (Greenwood 2019). Given this strong political relevance, studies about the factors driving attitudes toward immigration have proliferated. Largely focusing on explaining whites' immigration attitudes (e.g. Cargile et al. 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015), existing studies have found that considerations regarding the economy, culture, and safety mold individuals' views on immigration. However, we know little about how these attributes affect minority outlooks. Moreover, the preceding chapter shows that other aspects of immigration are available to different groups to varying degrees. It remains to be seen how these various attributes influence immigration attitudes across racial lines.

To fill the gap in our knowledge regarding the components of immigration attitudes across different racial groups, I extend the findings of my content analysis. In this attempt, I rely on Zaller's (1992) Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model as my theoretical basis. Zaller argues that those considerations that have been received from the information environment, and thus become accessible, shape individuals' opinions on relevant issues. Drawing on this theory, I posit that the considerations of immigration made available by information sources like news media may shape individuals' views on the issue. To test this proposition, I analyze a set of public opinion surveys to assess how assorted attributes of immigration identified through my content analysis predict immigration attitudes across four racial groups.

In my analysis, I find partial support for several predictions. First, economic, cultural, and familial considerations of immigration that are widely featured in the news discourse correlate with individuals' immigration attitudes across racial lines. The only exception is found among Asian Americans, for whom familial factors fail to predict their opinions. As theorized, feelings toward Asians positively correlate only with Asian Americans' views on immigration, though not significantly.

At the same time, there are hypotheses for which my analysis provides little evidence. The crime consideration of immigration correlates with neither Asians' nor Latinos' immigration attitudes. Opinions of Latinos, who are commonly featured in the immigration news discourse, only predict immigration attitudes among white Americans and Latinos rather than across all groups. Black Americans do not find racial discrimination as particularly important for their opinions relative to their counterparts of other races. Further, the four racial groups do not seem to draw much of a distinction between illegal and undocumented. I provide possible explanations for these unanticipated findings.

The present research offers two scholarly contributions. First, this study goes beyond the current literature by investigating immigration attitudes among not only white Americans but also racial minorities. Since most of the existing works have focused on explaining whites' opinions, we know little about the components of minorities' attitudes. My analysis contributes by expanding our limited knowledge. Second, my findings show that not every consideration of immigration available in the information environment may become accepted by individuals. This leads me to believe that there may be factors modifying their accessibilities. Zaller himself notes this very possibility. I further elaborate on this in the discussion section.

II. Existing works on Immigration Considerations and Attitudes

Given the prominence of immigration as a political issue, scholars have strived to better understand what factors predict individuals' immigration attitudes. Most existing studies, however, focus on explaining whites' opinions, thereby neglecting views among racial minorities. In this section, I review the previous research on considerations influencing individuals' attitudes toward immigration and identify the gaps in this literature. Extending the preceding chapter of news content analysis, I offer a way to broaden our understanding of public opinion about immigration in the U.S.

In exploring whites' attitudes toward immigration, scholars have put forward several considerations that correlate with individuals' opinions: most generally those concerning the economy, culture, and public safety. In the economic account, perceptions about the impact of immigration on material self-interest (Malhotra et al. 2013; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001) or the national economy as a whole (Citrin et al. 1997; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2015; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007) play an important role in shaping attitudes toward the issue.

Others have claimed that anxiety about crime (Igartua and Cheng 2009; McLaren and Johnson 2007) or terrorism (Merolla and Zechmeister 2009) also negatively influences whites' immigration attitudes. Another theoretical approach emphasizes the cultural consequences of immigration; perceiving immigration as threatening to or enriching of American identities and norms leads to pronounced individual-level differences in immigration attitudes (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Hartman et al. 2014; Newman et al. 2012; Pantoja 2006). Some scholars have even claimed the primacy of cultural concerns, demonstrating their comparatively stronger effects on attitudes over other factors (e.g. Sniderman et al. 2004; Malhotra et al. 2013; Newman and Malhotra 2019, c.f. Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). According to the current literature then, it is the variants of these three attributes—particularly those related to culture—that primarily drive white public opinion on immigration.

Compared to this extensive research on whites' immigration attitudes, our understanding of minorities' views is limited. Some existing studies have analyzed other racial groups. Thanks to their contributions, we know that Black Americans tend to oppose permissive immigration, often to a similar extent to their white counterparts (Citrin and Sears 2014; Junn and Masuoka 2013, c.f. Citrin et al. 1997). Latinos and Asians, on the other hand, display supportive attitudes towards immigration, an issue that directly relates to their ingroups (Citrin and Sears 2014; Kinder and Kam 2009). However, there is even less research on what attributes correlate with these opinions among racial minorities. According to those few relevant studies, economic concerns correlate with Black Americans' opposition to immigration (Gay 2006, c.f. Frasure-Yokley and Greene 2013), and familial considerations with favorable attitudes among Latinos (Pérez 2015). Yet we still know very little about what attributes of immigration racial minorities take into consideration when assessing the issue.

While the literature says little about what constitutes minorities' views on immigration, my content analysis provides some insights. Though I do not claim that the news media is the only source of information from which individuals may receive various considerations of immigration, I believe that it plays a prominent role in disseminating these narratives (Lippman 1922). Therefore, the aim of my content analysis is to investigate what aspects of the issue are available for diverse groups. To review my findings, those attributes concerning the economy, culture, crime, and security are frequently mentioned for racial minorities as well as white Americans. Among them, the cultural narrative had an overwhelming positive tone across the

news sources. In addition, the aspects related to family that portray immigration favorably also dominate the general news discourse on immigration. Furthermore, certain considerations are more visible in some news sources but not in others. For example, Black and Latino news platforms bring up those aspects like rights and discrimination that are often downplayed in the mainstream news. Although Mexico is heavily mentioned in all news sources, minority news outlets also prominently feature the nationalities and ethnicities pertinent to their target audience. As a modifier for unlawful immigration, the term “illegal” is more frequently used by Fox News and China Press, whereas the less disparaging “undocumented” is preferred by Univision; CNN and the two Black news sources did not exhibit a pronounced preference for either.

Having investigated what attributes of immigration are highlighted for different racial groups, I now move to probe how they may correlate with individuals’ immigration attitudes across groups. In this attempt, I draw on Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample model (1992) to theorize their associations.

III. The RAS model

In theorizing the relationship between considerations of immigration and individuals’ attitudes on the issue, I refer to Zaller’s (1992) Receive-Accept-Sample, or RAS model. Zaller proposes the model to explain the formation of mass opinion on various political issues. According to the model, individuals, upon confronting a stimulus like a survey question, convert the relevant considerations that have been recently recalled from memory into their attitudes. This is largely based on the idea put forward by psychologists such as Taylor and Fiske (1978) that “people frequently use the information which is most salient or available to them...which is most easily brought to mind” (p.251). Clarifying his model, Zaller puts forward four axioms. First, individuals receive messages or frames concerning an issue from various information sources, most often the news media. Second, individuals decide whether to accept or reject the presented arguments. Only when the narratives are accepted do they become accessible. Third, the more recently a consideration has been retrieved from memory, the higher its accessibility. Put differently, those attributes of an issue that are often brought to mind due to frequent or recent receptions are likely more accessible, thus more influential for individuals’ attitudes (Higgins and King 1981). Finally, individuals average the considerations that are immediately accessible when determining their overall opinions on a given topic. This average manifests as

individuals' responses to survey questions. In short, considerations available in the information environment that have been accepted and regularly recalled shape individuals' attitudes.

Based on the RAS model, I posit that those aspects of immigration identified in my content analysis may correlate with individuals' immigration attitudes. Because I do not have data on individuals' news consumption, I cannot test whether these considerations are accepted upon reception. Rather, what I seek to provide is an indirect test of accessibility. I assume the accessibility of a consideration based on its association with attitudes. Drawing on the RAS model, I hypothesize that an attribute of immigration will predict an individual's view on immigration if it is already accessible in her memory. As Zaller (1992) argues, it is those considerations that are easily retrieved with which individuals form their judgements about a given issue. Accordingly, it does not seem far-fetched to presume that a certain narrative of immigration is accessible if it predicts stances on immigration.

However, it is important to note that my approach has a limit to its implications. Since I mostly use observational rather than experimental method, I cannot rule out the possibility of reverse causality; that is, individuals' immigration attitudes determine which considerations come to mind. For example, a survey respondent with an exclusionary attitude may answer that immigration has negative economic consequences in order to justify her stance on the issue. As previously explained, my hypothesis relies on the claim that considerations predict the overall opinion and not the other way around. In this case then, I cannot assume that the negative economic consideration is accessible for this individual. Despite this shortcoming, I contend that my approach is a necessary first step. The principal aim of my research is to investigate the possibility that the various aspects of immigration largely disseminated through the news media may be accessible in individuals' memories and thereby influence the public's opinion on the issue. As with most scholarly investigations, future research should examine this proposition with more rigorous tests of causality.

Having explained the RAS model as my theoretical basis and the limitations of my research, I now elaborate on several testable hypotheses. First, those aspects of immigration that are frequently brought up in the general discourse on the topic may be accessible for all groups. These factors should predict immigration attitudes across racial lines. Given the availability of pertinent survey questions, I can empirically test this proposition for four considerations: those pertaining to the economy, culture, crime, and family. According to my content analysis, these

attributes are available in news platforms targeting diverse racial groups. If they are commonly accessible, then these considerations should shape individuals' opinions on immigration; that is, positive (negative) considerations will lead to (un)favorable immigration attitudes.

H₁: economic, cultural, crime, and familial considerations will have positive and significant correlations with immigration attitudes across racial groups.

At the same time, however, certain considerations may be more accessible for some groups but not others. For instance, recall that the Black news sources frequently framed immigration in terms of racial injustice. This attribute then may be especially accessible for Black Americans. If this is the case, then views on racial inequality should more strongly correlate with Black Americans' opinions on immigration than with those of other groups.

H₂: the correlation between immigration attitude and consideration about racial discrimination will be the largest for Black Americans.

Based on the previous two hypotheses, I postulate that some considerations are accessible for all groups while others are more accessible for certain groups. Ethnicities and nationalities of immigrants may be this case. As shown in the preceding chapter, immigration from Mexico and Central American countries is frequently featured in the general news discourse. However, minority news outlets also highlight immigration of the nationalities and ethnicities of their target audience; China Press frequently discusses immigration from Asia, and LA Sentinel and NY Amsterdam from Africa and the Caribbean. Per the RAS model (Zaller 1992), this disparity may translate into dissimilar accessibilities. Opinions of Latino immigration and immigrants may be commonly accessible and thus predict immigration attitudes for all racial groups. On the other hand, those of Asians and Africans may be particularly accessible for Asian and Black Americans, respectively. Then, these aspects should correlate opinions on immigration within the respective groups.¹⁶ Unfortunately, the

¹⁶ It is possible that the opinions toward one's co-ethnic/racial immigrants may not require the news media to become accessible. However, the news media may play a role in increasing the accessibilities of these factors through frequent framing (Zaller 1992). In this way, the correlations may become more pronounced for the relevant groups.

survey I utilize does not inquire about respondents' thoughts on Latino, Asian, and African immigrants. To circumvent this challenge, I use attitudes toward Latinos and Asian Americans. These two groups are generally perceived as foreigners: a stereotype well known within both their in-groups and out-groups (Zou and Cheryan 2017). Therefore, I believe that these measures will serve as suitable proxies.

H₃: positive (negative) opinions on Latinos will predict (un)favorable immigration attitudes across racial groups.

H_{3b}: positive (negative) opinions on Asians will predict (un)favorable immigration attitudes among Asian Americans.

Finally, modifiers for unauthorized immigration may also vary in their accessibilities, which in turn could cause diverging immigration attitudes across racial groups. In my content analysis, the six news sources all evoked the term “illegal” to frame immigration negatively and “undocumented” positively. Due to this consensus, I hypothesize that these modifiers are accessible with the corresponding tones in individuals' memories. If this is so, different modifiers may lead to the views on immigration that they promote.

H₄: framing immigrants as “illegal” as opposed to “undocumented” will cause unfavorable immigration attitudes.

The news outlets seemed to differ, however, in which option they preferred. To reiterate, Fox News and China Press often opted for illegal, while Univision favored undocumented. As I argued in chapter 1, CNN and Fox News represent the mainstream news sources in the U.S. Given the increasing ideological polarization of the two sources, conservative whites are more likely to consume Fox News, which tends to have more negative coverage of immigration (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012). For conservative whites and Asians then, I predict that illegal is more accessible than undocumented. Consequently, the negative effects of framing immigrants as illegal rather than undocumented will be pronounced among these two groups.

H_{4b}: the negative effect of framing immigrants as illegal (vs. undocumented) will be greatest among conservative whites and Asians.

In essence, I assert that whichever modifier is more accessible for a group will exert a greater influence on individuals' immigration attitudes. This is because, drawing on the RAS model (Zaller 1992), those considerations that are easily recalled—in other words, high on accessibility—should be most impactful. However, one might offer an alternative argument that individuals' opinions will move in the direction of the less accessible term due to its novelty. While this is plausible, the RAS model disputes against this prospect. According to the RAS model, individuals might resist a message that is inconsistent with their pre-existing considerations. This phenomenon concerns the second axiom I previously discussed. Therefore, when individuals are presented with the less accessible modifier, they might not change their attitudes in the same direction as much those who find the term more accessible.

To test these hypotheses, I analyze three public opinion datasets: the 2016 American National Election Survey (ANES), the 2018 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), and the 2016 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS). I next discuss the regression analysis.

IV. Analysis

Part 1

First, I examine H₁ and H_{1b}: the relationships between those considerations of immigration commonly featured in the news discourse and individuals' immigration attitudes. From my content analysis, I found that the news outlets targeting various racial groups all frequently mention those aspects of immigration concerning the economy, culture, crime, and family. Accordingly, I expect that these facets of the issue should predict immigration opinions of diverse individuals. To test this hypothesis, I employ the 2016 ANES time series data.

The 2016 ANES has two features that render it suitable for this analysis. First, it has sufficient numbers of minority respondents to conduct regression analyses as shown in Table 2.1. Assuming simple random sampling, the standard errors are approximately 0.05 for Black and Latino respondents, and 0.10 for Asian respondents.¹⁷ In this way, the number of minority respondents should enable performing reliable statistical analyses.

Table 2.1. The Number of 2016 ANES Post Election Respondents by Racial Groups

Group	N
White	2,616
Black	338
Asian	113
Hispanic	370
Total	3,437

Second, the dataset has questions that pertain to those considerations of immigration commonly featured across news outlets. I selected those questions that closely reflect how I conceptualized each of the four frames during the content analysis. I use them to create the four independent variables listed in Table 2.2. The table also displays the paraphrased question wordings, Cronbach's α if applicable, and the means and standard errors of the variables for each racial group of respondents. Each variable ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more inclusive immigration attitudes.

¹⁷ Calculated based on the formula provided in Weisberg (2005).

Table 2.2. Independent Variables

Variable	Question(s)	Cronbach's α	Mean (s.e.)
Economy ¹⁸	How likely immigration will take away jobs. Immigrants are generally good for America's economy.	Whites: 0.63 Blacks: 0.48 ¹⁹ Asians: 0.67 Latinos: 0.48 ²⁰	Whites: 0.56 (0.01) Blacks: 0.59 (0.01) Asians: 0.70 (0.02) Latinos: 0.69 (0.01)
Culture	To be truly American important to speak English. How good/bad does R feel to see American flag. America's culture is generally harmed by immigrants. Minorities should adapt to customs/traditions of U.S. To be truly American important to follow America's customs/traditions.	Whites: 0.78 Blacks: 0.62 Asians: 0.70 Latinos: 0.66	Whites: 0.32 (0.004) Blacks: 0.39 (0.01) Asians: 0.43 (0.02) Latinos: 0.39 (0.01)
Crime	Immigrants increase crime rates in the U.S.	n/a	Whites: 0.54 (0.01) Blacks: 0.63 (0.02) Asians: 0.64 (0.02) Latinos: 0.66 (0.02)
Familial	Children brought illegally should be [sent back/ allowed to stay].	n/a	Whites: 0.69 (0.01) Blacks: 0.79 (0.02) Asians: 0.76 (0.02) Latinos: 0.87 (0.01)

¹⁸ In the survey, there are two other questions that conceptually reflect the economic considerations of immigration: "Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in the United States has [gotten much better, gotten somewhat better, stayed about the same, gotten somewhat worse, or gotten much worse]?" and "How likely is it that many whites are unable to find a job because employers are hiring minorities instead?". The former loads with factor loading less than 0.5, thus I discounted it. The latter is only asked to white respondents.


¹⁹ Because Cronbach's $\alpha < 0.60$ for Black respondents, I report a separate regression analysis using each question to operationalize the economic consideration in the Appendix Table 2.3.

²⁰ Because Cronbach's $\alpha < 0.60$ for Latino respondents, I report a separate regression analysis using each question to operationalize the economic consideration in the Appendix Table 2.3.

Two additional points should be noted from Table 2.2. As clarified earlier, I chose the questions that reflect how I conceptualized each frame during the content analysis. Unfortunately, the two questions constituting the economy variable fail to attain Cronbach's α greater than or equal to 0.60 among Black and Latino respondents. For these groups, I conduct additional analyses in which each question serves as the economic consideration. These results can be found in the Appendix Table 2.3. Also, note that there are five questions making up the culture variable. The five questions all load to the same factor with factor loadings 0.5 and above as displayed in the third column of Table 2.2. Therefore, I re-run the regression with cultural consideration only comprised of "America's culture is generally harmed by immigrants [reverse coded]". This result is reported in the Appendix Table 2.4. I will later discuss in-depth how the results differ when using different measures of cultural consideration and its implications.

In gauging individuals' attitudes toward immigration, I use the question "Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot?". This has been similarly used by previous studies on immigration attitudes (e.g. Brader et al. 2008; Citrin et al. 1997; Malhotra et al. 2013). Figure 2.1 summarizes the distributions of the dependent variable.

Figure 2.1. The Preferred Level of Immigrants Permitted to Come to the United States



In Figure 2.1, the modal response to the preferred level of legal immigration is to retain the status quo for all groups. Even for Asians and Latinos who make up the main immigrant groups to the U.S., majorities prefer to keep immigration at its current level. However, there are still variations across the panels. Compared to others, white respondents exhibit more exclusionary stances. In fact, “decrease a lot” is the second most frequent response among them. Conversely, Asian and Latino respondents are comparatively more supportive of increasing the threshold of legal immigration. Black respondents gravitate between these groups (mean=0.49). The multivariate tests of means in the Appendix Table 2.1 also show that we can reject the null hypothesis of equal means for the four groups. A similar variation across the groups has been observed by Junn and Masuoka (2013) who find that white Americans are least likely to support permissive immigration as opposed to Latinos and Asians, whereas Black Americans fall in between. For the regression analyses to follow, I combine the increase[decrease] “a lot” and “a little” responses to account for the small numbers of Asians and Latinos in the former category.

It is reasonable to suspect that these variations across racial may look different if immigration attitude is measured as respondents' views on other immigration policies. For example, Black Americans might be more critical of policies such as imprisonment of unlawful border crossers or ICE raids that treat immigrants like criminals. This is because Black Americans confront the stereotype of Black American criminality (Zou and Cheryan 2017). In contrast, Asians who are often called model minorities do not face such negative prejudice as often (ibid). Thus, they may not be as disapproving of those policies criminalizing immigrants. On the other hand, Asians are often perceived as foreigners: not fluent in English, indifferent to core American ideals, etc. (ibid). Then, this group may be less enthusiastic about policies, such as making English the official language that accentuate immigrants' cultural differences. Black Americans who are not as committed to defending aspects of American culture that they perceive as primarily defined by white Americans (Carter 2019) may feel ambivalent about such laws. Latinos who are stereotyped as both criminal and alien (Zou and Cheryan 2017) may find both types of policies unfavorable toward their group. In this way, immigration attitudes for each group may look different depending on how they are operationalized. At this point, it is not clear whether these differences are large enough to generate different empirical results. While my analysis follows the standard practice in the literature, future research might look into the extent of such variation.

I model immigration attitude as a function of each of the considerations listed in Table 2.2. Since the four factors are significantly correlated with each other as shown in the Appendix Table 2.2, I include all of them in the same model. In estimating these relationships, I also control for demographic factors that existing works have identified to influence immigration attitudes: gender, age, partisanship, level of education, and household income (Chavez 2016; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006).²¹ To estimate the model explained above, I use ordered probit given the ordinal nature of my dependent variable. I use the post-election survey weights

²¹ Gender is a dummy that is coded 1 for males, 0 for females. Age is a continuous variable ranging from 20 (coded 0) to 92 (coded 1). Partisanship is measured in seven categories, from strong Democrat (0) to strong Republican (1). Education is a 4-category variable ranging from high school or less (0) to post college (1). There are four dummy variables for household incomes corresponding to "poor", "lower income", "middle income" and "rich". Drawing on Pew's definition, I classify those whose household incomes are two-thirds to double the U.S. median household income in 2016 (\$59,039) as belonging to the middle-income group. I also code the respondents with household incomes lower than \$21,330 (the poverty cutoff for a 3 people household in 2016) as "poor". A separate dummy variable is included to account for nonresponse to the income question.

provided with the dataset since both the dependent and independent variables are asked in the second round of the survey. The results are summarized in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3. Effects of Four Common Considerations on Increasing Immigration

VARIABLES	(1) White	(2) Black	(3) Asian	(4) Latino
Economic consideration	1.880*** (0.142)	0.533* (0.301)	1.365* (0.784)	0.959*** (0.309)
Cultural consideration	1.706*** (0.187)	1.145*** (0.433)	1.528* (0.906)	1.038*** (0.389)
Crime consideration	0.556*** (0.117)	0.480* (0.267)	0.006 (0.660)	0.332 (0.252)
Familial consideration	0.383*** (0.096)	0.737*** (0.254)	-0.140 (0.456)	1.644*** (0.399)
Partisanship	-0.282*** (0.082)	-0.095 (0.258)	-1.282*** (0.481)	-0.410* (0.217)
Age	-0.457*** (0.108)	-0.314 (0.342)	0.101 (0.570)	-0.261 (0.272)
Male	0.061 (0.052)	0.338** (0.142)	0.152 (0.262)	-0.016 (0.129)
Education	0.072 (0.077)	0.204 (0.227)	-0.332 (0.390)	0.053 (0.212)
Lower income	0.048 (0.094)	-0.272 (0.183)	-0.448 (0.498)	0.222 (0.209)
Middle income	-0.192** (0.076)	-0.470*** (0.167)	-0.124 (0.432)	0.094 (0.158)
Upper income	-0.099 (0.092)	-0.586* (0.329)	-0.178 (0.484)	-0.081 (0.245)
Income refused	0.032 (0.192)	-0.240 (0.664)	2.091* (1.073)	-0.104 (0.561)
/cut1	1.735*** (0.132)	0.930*** (0.307)	-0.475 (0.752)	1.996*** (0.434)
/cut2	3.252*** (0.141)	2.517*** (0.325)	1.656** (0.765)	3.622*** (0.456)
Observations	2,456	315	101	345

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1


Contradictory to H1, the four considerations commonly featured in the news media differently correlate with immigration attitude across racial lines. In line with the existing findings reviewed earlier, they all significantly correlate with whites' immigration attitudes as shown in the first column. The variables also have the expected positive and significant coefficients among Black Americans. Among Asians and Latinos, however, the associations are not as straightforward. Although the crime variable has positive coefficients as predicted, it fails to attain statistical significance for both groups. This suggests that the crime attributes of immigration may not be as accessible for these individuals. In addition, the familial attribute of immigration does not significantly correlate with Asian's immigration attitudes; it also has an unexpected negative sign. Of the four considerations of immigration then, Asians appear to primarily draw on the economic and cultural factors when forming their opinions. The results show that not all attributes of immigration commonly available in the information environment may predict immigration attitude across racial groups. This is particularly true among Asians and Latinos who are largely made up of immigrants. I suspect that this is due to the influence of factors at the individual level that interfere with the accessibilities of immigration considerations. I will be investigating this possibility in the next chapters.

Some of the control variables warrant further elaboration. Identifying as a Republican is correlated with more restrictive immigration attitudes for all groups except Black Americans, for whom the variable does not attain statistical significance. This is likely due to the fact that a majority of them support the Democratic party; in my data, less than 5% of Black respondents identify as a Republican. On the other hand, Asians and Latinos have been characterized as nonpartisan due to cultural barriers (Hanjal and Lee 2011). Considering this pattern, it is interesting that partisanship strongly predicts immigration attitudes within these groups. In contrast, Black Americans exhibit a somewhat more consistent pattern than other minorities regarding the effect of household income. In each model, the "poor" category serves as the comparison group. Among Black respondents, those assigned to the middle-income group are less supportive than their poorer counterparts. This finding may seem at odds with realistic conflict theory (Jackson 1993), which posits that economic insecurity causes resentment towards an outgroup, in this case, immigrants. However, it is actually compatible with Frasure-Yokley and Greene's finding (2013) that poorer Black Americans in Los Angeles are more likely to

support permissive immigration policies. Further research is needed on the impact of economic instability on Black American’s immigration attitudes.

Since it is not straightforward to interpret the ordered probit coefficients, I estimate the predicted probabilities of preferring to increase immigration. All other variables are set at their group means. Figure 2.2 plots the results for each consideration.

Figure 2.2. Predicted Probabilities of Preferring to Increase Immigration



In Figure 2.2, the probabilities of endorsing permissive immigration generally increase with favorable economic, cultural, crime, and familial considerations. The greatest attitude changes occur with cultural consideration. Moving from 0 (least favorable) to 1 (most favorable) on the x-axis, the predicted probability of supporting permissive immigration increases by 42 percentage points for white, 32 for Black, 48 for Asian, and 32 for Latino respondents, respectively. Existing studies have noted that cultural considerations exert a substantial influence over whites’ immigration attitudes (e.g. Sniderman et al. 2004; Malhotra et al. 2013; Newman and Malhotra

2019, c.f. Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). My research shows that a similar trend is found among other racial groups as well. This finding is intriguing given the logic generally provided to explain the primacy of cultural consideration. Because American culture is largely based on the Protestant, Anglo Saxon traditions and beliefs (McClosky and Zaller 1984), researchers have contended that immigration poses the greatest cultural implications to white Americans. However, my analysis finds that racial minorities also appear to reflect on cultural attributes when evaluating the issue. Thus, scholars might need to investigate a different rationale for the preeminence of cultural considerations.

One plausible explanation is that the cultural aspects of immigration may be more broadly conceived than just the perceived threat to American culture, especially among Asians and Latinos. Recall that I also estimate the model with an alternative measure of cultural consideration containing only one survey question that directly mentions immigration: “America’s culture is generally harmed by immigrants”. In the Appendix Table 2.4, the variable attains statistical significance only among white and Black Americans. That the alternative measure has no correlation with Asians’ and Latinos’ immigration opinions might suggest that these groups conceptualize the cultural consideration differently. Specifically, for Latinos and Asians, those cultural aspects of immigration pertinent to acculturation and cultural symbols like flags might be more pertinent, which I reflect in operationalizing the cultural variable based on my content analysis. Future research should further investigate how diverse groups might differ in what cultural considerations they find relevant for their views on immigration.

Overall, the four considerations predict immigration attitudes among white and Black Americans. For Asians and Latinos, the crime attribute does not seem as accessible. The familial consideration also does not correlate with Asians’ views on immigration.

Part 2

Shifting from the considerations of immigration that may be accessible to all, I now focus on those that may be particularly relevant to certain groups. One of these aspects is racial inequality. The two Black news sources I analyzed in chapter 1—NY Amsterdam and LA Sentinel—underscored discrimination against non-whites in criticizing exclusionary immigration policies more often than other news outlets. Historically, Black outlets often emphasized this aspect in critiquing the nation’s immigration policies that target certain minority groups; for instance, the Baltimore Afro-American in 1920 condemned that the “exclusion of Japanese...was grounded in color prejudice” (Carter 2019). Given this frequent framing of immigration in terms of racism in Black American’s information environment, I hypothesize that this attribute may be particularly accessible for them. Then, it will correlate more strongly with Black Americans’ immigration attitudes than with other groups’ (H₂).

To test this proposition, I employ the 2018 CCES.²² The survey includes two questions that tap individuals’ opinions on the extent of racial discrimination in the U.S.

- White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their skin.
- Racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations [reverse coded].

I believe these questions reflect how Black news outlets describes racial inequality in discussing immigration. The news sources I analyze rarely discuss inequality specifically against Black Americans in framing immigration. Rather, they emphasize white supremacy and bias against people of color. The exemplifying excerpts are showcased below.


²² One might suggest that I use the egalitarian scale in the 2016 ANES Time Series in lieu of symbolic racism. The scale includes two questions that concern equality/discrimination: “This country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are” and “If people were treated more equally in this country, we would have many fewer problems”. These questions, while definitely focusing on general inequality rather than racism specifically against Black Americans, appear to lack a racial component. Put differently, they tap individuals’ opinions on unequal treatment at large rather than racial injustice though scholars such as Kinder and Sander (1996) who use the questions to predict racial attitudes might disagree. However, the egalitarian questions do not conceptually match how I conceive of the consideration during the content analysis as closely as the 2018 CCES questions. Nevertheless, I examine how each question correlates with individuals’ preferred level of immigration in the appendix. I do not combine the two questions because the Cronbach α does not exceed 0.60 for any racial group. As displayed in Table 5A, statistically significant relations emerge only among White and Asian Americans.

“We know that White supremacy is prevalent in this nation, and how the law enforcement, Sheriff’s Department is another form of White supremacy, in ways of terrorizing and making it harder for people to thrive,” said Zack Mohamed, an organizer with the BAJI – the Black Alliance for Just Immigration (LA Sentinel, August 10, 2017).

Consistently delighting your supporters with your racist and xenophobic diatribes that scapegoat immigrants by creating an atmosphere of hate and divisiveness in the country where some whites feels empowered to call the police on people of color. (NY Amsterdam, June 12, 2018).

I combine the responses to the questions²³ and recode the sum to range from 0 to 1 so that higher values indicate greater perceived racism. Figure 2.3 helps compare the averages across groups.

Figure 2.3. Mean of Perceived Racism



²³ Cronbach’s $\alpha=0.66$ for white, 0.51 for Black, 0.61 for Latino, and 0.56 for Asian respondents. Since α is less than 0.60 for Black respondents, the results should not be taken at face value.

Black Americans exhibit the highest average in perceiving racism followed by Asians and Latinos. White respondents, while falling behind the three groups, still acknowledge that racism is a serious problem for the most part. In brief, Americans across all racial groups admit that racism is persistent and prevalent in today’s society.

As for the dependent variable, I utilize respondents’ stances on the five immigration policies listed in Table 2.4. The response options for each question are either support (1) or oppose (0). I aggregate the responses²⁴ and re-scale the sum to extend from 0 to 1. Greater values designate more lenient positions on these policies.

Table 2.4. Immigration Policies in the 2018 CCES

Variable name	Question wording
Border security	Increase spending on border security by \$25 billion, including building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico.
Family-based immigration	Reduce legal immigration by eliminating the visa lottery and ending family-based migration.
DACA	Provide legal status to children of immigrants who are already in the United States and were brought to the United States by their parents; provide these children the option of citizenship in 10 years if they meet citizenship requirements and commit no crimes [reverse coded].
Sanctuary city	Withhold federal funds from any local police department that does not report to the federal government anyone they identify as an illegal immigrant.
Imprison the deportees	Send to prison any person who has been deported from the United States and reenters the United States.

²⁴ Mean (s.e)=0.55 (0.002) for white, 0.73 (0.004) for Black, 0.72 (0.004) for Latino, and 0.69 (0.007) for Asian respondents. Cronbach’s α =0.84 for white, 0.64 for Black, 0.76 for Latino, and 0.72 for Asian respondents.

I control for gender, age, partisanship, level of education, and household income as before. Since the independent variable is now representing the severity of racism, I expect a positive relationship with the dependent variable. I predict that this correlation will be most pronounced for Black Americans whose minority news sources evoke this consideration more frequently. Given the continuous nature of the dependent variable, I use Ordinary Least Squares regression with the survey's weights. Table 2.5 displays the regression results.

Table 2.5. The Effects of Perceiving Racial Inequality on Supporting Permissive Immigration

VARIABLES	(1) White	(2) Black	(3) Latino	(4) Asian
Racism	0.522*** (0.005)	0.276*** (0.019)	0.421*** (0.018)	0.513*** (0.032)
Age	-0.248*** (0.006)	-0.114*** (0.020)	-0.190*** (0.020)	-0.244*** (0.035)
Male	-0.037*** (0.003)	-0.043*** (0.008)	-0.036*** (0.008)	-0.037*** (0.014)
Education	0.048*** (0.004)	0.022 (0.014)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.061*** (0.023)
Lower income	0.011** (0.005)	-0.023* (0.012)	0.009 (0.014)	-0.013 (0.037)
Middle income	0.008* (0.004)	0.013 (0.011)	-0.012 (0.013)	0.016 (0.034)
Upper income	0.009* (0.005)	0.006 (0.019)	-0.006 (0.019)	0.032 (0.037)
Income refused	-0.005 (0.005)	0.022 (0.018)	0.017 (0.021)	0.017 (0.038)
Partisanship	-0.449*** (0.004)	-0.246*** (0.017)	-0.332*** (0.014)	-0.334*** (0.025)
Constant	0.547*** (0.007)	0.587*** (0.020)	0.610*** (0.021)	0.522*** (0.044)
Observations	36,416	4,205	3,476	1,314
R-squared	0.630	0.134	0.418	0.420

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Overall, acknowledging inequality against minorities is positively and significantly associated with endorsing more lenient positions on immigration. However, there seems to be little support for H₂. Among Black Americans, moving from minimum to maximum on the perceived racism scale leads to an approximately 0.28 unit increase on the 0-1 scale in support for permissive immigration. Yet this is far surpassed by the 0.50 unit increase among white and Latino respondents, and 0.40 unit increase among Asians. Therefore, although perceiving inequality against racial minorities does prompt more favorable immigration stances, it does not have a particularly strong influence on Black Americans' immigration attitudes as I hypothesized.

This null finding warrants further elaboration. One possibility is that racism as a consideration of immigration is not as accessible for Black Americans as for other racial groups. Consequently, the correlation between this attribute and individuals' immigration attitudes is the weakest for Black Americans. Another explanation is that this result reflects a sense of *conflicted nativism* (Carter 2019) among Black Americans. According to Carter, most Black Americans are actually ambivalent about the issue of immigration. It is true that the group has long criticized immigration policies motivated by racial discrimination such as the Chinese Exclusion Act. At the same time, however, Black Americans have been wary of watching immigrants progress faster than their group, which has been disadvantaged by their Blackness. In fact, they find immigration threatening to the extent that they perceive it as white Americans' exploitation of other groups—Asians and Latinos—to sustain the racial hierarchy with Black Americans at the bottom (ibid). Thus, racism is a reason to both support and oppose immigration for Black Americans, causing them to become conflicted about the issue. Due to this ambivalence, considerations about racism may be accessible but not as strongly correlated with permissive immigration attitudes among Black Americans. It is outside the scope of my research to examine this further. Future studies should endeavor to investigate this possibility. Next, I explore the impact of ethnicities and nationalities of immigrants that may be differently accessible to each racial group.

Part 3

I now direct our attention to the ethnicities or nationalities of immigrants. To briefly review chapter 1, the news sources vary in which ethnicities or nationalities of immigrants they feature most frequently. Both mainstream and minority news sources spotlight immigration from Mexico and other Central American countries. At the same time, China Press and two Black American news platforms also highlight immigration from Asia and Africa, respectively. From this pattern, I speculate that the perceptions of who immigrants are differ across the racial groups. Put simply, individuals of all groups might consider Latinos to largely make up the immigrant population due to the prevalent image of Latino immigrants in the information environment (Brader 2013; Pérez 2016). However, Asians and Black Americans might also be familiar with Asian and African immigration; as a result, they may regard their co-racial immigrants as a substantial subset of the immigrant population. In this way, different images of immigrants may be available to each group; these perceptions then might have become dissimilarly accessible and thus influential for individuals' immigration attitudes. Given the available survey questions, I can test this proposition for two immigrant groups. First, perceptions of Latino immigrants may be similarly accessible for all groups. These will predict individuals' opinions on immigration across the racial groups (H_3). Second, those of Asian immigrants may be especially accessible for Asians and thus strongly correlate with Asians' views on the issue (H_{3b}).

To test these hypotheses, I analyze the 2016 ANES data. The dependent variable is respondents' preferred level of immigration as before. To gauge individuals' opinions of Latino and Asian immigrants, I use the feeling thermometer evaluation of Latinos and Asians. Each rating is rescaled from 0 to 1, higher values representing warmer attitudes. As previously explained, I take advantage of the fact that Asians and Latinos are widely stereotyped as foreigners among Americans (e.g. Zou and Cheryan 2017). Thus, opinions of Asian and Latino individuals may proxy those of Asian and Latino immigrants, respectively. I control for respondents' partisanship, age, gender, education, and household income. Given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable, it is estimated using weighted ordered probit. First, I examine the effect of feelings toward Latinos for each racial group. Table 2.6 reports the regression results.

Table 2.6. Effect of Feelings toward Latinos and Asians on Increasing Immigration


VARIABLES	(1) White	(2) Black	(3) Asian	(4) Latino
Feelings toward Latinos	1.262*** (0.189)	0.167 (0.476)	0.184 (0.728)	0.863** (0.405)
Feelings toward Asians	-0.024 (0.193)	0.126 (0.456)	1.176 (0.821)	-0.198 (0.381)
Partisanship	-1.131*** (0.070)	-0.105 (0.248)	-1.610*** (0.423)	-0.926*** (0.207)
Age	-0.765*** (0.098)	-0.384 (0.314)	-0.656 (0.523)	-0.209 (0.269)
Male	0.103** (0.049)	0.247* (0.137)	0.189 (0.251)	-0.080 (0.128)
Education	0.521*** (0.072)	0.317 (0.213)	-0.216 (0.378)	0.156 (0.204)
Lower income	0.136 (0.089)	-0.210 (0.176)	-0.250 (0.475)	0.119 (0.213)
Upper income	-0.057 (0.071)	-0.300* (0.160)	0.103 (0.409)	-0.063 (0.158)
Rich	0.134 (0.086)	-0.353 (0.337)	0.241 (0.456)	-0.121 (0.240)
Income refused	-0.159 (0.179)	-0.036 (0.491)	2.266** (1.002)	-0.309 (0.568)
/cut1	0.144 (0.116)	-0.385 (0.264)	-0.975 (0.714)	-0.432 (0.333)
/cut2	1.391*** (0.119)	1.043*** (0.267)	1.039 (0.720)	1.030*** (0.335)
Observations	2,491	321	102	330

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Looking at Table 2.6, I find partial support for H₃. Feelings toward Latinos positively correlate with immigration attitudes among Whites and Latinos. However, no corresponding correlations are found among Black and Asian respondents. In addition, there is limited evidence for H_{3b}; warmth toward Asians has a positive and the largest coefficient among Asian respondents, though it fails to attain statistical significance.

To interpret the regression coefficients, I plot the predicted probabilities. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 display how support for increasing immigration changes with feelings toward Latinos and Asians, respectively. All other variables are set to the mean values of each group.

Figure 2.4. Predicted probabilities of preferring to increase immigration by feelings toward Latinos




First, I will discuss the effect of warmth toward Latinos. Moving from 0 to 1 on the feeling thermometer, support for more immigration increases by approximately 20 percentage points for both white and Latino respondents. On the other hand, opinions among Black and Asian respondents hardly change across different levels of feelings toward Latinos.

The null finding among Black Americans may not necessarily imply that considerations about Latino immigrants are not accessible for this group of individuals when evaluating their opinions on immigration. Rather, it might point us back to the *conflicted nativism* among Black Americans (Carter 2019). Since Black Americans are inherently opposed to racial discrimination, opinions of other minority groups may lead them to take a more ambivalent position. Carter finds preliminary evidence for this, noting that their average feeling thermometer

rating for Latino immigrants is 50. As previously argued, my research design does not allow me to directly test whether a certain consideration is accessible. To reiterate, I infer its accessibility based on its correlation with immigration attitude based on the RAS model (Zaller 1992). A more straightforward test may reveal that the popular perception of immigrants as Latinos is accessible for Black Americans. As for the lack of evidence among Asians, I currently have no adequate explanation. More research on Asians' intergroup relations will help shed light on this confounding result.

Figure 2.5. Predicted probabilities of preferring to increase immigration by feelings toward Asians



Next, I elaborate on the effect of feelings toward Asians depicted in Figure 2.5. The predicted probabilities to support more immigration barely change for White, Black, and Latino respondents. As hypothesized, however, I find a positive correlation among Asian Americans. One might argue that this finding indicates in-group favoritism rather than accessibility. This is a valid criticism given that I only infer accessibilities based on correlations. Further research employing a direct test of accessibility may help clarify how to interpret this result.

In short, contrary to my prediction, affect toward Latinos seem relevant for only white Americans' and Latinos' immigration attitudes. Also, there is some evidence that considerations about Asian immigrants are especially accessible for Asians, though the finding lacks statistical significance.

Part 4

Finally, I conclude this chapter with the analysis of another consideration that might render divergent immigration attitudes across racial groups: the preferred modifier for unauthorized immigration. In the content analysis, I find that news sources differ in what modifiers they prefer in describing unlawful immigration. Fox News and China Press often opt for illegal, while Univision favors undocumented. CNN and the two Black news sources do not exhibit distinct preferences. Though the two modifiers differed in their frequencies of appearance across the news outlets, they consistently promoted opposing tones; whereas illegal is evoked to insinuate more negative sentiment, undocumented is used to frame the issue favorably.

Based on my content analysis, I postulate that the term illegal is most accessible to conservative Whites and Asians and least accessible to Latinos. As previously elaborated, conservative whites have been increasingly consuming Fox News, which reports more negative coverage on immigration (Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012). For this reason, I equate them with the Fox News audience. Compared to other groups then, conservative Whites and Asians will become more disapproving of immigration when the illegal attribute is made accessible and Latinos least critical. Liberal Whites and black Americans who find the two terms similarly accessible will not exhibit such a change in their opinions. In this way, the shift in immigration attitudes should be most pronounced among those with skewed accessibility for either modifier. As mentioned earlier, it is plausible that the opinion changes will occur in the direction of the less accessible modifier due to its novelty. While I acknowledge this possibility, I also suspect that individuals may resist the less familiar modifier (Zaller 1992).

Previous studies on the relationship between the modifiers and immigration attitude have been limited. At least among white Americans, scholars have found limited evidence that these terms sway opinion (Merolla et al. 2013). However, other groups might react differently. Haynes and colleagues (2016), for example, find that first- and second- generation Latinos become more

supportive of immigration when it is framed as illegal as opposed to undocumented. Still, we know very little about the effects of modifiers across the race categories.

To examine how different racial groups respond to the two modifiers, I analyze the 2016 CMPS. In the survey, there are two questions with one version presented to half of the respondents, and another to the other half at random.

- Which comes closest to your views about [undocumented/illegal] immigrants who are already living and working in the U.S.?
 - They should be allowed to stay in their jobs and apply for U.S. citizenship (1)
 - They should be allowed to stay in their jobs, but temporarily (0.5)
 - They should be required to leave their jobs and immediately leave the U.S. (0)

- Please indicate whether you would like to see federal spending increased or decreased or stay the same: Tightening border security to prevent [undocumented/illegal] immigration.
 - Increase (0)
 - Stay the same (0.5)
 - Decrease (1)

I test whether the modifiers could affect respondents' answers to these questions. The independent variable is which modifier was shown to the given respondent (0=illegal, 1=undocumented). Note that he or she may not view the same modifier for each question. The dependent variables are individuals' response to each immigration question with values 0, 0.5, or 1 as shown above. Since it was a random split sample, I compare means of the dependent variables for each group. Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 report the results.

Table 2.7. Views about Immigrants Already Living and Working in the U.S.

Group	Mean of illegal (N, s.e.)	Mean of undoc. (N, s.e.)	Two-tailed p-value
Liberal white	0.82 (151, 0.03)	0.86 (141, 0.03)	0.28
Conservative white	0.53 (159, 0.03)	0.54 (156, 0.04)	0.84
Black	0.84 (1574, 0.01)	0.84 (1528, 0.01)	0.98
Latino	0.85 (1510, 0.01)	0.84 (1493, 0.01)	0.17
Asian	0.69 (1474, 0.01)	0.71 (1531, 0.01)	0.14

Table 2.8. Border Security

Group	Mean of illegal (N, s.e.)	Mean of undoc. (N, s.e.)	Two-tailed p-value
Liberal white	0.45 (142, 0.03)	0.49 (150,0.03)	0.27
Conservative white	0.08 (151,0.02)	0.09 (164, 0.02)	0.46
Black	0.35 (1576, 0.01)	0.35 (1526, 0.01)	0.97
Latino	0.42 (1481, 0.01)	0.40 (1522, 0.01)	0.09
Asian	0.34 (1506, 0.01)	0.33 (1500, 0.01)	0.39

Overall, there appears very little evidence for H₄, H_{4b}, and H_{4c}. The differences in means of moving from the illegal to the undocumented condition are statistically indistinguishable from 0. On the whole, whether undocumented or illegal aspect of immigration is accentuated has limited influence on immigration attitudes.

This null result warrants further interpretation. Existing research has shown that alterations in naming do not necessarily guarantee changes in attitudes. According to Rudolph (2009), for example, framing the inheritance tax as a “death tax” or “estate tax” does not affect individuals’ opinions on the policy. Similarly, Mikos and Kam (2019) find that public support for legalizing “marijuana” or “cannabis” does not depend on which term is used. Furthermore, my finding here is in line Haynes et al. (2016) and Merolla et al. (2013) who argue that the terms used to describe immigrants have an inconsequential effect on white Americans’ attitudes. These works attribute the lack of framing effect to the sparse usage of “undocumented” by the news media at that time. However, the undocumented frame is quite common today, especially in minority news outlets, as shown in the last chapter. Thus, I offer an alternative explanation. That is, this null finding may be because the public perceives the two terms as synonymous. According to my content analysis, the six news sources refer to both “undocumented” and “illegal”. In other words, both modifiers are accessible to the public. Then, individuals may consider the modifiers as somewhat interchangeable. As a result, framing immigrants as either illegal or undocumented makes no discernable change in individuals’ outlooks. Again, because I am not directly testing the accessibilities of these modifiers, I cannot confirm this proposition. This result may provide an avenue for future research.

V. Discussion

In this chapter, I empirically tested how various considerations of immigration identified in my content analysis predict attitudes among individuals of diverse racial groups. To theorize my expectations, I referred to Zaller's RAS model (1992), which posits that considerations of an issue made available via news framing become accessible. Accordingly, I hypothesized that various aspects of immigration will correlate with individuals' opinions on immigration to the extent that they are evoked in the news outlets that target distinct racial groups.

I tested several hypotheses using three public opinion survey data. First, I found that the economic, cultural, and familial attributes that are widely featured in the news media correlate with immigration attitude for all groups except Asian Americans; the crime consideration, which is also prominently discussed, does not predict immigration opinions among Asians and Latinos. Although Black Americans do take racial inequality into their views on immigration, its impact is not considerably stronger for the group as I hypothesized. Attitudes toward Latino immigrants, proxied by feelings toward Latinos, only influence whites' and Latinos' immigration attitudes. Also, there is only weak evidence that Asians appear to relate their feelings toward Asians with their stances on immigration. Finally, describing immigrants as illegal or undocumented makes no discernible change in attitude. I suspect this is because the terms are considered largely interchangeable.

In short then, there is partial evidence for my hypotheses at best. This overall finding implies that not every consideration of an issue made accessible via news framing may influence individuals' attitudes. Zaller (1992) himself notes that individuals may opt to accept or reject the attributes spotlighted in the information environment. He argues that this is because there are individual level factors that modify the exposure to and comprehension of these considerations. Put differently, accessibilities, and thus associations of various considerations with attitude may be heterogenous across individuals; for some, the correlations I analyze in this chapter may be more pronounced than among others. In the next chapter, I investigate one of these potential interfering agents: individuals' political awareness.

Chapter 3.

Does Political Knowledge Moderate the Effects of Immigration Considerations?

I. Introduction

The mass public, trying to grasp the world of public affairs beyond their experience, relies on the news media to receive political information (Lippmann 1922). In delivering information, political and journalistic elites almost always frame a given issue, highlighting those features they regard as relevant and important while often downplaying others (Chong and Druckman 2007; Gamson 1992). These selective considerations may thereby become accessible for the masses, increasing their influence over individuals' opinions on the issue (Zaller 1992). In the previous chapters, I examined what attributes of immigration may have become accessible by examining how they predict immigration attitudes across a diverse body of individuals. One of the main takeaways from these analyses is that those aspects of immigration concerning the economy, culture, crime, and family that are commonly featured across different news platforms cut across racial lines when correlating with individuals' immigration opinions, some more strongly than others. As such, those considerations frequently disseminated by the news media are influential for American public opinion on immigration.

The associations between considerations widely disseminated in the information environment and immigration attitudes, however, may be conditioned by other factors. In his Receive-Accept-Sample (RAS) model, Zaller (1992) puts forward political awareness as a potential candidate. He theorizes that individuals' political awareness, measured as political knowledge of factual information, equates to their exposure to those features accentuated by the elites. Additionally, politically aware individuals are better able to evaluate and scrutinize the information they receive, only accepting into memory those considerations with which they already agree. In this way, political awareness moderates the accessibilities of the given considerations, which influence individuals' attitudes.

In the present chapter, I investigate whether and how political awareness interacts with the economic, cultural, crime, and familial attributes of immigration that correlate with immigration attitudes across the four racial groups. I review the RAS model to hypothesize the extent of the moderating effect of political awareness. To test this proposition, I analyze the 2016 American National Election Survey (ANES). I find supporting evidence among white and Asian Americans

whose political knowledge positively and significantly interacts with each of the four considerations. For Black Americans and Latinos, political knowledge moderates only the crime attribute of immigration. I conclude this chapter discussing the implications of these variations.

I seek to expand our knowledge of the moderating effect of political awareness for diverse individuals. Political scientists have long considered political knowledge as critical for a well-functioning democracy as it influences both public opinion and political participation (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Verba et al. 1993; Prior 2005). However, there is little research on the role of political knowledge on shaping public opinion among racial minorities (c.f. Pérez 2015b). I attempt to narrow this gap in the literature by investigating how political knowledge interacts with immigration considerations to predict immigration attitudes across racial groups.

II. Moderation by Political Awareness

In theorizing the interactive relationships between political awareness and considerations of immigration, I primarily draw on Zaller's RAS model (1992). As reviewed in the prior chapter, Zaller posits that individuals form their opinions based on considerations accepted from the news media and other information sources. These are said to be accessible in long-term memory. Those considerations frequently brought to attention increase in their accessibilities and consequently, in their attitudinal salience (Higgins and King 1981; Higgins et al. 1982). In line with this claim, I found that the aspects of immigration concerning the economy, crime, culture, and families commonly featured across different news platforms indeed correlate with attitudes among diverse individuals, some more strongly than others.

To this theorem, Zaller (1992) adds that an individual's political awareness of an issue may further increase the accessibilities of those considerations, amplifying the extent to which they are influential when forming an attitude. As Zaller states, the "greater a person's level of cognitive engagement with an issue, the more likely he or she is to be exposed to and comprehend—in a word, to receive—political messages concerning that issue" (pg.42). Other empirical studies have shown that highly politically aware individuals do receive and possess more considerations than their less aware counterparts (Bechtel et al. 2015; Brewer 2003; de Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Lecheler and de Vreese 2012; Nelson et al. 1997). In addition, more politically aware individuals have more constrained and better organized views on issues.

As a result, they are “better able to evaluate and critically scrutinize the new information they encounter” (Zaller 1992, pg.19). Those considerations that are already present in their memories are more likely to be accepted, thereby further increasing their accessibilities. Accordingly, political awareness should strengthen the positive correlations between the economic, cultural, crime, and familial considerations of immigration and individuals’ immigration attitudes.

Zaller defines political awareness as the “extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and understands what he or she has encountered” (1992, pg.21). To operationalize this concept, he relies on the measure of individuals’ political knowledge. Political scientists have long considered political knowledge as critical for a well-functioning democracy (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Verba et al. 1993). They have shown that political knowledge not only affects public opinion and political participation (e.g. Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Pérez 2015; Prior 2005), but also moderates the relationship between various considerations and individuals’ political attitudes (e.g. Brewer 2003; Lecheler et al. 2015; Slothuus and deVreese 2010). Regarding the latter, scholars have found mixed evidence on the moderating effect of political knowledge. Specifically, the influence of frames on attitude is strongest among the least knowledgeable in some studies (Bechtel et al. 2015; Schuck and de Vreese 2006), but strongest among the most knowledgeable in others (Brewer 2003; Lecheler and de Vreese 2012; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). To explain this discrepancy, researchers argue that individuals with low levels of political knowledge have few accessible considerations, and are thus susceptible to framing. Others assert that highly knowledgeable individuals have a wider array of accessible considerations that become activated upon framing. Since my study focuses on the considerations already accessible in memory rather than those introduced via a framing experiment, I posit that political knowledge will positively interact with the economic, crime, cultural, and familial considerations of immigration. However, since the existing studies generally examine the effects of whites’ political knowledge, it is not certain that this prediction will hold for other racial groups as well. Therefore, my research aims to expand our knowledge in the role of political knowledge on minorities political attitudes.

Before detailing how to test this proposition, it is necessary to justify this particular operationalization of political awareness. While there are other suitable measures of political awareness such as education, participation in politics, and media exposure, there are two main reasons why political knowledge is the most appropriate proxy. First, political knowledge is a

relatively objective measure. Unlike other measures, tests of political knowledge are relatively unlikely to suffer from social desirability bias. As Zaller asserts, “individuals cannot overstate the levels of information holding because they perceive that it is socially desirable to appear politically aware” (1992, pg.335). Tests of political knowledge also do not yield subjective interpretations of respondents who only answer them either correctly or incorrectly. Therefore, political knowledge poses as a relatively unbiased measure of individuals’ awareness.

Second, political knowledge is preferable to other measures on theoretical grounds as well. Like Zaller, I am interested in the effect of not only exposure to, but also comprehension of the considerations of immigration available in the information environment. Mere attention to the news does not successfully capture the latter. Political knowledge, on the other hand, reflects how well individuals acquire *and* store political information. For instance, according to Converse (1964), politically knowledgeable individuals hold more consistent positions on a given issue over time. From this finding, one could infer that knowledgeable individuals are better able to organize their thoughts about a given issue. Accordingly, political knowledge better fits how Zaller conceptualizes political awareness for his model. Based on these reasons, I regard political knowledge as a methodologically and theoretically appropriate measure of political awareness.

However, it is important to note that the measure of political knowledge generally used by researchers may be biased against racial minorities. According to Pérez (2015b), the survey questions making up the measurement mostly cater to white Americans’ understanding of politics. He shows that including factual questions about deportation, Sonia Sotomayor, and Marco Rubio that Latinos find important into the measurement helps reduce the gap in political knowledge between white Americans and Latinos. Drawing on this argument, I speculate that estimating political awareness with political knowledge might systematically subdue its theorized moderating effect racial minorities’ immigration opinions. To check if an alternative proxy—media exposure—better captures political awareness among minorities, I also conduct an additional analysis.

In sum, I theorize that individuals’ political awareness proxied by their political knowledge positively interacts with the economic, cultural, crime, and familial considerations of immigration. Put differently, the correlations between these considerations and immigration attitude will be enhanced with political knowledge. This is because, per the RAS model (Zaller

1992), political awareness moderates individuals' reception and comprehension of these considerations, hence their accessibilities. To test this prediction, I analyze the 2016 ANES.

III. Research Design

In this section, I briefly discuss the research design to examine the moderating effect of political knowledge. The model is mostly the same as the one tested in the previous chapter. As before, the dependent variable is individuals' preferred level of immigration; the response options include increase a lot, increase a little, remain the same, decrease a little, and decrease a lot. The key independent variables are the economic, crime, cultural, and familial considerations of immigration from part 1 of the analysis in chapter 2. The dependent and independent variables range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more favorable immigration attitudes and considerations. Consistent with my original model, I control for gender, age, partisanship, level of education, and household income of respondents. The only addition to the model is political knowledge, the moderator of interest. For each question answered correctly, I assign 0.25; for each question answered incorrectly, 0.²⁵


- For how many years is a United States Senator elected that is, how many years are there in one full term of office for a U.S. Senator?
- On which of the following does the U.S. federal government currently spend the least? Foreign aid, Medicare, national defense, and social security.
- Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the U.S. House of Representatives in Washington?
- Do you happen to know which party currently has the most members in the U.S. Senate?

Scholars have well documented the low levels of political knowledge of the American public (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Luskin 1990). Moreover, they have found in survey data that Black Americans and Latinos possess even lower levels of political knowledge than whites (Abrajano 2010; Prior and Lupia 2008; Verba et al. 1993). As far as Asian Americans, however, little is known about how well versed the group is in the realm of politics. Existing studies have

²⁵ I also code non-response as incorrect. Coding it as missing does not change the results substantially.

shown that Asian Americans participate in politics at a rate as low as that of Latinos (Lee and Hajnal 2011; Junn et al. 2011). At the same time, however, Asians are comparable to white Americans in terms of economic prosperity and educational attainment²⁶, the two highly relevant factors for political knowledge. This suggests that Asians may be more politically knowledgeable than other minority groups. I examine how the 2016 ANES respondents fare on the test of political knowledge. Figure 3.1. show shows the distributions of political knowledge by group.

Figure 3.1 Distributions of Political Knowledge for Each Group



From a quick glance, respondents across the four groups seem to answer two or less (≤ 0.50) out of four questions correct. In line with the literature, Black Americans and Latinos exhibit lower levels of political knowledge. Asian Americans, on the other hand, show a similar average to white respondents. This implies that despite their low political participation, Asian Americans are as politically knowledgeable as their white counterparts. To account for the small number of

²⁶ Pew 2012. "The Rise of Asian Americans". *Pew Research Center: Social and Demographic Trends*. Web. <https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/06/19/the-rise-of-asian-americans/#identity>

minority respondents in the categories 0 and 1, I convert political knowledge as a categorical variable. I designate those respondents who score 0 and 0.25 on the political knowledge scale as “low political knowledge (PK)”, 0.5 as “mid PK”, and 0.75 and 1 as “high PK”. Having examined the distributive statistic, I now direct our attention to statistical analysis.

IV. Analysis

Using the 2016 ANES time series, I investigate the hypothesized moderating effect of political knowledge.²⁷ I hypothesize that all things equal, political knowledge will positively and significantly interact with the economic, crime, cultural, and familial attributes of immigration. To facilitate the interpretations, I discuss the regression results by racial groups. First, I analyze the interactions between political knowledge and the four considerations among white respondents in Table 3.1.

²⁷ Political knowledge itself positively and significantly correlates with whites’ immigration attitudes. This is consistent with the literature (e.g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Pérez 2015b). Among other racial groups, however, the variable fails to attain statistical significance.

Table 3.1. Interaction with Political Knowledge among Whites

VARIABLES	(1) Economic	(2) Crime	(3) Cultural	(4) Familial
Mid PK	-0.136 (0.172)	-0.262* (0.146)	-0.177 (0.135)	-0.424** (0.165)
High PK	-0.683*** (0.182)	-0.507*** (0.146)	-0.324** (0.135)	-0.592*** (0.173)
Econ X Mid PK	0.393 (0.276)			
Econ X High PK	1.179*** (0.275)			
Crime X Mid PK		0.643*** (0.237)		
Crime X High PK		0.971*** (0.225)		
Culture X Mid PK			0.779** (0.361)	
Culture X High PK			1.080*** (0.340)	
Familial X Mid PK				0.714*** (0.213)
Familial X High PK				0.888*** (0.218)
Economic	1.360*** (0.211)	1.892*** (0.143)	1.913*** (0.143)	1.896*** (0.143)
Crime	0.536*** (0.118)	-0.011 (0.183)	0.561*** (0.118)	0.566*** (0.118)
Cultural	1.737*** (0.188)	1.720*** (0.188)	1.024*** (0.293)	1.681*** (0.188)
Familial	0.363*** (0.096)	0.375*** (0.096)	0.363*** (0.096)	-0.131 (0.149)
Partisanship	-0.248*** (0.083)	-0.238*** (0.083)	-0.249*** (0.083)	-0.239*** (0.083)
Age	-0.475*** (0.110)	-0.476*** (0.110)	-0.488*** (0.110)	-0.490*** (0.110)
Male	0.065 (0.053)	0.064 (0.053)	0.069 (0.053)	0.061 (0.053)
Education	0.054 (0.080)	0.045 (0.080)	0.059 (0.079)	0.056 (0.079)
Lower income	0.050 (0.094)	0.055 (0.094)	0.036 (0.094)	0.035 (0.094)
Middle income	-0.185** (0.077)	-0.191** (0.077)	-0.202*** (0.076)	-0.212*** (0.077)
Upper income	-0.097 (0.093)	-0.100 (0.093)	-0.113 (0.092)	-0.128 (0.093)
Income refused	0.086 (0.197)	0.132 (0.195)	0.067 (0.195)	0.018 (0.195)
/cut1	1.473*** (0.158)	1.488*** (0.149)	1.551*** (0.150)	1.406*** (0.155)
/cut2	3.005*** (0.165)	3.021*** (0.156)	3.079*** (0.157)	2.938*** (0.161)
Observations	2,446	2,446	2,446	2,446

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

As shown in Table 3.1, the interaction terms are positive and mostly statistically significant. In other words, more knowledgeable white Americans (High-PK and Mid-PK) make stronger connections between their opinions on immigration and the economic, cultural, crime, and familial aspects of the issue than their less knowledgeable counterparts (Low-PK). This pattern is visualized in Figure 3.2 below.

Figure 3.2. Predicted Probabilities for Supporting More Immigration among Whites




Figure 3.2. plots the predicted probabilities of supporting more immigration per varying levels of the considerations for high, middle, and low knowledge white respondents. As hypothesized, the relationships between (un)favorable considerations of immigration and (restrictive)permissive immigration attitude are more pronounced among high knowledge individuals. Moreover, it appears more accurate to say that political knowledge mainly interacts with positive attributes of immigration. Regardless of their levels of political knowledge, those with unfavorable considerations do not wish to increase immigration (their predicted probabilities near 0). In contrast, among those with favorable considerations, the highly knowledgeable are always more likely to prefer increased immigration; these differences Low-

PK and High-PK are statistically significant for the economic, crime, and familial aspects of immigration.

Next, I analyze the moderating role of political knowledge on Asians' immigration attitudes. The regression results are summarized in Table 3.2. As with White Americans, political knowledge among Asian Americans positively and significantly interacts with the four considerations of immigration. This finding regarding Asian Americans is particularly interesting given that only economic and cultural consideration significantly correlated with their preferred level of immigration in the preceding chapter. Based on the current analysis, it seems that the relevance of other attributes for immigration attitude increases with political knowledge. I postulate that this may be due to the increased exposure to and acceptance of those considerations of immigration not concerning the economy available in the information environment. In this way, political knowledge may come to have an even more pronounced moderating effect among Asian Americans. As previously reviewed, we know very little about Asian Americans' political knowledge, let alone its influence over political attitude. My finding here suggests that this research avenue is worth exploring further.

Table 3.2. Interaction with Political Knowledge among Asians

VARIABLES	(1) Economic	(2) Crime	(3) Cultural	(4) Familial
Mid PK	-1.132 (1.271)	-1.152 (0.873)	-1.489 (0.958)	-0.525 (0.955)
High PK	-3.493** (1.524)	-2.740*** (0.996)	-3.028*** (0.974)	-1.775* (0.994)
Econ X Mid PK	2.323 (1.841)			
Econ X High PK	4.887** (2.115)			
Crime X Mid PK		2.691** (1.366)		
Crime X High PK		4.181*** (1.453)		
Culture X Mid PK			4.356** (2.049)	
Culture X High PK			6.968*** (2.165)	
Familial X Mid PK				1.184 (1.203)
Familial X High PK				2.154* (1.181)
Economic	-1.088 (1.558)	0.547 (0.868)	1.364* (0.829)	1.325 (0.861)
Crime	-0.221 (0.700)	-1.890* (1.031)	-0.118 (0.698)	0.293 (0.702)
Cultural	1.502 (0.939)	1.488 (0.950)	-2.444 (1.606)	1.446 (0.948)
Familial	-0.088 (0.484)	0.011 (0.473)	-0.035 (0.475)	-1.365 (0.920)
Partisanship	-1.326*** (0.502)	-1.217** (0.498)	-1.745*** (0.516)	-1.280** (0.502)
Age	0.114 (0.584)	0.297 (0.588)	0.324 (0.594)	0.138 (0.581)
Male	0.380 (0.281)	0.292 (0.288)	0.135 (0.285)	0.259 (0.273)
Education	-0.618 (0.415)	-0.492 (0.404)	-0.594 (0.413)	-0.453 (0.404)
Lower income	-0.020 (0.541)	-0.006 (0.529)	-0.452 (0.523)	-0.257 (0.520)
Middle income	0.200 (0.462)	0.063 (0.445)	0.163 (0.462)	0.014 (0.446)
Upper income	0.279 (0.525)	0.127 (0.503)	0.209 (0.522)	0.135 (0.512)
Income refused	2.554** (1.125)	2.008* (1.209)	2.196* (1.179)	2.600** (1.099)
/cut1	-1.890 (1.198)	-1.669* (0.967)	-2.243*** (1.036)	-1.078 (0.953)
/cut2	0.329 (1.187)	0.599 (0.953)	0.025 (1.021)	1.124 (0.953)
Observations	101	101	101	101

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 3.3. Predicted Probabilities for Supporting More Immigration among Asians




Figure 3.3 displays the predicted probabilities of supporting more immigration for High, Mid, and Low-PK Asian respondents.²⁸ The change in predicted probabilities is greatest among highly knowledgeable Asians: the extent of change being as great as 99% with cultural attribute and as little as 20% with familial attribute. Interestingly, an opposite trend is observed among Asians with low levels of political knowledge. However, because their confidence intervals overlap, it is difficult to conclude that the predicted probabilities actually decline with each consideration. Rather, I would argue that among unknowledgeable Asian respondents, the likelihood to prefer increasing immigration does not vary with each consideration of immigration. For those lacking the broad sense of politics then, political awareness seems to have minimal moderating influence over Asians' immigration attitudes. This may be because Asians, particularly those who are immigrants or families of recent immigrants and thus likely to

²⁸ One may notice that the 95% confidence intervals for High [Low] PK Asians are quite small for the predicted probabilities at un[favorable] considerations of immigration. Cross tabbing the responses within this group, I find that majority High PK Asians with unfavorable considerations of immigration (x-axis <0.50) oppose increasing immigration; a similar trend is observed among Low PK Asians with favorable attributes of immigration. This consistency in response distributions may have reduced variabilities, thereby decreasing the confidence intervals.

lack understanding of American politics, rely²⁹ on other aspects of immigration more chronically accessible to them due to their lived experience. Consequently, the economic, crime, cultural, and familial attributes of immigration may be less accessible, and thus influential, for these individuals. I investigate this possibility in the next chapter.

Finally, I analyze the moderating effect of political knowledge among Black Americans and Latinos. I discuss these groups together given the similarity in their empirical findings. Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 report the regression results for Black and Latino respondents, respectively.

²⁹ However, my measure of lived experience that will be introduced in Chapter 4 has a rather weak association with political knowledge among Asians and Latinos (pairwise correlations 0.08 and 0.02, respectively). I posit that this is because the ANES survey only samples those who are native-born citizens or naturalized immigrants, who likely are somewhat familiarized with American politics in order to prepare for the mandatory civics test.

Table 3.3. Interaction with Political Knowledge among Blacks

VARIABLES	(1) Economic	(2) Crime	(3) Cultural	(4) Familial
Mid PK	-0.224 (0.407)	-1.144*** (0.361)	0.138 (0.374)	-0.948** (0.471)
High PK	-0.754 (0.526)	-0.917* (0.501)	-0.366 (0.416)	-0.559 (0.564)
Econ X Mid PK	0.139 (0.641)			
Econ X High PK	1.007 (0.794)			
Crime X Mid PK		1.668*** (0.535)		
Crime X High PK		1.298* (0.671)		
Culture X Mid PK			-0.730 (0.868)	
Culture X High PK			0.627 (0.955)	
Familial X Mid PK				1.018* (0.563)
Familial X High PK				0.563 (0.640)
Economic	0.233 (0.493)	0.505* (0.305)	0.510* (0.304)	0.438 (0.307)
Crime	0.554** (0.276)	-0.442 (0.409)	0.526* (0.275)	0.584** (0.277)
Cultural	1.038** (0.443)	1.087** (0.443)	1.222* (0.683)	1.018** (0.442)
Familial	0.788*** (0.257)	0.829*** (0.259)	0.788*** (0.256)	0.277 (0.381)
Partisanship	-0.131 (0.261)	-0.056 (0.264)	-0.107 (0.260)	-0.083 (0.262)
Age	-0.379 (0.352)	-0.435 (0.350)	-0.335 (0.348)	-0.405 (0.350)
Male	0.368** (0.144)	0.349** (0.144)	0.393*** (0.145)	0.403*** (0.145)
Education	0.230 (0.235)	0.245 (0.235)	0.225 (0.236)	0.224 (0.235)
Lower income	-0.280 (0.188)	-0.298 (0.188)	-0.300 (0.189)	-0.310* (0.188)
Middle income	-0.464*** (0.170)	-0.434** (0.169)	-0.465*** (0.169)	-0.398** (0.170)
Upper income	-0.516 (0.332)	-0.596* (0.335)	-0.561* (0.331)	-0.515 (0.333)
Income refused	-0.167 (0.669)	-0.162 (0.671)	-0.287 (0.671)	-0.133 (0.670)
/cut1	0.704* (0.395)	0.327 (0.360)	0.942** (0.388)	0.476 (0.388)
/cut2	2.318*** (0.407)	1.966*** (0.371)	2.556*** (0.402)	2.087*** (0.400)
Observations	313	313	313	313

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.4. Interaction with Political Knowledge among Latinos

VARIABLES	(1) Economic	(2) Crime	(3) Cultural	(4) Familial
Mid PK	-0.377 (0.469)	-0.486 (0.373)	0.126 (0.377)	0.012 (0.867)
High PK	-0.214 (0.530)	-0.723 (0.452)	-0.132 (0.389)	0.554 (0.809)
Econ X Mid PK	0.672 (0.635)			
Econ X High PK	0.356 (0.715)			
Crime X Mid PK		0.910* (0.536)		
Crime X High PK		1.106* (0.601)		
Culture X Mid PK			-0.081 (0.874)	
Culture X High PK			0.393 (0.879)	
Familial X Mid PK				0.088 (0.945)
Familial X High PK				-0.587 (0.883)
Economic	0.603 (0.478)	0.966*** (0.312)	0.961*** (0.312)	0.958*** (0.310)
Crime	0.343 (0.256)	-0.325 (0.419)	0.354 (0.256)	0.342 (0.256)
Cultural	0.987** (0.391)	1.015*** (0.390)	0.923 (0.659)	1.024*** (0.389)
Familial	1.662*** (0.400)	1.671*** (0.401)	1.620*** (0.401)	1.802*** (0.634)
Partisanship	-0.406* (0.219)	-0.418* (0.219)	-0.418* (0.221)	-0.422* (0.221)
Age	-0.299 (0.276)	-0.236 (0.275)	-0.242 (0.276)	-0.265 (0.275)
Male	-0.010 (0.130)	-0.025 (0.131)	-0.011 (0.130)	-0.008 (0.130)
Education	0.071 (0.215)	0.044 (0.216)	0.058 (0.215)	0.072 (0.215)
Lower income	0.257 (0.212)	0.216 (0.210)	0.223 (0.209)	0.223 (0.210)
Middle income	0.102 (0.163)	0.077 (0.161)	0.070 (0.161)	0.061 (0.162)
Upper income	-0.083 (0.247)	-0.123 (0.250)	-0.099 (0.248)	-0.093 (0.248)
Income refused	-0.095 (0.559)	-0.032 (0.564)	-0.140 (0.562)	-0.089 (0.576)
/cut1	1.796*** (0.500)	1.619*** (0.477)	1.977*** (0.500)	2.165*** (0.602)
/cut2	3.432*** (0.516)	3.263*** (0.495)	3.606*** (0.518)	3.794*** (0.619)
Observations	345	345	345	345

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Among Black Americans and Latinos, I do not observe the consistent pattern previously found with white and Asian Americans. As shown in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, only crime consideration positively and significantly interacts with the categorical PK variable. Furthermore, the interaction between mid-PK and cultural consideration has a negative—though not statistically significant—sign for both racial groups. Since the ordered probit coefficients are not intuitive to interpret, I plot the predicted probabilities. Figure 3.4. and Figure 3.5. show the likelihoods of supporting more immigration.

Figure 3.4. Predicted Probabilities for Supporting More Immigration among Blacks






Figure 3.4. Predicted Probabilities for Supporting More Immigration among Blacks



Looking at the predicted probabilities among Black Americans and Latinos, I observe a pattern similar to white Americans in Figure 3.2. According to Figure 3.4 and 3.5, the magnitudes of changes in predicted probabilities are greater for Mid- and High-PK Black respondents than the unknowledgeable. However, the differences between three categories are quite small and statistically indistinguishable from each other. Extending this line of reasoning, I speculate that the present analysis' measurement may be inadequate to capture political knowledge among Black Americans and Latinos, thereby subduing its moderating effect. With a more appropriate measurement of political knowledge, the moderating role of political knowledge among Black Americans and Latinos may become more pronounced. Then, we may find the hypothesized positive and significant interactions with the four attributes of immigration.

Earlier, I raised the possibility that the present analysis' measurement may be inadequate to capture political knowledge among racial minorities (Pérez 2015b). Then, the moderating effects among Black and Latino respondents we observe here may be subdued ones.³⁰ For these groups, an alternative measure may be more appropriate. One such substitute is media exposure. The 2016 ANES asks respondents how many days in a week they consume any type of news. Figure 3.6 summarizes the distributions of responses for each racial group.

Figure 3.6. Days in a Week Watch/Listen/Read News on any Media




³⁰ This possibility, however, invites another question. Why then, does the same variable interact significantly with the four considerations among Asian Americans? As previously explained, we know little about Asian Americans' political knowledge. Given their high levels of wealth and education, Asians' political knowledge may parallel that of white Americans. If this is so, the current measurement may not be as problematic as for other racial minorities. Further research on Asians' political knowledge will help clarify this postulation.

The modal response for all groups is 7 days a week. However, there are subtle differences across the panels. White Americans appear to consume news relatively more frequently than other groups with close to 60% of them answering 7 days in a week. Among racial minorities, such respondents consist of 50 percentage points or less. Then, while all individuals report to regularly use the news media, racial minorities consume slightly less news than white Americans.


To evaluate moderation by media exposure, I estimate its interactive effects with the four considerations of immigration. I focus on Black Americans and Latinos in this additional analysis. I create a 3-way categorical variable: high (more than 5 days), middle (5 days), and low (less than 5 days) media exposure. In Figure 3.7 and 3.8, I compare the predicted probabilities of supporting more immigration per varying levels of immigration considerations between high, mid, and low-Exp Blacks and Latinos, respectively.³¹

Figure 3.7. Predicted Probabilities for Supporting More Immigration among Blacks



³¹ The regression estimates for this analysis is reported in the appendix.

Figure 3.8. Predicted Probabilities for Supporting More Immigration among Latinos



Looking at Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8, the moderating effect by media exposure seem to parallel that of political knowledge. The association between each consideration and immigration attitude becomes increasingly pronounced for individuals with greater media exposure. However, the differences between the three categories do not appear substantially bigger than when using political knowledge. Thus, media exposure may not be necessarily a better measure of political awareness for Black Americans and Latinos. As previously argued, I also consider factual knowledge about politics as the conceptually closer proxy. For these reasons, I advocate for a new measurement that reliably captures inter-group political knowledge. To better measure political knowledge of Black Americans, we may include questions on polices such as affirmative actions and politicians like Kamala Harris that are relevant for the group. Per Latinos, we might adopt the questions suggested by Pérez (2015b). Future research should investigate whether an improved measure of political knowledge could produce significant results among these minority groups.

V. Discussion

In this chapter, I explored how political awareness moderates the correlations between the attributes of immigration commonly emphasized by various news outlets and immigration attitudes across racial lines. Drawing on Zaller's RAS model (1992) I theorized that political awareness, operationalized as factual knowledge about politics, positively interacts with the economic, crime, cultural, and familial considerations. This is because the politically aware may be more likely to receive and comprehend the considerations highlighted by the political and journalistic elites.

To test this proposition, I analyzed the 2016 ANES data. Among white and Asian Americans, I find positive and significant interactions between political knowledge and the four considerations of immigrations. For Black Americans and Latinos, political knowledge only interacts with the crime attribute of immigration. The null result among Black Americans and Latinos may be due to the inappropriate measurement of political knowledge. As Pérez (2015) argues, the current method used to capture political knowledge largely caters to whites' understanding of politics. With a more accommodating measurement, we might observe the moderating effects of political knowledge among Black Americans and Latinos as well.

Undoubtedly, political awareness is not the only factor that may interact with various aspects of immigration to shape individuals' attitudes toward the issue. Another potential moderator is individuals' lived experience as immigrants or recent descendants of immigrants. This may be especially relevant for Asians and Latinos who comprise the majority of immigrants in the U.S. I will explore this possibility in the next chapter.

Chapter 4.

The Direct and Indirect Relationships between Lived Experience and Immigration Attitude Among Asians and Latinos

I. Introduction

By 2045, the United States is projected to become a minority majority nation (Frey 2018), the first major post-industrial society to do so (Deasy 2012). The primary source for this demographic change is mass immigration, particularly from Asia and South and Central America (Migration Policy Institute). Despite their growing presence and important relationship with the issue of immigration, racial minorities have been under-researched as compared to whites in the literature on immigration attitudes. Several notable works have shown that Latinos and Asians generally have more favorable opinions on immigration than their white counterparts (e.g. Citrin and Sears 2014; Junn and Masuoka 2013). However, there remains a gap in our understanding of how Asians and Latinos assess the attributes of immigration widely available in the information environment identified in Chapter 1. In chapter 2, I showed that Asians and Latinos' attitudes correlate with these considerations. Such associations, I further posit, may be moderated by their lived experience as immigrants or recent descendants of immigrants.

In this chapter, I investigate how the lived experience of immigration influences Asians' and Latinos' views on immigration both directly and indirectly. Drawing on social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), I hypothesize that lived experience may predict favorable immigration attitude. Indirectly, lived experience might affect individuals' opinions by changing the accessibilities of various considerations on which they base their opinions. Per the Receive-Accept-Sample model (Zaller 1992), I predict that lived experience may act as an individual predisposition that increases or decreases accessibilities of these considerations.

To test these hypotheses, I analyze the 2016 American National Election Survey. I find a diverging impact of lived experience for Asians and Latinos. While lived experience positively correlates with Latinos' immigration attitudes as expected, it appears to have a negative association with Asians' opinions. Analyzing another dataset further confirms this contrasting pattern. Moreover, I find suggestive evidence that lived experience among Latinos positively interacts with the considerations of immigration, whereas the opposite seems true for Asians. I discuss a potential explanation for this divergence between the two groups.

This research contributes to extending our knowledge on racial minorities' immigration attitudes. Particularly, it illustrates how lived experience differently influences opinions among Asians and Latinos, the two groups that make up the majority of the immigrant population of the U.S. The findings here suggest that lived experience is far from uniform across immigrant groups.

II. The Direct and Indirect Role of Lived Experience of Immigration

I theorize that the lived experience of immigration influences individuals' immigration attitudes in two distinct ways. Lived experience refers to "personal knowledge about the world gained through direct, first-hand involvement in everyday events rather than through representations constructed by other people" (Chandler and Munday 2011, Web). In the context of this research, I interpret it as a distinct understanding of immigration based on personal experiences as an immigrant or recent descendant. Put differently, those who are immigrants themselves or are related to immigrants would have lived experiences of immigration.

First, I hypothesize that lived experience of immigration predicts favorable views on immigration. According to Social Identity Theory or SIT, individuals consider their ingroup favorably in order to uphold positive self-image (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Immigrants and families of recent immigrants might perceive more similarities between themselves and other immigrants. In this way, lived experience will lead individuals to consider immigrants as an ingroup, thereby encouraging them to view immigration in a favorable light. Furthermore, I conceive of this relationship between lived experience and immigration attitude as monotonic. Previous works have argued that individuals' attachment to immigrants as ingroup increases inversely with their distance to the immigration experience. Murray and Marx (2013), for example, find that individuals whose families immigrated more recently to the U.S. perceive fewer realistic and symbolic threats from unauthorized immigration than those a few generations removed. Pérez (2015) also shows that first generation Latinos more strongly react against xenophobic speech than second and third generations, thereby becoming more supportive of policies that benefit Latinos. Similarly, experimentally framing immigrants as illegal as opposed to undocumented causes first generation Latinos to become more supportive of permissive immigration than their second-generation counterparts (Haynes et al. 2016; Junn and Masuoka 2013). Since existing studies generally focus on Latinos, however, we know little about how

lived experience predicts attitudes among other immigrant groups. My research seeks to address this gap by investigating the role of lived experience of immigration among other relevant individuals, especially Asians.

H₁: greater levels of lived experience of immigration will correlate with favorable immigration attitudes.

Second, lived experience may indirectly affect immigration attitudes. There are two pathways by which it might do so. Immigrants and their recent descendants may possess positive views of their in-group. Individuals are often motivated to seek out information that conforms to their ingroup favoritism. So called motivated reasoning, the phenomenon refers to individuals valuing directional goals over accuracy goals, preferring the considerations consistent with their prior beliefs and identities despite their objective accuracy (Kunda 1990; Lodge and Taber 2006). Extending this line of reasoning, immigrants or recent descendants of immigrants may be motivated to accept more favorable attributes of immigration due to their ingroup attachment. In Chapter 2, I showed that these positive attributes of immigration predict permissive immigration attitude. By altering the default levels of these considerations, lived experience may indirectly shape individuals' views on immigration.

H₂: lived experience will predispose individuals to accept more favorable immigration considerations.

In addition, lived experience may moderate how these considerations predict individuals' opinions on immigration. On the one hand, I hypothesize that lived experience might act like political awareness. In the previous chapter, I argued that political awareness enhances the relationships between immigration considerations and immigration attitude. This is because political awareness increases individuals' exposure to and comprehension of relevant information (Zaller 1992). I posit that the lived experience may have a similar effect. For recent immigrants and their families, immigration as an issue may pose great personal importance and relevance. Thus, they may be more likely to encounter various narratives about the issue. At the same time, those with greater levels of lived experience may be more likely to possess first-hand

knowledge about the issue. Put differently, lived experience increases individuals' comprehension of immigration considerations. In this way, the moderating effect of lived experience may mirror that of political knowledge.

H_{3a}: lived experience positively moderates the associations between favorable considerations of immigration and permissive immigration attitude.


On the other hand, lived experience may weaken the relationships. According to Zaller (1992), individuals with many pre-existing considerations may not as easily accept an argument they encounter. Zaller calls this tendency inertial resistance. To illustrate his point, Zaller shows that individuals with more considerations regarding Reagan from before the Iran-Contra affair were less likely to change their opinions on the President after the scandal. Based on this logic, I speculate that individuals with lived experience of immigration may possess more considerations of immigration not available to those who only learn about the issue second-hand. These may pertain to the stress of acculturation, trauma from immigrating, or experiences in the sending countries (e.g. Harker 2001; Harris 1999; Mena et al. 1987). Due to the lack of relevant open-ended survey data, it is beyond the scope of this research to examine what pre-existing considerations of immigration originating from lived experience there may be present. What I argue is that recent immigrants and their families may have other facets of immigration with which they assess the issue. These individuals then may be less likely to accept the immigration narratives available in the information environment compared to their native-born counterparts with fewer alternative considerations.

H_{3b}: lived experience negatively moderates the associations between immigration considerations and immigration attitude.

To illustrate the three hypotheses presented thus far, I present an arrow diagram in Figure 4.1. The solid line titled H₁ concerns the direct effect of lived experience on immigration attitude. The two dashed lines indicate the indirect effects of lived experience. Lived experience may indirectly shape immigration attitude by affecting the level of immigration considerations that (H₂) and the correlation between these considerations and immigration attitude (H_{3a}, H_{3b}).

The total indirect effect then is the product of these two pathways. I will elaborate more on estimating this sum later.

Figure 4.1. Arrow Diagram for the Hypotheses about Lived Experience



To test my hypotheses, I analyze the 2016 American National Election Survey (ANES) data. As with the preceding chapter, I focus on the four considerations of immigration—economic, crime, cultural, and familial—commonly accessible to all groups. In this chapter, however, I limit the analysis to Asian Americans and Latinos who make up the majority of immigrants to the U.S., and are thus likely to vary in their lived experience of immigration.

III. Research Design


In this section, I discuss my plan to analyze the 2016 ANES data. Immigration attitude is measured as individuals' preferred level of immigration; the response options include increase a lot, increase a little, remain the same, decrease a little, and decrease a lot. The economic, crime, cultural, and familial considerations of immigration are coded as they were in part 1 of chapter 2. All of these variables are coded ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more favorable immigration attitudes and considerations. Consistent with my previous analyses, I control for gender, age, partisanship, level of education, and household income of respondents.

To operationalize the lived experience of immigration, I create a variable for individuals' generational status. I assign the variable with values 0 (3rd+ gen: native born with native born parents), 0.50 (2nd gen: native born with at least one foreign born parent), and 1 (foreign born). This is consistent with how past studies quantify generational differences (e.g., Canale et al. 2017; Harker 2001; Harris 1999; Hovey and King 1996; Mena et al. 1987; Perriera et al. 2005; Wiley et al. 2012). I believe that generational status is an approximate proxy for lived experience. Immigrants and recent descendants who have greater levels of lived experience than native-born citizens likely feel closer to immigrants. Existing works have shown that generational status measures the degree of this attachment (Murray and Marx 2013; Pérez 2015). However, lived experience and generational status are not synonymous. The latter does not necessarily relate to the perception of immigration derived from having immigrated or being closely related to immigrants. Rather, generational status measures one of the observable implications of lived experience: the in-group attachment to immigrants. Thus, generational status serves as one way to operationalize the lived experience of immigration.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that the 2016 ANES only samples U.S. eligible voters. As shown in Figure 4.2, naturalized immigrants tend to have more years of residence in the U.S. than permanent residents (green card holders) and visa holders.³²

³² The differences of means between citizens vs. permanent residents/visa holders are statistically significant.


Figure 4.2. Mean Years Lived in the U.S



I believe analyzing the 2016 ANES data might provide a rather conservative test of my hypotheses. Compared to recent immigrants, naturalized immigrants might feel less attached to immigrants as their in-group. If this is so, the hypothesized direct and indirect effects of lived experience might be weaker among naturalized Asians and Latinos. Thus, any estimated results in this chapter may be somewhat subdued.

Having acknowledged this potential limitation of my data, I examine the distributions of lived experience for Asian and Latino respondents.

Figure 4.3. Distributions of Lived Experience among Asians and Latinos



The two figures display an interesting contrast. As shown in Figure 4.3, the majority of Asian respondents are foreign born. The next most common group is composed of those with immigrant parents. In contrast, close to 40% of Latinos in the sample are born in the U.S. to native born parents. Still, foreign-born Latinos comprise approximately 30% of their respective group. These patterns coincide with the demographic projection that Asians will become the

largest immigrant group in country.³³ Because there are so few native-born Asians in this sample, I combine them with second generation respondents. Thus, lived experience is a binary measure for Asians, whereas it takes three values for Latino respondents. With this measurement, I now move to the regression analysis.

IV. Analysis

Part 1

I begin by investigating the direct relationship between lived experience of immigration and individuals' immigration attitudes. To reiterate, I expect positive and significant correlations for both Asians and Latinos (H_1). Considering the ranked ordinal nature of my dependent variable, I estimate the model using an ordered probit regression. I use the post-election survey weight for the full sample. Table 4.1 displays the regression results.

³³ López, Gustavo, Neil G. Ruiz, and Eileen Pattern 2017. "Key facts about Asian Americans, a diverse and growing population". *Pew Research Center*. <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/09/08/key-facts-about-asian-americans/>

Table 4.1. The Effects of Lived Experience on Support for More Immigration

VARIABLES	(1) Asian	(2) Latino
Lived experience	-0.319 (0.256)	0.244 (0.155)
Partisanship	-1.574*** (0.410)	-0.909*** (0.200)
Age	-0.388 (0.521)	-0.420 (0.259)
Male	0.161 (0.247)	-0.051 (0.122)
Education	-0.093 (0.374)	0.185 (0.198)
Lower income	-0.205 (0.481)	0.252 (0.202)
Middle income	0.179 (0.414)	0.076 (0.150)
Upper income	0.193 (0.454)	-0.009 (0.232)
Income refused	2.244** (1.011)	0.031 (0.489)
/cut1	-1.965*** (0.460)	-0.781*** (0.185)
/cut2	0.023 (0.423)	0.662*** (0.184)
Observations	103	349


Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The main variable, lived experience has the expected positive correlation among Latino respondents. Contrary to my prediction, it is negatively correlated with Asians' immigration attitudes. However, the variable fails to attain statistical significance in either group. Since the ordered probit regression does not provide a substantive interpretation, I estimate the predicted probabilities of preferring to increase immigration a little or a lot in Figure 4.4.³⁴

³⁴ All the other variables in the model are held at the group mean.

Figure 4.4. Predicted Probabilities of Supporting More Immigration by Lived Experience



For Asian Americans, moving from 0 to 1 on lived experience leads to a 9-percentage point decrease in the likelihood to endorse more immigration. In contrast, the average Latinos’ probability increases from 15 to 22 percentage points. This 7-percentage point change may appear small. However, recall from chapter 2 that a majority of Latinos prefer to decrease immigration or keep the current level.³⁵ Then, this small increment may be due to the small number of Latinos who support liberal immigration. However, re-estimating the predicted probabilities for an outcome that combines “increase immigration a little/a lot” and “keep as it is” also results in a 7-percentage point increase only (from 64 to 74 percentage points). Furthermore, the effect of lived experience is much smaller compared to that of partisanship in Table 4.1. Moving from strong Democratic to strong Republican partisanship is associated with 39- and 21-percentage point decline in the predicted probability for Asians and Latinos, respectively.

³⁵ Specifically, 31% say “decrease a little/a lot”, 49% “keep it as it is”, and 19% “increase a little/a lot”.

While lived experience seems to have a contrasting direct effect between Asians and Latinos, the lack of significant result offers insufficient evidence. Fortunately, the 2016 National Asian American Survey (NAAS) includes relevant questions to test H1 again.³⁶ Using this data, I measure lived experience as 1 (immigrants with green card or visas), 0.67 (naturalized citizens), 0.33 (second-generation), and 0 (native-born). This coding decision is to fine tune the effect of lived experience, accounting for the variations in time lived in the U.S. between different classes of immigrants that I noted earlier. The survey also asks respondents their opinions on the four immigration policies listed below.

- Undocumented or illegal immigrants should be allowed to have an opportunity to eventually become U.S. citizens.
- Congress needs to increase the number of work visas it issues every year.
- Congress needs to increase the number of family visas it issues every year.
- States should provide driver's license to all residents, regardless of their immigration status.

I code responses to each question to scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 1 (strongly agree). Higher values indicate support for more permissive immigration policies. I regress lived experience on each of these dependent variables while controlling for partisanship, age, gender, education, and family income. The ordered probit results are summarized in Table 4.2. and Table 4.3.

³⁶ Ramakrishnan, Karthick, Jennifer Lee, Taeku Lee, and Janelle Wong. "National Asian American Survey (NAAS) 2016 Pre-Election Survey". Riverside, CA: National Asian American Survey. 2017-12-05. Contact the PIs for more information on sampling.

Table 4.2. The Effects of Lived Experience on Immigration Policies among Asians

VARIABLES	(1) Citizenship	(2) Work visa	(3) Family visa	(4) License
Lived experience	-1.030*** (0.108)	-0.150 (0.105)	-0.238** (0.107)	-0.066 (0.105)
Partisanship	-0.635*** (0.064)	-0.328*** (0.064)	-0.416*** (0.064)	-0.492*** (0.064)
Age	-0.527*** (0.081)	-0.391*** (0.081)	-0.516*** (0.082)	-0.128 (0.080)
Male	0.077* (0.043)	0.070* (0.043)	0.138*** (0.043)	-0.015 (0.042)
Education	-0.108 (0.093)	0.028 (0.093)	0.145 (0.093)	-0.109 (0.092)
Lower income	0.094 (0.073)	-0.080 (0.073)	-0.125* (0.075)	-0.122* (0.073)
Middle income	0.239*** (0.071)	0.073 (0.070)	-0.042 (0.072)	0.015 (0.071)
Upper income	0.223*** (0.082)	0.101 (0.082)	0.032 (0.083)	0.054 (0.083)
Income refused	0.063 (0.083)	0.145* (0.084)	0.078 (0.085)	-0.018 (0.082)
/cut1	-1.954*** (0.110)	-1.402*** (0.107)	-1.500*** (0.108)	-1.114*** (0.105)
/cut2	-1.516*** (0.108)	-0.802*** (0.104)	-0.965*** (0.106)	-0.693*** (0.104)
/cut3	-1.248*** (0.107)	-0.409*** (0.104)	-0.541*** (0.105)	-0.500*** (0.104)
/cut4	-0.469*** (0.106)	0.362*** (0.104)	0.212** (0.105)	0.163 (0.104)
Observations	2,673	2,559	2,553	2,683

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.3. The Effects of Lived Experience on Immigration Policies among Latinos

VARIABLES	(1) Citizenship	(2) Work visa	(3) Family visa	(4) License
Lived experience	0.416** (0.185)	0.317* (0.164)	0.673*** (0.164)	0.920*** (0.165)
Partisanship	-1.125*** (0.167)	-0.870*** (0.156)	-0.725*** (0.158)	-1.507*** (0.164)
Age	-0.755*** (0.217)	-0.139 (0.188)	-0.251 (0.185)	-0.440** (0.187)
Male	-0.256** (0.115)	-0.051 (0.099)	-0.100 (0.099)	-0.086 (0.100)
Education	-0.448* (0.248)	-0.471** (0.215)	-0.630*** (0.213)	-0.215 (0.215)
Lower income	-0.032 (0.162)	-0.131 (0.145)	0.106 (0.146)	-0.183 (0.151)
Middle income	0.091 (0.177)	-0.124 (0.154)	0.081 (0.154)	-0.284* (0.159)
Upper income	0.247 (0.279)	0.400 (0.248)	0.305 (0.240)	0.280 (0.260)
Income refused	0.290 (0.219)	0.507** (0.197)	0.238 (0.189)	-0.127 (0.184)
/cut1	-2.727*** (0.272)	-1.887*** (0.222)	-1.876*** (0.218)	-1.753*** (0.222)
/cut2	-2.335*** (0.256)	-1.539*** (0.215)	-1.475*** (0.212)	-1.207*** (0.214)
/cut3	-2.163*** (0.251)	-1.168*** (0.211)	-1.092*** (0.208)	-1.048*** (0.213)
/cut4	-1.356*** (0.242)	-0.387* (0.208)	-0.288 (0.205)	-0.491** (0.212)
Observations	597	571	573	590

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The tables above display a clear contrast between Asians and Latinos. Asians' lived experience negatively correlates with each policy; its associations with the policies regarding citizenship and family visas are statistically significant. However, Latinos' lived experience has a positive and significant association with every dependent variable. To better interpret these opposing results, I plot the predicted probabilities in Figure 4.5 and Figure 4.6.

Figure 4.5. Predicted Probabilities to Support Permissive Policies among Asians




Figure 4.6. Predicted Probabilities to Support Permissive Policies among Latinos




Figure 4.5. and Figure 4.6. paint a very different picture of the role of lived experience between Asians and Latinos. Among Asians, the support for each policy declines with lived experience as indicated by the downward slopes in Figure 4.5. The most conspicuous change concerns granting citizenship to undocumented or illegal immigrants: about a 40-percentage point difference between native-born Asians and Asian immigrants with a visa or green card. Compared to Asians, Latinos' predicted support for the four policies increases with lived experience. Except for the policy concerning driver's licenses, they also show greater levels of endorsement for each policy compared to their Asian counterparts.

What explains this diverging role of lived experience on Asians and Latinos' immigration opinions? In particular, why do Asians with more lived experience tend to exhibit restrictive attitudes? Recall that in my content analysis, China Press preferred to use the term illegal over undocumented, indicating a more disparaging tone. Asian immigrants, particularly those who moved to the U.S. more recently, may be motivated to hold a positive image of their ingroup by distinguishing themselves from those groups they disapprove of. That they are especially unenthusiastic about naturalizing undocumented or illegal immigrants in Figure 4.5 further supports this possibility. Because most research on generational differences in immigration attitudes has focused on Latinos (e.g. Pérez 2015; Junn and Masuoka 2013), we may have been misled to believe that Asians would exhibit a similar pattern. However, immigration attitude is differently measured between the ANES and the NAAS data sets. Thus, I cannot ascertain whether lived experience indeed poses dissimilar implications for Asians and Latinos. More research on confirming this pattern is necessary.

Part 2

I now turn to the indirect relationship between lived experiences and immigration attitudes. First, I examine whether the immigration considerations themselves vary with lived experience. Based on SIT (Tajfel and Turner 1979), I hypothesize that immigrants and families of recent immigrants hold more favorable considerations of immigration. In other words, lived experience increases the levels of immigration considerations (H_2). To test this proposition, I compare the average levels of the economic, crime, cultural, and familial considerations between the foreign born and native born (combined with second generation in case of Asians) respondents. The results are summarized in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4. Average Levels of the Four Immigration Considerations

Asian				
Lived Exp.	Economic	Crime	Culture*	Familial
Foreign born	0.70	0.68	0.39	0.72
2 nd & 3 rd + gen	0.69	0.63	0.47	0.68

Latino				
Lived Exp.	Economic*	Crime*	Culture	Familial*
Foreign born	0.77	0.77	0.38	0.89
3 rd + gen	0.65	0.63	0.37	0.84

Recall that each variable ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater favorability. The asterisk signifies that the estimates are statistically different ($p < 0.05$) between the two categories of respondents. I will begin with the results among Asians. From the first glance, foreign born Asians appear to have higher levels of immigration considerations except for the cultural attribute. However, these mean values are not statistically distinguishable from those among the second and third plus generations. In fact, the level of cultural consideration is greater for native-born Asians. Among Latino respondents, I find evidence more consistent with H_2 . The averages of the four variables are higher for foreign born Latinos, though it is not statistically so for the cultural consideration.

That the levels of cultural consideration are not statistically greater for foreign-born Asians than Latinos is interesting. This commonality may be due to how I operationalize cultural consideration. In chapter 2, I used the five survey questions below to construct the variable.

1. To be truly American, it is important to speak English.
2. How good or bad does R feel to see American flag.
3. America’s culture is generally harmed by immigrants.
4. Minorities should adapt to customs/traditions of U.S.
5. To be truly American, it is important to follow America’s customs and traditions.

I chose them to reflect how I conceptualized the cultural frame during my content analysis. They are coded to range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more favorable cultural aspects of immigration. As you may note, some of them concern acculturation—specifically, 1, 4, and 5. For these questions, I assigned higher values for responses advocating *against*

acculturation. This is to mirror the discourse in favor of immigration that tends to encourage diversity over forced assimilation. However, Asians and Latinos who have recently immigrated to the U.S. might consider assimilation as vital for their survival. To test this possibility, I create a variable made up of the three questions ranging from 0 to 1 with higher values indicating stronger support for acculturation. Foreign born Asian and Latino respondents have higher means than their native-born counterparts, though the difference is statistically significant only for Asians.

In short, lived experience seems to increase the levels of immigration considerations, save for those concerning the cultural aspect. Because the differences between foreign-born and native-born Asians are statistically significant, however, their findings are not as conclusive as for Latinos.

Part 3

Next, I investigate another indirect pathway through which lived experience may affect immigration attitude. Specifically, I theorize that lived experience may moderate the correlations between the immigration considerations and immigration attitude. Earlier, I offered two competing predictions regarding this moderating effect. Lived experience may positively moderate the associations by increasing the accessibilities of favorable immigration considerations, which shapes permissive immigration attitude (H_{3a}). In contrast, it may negatively moderate the correlations by decreasing their accessibilities (H_{3b}). To test these hypotheses, I estimate the interactions of lived experience and each of the four considerations. Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 summarize the weighted ordered probit regression results for Asians and Latinos, respectively.

Table 4.5. Interaction with Lived Experience among Asians

VARIABLES	(1) Economic	(2) Crime	(3) Cultural	(4) Familial
Lived experience	0.719 (0.908)	1.557** (0.740)	1.611** (0.789)	0.269 (0.788)
Econ X Lived exp	-1.440 (1.262)			
Crime X Lived exp		-3.019*** (1.142)		
Culture X Lived exp			-4.294** (1.684)	
Familial X Lived exp				-0.701 (0.963)
Economic	2.195** (1.084)	0.963 (0.812)	1.045 (0.808)	1.253 (0.798)
Crime	0.161 (0.685)	2.387** (1.103)	0.468 (0.707)	0.222 (0.688)
Cultural	1.300 (0.944)	1.346 (0.968)	3.715*** (1.382)	1.338 (0.940)
Familial	-0.214 (0.459)	-0.127 (0.463)	-0.181 (0.464)	0.312 (0.822)
Partisanship	-1.281*** (0.485)	-1.346*** (0.495)	-1.449*** (0.497)	-1.281*** (0.483)
Age	0.219 (0.578)	0.140 (0.582)	-0.077 (0.588)	0.137 (0.574)
Male	0.147 (0.263)	0.151 (0.267)	0.151 (0.266)	0.166 (0.263)
Education	-0.329 (0.395)	-0.278 (0.399)	-0.454 (0.407)	-0.310 (0.392)
Lower income	-0.404 (0.524)	-0.253 (0.531)	-0.372 (0.531)	-0.316 (0.516)
Middle income	-0.106 (0.453)	-0.028 (0.459)	-0.001 (0.459)	-0.028 (0.445)
Upper income	-0.243 (0.509)	-0.062 (0.508)	-0.001 (0.505)	-0.130 (0.492)
Income refused	2.152* (1.101)	1.959* (1.120)	2.405** (1.097)	2.336** (1.093)
/cut1	-0.108 (0.848)	0.475 (0.857)	0.305 (0.836)	-0.195 (0.895)
/cut2	2.053** (0.865)	2.705*** (0.886)	2.539*** (0.868)	1.950** (0.907)
Observations	101	101	101	101

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.6. Interaction with Lived Experience among Latinos

VARIABLES	(1) Economic	(2) Crime	(3) Cultural	(4) Familial
Lived exp. (2 nd gen)	-0.611 (0.485)	-0.236 (0.406)	0.395 (0.377)	-0.629 (0.788)
Lived exp. (3 rd + gen)	-0.282 (0.507)	-0.067 (0.407)	0.862** (0.394)	-2.152** (1.040)
Econ X 2nd gen	1.202* (0.659)			
Econ X 3rd+ gen	0.602 (0.684)			
Crime X 2nd gen		0.684 (0.560)		
Crime X 3rd+ gen		0.289 (0.570)		
Culture X 2nd gen			-0.442 (0.839)	
Culture X 3rd+ gen			-1.928** (0.929)	
Familial X 2nd gen				0.973 (0.866)
Familial X 3rd+ gen				2.480** (1.111)
Economic	0.387 (0.455)	0.975*** (0.317)	0.838*** (0.316)	0.902*** (0.312)
Crime	0.376 (0.257)	-0.003 (0.431)	0.332 (0.253)	0.357 (0.253)
Cultural	0.974** (0.406)	1.028*** (0.396)	1.727*** (0.632)	1.003** (0.396)
Familial	1.567*** (0.397)	1.593*** (0.400)	1.643*** (0.403)	0.925* (0.510)
Partisanship	-0.394* (0.221)	-0.383* (0.221)	-0.358 (0.221)	-0.405* (0.221)
Age	-0.221 (0.279)	-0.223 (0.278)	-0.272 (0.278)	-0.249 (0.278)
Male	0.009 (0.130)	0.015 (0.130)	-0.041 (0.132)	-0.005 (0.131)
Education	0.025 (0.214)	0.025 (0.215)	0.060 (0.214)	0.082 (0.214)
Lower income	0.220 (0.210)	0.226 (0.212)	0.212 (0.209)	0.226 (0.210)
Middle income	0.104 (0.159)	0.099 (0.161)	0.071 (0.160)	0.114 (0.158)
Upper income	-0.105 (0.246)	-0.098 (0.248)	-0.147 (0.248)	-0.130 (0.247)
Income refused	-0.019 (0.567)	-0.131 (0.568)	0.063 (0.557)	-0.129 (0.574)
/cut1	1.681*** (0.487)	1.878*** (0.472)	2.271*** (0.485)	1.458*** (0.524)
/cut2	3.325*** (0.505)	3.511*** (0.492)	3.914*** (0.507)	3.106*** (0.539)
Observations	344	344	344	344

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results are not as straightforward as I expected. I will first discuss patterns among Asian Americans in Table 4.5. In line with H_{3b}, all interaction terms have negative signs. Among them, the interactions with crime and cultural considerations attain statistical significance. This indicates that the correlations between these attributes and immigration opinions are weaker for foreign-born Asians compared to the second and third generations. Therefore, lived experience among Asians appears to subdue the relationship between four attributes of immigration and individuals' opinions. Among Latino respondents in Table 4.6, however, there appears to be weak support for H_{3a}. The interactions with economic, crime, and familial considerations have positive coefficients, though only the latter is statistically significant for 3rd+ generation Latinos. Intriguingly, the interaction with cultural consideration is negative and significant for both Asians and Latinos. This may be due to how the variable is operationalized as discussed in the analysis Part 2.

Since the regression results do not specifically show how the effects of favorable immigration considerations diverge with lived experience, I estimate the predicted probabilities.³⁷ Figure 4.7 and Figure 4.8 compare the likelihoods of preferring to increase immigration between native-born (and second generation for Asians) vs. foreign-born Asians and Latinos, respectively.

³⁷ All the other variables in the model are held at the group mean.

Figure 4.7. Predicted Probabilities for Supporting More Immigration among Asians





Figure 4.8. Predicted Probabilities for Supporting More Immigration among Latinos



Per H3b, the positive slopes between the four considerations and immigration attitude should be steeper for native-born than first-generation. This is the pattern observed in Figure 4.7. Overall, the predicted probabilities for foreign-born Asians remain the same across the x-axis. This contrasts with native-born Asians whose likelihood to support more immigration increases with favorable economic, crime, and cultural attributes of immigration. The single exception is found in the bottom right panel; For both native-born and foreign-born Asians, the correlation between immigration attitude and the familial consideration neither increases nor decreases.

In contrast, according to H3a, the positive relations will be more pronounced for foreign-born respondents. Figure 4.8. provides suggestive evidence in favor of H3 among Latino respondents. Except for the cultural consideration in the bottom left panel, the positive effect of each attribute on immigration attitude is slightly greater for foreign-born Latinos. However, the differences between native-born and foreign-born Latinos are rather small.

As previously explained, the ANES data does not sample non-citizen Asians and Latinos who are more likely to be recent immigrants. Thus, the hypothesized effect of lived experience may be somewhat suppressed. I speculate that with a more ideal dataset that includes non-naturalized Latinos and Asians, I might observe more substantial interaction effects.

This disparity between Asians and Latinos warrants further discussion. One possible explanation for this opposing interactive effect may be in the nature of those considerations accessible in individuals' minds. As shown in my content analysis, different news outlets all frequently feature immigration from Mexico and Central America. Consequently, the economic, crime, cultural, and familial considerations of immigration are likely connected with the corresponding nationalities and race. If this is so, Latino's' lived experience may serve to amplify the effects of these consideration on their immigration attitude. For Asians, especially those who are foreign born and second generation, these attributes might be perceived as mostly pertaining to an outgroup. In assessing immigration, they might reflect more heavily on other considerations that are more personally relevant for them as immigrants or recent descendants. Thus, the accessibilities of economic, cultural, crime, and familial attributes may be lower for them than for their native-born counterparts who mostly rely on these facets to assess the issue. Future research inquiring further into this prospect will help enrich our limited understanding of minorities' immigration attitude.

Part 4

Finally, I estimate the total indirect effects of lived experience on individuals' immigration attitudes. In Part 2 and Part 3, I examined how the lived experience of immigration indirectly affects immigration attitude. Specifically, I argued that lived experience shapes immigration attitude through altering the levels and effects of immigration considerations. In this final analysis, I attempt to calculate the cumulative indirect effects. To do so, I employ the outcome model in Burns et al. (2001). The researchers are interested in the indirect effect of gender on individuals' political participation. For men and women separately, they calculate the average levels of various factors such as educational attainment and wealth that matter for political participation. Then, they estimate the correlations between each of these factors and political participation. To compute the indirect effect of gender through each factor, they multiply their average levels and regression coefficients and compare the products between men and women. Finally, they add up the differences and call it the net effect of gender. Adopting this approach, I present the following strategy.

First, I calculate the means of each consideration for first-generation and native-born respondents. These values are in Table 4.4 in Part 2. Then, for each group, I estimate the regression coefficients of each consideration on preferred level of immigration.³⁸ Next, I multiply the mean and coefficient of each consideration to generate overall outcomes. For those coefficients that are not significantly different between first generation and native-born respondents, I use their averages instead.³⁹ Finally, I find differences between first-generation and native-born respondents in their overall outcomes of each consideration. The surplus implies that the indirect effect was greater for first-generation respondents. Adding these differences produces net effect, which indicates how much more indirect effects of lived experience accumulate for first generation individuals compared to their native-born counterparts. Table 4.7 summarizes these results for first-generation and native-born Latino respondents.

³⁸ The full regression results can be found in the appendix.

³⁹ This is to account for the possibility that the effect of each consideration on immigration attitude may not be statistically distinguishable between the foreign-born and native-born respondents (Burns et al.2001).

Table 4.7. First-Generation vs. Native-Born Latinos

Consd.	Mean		Coeff.		Overall outcome		Diff.
	1st	native	1st	native	1 st	Native	
Econ	0.77	0.65	.24	.07	0.12	0.10	+0.02
Cult	0.38	0.37	-.01	.57**	0.11	0.10	+0.01
Crime	0.70	0.63	.13	-.03	0.04	0.03	+0.01
Fam	0.89	0.84	.62**	.20*	0.55	0.17	+0.38
Net effect= +0.42							

Note: Weighted OLS regression. *p-value<0.1, ** p-value<0.05

As displayed in the last row, the net effect is +0.42, primarily originating from the familial consideration. This means that moving from the least (0) to most lived experience (1) will result in the 0.42-unit increase in the dependent variable. Since the dependent variable is coded to range from 0 to 1, this increase seems quite substantial.

I conduct the same analysis for Asians. Due to their small number, I combine the third plus generation Asians with second generation. Even so, the eventual sample size is 37. Therefore, the regression coefficient should be taken with caution. Table 4.8 display the outcome model results.

Table 4.8. First-Generation vs. Native-Born Asians

Consd.	Mean		Coeff.		Overall outcome		Diff.
	1st	native	1st	native	1 st	Native	
Econ	0.70	0.69	0.28	-0.30	0.20	-0.21	+0.41
Cult	0.39	0.47	0.04	0.59**	0.02	0.28	-0.26
Crime	0.68	0.63	-0.05	0.53**	-0.03	0.33	-0.36
Fam	0.72	0.68	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0
Net effect= -0.21							

Note: Weighted OLS regression. *p-value<0.1, ** p-value<0.05

The net effect of lived experience among Asians is -0.21. Moving from the least (0) to most lived experience (1) will result in a 0.21-unit decrease in the dependent variable. The direction of this change is opposite the one observed among Latinos and its magnitude is half the size. This indicates that the lived experience of immigration has a greater indirect effect on second and third plus generation Asians than those who are foreign-born. Overall then, lived experience appears to exert a positive indirect effect on Latinos' immigration attitudes, and a negative effect on Asians'.

V. Discussion

In this chapter, I examined how lived experience of immigration directly and indirectly correlates with immigration attitudes among Asians and Latinos. Drawing on SIT (Tajfel and Turner 1979), I hypothesized that lived experience will predict permissive immigration attitude. Furthermore, lived experience might exert an indirect influence via two pathways. First, lived experience may increase the levels of immigration considerations. Second, lived experience may either positively or negatively moderate how these considerations affect views on immigration.

Analyzing the 2016 ANES data, I find suggestive evidence that lived experience exerts diverging direct and indirect effects for Asians and Latinos. Lived experience positively correlates with Latinos' immigration attitudes, and negatively with Asians'. The latter finding is surprising given the initial assumption that lived experience will lead to greater ingroup attachment to immigrants. I postulate that this may be because Asian immigrants harbor bias against undocumented and illegal immigrants who are frequently portrayed as Latinos, their outgroup, in the information environment.

Lived experience also seems to lead individuals to ascribe more favorable attributes to immigration. Foreign-born Asians and Latinos exhibit higher levels of the economic, crime, and familial aspects of immigration than their native-born counterparts. However, the differences between immigration generations are statistically significant only among Latino respondents. The null result concerning the cultural attribute may be due to the importance of acculturation over sustaining cultural diversity for recent immigrants.

Moreover, there is partial support for the idea that lived experience has an opposing indirect influence over immigration attitude. Lived experience among Asians negatively interacts with the crime and cultural attributes of immigration. In other words, lived experience weakens the associations between these considerations and Asians' immigration attitudes. Latinos' lived experience, on the other hand, positively and significantly interacts with at least the familial aspect of immigration.

This chapter's findings imply that lived experience of immigration may pose dissimilar implications for Asians' and Latinos' immigration attitudes. Future research may benefit us by probing the underlying mechanism of this diversification. The significance of such scholarly investigation will only grow with the changing demographics in the U.S. In particular, we may

learn a lot more about the role of lived experience in shaping Asians' immigration opinions, which still remain inadequately researched compared to Latinos.

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I explored how various considerations of immigration predict immigration attitudes across diverse racial groups—white, Black, Asian, and Latino—in the U.S. I started by analyzing the news discourse on immigration from CNN, Fox News, Univision, China Press, Los Angeles Sentinel, and New York Amsterdam. This content analysis enabled me to explore what attributes of the issue are made salient in the information environment for different racial groups. I find both similarities and differences in how the six news sources frame immigration. Those aspects related to the economy, culture, crime/security, and family are commonly emphasized across the news sources. Among them, cultural and familial considerations have an overwhelmingly positive tone. At the same time, the news sources also exhibited differences. When choosing the modifier for describing unlawful immigration, Fox News and China Press more often opt for illegal, whereas Univision favors undocumented. The minority news outlets also distinguished themselves by spotlighting aspects of immigration that are less emphasized in the mainstream news. They frequently mention the nationalities and ethnicities pertinent to their target audience. In addition, the Black and Latino news platforms promote considerations related to rights and discrimination more frequently than others.

In chapter 2, I analyzed a variety of survey data, exploring how these considerations disseminated in the information environment correlate with immigration attitudes. The economic, cultural, crime, and familial considerations that are commonly available for all groups generally predict opinions across racial lines. However, not all attributes highlighted by the relevant news sources have meaningful associations with individuals' immigration attitudes. For example, the crime attribute does not correlate with immigration opinions among Latinos and Asians. I also find that the groups do not respond more strongly to the modifier (illegal vs. undocumented) that is promoted more often by the news platforms that target them. These mixed findings lead me to postulate that the associations between the considerations and immigration attitude may be heterogenous across individuals.

In chapter 3 and chapter 4, I examined political awareness and lived experience as the potential causes of this heterogeneity. I find that among white and Asian Americans, political awareness positively interacts with the economic, crime, cultural, and familial attributes in predicting their immigration attitudes. Though I do not find such supporting evidence among

Black Americans and Latinos, I speculate that a more adequate measure of political knowledge might produce the predicted interactions. Turning to lived experience, I find it has a diverging connection to opinions, both directly and indirectly. Lived experience positively correlates with Latinos' immigration attitudes, and negatively with Asians'. Moreover, there is weak evidence that lived experience reduces the associations between the considerations of immigration and Asians' attitudes whereas the opposite is true for Latinos.

Through this research project, I have sought to narrow the gap in our understanding of how public opinion on immigration varies across racial groups. There remain many unanswered questions. Although I inspected the news discourse from ethnic minority media sources in my content analysis, I had no way of substantiating actual news consumption patterns among minority respondents whose opinions I analyzed. Consequently, it is difficult to conclude that the attributes of immigration particularly emphasized in minority news sources are indeed more accessible to these individuals compared to white Americans. A representative survey that inquires into both the media exposure and opinions on immigration of minority respondents would help resolve this predicament. In addition, since I mostly rely on observational analysis, I cannot ascertain whether the considerations of immigration I examined do shape individuals' attitudes. Future research utilizing framing experiments might look into the question of causality among these correlations that my research identifies.

There were also several unanticipated findings for which I can only provide speculative explanations at best. For instance, why does framing immigrants as illegal or undocumented seem to have no effect on individuals' opinions? Is the null result among Black Americans and Latinos regarding the moderating role of political awareness simply a measurement issue? Also, what causes the diverging direct and indirect experience of lived experience between Asians and Latinos we observed in chapter 4? These questions might help open avenues for future studies worth investigating.

As the United States becomes increasingly diverse, the importance of studying minorities' political opinions will only continue to grow. In particular, immigration as a driving force behind this demographic change will likely remain highly relevant for public opinion and politics. It is my hope that this dissertation has shown the readers that research on immigration attitudes across racial lines is both ongoing and deeply worthwhile.

Appendix for Chapter 1

Appendix Table 1.1. News Consumption Patterns Among Racial Minorities

Black Americans	
Black/African American news more	11 (%)
Mainstream news more	75
Both equally	14
N	486

Native-born Latinos		Foreign-born Latinos	
Spanish news more	29 (%)	Spanish news more	57 (%)
English news more	61	English news more	32
Both equally	10	Both equally	11
N	491	N	222

Native-born Asians		Foreign-born Asians	
Ethnic news more	32 (%)	Ethnic news more	40 (%)
Mainstream news more	55	Mainstream news more	45
Both equally	13	Both equally	15
N	2550	N	1998

Source: National Asian American Survey 2016

Codebook for Content Analysis

<Overview>

This project investigates how the news media frames the issue of immigration. Frames are “the words, images, phrases, and presentation styles that a speaker uses when relaying information about an issue or event to an audience” (Chong and Druckman 2007, pg. 100). The chosen frames reveal what the speaker (in this case, news outlets) finds as relevant to the topic. Essentially, framing allows news outlets to convey information to the audience in a particular way. This codebook lists the diverse news frames of immigration I identify in the news discourse. It also describes how I code the tone of each frame and the coding sequence.

<Frames>

Below is the list of frames I code for my content analysis. Those in **red, underlined, bold font** are frames that are conceptually complicated and thus require a sophisticated discernment.

Economy: code if a stem of the word “economy” or any sub-category below appears.

- Job (job, employment, employer, work, worker, labor, wage, H-1 work visa, union)
- Welfare (welfare, social benefits health/medical care)
- Poverty (poverty, poor, low-income)
- Tax (tax, taxpayer)
- Skill (high/low skilled)
- Business (business, industry, Silicon Valley, company)
- Benefit (economic development/growth/benefit/contribution)
- Cost (economic burden/losses/cost/tuition)

Benefit: code for any concepts related to societal (non-economic) benefits, contributions, or merits.

Cost: code for any concepts related to societal (non-economic) burdens, costs, or harms.

Familial: Any mentions of families, (grand)parents, relatives, child(ren), infants, and spouses.

Crime: code if a stem of the word “crime” or any type of offense that appears below.⁴⁰

- Theft
- Drug
- (Human) smuggling/trafficking
- DUI
- Gang
- Murder and other violent assault
- Sexual assault
- Fraud

Security: code when encountering any concepts related to danger (or lack thereof). This includes...

- Security/safe(ty)
- National Security
- Public safety
- Border security/strong border
- Terrorism
- Danger

*Do NOT code for Department of Homeland ‘Security’.

Modifier: code which modifier appears as an adverb/adjective for immigration or immigrants.

- Legal
- Illegal
- Undocumented
- Lawful
- Unlawful
- Unauthorized
- “Criminal alien”

⁴⁰ For “criminal”, code as trait “violent/criminal-like”.

Culture: code if a stem of the word “culture” or any sub-category below appears.

- Religion (Christianity, Muslim, church, etc.)
- Language (English, Spanish, etc.)
- **Acculturation** (learning English, “U.S. is the only country I know”, “America is my home”, “I feel American”.)
- Symbol (flag, the Statue of Liberty, etc.)
- The American Dream (“America as a land of opportunity”, opportunity to work hard and succeed).
- Nation of immigrants (“my ancestors were immigrants”, “immigrants built this country”)
- Way of life (“un-American”)
- **Cultural values: abstract values** or principals such as liberty, democracy, work ethic, equality, morality, fairness, diversity, etc. that **characterize a group**.

“[immigration] will erode the values holding our nation together”.

“America is not a fortress but rather an exceptional beacon of universal liberty”

"Taking legal protections away from 800,000 young people raised in this country is absolutely counter to what we stand for as a nation."

Value: code for any abstract values or principals such as liberty, democracy, work ethic, equality, morality, fairness, diversity, etc. Notice that, unlike “cultural values”, values do not define a group.

"Family values don't stop at the Rio Grande and a hungry mother is going to try to feed her child," Bush famously said.

“ICE’s actions make our cities unsafe and inflict terror on millions in communities that just want to live with security and liberty.”

Discrimination: code when encountering any concepts related to discrimination. This includes...

- Racism
- Nativism
- Xenophobia
- Dehumanization
- Second-class citizens
- White supremacist

Trait: code for any characteristics (rather than abstract values) of a person or a group. This includes...

- Law-abiding
- Patriotic
- Hard-working⁴¹/ driven
- Lazy
- Violent/criminal-like
- Peaceful/innocent
- Intelligent/talented
- Unintelligent

Right: code when encountering any concepts related to right. This includes...

- Human rights
- Civil rights
- Rights to vote

Country: code which country (countries)/ethnicity (ethnicities)/national origin(s) is (are) mentioned.

- Canada
- Europe
- South America (Brazil, Venezuela, etc.)
- Mexico
- Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, etc.)
- The Caribbean (Haiti, Trinidad, Cuba, etc.)
- Africa (Somalia, Libya, Chad, Sudan, etc.)
- The Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Yemen, Syria, etc.)
- Asia (The Philippines, China, North Korea, etc.)
- Russia
- Turkey

⁴¹ If 'work-ethic' rather than hard-working, code as either value or cultural value.

Race: code which racial group(s) is (are) mentioned.

- White
- Black
- Hispanic/Latino
- Asian

Rule of law: code when encountering any concepts related to rule of law. This includes...

- “Rule of law”
- “Law and order”
- “Lawless”
- “Enforcing the law”
- “Get right by/with the law”
- “Playing by the rules”
- “(Un)Constitutional”

Phrases: code when encountering any of the phrases below.

- “Open border”
- “Chain migration”
- “Better life/future”
- “Amnesty”
- “Crisis”
- “Catch and release”
- “Nazi Germany”
- “(Japanese) Internment”

Appendix for Chapter 2

Appendix Table 2.1. Test of Equality of Group Means for the Preferred Level of Immigration

	Statistic	F(df1,	df2)	= F	Prob>F
Wilks' lambda	0.9733	3.0	3433.0	31.37	0.0000 e
Pillai's trace	0.0267	3.0	3433.0	31.37	0.0000 e
Lawley-Hotelling trace	0.0274	3.0	3433.0	31.37	0.0000 e
Roy's largest root	0.0274	3.0	3433.0	31.37	0.0000 e

e = exact, a = approximate, u = upper bound on F

Appendix Table 2.2. Pairwise Correlations between Economic, Cultural, Crime, and Familial Considerations with Significance at the 5% Level

1. White respondents

	econ	cult	crime	child
econ	1.0000			
cult	0.6565*	1.0000		
crime	0.5930*	0.6656*	1.0000	
child	0.4101*	0.4011*	0.3791*	1.0000

2. Black respondents

	econ	cult	crime	child
econ	1.0000			
cult	0.3841*	1.0000		
crime	0.4169*	0.6210*	1.0000	
child	0.3695*	0.3024*	0.2359*	1.0000

3. Asian respondents

	econ	cult	crime	child
econ	1.0000			
cult	0.5744*	1.0000		
crime	0.5915*	0.6811*	1.0000	
child	0.2660*	0.1689	0.1841*	1.0000

4. Latino respondents

	econ	cult	crime	child
econ	1.0000			
cult	0.4076*	1.0000		
crime	0.4557*	0.5041*	1.0000	
child	0.3741*	0.2995*	0.3461*	1.0000

Appendix Table 2.3. The Effects of Economic Consideration Using the Alternative Measure

VARIABLES	(1) Black	(2) Black	(3) Latino	(4) Latino
Job competition	0.114 (0.209)		0.343* (0.206)	
Economic benefits		0.481* (0.266)		1.109*** (0.278)
Cultural consideration	0.687** (0.274)	0.683** (0.278)	0.305 (0.257)	0.126 (0.263)
Crime consideration	0.449 (0.279)	0.449 (0.279)	0.534** (0.255)	0.454* (0.254)
Familial consideration	0.682*** (0.242)	0.577** (0.252)	1.834*** (0.389)	1.531*** (0.395)
Partisanship	-0.112 (0.259)	-0.099 (0.259)	-0.555*** (0.213)	-0.472** (0.215)
Age	-0.637** (0.325)	-0.576* (0.324)	-0.405 (0.265)	-0.442* (0.267)
Male	0.380*** (0.142)	0.343** (0.143)	0.023 (0.128)	-0.002 (0.128)
Education	0.232 (0.225)	0.193 (0.226)	0.168 (0.209)	0.111 (0.210)
Lower income	-0.233 (0.183)	-0.254 (0.183)	0.186 (0.207)	0.193 (0.208)
Middle income	-0.448*** (0.167)	-0.491*** (0.167)	0.049 (0.156)	-0.005 (0.158)
Upper income	-0.420 (0.321)	-0.473 (0.322)	-0.197 (0.238)	-0.223 (0.240)
Income refused	-0.278 (0.620)	-0.300 (0.621)	0.115 (0.552)	0.004 (0.520)
/cut1	0.560** (0.271)	0.638** (0.272)	1.611*** (0.415)	1.642*** (0.411)
/cut2	2.118*** (0.285)	2.229*** (0.289)	3.183*** (0.434)	3.259*** (0.432)
Observations	319	318	347	348

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 2.4. The Effects of Cultural Consideration Using the Alternative Measure

VARIABLES	(1) White	(2) Black	(3) Asian	(4) Latino
Economic consideration	1.971*** (0.146)	0.443 (0.305)	1.327* (0.781)	1.044*** (0.306)
Cultural consideration	0.672*** (0.133)	0.701** (0.279)	0.533 (0.681)	0.208 (0.260)
Crime consideration	0.667*** (0.119)	0.424 (0.280)	0.134 (0.703)	0.402 (0.258)
Familial consideration	0.411*** (0.095)	0.610** (0.251)	-0.113 (0.452)	1.638*** (0.395)
Partisanship	-0.407*** (0.080)	-0.099 (0.260)	-1.351*** (0.464)	-0.499** (0.214)
Age	-0.759*** (0.103)	-0.586* (0.327)	-0.358 (0.535)	-0.412 (0.266)
Male	0.069 (0.051)	0.356** (0.143)	0.108 (0.255)	-0.009 (0.128)
Education	0.104 (0.077)	0.185 (0.227)	-0.434 (0.388)	0.129 (0.211)
Lower income	0.050 (0.094)	-0.274 (0.184)	-0.487 (0.490)	0.173 (0.207)
Middle income	-0.194** (0.076)	-0.494*** (0.168)	-0.010 (0.424)	0.014 (0.157)
Upper income	-0.088 (0.091)	-0.460 (0.323)	0.006 (0.470)	-0.220 (0.240)
Income refused	0.028 (0.190)	-0.325 (0.622)	2.212** (1.066)	-0.057 (0.556)
/cut1	1.589*** (0.131)	0.636** (0.276)	-0.784 (0.707)	1.723*** (0.416)
/cut2	3.066*** (0.138)	2.218*** (0.292)	1.275* (0.712)	3.323*** (0.437)
Observations	2,461	316	103	347

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix for Chapter 3

Appendix Table 3.1. Interaction with News Exposure among Blacks

VARIABLES	(1) Economic	(2) Crime	(3) Cultural	(4) Familial
Mid News Exposure	-1.036* (0.614)	-1.147** (0.536)	-0.517 (0.576)	-1.255* (0.730)
High News Exposure	-0.338 (0.412)	-0.634* (0.383)	0.033 (0.379)	-1.010** (0.428)
Econ X Mid Exp	1.267 (0.935)			
Econ X High Exp	0.283 (0.653)			
Crime X Mid Exp		1.422* (0.785)		
Crime X High Exp		0.704 (0.546)		
Culture X Mid Exp			0.567 (1.269)	
Culture X High Exp			-0.562 (0.908)	
Familial X Mid Exp				1.223 (0.824)
Familial X High Exp				1.072** (0.514)
Economic	0.229 (0.545)	0.488 (0.305)	0.520* (0.304)	0.551* (0.304)
Crime	0.411 (0.271)	-0.170 (0.472)	0.457* (0.272)	0.456* (0.270)
Cultural	1.159*** (0.439)	1.150*** (0.439)	1.452* (0.786)	1.219*** (0.438)
Familial	0.777*** (0.257)	0.833*** (0.259)	0.779*** (0.256)	0.067 (0.407)
Partisanship	-0.014 (0.270)	-0.078 (0.270)	-0.060 (0.267)	0.042 (0.271)
Age	-0.283 (0.347)	-0.229 (0.347)	-0.269 (0.344)	-0.214 (0.346)
Male	0.325** (0.143)	0.351** (0.143)	0.326** (0.143)	0.320** (0.143)
Education	0.236 (0.229)	0.243 (0.229)	0.224 (0.229)	0.245 (0.230)
Lower income	-0.257 (0.185)	-0.307* (0.186)	-0.257 (0.185)	-0.278 (0.184)
Middle income	-0.447*** (0.170)	-0.508*** (0.168)	-0.460*** (0.168)	-0.444*** (0.167)
Upper income	-0.571* (0.332)	-0.623* (0.334)	-0.533 (0.337)	-0.643* (0.333)
Income refused	-0.193 (0.667)	-0.265 (0.668)	-0.188 (0.667)	-0.243 (0.668)
/cut1	0.647 (0.395)	0.444 (0.413)	0.946** (0.411)	0.369 (0.382)
/cut2	2.245*** (0.406)	2.045*** (0.423)	2.540*** (0.424)	1.975*** (0.392)
Observations	315	315	315	315

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 3.2. Interaction with News Exposure among Latinos

VARIABLES	(1) Economic	(2) Crime	(3) Cultural	(4) Familial
Mid News Exposure	-0.068 (0.610)	0.019 (0.503)	-0.323 (0.460)	-1.460 (1.088)
High News Exposure	0.043 (0.464)	0.154 (0.369)	-0.764** (0.372)	-0.792 (0.785)
Econ X Mid Exp	0.308			
	(0.818)			
Econ X High Exp	-0.119			
	(0.619)			
Crime X Mid Exp		0.191		
		(0.687)		
Crime X High Exp		-0.297		
		(0.506)		
Culture X Mid Exp			1.165	
			(1.069)	
Culture X High Exp			1.703**	
			(0.803)	
Familial X Mid Exp				1.807
				(1.191)
Familial X High Exp				0.829
				(0.858)
Economic	0.957** (0.479)	0.912*** (0.316)	1.026*** (0.314)	0.977*** (0.312)
Crime	0.319 (0.253)	0.456 (0.412)	0.317 (0.253)	0.295 (0.253)
Cultural	1.080*** (0.395)	1.051*** (0.394)	0.089 (0.619)	1.075*** (0.392)
Familial	1.658*** (0.398)	1.669*** (0.399)	1.621*** (0.401)	0.910 (0.692)
Partisanship	-0.405* (0.223)	-0.419* (0.221)	-0.367* (0.219)	-0.377* (0.219)
Age	-0.211 (0.297)	-0.216 (0.293)	-0.120 (0.296)	-0.174 (0.294)
Male	-0.004 (0.131)	-0.006 (0.130)	-0.045 (0.131)	-0.020 (0.130)
Education	0.066 (0.216)	0.091 (0.220)	0.084 (0.215)	0.091 (0.216)
Lower income	0.250 (0.212)	0.250 (0.212)	0.299 (0.213)	0.270 (0.212)
Middle income	0.095 (0.159)	0.093 (0.160)	0.108 (0.159)	0.106 (0.159)
Upper income	-0.075 (0.249)	-0.080 (0.248)	-0.002 (0.249)	-0.082 (0.248)
Income refused	-0.153 (0.571)	-0.093 (0.568)	-0.260 (0.568)	-0.180 (0.566)
/cut1	2.048*** (0.481)	2.101*** (0.483)	1.679*** (0.477)	1.398** (0.663)
/cut2	3.679*** (0.502)	3.734*** (0.505)	3.321*** (0.496)	3.033*** (0.677)
Observations	345	345	345	345

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix for Chapter 4

Appendix Table 4.1. Regression Coefficients for the Outcome Model among Latinos

VARIABLES	(1) First gen.	(2) Native
Economic	0.236 (0.189)	0.069 (0.124)
Cultural	-0.010 (0.239)	0.567*** (0.184)
Crime	0.126 (0.136)	-0.031 (0.129)
Familial	0.622*** (0.225)	0.204* (0.123)
Partisanship	-0.039 (0.127)	-0.165* (0.093)
Age	0.080 (0.172)	0.004 (0.127)
Male	0.027 (0.076)	-0.037 (0.055)
Education	-0.060 (0.125)	0.094 (0.089)
Lower income	0.139 (0.112)	0.043 (0.103)
Middle income	0.063 (0.097)	-0.026 (0.067)
Upper income	0.026 (0.153)	-0.081 (0.114)
Income refused	0.176 (0.235)	-0.244 (0.217)
Constant	-0.440 (0.272)	0.045 (0.157)
Observations	90	132
R-squared	0.213	0.257

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 4.2. Regression Coefficients for the Outcome Model among Asians

VARIABLES	(1) First gen.	(2) Native
Economic	0.284 (0.234)	-0.302 (0.260)
Cultural	0.042 (0.321)	0.594** (0.223)
Crime	-0.049 (0.204)	0.526** (0.224)
Familial	-0.019 (0.133)	0.014 (0.146)
Partisanship	-0.306** (0.141)	-0.485*** (0.140)
Age	0.186 (0.188)	-0.408** (0.162)
Male	0.001 (0.081)	0.103 (0.069)
Education	-0.086 (0.120)	0.158 (0.130)
Lower income	0.293 (0.209)	-0.169 (0.128)
Middle income	0.430** (0.191)	-0.144 (0.098)
Upper income	0.358* (0.204)	-0.109 (0.131)
Income refused	0.773** (0.309)	- -
Constant	0.067 (0.280)	0.467** (0.196)
Observations	64	37
R-squared	0.282	0.726

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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