Moving People: Refugee Politics, Foreign Aid, and the Emergence of American Humanitarianism in the Twentieth Century

By

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Introduction

In the fall of 1956, William Hallam Tuck viewed the start of the Hungarian Revolution from neighboring Austria. Serving as the U.S. representative to the Committee for European Migration, a precursor to the International Organization of Migration, Tuck quietly supported the anti-Soviet revolution, but he refused to comment publicly as to not jeopardize his position. In November the Soviet army invaded Hungary, killing thousands and displacing hundreds of thousands of refugees from the country. The events took place with alacrity—in the words of one historian, "like a thunderclap."[1] Within a few weeks of the invasion, tens of thousands of Hungarian refugees sought asylum, fleeing from the encroaching Soviet army. Facing bipartisan pressure from anticommunists in Congress demanding that he "rollback" communism in Eastern Europe, President Dwight Eisenhower formed the Committee for Hungarian Relief. Eisenhower vested this new committee with the power to identify, screen, and resettle Hungarian refugees seeking asylum in the United States. When looking for expertise on the process of identifying legitimate asylum-seekers—meaning, in the Cold War context, anti-communist—and a logistical expert to plan the movement for those refugees, Eisenhower turned not to a member of his cabinet or to the State Department, but to one of his predecessors: Herbert Hoover. Before his presidency, Hoover had famously organized a variety of humanitarian endeavors during and in the wake of World War I most notably the American Relief Administration (ARA). Hoover directed Eisenhower to Tuck, one of his old employees from the ARA days, considering him, "the most experienced citizen we have in refugee matters." Tuck did have the benefit of long experience, he had been working on humanitarian projects for close to forty years, serving in

[1] Carl J. Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War (Princeton, N.J., 2008), 60.

Hoover's ARA and as director of the International Refugee Organization. He had even worked in Hungary, delivering food to America's erstwhile enemy after the end of World War I. Eisenhower drafted Tuck into the Committee for Hungarian Relief where the career humanitarian took over the operation from Austria, eventually leading to tens of thousands of Hungarian refugees being resettled in the United States.

This dissertation follows how men like Tuck first began working in refugee relief and rehabilitation after World War I, how these new humanitarians refined and clarified their views into cohesive disciplines over the interwar years, and how those disciplines became the foundation for global humanitarian institutions during World War II and in the early Cold War. I follow a wide network of institutions charged with managing refugee crises overseas in the wake of World War I, when organizations established the norms of professionalized relief work and refugees came to be seen as a subject of international responsibility.[2] These included new technocratic nongovernmental organizations, groups of humanitarian aid workers, and missionary networks. Working in conjunction with the American state, these organizations gained an unprecedented degree of authority overseas in the newly formed nation-states created out of the former Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. American organizations thrived when imperial fallout, ethnic violence, and ideological conflict in these regions created, what Davide Rodogno terms, "sovereignty deficits"[3] In these places, U.S. humanitarian organizations implemented a wide variety of refugee management techniques, from overseeing camp management and labor regimes to controlling refugee flows through aid distribution. The refugee management work of these organizations rarely ended in resettlement in the United

[2] Sharif Gemie, Fiona Reid, Laure Humbert, Louise Ingram, *Outcast Europe: Refugees and Relief Workers in an Era of Total War, 1936-1948* (New York: Continuum Publishing Group, 2012), 5.
[3] Davide Rodogno, "Non-State Actors' Humanitarian Operations in the Aftermath of the First World War: The Case of Near East Relief" in Fabian Klose, ed., *The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention: Ideas and Practice from the Nineteenth Century to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 190.

States for the displaced peoples, but they left an indelible mark on the newly formed countries in Europe and the Middle East as well as on the American aid workers and policymakers involved. Due to the unprecedented destruction of World War I, these organizations were allowed immense control over the daily lives of people living overseas in the new states created out of the fallen empires in Europe and the Middle East. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, the networks established by these humanitarians proved extremely durable, with different organizations refining their work into cohesive disciplines like logistics and management or development policy. American humanitarians would embed these logics into the first global relief organizations. At the same time, my dissertation follows how, over the decades, organizational changes within U.S. humanitarian institutions led to a growing deference to national sovereignty, with this norm eventually becoming institutionalized in the United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration in the 1940s and, from there, diffused throughout international aid organizations worldwide.

This dissertation draws from several different fields of history. The most direct intervention of this dissertation lies within the rich scholarship on the history of American refugee policy, which has elaborated on the role of foreign policy imperatives in deciding who were "acceptable" refugees to resettle in the United States. Historians like Gil Loescher, John Scanlan, and Carl Bon Tempo have provided crucial insight into how displaced people become "acceptable" refugees and the shifting possibilities for refugee assimilation over the twentieth century.[4] These historians established innovative interpretive frameworks to understand refugee movement, particularly their emphasis on the importance of American foreign policy and global

[4] Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan, Calculated Kindness: Refugees and America's Half-Opened Door, 1945 to the Present (New York, 1986); Carl J. Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War (Princeton, N.J., 2008)

politics in shaping the domestic policies of resettlement.[5] The analytical focus of this field has been largely geared, however, towards answering questions centered on the Cold War. Specifically, how America's resettlement of refugees during the second half of the twentieth century can offer greater insight into how policymakers deployed resources in the fight against the Soviet Union. Refugee historians have generally looked to 1948 as the beginning of American involvement in global refugee politics. Only after the passage of the 1948 Displaced Persons act –which formulated the first standardized process for refugee resettlement in the United States – did the United States systematically organize how refugees would be accepted and resettled. While 1948 stands as a landmark year in American refugee policy, American involvement in refugee politics has remained too firmly tethered to the second half of the twentieth century. In many ways the sole focus on Cold War policymaking makes sense. Since

[5] The role of refugee politics during the Cold War has been the major focus of research from a wide variety of disciplines. For foundational works in this field, see Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate; Loescher and Scanlan, Calculated Kindness; Koehn, Refugees from Revolution; Zucker and Zucker, "From Immigration to Refugee Redefinition"; Teitelbaum, "Immigration, Refugees, and Foreign Policy"; Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Roots of American Refugee Policy," Social Research 55, no. 4 (1988): 649–678; Tara Zahra, The Great Departure: Mass Migration from Eastern Europe and the Making of the Free World (New York, 2016). On Cold War politics and East Asian refugee migration, see Hsu, The Good Immigrants; Arissa H. Oh, To Save the Children of Korea: The Cold War Origins of International Adoption (Stanford, Calif., 2015); Michael G. Davis, "Impetus for Immigration Reform: Asian Refugees and the Cold War," Journal of American–East Asian Relations 7, no. 3–4 (1998): 127–156; Davis, "The Cold War, Refugees, and U.S. Immigration Policy." On attempts to encourage escape from Communist Bloc countries in Europe and to mobilize anticommunist refugees, see Susan L. Carruthers, "Between Camps: Eastern Bloc 'Escapees' and Cold War Borderlands," American Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2005): 911–942; Simo Mikkonen, "Exploiting the Exiles: Soviet E´migre´s in U.S. Cold War Strategy," Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 2 (2012): 98–127. On U.S. programs to aid and mobilize Cuban anti-communist refugee communities, see Marı´a Cristina Garcı´a, Havana USA: Cuban Exiles and Cuban Americans in South Florida, 1959–1994 (Berkeley, Calif., 1996); Felix Roberto Masud-Piloto, From Welcomed Exiles to Illegal Immigrants: Cuban Migration to the U.S., 1959–1995 (Lanham, Md., 1996); John Scanlan and Gilburt Loescher, "U.S. Foreign Policy, 1959– 80: Impact on Refugee Flow from Cuba," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 467, no. 1 (1983): 116–137. On the politics of Vietnamese refugee relocation, see Yen Le Espiritu, Body Counts: The Vietnam War and Militarized Refugees (Berkeley, Calif., 2014); Sucheng Chan, "Politics and the Indochinese Refugee Exodus, 1976–1997," in Chan, ed., Remapping Asian American History (Lanham, Md., 2003), 171–222; Heather Marie Stur, "'Hiding behind the Humanitarian Label': Refugees, Repatriates, and the Rebuilding of America's Benevolent Image after the Vietnam War," Diplomatic History 39, no. 2 (2015): 223–244; Jana K. Lipman, "'Give Us a Ship': The Vietnamese Repatriate Movement on Guam, 1975," American Quarterly 64, no. 1 (2012): 1–31; Sam C. Vong, "Compassion Politics: The History of Indochinese Refugees and the Transnational Networks of Care, 1975–1994" (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 2013). On refugee resettlement's role in asserting a politics of gratitude to erase U.S. responsibility, see Espiritu, Body Counts; Yen Le Espiritu, "Militarized Refuge: A Critical Rereading of Vietnamese Flight to the United States," in Janet Hoskins and Viet Thanh Nguyen, eds., Transpacific Studies: Framing an Emerging Field (Honolulu, 2014), 201–224.

the passage of the DP Act, the U.S. has accepted and resettled millions of refugees; thus, the focus on resettlement as the central dynamic of American refugee policy. With this approach, American involvement in refugee movements before 1948 would merit little attention as the U.S. did not have a systematic process allowing refugees within their borders before then. Trying to understand American involvement in global refugee politics before the Cold War requires a new methodological approach, since America did not yet have a state process that categorized "refugees" outside of immigration channels. Addressing this, my dissertation moves past resettlement in the United States as the sole criteria for understanding American involvement in refugee movements abroad. Americans were actively involved overseas before the late 1940s in shaping refugee movements overseas where few if any refugees made it to American shores. My dissertation stresses the ways that Americans sought to express power over long distances, using imperial networks and global infrastructures to facilitate more ambitious refugee management projects ranging from mass migration to instituting labor regimes.[6] Separating the terms of resettlement from refugee politics broadens the chronological and analytical scope of studies on American refugee policy while simultaneously denaturalizing the concept of the United States as

[6] Works that foreground empire and imperial power represent another growing field in the history of immigration. See Izumi Hirobe, Japanese Pride, American Prejudice: Modifying the Exclusion Clause of the 1924 Immigration Act (Stanford, Calif., 2001); Mae M. Ngai, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America (Princeton, N.J., 2004); Eiichiro Azuma, Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America (New York, 2005); Carl J. Bon Tempo, Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees during the Cold War (Princeton, N.J., 2008); Rick Baldoz, The Third Asiatic Invasion: Empire and Migration in Filipino America, 1898–1946 (New York, 2011); Donna R. Gabaccia, Foreign Relations: American Immigration in Global Perspective (Princeton, N.J., 2012); Kornel S. Chang, Pacific Connections: The Making of the U.S.- Canadian Borderlands (Berkeley, Calif., 2012); Seema Sohi, Echoes of Mutiny: Race, Surveillance, and Indian Anticolonialism in North America (New York, 2014); Madeline Y. Hsu, The Good Immigrants: How the Yellow Peril Became the Model Minority (Princeton, N.J., 2015); Meredith Oyen, The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.-Chinese Relations in the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y., 2015); David C. Atkinson, The Burden of White Supremacy: Containing Asian Migration in the British Empire and the United States (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2016); Marı´a Cristina Garcı´a, The Refugee Challenge in Post–Cold War America (New York, 2017); Torrie Hester, Deportation: The Origins of U.S. Policy (Philadelphia, 2017); Edgardo Mele´ndez, Sponsored Migration: The State and Puerto Rican Postwar Migration to the United States (Columbus, Ohio, 2017); Beth Lew-Williams, The Chinese Must Go: Violence, Exclusion, and the Making of the Alien in America (Cambridge, Mass., 2018).

primarily a receiver of refugees. My dissertation shows that although the United States did not have official refugee *policy* during this era, it maintained a persistent, globalized refugee *politics*. This move to decenter the United States echoes historiographical shifts within the field of immigration history, which has increasingly stressed the importance of transnational networks to understand migration.[7]

By focusing on American humanitarian institutions as the projectors of U.S. authority, this dissertation also contributes to a growing body of literature on American humanitarianism. The first generation of scholars who studied non-governmental organizations articulated a straightforward narrative of the interwar years: a brief burst of "Wilsonian Internationalism" after World War I resulted in American engagement abroad, followed by American withdrawal, the rise of restrictive ethno-nationalist nation-states, and the decline of internationalism. This narrative ends after World War II, with the U.S. poised as the new global superpower, once again eager to engage with international politics.[8] Echoing this narrative historian of humanitarianism Michael Barnett terms World War I "a dry run," where the few humanitarian organizations created failed to respond to the enormity of the crisis.[9] This conception of the interwar years as a period of relative unimportance, however, glosses over and minimizes key continuities between the World Wars, both ideological and in terms of the personnel that staffed and organized humanitarian institutions.

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[7] See Nina Glick Schiller, "Transnationalism: A New Analytic Framework for Understanding Migration," in Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, eds., Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Nationalism Reconsidered (New York, 1992), 1–24; Donna R. Gabaccia, "Is Everywhere Nowhere? Nomads, Nations, and the Immigrant Paradigm of United States History," Journal of American History 86, no. 3 (1999): 1115–1134.

[8] For examples of this grand historical narrative that decenters World War I and the interwar years see Amos Yoder, *The Evolution of the United Nations System* , 2nd edn (Taylor & Francis, 1993). For more sophisticated versions of this narrative, see e.g. Akira Ariye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, 1997); Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919–1933* (Oxford, 2005). For a more thorough historiographical review of how this mode of thinking became so dominant in scholarship see, Jessica Reinisch, "Internationalism in Relief: The Birth (and Death) of UNRRA" *Past & Present* 210:6 (2011), Pages 258–289.

[9] Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 40.

After World War I, humanitarian organizations represented one of the key ways that Americans engaged with people overseas and a recent generation of historians have advanced new and rich interpretations centering this period in the history of international relief politics.[10] These works generally fall into two often-overlapping categories: crisis-centered histories and nuanced institutional biographies. Scholars have begun to write nuanced biographies of key humanitarian organizations in this period, like the American Red Cross, Near East Relief, and the American Relief Administration.[11] Rather than hagiographies or encyclopedic institutional chronicles, these works focus on the social and political networks that supported humanitarian institutions and the ramifications of their work overseas. These new works largely avoid, in the words of Keith David Watenpaugh, the "laundry lists of the activities of relief workers and descriptions of refugee camps, feeding centers, and resettlement programs…" that characterized earlier institutional histories, which, to Watenpaugh says, "do little to explain modern humanitarianism as an ideology and practice."[12] Scholars like Watenpaugh and Davide Rodogno use organizational histories of Near East Relief as a means to investigate broader concepts of modern humanitarianism by analyzing not only NER's aid work, but also the professionalization and bureaucratization that undergirded the organization's intellectual project in the Middle East. Similarly, Julia Irwin analyzes how the American Red Cross's professionalization process

[10] For a broad overview of the changing scholarship see Julia Irwin, "Taming Total War: Great War-Era American Humanitarianism and its Legacies" *Diplomatic History* 38:4 (September 2014), 763-775. For a longue duree account of the history of humanitarianism see Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).

[11] Julia Irwin, *Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian Awakening* (New York, 2013); Keith David Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015); Davide Rodogno, "Beyond Relief: A sketch of the Near East Relief's Humanitarian Operations, 1918-1929" *Monde(s)* 6 (2014): 45-64; Mary C. Gillett, *The Army Medical Department, 1917-1914* (Washington, DC, 2009) Bertrande Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921* (Stanford, 2002) Jennifer Polk, "Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary and Civil War Russia, 1917–1924" (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012); Thomas Westerman, "Rough and Ready Relief: American Identity, Humanitarian Experience, and the Commission for Relief in Belgium, 1914–1917" (PhD dissertation, University of Connecticut, 2014).

[12] Watenpaugh 23

influenced changing notions of masculinity and labor in the United States. Irwin also traces the political networks that founded and supported the ARC, showing how the ARC helped legitimize foreign aid as a tool to project U.S. imperial power. Crisis-centered histories take a catastrophe or humanitarian dilemma as their primary focus of analysis, tracing the ways that a variety of institutions and organizations considered, approached, and sought to resolve the crisis.[13] This type of history is best exemplified by the work of Melanie Tanielian, who follows how famine became the central concern of a nexus of political and humanitarian actors in the Middle East during World War I. By focusing on how famine became a crisis, Tanielian decenters institutional frameworks as a category of analysis, instead focusing on how a variety of organizations created techniques and methods to manage a single crisis. My dissertation draws from both of these frameworks, articulating a syncretic organizational history over time focused on how two aid institutions, the American Relief Administration and Near East Relief, operated within a network of American diplomatic authorities, U.S. based missionary communities, and international organizations. As these organizations confronted crises in Europe and the Middle East, they created, refined, and implemented disciplines and techniques that they would go on to embedded into the institutional logics of international aid organizations throughout the twentieth century.

By centering refugee management, my dissertation seeks to uncover the ways that humanitarian practice intertwined with systems of governance and control. In order to understand how the humanitarian organizational logics relate to structures of domination and

[13] Melanie Tanielian, *The Charity of War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017); Keith David Watenpaugh, "'A pious wish devoid of all practicability': Interwar Humanitarianism, The League of Nations and the Rescue of Trafficked Women and Children in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1920–1927," *American Historical Review* 115, no. 4 (October 2010): 1315–39; Branden Little, "Band of Crusaders: American Humanitarians, the Great War, and the Remaking of the World" (PhD dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 2009); Michael McGuire, "An Ephemeral Relationship: American Non-governmental Organizations, the Reconstruction of France, and Franco-American Relations, 1914–1924" (PhD dissertation, Boston University, 2012).

control, I draw on the work of anthropologist and sociologist Didier Fassin, particularly his theories of "humanitarian reason" and "humanitarian governance." Tracing the long history of humanitarianism in European thought, Fassin argues that, around the start of the twentieth century, a new way of understanding charity and philanthropy revolutionized humanitarian thinking. In contrast to earlier models that drew upon faith, humanitarian reason, "was based on a confidence in the efficacy of professionalism, buttressed by social science, advanced medicine, and public health, to address those problems."[14] Using this "humanitarian reason," organizations like the ARA and NER embarked on a variety of refugee management projects that sought to control the migration, labor, and daily lives of refugees to far greater extents than any non-governmental institution had ever tried. Using methods borrowed from the managerial revolution in the United States, the ARA and NER instituted new systems of knowledge to render their humanitarian charges legible to the U.S. state and international organizations, including rigorous identification and categorization systems and thorough bookkeeping. These management systems, in some cases, worked in tandem with state-sponsored governance, with humanitarian organizations taking over the basic social welfare of people in Europe and the Middle East. This process inverts what Fassin terms, "humanitarian governance." Focusing on the post-Cold War era, Fassin follows how repressive states have co-opted the terms of humanitarianism while enacting their policies. However, Fassin's definition of "humanitarian governance" is just as generative when applied to massive humanitarian organizations able to exercise control over the daily lives of displaced people. Fassin writes, "This tension between inequality and solidarity, between a relation of domination and a relation of assistance, is constitutive of all humanitarian

[14] Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 18.

government."[15] While Fassin's study focuses on how governments have co-opted the language of humanitarianism, his analysis applies just as astutely to humanitarian organizations that, in periods of imperial upset and "sovereignty deficits," performed many of the basic functions of government.

The case-studies in the first half of my dissertation, all of which take place directly in the aftermath of World War I, reveal the extent to which American humanitarian organizations were able to intercede in political structures overseas. The size and scope of the US organizations operating after World War I meant that they had unparalleled access to reshaping the lived experiences of people across the globe. Throughout my dissertation I term this access as "humanitarian intervention," or the ability for U.S. humanitarian organizations to intervene in other nation's sociopolitics. I argue that the terminology humanitarian intervention, typically associated with state military operations in the post-Cold War era, offers new insight into the breadth and scope of American humanitarian organization's refugee management projects in the early twentieth century. I draw this terminology from recent shifts in the history of humanitarianism that have sought to reframe "humanitarian intervention" as a term to help scholars understand the power of humanitarian work to reshape politics. Most scholars that study humanitarian intervention agree on three key features defining the phenomenon: transboundary interference, humanitarian purposes, and coercion.[16] Although I do not consider these to be

[15] Fassin, 3

[16] In political science, see: see especially Wheeler, Saving Strangers ; Welsh, Humanitarian Intervention ; Holzgrefe and Keohane, Humanitarian Intervention ; Heinze, Waging Humanitarian War ; Anne Orford, Reading Humanitarian Intervention: Human Rights and the Use of Force in International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2003). Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention , 3 . For the focus on the period since 1990 , see, for example, MacFarlane, Intervention , 49 – 83 ; Michael C. Davis, Wolfgang Dietrich, Bettina Scholdan, and Dieter Sepp, International Intervention in the Post-Cold War World: Moral Responsibility and Power Politics (Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 2004); Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention ; see also Thompson, Chapter 15 , 344 – 46. In legal studies, see: Fernando R. Tesón, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Transnational Publishers, 2005); Thakur, Responsibility to Protect ; Orford, International Authority . Louis Henkin, ' Kosovo and the Law of " Humanitarian Intervention "' , The American Journal of International Law

exhaustive or conclusive, American humanitarian organizations in the interwar years satisfied all of these conditions. In an edited volume on the topic Fabian Klose traces how a variety of scholarly disciplines have theorized the limits of humanitarian intervention over recent decades. The fields of political science and law, Klose concludes, established a genealogy of humanitarian intervention that ignores its long history.[17] By widening the scope of humanitarian intervention to include the refugee management projects of organizations like the ARA and NER, my dissertation gestures to another episode in this long history. These impulses for non-governmental organizations to intervene that were established in the interwar years reached their zenith in the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), which managed and resettled millions of refugees in the wake of World War II.

This dissertation does not seek to provide an exhaustive account of Near East Relief or the American Relief Administration's work after World War I, nor of the work of the UNNRA during the subsequent war. Instead, this dissertation traces the ways that techniques and policies of organizations can become embedded within institutional logics over time, framing the ways that humanitarian institutions confront crises. The chronological length of my project, over thirty years, restricts some of the synchronic insight that a more tightly focused work could provide. Both the American Relief Administration and Near East Relief, in keeping with their celebrated professionalism, maintained vast stores of archival information. The enormous amount of data

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, 93 , no. 4 (October 1999), 824 – 8 ; Jonathan I. Charney, ' Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo ' , The American Journal of International Law , 93 , no. 4 (October 1999), 834 – 41 ; Richard A. Falk, ' Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International Law ' , The America Journal of Law , 93 , no. 4 (October 1999), 847 – 57 ; Sean D. Murphy, ' The Intervention in Kosovo: A Law-Shaping Incident? ' , Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), 94 (5 – 8 April 2000), 302 – 04 ; Allen Buchanan, ' Reforming the International Law of 28 29 30 Humanitarian Intervention ' in J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 130 – 73 ; Katariina Simonen, The State versus the Individual: The Unresolved Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention (Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011); Ciarán Burke, An Equitable Framework for Humanitarian Intervention (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2013).*

[17] Klose, 12

generated by these organizations, however, can often obscure more than it reveals. The voices of refugees are rarely captured in the archives. Where possible I have tried to augment institutional records with other sources of archival material that can offer more insight into the daily lives of the refugees in the charge of these organizations. My language limitations, no doubt, have hampered this project similarly. I hope for this work to be a foundation for other scholars to build nuanced histories of refugee's lived experiences, syncretic analyses of non-American humanitarian organization, and transnational studies of global aid institutions.

Moving People is divided into three sections that map, roughly, onto the period of 1919 to 1945. The first of these sections follows three nearly simultaneous case-studies in relief and refugee management in the wake of World War I. Set on the peripheries of what historians commonly consider the flashpoints of the war, these chapters follow how American humanitarians in Turkey and Russia attempted to negotiate the changing politics of ideology and ethnic nationalism in the wake of imperial upset. In response to successive refugee crises, U.S. organizations shaped migration patterns in Russia, established infrastructures of travel in the Aegean Sea, and channeled refugees to the United States from Constantinople. The second section traces how, as regional conflict receded in the 1920s and 1930s, these same humanitarians, now newly minted experts in migration politics, moved into the private sector or into development projects in Europe and the Middle East. Throughout the interwar years, the American Relief Administration and Near East Relief refined their conceptions of humanitarian work into cohesive disciplines, championing the potential of logistics and development policy, respectively. By the 1930s, both of these aid organizations embraced "humanitarian reason" in their work, emphasizing efficiency, rationality, and standardization of best practices. Finally, the third section reveals how the U.S. state adopted and co-opted personnel and policies from the

post-WWI institutions to build their relief apparatus during World War II and the Cold War. As World War II loomed on the horizon, this earlier generation of humanitarian workers took up key positions in the U.S. government as the state prepared for war. When the United States confronted the massive refugee crises of the post-World War II world, these former aid workers drew from their previous experiences to construct the new refugee order.

Chapter 1

"The Land of Great Hunger:" The American Relief Administration in Russia

Later in his life, James Rives Childs would go on to be an American ambassador, a scholar, and the authoritative biographer of Giacomo Casanova, the Italian libertine. But in August of 1921 he was far from Casanova's Venice, and even farther from the United States; he was boarding a train to Kazan, a large Tatar city in southwest Russia on the banks of the Volga River. Kazan was suffering through one of the worst famines in its history, a devastating crisis that left hundreds of thousands starving. Upon arriving in the city, he chronicled in his diary, "A cold drizzling rain was falling to accentuate the misery visible in the mud and cold outside. We were definitely on the famine front though there was no pageantry or alarm of arms to distinguish [this] front [from] one we viewed on the battlefields of France…"[18] The conditions in Kazan were not unique: experts in the Soviet Union estimated five to seven million people across the entire nation were starving as of August. Nor was Childs' calling the famine territory a "front" unique either. Like many of his fellow veterans, Childs enlisted in post-war relief work after the end of World War I with the American Relief Administration (ARA), a wartime rationing and food distribution service headed by then Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover, that had been converted to a post-war relief institution after the Treaty of Versailles. Funded by the U.S. government and drawing its food from stockpiles in America amassed during the war, the ARA operated an enormous organization that spanned all of Europe and into the Middle

[18] James Rives Childs, *Red Days in Russia*, unpublished manuscript. ARA Russian Operational Records, Stanford University, Hoover Archives on Peace and War. Box 7, Folder 12, Reel 15. Pg. 23.

East.[19] Along with his ARA colleagues, Childs believed that the organization's food distribution in the wake of the destruction was as critical as the war itself.

This chapter traces the circuitous route by which the ARA, led by future president and avowed anti-Bolshevik Herbert Hoover, came to work alongside the Soviet government. Central to this narrative is the ARA's conception of humanitarian aid and refugee governance. The ARA's vision of humanitarian aid as peaceful combat demanded tactical thinking, strategic vision, and, in some cases, forceful action. In Russia, this vision ultimately led to the American Relief Administration using its aid to control the movement of millions of Russian peasants, often at the behest of the Soviet government. When Childs and his compatriots entered Soviet Russia, the organization conceived of their task as simply famine relief. Successive crises in Russia—World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Russian Civil War—led to millions of deaths, destroyed infrastructure, eradicated farm production, and, most importantly for the ARA, the displacement of millions of Russians.[20] Refugees became central to the way that the ARA confronted the task of relieving the Russian famine. The catastrophic nature of the famine granted ARA distributors enormous control over the transportation and dispensation of food packages. This level of control expanded the ARA's perceived humanitarian purview—they sought to both relieve the famine by distributing aid packages and also by enacting more ambitious socioeconomic plans, mostly involving the regulation of refugee movement. By the end of their tenure in Russia, the ARA had done far more than merely food distribution, they had broadened their humanitarian ambit to include disease control, refugee management, and labor

[19] For the most complete and thorough history of the American Relief Administration's work in Europe and in Russia see Bertrande Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
[20] The quick succession of internal and external wars in Russia accelerated successive refugee crises, for more see Peter Gatrell, *A Whole Empire Walking: Refugees in Russia during World War I* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

oversight. ARA workers regulated refugee movement in two ways. First, through a careful aid and incentive system built with the support of the Soviet government, the ARA ensured that hundreds of thousands of farmers would remain in famine-stricken areas in order to produce more crops. This process, which I call "sedentarization," led to higher crop yields, but also increased suffering from the famine. Rooted in an essentialist understanding of the Russian "national psyche," sedentarization sought to force incentives in the form of food packages into agricultural production in order to compensate for Bolshevism's perceived failures. Second, when confronted by refugees in towns that refused to leave back to the famine-stricken villages along the Volga, ARA distributors leveraged their aid to force villagers to travel back, either guaranteeing extra provisions for travel or threatening to withhold aid altogether. In some cases, ARA workers even organized recalcitrant refugees into labor gangs, tasking them with completing public works projects in order to receive daily rations.

The deployment of the American Relief Administration's massive resources in the country demonstrated the growing power of the U.S. state to influence overseas politics through non-military intervention and non-governmental organizations, as well as illuminating the complex relationship between humanitarian relief and development projects. The ARA's work in Russia can be best defined as a humanitarian intervention, a transboundary intercession into the lives of Russian peasants by an outside organization. Although, conventionally, scholars distinguish civil humanitarian organizations' operations from state military intervention, the ARA consistently leveraged its relief aid to manipulate the socioeconomic fabric of Russia. While the Soviet Union invited the ARA into its borders, the successful tactics of sedentarization

and the leveraging of aid to coerce certain habits and practices demonstrate the considerable geopolitical influence of the organization.[21]

As it affected the lives of Russian farmers, this level of access and control over the daily lives of aid recipients also transformed the American Relief Administration itself on an operational level. Although the ARA defined itself strictly as a famine relief institution, their work in Russia operated in the murky interstices between relief, aid, and development. I argue that in the hinterlands of the new Soviet Union, on the famine-stricken shores of the Volga River, the ARA developed a new food relief politics that sought to use food aid as relief, a tool of development, and a form of migration control. This new ethos of food relief rested on four interlocking dimensions: the rise of anti-Bolshevism in the United States; the changing masculinist politics of humanitarianism; new technocratic approaches to relief work; and the unprecedented amount of power afforded to ARA distributors due to the scope of the famine. This account offers another case-study to a growing bevy of works in the history of humanitarianism that seek to complicate the relationship between relief and development aid.[22] Although technically a non-governmental organization, the ARA engaged in extensive foreign

[21] As mentioned in the introduction, scholars from a variety of disciplines agree on three key features defining a humanitarian intervention: "the transboundary interference in the domestic affairs of a foreign state, the predominant humanitarian purposes, and the coercive nature of the engagement." Klose, *The Emergence of Humanitarian Intervention*, 8. Although I do not consider these categories to be always conclusive or exhaustive, ARA operations in Russia satisfy each of the points.

[22] The history of humanitarianism has seen an explosion of new work in the past decade. For an overview of this new scholarship and its changing chronological focus see Julia Irwin, "Taming Total War: Great War-Era American Humanitarianism and its Legacies" *Diplomatic History* 38:4 (September 2014), 763-775. For a longue duree account of the history of humanitarianism see Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011). For examples of this new scholarship see Melanie Tanielian, *The Charity of War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017); Keith David Watenpaugh, "'A pious wish devoid of all practicability': Interwar Humanitarianism, The League of Nations and the Rescue of Trafficked Women and Children in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1920–1927," *American Historical Review* 115, no. 4 (October 2010): 1315–39; Branden Little, "Band of Crusaders: American Humanitarians, the Great War, and the Remaking of the World" (PhD dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 2009); Michael McGuire, "An Ephemeral Relationship: American Non-governmental Organizations, the Reconstruction of France, and Franco-American Relations, 1914–1924" (PhD dissertation, Boston University, 2012); Kenneth Steuer, Pursuit of an "Unparalleled Opportunity": The American YMCA and Prisoner-of-War Diplomacy among the Central Power Nations during World War I, 1914–1923 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).

policy discussion and decision on behalf of the U.S. state, demonstrating the long and growing reach of the American state in the interwar years. As a humanitarian scion of U.S. foreign policy, The ARA's venture to Russia also serves as an early pre-Cold War case-study on some of the geopolitical dynamics of development projects, building on the work of scholars like Nicholas Cullather and Michael Latham.[23]

The ARA functions as a vehicle for understanding the reach of US imperial power, shaped through the idiosyncratic dispositions and ideologies of a particular organization. Their humanitarian aid provided food for hundreds of thousands of people, but their aid was not dispassionate, it had a guiding politics and an ideology. At the top, Hoover's anti-Bolshevik ideology drove the ARA into Russia to try and upset a government that he found politically distasteful. On the ground, ARA distributors in Russia used the power of their relief to manipulate refugee movement and, in some cases, even control the labor of Russian peasants in desperate need of food. This chapter traces the linkages between the ideological goals of the American Relief Administration on an organizational level and the practical work of humanitarians on the ground overseas, demonstrating the key role of humanitarian actors in shaping the politics and possibilities of migration and movement in this period.

Building an "American" Relief Administration

[23] The scholarship on modernization and development in the Cold War is rich and diverse. For an introduction to the field see the works of: Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010);David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); David Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), and *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).

One man ruled the American Relief Administration: Herbert Hoover. Before his tenure as President, Hoover held the epithet of the "Great Philanthropist" of the world. Hoover made his prodigious wealth in engineering; earning enough that he retired at the age of 38. He gained international prominence in the humanitarian community in 1914 when, caught in London at the start of the first World War, he organized American expatriates in the city, secured transportation, and conveyed tens of thousands of U.S. citizens back across the Atlantic. After returning to the U.S., he organized the Committee for Relief of Belgium (CRB), a massive food transportation operation that gained special dispensation from the Allied and Central Powers to deliver food to occupied Belgium. Historian Bertrand Patenaude describes the CRB as, "a unique brand of humanitarianism enterprise which was soon to become familiar to, though not always fully understood and appreciated by, Europeans and Americans." Patenaude continues, writing that the CRB employed a wide variety of new managerial tools that Hoover co-opted from his days as a mining executive, up to and including "commercial principles," mostly in the form of guaranteeing food aid through credit loans from the recipient nations.[24] The CRB operated on a strict budget and a small staff, mostly close friends of Hoover from his mining days or analytical experts brought in from the private sector and academia. The organization kept strict accounting methods—so rigorous that Hoover once claimed he knew where every single sack of flour delivered by the CRB ended up.[25] Hoover also pursued aggressive financial strategies, building massive advertising campaigns, holding citywide festivals called "relief bazaars," and

[24] Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bololand*, 29. For more on the CRB, see Elisabeth Piller, "American War Relief, Cultural Mobilization, and the Myth of Impartial Humanitarianism, 1914-1917" *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* 17 (2018); Thomas Westerman, "Rough and Ready Relief: American Identity, Humanitarian Experience, and the Commission for Relief in Belgium, 1914–1917" (PhD dissertation, University of Connecticut, 2014).
[25] Frank M. Surface and Raymond L. Bland, *American Food in the World War and Reconstruction Period* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1931), 12.

empowering thousands of local organizations to collect funds for the CRB.[26] While both the Allies and the Central powers respected the CRB's proclaimed neutrality, their aid was not impartial. Historian Elisabeth Piller writes, "Potent in theory, the impartiality of American relief work never existed in practice. Quite the contrary, hardly any other social activity so strongly reflected America's emotional ties, cultural affinities, and moral convictions during the period of neutrality." While the headquarters staff of the CRB judiciously refused to criticize the German government, the local relief committees that collected money for the organization stoked outrage over perceived and real German atrocities in Belgium.[27] This juxtaposition between official administrative goals and operational work on the ground presaged a similar disconnect during the Russian campaign. Organizationally, Hoover's wartime projects and postwar relief work mirrored the CRB's intense focus on food aid, efficiency, and incentivization.

When the U.S. declared war on Germany in 1917, Hoover had gained such status in the United States as an efficient manager, that President Woodrow Wilson appointed him as head of the Food Administration—Wilson's wartime rationing agency—despite Hoover lacking any background in the field of rationing. Hoover guided Food Administration with an ideology organized around four central poles. First, Hoover sought centralized power and authority at the Food Administration, ensuring that no other organizations were engaged in rationing work. Following this, Hoover recruited an assortment of businessmen and managerial experts, rather than experienced politicians, to run his organization. Much like his work with the CRB, Hoover focused the identity of the Food Administration on voluntarism, both among his employees and among the populace. Despite being federal employees, he characterized the work of his

[26] For analysis of "relief bazaars" and the narratives of humanitarian aid to Europe during World War I see Piller, "American War Relief, Cultural Mobilization, and the Myth of Impartial Humanitarianism, 1914-1917".
[27] Piller, "American War Relief, Cultural Mobilization, and the Myth of Impartial Humanitarianism, 1914-1917". 625

employees on rationing as a voluntary service to humanity and expected the same type of dedication from citizens. Finally, the Food Administration cemented the importance of food in Hoover's mind as the best way to achieve long-term political and economic goals. To Hoover, control over food rationing was not merely the management of national consumption, but could rather be a strategic tool necessary both in the making of war and peace as well as the realm of global politics. These four poles would remain critical to all of Hoover's subsequent humanitarian work over the following decade. Writing of Hoover's near obsession with food as a geopolitical tool, historian Nicholas Cullather concludes, "European governments had long recognized this requirement for domestic order, but Hoover stressed its symbolic and practical ramifications for U.S. strategy."[28] The Food Administration, much like America's involvement in the war overseas, was a short-lived endeavor. Hoover's tenure at the helm of the organization, however, had long-term ramifications on both the practicalities of American aid in the post-WWI world as well as his personal approach to humanitarian work.

Appointed as a delegate to the treaty of Versailles, Hoover continued to wield immense authority over America's interactions with the postwar world. In January 1919 the Allied powers nominated Hoover to become the chief Allied relief officer for all of Europe and the Middle East, including relief to the Central Powers. He received a congressional appropriation of 100 million dollars for the relief and rehabilitation of Central and Eastern Europe, and Hoover used those funds, as well as private donations, to convert the bureaucracy of the U.S. Food Administration into the American Relief Administration, the largest aid institution in the world at the time. Hoover had a critical advantage in this situation as his Food Administration had stockpiled millions of pounds of foodstuffs during the war in case of emergency. Those rationed

[28] Nick Cullather, *The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010)

food supplies, as well as others bought with the congressional appropriation, became the ARA tools for rehabilitating and relieving Europe.

The newly minted ARA consisted of two large branches of employees: the technocrats who managed the food and the young men who distributed it. In the United States and in bureau offices around the globe, the analysts and bureaucrats focused on managing and transporting food overseas. For this bureaucratic layer of the organization, Hoover mostly drew on his close associates from the Commission for Relief in Belgium, as well as academics and business managers, with the majority trained at Hoover's alma mater Stanford University. A representative case is Vernon Kellogg—a professor of entemology at Stanford University who became a close associate of Hoover's during his time there as a student. When Hoover began his work with the CRB, he tapped Kellogg to be his chief deputy, and then as his chief assistant at the Food Administration. After securing congressional funds to start the American Relief Administration, Hoover appointed Kellogg as head of the Poland mission, responsible for all ARA activities in the war-torn country. Kellogg and his associates organized, tabulated, and shipped millions of dollars' worth of food aid. Stationed in dozens of cities across Europe and the Middle East, hundreds of young men, mostly demobilized Army and Navy veterans, received the food and distributed it to the needy aided by locally hired labor. These were men like Bill Shafroth—an AEF veteran who had enlisted mostly for the adventure of it all.[29] After the war ended, many of these veterans, often from small towns in the United States, remained in Europe, captivated by the new experiences and driven by a sense of wanderlust. Bereft of many

[29] Patenaude, *Big Show in Bololand*, 49. John Dos Passos, famed novelist who had served in the ambulance corps during World War I, expressed similar sentiments about the war, writing, "We had spent our boyhood in the afterglow of the peaceful nineteenth century…What was war like? We wanted to see with our own eyes. We flocked into the volunteer services. I respected the conscientious objectors, and occasionally felt I should take that course myself, but hell, I wanted to see the show." John Dos Passos, *One Man's Initiation* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), 4. For more on this phenomenon see David M. Kennedy, *Over Here: The First World War and American Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) and Jennifer Keene, *World War I: The American Soldier Experience* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2011).

opportunities, hundreds of these veterans joined Hoover's nascent postwar relief programs, eager to continue on "another adventure."[30] Following Hoover's guidelines from the Food Administration, the administrators of the ARA constructed an intensely hierarchical organizational structure where authority flowed down from Hoover into the managerial level of analysts and bureaucrats and, finally, to the aid distributors on the ground. ARA employees were fiercely loyal to "the Chief," their own epithet for Hoover.

In addition to the administrative and distributive levels of the organization, Hoover also commissioned another crucial, yet often ignored, division within the administration: the Historical Department.[31] Starting from his time at the Commission for Relief in Belgium, Hoover constantly stressed the importance of maintaining archival documents among all of his employees. This stemmed from Hoover's "knowledge of the disappearance of contemporaneous records during the period of the French revolution" and subsequent fear that the work of his organizations could be lost in some catastrophe.[32] After establishing the Historical Department within the ARA, Hoover instructed his division chiefs to copy all "correspondence of historical interest" and exhorted his managers to constantly remind all relief workers to "record history while they were making it" by writing personal diaries.[33] These activities resulted in a plethora of primary source accounts, all of them carefully collated by the chief of the Historical Division.[34]

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[30] William Shafroth, Article 8, ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 81 Folder 8, Reel 32.
[31] In Patenaude's lengthy study, the Historical Department is mentioned only a handful of times, mostly in relation to Harold Henry Fisher's eventual appointment to its head. Little else has been written about the division.
[32] Dr. Grace Fox to P.W. Kuo "Memorandum on the Relationships between the American Red Cross and the American Relief Administration" October 19, 1944. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Records, Secretariat Executive Office Records, Reel 1, Slide 1.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Indeed, one of the principal primary sources used in subsequent histories of the ARA is Harold Henry Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia*. Before completing his exhaustive account of the Russia campaign in 1927, Fisher had served as the chief of the Historical Department of the American Relief Administration. His book received lengthy comments and edits from Hoover himself. While Fisher provides extensive factual information, his book is also laden with political and economic assumptions, particularly on the issue of the cause of the Russian famine, as well as florid and laudatory prose. He writes in his introduction, "On ruined towns and desolated villages across the bleak, dreary steppes had fallen the heavy pall of black misery, of inert despair. Into this atmosphere of fatalistic

From its earliest days, the American Relief Administration had an eye on its potential legacy, and Hoover planned for that legacy to be carefully recorded.

Hoover's organization distributed over one billion dollars' worth of food in Europe and the Middle East in the following years.[35] Unlike many other humanitarian organizations, however, the ARA gave aid on credit; Hoover guaranteed aid only if each nation agreed to the terms of a loan from his private organization to their nation in the form of food for cash.[36] In his public statements on the organization, Hoover claimed, "our goal is not rebuilding, but only famine relief."[37] Relieved of the immediate need to address hunger, Hoover reasoned, the industrious men of each country could then rebuild their nation in the aftermath of war. Hoover also believed that this approach to relief was universal: by simply delivering food to relieve hunger to any people, the ARA could facilitate reconstruction. Best termed as something like "bootstraps humanitarianism," this practice of offering hunger relief only under the conditions of a loan made Hoover immensely popular among Americans who embraced his capitalistic approach to humanitarian aid.[38]

Due to his continued management of Allied relief and the American Relief Administration, Hoover gained increasing prominence in Washington. Previously apolitical in public, the ARA chief declared his allegiance to the Republican Party in 1919, with some even championing him as a dark horse for the presidential nomination. He eventually ended up

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hopelessness came the representatives of that distant incredible land—America." Additionally, despite citing facts that show how ARA workers engaged with managing refugee populations, Fisher doggedly characterizes the ARA as "merely a food relief organization." These suppositions generally informed scholarship on the ARA for decades after the book's publication in 1927. Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia,* 27.

[35] Bertrand M. Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bololand: The American Relief Expedition to Soviet Russia in the Famine of 1921* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 20.

[36] "America in European Restoration" by Herbert Hoover in *ARA Association Review*, April 1, 1925, "The Commemoration Number."

[37] Commerce Papers, Box 30, Folder – American Relief Administration, Russia, Hoover Statement, March 8th, 1923. Herbert Hoover Library, West Branch, IA.

[38] "Hoover Accepts Place in Cabinet; Keeps Relief Post" in *New York Times* February 25, 1921. Pg. 1.

supporting Warren G. Harding who rewarded Hoover's support with an appointment to his cabinet as Secretary of Commerce. Hoover only accepted the post with certain conditions. According to the New York Times, "a complete reorganization of the Department of Commerce, making it of more importance than it has ever been before…was the basis of the terms laid down by Hoover."[39] Once in office he greatly increased the authority of his department, seeking to transform the vaguely defined Commerce Department into an engine of economic growth for the national economy. He commandeered control over radio lines, air travel, and even administering the census. Hoover became so powerful in Washington that he became known as "the Secretary of Commerce and Under-Secretary of all other departments."[40] As Hoover continued his ascendance in the capital, he relegated much of the day-to-day work of the ARA to a few trusted advisors in New York. Although initial projections envisioned the ARA completing the task of rehabilitation through feeding by 1921, successive humanitarian crises in Turkey, Greece, and Russia saw their work continue unabated into the following years, with the ARA taking on a series of growing responsibilities. These crises, caused largely by the Russian Civil War and the Greco-Turkish War, were markedly different from the famines of Central Europe that followed World War I. In addition to famine conditions, Turkey, Greece, and Russia also faced successive refugee crises, epidemics, and wartime casualties as their own conflicts ground on after Versailles. Faced with a series of new and evolving problems, the young ARA aid distributors on these front wielded immense authority in the starving nations in the Middle East and Eastern Europe. In Russia, the ARA would transform its very essence, operating not only as a food distributor, but as a potent political force that used its aid to confront epidemics, control labor, and manage refugee movement.

[39] Ibid., 1.
[40] Leuchtenbgerg, *Herbert Hoover* (New York: Times Books, 2009), 53.

A New Front for Peaceful Combat

In July 1921 renowned Russian author Maxim Gorky published a plea for his home nation: the Soviet Union was starving.[41] Through a combination of drought, the after-effects of World War I and the Russian Civil War, and Bolshevik economic policies, the newly created Soviet Union faced widespread crop failure and famine, deemed by Gorky as the worst in the country's long history. Millions of peasants along the Volga River faced imminent starvation and death. This news surprised some in Western Europe and the United States—the new Soviet government had attempted to restrict information flowing out of the state—but American observers in the Black Sea quickly verified the claim.[42] With the support of Lenin, international aid groups were granted access to the newly created U.S.S.R. for the first time.

Russia presented a unique opportunity for Hoover's ARA. Widespread famine in the country hardly made the ARA's venture a bygone conclusion. In fact, Hoover's institution most likely seemed like the last group that the Soviet government imagined would send aid when news of their plight reached newspapers. When asking for famine relief in May of 1921, Russian author and Lenin confidante Maxim Gorky first reached out to the League of Nations and the League Coordinator for Humanitarian Relief Fridtjof Nansen.[43] Gorky believed that Nansen represented one of the only humanitarians in the world who would voluntarily aid the Bolsheviks. His hesitancy was not unfounded. Hoover "The Great Philanthropist" was, indeed, decidedly anti-Bolshevik. In a letter to President Wilson written in 1919, well before the ARA

[41] U.S. Department of State, "To All Honest People," *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1921*, Vol. 2, 805.
[42] Ibid., "High Commissioner at Constantinople (Bristol) to the Secretary of State," 807.
[43] Letter from Fridtjof Nansen to Woodrow Wilson, April 3, 1919. ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 22, Folder 4, Reel 32.

trip to Russia, Hoover spared no criticism against Bolshevism, writing "As a tyranny, the Bolshevik has resorted to terror, bloodshed, and murder to a degree long since abandoned even amongst reactionary tyrannies. He has even to a greater degree relied upon criminal instinct to support his doctrines than even autocracy did."[44] These were hardly sentiments to inspire humanitarian relief.

However, Hoover also saw a clear and present danger. He continues in the letter, "The propaganda of Bolshevism, however, in my view will stir other populations only in ratio to their proportions of the suffering and ignorant and criminal. I feel myself, therefore, that the political danger of spread of Bolshevism by propaganda is a direct factor of the social and political development of the population which they attempt to impregnate."[45] Much like Wilson and other statesmen at the time, Hoover believed that socialism did not stem from politics, but rather social illness. The only solution to the "radical swings of the pendulum" that characterized Bolshevism and other tyrannies, for Hoover, resided in the alleviation of the "root causes": famine, starvation, and disenfranchisement. As a solution to the "problem" of Bolshevism, Hoover proposed that a "Neutral [nation] of international reputation create a second Belgian Relief Commission for Russia." He then outlined what would eventually be the work of the ARA in Russia, "If such an arrangement could be accomplished it might at least give a period of rest along the frontiers of Europe and would give some hope of stabilization. Time can thus be taken to determine whether or not this whole system is a world danger, and whether the Russian people will not themselves swing back to moderation and themselves bankrupt these ideas."[46] Given the realities of politics, the ARA needed to cooperate with the Bolsheviks if they wanted to distribute

[44] Letter from Herbert Hoover to Woodrow Wilson, April 25, 1919. ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 22, Folder 4, Reel 32. Pg. 1.
[45] Ibid., 3.
[46] Ibid., 3.

food in Russia, despite Hoover's personal misgivings. However, the end goal of food aid, for Hoover, remained the breakdown of the Bolshevik order. Hoover's conception of socialism cast the Russian people merely as puppets swinging in the hands of the Bolsheviks. Driven by the plight of starvation, they responded to the propaganda of radicalism. Humanitarian relief in the form of food aid, then, would not only relieve suffering but also push back Bolshevism itself. The ARA's food, then, could force a new "front" in the war on Bolshevism: one focused on limiting fatalities rather than causing them, but still a war with very real consequences.

This "front" against Bolshevism would also require new tactics. The enormous scope and reach of the ARA's work before they entered Russia finalized a long process of transformation of American humanitarian work from feminized religious charity into the "work of men." Scholars like Julia Irwin have traced how this metamorphosis emerged from the changing politics of the Progressive Era in the United States and solidified in the forge of the First World War. Speaking about the American Red Cross, Irwin writes that this era saw an acceleration in the professionalization of aid institutions, which "played a central part in legitimizing humanitarian work as a career choice for American men."[47] The American Relief Administration saw itself as part of this new generation of highly professionalized humanitarian aid organizations, however with one major difference: the ARA almost exclusively hired veterans of the Allied Expeditionary Forces as relief workers. As Childs indicated in his diary, the veteran members of the ARA conceived of humanitarian work not as a rejection of war making, but simply a different kind of war with nobler goals. In the words of Childs, "It struck me at the moment of our arrival, of how infinitely more worthwhile it was to engage in peaceful combat on a famine front which had for its object the saving of life than that on the battle front whose major

[47] Julia F. Irwin, *Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian Awakening* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 9.

objective was the taking of it."[48] Under this new model of professionalized, masculinized work, ARA workers could pursue "peaceful combat" as a labor on par with any other occupation.

At the administrative level, Hoover grounded his approach to aid with the ARA in the same principles that had guided his work at the CRB and the Food Administration, all rooted in the policies of the managerial revolution occurring in the United States. Hoover established firm and consistent hierarchies within his institution, required systematized bookkeeping, and maintained strict timetables from his employees for the transportation and distribution of food. In addition to their technocratic approach to aid, Hoover and the members of the ARA always framed their food strategies globally, especially in the wake of World War I. Alonzo Englebert Taylor, an ARA physiological chemist focused on food science, contextualized the importance of food management in explicitly geopolitical terms. The new age of warfare signaled by World War I had changed the politics of the "home front." Taylor writes, "It is difficult to assume that civilians can expect to receive consideration when the home front is no longer separated from the combat front, when interests of all ages of both sexes in a population are inseparably intertwined in conflict." Modern war had broken down the barriers between "home" and "war" front, most notably with a new type of tactic: the blockade. He continues, "It may, therefore, be expected that since blockade of foodstuffs has become an integral part of modern offensive war, the supply of foodstuffs becomes an integral part of defensive war."[49] The advent of the blockade signaled to men like Taylor and Hoover that food could no longer be a secondary concern in geopolitics even after an armistice. Instead, the work of the ARA became more than merely the relieving of hunger, but rather a strategic tool necessary both in the making of war and peace as well as the realm of geopolitics. Historian Nicholas Cullather concludes, "European governments

[48] Childs, 23.
[49] Alonzo Englebert Taylor, "A Statistical Account of US Relief Aid to Europe Immediately Following World War I, from November 11, 1918 to September, 1919." Alonzo Englebert Taylor Papers, Hoover Institution Archives.

had long recognized this requirement for domestic order, but Hoover stressed its symbolic and practical ramifications for U.S. strategy."[50] Indeed, Hoover believed that food could be a far more potent weapon than even the U.S. Army, especially in the case of Russia.

For Hoover, this belief had precedent. Only a year before Hoover founded the ARA, the U.S. Army had been involved in an invasion of the U.S.S.R. during the Russian Civil War. The U.S. sent 8000 AEF troops to Vladivostok in late summer of 1918 after the signing of Brest-Litovsk, "prompted by fear that war munitions had been shopped to pre-Bolshevik Russian governments and stored there might fall into the hands of the Germans."[51] It is difficult to say whether the troops were sent in under the explicit order to attack the Bolsheviks and upend Lenin's new government or merely defend munitions depots (reports vary on this front and historians disagree about the specifics), but in the words of Patenaude, "the intervention *became* an anti-Bolshevik enterprise…"[52] After several months of skirmishing with the Bolsheviks, the AEF troops left Siberia sick and demoralized. In addition to sending troops into Russia the U.S. and most of the Allied powers also supplied the White Army with funds and weapons. All of these interventions, of course, ultimately failed. The Red Army consolidated its victories in Russia and the Bolsheviks maintained central control for decades to come. The lesson of this for Hoover was clear: war could not drive out Bolshevism. The U.S. needed a different strategy.

By the time of the Riga agreement, which formalized the terms of the access of the ARA to Russia, Russian ambassador Maxim Litvinoff explicitly acknowledged the strategic value of food. Upon being assured that the ARA would not allow its employees to bring weapons into the U.S.S.R. to give to rebels, Litvinoff scoffed "Gentlemen, food *is* a weapon."[53] Emerging from

[50] Cullather, 18
[51] Patenaude,*Big Show in Bololand*, 12.
[52] Ibid., 13.
[53] Ibid., 40.

the nexus of post-World War I progressivism and technicization, the American Relief Administration conceived of their own work as peaceful war-making, and they wielded the most powerful weapon of all: food. The masculine ideals and technocratic policies of the ARA reinforced their approach to humanitarian aid as a geopolitical strategy, a diplomatic approach that could affect more change than war. From the top administrative levels to the distributors on the ground, many members of the ARA believed in their work as a "peaceful combat" that would stymy the rise of Bolshevism and tear down Lenin's government more surely than soldiers could. When the ARA reached Russia, however, their conceptions quickly became upended.

"Some Mythical Land of Bread and Honey:" The ARA in Russia

As with most large-scale organizations spread over wide distances, conditions on the ground rarely match up to the neat timetables and spreadsheets in the home office, however. For the ARA, this dichotomy took a sharp form in the separation between the aid distributors in Russian cities and towns on the Volga River, largely made up of young veterans, and the analysts and bureaucrats in New York City. When the American Relief Administration responded to calls for aid from the new Soviet Union, Hoover and many of his men in New York believed that their work would differ in practical terms very little from their previous work in the former Central Powers. The bureaucrats would organize shipments of food carefully collated by the technicians and the aid distributors would deliver them to the needy with the help of local labor. The sheer breadth of the famine, compounded by concurrent refugee crises and epidemics, confounded these carefully laid plans.

The ARA's first foray into the Soviet hinterlands revealed the extent of the crisis. On an exploratory mission to the city of Kazan on the Volga River, three American aid workers employed by the American Relief Administration (ARA)—Bill Shafroth, John Gregg, and Frank Golder—were stunned by the devastation of the famine. Looking out from their train car into the city, the workers saw hundreds of starving Russians. They were mostly children, living in abandoned railway cars, bellies distended from malnutrition waiting in the rail-yard for, in Shafroth's words, a way out to "some mythical land of bread and honey."[54] The Russian minders traveling with the relief workers informed them that these children were not locals, but refugees fleeing even worse conditions in rural regions. Shafroth, Gregg, and Golder were not new ARA recruits either; each of the men had served in Europe after World War I, delivering food aid to the nations of the former Central Powers. The conditions in Kazan far surpassed anything that the aid workers had encountered in their previous work. Conditions worsened in the city proper—hospitals and orphanages were overflowing, starvation was ever present, and refugees crowded all available spaces. The trio of workers quickly contacted the nascent ARA command structure in Moscow and informed their superiors of the extent of the crisis. The refugee crisis, in particular, stunned the ARA men—their message to Moscow emphasized the number of refugees, and the need for the ARA to ameliorate the problem.[55] From their first days in Russia, the ARA workers encountered refugees not as a tangential problem to their food aid, but an essential aspect of their relief work.

From the start of World War I well into the 1920s, a series of crises drove millions of Russian refugees out of their homes. The Bolshevik Revolution and ensuing Russian Civil War expelled millions of refugees out into Europe, but also internally displaced hundreds of

[54] ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 81, Folder 8.
[55] Ibid.

thousands of Russians.[56] As the Bolsheviks began to consolidate power in 1920, the new government began a new system of agricultural requisition to make sure that food would be evenly distributed in a centrally planned system. Towns and villages along the Volga River, which had been organized into communes, typically produced a majority of Russia's food. Commissioned tax collectors who were given wide legal authority by Moscow to procure food in any way possible targeted these communities. One of these groups of tax collectors working in the Volga region became notorious for their use of violent tactics, gaining the name "The Iron Broom."[57] One Russian farmer referred to the group as "behaving like they were in a conquered country. They were engaged in pure robbery, [taking] away whatever they pleased…"[58] Crucially, many of the farms along the Volga River had lost their farm animals and livestock to army requisitions, which hampered replanting in the spring of 1920. Already stretched by the destruction of the wars and revolution, many of the farms were unable to plant any seeds at all. Despite this, ARA historian H.H. Fisher writes, "likewise in Samara and Saratov, although the crop failure was considerable in 1920, the Iron Broom did its work."[59] The famine, which began in earnest the following year, only accelerated these trends. Widespread crop failure and increasingly violent and demanding tax collection led hundreds of thousands of farmers living along the Volga to flee to the nearest towns and cities over the summer of 1921, leaving their farms behind. These were the refugees, crowded into towns and cities with transportation centers, confronted by the three ARA workers. By the time that the ARA entered Russia, they had already been distributing food to Europe for over three years, funded mostly by the U.S. government. This type of work fell into a category most often associated with "relief:" the

[56] Gatrell, *A Whole Nation Walking*, 2-8.
[57] Vladimir N. Brovkin, *Behind the Front Lines of the Civil War: Political Parties and Social Movements in Russia, 1918-1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 304-307.
[58] Ibid., 306.
[59] Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, 499.

delivery of food and basic medical aid. When the American Relief Administration responded to calls for aid from the new Soviet Union, Hoover and many of his men in New York believed that their work would differ very little from their previous work in the former Central Powers. But, as Shafroth, Gregg, and Golder indicated, conditions merited a much bigger response. In response, the ARA initiated a new type of relief process in the Soviet Union, one that attempted to solve food scarcity through long-term, development-based solutions.

This long-term process had two prongs, one based in geopolitics and the other in migration control as a developmental tool. On the one hand, the ARA began negotiations with the Soviet government to force farmers to stay in the famine struck regions along the Volga. The Soviets enthusiastically supported this plan. Next, the ARA brought their primary weapon to bear: food. The ARA distributed aid to the Russian population in the Volga region not solely based on need, but on the condition that farmers would continue working their farms rather than moving to the cities. Additionally, the ARA distributed extra seeds and farming equipment to the starving Russians in the countryside in order to facilitate agricultural growth and, more importantly, maintain population levels among the farming communities. These two tactics in tandem enforced sedentarization among the Russian farmers, guaranteeing aid incentives for farmers in production zones who refused to flee to cities.

Although the ARA widely held a reputation as a technocratic, unbiased humanitarian institution, their response to the immense crisis on the Volga remained rooted in an essentialist, nationalistic understanding of Russian society and Bolshevik ideology. Some of this came from the top: Herbert Hoover had rigid anti-Bolshevik beliefs. Indeed, Hoover first proposed bringing the ARA to Russia as a means to enact geopolitical goals—he believed that food aid could stymy the rise of Bolshevism, perhaps even lead to a new capitalist revolution in the Soviet Union.

Hoover's antipathies were buoyed by the first comprehensive survey of the extent of the Russian famine by Americans, produced by a U.S. based organization named the Russian Relief Committee, or RRC. The statistical analysis of the RRC, as well as its recommendations for solutions, informed the ARA's work over the following two years. The RRC identified an array of problems in Russia that it believed were in the American purview to manage beyond simply famine relief. Most prominently, the organization sought to stymy the spread of disease and manage the movement of an increasing number of refugees. The RRC outlined a plan for Russian aid built out of an essentialist conception of both Russian history and the politics of Bolshevism. Building on the initial antipathies of politicians like Hoover against the ideology of Bolshevism, the Russian Relief Committee conceived of the Russian famine as a failure of Bolshevism to create incentives. As an ideology, the RRC argued, Bolshevism could not adequately supply incentives to produce as, say, a capitalist nation like the U.S. could.[60] This largely fell in line with Hoover's assessment, where in a letter to President Wilson in 1918, Hoover wrote, "The Bolshevik's land of illusion is that he can perfect these human qualities by destroying the basic processes of production and distribution instead of devoting himself to securing a better application of the collective surplus."[61] Without the incentive of capital to attain a collective national surplus, the RRC determined, the Bolshevik economic plan could never succeed.[62]

Beyond these general critiques of Bolshevism, the RRC also believed that Russia had particular social and historical problems that both led to the crisis of the Russian famine as well

[60] "The Famine of 1922-1923," undated by Allen Wardwell, Graham R. Taylor, Allen T. Burns, Commission on Russian Relief. ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 11, Folder 4, Reel 21. Pg. 21

[61] Herbert Hoover in letter to President Wilson while he was at Paris, March 28, 1919. 27336-27341. ARA Russian Operational Records. Box 22, Folder 4, Reel 32. Hoover, the administrator of an intensely hierarchical organization dedicated to centralized planning, never seemed to mention that the "lack of incentive" structure he criticized the Bolsheviks for largely resulted from central planning.

as extended its consequences out to other portions of society. In particular the history of serfdom, for the RRC, created huge problems in Russian agriculture. They write, "Since the large estates had always been more productive, proportionately, than the peasant farms, this in itself tended to reduce production."[63] After the Bolshevik government dismantled the large plantation-style farms of the Russian aristocrats, agricultural production plummeted without large incentives for smaller producers. This was compounded by further Soviet policies, namely:

> The Soviet government assumed a monopoly of internal and external trade in grain, forbade the use of hired labor, and made the entire crop of the individual farmer state property, subject to requisition in full, except for an allowance fixed by the government for his own food and seed requirements. In some cases the reserves accumulated from former harvests, and held as insurance against bad years were confiscated outright. These requisitions were a great discouragement to production.[64]

The RRC always framed the issue in terms of production and incentives. As the Bolshevik food management plans increasingly ran up against the tribulations of the Russian Civil War and destruction of crops the famine took firmer hold. In all of its subsequent actions, the RRC assumed that the fault of the famine firmly rested in the hands of the new Soviet government.

This ideological critique of Bolshevism melded in unique ways with national prejudices held by ARA workers against Russians as greedy, corruptible, and lazy. One ARA manager working in Russia wrote to a friend that the Russian locals they had contracted to aid in their distribution efforts, "…have neither the courage nor the strength to resist the pressures that is brought to bear upon them and to act without prejudice. They need the moral support of an American who is always accessible."[65] Counter to their policies in Europe, which funneled food mostly through locally hired workers, the ARA distributors retained tight control over how and

[63] "The Famine of 1922-1923," undated by Allen Wardwell, Graham R. Taylor, Allen T. Burns, Commission on Russian Relief. ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 11, Folder 4, Reel 21. Pg. 21
[64] Ibid., 21.
[65] 1 page from CG Bowden, District Supervisor of the ARA Tzaritzen to director of ARA, March 10, 1922

where they dispersed the massive amounts of food aid arriving in the country. Similarly, ARA workers believed that the "national character" of the Russians made them especially susceptible to suffering. Recording a summary of correspondence sent in the early days of the ARA campaign, Historical Department head H.H. Fisher notes, "The Russians, for whom famine was a familiar catastrophe, naturally could not understand the nervous impetuosity of the young Americans…the natives knew that there would be hungry to feed next week, the week after, and next year."[66] This combination of national prejudice and ideological understanding of Bolshevism led many of the ARA workers to see their aid less as humanitarian relief, and more as a tool of incentivization. Food could be a stimulus for change, not merely a salve for famine.

Practically, this food aid came in the form of care packages—a system employed by the ARA throughout Europe.[67] Transported through a complex series of shipping and rail transportation the packages contained a variety of food and cooking essentials, enough to feed a family of four for one week. The ARA workers had final say on the ultimate distribution of these packages. The distributors even had control over how entire regions were serviced. One such episode in the Orenburg district in southern Russia highlights this level of control. ARA manager Walter Coleman, overseer of the Orenburg distribution region, engaged in a series of escalating disputes with his government contact from Moscow, former Red Army general Commander Klimov, in July of 1922. Before Coleman's arrival, the ARA distributor in the region had fallen ill. Local officials assumed control over the distribution of ARA food packages. When Coleman arrived in the city, he reasserted the ARA's exclusive control over distribution, angering the local officials, including Klimov. At first disagreeing over a backup with local transportation, Klimov and Coleman clashed for months over a variety of issues, mostly revolving around who would

[66] Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, 94.
[67] Patenaude, 504

have ultimate control over distribution. In the eyes of the ARA, Klimov's obstinacy in the face of American relief led one of Coleman's employees, Harold Buckley, to pen an angry letter home, writing, "Our friends the "Bolos" are not helping us very much… I presume it is hard for them not to have their own way; apparently that is what hurts most; they never cease trying to get their fingers in the pie."[68] In response to the growing hostility, Coleman ordered his distributors to cease delivering food packages. After two months of withholding, Klimov relented and guaranteed the ARA sole distribution rights. Coleman ordered the packages to start being delivered again, with food going out the very next day.

Despite these personal antagonisms, the ARA's initial attempts at distribution did have noticeable effects on refugee movement in the region. Previously, hundreds of refugees arrived each week to transportation centers in cities like Orsk, Orenburg, and Kazan—larger cities situated in the famine-stricken region. Within the first few months of ARA distribution in the spring of 1922, this process slowed to the point that more Russian farmers were moving back to their farms to begin planting rather than fleeing to the cities.[69] This effect was noticed and actively promoted by food distributors on the ground. From their first days of distribution, the ARA workers on the ground conceived of their work in these spatial and geopolitical terms—one worker commented, "American corn has done more to stem the tide of refugees than the Bolos…"[70] However, RRC analysts concluded that the ARA would have to institute even stricter measures to ensure Russian farmers "stayed in productive zones."[71] Similarly, the RRC

[68] Harold Buckley to George Baker, June 15, 1922 ARA Russian Operations, Box 344, Folder 14.
The ARA men commonly referred to Bolshevik officers as "Bolos." The epithet seemed to carry no inherent insult among the Aramites, but Coleman certainly intended some in his letters. For a fuller account of the Orenburg incidents and the ARA's withdrawal see Patenaude, 385-390
[69] Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, 499.
[70] Ibid., 492.
[71] RRC Report, 12.

advocated that the ARA should pursue more aggressive strategies to combat disease among the refugees slowly moving back into their farming communities.

When confronted with the concurrent crises of disease and refugee flows the ARA distributors on the ground used the vast leeway granted by their unique authority to engage in relief and rehabilitation projects rarely attempted by their organization before. Similar to the American Red Cross in this period, the ARA increasingly saw links between famine and disease.[72] Not only did famine beget epidemics, they mutually intensified each of the crises' effects. So, in addition to distributing food in the regions surrounding the Volga River, ARA managers sought to control and manage the spread of disease. The RRC wrote, "One can say that typhus, relapsing fever, smallpox, and typhoid are sown over the entire country. While these diseases are not at present epidemic, from the Russian point of view, we found typhus in practically every district that we visited."[73] The RRC concluded that while the spread of contagious diseases like typhus, smallpox, and typhoid were not strictly epidemics—according to metrics designed by the Bolsheviks—they were a serious enough problem to hinder or completely derail the work of the ARA. After an urgent plea to Congress, the American Red Cross granted Hoover 4,000,000 dollars in medical supplies from their war stash. The ARA then provided assistance in the form of "practical emergency lines and including essential drugs, some equipment such as bedding, rubber goods, surgical instruments, etc…"[74] In this case, the exclusive access of the ARA to Russia—one of Hoover's first requests when negotiating the terms of aid—secured them not only the materials of the American Red Cross, but also exclusive control over the ARC's most important mission in the interwar years: the management of disease.

[72] Irwin, *Making the World Safe*, 142.
[73] RRC Report, 15.
[74] Ibid., 16

The ARA's initial relief operations in Russia began to blur the lines between relief and rehabilitation. From their first shipments of food altering refugee movement patterns to their focused distribution of medical equipment, the ARA in Russia had already begun to venture into more ambitious rehabilitation and reconstruction based projects. These more ambitious programs reached their apex in refugee management. In addition to the economic crisis, the RRC also blamed the Soviet government for the refugee crisis in the country. In response to the agricultural crises of early 1921, the Soviets forcibly transported hundreds of thousands of farmers in the Volga river region to larger cities in order to manage food distribution and control agricultural growth. Because of this, the ARA had to focus its efforts both on the rural areas of Russia that had formerly produced most of its food as well as the now overcrowded cities containing the internally displaced farmers. If any more farmers left the productive regions along the Volga, the RRC concluded, the Soviet Union would never be able to produce enough food to feed its people again. The only permanent solution to this crisis, the RRC reasoned, would be for the ARA to exercise rigid control over the potential movement of Russian farmers along the Volga.[75]

Surprisingly, this project of sedentarization fell in line with Soviet goals. In August 1921, the early days of the ARA relief campaign, prominent Soviet politician Mikhail Kalinin, formally titled the "All-Russian *Starosta*" or elder, began a tour of the worst-struck regions, hearing the pleas of the people and promising aid. During a stop in the Samara Province, an American reporter recorded Kalinin's discussions with the residents of a small town. Kalinin exhorted the farmers to stay in their fields—promising that aid was forthcoming. Although he never mentions the ARA, he does mention new stores of seed and food packages that would be coming to the people. Kalinin repeatedly claimed that, despite the famine, the farmers would be far worse off if they decided to flee the region. He concluded his speech on a foreboding note, "It

[75] "The Famine of 1922-1923," undated by Allen Wardwell, Graham R. Taylor, Allen T. Burns, 23.

is a question of time when we will die. We prefer that people do not die. In Samara province the population numbers 3 million and the more who survive the better, but some of these people will, of course, die."[76] One ARA manager Vernon Kellogg found Kalinin's speech outrageous, writing in his diary, "Think of President Harding standing up in front of the people here and saying, 'Many of you will have to die. Better to die making a fight than along the roadways.'"[77] Despite Kellogg's misgivings over Kalinin's perceived fatalism, Kellogg actually agreed with the ambition: the Russian state would be better served if the farmers remained in place. And his organization had the tools to accomplish that goal.

To this task, the ARA brought their primary weapon to bear: food. At the administrative level, the ARA directors in Russia encouraged their workers on the ground to target food distribution in two ways. First, the ARA distributed aid to the Russian population in the Volga region not solely based on need, but on the condition that farmers would continue working their farms rather than moving to the cities. Although the specifics varied depending on the idiosyncrasies of the distributor, ARA administrators encouraged each worker to ensure that productive farmers promised to stay working their farms, and they would receive extra provisions to do so.[78] Second, ARA distributors working in the larger towns along the Volga, like Kazan, actively encouraged fleeing refugees to return to their famine-stricken homes. Relief workers promised additional provisions to anyone seeking refuge in cities on the condition that they would move back to their farms and begin planting. H.H. Fisher, the head of the ARA's Historical Department, wrote, "Thus in Kazan, the ARA was for a time sending off a hundred a day, and this same activity was being carried on in every other district. The importance of getting

[76] Diary of Vernon Kellogg August 1921, George Barr Baker Papers, Box 9, Hoover Institution Archives.
[77] Ibid.,
[78] Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia,* 226.

these workers back on the soil was, of course, enormous."[79] Heedless of personal safety or preference, ARA distributors framed their work exclusively in these larger, geopolitical terms—only promoting productivity at all costs could stop the famine. In this task, ARA relief workers on the ground essentially had free rein to try and manipulate refugee flows in any way the saw fit. Walter Lyman Brown described the oversight of ARA workers in Russia as, "a relatively free hand as long as they make good."[80] Additionally, the ARA requisitioned extra seeds from the United States, rather than solely food packages, distributing millions of dollars of seeds to the starving Russians in the countryside in order to facilitate agricultural growth and, more importantly, maintain population levels among the farming communities.[81] Simultaneously, the Soviet Union began to restrict feeding programs in their larger cities, ensuring that the urban centers would offer no respite for potential refugees.[82] These two tactics in tandem enforced sedentarization among the Russian farmers, guaranteeing aid incentives for farmers in production zones and paving the way for any returning refugees to resettle back in to productive modes once they were allowed out of the cities by the Soviets. Despite the adamant anti-Bolshevism of the Hoover and the antipathies of some of the ARA distributors, in this case the goals of the administration were consistent with the Soviets.

"Neither Should He Eat:" Trading Labor for Food

[79] Ibid., 227.
[80] Walter Lyman Brown to Edgard Rickard, October 15, 1921, ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 339, Folder 4.
[81] "The Famine of 1922-1923," undated by Allen Wardwell, Graham R. Taylor, Allen T. Burns, 23. As with all of the ARA's distribution, the organization purchased the seed grain on the guarantee of a $4,000,000 repayment from the Soviet Union.
[82] Ibid., 40

At the administrative level Hoover organized the American Relief Administration's purchasing and distribution on credit. In the case of Russia, not only did Hoover require a guarantee of repayment for food aid, but also for the Soviet government to provide a credit for four million dollars in gold exclusively for seed grain. In a letter to the Walter Lyman Brown, the ARA director for Europe, Hoover wrote that he intended for this seed grain credit to "force their [the Soviet government] hand to do their share in adult feeding."[83] This approach to humanitarian relief embodied Hoover's dedication to, what I term, "bootstraps humanitarianism," a belief that merely giving relief aid on a national level could not solve the "root causes" that required relief. In the case of the Soviet Union, the famine had been caused, in Hoover's estimation, by their entire economic order. On the ground, this vision of humanitarianism as a means of development often repeated itself in strange and unpredictable ways. In line with Hoover's vision of "bootstraps humanitarianism," many ARA workers decided that their food aid should only be distributed to those deemed "deserving." As Director Brown had said, their only assignment was to "make good." A particular target for the ARA relief workers were refugees who remained in cities and refused to travel back to their farms, despite increasingly forceful attempts by ARA organizers and distributors to coerce them back to their farms. For those refugees who remained in cities, young ARA distributors working in Russia applied their own particular sensibilities on deservedness.

Starting in the summer of 1922, ARA relief workers began to implement labor schemes for those refugees who stayed in cities. In order to promote productivity among refugees seen as lazy and apathetic, ARA workers organized refugees into labor gangs, implicitly or explicitly threatening to withhold food packages for refugees that did not "volunteer" for public works

[83] Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia, 154.*

projects.[84] The relief workers believed that if they fed the refugees who refused to follow their entreaties to return to farming, they would cultivate dependency. Fisher writes, "They had to be fed, but the precedent of feeding people without requiring any work from them was a dangerous one."[85] In order to prevent such a precedent, ARA workers organized refugees into units and set them to accomplish any task that the distributor deemed necessary. These plans seemed to have come from no administrative direction; instead ARA relief workers on the ground generated them spontaneously. In the town of Ufa, near the Ural Mountains, and one of the hardest hit famine zones, ARA distributor Walter Bell convened with local officials to try to address the refugee problem.[86] Bell believed that hundreds of refugees living in the city represented an untapped work force. After negotiating with local officials, Bell organized six hundred refugees into labor gangs to work on local public works projects. After work had begun, ARA food packages were delivered to the laboring refugees. Following Bell's lead, ARA distributors in Zlatoust, Celiabinsk, Ekaterinburg, Koustanai, and Sterlimatak began similar projects. In Zlatoust a local ARA distributor, in an attempt to help promote agricultural development, took it upon himself to organize labor gangs to build a drainage canal. The ARA officials formally deemed these coerced labor gangs "committees" when they recorded the events. Fisher writes, "During the summer of 1922, these committees built 270 badly needed new bridges, and repaired 160 old ones. They constructed 94 new water cisterns for towns and villages, and repaired and restored to use a number of schools…" The refugees did this work without financial

[84] Ibid., 226.
[85] Ibid., 227.
[86] Walter Bell, a former Colonel in the AEF, apparently commanded a great deal of respect from local officials in Ufa. In one of the stranger instances of Russian appreciation for the ARA, a local politician gifted Bell with a bear cub, representing the thankful people of his town. Bell began to bring the bear cub around with him, driving around the city of Ufa with the cub in his passenger seat. He became so well known for this practice that local townsfolk in the city also gifted Bell two wolf cubs to complement his growing menagerie. When the wolf cubs began to harass his prized bear, Bell gave the wolves back.

compensation, instead, the ARA "employed labor for food."[87] The implicit threat of curbing food distribution coerced Russian farmers to live up to each individual distributor's ideal of productivity. In some cases, the threat of withholding food became explicit. In Orsk, ARA distributors implemented one of the most extensive labor-for-food schemes in the country. An unnamed ARA distributor working in Orsk leveraged his aid to enforce new standards of cleanliness in the region of the city under his purview. Whereas other distributors focused on organizing refugees to labor on public works projects, this ARA worker focused on the households and living areas of individual refugees. The distributor required each individual family to clean their houses and yard and, only after an inspection by the ARA and a satisfactory grade, would he deliver food packages to each family. If any family refused to participate in the process or did not clean their house to the ARA inspector's satisfaction, they "received no further issues of corn."[88]

In his official history, Fisher seems to find these transactional labor gangs not only necessary but also laudatory. He writes, "None of the severely undernourished or physically unfit was required to work, but to the able-bodied the injunction of St. Paul, 'if any would not work, neither should he eat' was applied." Due to the immense leverage that the food aid provided, on the ground distributors were able to apply their own idiosyncratic perspectives for which refugees "deserved" relief. For an organization organized around incentives, these types of coercive schemes reveal the enormous amount of control that ARA workers on the ground had over the lived experiences of refugees who had fled the famine. When those refugees refused to follow the increasingly adamant requests of the ARA organizers to return to their farming

[87] Fisher, *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, 296.
[88] Ibid., 296.

communities, ARA distributors wielded their growing authority to regulate the refugees' labor in new ways.

Conclusion

Aid to Russia abruptly ceased when, in the summer of 1923, the Soviet government began to sell wheat on the international market, a direct violation of the agreement negotiated by Hoover.[89] Despite the deployment of his most powerful weapon, food, Hoover had not subverted Bolshevism nor undermined the Soviet government as he had intended. Food had not been the ideological weapon that Hoover had imagined it would be in Russia, it had not freed the masses, in his mind, from the grip of Bolshevism. Indeed, in an ironic twist of fate, some ARA members themselves began to profess a fascination with communist ideology. Indeed, within a few weeks of his arrival in Kazan, James Childs became enthralled with the promises of socialism. He wrote privately in his diary, "my own mind was so poisoned with preconceived prejudices against the existing [Bolshevik] regime… that it was perhaps natural that during my sojourn, my attention should have been attracted to that evidence which tended to disprove those ideas which had been led to entertain about life in Soviet Russia."[90] He praised the adventurous spirit of Trotsky and complimented Lenin's political shrewdness, while deploring his violent excesses.[91] After only a few months, Childs saw Bolshevism not as "a swinging pendulum of tyranny" but rather a promising new system of government, indicating that the extensive planning and technicized policies of the ARA could not protect all of its relief workers from the "insidious grasp" of

[89] Patenaude, 700
[90] Childs, *V*.
[91] Childs, 7.

Bolshevism. If humanitarianism could be a war, then it seems like the old adage stayed true: "no plan survives contact with the enemy."

Despite the failures of their grand diplomatic strategy and vast sociopolitical goals, the ARA had succeeded in reshaping the political, economic, and human landscape of the Soviet Union. The ARA's humanitarian venture in the Soviet Union demonstrates three key shifts in the way that American organizations interacted with the world in the twentieth century. First, although the American Relief Administration operated as a private organization, it received significant funding and supplies from the U.S. state, including both relief aid, like food and medicine, as well as rehabilitation materiel, like seed grain and tractors. Although idiosyncratic in its hierarchy and leadership, the ARA operated as a vehicle for expressing the growing power of the American state outside of traditional diplomatic or military channels. Next, Hoover sought to use the ARA as a means to enact political and social change in Soviet Union and, despite the failure to overthrow the Bolshevik government, the ARA gained unprecedented amounts of authority within the U.S.S.R. based largely on the backing of the United States government. Although this intervention used food rather than weapons it had enormous consequences on both Soviet politics and the lived experiences of Russian farmers living along the Volga.

Finally, this narrative displays the often-fraught relationship between relief and development. Conventionally, historians have divided aid projects into categories of emergency aid or long-term development projects based on the organization's credos and goals. However, the ARA operated in the interstices of these two seemingly disparate categories: they sought to reorganize political, social, and labor structures in the U.S.S.R. through the access granted by their ability to deliver food aid. By transporting and distributing medical aid, the ARA engaged in a type of relief work beyond their self-professed ambit solely of food. Even by just delivering

food, the ARA sought to manipulate refugee flows in order to increase long-term productivity and national self-sufficiency in Russia. When this project did not accelerate productivity enough, ARA distributors began to actively encourage Russian farmers fleeing famine-stricken areas to return to their homes, giving those refugees who would return additional food and supplies. For the farmers who did remain, the ARA provided seed grain, tractors, and livestock, all of the products required to promote agricultural growth, a hallmark of development aid. In a large number of cases, ARA distributors also leveraged their aid to control the labor of intractable refugees who refused to return to the famine zones, forcing the refugees to perform hard labor, police towns, or clean public spaces to the satisfaction of an ARA overseer. The ARA's operations in the USSR shows that the categories of relief, rehabilitation, and development can often be definitionally murky and, in many cases, dictated and negotiated by the workers on the ground and the "beneficiaries" of humanitarian aid. As it affected the lives of Russian farmers, this level of access and control over the daily lives of aid recipients also transformed the American Relief Administration itself on an operational level. Although the ARA defined itself strictly as a famine relief institution, their work in Russia operated in the same murky interstices between relief, aid, and development.

By the spring of 1923, nearly two years after the ARA first came to Soviet Russia's aid, relieving the Russian famine had become the administration's largest single endeavor with over 300 American staff delivering 70 million dollars' worth of food. As an extension of the power of the U.S. state, the ARA exerted enormous control over hundreds of thousands of peasants, farmers, and refugees in the Soviet Union. The ARA had sedentarized over 800,000 Russian farmers, restricting movement in the countryside in order to ensure sufficient crop production.[92] Even more than the statistics of the endeavor, the ARA had also transformed the very essence of

[92] Ibid., 23.

their organization in Russia. Their work was not dispassionate and technocratic, as their own historians would write. In the countryside along the Volga River, ARA middle managers and young distributors re-oriented the scope of the American Relief Administration from simply famine relief to a larger and broader vision of humanitarianism rooted in their own particular conception of Russia's national character. In this vision, the ARA workers had the right and the duty to intervene to police mobility, restrict aid, coerce labor, and control refugee populations in order to relieve the famine in the long term.

Chapter 2

"The Whole Nation is on the Move": US Humanitarian Organizations, the Greco-Turkish Exchange, and the Politics of Refugee Management in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1918-1923

In 1922, a League of Nations treaty authorized Greece and the newly created nation of Turkey to denaturalize and expel over one and a half million residents of their nations in what became known as the Greco-Turkish population exchange. Hundreds of thousands of Greek and Turkish residents deemed ethnic minorities—Greeks in Turkey and Turks in Greece—were stripped of their citizenship and forced out of their homes on the promise that citizenship, along with housing and welfare, would await them in their new home country. While the Greek and Turkish governments oversaw the eviction and expulsion of their counterparts' newly made citizens, the actual movement of these refugees took place almost entirely under official protection of the United States Navy, with the transportation entirely under the auspices of two American humanitarian organizations with close ties to the U.S. state, the American Red Cross (ARC) and Near East Relief (NER).

This article traces how these two American humanitarian organizations operating in the Eastern Mediterranean came to serve as sponsors and supporters of the expulsion It also explores how a shifting network of relationships between these institutions, the U.S., Greek, and Turkish states, and the newly created League of Nations allowed for the population exchange to fit seamlessly into these organizations' humanitarian ideology and worldview. I follow how an eclectic mix of U.S. aid workers and State Department officials conceived of the Eastern Mediterranean in the wake of the unprecedented brutality of World War I. As the Ottoman Empire collapsed, these Americans increasingly identified strong nation-states as the only

possible solution to the famines and violence of the post-WWI world, eventually leading to tacit support for ethnic violence and expulsion on the assumption that it would lead to lasting peace. These changing notions of sovereignty led these actors to build new relationships with the Greek and Turkish governments through the connective network of the League of Nations. This new political nexus between U.S. aid groups, the consolidating ethno-states of Greece and Turkey, and the newly emergent League of Nations led to not only explicit support for the concept of a "population exchange" but extensive infrastructural aid. U.S. aid agencies were vocal participants at the League of Nations discussions between Greece and Turkey over the prospect of an exchange of ethnic minorities. Ultimately this led to NER and the ARC, with support from the American State Department and the U.S. Navy, providing food and relief for refugees during the exchange, managing the ships that transported the newly created expelled peoples, and providing a patchwork welfare net for the expelled peoples on their journey. These American organizations provided a system of humanitarian governance to support basic existence outside of the bonds of nation-state citizenship.[93] Lacking the duty of taking care of either their expelled former citizens or the transport and care of their newly made citizens, the states of Turkey and Greece were free to selectively create a new ethnic and religious identity for their nations. NER and the ARC doubtlessly saved thousands of lives, but these organizations' willingness to buttress the nascent ethno-nationalist politics of the Eastern Mediterranean also eased the way for the larger displacement and violence of the Greco-Turkish exchange.

This chapter offers another case study tracing how the U.S. state came to recognize humanitarianism as a tool to exert U.S. imperial power overseas during the interwar years. Building off of years of work in the region, American aid groups had established widespread

[93] Didier Fassin, *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 2.

relief and transportation networks throughout the Eastern Mediterranean that show the wide reach of American power in this period. Just as the American Relief Administration began to employ its more radical labor reorganization refugee management tactics in Russia, a variety of U.S. led humanitarian groups working in conjunction with the U.S. state in the Eastern Mediterranean responded to a series of successive refugee crises. The involvement of the U.S. Navy, in particular the work of Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol, and the support of the State Department in facilitating the Greco-Turkish population exchange have been largely overlooked in scholarship on the process.[94] As NER and the ARC wrestled with the changing politics of the Eastern Mediterranean and their role in facilitating the massive and brutal process of the Greco-Turkish population exchange, the U.S. government saw the process as an economic and geopolitical opportunity. In order to keep the Bosphorus Strait open to trade, facilitate U.S. business investment in Constantinople, and maintain the United States' image abroad as the world's "humanitarian nation," the U.S. Navy and State Department helped fund the work of NER and the ARC in the exchange process as well as providing official naval protection. Although, ultimately, these aid organizations ended up supporting state interests, they were not merely tools of the state—Greek, Turkish, or American. Each organization had its own institutional practices and internal logics that shaped their unique approach to refugee management.

This article traces how these logics eventually came into conflict with one another, iterating inter-agency conflict as the organizational, professionalized, and bureaucratic practices of Near East Relief and the American Red Cross collided during the process of the Greco-

[94] In recent years two books have focused exclusively on the Greco-Turkish Exchange: Renee Hirschon, *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey* (New York: Bergahn Books, 2003) and Bruce Clark, *Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions that Forged Modern Greece and Turkey* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). Neither of these books mentions the crucial role played by Mark Bristol in managing disaster relief plans.

Turkish exchange. These conflicts reveal the ways in which the population exchange as a policy had become effectively normalized within the worldviews of the ARC and the NER—the source of their conflict was not ideological, but technical, focusing on bureaucratic disagreements rather than broader debates over the nature of the population exchange. Finally, this chapter follows not only these humanitarian institutions' relationships with the U.S. state, but also how these organizations connected into political networks in the Eastern Mediterranean. It analyzes how the changing sociopolitical landscape of the post-Ottoman period led to new tenuous alliances and strange bedfellows as humanitarian institutions helped support the consolidation of the new ethno-states of Greece and Turkey and bankroll the grand diplomatic plans of the newly created League of Nations. The patchwork and uneven welfare system built by the ARC, NER, and the U.S. Navy during the process of the Greco-Turkish exchange ultimately buttressed both the nascent international institutions of the post-WWI period as well as ethnic nationalism in the region. While their aid provided a needed social welfare net to millions, it also eased the process of nation-state power consolidation, nationalism, and border drawing in the wake of the fall of the Ottoman Empire, helping to form the modern Middle East.

Generational Changes in the Eastern Mediterranean

The Eastern Mediterranean has long been a target for American economic, political, and religious ambitions.[95] By the start of World War I, missionary groups had been operating in the

[95] I use the term Eastern Mediterranean in the same manner as Keith David Watenpaugh. In this case, I use the term to encompass the modern nations of Cyprus, Greece, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, Palestine, Turkey, Egypt, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Jordan. This geography denaturalizes Orientalist conceptions of the Middle East as a confined and distinct region, bringing the nations typically associated with the Middle East into the same spatial reasoning as Greece and the Balkans. Additionally, the term accurately captures many of the ways that contemporary Americans, especially those working in Near East Relief, conceptualized the region. For more on this

region for over a century.[96] In 1915, U.S. Ambassador Henry Morgenthau Sr. put out an urgent call in the United States to help stop the systematic slaughter of Armenians and other Christian minorities by the Ottoman government. His greatest response came from the missionary community networks that had been embedded in the Eastern Mediterranean for decades, particularly the networks of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) or at the American University of Beirut (AUB). These institutions were funded by a string of wealthy patrons from the New York elite who, along with missionary leaders and clergy, formed the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief (ACASR) in 1915, led by James Barton, Charles Vickrey, two longstanding members of the missionary community, and funded in part by the wealthy and influential Dodge family.[97] Their express purpose, to, "investigate the facts regarding the reported massacre of non-Moslems in Turkey; and its relations to American interests and also to ascertain whether anything can be done to relieve the situation."[98] ACASR's mainly sought to protect Armenian Christians, who had been systematically targeted for eradication by Ottoman authorities through a system of forced

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terminology see Keith David Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015).

[96] For an overview of the voluminous literature on the U.S. missionary experience with the Middle East see David H. Finnie, *Pioneers East: The Early American Experience in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Joseph L. Grabill, *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927* (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota Press, 1971); Joan Jacobs Brumberg, "Zenanas and Girlless Villages: The Ethnology of American Evangelical Women, 1870-1910," *The Journal of American History* 69, no. 2 (1982): 347–71, https://doi.org/10.2307/1893823; Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008); Heather J Sharkey, *American Evangelicals in Egypt: Missionary Encounters in an Age of Empire* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Ussama Makdisi, *Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations: 1820-2001* (New York, NY: PublicAffairs, 2010); Hans-Lukas Kieser, *Nearest East: American Millenialism and Mission to the Middle East* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2010); Christine Leigh Heyrman, *American Apostles: When Evangelicals Entered the World of Islam* (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2015).

[97] Cleveland H. Dodge made his fortune in mining. A longstanding member of the New York Elite, Dodge donated widely from his vast fortune, often to groups with an interest in relief in the Eastern Mediterranean. His two sons, Cleveland E. Dodge and Bayard Dodge, would do the same. Cleveland E. Dodge followed his father's footsteps in business. Bayard Dodge became more involved in the politics of the Eastern Mediterranean, studying Islamic literature in school and, eventually, becoming the president of the Syrian Protestant College in 1923.

[98] "The Armenian Situation" 1915, Box 1, Folder 1 – Correspondence 1915-1916. Near East Relief Committee Records.

marches and deportations. As news trickled out of the Ottoman Empire about the rumored massacres of Armenian Christians, ACASR began an enormous grassroots fundraising campaign. They were widely recognized for pioneering a new type of humanitarian fundraising, what they called the "local pulpit, local press, local bank" policy that placed advertisements and sermon teachings nationwide, asked for money to be donated to a local chapter of their organization, then funneled local donations to the national committee. Within a year of their founding they had 14 branches operating in most major U.S. cities.[99]

From its inception, ACASR castigated Ottoman authorities for the nascent Armenian genocide, relying on stereotypes of the "Terrible Turk" in their fundraising campaigns and donor bulletins.[100] This stereotype had long roots in the missionary communities working in the Eastern Mediterranean, built around a vision of the Ottomans as violent oppressors of Christian minorities in the region. Although this conception of the Ottoman state littered ACASR's fundraising material, it should be noted that the missionary community working in the Ottoman Empire frequently employed antagonistic language when referring to the Ottomans for American audiences, however their long history in the region saw as many instances as accommodation as confrontation.[101] While ACASR sought to critique the Ottoman state, it also sought its permission to deliver aid and its collaboration to administer to Christian minorities in the region. This tenuous balance between hostility and necessary collaboration similarly defined the work of ACASR and its subsequent iterations, Near East Relief and the Near East Foundation.

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[99] For more on ACASR's revolutionary style of humanitarian fundraising, see Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones,* 31-42.

[100] For more on this stereotype and its roots in missionary culture and the politics of the First World War see M. Hakan Yavuz Orientalism, the 'Terrible Turk' and Genocide, *Middle East Critique*, 23:2 (2014),111-126.

[101] For more on this claim that runs counter to a significant amount of U.S. missionary historiography see the well-argued, Henry Gorman*, American Ottomans: Protestant Missionaries in the Service of an Islamic Empire* (Dissertation submitted to Vanderbilt University, 2019) accessed at: https://etd.library.vanderbilt.edu//available/etd-08182019-203150/

On the back of their immensely successful fundraising campaigns, ACASR began to plan for its first forays into relief work in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the United States remained officially neutral in the first years of the war, ACASR was able to build and grow a network of stations around the Eastern Mediterranean that funneled relief aid to displaced Armenian communities in and around the Ottoman Empire. In their first administrative reports and organizational meetings, ACASR sought not only to offer aid to Armenians fleeing the Ottoman state, they also articulated a vision of "uplifting" the region.[102] Less than a month after their first meeting in 1915, the ACASR executive committee compiled a report of eyewitness accounts of the Armenian genocide. The first sections include accounts of barbarity and abuse in the region, but the second half focuses exclusively on the deaths of educated Christian minorities within the empire. The report states, "Included among these refugees and victims are pupils and graduates from the American schools and colleges, teachers and professional men who have taken degrees in American and European universities, men and women who have represented the brains and enterprise of the country for a generation and more."[103] This problem, the killing of the "brains and enterprise" of Armenia and Syria, struck the leaders of ACASR as the most pressing consequence of the Ottoman efforts to eradicate Armenians. In the first weeks after hearing of the massacre, ACASR had already turned its attention to not only relieving, but eventually rebuilding the Near East and that required, in their estimation, not only bright young Christians in the region, but Christians trained at *Western* schools.

[102] For an excellent history of ACASR and NER's dedication to uplift in their work, as well as their relationship with the growing Zionist movement in the United States, see Michael Limberg, *Abundant Life: U.S. Aid and Development in the Near East, 1919-1939* (Dissertation submitted to the University of Connecticut, May 2018) Accessed at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/dissertations/1798/

[103] "The Armenian Situation" 1915, Box 1, Folder 1 – Correspondence 1915-1916. Near East Relief Committee Records.

ACASR's vision of regional uplift can also be seen in their hiring campaigns as they sought to rapidly bring in relief workers for new projects caring for displaced Armenians overseas. After that initial report, ACASR began its first hiring campaign. Their hiring practices also reflect this long-term focus for development in the Middle East. An internal memo sent to managers around the country stressed the priorities of the organization, saying "We are not content, however, with the saving of lives, if by so doing we merely prolong the physical existence of a certain number of human beings; we want not only to save life but to make life, bigger life, better life, for a better day of peace and international goodwill that is to be."[104] ACASR's stated goals of regional uplift and development, in their minds, required workers not only with technical skills but a certain type of moral fortitude. The pamphlet continues, "There are many subtle temptations in the Near East – differences in ethical standards – that tend toward lowering of ideals… Only those who are inflexible and immovable in their standards and determination to give, not their good, but their best, to the world, should seek appointment with the Near East Relief."[105] Working in the "perfidious East," they believed, required unusually high standards both in order to achieve their lofty goals and combat the assumed inherent backwardness of the region.

As the hiring campaign ramped up and the first envoys from ACASR went overseas, the executive committee soon began to realize the untenable scope of relieving not only the suffering Armenians but also the increasingly large number of victims suffering from the unprecedented carnage of World War I in the Middle East. The relief organization, originally intended to largely distribute food and aid, struggled to cope with the scope of problems in the area. They began to focus on two interrelated projects that would consume their work for the next decade: helping

[104] Personnel Qualifications Report, Box 2, Folder 1. Near East Relief Committee Records.
[105] Ibid.

refugees and raising orphans. Both of these projects, as you would imagine, fit neatly into their goals of development and uplift: refugees needed to be reincorporated into society to normalize socioeconomic structures and orphans could become the new "next generation" that would finally "solve" the Middle East.[106] This generational language became central ACASR's continued hiring campaigns. In another job pamphlet, they articulated this point clearly, writing, "Every man and woman in Near East Relief employ[ed] at home or abroad, who is true to his or her task, is at the present time directly or indirectly saving the lives of little children who would otherwise perish. These children are to be the future leaders of the New Near East, and if we are faithful to our opportunity, we, through them, can shape history and usher in a new era of peace and international goodwill."[107] Creating a new generation of—Christian—Armenians with Western education stood right alongside more prosaic forms of humanitarian relief like food aid. This type of generational rhetoric contextualized the short-term goals of ACASR—establishing orphan schools, opening soup kitchens—with their longer-term goals of reshaping the Eastern Mediterranean.

As the United States came closer to entering the war in 1917, the organizing committee of ACASR sought to maintain their growing pipeline of relief aid to the Ottoman Empire. Three of their networks of wealthy supporters in New York, Henry Morgenthau, Cleveland Dodge, and Charles Crane, privately advised President Woodrow Wilson to protect ACASR's work even as the U.S. entering the war came closer to reality.[108] This seemed to have some effect on the

[106] The one-time head of Near East Relief, James Barton, chronicles this shift in his book *The Story of Near East Relief* (New York: Macmillan, 1930), 118-142.
[107] "Men and Missions" Pamphlet, June 1916. Near East Relief Committee Records, Box 2, Folder 1.
[108] Bulletin on Turkish Situation, February 10, 1917, Folder 1, Box 6, Series I, Near East Relief Committee Papers. Cleveland Dodge's presence most likely helped sway Wilson. A longtime friend of the president, Dodge helped orchestrate the vote to secure Wilson his place as president of Princeton in 1902. As a trustee at the University, Dodge worked closely with Wilson to ensure Wilson's educational reforms were put into place. When Wilson ran for governor of New Jersey and, subsequent, president, Dodge became one of his primary financial supporters. As president, Wilson frequently asked Dodge for advice on how to deal with matters in the Eastern Mediterranean.

president, as the United States never formally declared war on the Ottoman Empire. After the United States did declare war against Germany, ACASR carefully balanced between antagonism towards the Ottoman state for perpetuating the Armenian Genocide and accommodation with the Ottomans to maintain their privileged position as a relief organization. ACASR fundraising campaigns ceased to use images and language of the "Terrible Turk" while increasingly focus on their campaign of generational uplift in the region. ACASR leader Charles Vickrey, however, still believed that ending Turkish brutality should have been the main goal of the organization.[109]

Seven months after the United States officially entered the war, the armistice of November 11th ceased hostilities. Throughout the war, ACASR had operated with relative freedom in Ottoman territory, delivering food aid and other relief to displaced Armenians, particularly orphans. While the organization's rhetoric depicted the Ottoman state as a monolithic, depredatory entity focused solely on violence, their actions often took the form of accommodation and collaboration as often as antagonism. By shaping the vision of their relief campaigns into a narrative of generational uplift, ACASR both softened their critique of the Ottoman state and articulated a vision for regional development anchored in their own particular legacy as a missionary organization. Despite their origins in the beginnings of the war, ACASR never discussed ending their relief work by the end of the war—the executive board and all of its workers assumed that though they might have been born out of the Armenian genocide, they would continue to work in the region. Although the war had ended, humanitarian crises continued to occur in the region, and ACASR confronted them with a newly sharpened vision for the future, one focused on reshaping the social and political landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean.

[109] Charles Vickrey to William Walker Rockwell, April 30 1917, MRL 2: Near East Relief Committee Records, series 1, box 3, folder 10,

From Uplift to Reconstruction

On February 8, 1919, French general Franchet d'Esperey entered the city of Constantinople on a horse led by two of his soldiers, emulating the actions of Mehmed II when he conquered Constantinople in 1453. In doing so, d'Esperey signified that Ottoman sovereignty over the city had finally reverted back to Western control. The end of World War I, marked by the Armistice of Mudros for the Ottomans, led to a sea change in the geopolitical status of the Eastern Mediterranean. Following the armistice, which closed the Middle Eastern theater of World War I, the Ottoman Empire ceded the Allies the right to occupy any Ottoman port cities in case of disorder. Although the Ottomans and the British informally agreed that Constantinople would be exempt from this treaty, French and British troops occupied the city in early November, 1918, where they would stay for almost five years, as rulers over a military administration of the city.

The Allied occupation of Constantinople and other key ports along the Bosphorus offered both opportunities and dangers for ACASR. The end of the war did little to stem the growing tide of humanitarian crises engulfing the Eastern Mediterranean in the spring of 1919. Hundreds of thousands of refugees, displaced by the war, still remained in Greater Syria, many of them Armenian. Throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, NER was intimately involved in the relief, management, and resettling of these Armenian refugees throughout the interwar period.[110] However, new conflicts erupted in the wake of the war as well. In Russia, the growing civil war

[110] For more see Keith David Watenpaugh *Bread from Stones: The Middle East and the Making of Modern Humanitarianism*; Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2015); and Melanie Tanielian, *The Charity of War: Famine, Humanitarianism Aid, and World War I in the Middle East* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2018).

began to push refugees across the Black Sea into Constantinople—many of whom would be aided by American relief organizations in the city, as detailed in the next chapter. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire led to fractious infighting among the multi-ethnic states carved out of the fallen state. Most devastatingly, Greece began a new campaign against the newly established Turkish state, seizing the port city of Smyrna and moving aggressively into Anatolia. These simultaneous crises created a series of challenges for American aid groups working in the area as most organizations sought to focus their aid towards certain ethnicities or causes.

ACASR confronted these crises with a continued vision of generational regional uplift. They did so, however, with a new name: Near East Relief. Officially incorporated in 1919, the new name expressed the organization's grander ambitions—not only focused on Armenian and Syrian relief, but on rehabilitating the region as a whole. NER's new slogan "Hunger Knows No Armistice" embodied this new vision, as well as the continuities between their war-work and their postwar relief. Organizationally, NER continued with the same type of work that they had during the war, largely focused around providing relief to refugees and maintaining orphanages. Their fundraising campaigns built off of the same principles as ACASR as well, relying on grassroots church-based networks in the United States. As donations for European relief efforts began to slow down in 1919, NER's fundraising campaigns actually raised more money than during the war. During the war, ACASR had operated on a budget of around five million dollars. In 1920, NER claimed a budget of twelve million dollars, a staff of five hundred full time relief workers, and millions of dollars of relief materiel. In the executive committee meeting recounting their work in 1920, NER president Charles Vickrey related that this new wave of

funding allowed NER to supervise over 100,000 orphans in camps around the Eastern Mediterranean.[111]

As NER's presence continued to grow in the region, workers and administrators alike began to sharpen their vision for what a reshaped Near East looked like. While visions of generational uplift had guided their work during the war, NER workers began to frame their vision with a more particularly American phrase: reconstruction. In literal terms, the practicalities of reconstruction operated in the middle ground between relief and development. NER continued to deliver food, clothing, and medical supplies to their stations in the Eastern Mediterranean, but they also began to rebuild physical infrastructure like roads and bridges as well as augmenting shipping lanes and travel in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas. In the words of one NER worker, these new projects would help restore the "broken-down community life, the economic and social organizations of these peoples..."[112] This process operated similarly to the American Relief Administration's expanded humanitarian purview in Russia.

The terminology of reconstruction also carried another more metaphorical meaning to NER workers, however. Historian Michael Limberg writes that NER's new vision of reconstruction in the Eastern Mediterranean, "echoed post-Civil War ideas in the American South: rehabilitating enemies, helping formerly oppressed minorities to achieve new freedoms, ending cultural backwardness, and using economic prosperity to reconcile everyone to the project."[113] This vision of reconstruction appeared most strongly in NER's sustained fundraising campaigns. One of these, a short three-page leaflet titled "Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" encapsulates this perfectly. The leaflet contains three pages with images and a few lines of text

[111] "Report of Executive Committee to the Board of Trustees," January 7 1921, Near East Relief Committee Records, Box 10, Folder 2.
[112] Ernest Pye, "To Renew Their Minds," *Missionary Herald*, May 1919, 207. For more on this concept of "reconstruction" in the minds of NER workers as well as Zionists see Limberg, *Abundant Life*, 28-33.
[113] Limberg, *Abundant Life*, 31.

underneath. One side, entitled "Yesterday: America to the Rescue," depicts two starving Armenian children in ragged clothes. The second page, "Today: America Holds On," shows Uncle Sam pulling up Armenian children, now fully clothed in boy scout uniforms, up a hill. Finally, the pamphlet reveals the two Armenian children, now grown up, wearing traditional Armenian clothes standing on a mountaintop next to Uncle Sam looking over prosperous cities. The caption reads "Tomorrow: The Near East Reconstructed."[114] Focusing on the children as the primary recipients of aid, NER saw their work in three intimately related stages. The first, relief, would alleviate the worst effects of war and starvation while also setting the stage for growth and development. The second, generational uplift, would move Armenian orphans closer to an American vision of progress and modernity, represented quite literally in this case, with Uncle Sam pulling up the now "modernized" Armenians up a mountain. Ultimately, the pamphlet articulates a vision of the future of the Eastern Mediterranean, one driven by the generational uplift to reconstruct the entire region.

NER did not exclusively limit itself to relief projects and fundraising campaigns; they also turned to geopolitics to aid in their ultimate goals of reconstruction. Similar to the American Relief Administration's efforts to derail Bolshevism in Russia, NER sought the aid of the U.S. state in achieving their ultimate goal to build a reconstructed Near East. These geopolitical goals materialized most emphatically in the debates over a potential American mandate in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the wake of World War I, the Allied powers sought to create new colonies, or "mandates" out of the fallen Ottoman Empire. Near East Relief, along with the American missionary community, strongly advocated for the United States to take up a mandate in the region, particularly one to protect Armenians. The option to claim a mandate received an early blow when the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty for the United States to join Wilson's

[114] "Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" Box 7, Folder 6. Near East Relief Committee Records.

brainchild, the League of Nations. James Barton, NER's former president and the head of the American Board of Commissioners on Foreign Missions, castigated this decision. One of the fiercest advocates for the U.S. taking a mandate in Greater Syria, Barton framed his response to the Senate vote in the terms of reconstruction that had become NER's hallmark. Writing in a polemical piece distributed throughout NER's branches, Barton excoriated the U.S. Senate's decision not to ratify the League of Nations treaty and urged American politicians to still remain active in the politics of the Middle East. He writes, "Since the Armistice in November, 1918, until the present time, America has taken no serious part in the protection of people who require help from without except in supplying food. We not only have maintained a negative attitude, but, by the recent action of the Senate, we decline to accept national responsibility in these matters."[115] For Barton, the problems in this region could not go away by themselves. He continues, "Every report brought by various Commissions, both European and American, that have been sent into Turkey indicates that the races dwelling within the old Turkish Empire have at present no capacity in themselves for safe self-government. Turks, Armenians, Syrians, and Arabs must have assistance from without…"[116] In other words, the peoples of the Middle East required an external force to compel moral development. The obvious solution, for Barton, required the United States to more forcefully intervene for the long-term health of the region. He writes, "The one request experienced by all of these American representative Commissions from all classes of people was, that America should come in, not as a conquering nation, eager to annex some part of the old Ottoman Empire, but as a strong, pacifying, controlling force, to restore order, to develop the resources of the country and lay the foundation for a permanent peace over an area that has known nothing but strife and disorder for centuries." Barton's push

[115] "Has America Responsibility for Protecting Armenia" by James Barton, Box 7, Folder 1. Near East Relief Committee Records.
[116] Ibid.

for a U.S. mandate represented the most grandiose geopolitical articulation of the long-held ideas among his organization: that the Middle East required external impetus from strong, moral Americans to develop and civilize.

American hopes for a mandate ended forcefully in May 1920 when Wilson sent a request to create an Armenian mandate to the Senate, and the Senate overwhelmingly voted it down. Even though the slim hopes of a mandate never materialized, the U.S. state still maintained a noticeable presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The principle agent for the U.S. government in the region had arrived a year before the mandate vote. In the summer of 1919, Admiral Mark Lambert Bristol arrived in the city to command the U.S. fleet stationed at the port. Although the United States had never declared war on the Ottoman Empire, they had withdrawn diplomatic ties, which carried over to the newly established Turkish state. Without a formal recognition of Turkey, the U.S. could not appoint an ambassador to the new nation. In lieu of a formal diplomat, Woodrow Wilson granted Bristol the special rank of High Commissioner – a rank that both allowed Bristol to retain his Admiralty while being granted the rights of an ambassador and put him on equal footing with the Allied military administrators in the city, all of who had been granted the same title.[117] This gave Bristol enormous leeway to operate as both a military officer and a political authority representing the United States. As High Commissioner, the State Department gave Bristol two discrete tasks: "the protection of Christian Minorities" and "the protection of American commercial interests" in the region.[118] Bristol took the command to protect American commercial interests with utmost seriousness. Operating from the American embassy in Constantinople, Bristol engaged in some of the normal work of a diplomatic envoy,

[117] Biographical Information Sheet, Papers of Mark L. Bristol, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. Box 84, Folder – Biographical information
[118] Correspondence from Charles Evans Hughes to Mark Bristol, October 30, 1922. Papers of Mark L. Bristol, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. Box 69, Folder – Lausanne

he ensured that American businessmen in the Eastern Mediterranean were guaranteed legal protection, and he encouraged business deals between local companies and the United States. Unlike most diplomats, however, Bristol also had a fleet of warships at his command. To ensure peaceful shipping lanes, Bristol cooperated with Allied forces to patrol the Aegean and Black seas to prevent piracy and maintain American access to the region. To protect the status of Christian minorities, Bristol relied upon the aid networks already established by Near East Relief. Only a few months earlier the first teams from the American Red Cross had arrived in Palestine, Greece, and Constantinople, augmenting the networks built by Near East Relief. The ARC, whose first team arrived in Palestine in late 1918, rapidly increased their staff there, sent additional workers to Greece, and established their own aid stations in Constantinople.[119] In recognition of his critical role in protecting the infrastructure of relief aid flowing into Constantinople, Near East Relief, the American Red Cross, and the American Relief Administration—which operated a transportation hub in Constantinople to send relief workers to Russia and the Balkans—all gave Bristol commissions in their organization.

While Bristol worked with these relief organizations to deliver food and aid to Christian minorities in the region still reeling from the successive wars in the region, in his personal letters, however, Bristol reveals deep antipathies to the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean. Writing to a friend back in New York in the wake of the first waves of refugees from the nascent Greco-Turkish War, Bristol fumed, "I wish our people at home would open their eyes to the real character of the races of people in this part of the world. It seems to me that this conduct of the Armenians, the Turks, and the Greeks in their election would tend to make our people realize how unreliable and untrustworthy all of these people are. I do not blame these races because they

[119] For an overview of the ARC's changing relief policies in the wake of World War I see Irwin, *Making America Safe*, 141-185.

have had little or no advantages for proper development; I only blame our own people for expecting too much of them."[120] For Bristol, the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean were inherently brutal and contentious—his interest in relief projects came from the same sort of imperial mindset that colored his tenure in Turkey: an obligation to the people of the city he was assigned to as well as direct orders from the Secretary of State to protect Christian minorities. Despite his antipathies Bristol still coordinated massive relief campaigns for Greeks and Christian minorities, however his belief in the fundamental brutality of people in the region often led to him ignoring or, in many cases, excusing acts of violence as somehow "natural."

As war raged in the Anatolian mainland between Greek and Turkish forces, NER and Bristol continued to develop transportation infrastructure to ensure the delivery of relief aid. With their dream of a mandate never realized, NER increasingly focused its work on building a sustainable infrastructure in the Eastern Mediterranean to facilitate their relief and development work. This vision of a "reconstruction" in the Near East would drive their work for the subsequent decades. However, as a massive refugee crisis began to erupt out of the Greco-Turkish war, the organization's dedication to reconstruction would lead to strange new bedfellows, as missionaries and relief workers alike sided with the new Turkish state in accepting the forceful denaturalization and expulsion of ethnic minorities in Greece and Turkey.

The Megali Idea and the Kindling of Smyrna's Fire

[120] Correspondence from Mark Bristol to Cleveland Dodge, December 6, 1920. Papers of Mark L. Bristol, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. Box 33, Folder – December 1920. Historian Umut Ozsu notes that, following the end of the Greco-Turkish War, Bristol became an avid supporter of new Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal. Ozsu argues that Bristol's fascination with Kemal's policies of modernization led to him turning a blind eye towards Turkish violence. For more see Umut Ozsu, *Formalizing Displacement: International Law and Population Transfers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015)

Largely due to the Allied occupation, Constantinople had been significantly insulated from the violence of the ongoing Greco-Turkish War that had been raging since 1919 in the wake of World War I. The city housed Armenian and other Christian minority refugees fleeing the war, but the conflict between the Greek army and the growing nationalist movement of Mustafa Kemal largely stayed within the boundaries of the Anatolian peninsula. In western Anatolia, American relief organizations nervously observed Mustafa Kemal's growing Nationalist movement in eastern Turkey. While the Allies had recognized an "official" Turkish government housed in Constantinople, Kemal's government in eastern Anatolia consolidated power and territory, pushing westward to secure all of Anatolia and Thrace. After World War I, most American institutions in Turkey remained in areas controlled by the Allied-controlled Turkish government in Constantinople, along the western coast of the Turkish mainland in port cities like Smyrna. American institutions in Turkey were buoyed when Greek forces landed in western Anatolia in 1919 to bolster Allied claims to the territory. The Greeks, however, advanced further into Anatolia, bent on conquering territory they had controlled centuries earlier. The destruction of this war, the Greco-Turkish war, along with ethnic violence perpetrated between civilian Greeks and Turks in the Anatolian mainland would produce hundreds of thousands of new refugees over the course of the war. The roots of the Greco-Turkish war set the stage for the massive conflict that would define the two nations and the results of the conflict built the modern nations of Greece and Turkey.

Greece and Turkey, of course, had a long and fraught history. Part of the Ottoman Empire until gaining independence in 1830, Greece's long and imbricated history with the Ottoman Empire led to lasting enmities. In the wake of their war for independence in the early 19th

century, Greek politicians and thinkers began to build an ideology that would come to be known as the "Megali Idea," an irredentist concept of Greek nationalism that imagined large portions of the Anatolian peninsula, which remained under Ottoman control, as part of a Hellenized community destined to become one unified Greek state. This idea ran up against Ottoman policies, of course, but also other hard realities. League of Nations writer Macartney elucidates, "as, however, the population in such districts was nowhere purely Hellenic, the result was bound to be friction, not only with the actual masters, the Turks, but also with the rival claimants, the Serbs, Bulgars and Albanians."[121] While this ideology caused some tension in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the outcome of the Balkan Wars in 1912-1913 accelerated the disputes. Greece emerged from the conflicts doubling its territorial size, adding the regions of Epirus, Crete, Lesbos, Chios, Samos, and the majority of Macedonia to its nation. Notably for the internecine chaos it caused afterwards, these new territories won in the Balkan wars included a variety of new ethnic minorities, including Turks, Albanians, Kutzo-Vlachs, Jews, and Bulgarians.

The biggest issues for the Greek government in administering these new lands were the Turks, or at least those they defined as Turks. The complex interweaving of ethnic and religious identities in Macedonia and Anatolia ran up against the polarizing lines of state-enforced ethnic homogeneity. The Greek Government seized the lands of any Muslims in their new territory, branding them "Turks" and expelled between 100,000 to 150,000 back to their "homeland" in the Ottoman Empire.[122] A similar process occurred across the Aegean Sea at the same time, as the Ottomans expelled the Greeks of Thrace, Gallipoli, and the Anatolian littoral. This action kicked off a series of violent expulsions under the rough guise of an "exchange" of ethnic

[121] C. A. Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League*, (London: League of Nations Union Publishers, 1931), 75
[122] Ibid., 76. For more see Ozsu, *Formalizing Displacement*.

minorities. Between 1913 and 1914, roughly 100,000 "Greeks" and "Turks" were expelled from their homes and sent either across the Aegean Sea or through the Thracian peninsula to the newly expanded Greek state or to Ottoman territories. Similar to the Armenian genocide, this expulsion happened through a combination of state enforced policy as well as mob violence. These newly created "Greeks" and "Turks" were supposed to simply occupy the houses of their counterparts upon reaching their new nations, but the whole process received very little state management and, by 1914, state support for the exchange collapsed leaving tens of thousands of refugees with no official aid system.[123] The outbreak of World War I quickly put an end to any formal recognition of this exchange process, but it set a crucial precedent in the years leading up to World War I that religious minorities were a problem to be solved for each nation-state.

Although World War I caused significant refugee problems in both Greece and the dissolving Ottoman Empire, the largest crises actually occurred after the official end of the war in 1919. The Treaty of Sevres, signed between the Allied powers and the newly established nation of Turkey in August of 1920 gave Greece a huge boon to its irredentist ideology: Thrace and a huge swathe of the Anatolian Peninsula. The Thracian peninsula (which, in contemporary times is split between Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey) had always been a target of Greek ambitions, not only because of its centrality to the Megali idea, but also its access to the Black Sea. The lands in Anatolia proper also seemed a crucial proving ground for the Megali idea as they encompassed crucial port cities like Smyrna and large swathes of arable farmland in the heart of the former Ottoman Empire. Turkey, however, refused to ratify the Treaty of Sevres, mostly due to the Greek annexation of Thrace. The Allied Powers pressured Greece to reconsider its terms, but Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos refused. Greek troops had already landed in Smyrna in 1919 at the request of the Supreme Allied Council, and the Greeks declared Thrace

[123] C. A. Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League*, 77.

and Western Anatolia as a part of Greece in 1921, using Smyrna as an advance point for an invasion of Anatolia to secure their newly granted lands. This heartened Near East Relief workers in Turkey, as the majority of American institutions in Anatolia remained in Aegean port cities, especially Smyrna. By July of 1921, the Greeks had advanced to Sakkaria where they were met and rebuffed by Turkish forces. The following months saw Greece lose all of the gains in rapid succession. By September, in a stunning turn of fortunes, Kemal's army pushed the Greek forces back into the very port they had arrived from: Smyrna. As one of the largest port cities in the region, Smyrna had become, under Greek occupation, a haven for Armenian and Greek refugees in Anatolia. When Kemal's forces arrived in Smyrna in September 1921, a series of catastrophic events led to the forced displacement of tens of thousands of people.

The Two Admirals

Before Turkish troops arrived in Smyrna, relief groups like NER and the American Red Cross had coordinated with Bristol's naval ships to organize a wide, if fragile, infrastructural network to ferry aid and refugees fleeing the violence of the Greco-Turkish war across the Aegean and Black Seas. The sheer number of refugees fleeing from Smyrna, however, forced a massive shift in the scope of their work. Through a series of political and military maneuvers, U.S. aid groups acquired two large fleets of ships to transport refugees out of Smyrna—which American relief organizations had decided on as the only acceptable course of action as Smyrna burned. In a chaotic month-long period, American aid groups and the U.S. Navy evacuated hundreds of thousands of refugees out of Smyrna, transporting them to various islands in the

Aegean and to the Greek mainland. However, this emergency action of evacuation built the infrastructural framework for the more grandiose project of the Greco-Turkish exchange by providing the very vessels used during the exchange. In the minds of the League and the Allied powers, if U.S. controlled ships could ferry hundreds of thousands of refugees out of a burning city, they could surely exchange the remaining Christian minorities as well. These fleets came from two sources, two "admirals." The first of these admirals, Mark Bristol, supplied protection and cargo space on his U.S. destroyers. The second of these admirals emerged more circumstantially, yet his actions provided another crucial piece of infrastructure to buttress Greece, Turkey, and the League of Nations' plans to consolidate new ethno-states in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the aftermath of World War I, the YMCA began to increase its overseas presence, building schools and education centers around the world.[124] In the Eastern Mediterranean, the YMCA recognized a kindred spirit in the missionary-driven Near East Relief, and coordinated extensively with the organization on their similar quests of moral uplift. About a month before the Turkish army reached Smyrna, a YMCA employee received a welcome promotion to boys' secretary in the city. In August of 1922, Asa Jennings brought his family and children to the city on the Anatolian peninsula to pursue his life goal of evangelizing the Middle East through the work of the YMCA. Early in September, Jennings' boss, E.O. Jacob, left the city for a few days to deal with personal matters in Constantinople; he left Jennings in charge of the city's YMCA. On September 6th, Jennings would be on the front lines of one of the world's largest

[124] For more on the YMCA's expanded presence in the Eastern Mediterranean see, Correspondence from Arthur Newell to Samuel Mott, July 7, 1923. Box 1, Folder – Correspondence Reports, 1923. YMCA Archives. For a broad, if dated, history of the YMCA's foreign work in the interwar period see Kenneth Scott Latourette, *World Service: A History of the Foreign Work and World Service of the Young Men's Christian Associations of the United States and Canada* (New York: Association Press, 1957)

humanitarian crises. The cachet of the YMCA and, consequently, the United States afforded Jennings an enormous amount of influence in the city—enough to relocate hundreds of refugees solely on the strength of his word. When the Greek front broke in September of 1922 and hundreds of thousands of refugees, both military and civilian, streamed into the city, Jennings began relief work. The YMCA had been offered a house by the Marsellou family, a Greek family who were members of the association, for whatever aid purposes they saw fit. Jennings drove through the city of Smyrna in his car and literally picked up anyone he saw that seemed in need of assistance, bringing them back to the Marsellou house. Using YMCA funds, Jennings purchased a dozen other houses in the vicinity of the YMCA, in the words of one of his fellow association workers, "into which he thrust defenceless girls, children, and women."[125] All told, Jennings placed around 2000 Greek refugees into the care of the YMCA merely by picking the people he saw around him.

In Constantinople, news of the growing disaster in Smyrna brought together the various aid groups operating from the city. Mark Bristol, unsurprisingly due to his accorded status in nearly every aid group in the region, organized a new ad hoc committee, the Smyrna Disaster Relief Committee, to deal with the crisis across the Aegean. With tens of thousands of Greeks streaming into a city already filled with refugees from the brutal Greco-Turkish War, Allied forces in Constantinople reached out to Bristol and the other American aid organizations in the city, identifying them as the only agencies with the infrastructure and funds to deal with the impending catastrophe. British High Commissioner Sir Horace Rumbold reached out to Bristol for American ships to help with evacuating refugees. Bristol recounted in his diary, "a letter that I had received from Sir Horace Rumbold, British High Commissioner, which I state was in my

[125] Correspondence from Caleb Lawrence (Chair of the American Relief Committee) to Van Bommel, October 15 1922, YMCA International Work in Turkey Collection, Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minnesota Archives and Special Collections, Minneapolis, MN. Box 1, Folder – Correspondence Reports, 1922.

opinion quite impertinent, because it invited our relief organizations to take up the relief work in Smyrna."[126] Bristol believed that the Allies, who he deemed largely responsible for condoning the Greek advance into Anatolia, should be responsible for a disaster that, in his mind, they caused.

On the Anatolian peninsula, Jennings met with an expedition from the Smyrna Disaster Relief Committee, writing in his diary, "[the committee] came for the purpose of affecting a more or less permanent relief committee to cooperate with a committee they had formed in Constantinople we gladly permitted them to assume the leadership." NER, the ARC, and the U.S. Navy began distributing food and medical aid to the refugees in the city in early September. Within a few days, though, all plans for long-term care became moot. The Turkish cavalry reached Smyrna on September 9th. For four days, the Turkish army struck an uneasy balance with the defeated Greek army and civilian population of Smyrna. According to contemporary observers, the Turkish army looted the bazaars of the city and began to round up Greek army regulars hiding in the city to take as prisoners of war or to execute in hurried Courts Martial. This type of conflict, in the mind of Bristol, appeared to be the inevitable consequence of the "brutal people" in the Eastern Mediterranean. In response to YMCA descriptions of looting and execution, Bristol responded that he saw the actions "as orderly a process as one could expect it to be."[127] However, things soon escalated beyond even Bristol's imaginations for violence. On September 13th, the fire started.

As one of the few major cities in Anatolia that had offered any protection for Armenian minorities during the genocide of the Ottomans, Smyrna contained a thriving Armenian quarter that quickly became a target of the Turkish army, who looted the quarter and, in some cases,

[126] War Diary, September 6th, 1922. Mark Lambert Bristol papers, Box 4, Folder – September, 1922.
[127] Correspondence from Mark Bristol to Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, September 1922, Papers of Mark L. Bristol, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. Box 74, Folder – Smyrna, General Situation.

executed Armenians out of hand. No observers knew who started the fire, or whether or not it was intentional, but all agreed that it came from the Armenian quarter, spread quickly throughout the city of Smyrna, raged for weeks, and destroyed nearly every building in the city. The following day, the YMCA evacuated its female staff. Writing after she landed in Constantinople, YMCA secretary Sarah Jacob recalled, "As we left, Smyrna was burning – a bank of flames in the rear, fanned by a strong wind toward the sea; the sea in front, the quay all along the waterfront, absolutely packed with people, stretching their arms to heaven and the few boats in the harbor."[128] The fire drove nearly the entire population of Smyrna to the harbor, one of the only safe refuges from the flames. An impromptu refugee camp grew on the quay, filled with hundreds of thousands of Greeks and Armenians. In Constantinople, these reports horrified the Smyrna Disaster Relief Committee. The Committee had been formed to deal with a few thousands war refugees, not to aid and resettle an entire city. In a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State, Bristol believed U.S. relief to be the only possible solution to the growing massive crisis, writing, "Rough estimate total number completely destitute refugees three hundred thousand. Probably impossible for these people return to their homes because firstly their villages have been destroyed secondly all reports concur their return would be sheer murder on account of infuriation by Turkish population which witnessed devastation of country by Greek forces." The only possible solution, in Bristol's mind, would be to relent to Allied pressure and begin American involvement organized by the admiral himself and the State Department. In a response, Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes gave Bristol full leeway to aid, relieve, and

[128] Correspondence from Sarah Jacob to D.A. Davis, September 14, 1922, YMCA International Work in Turkey Collection, Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minnesota Archives and Special Collections, Minneapolis, MN. Box 1, Folder – Correspondence Reports, 1922.

transport refugees as the Admiral saw fit.[129] Upon hearing this news, Bristol reached out to the Turkish forces of Mustafa Kemal and secured permission for American ships to aid and, eventually, transport the Smyrna refugees out of the city. Kemal agreed to an armistice with Bristol and the Allies, allowing them until the end of September to evacuate all refugees out of Smyrna.[130] Kemal had several demands, chiefly that all men of military age in the city, between 18 and 45, needed to stay as prisoners of war and that no Greek ships could be involved in the evacuation unless they were accompanied by Allied or American boats.[131] Operating now with the official sanction of the U.S. State Department, The U.S. Navy and Near East Relief offered emergency aid in the form of food relief on the harbor, but these were only short-term solutions. Jennings summed it up in his own diary, writing that there was only one solution to this crisis, "People everywhere were praying for ships. I also prayed for ships."[132] The U.S. Navy had evacuated a few thousand orphans and the staff of the International College at Smyrna, and the British Navy had done the same, but neither the Americans, Greeks, or the Allies had put any large-scale evacuation plans into motion. On September 20th, Jennings' birthday, the YMCA secretary decided on a plan to affect a mass evacuation of the refugees.

Drawing from the political capital of both the YMCA, NER, and the U.S. Navy, Jennings travelled to the quay where he browbeat an American destroyer—the *USS Edsall*, stationed by Bristol to protect the Americans in the city—into giving him a motorboat. Jennings proceeded out of the port on his motorboat until he ran into a ship anchored a few miles out from the city, an Italian steamer named, ironically, the *Constantinople*. The ship had no passengers; it had

[129] Correspondence from Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to Mark Bristol, September 21, 1922, Papers of Mark L. Bristol, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. Box 78, Folder – Turkey, Refugee Situation, 1922.
[130] C. A. Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League*, 79.
[131] Ibid., 80.
[132] Correspondence from Asa Jennings to D.A. Davis, April 8, 1923, YMCA International Work in Turkey Collection, Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minnesota Archives and Special Collections, Minneapolis, MN. Box 3, Folder – Asa K. Jennings.

planned on ferrying evacuees from Smyrna but had cancelled its plans when the Turkish army arrived. By promising payment from the YMCA, Jennings eventually convinced the captain of the *Constantinople* to take the 2000 refugees that Jennings had secured in YMCA properties to a nearby island. Located only about a hundred miles from Smyrna, the island of Mytilene, owned by the Greeks, in the Aegean Sea seemed a perfect place to offload Jennings' refugees and, potentially, solve the growing crisis at the harbor. The following day, Jennings and 2000 refugees boarded the *Constantinople* and proceeded to Mitylene. Under his orders from Davis and the rest of the committee in Constantinople, Jennings examined the island for the purposes of transporting more refugees there. Shockingly, he found the island's harbor provisioned with dozens of boats under the control of a large remnant of the Greek army that had fled in the face of the Turkish advance. Later, Jennings found out that he had stumbled upon a military coup in action. The army at Mitylene, under General Prangos, had secretly joined with revolutionary forces in Greece to oust King Constantine I and set up a military government in the wake of the disastrous failures of the Greco-Turkish War. Jennings writes, "We found out afterward that it was because of the plans of the revolutionary party and only two days from that time every soldier went over to the so-called Venizelos government…"[133] Prangos had no plans to use the ships in the harbor; he only wanted to control them from being taken by pro-royalist forces.

Jennings took the first step towards integrating the Greek polity into the political nexus he and the Smyrna Disaster Relief Committee had created to deal with the refugee crisis in Smyrna. To convince the general to allow the YMCA to use his ships, Jennings went to the mayor of Mytilene and secured his permission to use the island city as a refugee station. Upon further pressing, Prangos promised Jennings that he would contact his superiors in Athens for further instruction. Jennings returned to Smyrna where he received the news from the Disaster

[133] Ibid.

Relief Committee that Bristol had secured the sanction of the U.S. State Department to manage the evacuation. Bristol promised that any boats secured by Jennings could have an official U.S. Navy escort and thus satisfy Kemal's requirements for evacuation. Eventually Prangos relented, granting Jennings authority over the 50 Greek ships in the harbor at Mytilene. Jennings had secured his second fleet. Back in Smyrna, E.O. Jacobs recounted his experience seeing his subordinate arrive in command of a fleet of fifty ships on September 24th. "The first batch of Greek ships arrives with Jennings, convoyed by American destroyer…15000 out of a mob of 50000 were taken off by us today in stifling heat and dust amidst the indescribable crushing, confusing, robberies, and beatings by Turkish soldiers, and sickening wailing of mothers, wives, and children as sons and husbands were seized for deportation. One consolation carries us through this inferno: some do get away."[134] In the midst of the evacuation, Jennings' fellows began to refer to him as "Admiral" in respect to his audacious plan to commandeer Greek ships. In three days, Jennings evacuated nearly 100,000 additional refugees. By the 28th, the small island of Mytilene had been filled with over 200,000 refugees and Jennings secured Greek permission to transport more refugees through the nearby islands of Chios and Samos, with the fleet eventually moving another 80,000 refugees to the two islands.[135] During this chaotic emergency evacuation, the coup that Jennings had stumbled upon finally took place; a military government took control of the Greek government. Notably, the political connections that Jennings established on Mytilene continued between administrations; the U.S. evacuation continued unabated and with the new government's support. The new Greek government gave

[134] "My Smyrna Disaster Diary – Part Two" by E.O. Jacob, YMCA International Work in Turkey Collection, Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minnesota Archives and Special Collections, Minneapolis, MN. Box 1, Folder – Correspondence Reports, 1922.
[135] Correspondence from Asa Jennings to D.A. Davis, April 8, 1923, YMCA International Work in Turkey Collection, Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minnesota Archives and Special Collections, Minneapolis, MN. Box 3, Folder – Asa K. Jennings.

Jennings almost complete authority over how to proceed with the evacuation, where to put the refugees, and, with the aid of the Smyrna Disaster Relief Committee in Constantinople, the task of housing and feeding the refugees when they arrived, allowing American organizations to supply both the transportation and welfare net for Greek refugees.

Even during this time of emergency response, the U.S. government and American aid groups began to build larger networks of aid to eventually facilitate what they saw as a permanent solution to the conflict in the region. President Wilson asked Congress to authorize $200,000 in funds for the Smyrna Disaster Relief Committee. NER placed a general appeal for funds amongst its donors, which had already resulted in tens of thousands of dollars of additional aid. Even the American Relief Administration, which had only a small presence in Constantinople at the time, sent tens of thousands of dollars of food shipments from their Russian famine relief project through the Black Sea to help aid the Greek and Armenian refugees.[136] The network of aid that had been organized in Constantinople responded in force to the crisis. On September 30th, the Turkish forces under Kemal extended the armistice for eight more days in order to allow Jennings and his fleet to evacuate tens of thousands of more refugees from ports along the Anatolian coastlines on both the Aegean and Black Seas. Jennings, along with his fleet, traveled to Constantinople where the YMCA "Admiral" finally met Admiral Bristol for the first time in person. Together the two men agreed to try and bring many of the refugees on the temporary island stations of Mytilene, Chios, and Samos to Constantinople and, "if possible secure consent of the Turkish government to take them through into the Black Sea." Failing that, Jennings sought to use his fleet to load more of the refugees from port cities around Asia Minor and transport them to Greece. However, the exceptional conditions in Greece that

[136] Correspondence from Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to Mark Bristol, September 21, 1922, Papers of Mark L. Bristol, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. Box 78, Folder – Turkey, Refugee Situation, 1922.

had allowed Jennings such unprecedented authority over how and where to move refugees were quickly changing. Jennings recounts that, eventually, he and Bristol secured consent from Turkish authorities to ferry refugees from the Black Sea back to Greece, "but unfortunately the Greek government had changed their attitude with reference to receiving any more refugees from Asia Minor, and insisted on the Turks keeping them as they, the Greeks, claimed they had received already more than one million refugees since the Smyrna disaster, an increase of 20% of their population, and that it was impossible for them to receive more."[137] In the face of Greek refusal to take any more refugees, the evacuation ended in the first days of October. The work for U.S. humanitarian organizations now turned towards housing, feeding, and relief as fall turned into winter.

Smyrna had become a turning point for many of the organizations operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. For NER, the YMCA, and the American missionary community in the region, the loss of American access to the Anatolian heartland precipitated an ideological transformation—they could no longer work in the region if they did not fundamentally recognize the Turkish state, both politically and morally, as equal. This led to intense debate among the missionary community, and a radically altered approach to their relief and reconstruction work in the Eastern Mediterranean. The American Red Cross confronted one of its first massive refugee resettlement projects since the end of the war, one that put them into an uneasy alliance with missionary relief organizations like Neat East Relief. While the fires of Smyrna raged, American aid organizations acted in relative harmony. Jennings' audacious commandeering of Greek ships and the subsequent ferrying of hundreds of thousands of refugees only worked because of the support of the U.S. Navy and the access and funds of Near East Relief. This process revealed the strength of the infrastructure networks built by organizations like Near East Relief in the years

[137] Ibid.

following World War I. This organizational harmony, however, was short-lived. As the crises of the Greco-Turkish war died down in the winter of 1922, the same U.S. humanitarian organizations that had recently operated in concert began the longer and more contentious process of evacuating and resettling the refugees in Constantinople. While they were aided in this endeavor by the two American fleets, those pieces of a larger network of transportation infrastructure also provided the basis for the larger displacement of the Greco-Turkish exchange. The search for permanent solutions to "the refugee question," as it came to be known, would reveal the often-clashing goals and ideologies of the organizations.

Permanent Solutions

At the core of the conflicts and struggles between U.S. humanitarian organizations laid one central question: how do you solve a refugee crisis? Vast ideological changes in Near East Relief, a response to the catastrophe in Smyrna, led to the organization at first tacitly accepting and, eventually, fully supporting a League of Nations plan to denaturalize and expel ethnic minorities in Greece and Turkey. Professionalized organizations operating in the region, the American Red Cross, similarly accepted this plan, but more out of a respect for sovereignty than any ideological shift. However, these aid organizations were not monoliths; their members shifted their goals as realities changed and, in some cases, sought similar solutions to the refugee problem with other agencies while still squabbling over minutiae. Each organization participated in a variety of processes that they saw as the ultimate "solution" to the massive refugee crisis caused by the Greco-Turkish War. In the immediate aftermath of the Smyrna disaster, the signs

of future conflict among the organizations were already present. American organizations in Constantinople participated in two distinct processes that they regarded as solutions to the refugee crises of the Eastern Mediterranean: providing the transportation and financial infrastructure for diplomatic conventions and offering refugees aid until an ill-defined point that they became "incorporated into the economy" of their place of refuge. In pursuit of diplomatic solutions to the massive refugee crisis, American organizations turned to the already present infrastructure of the League of Nations in Constantinople, in particular League of Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, Fridtjof Nansen. Nansen took it upon himself to facilitate the process of transporting Greek refugees across the Aegean and, in his mind, ultimately solving the conflict between Greece and Turkey. From a meeting in early October discussing the practicalities of moving the refugees, "It was proposed and agreed that in conjunction with the organization of immediate relief, the League should take action in unison with competent authorities for the movement of refugees to areas suitable for their permanent Establishment, and lay down plans to this end."[138] In this case, the "competent authorities" were the American organizations present at the meeting: the American Red Cross, Near East Relief, and the American Relief Administration.

In the fall of 1922, the League of Nations authorized Nansen to explore solutions to the refugee crisis caused by the Greco-Turkish War, extending his mandate to the Greek refugees of Asia Minor.[139] Nansen saw his mandate for refugee aid in Asia Minor as license to bring a peaceful resolution to the entire Greco-Turkish conflict. To this end, he helped to bring Greek and Turkish leaders as well as the former Allied Powers together to the peace conference at

[138] Minutes of Meeting at League of Nations office in Constantinople, October 6, 1922, American Relief Administration Russian Operational Records, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford CA. Box 439, Folder 1, Reel 513.
[139] Carl J. Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate: The United States and Refugees During the Cold War*, 15; Bruno Cabanes, *The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924*, Chapter 3.

Lausanne.[140] When the Allies, Greece, and Turkey met in Lausanne in November, Nansen brought a formalized proposal of what he had suggested to U.S. aid groups the previous month. Greece and Turkey should formally sanction "exchanging" their minority populations, sending all the Greeks in Anatolia over to Greece and all the Turks in Greece across the Aegean.

A variety of Americans attended the Lausanne conference, including representatives of Near East Relief and the ABCFM as well as Admiral Bristol and other representatives of the U.S. state. The United States did not have an official role at the conference, but a team of American diplomats, including Bristol, was invited as "observers." Similarly, NER, ARC, and ABCFM members were invited to attend, a clear admission by Nansen and the League that any potential exchange would have to rely on American transportation and relief. The mission from the ABCFM, including James Barton, made an impassioned plea in the early days of Lausanne for any potential treaty to provide special protections to Christian minorities as well as guarantee Near East Relief and missionary access to the region indefinitely.[141] The American ambassadorial team, led by Bristol and longtime State Department diplomat Joseph Grew, sought to work the middle ground between the Allies and Turkey. Keeping in line with Secretary of State Hughes' order to protect Christian minorities and American commercial interests, Grew and Bristol entreated the Allies to grant Turkey sovereignty and relinquish control of Constantinople, trusting in Kemal's claims that he would aggressively pursue modernization policies in his new government.[142]

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[140] Ozsu, *Formalizing Displacement,* 4. For an extensive account of how the process of Lausanne unfolded, see John DeNovo, *American Interests and Policies in the Near East* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), 128-166.
[141] Diary entry, Thursday Dec. 21-Sunday Dec.31 1922, Joseph Grew Letters 1922 vol.2 47
[142] For more on Mustafa Kemal's modernizing vision for Turkey see Christine Philliou, *Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

Surprisingly, Near East Relief ultimately ended up supporting the American decision to promote Turkey's claims to sovereignty. The evacuation of Smyrna had reshaped Near East Relief's evolving ideology of reconstruction. Before the great fire, missionaries and relief workers in NER and the YMCA held onto a hope that Mustafa Kemal's nascent nationalist movement in eastern Anatolia would not reach the port cities of the Aegean. The administrators of Near East Relief had long saw western Anatolia as a potential permanent home for Armenian refugees displaced during the war and genocide. The burning of Smyrna, however, signaled that Kemal would seek a completely unified Turkish state. In huddled meetings in Lausanne, representatives from Near East Relief along with their counterparts in the ABCFM like Barton debated on whether or not to abandon relief work in Anatolia.[143] Some in the missionary community feared that Kemal would ban proselytization and persecute Christian minorities. However, Turkish claims to sovereignty in the first days of Lausanne seemed to convince them that the port cities of western Anatolia would never be independent. Limberg writes, "The Nationalist government [of Turkey] clearly intended to exercise greater control over missionary education and religious practice, which would likely reduce Americans' ability to openly teach Christianity. Staying on would mean accepting that Muslims (particularly Turkish Muslims) could truly achieve moral and social progress. Despite their qualms, the gathered missionaries elected to stay, even if it meant stepping back from direct proselytization."[144] This plan involved recognizing the Turks as both modern and equal, a radical break from their earlier messaging. This new approach to relief activity in the region, however, reflected their long history of both antagonism and accommodation to the Ottoman state.

[143] E.O. Jacobs, "The Smyrna Story," Folder "Turkey Correspondence and Reports, 1922," Box 1, Country Files: Turkey, YMCA Archives.
[144] Limberg, *Abundant Life*, 47-49.

A fundamental problem remained: how did one identify who was Greek and who was Turkish? Longstanding communities existed in both nations—especially in the conflict regions of Thrace, the Bosphorus, and areas of the Anatolian peninsula around Smyrna—that existed in the borderlands of national identity, moving back and forth between nations as politics and war changed their ancestral homelands' sovereigns. Similarly, ethnic and racial categories offered little insight into objective "Greekness" or "Turkishness" among these communities, many of which had existed divorced from these newly created national identities for hundreds of years. In the first days of Lausanne, following Nansen's proposal of a forced population exchange, the Turkish delegation requested the separation of Greeks and Turks based on religion rather than ethnic or racial categories. In order to identify the proper populations to be exchanged, the Lausanne Treaty authorized the Turkish and Greek governments to expel and denaturalize any Greek Orthodox citizens in Turkey and any Muslims in Greece. In practical terms, this meant that the new nation of Turkey denaturalized many Greek Orthodox ethnic Turks who claimed long lineages in the Ottoman empire and Greece forced out any Muslim despite their skin color, ethnicity, or ancestry or, indeed, their wishes.

The League appointed a "mixed commission" made up of "neutral members of the League of Nations."[145] This agreement disproportionately affected the "Greeks" in Turkey. Christian minorities had long lived in Thrace and the western portions of Anatolia now claimed by Kemal's new government. In terms of numbers, this meant that nearly one and a half million Christians were to be expelled from Turkey's claimed lands while only a few hundred thousand Muslims were forced out of Greek lands. However, this commission had limited funding and, thus, the members had almost no authority over how to actually supervise the process of the

[145] Mixed commission made up of Mr. E. E. Ekstrand, Swedish; General Manrique de Lara, Spanish; and Mr. K. M. Widding, Danish.

exchange. The commission, unsurprisingly, relied on the networks of transport and resettlement that already existed in the area, those set up by the Smyrna Disaster Relief Committee in the frenetic days of early September. As an agreement, the Greco-Turkish exchange only accelerated a process already occurring in the wake of the Greco-Turkish war. The evacuees from Smyrna and Thrace were merely the latest in a long line of "Christian minorities" forced out of each nation dating back to the Balkan Wars and earlier.

Even with the exchange agreed upon in the early days of Lausanne, the negotiations at the conference continued for weeks, with talks eventually breaking down in February of 1923. The conference reconvened in April, but only in July did they produce a peace treaty. This arduous eight months of negotiation created a unique period for relief agencies operating in the region. While both the Greek and Turkish governments had agreed upon the exchange, Greece refused to participate in actually transferring any refugees as they were still nominally at war with Turkey. As the vast majority of the Christian minorities in claimed Turkish lands were either in Anatolia or Thrace, two hotbeds of conflict, the Greek government delegated the task while the conference negotiations continued. In this interstitial space, between the armistice and exchange agreement and the actual signing of the treaty eight months later, American organizations were the sole institutional entities helping move refugees to fit the terms of the treaty. They had become the only "competent authorities," in Nansen's terms, with the influence to affect the exchange.

"Our Second Government"

Near East Relief's new formalized recognition of Turkish sovereignty led to a surprising acquiescence to the realities of the Greco-Turkish exchange. In the wake of the catastrophe at Smyrna, the directors of Near East Relief and their cohorts on the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions recalibrated their long-term ambitions for the Eastern Mediterranean to the new reality of Turkish sovereignty. By begrudgingly accepting Turkish sovereignty over Anatolia, Near East Relief narrowed their view of regional reconstruction from geopolitics to smaller, development-based work. Working with the Turkish state, in their minds, would provide the best chance at long-term reconstruction in the region. In practice, this acquiescence led NER to support the Greco-Turkish exchange as a means to secure peace in the region and allow them to work unhindered in Anatolia, regardless of the violence and inhumanity of the exchange itself.[146] Other critical American organizations in the region shared this assent to the exchange. After the first days at Lausanne, Admiral Bristol expressed an increasing admiration for Kemal's Nationalist government, who he viewed as far more modern and progressive than the Allied supported Turkish government.[147] He strongly advocated for Turkish sovereignty and thought the exchange to be, "overall a decent idea."[148] When Ambassador Grew formalized American consent to the exchange at Lausanne, American Red Cross workers came to the same conclusion as Near East Relief—Turkish sovereignty would be a reality, relief organizations had to live in it. Although each of the principal aid organizations in the region now concurred on a long-term solution, the practicalities of effecting the exchange still reveal the deeper antipathies and organizational logics that defined each institution

[146] C. A Macartney, a League of Nations representative, observed this conclusion in his official history of the Greco-Turkish exchange, writing, "This compulsory deportation was widely criticized as inhumane, but was probably the best solution under the circumstances…" C.A. Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League,* 85.
[147] For more on this see Ozsu, *Formalizing Displacement*, 54.
[148] War Diary, April 8th, 1922. Mark Lambert Bristol papers, Box 4, Folder – April, 1923.

To achieve this goal, the "competent authorities" of U.S. humanitarian organizations took two distinct routes. First, organizations like Near East Relief and the American Red Cross operated within the bounds of the Lausanne treaty and provided the infrastructure to move Greek and Turkish refugees between the two nations. Using the very same ships that Jennings had commandeered in the days after Smyrna, as well as U.S. Navy ships remanded for ARC use, these organizations managed the loading, transport, and disembarking of refugees moving from Turkey to Greece in the exchange, just as they had done when they were fleeing the fires of Smyrna. Second, NER and the ARC provided the funds and food necessary for refugees to make the journey and survive, for a short while, in their new country. The formality of the Lausanne treaty meant, in practice, very little change in the work of NER and ARC workers day-to-day. Despite this, cracks in the relationship between the two organizations quickly began to show.

The first conflicts emerged in the days after Jennings' evacuation ceased operation. Due to the enormous nature of the refugee crisis engulfing the Eastern Mediterranean, the Smyrna Disaster Relief Committee in Constantinople divvied up relief work between the two largest aid organizations in the region: the American Red Cross and Near East Relief. In a letter from Secretary of State Hughes to Bristol, Hughes relates, "The Department has been informed that the Red Cross and Near East Relief have agreed to take care of the situation jointly under the general direction of the Red Cross in Greece, it being understood that the Red Cross will deal with a principal emergency in every way in Greece and Near East Relief in Asia using Constantinople for warehousing and other purposes as heretofore."[149] While Constantinople still remained the central staging point for planning and resource distribution, the ARC and NER

[149] Correspondence from Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes to Mark Bristol, October 13, 1922, Papers of Mark L. Bristol, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C. Box 78, Folder – Turkey, Refugee Situation, 1922.

would each take control over their own groups of refugees, managing their movement, relief, and feeding.

Although the formal process of the Greco-Turkish exchange would not be formalized until the summer of 1923, refugees had already begun to stream into Constantinople, Thrace, and western Anatolia. Incited by the terms of the exchange discussion, ethnic violence began to break out in Turkish cities. Since the only category determining "Greek-ness" and "Turkish-ness" was religion, local mobs and Turkish soldiers often drove out ethnically Turkish civilians who had converted to Christianity, or had been part of longstanding Christian communities in the Anatolian mainland. Similar events transpired throughout Greece, with Muslim communities isolated and, eventually, evicted by Greek officials. Small details could incite ethnic violence and displacement—a rug seller in Greece found his shop burned down simply because of the association with Ottoman carpets.[150] This growing violence spurred massive refugee flows out of Turkey to port cities along the Aegean coast and to Constantinople. When they reached the cities, Near East Relief had been given sole control over their relief and transportation. NER received two boons in this process: two "admiral's fleets." Bristol remanded part of his fleet to escort any ships ferrying refugees across the Black and Aegean seas, and Asa Jennings, still in command of his commandeered Greek fleet, joined NER temporarily as an executive in charge of transportation.[151] Jennings had emerged from the Smyrna disaster with strong credibility throughout the region, one of his new fellows at NER recounted, "I think that no one would contradict the statement that Jennings is the best known and most loved American in the Near East today. I was astonished to see the entrée which he has everywhere he goes. I have seen him

[150] Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League,* 81-82.
[151] Correspondence from Hibbard to C.V. Vickrey, December 21, 1922, YMCA International Work in Turkey Collection, Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minnesota Archives and Special Collections, Minneapolis, MN. Box 1, Folder – Correspondence Reports, 1922.

now in Athens, Smyrna, and Constantinople. Everywhere he seems to be known. Practically no request which he makes in any quarter is refused."[152] This authority granted Jennings continued control over the fleet as well as access to Greek ministers. Through Bristol and Jennings' connections, NER and the ARC secured the right to transport Christian minorities to Greek lands on the condition that the relief groups provided for their feeding and housing.

The division of work seemed simple: Jennings' and Bristol's ships would transport refugees to Greece while the American Red Cross would provide for their care there. NER supervised the transportation of hundreds of thousands of refugees over the ensuing months. By sea, NER continued to use Mytilene as a base of transportation. Jennings recounted their involvement with Mytilene in a letter, writing, "The entire problem of the Island of Mitylene was also put in our hands where at one time we had more than 150,000 refugees and where there are still 80,000 – more than 200,000 refugees have passed thru Mitylene alone."[153] The nearby islands of Chios and Samos saw fewer, but still significant, numbers of refugees pass through the temporary camps built there in the wake of Smyrna. One NER representative bemoaned the massive numbers, complaining to his superior, "The whole nation is on the move. It is impossible to restrain them."[154] Constantinople remained a critical throughway for refugees from ports on the Black Sea. As the trip through the Bosphorus and back intruded on Turkish controlled waters, NER had to take particular caution in transporting refugees. The head of NER in the area, Jaquith, wrote "In response to the urgent appeal from the Greek government, Near East Relief is provisioning Allied ships for the voyage to Black Sea ports and return to the

[152] Correspondence from Hibbard to Carlisle, February 19, 1923, YMCA International Work in Turkey Collection, Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minnesota Archives and Special Collections, Minneapolis, MN. Box 1, Folder – Correspondence Reports, 1922.
[153] Correspondence from Asa Jennings to Hibbard, October 30, 1922, YMCA International Work in Turkey Collection, Kautz Family YMCA Archives, University of Minnesota Archives and Special Collections, Minneapolis, MN. Box 1, Folder – Correspondence Reports, 1922.
[154] Correspondence from Morris to NER Headquarters, October 22, 1922, Papers of Near East Relief, Union Theological Seminary Archives, New York City, NY. Box 7, Folder 5.

Bosphorus, and the Greek boats, which are receiving refugees here for Greece." With the two-part system of Allied and Greek ships forming a train through Constantinople, NER evacuated tens of thousands more Christian minorities to Greece. This process occurred haphazardly, but quickly. The refugees driven out of Turkey were packed onto boats, hundreds at a time, often without room to sit or lay down, ferried across the Aegean as quickly as possible to islands secured by NER and the YMCA during the evacuation of Smyrna.

Arriving in Greek territory did not solve the refugees' problems however. Indeed, as NER ferried more and more exchanged refugees across the Aegean, the American Red Cross began to regret their portion of the exchange work. ARC workers were particularly concerned about the spread of disease among the refugees.[155] This attentiveness to disease often formed the crux of difference between the ARC and NER, as Red Cross workers constantly feared epidemics among refugee populations, while NER focused more on the transportation of refugees in any condition possible. Aid workers in the ARC came to see NER as, at best, an inefficient humanitarian society and, at worst, a group of zealots actively harming the mission of the Red Cross in the area and putting refugee lives in danger. In early January of 1923, in the midst of the crisis, Dr. Ross W. Hill, one of the American Red Cross' directors of foreign operations, summed up these sentiments to a fellow ARC director, "the past few days have afforded an excellent exhibition of Near East Relief efforts to embarrass the American Red Cross…"[156] Hill had taken issue with Jennings' fleet's frantic pace in transporting refugees without adequately feeding them or checking for signs of illness. "Then Mr. A.K. Jennings, formerly with the YMCA at Smyrna, which means affiliation with the Near East Relief,

[155] After World War I, the American Red Cross became increasingly focused on disease prevention as one of their organizational goals. For more on this, see Julia Irwin, *Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian Awakening*.
[156] Correspondence from Dr. Ross Hill to ARC Directors in Greece, January 14, 1923, Records of the American National Red Cross, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford CA. Box 19, Folder 1, Reel 27.

proposed to me that the American Red Cross establish quarantine and living quarters for 10,000 new refugees…Of course the Near East Relief is responsible for the care of these [refugees] till they leave Asia Minor and their responsibility ceases when they get the refugees into Greece and thus into our hands. So Jennings has been very insistent…"[157] Hill's fellow ARC directors echoed his complaints, with managers complaining that Near East Relief charged the American Red Cross for goods and food that they never sent and that NER frequently ignored international health guidelines when transporting refugees.[158] Hill concluded his letter in exasperation, "But I must not continue on this subject for that crowd [Near East Relief] are so much worse than the Greeks that I think our problems here would have been relatively simple if we had had nothing to do with them from the outset."[159] Conflicts continued to erupt between the two organizations. In the middle of the exchange, Near East Relief shipped dozens of barrels of clothes to Greece to provide for the refugees. When American Red Cross workers opened the barrels, they found them half empty. ARC workers angrily wrote to their supervisors that Near East Relief sought not only to leave the refugees open to an epidemic, "but have them half-clothed as well…"[160] These conflicts, while perhaps not surprising during an evacuation of this scale, highlight the organizational divergence between the American Red Cross and Near East Relief. The American Red Cross had expanded its humanitarian purview during World War I to include more ambitious relief and rehabilitation projects.[161] However, unlike NER, their ultimate goals in the Eastern Mediterranean were never about radical socioeconomic or religious reconstruction, but about assuaging the destruction of war. Despite recognizing Turkish sovereignty, Near East

[157] Ibid.
[158] Correspondence from Edmund Daley to Dr. Ross Hill, January 22, 1923, Records of the American National Red Cross, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford CA. Box 20, Folder 4, Reel 28.
[159] Correspondence from Dr. Ross Hill to ARC Directors in Greece, January 14, 1923, Records of the American National Red Cross, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford CA. Box 19, Folder 1, Reel 27.
[160] Correspondence from Edmund Daley to Dr. Ross Hill, January 22, 1923, Records of the American National Red Cross, Hoover Institution Library and Archives, Stanford CA. Box 20, Folder 4, Reel 28.
[161] Irwin, *Making America Safe,* 66

Relief's work during the exchange demonstrated their ultimate goal of reconstruction and development in the Eastern Mediterranean, no matter the cost.

Even as the two organizations sniped at each other over practice and policy, they both sought the same goal: achieving the aims of the Lausanne treaty and "incorporating" their newly made refugees into their new nation. NER's role largely took the form of transport: once the refugees were out of Turkish claimed lands they were safely disposed. For the other aid organizations in Constantinople, this incorporation happened once the refugees reached their new homeland's shores. While the ARC had established feeding and housing projects in Greece, their work had a rigid temporal and financial boundary; they only had the funds and authority to aid the newly arrived refugees until the summer of 1923.[162] After that, they assumed that the refugees would be taken care of by Greece after signing the Lausanne Treaty and, thus, the refugees would be incorporated into their new nation.

At the same time that the American Red Cross wrapped up its work in the summer of 1923, NER also ceased its transportation. In a letter to NER's directors in America, an NER executive recounted it was time for "the responsible governments [to] organize [and] take over the work."[163] For nearly a year, however, the two organizations had provided the infrastructure and funding for a nation's worth of refugees. Greek authorities seemed to recognize this. In the same letter, the NER executive recounts a dinner with a prominent Greek minister who commented, "One cannot but be impressed by the recognition in Europe to Near East Relief as a factor in Near Eastern Affairs… Near East Relief has been 'our second government.'"[164] In many ways, NER and the American Red Cross had operated as a second government for Greece

[162] League observer C.A. Macartney estimated that the American Red Cross fed 800,000 refugees daily during the eight-month period.
[163] Correspondence from Charles Vickrey to Talcott Williams, June 16, 1923, Papers of Near East Relief, Union Theological Seminary Archives, New York City, NY. Box 7, Folder 6.
[164] Ibid.

during the violence and chaos of the Great Fire of Smyrna and the Greco-Turkish exchange, providing all of the basic amenities to support travel and welfare during the harrowing journey across the Aegean. Divested of the duty of taking care of either their expelled former citizens or the transport and care of their newly made citizens, the states of Turkey and Greece were free to selectively create the new ethnic and religious identity of their nations. U.S. humanitarian provided relief for hundreds of thousands of refugees through their actions at Smyrna and other flashpoints of conflict, but their implicit support for the nascent ethno-nationalist politics of the Eastern Mediterranean also eased the way for the larger displacement of the Greco-Turkish exchange. American aid institutions had become a "second government," one that allowed the new governments of Greece and Turkey to violently consolidate new ethno-states out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire.

Conclusion

On January 1st, 1924, months after Near East Relief and the American Red Cross had ceased their refugee transportation and relief work, NER published a graphic of their work in the preceding year. The graphic barely mentions the exchange, instead displaying information on the orphans cared for by NER: ages, food and medicine supplies, and their growing chances to secure jobs. One page triumphantly claimed that NER's orphans "have a better chance of a job than many in the United States." The massive refugee transportation and resettlement project NER engaged in the previous year receives only one small mention, in a chart depicting the organization's supply of clothing in 1923. The chart shows a dramatic, exponential increase in

their supply over the previous year with a footnote reading, "The peak came when 100,349 refugees were being cared for during April 1923…Thankfully, the majority of these were evacuated later to Greece."[165] The next page returns to discussions of NER's orphanages. Although it had participated in one of the largest refugee evacuation projects in history, Near East Relief instead championed their plans to "reconstruct" the Eastern Mediterranean through the administering of orphanages. These new development goals were smaller and more localized, but they drew from NER's long history in the region.

From their arrival in the Eastern Mediterranean in 1915, Near East Relief had been intimately involved in managing refugee movements and implementing ambitious development-based relief projects. When regional violence in the wake of World War I spurred massive refugee crises, Near East Relief became a locus of operations for relieving, transporting, and resettling refugees. Other American institutions, especially the American Red Cross and the U.S. Navy, joined NER in constructing a wide network of transportation infrastructure to maintain relief aid. This network facilitated both the travel of goods and the movement of people, including refugees. Through a variety of political exigencies and ideological shifts, each of these American organizations and institutions came to accept the mass violence of the Greco-Turkish exchange as somehow necessary and, perhaps, ultimately good. The strength of American organizations' network of transportation highlights their increased ability to intervene overseas during this period through humanitarian aid group. By supporting the exchange, both diplomatically at Lausanne and materially during the process itself, American aid organizations and the U.S. state strengthened ethno-nationalist agendas in both Greece and Turkey and solidified an ongoing process of ethnic nation-state formation in the Eastern Mediterranean. In this new world, Near East Relief tamped down on some of its grander geopolitical ambitions but

[165] Near East Relief Graphic, 1923, Box 7, Folder 6. Near East Relief Committee Records.

remained dedicated to reorganizing the region through development-based projects. Their presence in the region would continue for decades, a constant reminder of the growing reach of American power in the interwar years.

Chapter 3

Solving the "Russia Question": The American Relief Administration, the League of Nations, and Russian Refugees in Constantinople, 1920-1923

At a special meeting of the League of Nations in 1922, League of Nations High Commissioner on Refugees, Fridtjof Nansen, made an impassioned plea to League representatives. The League had formed Nansen's office only a year earlier, and had given him the task to deal with refugees fleeing the Russian Civil War. With limited funds, the High Commissioner had been focusing on dealing with refugee populations in major city centers, chief among them being Constantinople, where tens of thousands of Russians had fled across the Black Sea from the encroaching Red Army. Even with such a narrow spatial focus, Nansen needed more funds. Nansen related to the League that his office, "acts in some measures as a labour exchange, and would be able to evacuate larger numbers of refugees in special categories to countries where they could find employment, had it the material means to do so." In order to facilitate the first steps of this labor regime, Nansen asked for £20,000. With tens of thousands of lives at risk, Nansen pleaded for the League to free up more funds so that he could work on the refugee problem. In his response, the representative of the British Government, Lord Arthur Balfour, believed that the stakes were even higher than tens of thousands of lives.[166] While the plight of the Russian refugees in Constantinople struck Balfour as a worthy cause to donate to, he argued that there would be a greater loss if the League did not act. He began his response with

[166] This was the same Lord Balfour who, of course, made the infamous Balfour Declaration five years before his address. Then serving as foreign secretary, Balfour penned a letter to Baron Walter Rothschild stating the approval of the British government for the creation "of a national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine after the end of World War I. Later scholars have aptly traced how Balfour as well as other British and French politicians used promises of a Palestinian homeland for Jews in order to co-opt allies during the war. For more on Balfour and his statement's legacy, see Jonathan Schneer, *The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Random House, 2012) and David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Holt, 1989).

a nod to humanitarian geopolitics, "Now America, unfortunately as I think, is not a member of the League of Nations but it is quite clear that there are large sections, and most important and valuable sections of American opinion who are deeply concerned with the state of Europe on humanitarian as well as on political and economic grounds…and have been prepared to assist in any efforts…" For Balfour, the League needed to offer some kind of sum for this project, or else they would risk alienating the good favor of Americans, particularly American humanitarian organizations. How would American institutions react if the League could not, "even to go the length of finding the 20,000 pounds…"[167] Balfour's address to the League had a measure of success—they voted to supply Nansen with additional funds, however Nansen would need to connect with American aid institutions to complete his work. Although Nansen, the League of Nations, and the former Allied powers all worked to ameliorate the crises brought on by massive Russian refugee flows, the financial power of American aid institutions often led to U.S. organizations taking the lead.

This chapter will follow how a variety of organizations, from the League of Nations to enterprising private humanitarians to the American Relief Administration, sought to implement a series of aggressive relief and resettlement projects in order to solve the crisis of Russian refugees in Constantinople. First, this chapter traces how Nansen began the process of resettling Russian refugees in Constantinople and his work to implement grand and ambitious resettlement plans in collaboration with the newly established International Labor Office. Functioning as an international labor broker, Nansen believed that he could move refugees around the globe to nations willing to take in eager workers. This plan ran into the realities of global migration

[167] "Report by Nansen on Constantinople Russian Refugees, 1922" Folder – Geneva Office: Correspondence Sent--Russian Refugees, Box – Chronological Letters and Telegrams sent from Geneva, Commission Files of the Refugees Mixed Archival Group (Nansen Fonds). League of Nations Secretariat Archives.

restriction regimes.[168] Similar to when the League turned to Near East Relief and the American Red Cross to respond to the refugee crisis of the Greco-Turkish exchange, Nansen sought American aid to deal with Russian refugees in Constantinople. Running low on funds and with decreasing political clout, Nansen turned to the American Relief Administration to help resettle refugees from Constantinople in neighboring countries. The American Relief Administration sent Arthur Ringland, an ARA home office worker who had worked closely with Hoover to assess the scale of the Russian refugee crisis in Constantinople. Like his compatriots in Russia, Ringland sought to deal with the Russian refugee crisis swiftly and with the clout of the United States' largest humanitarian organization behind him. The process of resettling the refugees out of Constantinople quickly became known as, ominously, "liquidation."

Utilizing the networks of transportation and humanitarian connection built by other American aid agencies in the region and leveraging the political and economic clout of the ARA, Ringland managed to secure bilateral agreements to secure dispersal plans for thousands of refugees throughout Eastern Europe. In another ambitious resettlement plan, Ringland set up a committee of Americans in Constantinople to vet the "most desirable" Russian refugees for resettlement in America. Despite the U.S. Congress passing a series of progressively restrictive immigration quota laws, Ringland maneuvered several thousand refugees through the United States' increasingly byzantine and restrictive immigration system.[169] This plan's success relied on a network of sympathetic sponsors in the United States who guaranteed payment for Russian travel to the U.S. and settlement costs, a relationship that presaged the early Cold War system of

[168] For more on the shifting global restrictions on migration in the interwar years see Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, *Drawing a Global Colour Line: White Men's Countries and the International Challenge of Racial Equality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008)

[169] For foundational histories on the passage of restrictive immigration laws see John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860–1925* (New Brunswick, N.J., 2002) and Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004).

refugee resettlement.[170] After a few months of vetting, Ringland's committee fell into infighting as members clashed over differing visions over who "deserved" to be resettled in America. The fallout of Ringland's system also revealed conflicting visions over the goals of humanitarian work. This conflict had gendered dimensions. The male ARA committee members approved refugees that conformed to an ill-defined set of American ideals and those who the committee thought could contribute to American economic growth. They identified these characteristics as essentially masculine, a crucial quality for any American immigrant. Anna Mitchell and Alma Ruggles, humanitarians working for the Phelps-Stokes private relief fund, sought to resettle those Russian refugees that needed the most help, particularly the ill and disabled. When confronting the private relief fund workers, Ringland and his subordinates castigated their decisions as childish, naïve, and fundamentally unaware of what made a "good American." These different, gendered visions over refugee resettlement reveal larger disjunctures within each organization's humanitarian imagination.

Few histories have focused on plans for refugee movement to the United States in the interwar years. [171] Although the ARA's "liquidation" plan only transported a few thousand refugees to the United States, the organization's manipulation of the quota system reveals the fissures and filters within the American immigration regime. Historian Paul Kramer writes that, "modern state boundaries are best imagined not as walls but as filters, usually seeking less to

[170] See Carl Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gates: The United States and Refugees During the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 34-85.

[171] The majority of scholarly works on American refugee history in the interwar years focus on the U.S. response to Jews fleeing Nazi Germany, for more on this see: See Richard Breitman and Allan J. Lichtman, *FDR and the Jews* (Cambridge, Mass., 2013); Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut, *American Refugee Policy and European Jewry, 1933–1945* (Bloomington, Ind., 1988); David S. Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938–1941* (New York, 1985); Alan M. Kraut, Richard Breitman, and Thomas W. Imhoof, "The State Department, the Labor Department, and German Jewish Immigration, 1930–1940," *Journal of American Ethnic History* 3, no. 2 (1984): 5–38; Saul S. Friedman, *No Haven for the Oppressed: United States Policy toward Jewish Refugees, 1938–1945* (Detroit, 1973); Shlomo Shafir, "American Diplomats in Berlin, 1933–1939, and Their Attitude to the Nazi Persecution of the Jews," *Yad Vashem Studies on the European Jewish Catastrophe and Resistance*, no. 9 (1973): 71–104; Henry L. Feingold, *The Politics of Rescue: The Roosevelt Administration and the Holocaust, 1938–1945* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1970).

block human movement entirely than to select, channel, and discipline it."[172] As an outside organization, albeit one with extensive ties to the government, the ARA's ability to vet "desirable" refugees and have them pass beyond the quota system demonstrated their knowledge of what type of person the state sought to channel. The committee's early success demonstrated that, despite its vagueness, the ARA committee members' conception of masculine "American-ness" resonated with officials in the United States. When this conception clashed with a contrasting vision of humanitarianism as helping the neediest, ARA members feminized and demeaned the process. Recent works in the history of humanitarianism have traced the ways that men sought to "scientize" and masculinize humanitarian work in the early twentieth century, moving away from sentimentality as the driving force for charity.[173] The conflict between Ringland and Mitchell reveals that this process did not occur easily or quickly, but instead in a messy transition as aid workers clashed over the consequences of relief and resettlement strategies. These two visions collided, and the refugee-vetting panel collapsed, but that collapse revealed the contrasting humanitarian imaginations of the members. This chapter traces how a variety of humanitarians sought to confront a refugee crisis and how their contending visions came into conflict.

The Russian Question in Constantinople

Due to World War I, the Bolshevik revolution, and the subsequent civil war, flows of Russian refugees had become a distressingly common phenomenon in Europe. The first refugees came from Russia in a trickle. Made up largely of aristocrats, landowners, and the other wealthy

[172] Paul Kramer, "The Geopolitics of Mobility: Immigration Policy and American Global Power in the Long Twentieth Century" *The American Historical Review* 123:2 (April 2018), 399.
[173] See Julia Irwin, *Making the World Safe*, 7-9 and David Keith Watenpaugh, *Bread From Stones*, 18-24.

elite of the Tsarist state—either ousted by Bolsheviks or fleeing from the possibility in the early days of the revolution—these first refugees found easy settlement across the noble houses of Europe. The torrent would come soon afterwards. As the Russian Civil War intensified in the wake of World War I, Russian peasants, farmers, and fleeing soldiers abandoned their homeland and sought refuge anywhere possible. From 1917 to 1919 hundreds of thousands of refugees trekked west on land into Europe or by sea through Constantinople. These first refugees were often poor but ultimately transient. In Constantinople, Admiral Bristol, the American Red Cross, and Near East Relief rarely mention any need for aid among these refugees. The fleeing Russians quickly boarded ships from the Black Sea to the Aegean.[174]

In the fall of 1920, however, another wave of Russian refugees overwhelmed the fragile equilibrium in the Allied occupied city. The White Army, composed of Tsarist military forces and other Bolshevik opponents and supported by European allies, had suffered successive losses all throughout the war. General Pjotr Wrangel, the latest in a long line of generals facing the Red Army, saw his forces pushed back through the Crimea all the way to the Black Sea. Recognizing defeat, in November 1920, Wrangel ordered the complete and final evacuation of Russia in the face of the encroaching Bolshevik army. At this point, Wrangel's army consisted not only of military men, but also their families and any army followers gathered on their retreat through Crimea, roughly 130,000 people. Using the remnants of the White fleet stationed in the Black Sea, Wrangel ushered his army, now refugees from their homeland, onto ships destined for Constantinople. However, with the Red Army approaching and many of the Russian ships in disrepair, the evacuation quickly became chaotic and dangerous. Allied ships in Constantinople represented Wrangel's best hope. Upon receiving a call, French, British, and Italian ships

[174] Bristol Papers, Box 74 Folder – Russian Refugees, account of Mrs. Bristol's Relief Work in Constantinople November 1920 – August 1923

ventured from the port to help in the evacuation process. The U.S. Navy also got involved in the process, much like how they would two years later when Greek refugees were fleeing the fires at Smyrna. Upon hearing of the evacuation of Wrangel's army from the Crimean Peninsula, Bristol ordered his detachment of destroyers in the Black Sea to pick up refugees from the city. When they arrived to the peninsula, the Navy destroyers loaded on thousands of Wrangel's refugees and even saved a downed Russian ship that had been taking on water.[175]

In Constantinople, the Allied powers debated how to respond to this new, massive refugee crisis coming to the city. After much debate, the French High Commissioner offered to pay for refugee "maintenance," offering funds for food and temporary housing for the tens of thousands of Russians.[176] In addition to French state support, informal networks of private humanitarian aid, often American, offered relief for the Russian refugees. Admiral Bristol's wife, Helen Bristol, quickly became a fixture among the Russian refugee community in Constantinople. She became such a common sight, that most of the Russian refugees recognized her immediately, and her passage in the city would be greeted with cries of "Mrs. Bristol" or "Mrs. Admiral" as she had become commonly known. While the admiral controlled the navy and managed relief convoys in the Aegean and Black Seas, Helen Bristol collected money from her fellow elites in the city, organized soup kitchens and housing for refugees, and set up small networks of donors back in the United States to aid with her projects. This gendered labor had unexpected benefits – Bristol could attract personal donations through her own elite networks back in America, mostly made up of the wives of politicians and military officers. Writing to potential donors in the U.S., Bristol spared no attempt to elicit sympathy in her descriptions, writing, "It was started in November 1920, when overloaded vessels carrying the remnants of

[175] Bristol Papers, Box 74 Folder – Russian Refugees, "The Big U" November 19, 1921
[176] Macartney, *The Work of the League*, 14.

General Wrangel's Army and thousands of fugitives with their children, women, and invalids landed in the harbour of Constantinople. As the condition of these unfortunate people – starving, soiled, and exhausted, frequently with no other belongings but the ragged clothes on their back appeared most pitiful."[177] Mrs. Bristol, along with the wives of the other High Commissioners, opened a canteen on the port to feed the first refugees. By the following summer, her accumulated funds allowed her to organize housing for Russian officers and "individuals whose condition was peculiarly distressing," such as invalids, widows, and orphans.[178] The American Red Cross, Near East Relief, the Navy, and the YMCA all gave supplies for relief as well.[179] In August of 1921, around six months after the refugees had first landed in Constantinople, France ceased its relief work, leaving only the informal networks of private groups like Bristol's to support the refugees.

The Russian refugees in Constantinople presented a unique challenge for humanitarian relief. Wrangel had ordered his men, and thus their families, to stay in the city. He sought to create a Russian government-in-exile and refused requests from his soldiers to leave the overcrowded city and find refuge elsewhere.[180] The Allied government framed the need for dealing with the refugees almost exclusively in terms of international security, a prevalent conception during this era. Historian Michael Barnett characterizes the nature of this problem, writing of the broad refugee problem after World War I, "At issue was not the compassionate desire to relieve the suffering of displaced peoples, but a fear that the mass movements of people was undermining peace and security. This demand to address the refugee flows was couched in

[177] Bristol Papers, Box 74 Folder – Russian Refugees, account of Mrs. Bristol's Relief Work in Constantinople November 1920 – August 1923
[178] Ibid.
[179] Bristol Papers, Box 74 Folder – Russian Refugees

humanitarianism."[181] The League saw these refugees not only as a massive humanitarian catastrophe, but, more importantly, as posing a significant security threat. European nations feared the stateless Russian refugees would, at best, weigh down slowly recovering economies and, at worst, bring the seed of Bolshevism. One American aid worker visiting the city wrote, "the situation in Constantinople is critical, owing to the possibility of local disorders and the threat of ideological spread....threats of mob violence must surely stimulate evacuation."[182] Even if Wrangel allowed the refugees to leave the city, chances that other nations would accept them without pressure were slim. A League of Nations observer wrote, "No country, in European post-war conditions, was willing to admit unidentified and destitute aliens, and least of all Russians, who might prove to be secret emissaries of the Third International."[183] Fears of this type of a security risk, not only for the city, but for the continent as a whole spurred the Allied powers to facilitate a more formal process to solve the "Russian refugee question," as it came to be known. They turned to the League of Nations to begin a process of removing the Russian refugees out of the city, by whatever means possible.

In February of 1921, only a few months after Wrangel's refugees landed in Constantinople, the League of Nations created a new position in their growing network of bureaucratic administration: the High Commissioner for Refugees. The Russian Revolution and the ensuing civil war had created roughly two million stateless people who held no internationally recognized legal status and held no right to international travel beyond special dispensations offered by various national governments. Into this new office stepped an unlikely

[181] Michael Barnett, "Refugees and Humanitarianism" in *The Oxford Book of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies* ed., Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long, and Nando Sigona (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 245.
[182] Correspondence from Krueger to Ross Hill, September 30, 1922. Box 438, Folder 1. ARA Russian Operational Records.
[183] Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League*, 15.

character: Fridtjof Nansen. As discussed in the previous chapter, Nansen engaged with his work as the League of Nation's High Commissioner on Refugees with zeal.[184] Nansen's role as High Commissioner had explicit limits. When he worked to secure the terms of the Greco-Turkish exchange, he pressed against the boundaries of his commission. On the case of Russian refugees, however, he remained firmly in his prescribed field. Under the League's commission, the only "refugees" that Nansen could focus on were Russian refugees. He had no mandate beyond the two million stateless people pushed out by civil war and Bolshevik social policies.

Nansen's first sought to address the Russian refugee crisis by repatriating willing Russians spread around Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. Many observers in Europe assumed that, after the Russian Civil War ended, the fleeing refugees would be allowed back into their homes. A League of Nations official commented that the League had "organised its whole relief and particularly its educative work on the assumption that the economic restoration of Russia would eventually call for a large number of workers, both manual and intellectual, and that the 'active forces' for this task would be found among the refugees."[185] This view was common among many of the refugees as well, even if they feared persecution when returning to Russia. The refugees expected, historian Peter Gattrell writes, to return to their *soslovie* or specific estate after the civil war died down. He goes on to explain, "No one thought that an individual would remain a refugee for the rest of her or his life."[186] The newly established Soviet Union, however, viewed the refugees as, at best, ideological opponents of the new regime and, at worst, secret counter-revolutionaries sent by European governments to destabilize the nation.[187] Even as the first signs of famine began to appear in the Volga region of Russia, the Soviet Union revoked the

[184] Reynolds, *Nansen*, 214
[185] Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League*, 14.
[186] Gatrell, *A Whole Nation Walking,* 197.
[187] Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League*, 16.

citizenship of any Russian refugee who had fled. Gatrell continues, "displaced people lost their place in the social hierarchy…they were lumped together in a hastily devised category for which there was no precedent in Russian history." In a global environment increasingly focused on border-making, identification, and categorization, the Russian refugees in Constantinople had no way of gaining formal recognition. This led, in the words of one League of Nations official to a people who "cannot travel, marry, be born, or die without creating legal problems to which there is no solution."[188] By revoking their citizenship status, the Soviet government effectively ended any chance of large-scale repatriation of Russian refugees, in Constantinople or elsewhere.

With little enthusiasm for repatriation from any party, Nansen turned towards smaller, focused projects to relieve the refugee crisis. With only a small budget provided by the League, Nansen decided to tackle the Russian refugee problem by first targeting cities with the largest numbers of refugees; Constantinople became his first zone of operation. Nansen established a League office in the Allied-held city and began to assess the scope of the refugee problem there. However, according to the League, the High Commissioner would *not* aid or relieve these refugees, but rather "make the refugees self-supporting by dispersing them throughout countries" Essentially, the League tasked Nansen to become a labor manager, coordinating flows of refugee workers to where they could best find work and provide for the international economy.[189] This "dispersal" process would become the chief means by which the League and, eventually, the American Relief Administration would seek to address the Russian refugee population in Constantinople. This process rested upon a nebulous concept of refugees becoming "incorporated into local economies" at some point after the dispersal. Never well defined, becoming incorporated into the economy signaled for Nansen and League observers that their

[188] Gatrell, *A Whole Nation Walking*, 194.
[189] Macartney 22

work in responding to the crisis had ended. They assumed that this process of incorporation would occur naturally once refugees were dispersed out of the city.[190] Under this definition, the League could "solve" the Russian refugee question in Constantinople merely by moving the refugees out. After that, the refugees would become miraculously incorporated into local economies. With repatriation impossible and the Allied powers unwilling to assist or let the refugees remain in the city without a plan for evacuation, Nansen began a three-pronged process to move refugees out of the city.

Nansen's three step plan for dispersal proceeded from the League's command for Nansen to function as an international labor organizer. First, Nansen convinced Wrangel to allow the remnants of his army to leave the city. Through a series of backdoor negotiations, and a forceful entreaty from the Allied powers, Wrangel gave up on his plans to create a government-in-exile.[191] Next, Nansen initiated a large-scale bureaucratic operation to identify, register, and categorize the refugees living in the city. The League's process of categorization revolved around labor. The League directed the International Labor Organization (ILO) to begin a census of the displaced Russian refugees. A newly organized branch of the League, the ILO sought to create a "makeable society," a global polity centrally organized by the League that maneuvered unrestricted flows of labor to the places that needed them most.[192] This ambitious goal frequently

[190] This concept of being "incorporated into the economy" dominated thinking about refugees in this period. This terminology dominated debates over the long-term process of resettling Greek refugees who had fled the violence of the Greco-Turkish war as well as those newly created "Greeks" made by the Lausanne Treaty. In an attempt to ameliorate the worst effects of Lausanne, the League helped facilitate a resettlement commission for Greek refugees named the Refugee Settlement Commission, chaired by former U.S. ambassador Henry Morgenthau Sr. In their year-long debates over how to resettle the Greek refugees, the Commission offered contrasting versions of economic incorporation. Some believed that whenever a refugee got a job, they had become incorporated. Others pointed to long-term success, including maintaining housing, job productivity, and a healthy family life. The nebulousness of this term reflects the eagerness for some humanitarian aid groups to "solve" a crisis quickly. For more on the Refugee Settlement Commission see the Commission Reports of the RSC, Box 31, Folder – Refugee Settlement Commission. Henry Morgenthau Sr. Papers.

[191] Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League*, 15

[192] For more on this see Jasmien VanDaele, "Engineering Social Peace: Networks, Ideas, and the Founding of the International Labor Organization" *International Review of Social History* 50 (2005), 435-466.

ran up against the increasingly xenophobic and restrictive migration laws passed in the wake of World War I.[193] In Constantinople, the ILO found a static population on which they could exercise their aspirations. Working with Nansen, the ILO interviewed tens of thousands of Russian refugees in the city, giving each of them a lengthy questionnaire focused on potential labor. Organized into a variety of sections, the questionnaire asked the refugees to explain any skills they had, from reading to pottery-making, as well as any professional experience. From that data, the ILO produced factsheets on as many refugees as they could, as well as collections of data on various skillsets. Nansen believed that this information could help provide unwilling nations a reason to accept and resettle refugees.[194] Next, the Nansen office sought to categorize and classify the refugees through the creation of a novel legal status paired with a new form of legal document: the Nansen passport. This certificate authorized the bearer as a "refugee," which, after being accepted by a joint committee of sixteen governments in July 1922, became a certifiable category and legal status with the authority and the ability to move between countries. For the first time in history, the term "refugee" had an international agreed upon definition: a Russian fleeing the Bolsheviks. The Nansen passport could be used in the same way as a passport, but it did not allow for a return visa.[195] By entering the refugees into the growing bureaucratic machine of the League of Nations, Nansen and the ILO sought to render the refugees legible to states seeking eager labor forces.

This ambitious plan immediately ran into several roadblocks. First, and most importantly, the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees had little funding and limited staff. While the

[193] Ibid., 442.
[194] Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League*, 22.
[195] Eventually the Nansen passport would be extended to Armenians on May 31, 1924 but for these two years, the only type of "legal refugee" was Russian. For more on this see Michael R. Marrus, *The Unwanted: European Refugfees in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) and Claudena Skran, *Refugees in Inter-War Europe: The Emergence of a Regime* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995)

ILO had a large network in Switzerland, their surveys did not assess all the refugees in Constantinople.[196] Even with labor data, few nations subscribed to Nansen's optimistic view of an unrestricted labor force migrating freely throughout Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. The few countries who expressed any willingness to resettle Russian refugees in Constantinople—predominantly neighboring countries like Bulgaria and Serbia as well as Eastern European communities with Russian-speaking populations like Czechoslovakia—required the League to pay for transportation, food, bedding, and even, in some cases, months of wages for any refugees dispersed to their countries.[197] In response, Nansen approached the League for more funds. As mentioned at the beginning, Lord Balfour's remonstration encouraged the League to donate a small sum. However, the British representative's conclusion that the League needed to appeal to the, "valuable sections of American opinion who are deeply concerned with the state of Europe on humanitarian as well as on political and economic grounds" prompted Nansen to look outside of the League to facilitate a more rapid refugee dispersal. In lieu of significant League funds, Nansen turned to the already present networks of American humanitarian aid institutions for relief funding, food, and transport in Constantinople. In the fall of 1922, nearly two years after Wrangel's fleet had arrived in Constantinople and only a few weeks after the Great Fire of Smyrna, Nansen convened representatives from the major American aid organizations in Constantinople at the League offices in the city to try and address the series of refugee crises engulfing the city. An unlikely organization, the American Relief Administration, would take over Nansen's plan for dispersal, engaging in a series of large-scale diplomatic interventions to try and rapidly evacuate the refugees from Constantinople.

[196] Macartney, *Refugees: The Work of the League*, 16.
[197] Correspondence from Krueger to Ross Hill, September 21, 1922. Box 438, Folder 1. ARA Russian Operational Records.

Liquidation and the ARA's Selective Immigration Plan

With the Greco-Turkish exchange already underway, American humanitarian organizations working in Constantinople were already stretched thin. Representatives from the American Red Cross, the YMCA, Near East Relief, and the American Relief Administration attended Nansen's meeting in 1922.[198] A variety of these organizations, including Near East Relief and the American Red Cross, had been distributing aid to Russian refugees in Constantinople on an ad-hoc basis, but they had not implemented any long-term resettlement plans. Near East Relief argued that, considering the unprecedented needs of Greek refugees, Russian refugees were not in their purview. NER's conception of reconstructing the Eastern Mediterranean did not require resettling Russian refugees. While NER had certainly paved the way for the consolidation of Greek and Turkish sovereignty in the region, they did not have the authority to manage all the refugees in Constantinople. Nansen had delegated food provision and care of the Russian refugees to the American Red Cross, as well as local networks of aid run by Mrs. Bristol, for years. However, due to the added pressures of aiding and resettling Greek refugees, the ARC ran out of funds to help the Russian refugees with any aid in the fall of 1922, let alone a vast resettlement plan**.** The Constantinople Relief Fund for Russian Refugees, organized by Mrs. Bristol, summed up the situation, "Rations have been supplied to the existing feeding stations up to the 13th October, after which date we will have in Constantinople over 17,000 literally starving people. From the point of view of humanity it will be a catastrophe – a great proportion of these people are invalids, women, and children. At the same time the danger

[198] Minutes of Meeting at League of Nations Constantinople Office, October 6, 1922. Box 439, Folder 1. ARA Russian Operational Records.

to the city cannot be overlooked."[199] As the central staging point for the Greek and Turkish exchange--proceeding at the same time as the dispersal of Russian refugees--the safety of Constantinople remained paramount and, as Mrs. Bristol's organization intimates, starving Russian refugees could pose a security threat. The American Relief Administration remained Nansen's last hope. The American Relief Administration maintained a small outpost in Constantinople to facilitate travel for their massive Russian famine relief campaign, however most of their organization worked in Europe. The ARA had donated food for Russian refugee relief, but they claimed impartiality in any larger plans for resettlement. Since the ARA had already negotiated a treaty with the new Soviet Union in order to enter for famine relief, Nansen believed that the ARA's involvement in dispersing the refugees would not lead to recrimination from the Bolsheviks. Working with Admiral Bristol, who had an honorary position in the ARA, Nansen reached out to Herbert Hoover to try and convince the humanitarian "Chief" that the ARA represented the refugees' last hope.

Implementing a refugee resettlement plan in Constantinople caused controversy in the upper echelons of the ARA. Then serving as the Secretary of Commerce, Hoover no longer officially ran the ARA in 1922, having delegated the task to a few trusted lieutenants. Regardless, Nansen reached out to Hoover directly, who informed the directors of the ARA. In Russia, refugee management occurred largely in the field, overseen by young American aid distributors. At the administrative level, ARA managers repeated the claim that the ARA's sole purview was food distribution, despite the evidence on the ground in Russia. One director, Edwin Sherman, wrote to one of his peers, that, in his mind, "so far as the ARA is concerned, we should confine our activities solely to feeding that we may not become involved in any of the

[199] ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 438, Folder 1, Reel 512, Missive from Contantinople Relief Fund for Russian Refugees, describing situation in Constantinople undated

political phases connected with this situation."[200] The ARA repeated this mantra of apolitical aid throughout all their work, but, as was the case in their projects throughout Europe and Russia, the organization's immense funding and authority granted them enormous leeway in shaping the political fate of their charges. Hoover, however, believed that the ARA were in the position to effect change. As had always happened even before he left, the ARA directors deferred to their Chief.[201] To assuage the fears of ARA managers, Hoover sought another source of capital. The ARA had been funded largely by the American government at its start, but the organization relied mostly on private donations in its later relief work. Uneasy about using donated money to manage the, "political phases connected with this situation," Hoover reached out to some of the new associates in he had made as Secretary of Commerce. Hoover contacted the Rockefeller Foundation in the U.S. and requested a one-time donation of funds in order to respond to the Russian refugee situation in Constantinople. The Rockefeller Foundation, which normally only provided aid for education, development, sanitation, and medical projects, offered the ARA a special dispensation of $100,000 in order to "disperse the refugees in the vicinity of Constantinople."[202] Although they had never offered support for the ARA before, the Rockefeller Foundation encouraged an approach to charity, which they termed "scientific philanthropy," that paralleled the ARA's technical focus.[203] To administer the fund, the ARA sent one of their long-serving veterans, Arthur Ringland, to Constantinople in order to assess the refugee situation. Ringland began his career working with the U.S. Department of Agriculture in the Forestry Services division. When the U.S. entered World War I, he joined the army as a

[200] Correspondence from Edwin Sherman to W.B. Poland, July 1st, 1922. Box 438, Folder 1. ARA Russian Operational Records.
[201] Ringland Interview. Pg 8.
[202] Lewis Strauss Papers Box 2, Folder – American Relief Administration, Annual Report of Executive Committee, 1922
[203] Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones*, 75.

commissioned officer, serving as the director of a sawmill near the front in France. After the war ended, Ringland ended up in the orbit of Herbert Hoover in his position as Chief Allied Relief Officer, who tapped Ringland for a leadership position in the American Relief Administration's work in Europe. Unlike many veterans who signed up for postwar relief work, Ringland did not serve as a food distributor in his early work for the ARA, instead working directly under Hoover in London coordinating transportation and distribution from the home office. By the fall of 1922, it seems that Ringland had had enough of working in London, as one of his close friends in the administration wrote that the onetime sawmill director was "dying to get to Russia." As the largest ARA operation to date, the campaign in Russia captivated many ARA workers engaged elsewhere. Located just across the Black Sea from the main ARA staging point in Russia, Istanbul clearly offered Ringland[204][205]

Without the authority of a diplomatic convention like the Lausanne treaty, the American Relief Administration executed an entirely different project to "solve" the Russian refugee problem in Constantinople. Ringland first turned to the Soviet Union. Using his contacts in the Bolshevik state gained from his compatriots in the field in Russia, ARA officials concurred with the League's conclusion that repatriation to the new Soviet Union would only end in death or forced labor for the once-members of the White Army.[206] Repatriation out of the question, Ringland turned to another hallmark of ARA policy: bilateral treaties. [207] Nansen's office in Constantinople had been trying, relatively unsuccessfully, to negotiate with Serbia and Bulgaria to accept Russian refugees. Both nations tentatively accepted League resettlement plans, but laid

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[205] ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 440 Folder 1 Reel 514 letter from Christian Herter to Lyman Brown September 17, 1923

[206] ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 438, Folder 1, Reel 512, 2 pages from Edwin Sherman of the ARA to WB Poland, July 1st 1922

[207] The ARA had a long history of negotiation bilateral treaties with nations, see the Riga agreement with Russia in Patenaude

out extremely stringent procedures for migration, chief of these being the refugees needed to be provided with food and basic supplies for six months in their new nations.[208] Ringland threw the ARA's political clout behind the negotiations. He promised funding and food from the ARA to both nations if they each promised to take 5000 refugees from Constantinople. Bulgaria and Serbia agreed to a plan that put the League of Nations in charge of the camps in each nation and to provide half of the aid, "and that the ARA [would] provide the food for the 5,000 refugees which it is expected will be sent to the Camp at Cattaro [in Serbia]."[209] Ringland repeated this process, in smaller numbers, around other Balkan nations.[210] Thanks to the contacts forged by Hoover and other ARA directors around Europe, Ringland managed to begin a new flow of refugees out of Constantinople into neighboring countries.[211] This process of shifting refugees out from Constantinople soon took on the portentous sounding title, the "liquidation."

As with most massive refugee movements, however, there remained a "hard core" of refugees unable to become "incorporated into the economy" to the satisfaction of the League of Nations or the ARA or easily "liquidated".[212] Two groups of people in this "hard core" of Russian refugees in Constantinople were particularly difficult for the ARA to "liquidate". First, the types of refugees that Nansen and the ILO's grand labor management schemes could not process: women, children, and the disabled. People who did not fit into masculine conceptualizations of the public sphere working environment. Second, several thousand of the Russian refugees in the city refused to take the ARA offer to travel to Bulgaria. By March 1923, Ringland and the ARA had helped disperse 15,000 refugees to nations around Constantinople. In

[208] ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 438, Folder 1, Reel 512, 1 page from Krueger to Bicknell, November 18, 1922
[209] Ibid
[210] Ibid.
[211] Correspondence from Ernest Bicknell to J.W. Krueger, December 7, 1922. Box 438, Folder 1. ARA Russian Operational Records.
[212] For more on the concept of a "hard core" of refugees see Gerard Cohen, *In War's Wake,* 8-11.

a review of the situation still at hand, Ringland laid out the numbers in typical ARA, data-focused language. In October, "the League had 29,208 refugees registered, and the ARA took feeding responsibility for 11,407. To January one of this year the League had evacuated a total of 11,471 including 6,913 men, 2,466 women and 2,092 children. To February 15th the total evacuated by the League rose to 15,000 and our obligation was reduced to 1,362. Therefore we have liquidated a total of 10,045. Of this number 3,326 were actually evacuated from Constantinople and from our lists, that is, this number was fed by the ARA to the date of sailing or rail movement and given travel rations in addition. The balance of 6,719 refused for various reasons to leave on the date of evacuations and unless they could present good and sufficient reasons, their names were stricken from our feeding rolls." According to Ringland, some refugees refused to leave out of fear that Bulgaria would be taken over by the USSR. "And then we had to reckon with the psychology of the Russian refugee – and this is beyond comprehension."[213] Ringland disregarded the fears of these refugees, instead striking their names off the ARA relief provisions list. With this type of brutal efficiency, in six months, the ARA had facilitated the "liquidation" of 15,000 refugees across the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. By erasing the names of recalcitrant refugees, Ringland also lowered the total refugee count in Constantinople, at least on paper. This process received the support of Nansen and the bureaucratic machinery of the League of Nations, both eager to lower the statistics of refugees in the city.

Although the ARA only had responsibility for providing food just over a thousand refugees left in Constantinople, Ringland still viewed the entire remaining refugee number, around 8000 people, as a problem to solve. Reaching out to his supervisor in Europe, Ringland

[213] ARA Rusian Operational Records, Box 439, Folder 4, Reel 513, 4 page from Ringland to a Walter Lyman Brown, March 4, 1923

had a new proposal: sending the refugees to the United States. Writing to the ARA European director Walter Lyman Brown, second-in-command of the ARA, Ringland admitted, "our refugees are of the class most difficult to absorb in America. These will have a hard experience wherever they go." This "hard-core" of refugees would struggle the most to reach the vague goal of economic incorporation. Despite this, Ringland believed that some of the refugees could become productive in the United States. "However, we must send to America only those who can make good. Therefore we have been working on this plan…" Ringland had devised a project "to evacuate an equal number of able-bodied to America, even though these may not be on our feeding lists provided the League contributes the average cost of European evacuations and the Amcross throws in its share. Both the League and Amcross agree in principle to this proposal of ours."[214] With support from the League and the American Red Cross, Ringland sought to send the best, most productive of the remaining refugees to the United States. Although organizations like Near East Relief had sought to facilitate emigration for refugees to America before, especially Armenians, such plans were normally implemented ad hoc and in small, personal cases. Ringland imagined a much bigger, more organized procedure. Using a committee made up of executives from the U.S. Navy, the ARC, the ARA, the YMCA, and a few volunteers from local aid agencies, Ringland formed, essentially, an immigration vetting organization to try and send "a hand-picked lot" to the U.S., exempt from the immigration quotas.[215] In the wake of World War I, economic decline and rising xenophobia in the United States led to the federal government passing a series of stringent anti-immigration laws that used a rigid quota system,

[214] ARA Rusian Operational Records, Box 439, Folder 4, Reel 513, 4 page from Ringland to a Walter Lyman Brown, March 4, 1923
[215] Christian Herter to Walter Lyman Brown, October 2, 1923, ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 440 Folder 1 Reel 514.

severely restricting immigration to America.[216] While the new laws in the U.S. hugely cut total immigration numbers, it still had skilled worker exceptions as well as yearly-renewed quotas for each nation.[217] Using ARA contacts in the American government, transnational networks of humanitarian support, and a selection process that championed notions of masculine "American-ness," Ringland believed that he could maneuver Russian refugees through the byzantine system of immigration in the United States. This process of selecting refugees who could "make good," those who could maneuver through the United States' progressively restrictive immigration laws, revealed the contrasting visions of humanitarians working in Constantinople.

Ringland's vision of what made a qualified refugee revolved around conceptions of productivity and an openness to a vague concept of "American-ness" defined around rugged individualism. In order to assess each refugees' potential for resettlement in the United States, Ringland orchestrated another bureaucratic assessment of the Russians in Constantinople, one far more thorough than the questionnaires of Nansen and the ILO. To provide more information for the selection process, Ringland, "made a very thorough examination of all refugees, indexed, tabulated, and divided them into groups." As opposed to the ILO's questionnaire, which focused on work history and skills, Ringland's examination included more nebulous questions. In interviews and exams, Ringland's panel asked refugees to not only state their work history, but

[216] The Emergency Quota Act of 1921, passed a year before Ringland and the ARA implemented the plan to send Russian refugees to the United States, set the first ever quotas for immigration to America. These quotas served as the basis for the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act's National Origins Formula. These laws represented only the latest in a long line of restrictive immigration policies enforced federally and in U.S. states. For more on this policy history see: Hidetaka Hirota, *Expelling the Poor: Atlantic Seaboard States and the Nineteenth-Century Origins of American Immigration Policy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Mae Ngai, *Impossible Subjects*; Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Barbarian Virtues;* Lucy E. Salyer, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995); Lee, At America's Gates; Daniel J. Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America (Princeton, N.J., 2002); Hester, Deportation; Higham, Strangers in the Land; and Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants since 1882 (New York, 2004)

[217] These exceptions had long been a part of America's exclusionary immigration policies. See Kramer, "Imperial Openings: Civilization, Exemption, and the Geopolitics of Mobility in the History of Chinese Exclusion, 1868-1910"

to explain how they made their work especially productive. They asked one carpenter if he would partake in more training to learn how to build cabinets. The panel pressed the refugees on questions of additional work training and willingness to start projects on an individual basis.[218] These questions about productivity and individualism highlight that Ringland's viewed refugees' "deservedness" to come to the United States not on their needs, but on how they could strengthen the American economy. In addition, Ringland instituted a caveat for resettlement that echoed Hoover's management of the ARA. Once vetted and approved, the panel forced each refugee to sign a pledge swearing that they would repay any money expended on their behalf within one year.[219] After two weeks of examinations and questioning, the panel selected 1100 refugees "as suitable to come to [America]."[220] This group consisted largely of academics, students, and workers with professional, artisan skills. Each of these refugees, at some point during the examination process, expressed an eagerness to engage in individual work and learn new, productive habits.

In addition to winnowing the refugees, Ringland also used the data secured from the panel's examinations to facilitate a transnational dimension to the resettlement process. For this plan, Ringland's committee worked closely with the Russian Refugee Relief Society, an organization built out of the pre-existing networks in the United States formed by Mrs. Bristol, which operated as an informal resettlement agency for the Russian refugees. Ringland sent the society the complete set of data that his panel had collected including personal data, skills, and former professions in order to help the refugees find work in America. One member of the society in the U.S. praised Ringland's thoroughness, writing, "Ringland sent information about

[218] Correspondence from Ringland to Walter Lyman Brown, June 4, 1923. Box 440, Folder 1. ARA Russian Operational Records.
[219] Correspondence from Arthur Ringland to Walter Lyman Brown, June 4, 1923. Box 440, Folder 1. ARA Russian Operational Records.
[220] ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 440 Folder 1 Reel 514, from to Chris Herter, October 2, 1923

each man, which information helped the committee immensely."[221] The Russian Refugee Relief Society offered guarantees to ARA contacts in the Department of Commerce and Labor--where the Bureau of Immigration had been relocated to in 1903--that any refugees sent to the United States through Ringland's plan would be assisted with finding a job immediately upon arrival.[222] With these assurances in place the Bureau agreed to run through any Russian refugees from Constantinople[223]With the support of aid networks both in Constantinople and the U.S., Ringland's plan only faced one final hurdle: passports and visas. A few hundred of the Russian refugees had qualified for Nansen passports and could move out of Constantinople with relative ease, for the others Ringland needed special visas. [224] Using his contacts within the State Department, Ringland's supervisor, Walter Lyman Brown, secured additional visas for Ringland's refugees to travel to the United States, with the department supplying as many as the ARA needed for those its committee approved. Although not officially a state organization, the American Relief Administration still wielded an enormous amount of authority and respect from the American government. Using this regard, Ringland managed to secure assurances from multiple federal departments to give special access to the Russian refugees in Constantinople, all in the context of Congressional immigration restrictions.

After securing the additional visas, Ringland's panel in Constantinople used League of Nations funds to transport the refuges to the United States where they gained easy access, justifying, in Ringland's mind, the panel's ideological vetting process. In June of 1923, the first 1100 Russian refugees arrived in the United States, where they breezed past immigration lines.

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[221] ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 440 Folder 1 Reel 514, from to Chris Herter, October 2, 1923

[222] It is unclear the extent to which Hoover, then serving as the Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor, knew about Ringland's U.S. resettlement plan. Ringland directed most of his requests for refugee access and visas to his direct superior, Walter Lyman Brown, the Director for the ARA in Europe. Brown undoubtedly had a direct line of contact to Hoover, but his papers do not show any explicit requests for aid from the Chief.

[224] ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 440 Folder 1 Reel 514, 3 pages, from Ringland to Walter Lyman Brown, June 4, 1923

Ringland's conceptions of productivity and individuality as desirable qualities among the Russians seemed to resonate with immigration officials in the United States, who allowed the refugees access after only a cursory examination. Political leverage also smoothed the immigration process. Christian Herter, one of Ringland's subordinates in Constantinople, explained, "The immigration authorities, because the ARA was interested in this work, were extremely lenient in the interpretation of their laws. In addition, great pressure was brought to bear upon them by members of the Russian Refugee Relief Committee in New York." Ringland and his panel in Constantinople believed that their vetting guaranteed the refugees a productive life in the United States. Herter continues, "The committee had no trouble in getting positions for them and they have become useful and good prospective citizens."[225] After landing in New York City, the Russian Refugee Relief Committee, in tandem with ARA home office worker Frank Page, helped the refugees look for jobs in their fields of work.[226] This arrangement between the vetting panel in Constantinople and the relief committee in the United States presaged the process of refugee resettlement during the early Cold War, which required potential refugees to have a "sponsor" in the United States willing to help them find work and housing.[227] Despite America's harsh, restrictive immigration laws, the ARA had managed to negotiate a flow, small but still significant, of Russian refugees to the United States. The ARA had worked within the filter of the U.S. immigration system, channeling "desirable" immigrants to the U.S. through the vetting process of the Constantinople committee.

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[225] Christian Herter to Walter Lyman Brown, October 2, 1923, ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 440 Folder 1 Reel 514. Later in his life Herter went on to a long and successful career politician, serving as a house member and then governor Masachusetts. In 1957 Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Herter Under Secretary of State serving under John Foster Dulles. When Dulles became ill in 1959, Herter gained the appointment as Secretary of State. Herter served as Secretary during the famous U-2 spy incident and the early stages of America's effort to stymy Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba.

[226] Correspondence from Arthur T. Dailey to Edgar Rickard, August 2, 1923. Box 440, Folder 1. ARA Russian Operational Records.

[227] Bon Tempo, *Americans at the Gate*, 34-59.

Ringland had set up the committee in Constantinople as more or less of a permanent structure with hopes that his vetting process could be expanded to other sites of refugee flows. The panel in Constantinople continued to vet Russian refugee applicants throughout the month of June as their first group went through. Ringland imagined that this process would quickly deal with the 7000 or so remaining refugees in the city. He saw so much promise in the committee vetting process that he even wrote up an academic article to spread among his fellow relief professionals in the United States.[228] Writing to his supervisor, Ringland crowed, "So much interest has been roused in the Committee's effort to intelligently select immigrants for America that it is planned to publish a full report of the work in pamphlet form." For Ringland, this type of "intelligent" vetting could be used by other humanitarian agencies to facilitate more resettlement plans in the United States. "We hope by the circulation of this report among public society and public spirited individuals at home to stimulate interest in our immigration problem."[229] Ringland even imagined that his committee in Constantinople could resettle other groups of refugees as well—if the vetting panel had a clear vision of American values. Ringland, however, would not be able to realize these aspirations in Constantinople. In July, shortly after the first convoy of refugees arrived in the United States, Ringland received the promotion that he had been searching for. His superiors offered him the chance to take on managerial work in Russia.[230] In his absence, rivaling visions for the future of the panel's work would reveal deeper conflicts within Constantinople's humanitarian community.

[228] ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 440 Folder 1 Reel 514, 3 pages, from Ringland to Walter Lyman Brown, June 4, 1923
[229] Correspondence from Arthur Ringland to Walter Lyman Brown, June 4, 1923. Box 440, Folder 1. ARA Russian Operational Records.
[230] ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 440 Folder 1 Reel 514 letter from Christian Herter to Lyman Brown September 17, 1923

Visions of Humanitarianism

Before the process of humanitarian professionalization that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, relief work had always been associated with women and the female realm. Julia Irwin convincingly argues that the work of the American Red Cross in World War I played a huge role in "legitimizing humanitarian work as a career choice for American men."[231] As one of the premiere U.S. aid organizations, the ARC's adoption of professionalized structures and their aggressive recruiting campaign for medical and social welfare professionals codified new gender norms into humanitarian practice. Building off of models like the ARC, the American Relief Administration went one step further: their organization consisted almost entirely of men, particularly demobilized veterans. These changes highlight the gendered aspects of, what Keith Watenpaugh terms, "modern humanitarianism" or the "replacement of independent missionary-based charity with secular, professional, and bureaucratized intergovernmental forms of aid and development."[232] Women, of course, still played a huge role in the administering of relief, but the professionalization of aid work brought new, gendered conceptions of humanitarianism, where data-driven and scientific approaches were seen as more masculine. The ARA modeled this in action, frequently associating their type of professionalized work with a vision of masculinity. However, the process of transitioning to modern humanitarianism did not happen immediately nor completely. Conflicts within Ringland's refugee vetting panel soon revealed the gendered assumptions of committee members. When female members of the vetting panel challenged Ringland's vision of

[231] Irwin, *Making the World Safe*, 8.
[232] Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones*, 2.

resettlement and sought to send refugees who were the most in need of modern public welfare services to the United States, the supporters of Ringland's plan responded with antagonistic, gendered criticism. These separate, gendered visions over refugee "deservedness" illuminate the core assumptions within both the ARA and Mitchell and Ruggles' humanitarian imaginations.

After Ringland departed for Russia, his productivity-focused, technically based vetting process collided with a separate vision of humanitarian work articulated by two women outside of the ARA. Anna Mitchell and Alma Ruggles worked for the Phelps Stokes fund, a private humanitarian agency funded by the fortune of Anson Phelps Stokes, a New York philanthropist.[233] Stokes' sister-in-law, Mitchell commanded a great deal of authority among the humanitarian community in Constantinople, who viewed her as having essentially unlimited funds for whatever project she sought to implement. In recognition of her place in the Constantinople humanitarian community, Ringland had given Mitchell and her fellow Ruggles places on his refugee vetting community. With Ringland in charge, Mitchell and Ruggles sought to expand the vetting process to include Russian refugees in dire need of medical care, but Ringland vetoed their proposals. In many ways, Mitchell and Ruggles' conception of humanitarianism relied on older tropes of missionary-based relief work.[234] Their reports on the Russian refugees highlighted individual suffering, rather than the ARA's statistics-driven accounts, and focused on fostering Christian morals among the refugees. In a letter to Helen Bristol, one of Mitchell's allies in the city, the relief worker vented her frustration with Ringland's rigid vetting process, "You know what our troubles over the refugees in the past have

[233] Anson Phelps Stokes made his fortune from a variety of business ventures, but he received his start in business from working at his grandfather's exporting and mining business, the Phelps Dodge Company. Stokes' grandfather had started the company along with William Earl Dodge and Daniel James Dodge. Cleveland Dodge, the son of William Earl, would go on to become president of the company, and one of the primary financiers of Near East Relief.

[234] Watenpaugh, *Bread from Stones*, 12-18. Watenpaugh describes the professionalized, science-focused vision of humanitarianism in his book as "modern humanitarianism" This is in contrast to, presumable, pre-modern humanitarianism, focused on sensationalism and emotions.

been: the struggle to find them work or to get them to a country where they had a chance; to connect them with their family or friends; to prevent them dying in the street when ill."[235] Despite Mitchells' entreaties, Ringland remained focused solely on sending "productive" refugees to the United States, those who could help serve America the most, in his mind.

Mitchell viewed this type of resettlement plan as misguided, at best, and based on a disingenuous survey of the refugee problem. As mentioned earlier, Ringland had brutally cut down on refugee numbers in the city by striking any refugee who refused a dispersal plan off of the list. Mitchell argued that this ruthless efficiency downplayed the extent of the problem that her and her coworkers saw every day, "Now, we have been told in the papers – and the people told in America – that the problems here have been solved, "the situation liquidated", that all the Russians have been cared for and evacuated by the League, the ARA, and the ARC. Wonderful, heartening words – if only there were not these 8000 who are left! Perhaps they are too few to interest America; it is different with those of us who see them." The Ringland vetting methods, for Mitchell, also punished any Russian refugee who rightly feared persecution in the Soviet Union. She described one, "former Wrangelite officer who refused evacuation to Bulgaria on fear of Soviet influence," who Ringland then struck from the ARA provision rolls. When the officer applied for the panel's resettlement plan, Ringland and the ARA members denied his application.

After Ringland's departure for Russia, Mitchell and her allies were able to sway the work of the panel, resulting in acrimonious fights between Mitchell and Ringland's subordinates still on the committee. Mitchell's successes in Ringland's absence highlighted the two different visions of refugee resettlement and sharpened the gendered dimensions of the conflict between

[235] Correspondence from Anna Mitchell to Helen Bristol, December 24, 1923. Box 440, Folder 1. ARA Russian Operational Records.

Mitchell and the ARA workers. Ringland had turned control over the vetting panel to Major Davis of the American Red Cross, an aging relief worker who had arrived in the city not long before Ringland. Mitchell and Ruggles found Davis far more amenable to shifting the criteria that the vetting panel used for screening the Russian refugees, securing un-vetted for several hundred new refugees to the second convoy destined for America who did not go through the committee's vetting process. Since the U.S. State Department had guaranteed as many visas as requested by the committee, Mitchell and Ruggles were able to select several hundred refugees ad hoc to fill the new spots. From the remaining Russian refugee community in Constantinople, they chose those refugees that seemed in the most dire need of medical help—including the disabled and elderly—or the most malnourished. The rest of the panel, largely made up of Ringland's allies and supporters, had no knowledge of these additions until after the time that the convoy had set off for the United States. Christian Herter, Ringland's chief subordinate in Constantinople, angrily recounted the subsequent events, writing, "In just about a week things were in a state of absolute chaos." Herter considered Mitchell and Ruggles' approach to refugee resettlement naïve and childish. Herter points out, "Miss M is the intensely sentimental type and has allowed herself to be worked on by the plausible Russians who are shabby and dirty and apparently suffering – but who are really nothing but bums and loafers."[236] Mitchell's gullibility, Herter concluded, had no place in the statistics-driven, future-looking work of the ARA. To Herter, Mitchell's "sentimental" approach to humanitarianism made her unfit for the more professionalized, masculine work of modern humanitarian organizations. Herter also castigated Major Davis of the American Red Cross, accusing him of losing his wits in his old age and becoming susceptible to the wiles of Mitchell and Ruggles. Herter goes on, "You know Major

[236] [236] ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 440 Folder 1 Reel 514 letter from Christian Herter to Lyman Brown September 17, 1923

Davis is constitutionally incapable of saying "no" especially to a lady. This is a trait which has been growing on him of late to an alarming extent. So when Miss Mitchell discovered that there were a lot of poor dears here whose money was all gone or who were out of work, he allowed her to juggle with the lists..."[237] Herter did not dispute that the refugees Mitchell and Ruggles included in the lists needed relief, rather he articulates a different vision of who deserved to be a refugee to America. Herter writes of Mitchell, "She looks at this thing not from the point of which types will make good future US citizens, and become good active, useful workers, but from the view of which ones are in a hopeless condition and ought to be helped to a more comfortable place."[238] This contrast between the two visions of "deservedness" demonstrated that the core of Ringland's first selection process revolved around concepts of masculinity as much as productivity, that gendered conceptions of economic potential determined who would get a coveted position in the United States.

Despite Herter's vitriol, the second convoy of refugees made it to the United States where Mitchell's vision for a system of resettlement where need trumped the ARA's masculine ideals of Americanness collided against the realities American immigration system. When the second convoy of refugees including the several hundred refugees chosen by Mitchell and Ruggles arrived in the U.S., the Russian Refugee Relief Society reached out to the committee, saying that the second convoy of refugees, "were very inferior." The RRRS had been surprised to find several hundred refugees who they did not have the documentation for that they had become accustomed to, making it more difficult to connect the refugees with job opportunities. The antagonisms between Herter and Ringland and Mitchell and Ruggles seemed to be shared among the refugees that each portion of the panel had selected for the resettlement plan. The Russian

[237] Ibid.
[238] Ibid.

Refugee Resettlement Commission informed Christian Herter that "…the Russians who have come over in charge of the convoys, who were men originally picked by Ringland, are perfectly frank in their statements that the original lists have been discarded and now to get on the immigration list at Constantinople, bribery, lying, and appealing to sentimentality of certain of the members of the committee are all that is necessary." Neither the RRRS nor Herter provided evidence for this bribery, but it highlights the internecine conflicts among the refugees themselves, some of whom seemed to take satisfaction in being vetted by Ringland's panel. The clear delineation between refugees chosen by the ARA and those chosen by Mitchell and Ruggles led to increased scrutiny by American officials. While the first convoy of Russian refugees had received approval from immigration officials, this new convoy In Constantinople, Herter heard from his ARA contacts that the State Department, which had granted visas freely to refugees identified by the committee, deemed the newest convoy of refugees to be "unfit, especially in comparison to the first batch."[239] From his contacts at the Bureau of Immigration, Herter heard that the latest convoy of refugees, "was a very inferior lot of people and in addition to the aged and infirm were included a number of distinctly undesireables." Despite this increased scrutiny, the visas supplied by the State Department and the presence of the RRRS prompted immigration officials to follow the same procedures they had previously: the refugees were allowed in.

In Russia, Ringland's long awaited promotion to Russian work ended sooner than he had anticipated—Ringland arrived in Russia in early June, and the ARA ceased its operations in the

[239] Correspondence from Christian Herter to Unknown, September 17, 1923. Box 440, Folder 1. ARA Russian Operational Records. This correspondence from Herter is unaddressed but seems to carry his most sincere thoughts on the matter. He begins the letter with the claim that he has to "let off a little steam" about the controversy, and that if he "were a free agent" he would bring this controversy to Washington and have Mitchell and the Phelps-Stokes Fund rebuked. The recipient seems not to be a member of the ARA, since Herter has to explain the ARA's role in Constantinople, but someone who is familiar with Arthur Ringland, who he only refers to as "Ring."

country on June 15, 1923, when reports came out that the Soviet Union had started exporting grain, a violation of the treaty the nation had signed with the ARA. After several more weeks of travel, Ringland returned to Constantinople to find the committee he created in a civil war. Herter and Ringland's other supporters accused Mitchell, Ruggles, and Davis of naiveté, short-sightedness, and, worst in their minds, putting the needs of the Russian refugees above the needs of the United States. In a letter explaining the panel's conflict to his supervisor, Walter Lyman Brown, Herter concluded that the goal of resettlement should be about strengthening the United States. In an indignant conclusion to his letter, Herter commented, "There is not question but that the committee in Constantinople has forgotten about America and is just looking at the condition in Constantinople."[240] By the time that Ringland had ascertained the extent to which the committee vetting process had broken down, according to Herter, "It was in ruins and he was too late to set it right."[241] Seeing the responses of the State Department and the RRRC, Ringland pulled ARA support from the vetting panel. Without the support of the ARA and its network in the United States, the committee's work quickly fell apart and the State Department cancelled all future special visas for their work. By manipulating their network of political contacts in the U.S. government and setting up the infrastructure for an informal, private resettlement agency in America, the ARA had figured out a process to maneuver through the restrictive immigration laws of America. Decades later, the U.S. government would use this same process to identify and resettle refugees displaced by World War II.[242] In a period of increasingly restrictive immigration

[240] Christian Herter to Walter Lyman Brown, October 2, 1923, ARA Russian Operational Records, Box 440 Folder 1 Reel 514.
[241] Ibid.
[242] The 1948 Displaced Persons Act (DP Act) completely changed American policy on refugee resettlement. Before the passage of the act, refugees could only come to the United States through the immigration quota system—or in cases like the Russian refugees from Constantinople, through exceptions in the process. The DP act created a separate channel for refugees with its own quotas unrelated to national-origins, although it did restrict migration to those who were granted DPs status by the United Nations in the wake of the war. The DP act created a governmental

policies, however, the Constantinople committee's struggles over "deserving" refugees ran up against the harsher boundaries of U.S. immigration law.

The conflict that ended the process also reveals two starkly differing visions of humanitarianism that drove relief workers in Constantinople. While the ARA sought efficiency and results, no matter the human cost, Anna Mitchell articulated a version of humanitarianism grounded in charity and Christian morality. Ringland's refugee resettlement plan would be the last major humanitarian operation for the American Relief Administration. With the campaign in Russia quickly ended following the Soviet violation of the treaty, the ARA began the long process of pulling all its workers out of the field. The organization would dissolve over the next few months, citing their work finished in Europe. The ARA's relief projects would leave a lasting legacy in Constantinople and in the United States, where the Russian refugee communities touched by American humanitarianism would continue to live and work for decades.

A "Solved Problem"

The ARA and the U.S. state clearly had similar conceptions of what type of refugee would make a successful American. Ringland articulated a consistent vision for the refugees he vetted on his commission: they needed to be driven, individualistic, and have skills that could benefit the United States and lead to long-term productivity. This evidently resonated with American officials, who only questioned the refugees' potential productivity when Mitchell and

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commission, much like Ringland's, which vetted refugees and connected them to private "sponsors" in the United States.

Ruggles used a different vetting process. However, Ringland's extensive questioning and examination over questions productivity and individualism did not seem to have the results he imagined. The voices of the Russian refugees who underwent the ARA's resettlement plan are rare in the ARA's records. In a rare letter in the archives from one of the Russian refugees, one of the resettled refugees, Valentin Glazoff wrote a letter to Herbert Hoover himself in 1924. Glazoff's begins in the most grateful tones, praising Hoover's organization for "affording [us] the benefit of immigration into the U.S.A., thus escaping from the gloomy and wretched Constantinople existence." Access to higher learning in the United States particularly enchanted Glazoff, who continued, "Some of us, already knowing the language, got the chance to study in Universities whereby our ultimate goal to follow again the path of culture and civilization was achieved." However, Ringland's careful vetting, which had been intended to weed out any unskilled workers or those who could not succeed in the U.S., seemed to have failed. Glazoff concluded his letter to Hoover on a more somber note, noting "the great majority of us [the Russian refugees] are still forced to earn our living by physical labor." Glazoff then included a request for additional aid for some members of the refugee community who struggled to even find physical labor jobs. Although this is only one small instance of the Russian refugees appearing in the ARA's institutional memory, Glazoff's alternating praise and anxiety highlights the disjuncture between the Ringland committee's ambitious plan and the reality of life in the refugee resettlement process. Although it formed the crux of the disagreement between Ringland and Mitchell that tore apart the vetting committee, Ringland's ideological standards did not result in the unmitigated success he had imagined.

The Russian refugees that remained in Constantinople also sought the protection of the old U.S. humanitarian networks that had relieved them in the wake of World War I. In 1934 the

American embassy in Istanbul—renamed from Constantinople after Kemal's forces retook the city—received an urgent letter from an unnamed Russian refugee asking for "Admiral Bristol." The new ambassador in Istanbul dutifully forwarded the letter to Washington D.C. where, now retired, Mark and Helen Bristol lived. The Russian refugee had been one of those "incorporated into the economy" by the ARA over a decade before and thus had disappeared from any official aid lists and therefore no longer existed as a "refugee" in the eyes of U.S. humanitarians. Before the ARA and Bristol had left, they had secured dispensation from the Turkish government to accord the Russian refugees certain privileges equivalent to Turkish citizens. In 1934, the Turkish government began to revoke these rights, passing a series of stringent laws that forbade any non-Turks to own small businesses or operate in artisanal trades. In desperation, the unnamed Russian reached out to one of the only people who had effected real change in the living situation of the Russian refugees in Constantinople: Bristol. He wrote, "I know that Mrs. Bristol, were she here now, would feel as keenly as we do the situation of these families, who after ten days without work have already used up their small savings and do not know where to turn for their next meal. There can be nowadays no American Red Cross nor American Relief Association [sic] to come to the rescue, and our rapidly vanishing funds are overburdened by cases of illness."[243] His letter had no effect; Bristol had been retired for years. Although American organizations had used a window of unprecedented access and control to manage refugee movements in the Eastern Mediterranean, their system of state-alternative welfare had gaps and holes, and a rigid temporal boundary. The Russian refugees had no choice for relief but from a state uninterested in their plight. The small window where Americans had been able to exercise control had shut.

[243] Bristol papers, Box 74 Folder – Russian Refugees, from unknown to Bristol, August 31, 1934

Conclusion

The many humanitarian aid organizations in Constantinople saw the Russian refugees who had fled civil war first and foremost as a problem to be solved, a vessel for enacting differing visions of humanitarianism. Seeking to satisfy the demands of his office, Fridjtof Nansen approached the Russian refugee crisis as a labor broker, trying to arrange contracts and deals with nations to facilitate migration. Along with the ILO, Nansen imagined a world where free, unrestricted labor could be managed by a centralized body. This imaginary clashed with the realities of states that, in the wake of war, saw migration as a security threat. While Near East Relied and the American Red Cross grappled with the consequences of the Greco-Turkish War, Arthur Ringland of the American Relief Administration sought to quickly "liquidate" the Russians in Constantinople through a series of aggressive projects, from leveraging the ARA's financial clout to a vetting panel that would navigate America's restrictive immigration system. Conflict among the panel revealed that gendered assumptions about productivity lay at the core of this resettlement process, and Ringland's supporters lambasted Mitchell and Ruggles as naïve women who could not understand the masculine work of refugee resettlement. Although the ARA plan to resettle refugees in the United States only sent a few thousand Russians to the U.S., its existence reveals the ambitions of American relief workers overseas in the post-WWI period and two starkly different visions of humanitarianism.

The two humanitarian organizations that have been the focus of these chapters so far, Near East Relief and the American Relief Administration, went down two very different paths in the interwar years. In the years after the Greco-Turkish exchange, Near East Relief increasingly

struggled to fund their more ambitious development plans for the Eastern Mediterranean. Following the suggestions of the Rockefeller Foundation, the private organization that had pioneered "Scientific Philanthropy", Near East Relief began a long process that would culminate in an identify shift for the organization, and a new name: the Near East Foundation (NEF). Stepping away from their missionary roots, the NEF expanded NER's development-based projects to include agricultural training, domestic life demonstrations, and public health projects. In contrast, the American Relief Administration would dissolve in 1923. The thousands of ARA workers, who named themselves Aramites in the wake of the dissolution, began an uneasy process of re-adjusting to life in the United States. Over twenty years, the Aramite community would radically reshape its own conceptions of its work during and after World War I, emphasizing the logistical nature of their work over its humanitarian ambitions. Although neither Near East Relief or the American Relief Administration existed in name by the time of World War II, each organization would contribute in their own way to shaping the world's largest humanitarian operation. The next two chapters will trace how these institutions responded to the changing geopolitical realities of the subsequent decades, and how those changes resulted in the creation of new visions of global humanitarianism.

Chapter 4

"Before History Moved West": Capital, Technicization, and Civilizational Uplift in the Work of the Near East Foundation

Eight years after the fires at Smyrna left the city in ruins, Ralph Allee arrived in the rebuilding city, renamed Izmir by the new Kemalist government in Turkey. Allee worked for Near East Relief, which, much like the city of Izmir, had also gained a new name: the Near East Foundation. Unlike Asa Jennings or his other predecessors who ferried refugees across the Aegean, Allee had no experience in missionary work. Trained in agricultural science, Allee had taught industrial farming techniques at the International College in Beirut for four years. In a small village outside of Izmir Allee set up a "health zone," a building that would operate as the NEF's base of operations in the region. From this headquarters Allee coordinated the new work of the foundation: agricultural training, domestic demonstrations, recreational activities, and public health projects.[244] Allee represented a new generation of workers in the Eastern Mediterranean. In contrast to the relief workers of World War I, Allee did not have missionary training or a background in evangelism. Instead, he and this new cohort of the Near East Foundation were teachers, nurses, doctors, and Progressive Era industrial agriculture workers. This new generation, in line with the goals of the Near East Foundation, implemented development-based projects across the Eastern Mediterranean, building networks of schools, agricultural training classes, domestic life centers, and public health projects. The NEF believed that all these projects were interconnected, arguing that both the public and private lives of

[244] "Near East Foundation: A Twentieth Century Concept of Practical Philanthropy" Box 8, Folder 8. Near East Relief Committee Records.

people in the Eastern Mediterranean needed to be completely reorganized. This new approach to "reconstruction" in the Eastern Mediterranean relied upon hierarchical notions of civilization, where the NEF's scientific methods of farming and parenting would guide the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean towards modernity.

The Near East Foundation's development work in the region was the result of a decade long process that converted Near East Relief from a missionary-based institution with dreams of "reconstruction" into a modernized, technicized development-based organization. This chapter traces this process, first following how private capital networks embedded themselves into the nascent development projects of the Near East Foundation. As Near East Relief began to lose funding, they turned to the Rockefeller Foundation which slowly but insistently encouraged them to focus on development work. When NER finally decided to reevaluate its organizational mission, the Rockefeller Foundation connected the aid institution to Thomas Jesse Jones, Progressive Era urban and educational reformer. Jones had made his career evaluating struggling black colleges and universities in America, a role which highlighted both his conviction in education as well as his deeply held beliefs about racial hierarchies. In the early 1920s, Jones worked with the Rockefeller Foundation and British colonial officials to map Progressive Era American educational onto the British imperial system in Africa. On the recommendation of the Rockefeller Foundation, NER reached out to Jones, whose focus on uplifting "under-developed minorities" resonated with leaders in NER who sought to move away from relief projects and into development and educational work. "Development" has been a productive analytic for scholars in a variety of fields. In U.S. in the World historiography, development politics are typically associated with the Cold War period, particularly the era of "high modernization" in the

1950s and early 1960s.[245] Erez Manela and Stephen Macekura define development as more of a framework than an ideology, "a set of assumptions— that history moves through stages; that leaders and/or experts could guide or direct the evolution of societies through these stages; that some places and people in the world are at more advanced stages than others...."[246] In the 1930s, the NEF sought to guide the Eastern Mediterranean through those stages through a series of interlinked programs. The Near East Foundation focused its energies on a wide variety of development-based projects, including agricultural training, home demonstrations, rural reconstruction, and public health projects. Operating in eight countries, the NEF established a wide variety of educational and reconstruction projects that they believed would "radiate" out into countries, leading to civilizational uplift.

These projects attempted to, in the NEF's words, "restore the lost glory" of nations that had for centuries been falling behind the modernizing West. The NEF relied on a historical framework that blamed Ottoman rule for poverty in the nations created out of the fallen empire. The organization championed language that emphasized cooperation and local leadership, but in practice they embedded imperialist and civilizational hierarchies into their projects, consistently championing American ideals alongside Progressive Era agricultural and health projects. These projects encompassed both labor education as well as domestic training—the NEF sought to

[245] David Ekbladh, *The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Michael Adas, *Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology, and Ideologies of Western Dominance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); David Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003); Michael Latham, *The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011); Daniel Immerwahr, *Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013; Nathan J. Citino, *Envisioning the Arab Future: Modernization in US-Arab Relations, 1945-1967* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016); Nicole Sackley, "Cosmopolitanism and the Uses of Tradition: Robert Redfield and Alternative Visions of Modernization during the Cold War," *Modern Intellectual History*, 9.3 (2012): 565-95.

[246] Erez Manela and Stephen Macekura, eds., *The Development Century: A Global History*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 3.

reshape every aspect of private and public life in the Eastern Mediterranean. Medical education stood at the core of the organization's work. The Near East Foundation's work in public health reshaped the biopolitics of the region, with NEF nurses and doctors organizing increasingly elaborate projects to institute new sanitation and health education regimes. These projects gathered massive amounts of data on regional disease occurrences, which the NEF used to support growing networks of international health communication coordinated by the League of Nations. All of these projects, from health education to agricultural extension, relied on the tropes and national stereotypes that had characterized the work of NER, based on a fundamental belief that "the East" could only be modernized through forceful and repeated intervention.

Following the "Golden Rule"

Over the 1920s, a series of internal debates and funding changes led to Near East Relief's transformation into the Near East Foundation. Massive fundraising campaigns had always been the core of Near East Relief's organizational strategy. As ACASR, what became Near East Relief had started as a wartime relief organization. During the war, the organization had pioneered revolutionary fundraising methods, using grassroots church networks and high-profile endorsements in the United States to fund their relief projects in Armenia and Syria. After the war, NER continued with these fundraising processes, adapting their mission towards grander ambitions of "reconstructing" the Eastern Mediterranean through large scale relief and development projects, notably including the administration of orphanages and refugee transportation operations. NER, and especially its president Charles Vickrey, had always

championed its missionary roots and connections with the YMCA and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, however many members of the organization also sought to highlight NER's modernized fundraising methods and scientized relief projects. Both groups within the institution believed in reconstructing the Eastern Mediterranean, but they often disagreed on tactics. These two poles, the organization's evangelist roots and its Progressive Era modernism, can be best seen in the divide between Charles Vickrey, the long-serving president of NER, and Barclay Acheson. An ordained minister, Acheson first joined Near East Relief during their post-war campaigns. In 1922 he became Associate Secretary General of NER--a post akin to a regional director in the ARA--and toured the Eastern Mediterranean surveying the scope of the crisis caused by World War I and the Greco-Turkish War. In 1923, NER named Acheson the director of all relief work in Greece, Syria, and the Caucusus. Stationed in Athens, Acheson served as the chief NER representative in Greece during the Great Fire of Smyrna and the Greco-Turkish exchange. Acheson had originally joined the organization out of a desire to proselytize, however his experiences in Athens transformed Acheson's worldview. Working for years to try and resettle the Greek refugees expelled by the exchange, Acheson argued that, in order to achieve long-term change in the Eastern Mediterranean, NER would have to leave its missionary roots behind and implement more modern relief practices along the lines of the American Red Cross.

Acheson's dreams for a secularized, scientific NER along the lines of other Progressive Era relief organizations clashed with key leaders within the organization, especially president Charles Vickrey. Vickrey had joined NER after working with a missionary society in the United States. During his tenure as president, Vickrey rarely traveled to the Eastern Mediterranean, instead visiting churches and charities across the United States to help with fundraising

campaigns. A prodigious fundraiser, Vickrey had pioneered ACASR's massive grassroots campaigns during World War I, relying on local church donations and high-profile endorsements from celebrities and politicians. Vickrey proudly claimed that he traveled over 7000 miles a year to support Near East Relief's fundraising campaigns.[247] As donations began to decrease in the early 1920s, Vickrey organized another national campaign to try and restore NER's funds to its earlier levels: International Golden Rule Sunday. NER declared December 2nd, 1923 as "Golden Rule Sunday" and asked supporters of Near East Relief to "eat on that day the simple foods that the Near East Relief children eat everyday so that they might realize how much better off they were themselves, and then give a thank-offering for the benefit of the children."[248] Families were encouraged to eat the meals offered at an NER orphanage, typically non-perishable items like beans and grits, any money that the family saved they would donate to NER. This event, Vickrey claimed, would connect families to the experiences of NER's orphan charges in the Eastern Mediterranean, albeit only for a short period of time and in a small, simple manner. A combination of their most successful fundraising techniques, Golden Rule Sunday targeted everyday families through local church networks, pastors were encouraged to give sermons extolling the virtues of NER and invite parishioners to participate. NER also sent letters to prominent politicians, including President Calvin Coolidge, asking them to partake, and to tell their constituents. NER's entreaties gained bipartisan support--both Coolidge and Woodrow Wilson agreed to participate in the event. Vickrey also organized a massive advertising campaign, paying for advertisements in newspapers, on radio shows--including regular

[247] "A Lasting Impact: The Near East Foundation Celebrates a Century of Service," by Jennifer Abdella and Molly Sullivan. https://neareastmuseum.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/A-Lasting-Impact-The-Near-East-Relief-Foundation-Celebrates-a-Century-of-Service.pdf

[248] "Team Work: An Occasional Publication by Near East Relief" January 3, 1924. Box 7, Folder 1. Near East Relief Committee Records.

broadcasting and on Sunday sermons—and in department stores around the nation. Embracing the modern aspects of fundraising, NER even put up ads in the newly made cinemas, or "kinemas" as the organization called them in its internal correspondence. In a retrospective published a month after the dinner, Near East Relief boasted about the fundraiser's success. The institution seemed particularly proud that the advertising campaigns had reached across all demographics, from Coolidge to children in the American heartland. "Seven year old Jack in Kirkwood, Missouri was invited to have dinner on Golden Rule Sunday with one of his playmates. After thinking it over he gave up the pleasure of his own accord because his family had voted to have a bread and soup dinner and he was a good sport and felt that it 'would not be fair to have chicken and ice cream today.'" The retrospective continued to boast of the fundraiser's success, stating, "International Golden Rule Sunday is a great idea—an inspiration. It caught the attention of the press and people and focused it upon the value of the Near East Relief Service in a never-to-be-forgotten way." The NER produced article also stressed the harmony between NER's evangelical mission and its relief politics as capture in Golden Rule Sunday, writing, "it struck the note of practical idealism in international relations which appeals most strongly to Americans. Its recognized spiritual significance will be far-reaching in the years to come."[249] The Golden Rule Sunday dinners embodied the archetypal fundraising campaign that the organization had used so effectively during World War I. Through enormous advertising campaigns and high-profile participation, NER ensured that it cast a wide net for potential donations. The dinners prompted NER supporters to consider the experiences of refugees in a tactile, if relatively facile and temporary, way. Although widely popular, Golden Rule Sunday did not prove to be the transformative campaign that Vickrey had hoped it to be. The campaign did not raise as much money as hoped, and most of the money made through donations for the

[249] Ibid.

dinners went back into advertising for the following year's dinner, rather than to the relief projects that the event promised.[250] The failure of Golden Rule Sunday and diminishing donations would bring the tensions that had been simmering in Near East Relief between the organization's missionary ancestry and its technical aspirations to a head.

Amid declining donations and increasing tension among leaders like Acheson and Vickrey over the future of the organization, Near East Relief commissioned a survey to offer recommendations for the future of the organization. For the survey, NER commissioned three professionals from different fields—education, welfare, and church leadership—to survey all of NER's work in the Eastern Mediterranean and suggest possible futures where the organization could operate on less funding. The makeup of the committee clearly tried to balance the different impulses on NER's leading council. Monroe, the director of the International Institute of Teachers College at Columbia University, and Reeder, the overseas commissioner of the Serbian Child Welfare Association during World War I, represented the secularized future envisioned by NER organizers like Acheson. The third member, James Vance, who worked as the moderator of the Presbyterian Church in the South, embodied NER's missionary and evangelical roots. Near East Relief's directors believed that this balance of technical skill and religious background would facilitate an even survey, one that could chart a course for the organization's future. After months surveying NER's overseas work, the committee returned with a series of recommendations for the institution. Rather than small, tactical changes, the committee recommended an organizational overhaul. Their report repeatedly emphasized the need to end expensive relief programs and focus on cheaper, more sustainable long-term development projects. In their report, the committee criticized NER's longstanding orphanage and refugee relief projects, arguing that children and refugees should never receive aid for so long that they

[250] Limberg, *Abundant Life,* 61.

become dependent. Monroe argued that relief aid, like food and housing, should only be given on a short-term basis and then refugees should be turned out, forcing them to learn the skills to live on their own.[251] In a section titled "Refugees Challenge Philanthropy," the committee concluded that Near East Relief's work relieving refugees ended up harming refugees in the long-term. The potential damage that this would cause to refugee communities in the Eastern Mediterranean did not seem to bother the committee members. Politically, the report argued, NER's aid had helped "encourage policies of persecution" from local governments freed from having to care for dispossessed ethnic minorities. Economically, the committee argued that refugees who received aid were likely "to become paupers," becoming dependent on the largesse of strangers.[252] This moral dimension to the committee's report seemed to resonate with NER's organizers: the concept of promoting independence became increasingly important to the institution's work over the following decades. Looking to the future Monroe, Reeder, and Vance focused on rural improvement as offering the greatest potential for Near East Relief's goals of regional uplift. The committee recommended that NER shift funds from its orphanages and refugee relief funds to promoting vocational education and agricultural training.[253] Finally, the committee suggested that NER's wartime model of grassroots fundraising could not successfully fund the organization anymore; they recommended that NER look to outside sources of support, notably private philanthropic organizations.[254]

The report of the survey committee heightened tensions within Near East Relief over the future of the organization, with the differing visions for the future eventually culminating with a massive debate at a 1924 conference in now Turkish-controlled Istanbul. Near East Relief and

[251] Paul Monroe, R.R. Reeder, and James L. Vance, "A Survey of Near East Relief: Educational, Social, Religious" Box 8, Folder 8. Near East Committee Relief Records.*
[252] Ibid., 13.
[253] Ibid., 22.
[254] Ibid., 40.

the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions organized the conference in Istanbul to formally debate the future of American evangelical presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Three camps emerged at the conference. First, some Near East Relief and YMCA workers, jaded by the violence of the Greco-Turkish War and NER's failure to reshape the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, asserted that NER should follow the example of the ARA and simply dissolve. A second camp, led by Vickrey and missionary leaders, proposed to officially absorb Near East Relief into the ABCFM, making NER an explicit para-church organization rather than a nondenominational aid group. Others, including James Barton, the one-time president of NER and ABCFM, NER Foreign Secretary Barclay Acheson, and longtime NER backer Cleveland Dodge favored redesigning Near East Relief to operate like secular philanthropic organizations in the United States, like the American Relief Administration or the American Red Cross, but with a greater focus on development. After days of debate, ultimately, Barton, Acheson, and Dodge won out over Vickrey and the others. Facing a united opposition, Vickrey acceded to the wills of his fellow organizers, commissioning another survey to thoroughly analyze how Near East Relief could transition away from its missionary origins and move towards becoming a secular, Progressive Era scientific aid organization. This survey would not be published until 1927, but during those intervening three years, the balance of power among the directors of NER would slowly start to shift, aided by outside capital networks, particularly from the Rockefeller Foundation.[255]

Foundation and Empire

[255] Frank A. Ross, C. Luther Fry, Elbridge Sibley, *The Near East and American Philanthropy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), 1-6.

Near East Relief had always operated with a sense of cultural superiority over its humanitarian charges, especially in relation to the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, but the organization's transition to becoming the Near East Foundation codified their perceived Western supremacy into the mission and structure of the new organization. This process began with the massive survey called for at the 1924 Istanbul conference. Before the survey began, NER's search for new funding streams would offer a new direction for the future of the organization. As the traditional small donations that they had come to rely on dried up, NER increasingly turned to large block grants from private charities to fund their work. In this field, few organizations could match the financial power of the Rockefeller foundation. NER's longtime supporter Cleveland Dodge moved in some of the same social circles as the New York Rockefellers, and he believed that their foundation could help in the transition process to transform Near East Relief into a more formal, secularized aid institution. Oil titan John D. Rockefeller founded the Rockefeller Foundation in 1913 on the advice of his longtime associate Frederick Taylor Gates, who counseled Rockefeller that his fortune had been growing so fast that he needed to "dissipate the inheritances or [his children] would become intoxicated with power." Like his fellow tycoon, Andrew Carnegie, Rockefeller "permanent corporate philanthropies for the good of Mankind," to disperse a small part of his vast fortune.[256] Once founded the Rockefeller Foundation donated to a wide variety of causes, championing a new approach to charity that they titled "scientific philanthropy." Rooted in a belief that philanthropy should be used for long-term development rather than short-term relief, the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored public health campaigns,

[256] Ron Chernow, *Titan: The Life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr.* (New York: Random House, 1998), 563.

social science research, and, famously, eugenics labs in Germany.[257] Seeking to tap this new resource, Cleveland Dodge reached out to the foundation, who recommended that he contact Thomas Jesse Jones, an educational reformer that the foundation had often worked with.

Jones endorsed the Rockefeller Foundation's view of philanthropy as a tool for development rather than relief. In his work *Essentials of Civilization: A Study in Social Values*, Jones laid out four main ingredients for civilizational development: health and sanitation; domination of the environment; "social heritage" or the power of domestic learning; and recreation, both physical and spiritual. These four "essentials" would become central to Near East Relief's work in the Eastern Mediterranean. To articulate these "essentials," Jones drew from a long career of educational reform, particularly in the U.S. South. In the 1910s, Jones had worked with the Phelps-Stokes Fund—the same private charity that would fund the work of Anna Mitchell and Alma Ruggles in Constantinople—to evaluate the progress of black schools in the U.S. South. Jones sharply criticized the struggling black education system in the South, arguing that "inferior races" needed a more scientific approach to education. Jones deeply believed in racial hierarchies, but he also believed in the possibility of development, if the lower races followed his "essentials." In order to progress, Jones believed, racial groups lower on the civilizational hierarchy needed more than mere education, they needed to completely reorganize the physical, spiritual, and social structures that undergirded their existence. As the controller of the Phelps-Stokes education fund, Jones wielded his financial clout ruthlessly, cutting funds for schools that did not adopt his "essentials" and rewarding those who incorporated his physical and spiritual recommendations.[258] Jones believed this model to be globally applicable, and he

[257] Edward H. Berman, *The Ideology of Philanthropy: The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983)
[258] After Jones' death in 1950, Carter G. Woodson published an article in the Journal of Negro History recounting the life of the educational reformer. Woodson wrote, "to say that Jones did not accomplish some good in the various

participated in projects that mapped his civilizational model of the world onto the pathways of empire. In 1924, the British Colonial Office hired Jones to apply his educational models to their colonies in Africa. Jones became so well known for his racialized hierarchical approach to global education that W.E.B. Dubois labeled Jones "that evil genius of the Negro race."[259] Jones had participated in several educational reform projects with the Rockefeller Foundation, who admired his dedication to fostering long-term independence, as well as his belief in global racial hierarchies. Following the direction of the Rockefeller Foundation, Near East Relief hired Jones in an advisory capacity to assist a trio of Columbia University social scientists, Frank A. Ross, C. Luther Fry, and Eldridge Sibley, with the second commissioned survey to chart NER's long-term survival. The second survey, supported by Jones, did several tours of Near East Relief sites in the Eastern Mediterranean between 1924 and 1927.

While the survey evaluated the long-term prospects of the organization, reformers within Near East Relief slowly began to change the organization's administrative structure to accommodate to their new future as a development-based organization. Following the advice of Paul Monroe, one of the members of the first survey, NER worked to establish closer relationships with the administrative machinery of nation-states in the Eastern Mediterranean. To facilitate this, NER appointed a new educational director, George Wilcox, whose sole purpose would be to coordinate regional development projects with local governments. Wilcox had served as a principal of a school in New York and, according to Monroe, he "understood the Oriental type of mind."[260] Wilcox's goal would be to ensure that any projects started by NER

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positions which he filled would be far from the truth. Ile would have achieved greater success, however, if he had not been so narrow-minded, short-sighted, vindictive and undermining." C. G. Woodson, "Thomas Jesse Jones" *The Journal of Negro History* 35:1 (Jan., 1950), 107-109.

[259] Herbert Kliebard, " 'That Evil Genius of the Negro Race': Thomas Jesse Jones and Educational Reform," *Journal of Curriculum and Supervision* 10, no.1 (Fall 1991)

[260] Paul Monroe, R.R. Reeder, and James L. Vance, "A Survey of Near East Relief: Educational, Social, Religious" Box 8, Folder 8. Near East Committee Relief Records.*

received local governmental support. While Near East Relief had started as an organization dedicated to changing the geopolitics of the region, the organization's slow transformation into the NEF relied upon a fundamental deference to local sovereignty. In terms of operations, Barclay Acheson, who remained dedicated to a new vision of Near East Relief that focused on secularized philanthropy, received a promotion to Director of Overseas Operations in 1925. As director, Acheson began to curtail funding for NER's relief projects, cutting refugee aid packages, and moved more personnel into managerial positions managing orphanages and educational centers.

In 1927, the committee published the long awaited second survey, which consolidated the push for a modernized, secularized Near East Relief. Much like the first survey, the committee recommended long-term development projects over relief aid, arguing that the main goal of NER should be to foster independence. Following the civilizational concepts of Jones, the second survey claimed that "open violence, hatred, and bloodshed" in the Eastern Mediterranean had shattered people's physical means of rehabilitation and, perhaps more importantly, their spiritual vitality.[261] The committee argued that NER should institutionalize Jones' concept of civilizational hierarchy within their work. "The need for social industrial and spiritual help of a constructive nature is very urgent to enable the Eastern people to lay hold on those things in Western life which are uplifting"[262] In practical terms, the committee recommended a series of interlocking development strategies. These strategies focused on fostering economic recovery in the region but emphasized that economic rehabilitation relied on a series of other programs, from public health projects to agricultural education. The report continued, ""The solution of the problem is mass education of a simple, direct sort, carried to the people in their fields and in their

[261] Frank A. Ross, C. Luther Fry, Elbridge Sibley*, The Near East and American Philanthropy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), 3.
[262] Ibid.

workshops. It must be an education vital to their lives as tillers or craftsmen..." This type of education, the committee members emphasized, should ultimately foster independence. "It should accent 'helping to do' rather than 'doing for.'"[263] This notion of relief as ultimately harmful finalized the slow transformation within NER against their original mission. The response to the report resolved the long conflict within NER over the future of the organization.

In 1930 "for the purpose of meeting the unmet needs as outlined in part by the survey," Near East Relief voted to change its name officially to the Near East Foundation and to adopt the principles of the survey in their mission statement: a dedication to fostering independence, a deference to national sovereignty, and a commitment to transferring the knowledge of "Western life" to the peoples of the Eastern Mediterranean.[264] Representatives from both of the major surveys would end up joining the new NEF, guiding it during the following decade. Paul Monroe and Thomas Jesse Jones "became the brain trust that operated as the NEF Program Committee."[265] Acheson, Dodge, Monroe, and Jones ousted Charles Vickrey from the presidency, installing Acheson as the first director of the new Near East Foundation.[266] The organization's new name reflected their changed mission: they would no longer give short-term relief that would, in their minds, perpetuate suffering instead they would work for long-term development founded in the scientific principles of the Rockefeller Foundation and the educational precepts of Thomas Jesse Jones. Over the following decade, the Near East Foundation would engage in a wide variety of projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, reshaping

[263] Ibid., 4-5.
[264] "Near East Foundation: A Twentieth Century Concept of Practical Philanthropy" 1933. Box 8, Folder 8. Near East Relief Committee Records.
[265] "A Lasting Impact: The Near East Foundation Celebrates a Century of Service," by Jennifer Abdella and Molly Sullivan.
[266] Vickrey would continue to champion his Golden Rule Dinner fundraising method. After leaving NER in 1929, he launched the Golden Rule Foundation, which held yearly Golden Rule Dinners for a variety of causes.

the lived experiences of people from Albania to Turkey and fostering new transnational relationships that would transform global health politics.

Development and "Practical Philanthropy:" The Rural Life Program

Building off the recommendations of Thomas Jesse Jones and Paul Monroe, the Near East Foundation would engage throughout the 1930s in four categories of development programs: agricultural education, domestic demonstrations, recreation activities, and public health projects. These educational projects in the Eastern Mediterranean relied on a historical narrative that the nations of the region had long withered under Ottoman rule. This narrative embedded notions of civilizational hierarchy directly into the practices of development. To promote progress, the NEF believed they had to restore these nations to their lost glory by reconnecting them to Western values and ideas. Enlarging their geographic scope, the NEF expanded its operations in Greece, Turkey, and Syria as well as opening centers in Albania, and Bulgaria to effect regional development. This expansion to the Balkan nations demonstrated the NEF's developmental approach to the region grounded in narratives of restoration. The Near East Foundation explicated this historical narrative of lost glory in an account of their work between 1930 and 1933,. The Near East Foundation considered Albania to be "the key to the Balkans," a country "remarkable resources of character and their history is at once the most tragic and romantic of any European nation."[267] As the closest nation to "modern" western Europe, the Near East Foundation believed that Albania could be a gateway for knowledge

[267] "Near East Foundation: A Twentieth Century Concept of Practical Philanthropy" published in 1933, page 16. Box 8, Folder 8. Near East Relief Committee Records.

transfer between the Eastern Mediterranean and Europe. The Near East Foundation sought to restore Albania to its European roots before its various occupations by the Ottoman Empire starting in 1479. This project required Albanians to both progress into a NEF-envisioned modernity by, paradoxically, returning to their European roots. This can be best seen in the NEF's vision of culture as captured in national "costumes." A report from the NEF lauds Albania's progress in recent years, writing, "Albania is emerging into modern life. It is burying tribal feuds and ancient superstitions while still delighting the eye with its colorful native costumes."[268] By retaining their "colorful" outfits, Albanians paid homage to their past while embracing the visions of the future articulated by the foundation. The NEF captured this concept concisely in their description of Albania's fellow Balkan state, writing, "in the days before history moved west, Bulgaria held an important place in the world."[269] Through their development projects, the NEF believed they would recover this lost importance, once again elevating the Eastern Mediterranean into Western history. The NEF applied this logic beyond the Balkans. Any former Ottoman territories, in their view, could push past the stultifying effects of former Turkish rule if they embraced the NEF's wide variety of progressive platforms.

The Near East Foundation manifested its new drive to develop the Eastern Mediterranean through a series of agricultural extension and education projects imported from the United States. The NEF identified rural areas as the most effective zones to implement their agricultural training, establishing the Rural Life Program (RLP) to oversee the institution's agricultural education and rural extension projects. The RLP, the Near East Foundation believed, targeted the most needy people in the Eastern Mediterranean. "Outside of the colorful cities of the Near East, millions of hungry human beings are trying to wrest subsistence from the soil. Rural areas are

[268] Ibid., 15.
[269] Ibid., 21.

retarded and the story is everywhere the same. A few words will suffice to tell it. Poverty. Hunger. Dirt. Disease. Ignorance."[270] For the NEF, rural poverty stemmed directly from a lack of agricultural knowledge, which, in turn, promoted the other targets of the organization's development, "disease and ignorance". To transmit agricultural knowledge, the NEF turned to changing vocational systems in the United States. In 1917, the U.S. Congress passed the Smith-Hughes Vocational Education Act. This legislation promoted vocational education in the U.S. and distributed federal funds for technical training in agriculture.[271] Tapping into the networks of graduates produced by this program, the Near East Foundation hired dozens of agricultural experts newly trained in the scientific methods of growth championed by the United States. While Near East Relief relied on missionary networks for its staffing, the foundation selected "trained American personnel of proved ability to direct each project...pledged to respect native customs and work in concord with native religious opinion."[272] The Near East Foundation consistently emphasized the importance of respecting the various religious practices of people in the Eastern Mediterranean; instead of seeking to spread Christianity, like its predecessor organization, the foundation sought to spread a certain type of Americanism, embodied in the techniques and practices of U.S. educational systems.

For their rural projects, the NEF's first point of contact with villages would be an "agronome," a traveling representation of the foundation who established the early foundations for later development projects. In Turkey, Ralph Allee served as one of the NEF's agronomes,

[270] Ibid., 5.
[271] For more on how the Smith-Hughes act affected American vocational education see, David Carleton, *Landmark Congressional Laws on Education* (Westport: Greenwood, 2001), Chapter 6, "The Smith-Hughes Act." For a factual overview of the effects of the Smith-Hughes and Smith-Lever acts on the U.S. agricultural system see, Clarence Beaman Smith and Meredith Chester Wilson, *The Agricultural Extension System of the United States* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1930)
[272] "Near East Foundation: A Twentieth Century Concept of Practical Philanthropy," 1.

traveling to a small village outside of Izmir.[273] Explaining the work of Allee and others, the NEF emphasized the fundamental other-ness of the agronome to rural farmers. "Wherever he goes he carries his equipment case, a source of never-ending wonder to the peasants. Including in it are pictures, posters, and pamphlets for classroom teaching; tools for grafting, budding and pruning; chemicals for simple experiments and first aid kits."[274] The agronome's equipment case represented the many types of projects pursued by the NEF in the region, from educational tools to medical equipment. The agronome, the NEF believed, would begin the first step in a larger cultural transformation of the region by promoting a new form of sociability. "He also promotes games, athletics, and social activities in an effort to inject a happier spirit into the sad little villages."[275] The interlocking dimensions of agricultural development and sociocultural uplift saturated the writings of the RLP. The Near East Foundation believed that by the agronome merely exposing rural farmers to the "wonders" of the West. These educational practices would foster, in the NEF's vision, long-term sociocultural change. The NEF articulated this in incremental language, writing, "it takes time to grow a crop, plant an orchard, and change long-standing habits."[276] In this worldview, agricultural knowledge represented only the first step towards altering cultural norms that held back a civilization.

The Institute for Rural Life offered its services to a network of American educational institutions in the Eastern Mediterranean. One collaboration with the International College in Izmir revealed some of the pitfalls of the civilizational hierarchies embedded in the RLP's outreach programs. International College had been established as an outgrowth of the U.S.

[273] Near East Foundation documents label this village as "Kizil Chulla," although there are no geographical records of such a village. In their records, the NEF often anglicized village names, changing letters and name order, making it difficult to identify exactly where the Rural Life Program operated.
[274] "Near East Foundation: A Twentieth Century Concept of Practical Philanthropy," 10.
[275] Ibid., 11.
[276] Ibid., 12.

missionary presence in the Ottoman Empire, where it embedded missionary ideals into its education system. Before 1922, the college educated mostly Greek and Armenian Christians and classes emphasized religious training and philosophy. The Greco-Turkish exchange radically reshaped International College's student body. After the evacuation of Smyrna, new nationalist Turks settled in the renamed Izmir. Following the model of organizations like NER, International College deferred to Turkish sovereignty and remodeled their school to focus on business training and agricultural education.[277] International College seemed to be the perfect partner for the Near East Foundation, an American institution in the Eastern Mediterranean that had followed the Foundation's winding path towards development based educational projects. Following a dialogue between the new Dean of the college, Cass Arthur Reed, and the NEF, the college instituted new training programs orchestrated by th focused on rural extension and agricultural training. These educational projects, however, retained the civilizational rhetoric of the Near East Foundation—students were expected to not only learn new farming techniques but also concede the fundamental superiority of Western agriculture.[278]In 1933, the Turkish students at International College went on strike, claiming that the school focused too much on foisting American values on the students and not enough on objective, technical training. The strike continued for months, reducing enrollment and funds at the college. In response, International College slashed its teacher budget, desperately trying to stay financially solvent. Finally, after a year of slow decline, the college's trustees sold the campus and its remaining faculty to the American University of Beirut, hoping that the university's president Bayard Dodge could salvage the institution. International College's failure to implement the NEF's agricultural reforms highlights the contentious politics of development projects. While the Near East

[277] "Annual Report of the President of International College to the Trustees" 1934. Box 8, Folder 11. Near East Relief Committee Records.
[278] Ibid.

Foundation consistently highlighted its progress, incidents like this challenge their claims of unmitigated success.[279]

From Reconstruction to Re-Creation in Macedonia

Despite their failure in Izmir, the RLP continued to operate for years in the region. As the first point of contact with the NEF for many rural farmers, the RLP offered tangible education and training, albeit education laced with embedded cultural hierarchies. After establishing a presence in villages, agronomes and other NEF employees began to institute other development programs. These new programs also sought to train rural villagers in skills, but the projects also sought to inculcate Westernized morals and habits that would ensure generational change in the Eastern Mediterranean. Agricultural development only represented one of the links in the interlinked chain of development imagined by the Near East Foundation. The next links were taken directly from Thomas Jesse Jones' *Essentials of Civilization*: recreation and domestic life. The NEF's work in the Macedonia region of Greece demonstrated the foundation's dedication to the concept of interlinking development. Situated in northern Greece, Macedonia had been one of the central zones of population exchange following the Lausanne treaty. Following the exchange, hundreds of thousands of newly created "Greeks" were forced to settle in Macedonia with few supplies. The NEF assessed the situation, "A half million exiles with little more than their bare hands are trying to tame the erstwhile battleground. They live in huts abandoned by the Turkish peasants in the exchange of populations, and in new refugee villages deeply in debt."[280]

[279] For a thorough account of the collapse of the International College see Limberg, *Abundant Life,* 123-129.
[280] "Near East Foundation: A Twentieth Century Concept of Practical Philanthropy,", 7-8.

After an initial approach by an agronome, the NEF established two centers in Macedonian villages.

Near East Relief had operated in Greece for years, and the organization had been intimately involved in the refugee resettlement process in the wake of the Greco-Turkish exchange. This long history allowing the foundation to tap into an unexpected source of intermediaries in transmitting their educational models. Living in Macedonia were "some 4000 boys and girls trained in Near East Relief orphanages who are a link between the American leaders and the untutored peasants."[281] These former orphans would serve a crucial role as translators, both of language and of information. Long focused on administering orphanages to effect generational changes in the Eastern Mediterranean, Near East Relief had managed dozens of orphanages with tens of thousands of children, mostly Armenian and other Christian minorities. The Near East Foundation continued this work, but with a more rigorous dedication to connecting physical education and spiritual uplift. The foundation implemented a series of new physical education programs in both their orphanages and the villages in Macedonia. Drawing from Jones' *Essentials of Civilization* the NEF deemed this work "Re-Creation," playing on the dual meaning of physical education and metaphysical rebirth. Jones believed in physical education to foster racial development.[282] The Near East Foundation extrapolated a similar vision of racial hierarchy centered on recreation. A booklet detailing the racial theories of the foundation articulates this point, "It has been said that the character of a race is formed by its recreative activities. Good sportsmanship, team play, and cooperation are ideals equally of Western play and Western culture. In the Near East, where play, particularly group play, is

[281] Ibid., 8.
[282] Jones, *Essentials of Civilization*, 16-25. *

almost unknown, individualism is the keynote of the social order."[283] In a curious inversion of normal tropes that promote Western culture, particularly American, as individualistic, the NEF claimed that the people of the Eastern Mediterranean required *less* individualism. In rural villages, the booklet continued, farmers were likely to spend time by themselves after laboring, and therefore they could not enter into the spirit of competition. Re-creation relied on a conception of rural villagers as fundamentally lazy and prone to apathy. The foundation theorized that games and activities would "stimulate development of the mind" among the Macedonians, leading to larger cultural changes. Although the NEF participated in perpetuating systems of racial hierarchies, re-creation particularly targeted rural peoples, regardless of race, arguing that the simplicity of the rural farming lifestyle led to intellectual decay. "Among people in isolated farm villages already devitalized by disease, idleness is the only alternative to physical labor. When work slackens, there is nothing else to do but drowse against a sunbaked wall. Village life stagnates. Minds are dulled."[284] In response to this perceived intellectual dulling, the NEF created a program for boys and men to partake in physical exercises outside of labor, arguing that villagers would get "plenty of exercise at their daily labor, but often so much of one kind that natural growth is warped and mentalities stultified."[285] The village's agronome organized a series of simple physical exercises in each village—running, swimming, long-jump—and then had the winner of each village compete against the others in a grand tournament. The NEF lauded this competition, claiming that it offered a novel way for Macedonians to engage with physical education, never quite grasping that among their Greek villages they had merely instituted a local version of the Olympics. The Near East Foundation saw re-creation as one of the constituent projects that translated education into moral uplift.

[283] Ibid., 42.
[284] Ibid., 46.
[285] Ibid., 46.

The NEF also implemented new educational programs to bridge the worlds of domestic and farming labor. To one of the villages in Macedonia, the foundation sent Martha Parrot, one of the new class of NEF personnel. Parrot had trained at the Cornell University Department of Agriculture, and her work in Macedonia sought to bridge the worlds of domestic and agricultural labor. Parrot implemented two plans for "domestic education:" one focused on training the girls of the local village to better care for the home and one targeted at the adult women in the village to alter child-raising habits. Parrot organized four "Home Demonstration Centers," small simulacra of American households to "teach the rudiments of homemaking to village girls by providing instruction in simple cooking and cutting and making all kinds of garments, care of home and babies, and elementary nursing and first aid." By targeting young women and girls in the village, the NEF sought to bridge gaps between domestic life and farming labor. The foundation made this connection explicit in their acount of Parrot's work, writing, "While farmers are learning better farm skills so that there will be more and better food, their wives and daughters, guided by Miss Parrot, are learning how to protect family health through better home making and hygiene and improved and varied diet."[286] This gendered form of domesticity dominated thinking within the foundation. The NEF believed that every aspect of life, public and private, needed to be altered to bring the refugees into modernity. For adult women, Parrot led babycare seminars. Ironically, Parrot's seminars required the very thing that the foundation sought to distance itself from: short-term aid. On the promise that baby food and formula would be distributed, local women in the village attended a class led by Parrot on "the right way to bathe, dress, and feed a baby." After explaining to mothers how they did not know how to properly take care of their children, Parrot pointed out "danger spots outside the house—the

[286] Ibid., 42.

uncovered well, exposed rubbish..."[287] The foundation did not document the local women's responses, but this type of intrusive education that embedded American superiority had failed in stunning fashion at the International College in Izmir.

In Macedonia, the Near East Foundation experimented with projects focused on reshaping domestic life. Although lauded as objective and technically based, these projects, from re-creation to domestic demonstrations, carried the gendered and racialized assumptions of Jones' *Essentials of Civilization*. Centers like the one established by Parrot functioned as the organizational hubs of the Near East Foundation. The NEF believed that its centers would "radiate" information out into the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean. This process of "radiation," as they termed it, would occur through education and travel, but also by the growing connectivity of the world. Over the 1930s, the NEF participated in a growing transnational network of information collection and data transmission focused on epidemic prevention. In the foundation's worldview, all of the NEF's activities—agricultural extension, re-creation, and domestic training—relied on the institution's new ability to promote regional health through sanitation education and public medical projects.

"The Basis of Progress" NEF Health Projects in the Eastern Mediterranean

The Near East Foundation believed all their work to be "transformational." From physical education to agricultural training, the NEF connected the process of education with aspirational moral uplift. However, the foundation believed that none of these programs could take effect without a fundamental system of education: health. In an account of their work in the

[287] Ibid.

early 1930s, the NEF proclaimed, "the basis of progress is health."[288] Through a series of public health projects throughout the Eastern Mediterranean, the NEF sought to establish long-term programs to prevent epidemics. In order to appeal to local authorities, the foundation framed this work in national terms, claiming that preventing the spread of disease would lead to a "vital nation." Throughout their projects, the NEF gathered an enormous amount of data about the spread of disease in the region. The NEF served as the largest hub in the Eastern Mediterranean for information on epidemics and health statistics in the region.[289] The NEF's medical campaigns contributed to a growing transnational network of epidemiological intelligence coordinated by the League of Nations that would transform global health politics. The League of Nations Health Organization would reshape global health information infrastructure.This new network of information worked in tandem with another of the NEF's medical projects in the region: the training of nurses and doctors. These two processes, one informational one professional, would leave a lasting legacy in the region.

For the Near East Foundation, health education and medical operations formed the core of the interconnected web of development. Preventing epidemics not only saved lives, but allowed farmers to be more productive, mothers more freedom to spend with their children, and kids more time to grow into the leaders of tomorrow. One NEF pamphlet neatly summed up this worldview, "epidemics kill man, leaving no one to care for the ripening fields." Much like their re-creation projects, the NEF's health and sanitation programs emphasized spiritual growth. In Syria, Annie Slack represented the health and sanitation wing of the foundation. A registered nurse and an ambulance driver during World War I, Slack operated a mobile medical practice dubbed by NEF as the "Healthmobile." Slack would drive from village to village in Syria,

[288] Ibid., 32.
[289] For more on this see League of Nations Secretariat Archives, Health and Social Questions Fond, Registry Files Subfond, 8A Health – General, "Correspondence with the Near East Foundation."

offering medical advice, administering vaccines, and educating farmers on American sanitation methods.[290] Slack's work, according to the foundation, brought farmers not only medical education but "a spiritual stimulus that gives new courage, faith, and hope to a discouraged and lonely people."[291] The NEF believed that Slack's mobile medical unit would serve as one more hub in the foundation's growing network of public health projects. "It has been found necessary to "plant" the simple techniques of nursing and health teaching in the heart of village life, using the Healthmobile to expand the service and drawing other villagers and nomads to the centers of health." Tapping into the networks of Near East Relief, Slack worked with orphans in Syria that had lived in NER camps. She began a training system whereby dozens of these young women would serve as her nurses in the Healthmobile. This type of connection between NER and the foundation would be replicated throughout the Eastern Mediterranean—the NEF would go on to train hundreds of nurses and doctors through their public health projects.

While the NEF managed these projects, they still sought to transfer the administration to the local government—allowing the foundation to save money and promote their concepts of independence. In Greece, the NEF collaborated with the Greek Ministry of Health to initiate a new nation-wide health protocol to prevent the spread of tuberculosis. With Greek governmental support, the NEF established a set of medical centers around the nation, organized by nurse Alice G. Carr. One of the few holdovers from Near East Relief, the NEF highlighted that Carr had also served in the American Red Cross and had been, "many times honored for brilliant welfare work in the East."[292] Under Carr's supervision, the NEF initiated a rigorous data-collection process on

[290] Slack was born in Saint Kitts, Canada. She served as an ambulance driver for the Canadian forces during World War I. After her work with the Near East Foundation she emigrated to the United States and gained citizenship. "Annie Earle Slack," The National Archives and Records Administration; Washington, D.C.; *Petitions for Naturalization from the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1897-1944*; Series: *M1972*; Roll: *609*

[291] "Near East Foundation: A Twentieth Century Concept of Practical Philanthropy," 36.

[292] Ibid., 42.

the spread of tuberculosis in Greece. Thousands of children from local villages were brought in by the Greek government for testing and examinations. One NEF official recounted Carr's meticulous record-keeping, "Record is kept of each child's weight and response to supplementary feeding. The same children receive hot luncheons daily in school."[293] After tracking all these data points, Carr recommended playgrounds to be built around NEF centers to allow children more time for physical activity. This project melded with the NEF's narrative of national restoration, with one NEF booklet claiming, "to the Greeks, once famous for competitive sports but today the victims of almost epidemic tuberculosis, it offers a demonstration in disease control which is both more economical and more effective than sanitaria treatment..."[294] These same centers would serve as sites of medical education, following the model of Annie Slack's Healthmobile, but on a more permanent footing. The Greek government collaborated with NEF to train Greek nurses, with girls from around the region being, "sent to Miss Carr for training in public health nursing."[295] Like Slack, Carr also trained former members of Near East Relief orphanages, building a network of NEF trained medical personnel around the Eastern Mediterranean. The NEF believed that this growing network of professionals would "radiate out the activities of our disease prevention and health betterment program."[296] This collaboration with the Greek state led to the foundation training hundreds of nurses over the course of the 1930, reshaping public health infrastructure in the country.

Although ultimately deferential to national sovereignty, the Near East Foundation also operated at the center of a growing network of transnational data collection and information sharing. From each of their public health programs, the Near East Foundation drew a wealth of

[293] "The Work of Alice Carr, 1930-1933" Box 8, Folder 13. Near East Relief Committee Records.*
[294] "Near East Foundation: A Twentieth Century Concept of Practical Philanthropy," 34.
[295] Ibid., 41.
[296] Ibid., 43.

data about the spread of disease in the Eastern Mediterranean. Similar to Carr's records of the spread of tuberculosis, NEF trained medical personnel maintained voluminous records on health in the region. In the 1920s, the League of Nations organized the first international international health information sharing system, the League of Nations Health Organization (LNHO). According to Heidi Tworek, the LNHO, for the first time, "made information a vital part of epidemic management."[297] Tworek argues that the LNHO established a new, globalized form of information sharing in the 1920s, a period typically associated with growing restrictions on information and movement. As one of the central LNHO hubs for data in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Near East Foundation participated in a process that would lead directly to the establishment of global health institutions like the World Health Organization. The NEF transmitted their carefully collected data to the League throughout the 1930s, shaping the international organization's response to epidemics in the Eastern Mediterranean.[298] This network of transnational communication would become critically important as global war broke out in the late 1930s. Tworek continues, "In a time increasing ideological strife and military violence, Heidi Tworek argues, "Health communications created new hubs for information exchange across borders precisely as liberal internationalism was challenged by competing ideologies of fascism and communism. After World War II, those hubs and the practices of health communications would swiftly reassert their importance."[299] The Near East Foundation would continue their work uninterrupted throughout the 1930s. When conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean swelled, international organizations turned to the NEF for medical assistance. The

[297] Heidi Tworek, "Communicable Disease: Information, Health, and Globalization in the Interwar Period" *The American Historical Review* 124:3 (June 2019), 842.
[298] Reports compiled by the Near East Foundation and submitted to the League of Nations Health Organization can be found at: League of Nations Secretariat Archives, Health and Social Questions Fond, Registry Files Subfond, 8A Health – General, "Correspondence with the Near East Foundation."
[299] Ibid., 842.

education programs started by the NEF created a network of medical professionals across the Eastern Mediterranean who were legible and accessible to American and global institutions. During World War II, NEF trained medical personnel were the primary organizers and distributors of Allied relief in the region. Due to the transnational interconnectivity established in the interwar years, the foundation emerged from the war at the center of a globalized network of public health.

Conclusion

The decade long conflict within Near East Relief reshaped the organization and led to the creation of one of America's first development-focused foreign aid organization. This debate centered not on goals but tactics. The Near East Foundation shared Near East Relief's vision for a transformed Eastern Mediterranean. Building off the educational and racially informed models of Thomas Jesse Jones, the Near East Foundation eschewed the practices of relief and aid and began to implement development-focused projects focused on fostering independence and national cooperation. Through a variety of projects, the NEF sought to reorganize every aspect of daily life for people in the Eastern Mediterranean, from domestic work to agricultural labor. These projects institutionalized hierarchical, civilizational ways of thinking, embedding concepts of Western superiority into acts ranging from babycare to plowing a field. Through their medical programs, the NEF recorded massive amounts of data to share with a growing transnational health infrastructure. In tandem, the foundation trained nurses and doctors who would be readily accessible to Western institutions.

These intertwined projects would culminate during World War II, when NEF personnel became the central humanitarian figures in the Eastern Mediterranean during the war and during postwar reconstruction. The sixth chapter of this dissertation will touch on that process. The next chapter, however, will start at the same point as this one: in 1923 when changing geopolitics radically reshaped U.S. humanitarian ambitions for the world. The next chapter will follow the personnel of the American Relief Administration in the interwar years. In contrast to Near East Relief the ARA would not continue their work past 1923. Dissolved after the conclusion of their campaign in Russia and the failed Constantinople Russian refugee resettlement process, ARA members returned to the United States to work in private enterprise. Over the years, the "Aramites," as they termed themselves, would form a tight-knit community that celebrated voluntarism and private action as the source of progress. The shifting political landscape of the U.S., however, would shatter this consensus and impel the Aramites towards public service. Much like how the Near East Foundation became the core of the American humanitarian response to crises in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Aramites would become the logistical organizers of America's vast military bureaucracy. In the wake of the war, former ARA workers would coordinate refugee resettlement programs and political reorganization plans within the U.S. government.

Chapter 5

"I'm Going Home, Sad Word": The American Relief Administration in the Interwar Years

In 1923, the American Relief Administration ended all its projects in Europe and the Middle East. The hundreds of ARA workers would need to find new employment overseas or return home. Many in the ARA confronted this transition with a peculiar anxiety. Plenty of the Aramites—as they colloquially termed themselves—were Army and Navy veterans of World War I who had signed up for the agency in the immediate aftermath of the war. In Russia, ARA employees commanded a huge amount of respect and authority among local populations as they controlled food aid distribution. Returning to the United States became a step down on the social ladder. Arthur Hillman, an ARA relief worker in Kazan, expressed his regrets in a poem that he had distributed among his co-workers. It began:

> I'm going home, sad word,
> To become a member of the common herd.
> No private cars on railroad trains;
> No pretty girls, no shady lanes;
> No crew of servants at beck and call;
> None to observe my rise and fall.

Rather than a triumphant return home, many Aramites faced their impending loss of status with regret and, ultimately, fear. In the U.S. they would merely be members of the common herd, with no servants or special treatment, merely normal Americans.

Histories of this period largely accept Hillman's lament. After returning to the United States from Russia, the American Relief Administration and most of its members fade from the historical record with few histories venturing beyond 1923. Historians brand the ensuing years as relatively unimportant in terms of humanitarianism, little more than a waiting period for the more consequential changes that would result from World War II and the ensuing Cold War.

Historian of humanitarianism Michael Barnett terms the period "a dry run," where "the few humanitarian institutions that states had built after the war were completely inadequate to the task."[300] This conception of the interwar period as a period of relative unimportance, however, glosses over and minimizes key continuities between the World Wars, both ideological and in terms of the personnel that staffed and organized humanitarian institutions. Historian Julia Irwin offers a powerful retort to this conception in her history of the American Red Cross, pointing out that the interwar period, far from being "a dry run," could be better classified as an age of "simultaneous continuity and change, a period in which Americans retained their interest in influencing the wider world even as they revised older methods of doing so."[301] The American Red Cross, Irwin argues, in the interwar period laid the groundwork for a wave of secular humanitarian institutions focused on disease prevention and disaster response that would emerge in the post-WWII world.[302]

Although the ARA formally disbanded in 1923, its members continued to meet well into the 1930s and 1940s. The thousands of men who had served in food distribution throughout Europe and the Middle East formed a budding community in the New Era of the 1920s, held together by the bonds of nostalgia and mutual interest. The former leaders of the ARA even formed a society, the ARA Association, to maintain connections among the Aramites. The ARA

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[300] Michael Barnett, *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013), 40.

[301] Julia Irwin, *Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation's Humanitarian Awakening* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 186.

[302] A growing subset of scholarship on the history of US humanitarianism has begun to follow this strategy, focusing more on the interwar years as formative for humanitarianism in the "American Century." For more see, Julia F. Irwin, "Taming Total War: Great War-Era American Humanitarianism and its Legacies," *Diplomatic History* 38, no. 4, (September 2014): 763-775; Keith David Watenpaugh, "'A pious wish devoid of all practicability': Interwar Humanitarianism, The League of Nations and the Rescue of Trafficked Women and Children in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1920–1927," *American Historical Review* 115, no. 4 (October 2010): 1315–39; Branden Little, "Band of Crusaders: American Humanitarians, the Great War, and the Remaking of the World" (PhD dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 2009); Michael McGuire, "An Ephemeral Relationship: American Non-governmental Organizations, the Reconstruction of France, and Franco-American Relations, 1914–1924" (PhD dissertation, Boston University, 2012); Jennifer Polk, "Constructive Efforts: The American Red Cross and YMCA in Revolutionary and Civil War Russia, 1917–1924" (PhD dissertation, University of Toronto, 2012

Association even published a quarterly journal—titled the *ARA Association Review*—that printed articles on continued European relief efforts and the politics of international reconstruction. At yearly meetings and in the pages of the *Review*, the Aramite community established a narrative of their work, one that elevated the skills and techniques they had employed after World War I and highlighted the organization's voluntarist identity. Over years, the editors of the *Review* reinforced this vision, extolling the virtues of the ARA's logistical prowess and voluntarist background to help secure former members' jobs in the industry and the private sector. As time moved on, the *Review* became a place for ARA members and other luminaries of the humanitarian community to articulate these evolving conceptions of relief and aid in a rapidly changing global community. The interwar years saw great political successes for the Aramite community—most notably the elevation of their former leader Herbert Hoover to the presidency—as well as successive crushing defeats as the economy crashed and the Great Depression ensued. These shifting political tides reshaped the politics of the *Review*. The journal reflected the fractures within the Aramite community, but its editors also used that turmoil to articulate a new vision of humanitarian aid, one that accepted the primacy of the state in rehabilitating projects overseas, while still emphasizing professionalized logistical administration as the core of modern relief organization. By the end of the 1930s, the community of Aramites had solidified behind this concept of public service so firmly that the beginning of war in Europe saw hundreds of their number flock to Washington and gain critical appointments and promotions. Far from becoming "members of the common herd," as Arthur Hillman so feared, the Aramites took up key positions in the State Department, Office of Foreign Rehabilitation and Relief, and the War Production Board as the U.S. prepared for another devastating war overseas. Rather than returning to an agency akin to the ARA, a voluntarist, semi-private aid organization

run top-down by a charismatic leader, the Aramites served as loyal bureaucrats in the growing American state. This chapter focuses on the interim between the flashpoints of the world wars. It traces the ways that the ARA Association constructed its own narrative legacy in the wake of their organization's dissolution and how this group of humanitarians forged in the conflict of World War I became the administrators and managers of America's war supplies and relief distribution in World War II.

Community Building Activities

The ARA halted its aid to Russia when, in 1923, the Soviet government began to sell wheat on the international market while still receiving food aid from the ARA, a direct violation of the agreement negotiated by Hoover.[303] In the countryside along the Volga River, ARA middle managers and young distributors had wielded unprecedented authority, expanding their charge from simply famine relief to a larger and broader vision of humanitarianism rooted in their own conception of Russia's national character. These aid workers, many of them young men in their twenties, had used their power to enforce sedentarization policies, dictate epidemic relief plans, and implement labor control regimes; they had become respected leaders and influential men among their Russian humanitarian subjects. On the ground, even in the face of the massive humanitarian crises they had witnessed, many of the ARA distributors confronted the end of their labor with trepidation. In the words of Hillman they were "going home, sad word" to face the practicalities of life in America. Bertrand Patenaude profiled the returning distributors as having, "grown accustomed to being the object of adoring attention by the natives

[303] Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bololand,* 700*

[they] had rescued to being toasted as the savior of a nation….Now [they] stood on the brink of anonymity."[304] In Russia, the ARA had been a celebrated and powerful collective; in the United States ARA workers foresaw becoming "the common herd."

The members of the ARA campaign in Russia represented the largest single group of ARA employees in the organization, and their extraordinary authority in Russia led many of them to see any other type of work as beneath them. Hoover had organized a special office in New York to deal with returning ARA employees and help them find work. Frank Page, the same man who organized work for the Russian refugees who had arrived a few months earlier, arranged interviews and job placements for ARA veterans in a variety of industries in New York City, from insurance companies and newspapers to engineering firms and mining companies.[305] In a letter to a fellow Aramite, Page detailed the complications of dealing with the ARA Russian workers, "they tended to wander around for quite a while before they settle down to do something." Many of the Aramites who had worked in Russia expressed resentment at having to work in offices or as analysts, rather than executives, until they "gradually readjusting themselves to a life of business rather than to being czars in their own particular kingdom." Page served as the first point of contact when these ARA workers' hostility spilled over into their new jobs. Page recounted the story of Russel Cobb, an ARA worker who had worked in Saratov. Page had helped secure Cobb employment at the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Page related, "He hated it. They gave their annual dinner to all employees and Cobb proceeded to take too much to drink and thought he was back bossing his Khirgees and he made two speeches on

[304] Patenaude, 730. Patenaude's exhaustive account of the ARA relief expedition to Soviet Russia provides extensive details of the day-to-day work of relief distributors in Russia, including an analysis of their departure in 1923, however Patenaude largely accepts this narrative of the Aramites "disappearing" upon their return to the United States.

[305] *ARA Association Review*, July 1, 1925. The "Who's Where in the Association" section of the Review lists dozens of jobs secured by Page and his associations for the returning members in the aftermath of the European and Russian campaigns.

how damn rotten they ran their business." The next day, Cobb's boss called him into his office where he reprimanded the onetime relief worker, but begrudgingly admitted that he "passed out some mighty good ideas" but that he would never let Cobb work in New York again, sending him to another branch in Chicago. Page spun the story to reflect well on the ARA, writing, "Russel Cobb never in the world would have dared to tell the assembled multitude the truth before he had had the experience in Russia."[306] Although fanciful, and most likely exaggerated, Page's story about Cobb captured how the returning ARA workers seemed to view themselves: as smart, technically driven men who had grown too comfortable with authority.

While the ARA workers had helped curb the worst effects of famine in Russia, they had also grown used to the power, respect, and authority granted by their status. Page believed that this self-importance would die down over time, and the returning workers would gradually adjust to normal life. However, re-integration into the United States proved difficult for many members of the ARA, even those who had worked in the regional offices. Some of the ARA veterans even received personal help from the Chief himself. Hoover's growing prestige in Washington as Secretary of Commerce opened up new avenues for Aramite employment in the capital and elsewhere. In late 1920, having served with the ARA for two years as a technical analyst, Edward Eyre Hunt wrote to one of his friends on his increasingly worse job prospects after leaving the relief organization, complaining that, even with his years of experience as a manager and a humanitarian, he could not find a job. Luckily, Hunt had a personal savior. He penned, "I have also seen Hoover, and Hoover has just exactly the thing…"[307] Within the next month, Hoover appointed Hunt as a member of the Committee on Elimination of Waste in Industry, one of the dozens of committees and subcommittees organized by Hoover in Washington under his

[306] Patenaude, *The Big Show in Bololand, 731.*
[307] Hunt to Boyd Fisher, November 3, 1920. Edward Eyre Hunt Papers Box 1, Folder – Correspondence 1920-1921. Herbert Hoover Library, West Branch, IA.

growing power in the Department of Commerce. Only two years later, Hunt would gain another appointment as Secretary of the U.S. Coal Commission.[308] Serving as a key liaison between industry and the government, Hunt formed another link in the slowly growing chain of ARA veterans influencing the world of business.

Seeking to recapture the camaraderie from their days doing relief work, a group of Aramites created a society intended to encompass all the relief veterans that had served under Hoover. Responding to these calls, in 1925 hundreds of ARA veterans met in New York to hold the first annual reunion of the ARA Association, comprised of all those who worked in Hoover-led institutions. That same year saw the publication of the first issue of the *ARA Association Review,* a quarterly journal edited by former ARA staff that sought to chart the continued success of the organization's members, carry intellectual opinion pieces and scholarly articles on international politics and reconstruction, and serve as a locus for communication and connection among the Aramites. The *ARA Association Review* imagined their group as a great tree with multiple branches from their different organizations—the Food Administration, the Commission for Relief of Belgium, the ARA, and others—all bound together through the figure of Hoover.

Organizations that work on discrete humanitarian relief projects, like the ARA, generally have a limited lifespan. When the organization ceases its operations, records of their work normally cease as well. The issues of the *ARA Association Review*, published until 1964, offer unique insight into how the personnel of an organization, deprived of the institutional cohesion that once bound them together, can evolve over time. The pages of the *Review* became a place to collectively reminisce about past ventures, but also a venue for articulating a new narrative of the American Relief Administration's work that sought to re-categorize all of the ARA's endeavors

[308] Edward Eyre Hunt Biographical Information, Edward Eyre Hunt Papers, Box 1, Folder – Biographical Information. Herbert Hoover Library, West Branch, IA.

not as humanitarian work, but as logistical operations. None other than the most influential member of the Aramite community offered this new mythology: Herbert Hoover. In an address to an assembly of over 1000 ARA veterans in New York at the first annual reunion dinner Hoover offered a powerful and cohesive account of the efforts of the organizations he headed, one that minimized the broad vision of humanitarianism practiced in Russia and magnified his own particular conception of "bootstraps humanitarianism." Instead of a wide-ranging humanitarian organization that combatted disease and controlled population movement, Hoover instead distilled the work of the various organizations he headed into a single narrative that championed the private, voluntarist ARA as an organization that rehabilitated Europe through logistical prowess. Taking the stage at the Army and Navy Club in March of 1925, Hoover addressed the assembled cohort of hundreds of Aramites with his own account of how he founded the ARA and the long-term ramifications of its work. Hoover began his narrative with an account of World War I. The armistice of 1918 included, "a provision that food supplies were to be furnished to the enemy countries." After receiving Wilson's appointment to go to Europe, Hoover called together his workers from the Food Administration and traveled to the continent where the Allied powers had constructed an organization, in the mind of the Chief, "more directed to diplomatic questions and international relations and political effects than toward the provision of finances and actual definite economic measures."[309] In Hoover's conception, food aid should only have been distributed as it served to relieve and rebuild the global economic system. Conveniently, Hoover obscures his geopolitical strategy in Russia to subvert the rise of Bolshevism by aid. This elision continues throughout his address. Speaking of the overall goals of the ARA, Hoover continued, "In our vision (which proved correct) the problem was not one

[309] "America in European Restoration" by Herbert Hoover in *ARA Association Review*, April 1, 1925, "The Commemoration Number."

alone of foodstuffs. It was a problem of the establishment of actual government and governmental machinery which would recreate economic life." In this re-telling, famine relief no longer took primacy in the story of the ARA, as Hoover had claimed so often during the reconstruction period. Instead famine relief served as a tool towards economic rebuilding, a process achieved through the logistical process of transportation, infrastructure building, and communication. In this narrative, the goal of economic reconstruction, too, could only have been accomplished by a voluntarist, logistically focused organization like the ARA. He continues, "Thus began the second intervention of America in Europe. We had gone to Europe with our armies and brought their war to an end but if we were to maintain civilization itself we had again to intervene with the one constructive agency in the world that was singleminded, strong, and able."[310] Governments could not handle the responsibility of reconstruction; that called for a private, voluntarist organization capable of relief without political aims. Despite his appointment as an Allied relief officer, the millions of dollars of congressional appropriation, and his own status as a Presidential Cabinet member during the ARA's tenure, Hoover's narrative of the organization consistently obscured the role of the government in financing and supporting his aid projects. Instead the ARA became, in this new mythology, a model private company doing the business of humanitarianism, delivering food overseas for the sole goal of economic reconstruction. Hoover distilled the varied exploits of the Russian venture, focused on strategic geopolitical goals and with a broad humanitarian scope, into a single, defined discipline: logistics.

Following his address, several ARA personnel stood up to give extemporaneous speeches cementing the Chief's new narrative of the ARA as a voluntarist, logistical organization. Frank Page, the Aramite responsible for resettling returning ARA workers, commented, "…not five

[310] Ibid.

percent of those who worked abroad, or of those who worked in this country, have the remotest idea of what the ARA did." Neatly dividing out the ARA workers on the ground from any say over the practices and goals of the ARA, Page promoted the concept of the ARA as the ultimate savior and rebuilder of Europe, announcing that the administration had, "…stopped an economic, a political, and a social destruction of all Central Europe."[311] Former Indiana governor and Hoover confidante James P. Goodrich agreed, shortly after, announcing to the crowd, "I do sometimes think that you were doing more than feeding people. You were creating sentiment for America, and settling social and political conditions over there. These two depend so much upon the economic condition."[312] Hoover's re-telling of the ARA's past eventually gained acceptance from the younger foreign workers as well when John P. Gregg, a distributor in Russia, stood up and announced that he would be "speaking for the younger men." He concurred with the Chief's new account of their work, opining, "I think that many of the men realized that what they were doing was not only giving a ration here and there, but also laying a foundation for the health of the country that was to be."[313] Accepting the narrative of the ARA as a logistical organization, rather than a humanitarian relief operation, Gregg elided the massive projects he and the other "younger men" implemented in Russia. This concept of logistical know-how as the sole and best means for economic reconstruction became central to the new mythology of the ARA; refugee regulation, disease management, or geopolitical goals were merely subsets of the greater organizational structure. As would happen with most of the subsequent reunions, the night then devolved into a series of nearly endless toasts and occasional drunken speeches. In the pages of its first issue, the *Review* took up this new narrative from Hoover, shaping his vision of the ARA's past and projecting a future for the association's membership. Edited in its first years

[311] Frank Page, "The Character of the ARA Association," in *ARA Association Review*, April 1, 1925.
[312] James P. Goodrich, "The Character of the ARA Association," in *ARA Association Review*, April 1, 1925.
[313] John P. Gregg, "The Character of the ARA Association," in *ARA Association Review*, April 1, 1925.

by a group of editors led by former ARA manager Sidney Brooks, an older bureaucrat who had long served under Hoover, the *Review* released four more issues with an assortment of new series that promoted Hoover's new narrative of the ARA's past. Through a collection of different articles and series, Brooks and his cohort sought to accomplish two main goals: maintain a space for Aramites to connect, reminisce, and maintain business relations and, most importantly, endorse and valorize Hoover's new narrative of the ARA where the organization's work constituted a coherent discipline. The first issues of the *Review* emphasized the role of logistics and voluntariasm in three key ways: by publishing retrospectives on the ARA that highlighted this view; publishing articles that contrasted the ARA's work with relief projects deemed "more emotional" and "less rigorous;" and finally by curating academic pieces on international relief, strategic planning, and infrastructure building.

First, Brooks and his fellow editors published several articles on growing success in Europe as a result of the ARA's work as an example of the long-term viability of infrastructure created by the ARA. "Leaders in European Reconstruction," a key series that ran in the *Review* for the following year elaborated on Hoover's claim that "earnest men" now ran Europe.[314] This series proceeded from Hoover's initial claims that the ARA's logistical planning and distribution had allowed Europe to economically rehabilitate and offered a series of profiles of leaders "over there" who had taken up the gifts of the ARA, as they saw it, and continued reconstruction. Over several installations the series profiled leaders in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Finland, Hungary, and the League of Nations. These profiles extolled the critical role of the American Relief Administration in giving the leaders the tools to thrive. In a profile of Poland's former Prime Minister Ignace Jan Paderewsky, contributor Vernon Kellogg commented, "his mere

[314] "America in European Restoration" by Herbert Hoover in *ARA Association Review*, April 1, 1925, "The Commemoration Number."

personal presence in Poland during those fateful early months of 1919 led to a unique outpouring of national spirit and enthusiasm which swept over all of Poland…" However, Paderewski relied on "…something that only assistance from the outside could provide. This assistance came from the American Relief Administration by the provisioning of the people until that time when they could be self-sustaining."[315] Profiles of luminaries from Czechoslovakia's President Garrigue Masaryk to the League of Nation's High Commissioner for Refugees Fridtjof Nansen painted a similar picture: European leaders were succeeding in rebuilding Europe's economy, but they received their initial impetus from the United States and the ARA.

Over the 1920s Harold Fisher, the former chief of the Historical Department of the ARA, relentlessly championed this narrative in his professional work and publications. As mentioned in Chapter One, the ARA encouraged rigorous record-keeping, which produced tens of thousands of documents covering a wide variety of subjects, chronologies, and geologies. As the head of the Historical Division, Fisher collected and distilled these records for archival keeping. In 1924, a donation from Hoover helped create the "Hoover War Library" at Stanford University, Hoover's alma mater. The "Hoover War Library" received a lengthy study in the *Review*. The archive, formed from Hoover's private collection of records, became in the words of *Review* editor Sidney Brooks, "a memorial to our own services." Brooks, who had toured the archive with Hoover himself, commented "…in bringing together these raw materials of history, the Chief had used the same vision and foresight that have characterized those other activities of his…" Its collections, in the eyes of Brooks, were unparalleled in capturing the ARA's past. He continues, "It, of course, stands alone in its records of American participation in the

[315] "Ignace Jan Paderewski" by Vernon Kellogg in *ARA Association Review*, July 1, 1925.

reconstruction of Europe from the chaos and anarchy that followed the war."[316] The "Hoover War Library" became a physical testament to the power of its benefactor's control over the ARA's historical narrative. In another example of business networking, Fisher secured the position of curator of the archive as well as a lectureship at Stanford University, both courtesy of Stanford alumnus Hoover.[317] While curator, Fisher published *The Famine in Soviet Russia*, which became the authoritative history of the ARA's campaign.[318] Despite depicting narratives that show how ARA workers engaged with managing refugee populations, Fisher doggedly characterizes the ARA as "merely a food relief organization." These suppositions generally informed scholarship on the ARA for decades after the book's publication in 1927.

The *Review* also played host to a series of articles that contrasted the ARA's work with other organizations, deemed less rigorous and "more emotional." In an article titled "Les Embusques," newly named archival curator Harold Fisher recalled the massive needs of Europe after World War I, writing "the problem was not to call out new agencies to appeal to the generosity of our people, but to prevent the dissipation of that generosity by too many uncoordinated demands upon it."[319] Fisher argued that too many organizations responded to the calls for aid, and that the relief process could have been administered much more efficiently by one centralized, apolitical institution. Fisher also criticized organizations with "racial, religious, or other affiliations," whose work had been restricted by politics or racial and religious

[316] "The Hoover War Library" by Sidney Brooks in *ARA Association Review*, July 1, 1925. In an ironic twist of fate, the actual printed and bound copies of the *Review* are no longer held at this archive, now renamed the "Hoover Institution and Library on War, Revolution, and Peace." In 1962, on Hoover's 88th birthday, the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library opened in West Branch, Iowa, located a hundred feet from Hoover's birthplace. They purchased the issues of the *Review* from Hoover's first archive at Stanford.

[317] While Fisher certainly seemed to be the most qualified candidate for the job, the lack of an open search and subsequent six-month delay in contact seems oddly disappointing.

[318] For reference, Bertrand Patenaude's *The Big Show in Bololand* cites Fisher in the index more than Herbert Hoover, 799-800, 803-804. Patenaude's thorough and rigorous examination of the ARA campaign in Russia far exceeds Fisher's work, especially on an analytic level, however *Big Show in Bololand* still relies on Fisher's history for much of its narrative and structure.

[319] "Les Embusques" by H.H. Fisher in *ARA Association Review*, July 1, 1925

solidarities. In this narrative, the ARA's success stemmed both from its rigorous planning techniques as well as its apolitical identity. Other organizations, Fisher concluded, were too mired in helping their own ethnic or religious groups and thus could not effect massive change like the ARA. In the following article, Julius H. Barnes drew the organizational lines even more clearly. Recounting the work of the ARA in Europe after World War I, Barnes commented that most organizations "made a record of emotional futility" in stark contrast to the ARA which "has been recorded with efficiency of service."[320] Without naming any specific organization, Barnes concluded that the ARA's legacy should be its efficiency and logistics, its greatest strength had been its lack of emotion.

Brooks rounded out these two types of articles with serious journalistic pieces and book reviews about international rehabilitation. Book reviews, in particular, took a prominent role in the first issues of the ARA Review, with each issue dedicating about a quarter of its pages to reviews of books in a wide variety of fields. The first issues offer page-long reviews of the latest works covering subjects like post-WWI recovery, Russian history, and managerial planning.[321] These reviews, mostly done by Brooks, emphasize the professional applications of these works, claiming that the newest knowledge of managerial planning would help the Aramites succeed in their private enterprises.[322] Each subsequent issue's reviews also pushed further afield from the ARA's traditional academic territory, with books on topics like the politics of war, international law, and modern engineering practices appearing in the pages of the *Review*. As the book reviews began to grow in scope, so did articles on international politics and relief. Two articles show the *Review*'s fledgling attempts at articulating a coherent vision of their type of logistics-

[320] "Leadership in Modern Civilizations" by Julius H. Barnes in *ARA Association Review*, July 1, 1925
[321] "Book Reviews" *ARA Association Review*, July 1, 1925; "Book Reviews" *ARA Association Review*, October, 1925. "Book Reviews" *ARA Association Review*, January 1926.
[322] "Book Reviews" *ARA Association Review*, January 1926.

centered foreign aid. By October 1925, the journal's third issue, the *Review* had begun to move away from nostalgic articles, instead articulating a larger vision of the future of foreign relief work. In "China and the Foreign Devil," future *Review* editor Harold M. Fleming details a statistical analysis of China's infrastructural progress over the previous two decades. Fleming argues that China's attempts to "throw out foreign assistance" have crippled their infrastructural growth. The nation needed an infusion of outside capital and foreign planning techniques, Fleming wrote, "When China is able to provide her own capital, to administer her own industries and railways, and to govern her own people, then she is justified in ridding herself of foreign capitalists, but she is in no position to dispense with them yet."[323] Fleming's article carried all of the assumed civilizational supremacy that had characterized much of the ARA's work overseas. In particular, his article highlights the key role that he believes Americans should play in overseas relations: as investors and logistical planners. These sentiments were echoed in the following article, a piece titled "America and Germany" by future commissioner of the Atomic Energy Commission, Lewis Strauss. Strauss re-emphasized Fleming's key argument, writing that Germany needed "the technical thinking of the ARA" in order to rebuild its destroyed infrastructure. Railroads, canals, roads, and telegraph lines would all need to be rebuilt and, in Strauss' mind, this project called for the logistical planning intelligence of the ARA.[324] These articles by Fleming and Strauss show the drive within the *Review* to portray their previous work as a coherent discipline. In the subsequent years, the editor of the journal would continue this practice, increasingly with an eye on how the abilities of a logistics focused relief worker could be of use in the private sector.

[323] "China and the Foreign Devil" by Harold M. Fleming, *ARA Association Review,* October 1925.
[324] "America and Germany" by Lewis Strauss, *ARA Association Review,* October 1925.

By 1926, the *Review* had cemented Hoover's conception of the ARA through its series of articles and profiles. Over the next two years, editor Sidney Brooks turned his focus towards forming the Aramites into a cohesive community. This took two forms, first Brooks encouraged his fellows to live and work in the United States. Although the majority of ARA workers returned home to the U.S. following their service, many stayed overseas or went back to Europe shortly after returning to America. Brooks saw this as a huge issue for the community. In response he commissioned a series of articles praising the promise and potential of the United States in an attempt to bring home wayward Aramites and enfold them into the growing community. Second, Brooks published a series of articles championing the expertise and prowess of ARA veterans in the realm of international business, pushing the community to use their overseas connections to promote American business interests.

Between 1926 and 1928 Brooks printed articles from domestic Aramites exhorting their fellows to return to the U.S. from their overseas locations, mostly focused on the economic growth and potential of the United States. In an article titled "The Case for America" by John Ellingston, the former ARA manager praises the virtues of New Era America, writing, "The one inescapable fact is that the place for the young American is America." Offering slight praise to Europe for its achievements in architecture and art, Ellingston continues, writing that Europe only has its history to draw inspiration from, whereas the United States draws its inspiration from something bigger: itself, "America—crude, powerful, dynamic, immensely physical." He concludes with a final warning, "All men owe their virtue more to their attachment than to themselves, and the more completely a part of that attachment they are, the greater their virtue may be. That is why the ARA man's yearning for Europe is a traitor to his highest interests. That

is the Case for America."[325] Two years later, young Aramite Harold Fleming echoed many of Ellingston's rejoinders, with a slightly lighter tone, in his article "Why I Prefer to Live in the United States." Much like Ellingston, Fleming casts the divide between Europe and the United States in the terms of dichotomy, "The simple statement that Europe is old and America is young, brings into focus better than any other words the spiritual differences between the two continents…" In this case, Fleming sees age as an iniquity rather than a benefit, writing, "for societies grow old just as men do. On all sides in Europe are the visible evidences of her hampering antiquity."[326] In these terms, Ellingston, Fleming, and Brooks all sought to lie out the case for the United States as a nation of endless growth and possibility.

Growth, for Brooks and his contributors, largely meant one thing: business. In addition to calls for Aramites to return home, Brooks positioned the *Review* as a central location to connect ARA veterans with business opportunities and employment. The first issues of the *Review* included short sections detailing exemplary work from members of the Aramite community. By the third issue, Brooks had taken these short sections and turned them into the increasingly lengthy "Who's Where" series that ran in every subsequent issue for the next four decades. "Who's Where" offered alphabetically ordered profiles of all of the members of the Aramite community that stayed in touch with the *Review*. Not only did this section serve as a place for reminiscing and connection, but also as a sort of advertisement space for potential work and lines of employment. Several of the "Who's Where" profiles include calls like "able, technical men needed" for positions in engineering firms, mining companies, or oil corporations.[327] Having Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover as a benefactor certainly held promise for business—as

[325] "The Case for America" by John Ellingston in *ARA Association Review* February, 1926, "First Anniversary Number."
[326] "Why I Prefer to Live in the United States" by Harold Fleming in *ARA Association Review*, January 1928, "Slavic Number."
[327] "Who's Where" in *ARA Association Review*, October, 1925.

Aramites like Edward Eyre Hunt had already found out—and many of the ARA community used these connections to parlay access to their own networks of international business relations. In an article titled "The International Chamber of Commerce", former ARA manager E.G. Burland described the initial workings of the ICC and how Aramites could use its policies for their own gain. As an international organization focused on fostering business and capitalistic growth, Burland cast the ICC, which he served as a member of, as a spiritual successor to the work of the ARA, writing, "Now [the] ARA is bent with time and the hoar of experience, while the [International Chamber of Commerce] is just going after the heavyweight championship in international business affairs. The work of one is done. The other just beginning. Perhaps the ARA and the International Chamber are cousins of sorts." If any ARA man wanted to get into contact with the ICC to advocate policy or solicit advice, he would find a welcome familiarity among the leadership with former ARA members serving at almost every level. He continued, "Mr. Hoover is on the American Committee of the International Chamber, and Julius Barnes is one of its' Vice-Presidents and principal contributors of leadership. Cyril Quinn is manager of the American Section at Washington, and as usual carrys [sic] a peak load of the London-Warsaw-Moscow type."[328] These sorts of articles illustrate how the growing network of Aramites in the interwar years had used their connections to consolidate business relationships.

Beyond several series of articles in the *Review*, the ARA Association also offered physical space for business development at their annual reunion. In an advertisement for the 1927 reunion, the *Review* published a page on the pleasures available to visiting Aramites in bullet-pointed brevity:

- The pleasures:
    - Of meeting your friends

[328] "The International Chamber of Commerce" by E.G. Burland in *ARA Association Review*, April 1, 1925, "The Commemoration Number."

- Of talking about yourself
- Of discovering the year's changes
- Of hearing Wise Men speak
- Of attending the business meetings
- Of sentimental reminiscing

The reunion served not only as a place for "sentimental reminiscing" but also a time for securing business contacts and striking up new connections. Each of the reunions occurred over two days with the first day consisting mostly of lunch meetings and business dealings for any interested members. By 1928, the "Who's Where" section of the *Review* had become littered with Aramites working in shipping, manufacturing, mining, and myriad other big businesses of the New Era, mostly jobs that emphasized logistics and planning. The thousands of former ARA members had become a community embodiment of Hoover's conception of the ARA: a network of strategic thinkers working in private enterprise.

1928 also saw the culmination of the *Review*'s vision for the future: Herbert Hoover clinched the nomination for the Republican Party at the Republican National Convention in June. The July issue of the *Review* led with a proud pronouncement, "The name of Hoover has become a symbol for straight-dealing, mercy, and truth." In the style of the inaugural issue, the *Review* also ran a retrospective, "Eight Years After" by Lincoln Hutchinson, that sought to capture the long-term effects of ARA work in Prague over the eight-year interim. Exuberantly, Hutchinson writes, "I wonder how many of that little band of ARA's who had pilgrimaged to Prague in the Spring of 1919 have since had the pleasure of returning to that golden city to see the transformation which has come in these few years to the land which they helped rescue…" The city even named a street in Hoover's honor, Hutchinson concludes, "long before they knew that he was to be the next President of the United States."[329] In November, Hoover's trouncing of New Yorker Al Smith in the presidential election only validated the Aramites' faith even more.

[329] "Eight Years After" by Lincoln Hutchinson in *ARA Association Review*, July 1928, "The Blue Pencil Number."

The ARA had achieved their goals both overseas and domestically, 1928 ended as a year of unmitigated success.

A Victorious Year

At first glance, "The Victory Number" seems like a strange title for a journal issue published in 1929. For a year so thoroughly associated with the Stock Market Crash, the onset of the Great Depression, and the ultimate political downfall of Herbert Hoover, the year began brightly for the Aramites. The first issue of the review in 1929, "The Victory Number," consisted solely of the lengthiest "Who's Where" section to appear in an issue as of then.[330] The following issue, published in July after the reunion dinner and inauguration, captured the ebullient spirit of the Aramites. Helmed by new editor Danton Walker, the *Review* published a series of articles extolling the virtues of their new president. Writing about their annual dinner, which had been dedicated in honor to the Chief, Walker praised the Aramites for their Chief's victory, writing, "They have had abiding confidence in his future. They have never lost faith that some day he would arrive in the seat of the American mighty. They have proved themselves valiant crusaders in his cause…" Hoover's ascension only promised more to the Aramites, Walker continues, pointing to one of Hoover's first acts as president: the opening of a new information bureau within the Chamber of Commerce Building to "give direction to incoming Aramites."[331] The

[330] *ARA Association Review*, February, 1929, "The Victory Number"
[331] "On the Annual Dinner" by Danton Walker in *ARA Association Review* July, 1929, "The Hay-Fever Number." The title of this issue, "The Hay-Fever Number" is an oblique reference to how the ARA Association imagined their past work. Walker writes later in the issue, speaking of the illness, "Relief (though not a cure) may be obtained through certain healing ointments, but the treatments "must be carried on at home, or at business, by the patient himself." Just like this treatment, their humanitarian relief could cure Europe, but it could provide the tools for the continent to cure itself.

conclusion of the dinner held an even greater surprise. The ARA Association had been awarded several dozen tickets to attend the inaugural reception at the White House, which they raffled off, another gift of largesse from their lofty benefactor.

The *Review* then capped its issue off with a firsthand account of one of the lucky raffle winners, Arnold E. Rattray. In thorough detail, Rattray recounts the shock and surprise of his cab driver when he ordered a trip to the White House, the delight of the guests when he announced his connections with the Chief, and the awe of seeing his leader gracing the party. Remembering what another guest said to him, Rattray recalls, "I have seen Mr. Coolidge; his greeting was cold; Wilson was not much better. But Hoover reminds me of Roosevelt, a president who greeted people with a warm kind word, a hearty handshake and many times by slapping his callers over the shoulders. The Hoovers will be extremely popular in the White House."[332] Of course, that popularity did not last as long as Rattray, or any Aramite, would have imagined. When the stock market crashed, it not only smeared Hoover's reputation and presaged the Great Depression, it also rocked the previously solid and cohesive Aramite community carefully built and maintained by the *Review*. Over the following three years, the ARA Association fractured in disagreement and the usually congenial pages of the *Review* began playing host to a variety of disputes and arguments over the cause of the crisis. Their long-sought moment of glory, when Hoover seized the presidency, had come crashing down upon their heads.

The first two years after the crash seemed innocuous in the *Review*. Ironically, Walker titled the February, 1930 issue, "S.O.S. Number," not in reference to emergency that had occurred in their nation, but in reference to a call for submissions for subsequent issues. Writing only a month or so after the crash, Walker largely writes off any long-term effects in his

[332] "The Thrill that Comes Once in a Lifetime" by Arnold E. Rattray in *ARA Association Review*, July, 1929, "The Hay-Fever Number."

editorial, "It was inevitable, ere the reverberations had died away, the moralists would be drawing painful lessons from the big crash. And so, in righteous, if belated, indignation, they did… We take no stock in these admonitions." These "moralists," mostly made up of scurrilous Democrats in his eyes, had little knowledge of economic matters, only a desire to tear down their betters. Walker ultimately blames what he characterizes as an American national ethos of trust. "We are a trusting people. We love our rose-colored glasses, and we cling to our Santa Claus complex. While we are not so naïve as to believe, with the once-secretary of State Seward, that our government is "the purest, the best, the wisest, and the happiest in the world," it has always had our affection and our respect, and most of the time our confidence. Let us become thoroughly cynical once and see what happens!"[333] By the following year, Walker had changed his tone very little, despite worsening economic conditions around the country. He continues in another editorial, "After reading up quite a bit, it seems to us that in plain language we simply got ahead of ourselves; kidding ourselves into believing we were a lot richer than we were…"[334] The economic recession, in Walker's eyes, would present little challenge for their Chief to solve. By January of 1932, the cracks began to show. The first issue of 1932, published right after the New Year, began with an obvious difference: as opposed to being printed and bound, the issue had been typewritten and only contained a few short articles. One of these, "Taking in Some Short Positions" by Harold Fleming, offered a fiery editorial on the problems facing the United States. Fleming began by criticizing intellectuals and economists for starting the crash, regarding them as "men who promise everything to everyone." Instead of following intellectuals, Fleming posited a new system of governance: appointed technocratic men would manage aspects of the economy, as opposed to the free-for-all of elections. In Fleming's eyes, the government should

[333] "Editorial" by Danton Walker, *ARA Association Review* February, 1930, "S.O.S. Number."
[334] "Editorial" by Danton Walker, *ARA Association Review* February, 1931, "The Apple Number."

have a direct hand in managing the economy and allow businesses to thrive within this purview. He continues, writing that government failed by not understanding the economy and "thinking about it scientifically. If we took the laws of gravity as we take the laws of economics, we would all lie down!"[335] While Fleming's desire for the scientization of government did not fall out of line with Hooverian principles, the fundamental faith of Fleming in the government's ability to manage economic crisis belied a massive shift in the ARA consensus on their own history. Whereas Hoover had categorized the ARA's most important attribute as being its private, voluntarist nature, Fleming instead believed that the government had not only a right, but also a duty to manage the economy.

Budget problems compelled Fleming's jeremiad to remain unanswered for a good portion of the year. By October the ARA Association had recouped enough of its financial losses to publish another issue—this time printed and bound. Several contributions in the October issue echoed Fleming's anger and desire for change, with one contribution even offering the thought that the Russians may have been on to something with their own revolution, suggesting a turn of support for America's Socialist Party.[336] Another contributor opined in his title, "Is Democracy Outworn?".[337] In a lengthy editorial response to the questions and criticisms of Fleming and the other contributors, Walker largely disregards their assessments, writing that Fleming's idea of appointing technocratic men to manage the government is "interesting but inconclusive," and that "the remedy, we should say, lies not in discarding the vote but in educating the voter." He similarly dismisses the Socialist Party as "a group of ineffectual malcontents." Having initially blamed America's natural trustworthiness, Walker changes his account: blaming the Gold

[335] "Taking in Some Short Positions" by Harold Fleming, *ARA Association Review* January, 1932 "Red-Ink Number."
[336] "Testimonials" in *ARA Association Review*, October, 1932, "New-Era Number."
[337] "Is Democracy Outworn" by Donald Lowrie. *ARA Association Review*, October, 1932, "New-Era Number."

Standard, international credit, and even prohibition in a wide-ranging narrative. Despite his scattershot approach to blame, Walker did agree with Fleming on one single point, writing, "the debacle in which the world now finds itself shows how badly needed is more power of supervision of the political over the economic side of government… after all, money is our servant, not our master."[338] This new consensus revealed the deep shift that had occurred over the years following the great crash. While the Aramites had supported Hoover's bid for the presidency, few found their way into government work, or thought much of the government as an apparatus of economic control. While Hoover's beneficence as Secretary of Commerce and President certainly helped many careers in the ARA Association, much of the organization had remained dedicated to Hoover's founding message of private citizenship and business as the keys to success.

1932 heralded a new year for the nation with Hoover's defeat in November to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, largely on the back of Roosevelt's powerful articulation of the need for the U.S. state to intervene in economic matters. While Hoover's election had been met with great praise and contributions in the *Review*, Roosevelt and his New Deal hardly get a mention in the first issue of 1933. Switching over to a yearly issue rather than quarterly, the 1933 *Review* saw old editor Sidney Brooks return for an issue on the ten-year anniversary of the ARA completing its overseas work. Instead of talking about the current political or economic predicament, as Walker had largely used his editorial space, Brooks instead ceded much of his editorial to a series of "testimonials" from Aramites. In his short opener, Brooks praised the association for staying strong in the shifting political winds of the time, commenting that he had received hundreds of testimonials. While it is difficult to know how Brooks parsed through these contributions, most of the published testimonials call for their fellows to run for political office.

[338] "Editorial" by Danton Walker, October, 1932, "New-Era Number."

Former ARA statistician Lincoln Hutchinson commented, "The ARA Association is made up of men who have learned something of the world and its problems through personal experience. Though small in number, we are strong in unity and spirit. By keeping our heads in this time of crisis, we may be able to do much to help save our country from panicky experimentation." In another letter, one-time ARA executive Geroge Barr Baker opined that the nation might need for the Aramites to serve again, writing, "The world was a mess in 1923. The world is in a mess in 1933." In his own concluding testimonial, Brooks offered a grim, if vague, account of politics in the nation, "Radicals are active in their trade unions and industrial centers and mine fields. Radicals are systematically boring into the national guard and into American Federation labor unions." The Aramites could be an ultimate bulwark against this type of radical change, Brooks continued, "ARA men have been through all this abroad, on the ground or close to events, and have seen the consequences, either bad or the worst, of such conditions and such tendencies. If there is any body of men who should think of these things and is capable of seeing them clearly, it is this body."[339] Continuing on the new consensus of the earlier year, Brooks' 1933 issue both exalted the past of the ARA and called for its members to be active in the future.

Brooks' and his fellows' exhortation continued in the following years as young firebrand Harold Fleming took the reins of the *Review* from Danton Walker.[340] Fleming remained at the helm of the *Review* for the next decade, the longest tenure of any editor. While his editorials over the years rarely matched the passion of his first contributions to the *Review*, his principles in guiding the journal stayed largely the same; he imagined the ARA Association as a group of scientific, technocratic men who needed to get involved in politics in order to salvage the country

[339] "Testimonials" *ARA Association Review*, December, 1933, "Ten Years After."
[340] Walker did continue to edit one more issue of the *Review* in 1935, but "The Personnel Number" contained no editorials, contributions, or articles, only an extended "Who's Where" section. In a later editorial, Fleming admits that, to his own knowledge at least, he was actually the youngest member of the ARA Association, having only been 22 when he served in Russia as an aid distributor.

and the world. His first issue as editor, in 1934, exemplified this goal. The first piece in the journal, written by Fleming himself and titled "The Need for Iron Men," starts with a straightforward call to action. Although the association may have broken from an earlier consensus on the role of government vis a vis large economic action, the majority of the Aramites remained stalwart Republicans. Instead of blaming Roosevelt the Democrats, Fleming cast blame for the party's current failings on "the unimaginative reactionaries of the Grand Old Party." To Fleming the solution seemed obvious: the Republican Party needed an infusion of "Iron Men," the men of the ARA. In this case, "Iron Men" meant not only men of strong will and moral fiber, but men with technical expertise in managing large-scale enterprises. Offering a series of remedies for the ailing economy largely focused on stabilizing credit expansion, Fleming commented that his propositions "lack dramatic value. It is as un-emotional as the adjustment of a carburetor, and as free of moral indignation. But if the solution is to be found in the heat of emotion, the Communist solution is a natural and the Republicans have nothing on the ball at all."[341] True solutions to economic issues, Fleming concludes, lie in cold reason, not emotion and passion. Notably, Fleming makes no reference to voluntarism in his editorial. Retaining the dedication to logistics, Fleming began to discard a central aspect of Hoover's narrative of the organization. This would continue over the subsequent issues.

By 1936, it seems that Fleming's encouragement had reaped some rewards. In an article titled "Let's Look At Us," Fleming recounts the growing list of achievements and honors in the Aramite community. In addition to the normal slew of engineers, scientists, journalists, and authors, Fleming pays special attention to a growing community of politicians. Fleming queries, "Did you know what an extraordinarily large number of our membership played important political roles or occupied governmental positions of weight and dignity?" The ARA Association

[341] "The Need for Iron Men" by Harold Fleming, *ARA Association Review*, July, 1934 "The Editors' Number."

hosted, in Fleming's words, two congressmen, two ex-Governors, a New York assemblyman, and soon-to-be senator Robert Taft. He continues, "The list of appointed public servants is even longer, and hence, more imposing." Ranging from a former Under-Secretary of State, to ministers to Japan, Brazil, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, among many others, the association's number even included an ex-Governor General of the Philippines.[342] Fleming also writes that a few of the association's number have sought to reach the public, "…in a more subtle and less conspicuous way. ARA men have gone heavily into the business of publicity, or if you don't like it, "propaganda."…Colonel Krueger is in charge of the Division of Naturalized Citizens of the eastern headquarters of the Republican National Committee and Sidney Brooks is temporarily assisting him as editor; John Gregg and Freddy Lyons are acting as field agents…Ray Mayer commutes from his office…to his duties at the Republican National Committee headquarters in Chicago." Having extolled the virtues of those who had already begun to serve, Fleming concludes by saying that he views the *Review* not as a place to articulate his own politics, but rather to reflect the collected vision of the ARA Association. To that point, he comments, "the membership in this organization, it can safely be stated…is very safely in the Republican bag for a long time to come." Despite this fact, Fleming writes that he imagines the *Review* as largely apolitical. "An astonishingly large number of the membership take some active part in the political life of the country, and it may be a relief to them to belong to one organization which

[342] A full list of the men in politics are as follows; elected men: Charles M. Bakewell, Congressman from Connecticut; John B. Hollister, Congressman from Ohio; James P. Goodrich, ex-Governor of Indiana; H.N. Spaulding, ex-Governor of New Hampshire; Laurens M. Hamilton, Assemblyman from New York; Robert A. Taft, ex-Speaker of the Senate of Ohio. And the appointed men: William R. Castle, former Under-Secretary of State; Robert W. Bliss, special Ambassador to Japan; Dwight F. Davis, Ex-Governor General of the Philippine Islands; Franklin W. Fort, ex-Congressman from New Jersey; Hugh Gibson, ex-Ambassador to Brazil; Leland Harrison, former Minister to Sweden and Uruguay; Henry L. Stimson, former Secretary of State; Gilchrist B. Stockton, former Minister to Austria; Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, former Secretary of Commerce; J. Butler Wright, Minister to Czechoslovakia; Frederic M. Sackett, ex-Senator from Kentucky.

has no official politics…"[343] No official politics, however, did not mean no official ideology. Instead of supporting a specific party, Fleming remained dedicated to an ideal of the ARA Association as a group of men dedicated to technical expertise and scientific practice rather than a party line. Most likely practical in a political space dominated by New Deal Democrats, Fleming's technically focused approach also served to smooth over any remaining political tensions among the Aramites. By removing explicit politics from the pages of the *Review*, Fleming sought to situate the journal as above petty politics, instead focusing on objective, technical truths.

The Great Depression caused great turmoil in the nation, but it also fractured a consensus started by Hoover and carefully maintained over the years by the *Review*: that private, voluntarist aid served as the best means to rehabilitate and build an economy. Instead of continuing to embrace Hoover's vision of the ARA community as a group of private American citizens fixing the world's economy through efficiency, Fleming's *Review* pushed the Aramites towards even greater involvement in the government, but with an intensive focus on scientific skills and technical expertise. By focusing on the ARA veterans as "technical men," Fleming urged the Aramites towards public service as a means to downplay political disagreements within the community. As Europe once again erupted into conflict, the Aramites quickly took up positions of leadership in America's growing bureaucratic state. Hoover remained "the Chief" to the Aramites, but he would no longer be the final arbiter of American relief abroad for the community he founded.

State of Relief

[343] "Let's Talk About Us" by Harold Fleming, *ARA Association Review* November, 1936, "Who's Who Number."

The advent of war in Europe in 1939 brought a renewed interest in the *Review*. Between 1939 and 1941 Fleming only published two issues of the journal, but the pages of both were rife with praise and congratulations for the work of the association. In an editorial from January of 1941, Fleming laid out the problems and potential promises of the conflict overseas. He asserted, "Less than 25 years have passed since the end of the war, less than 20 years since the end of the feeding. Yet Europe is again under arms, and Hunger again is King." Faced with famine and starvation in Europe, Fleming saw no better saviors than the Aramites, continuing, "Yet hope springs eternal, and so does the instinct of mutual aid. The desire to rescue the perishing, to extend a helping hand to the victims of war, is as old as war itself." In Fleming's estimation, the ARA community's expertise with food would not only be necessary for relieving the war but also in stymying the growth of tyranny. He goes on to say, "A lot of people seem to think that if a people is starved far enough it will revolt. This notion seems to be derived from the revolutionary strategy and technic of a generation ago…But today the argument works around the other way. Old and weak governments can be shed during hunger; new, strong, and ruthless governments can capitalize hunger for their own ends."[344] While the association had largely shed Hoover's ideal of private action, they retained their expertise and direction from the past decades, particularly in the administration of food distribution.

Reinvigorated in the political sphere, the members of the ARA Association also refreshed their connections with each other. In a subsequent issue, Fleming remarked, "We are astonished this year at the volume of material that has flowed into us for the Who's Where columns of this Review. We do not know why, but this year you members have been responsive as never before to our editorial appeals…there are more entries than we have ever had before." The war could be

[344] "Editorial" by Harold Fleming, *ARA Association Review*, January, 1941, "The Minute-Man Number."

the only cause for this, in Fleming's mind. He explored, "Perhaps the answer is that the last year has brought Europe closer to us than it has been since actual ARA operations ceased…One of our members, Ron Allen, is back in Moscow. Others are travelling or stationed in out of the way places unfamiliar to most Americans but well known to Aramites. And their missions are active ones, more like those of the old days than like any since 1923." The association took particular notice of conflicts and devastation in their former zones of relief, "It looks like a long war, and a bitter war, and a war which will leave devastation and starvation over the entire sweep of territories once covered by the agencies headed by the Chief." Despite the lack of long-term prosperity in these places, though, Fleming concluded his editorial with hope: the ARA could solve this problem again, writing, "Washington is more studded than ever with ARA members."[345] Not only did the Aramites have the technical expertise to administer relief, Fleming closed, they were in the right place to do it: the government.

Rather than a turning point, Pearl Harbor only served to intensify the pattern already at play. Following the U.S. declaration of war, even more Aramites converged on Washington, occupying key roles in the wartime effort. Due to the *Review*'s irregular publishing schedule, Fleming did not release another issue until almost a year after the attacks at Pearl Harbor. He comments in his editorial, wryly, "This is probably the last magazine in the United States to be bringing out its first issue since Pearl Harbor. It is a little late to comment on that curtain-raising event, but we can report that its effect on the membership of the ARA association has been electrical." This electrical effect took the form of new civil servants as well as promotions and advancements. Specifically, "Scores have been drawn to Washington as to a suddenly polarized magnet; other scores have joined the armed services of the United States; still other scores have been catapulted upward in rank or scattered from hell to breakfast in the far-flung military, naval,

[345] "Editorial" by Harold Fleming, *ARA Association Review* December, 1941, "M-Day Number."

and diplomatic services of the United States." Fleming contends that the Aramites would not only be useful for their technical expertise, but also their experience. He concludes in his editorial, "official knowledge of what Aramites did 20-25 years ago seems to be nil."[346] To remedy this, the old ARA hands needed to deploy their unique logistical knowledge in positions within the government. In an exhaustive editorial, Fleming lists every member he was aware of in the ARA Association who had taken up work in the wartime government. Aramites had assumed key positions in the US Army, the State Department, the Board of Economic Warfare, the Red Cross, and, to Fleming's delight, "the biggest haul of ARA names" were in the War Production Board (WPB), responsible for converting America's industries to manage war needs.[347] In stark contrast to their work during World War I, the majority of the Aramites would be managing and transporting the weapons of war, rather than food and relief. That this passes with no special comment, indeed Fleming thought this perfectly normal, demonstrates the enduring power of the narrative initiated and maintained by the *Review:* the ARA had been a logistics organization, relief had only been incidental.

While tracing the actions of each individual Aramite engaged in wartime operations, from relief to production management, would be difficult (and lengthy) the actions of one

[346] "Editorial" by Harold Fleming, *ARA Association Review* December, 1942, "War Number."
[347] Fleming spends several pages listing Aramites involved in government work. A truncated list of the key members is as follows: Army: Adjutant general of the Army, James Ulio; Executive officer of Air Corps Intelligence, Merian Cooper; Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, Harvey Bundy; Director General of the Army Specialist Corps, Dwight Davis. War Production Board: Office of Director of Industry Operations, Sidney Brooks; Finance Division members Gordon Brown and Tommy Burland; Combined Production and Resources Board Member John Gregg; Director of "Combined Raw Materials Board" William Batt tasked with handling "over-all policy allocation of critical materials to Army, Navy, and Maritime Lease-lend, and BEW."; Chief of the Bureau of Finance, Bradley Nash. State Department: Edward Eyre Hunt as Assistant Director of OFFRO; Fred Exton as head of Arms Shipments at the State Department; Raymond Geist has head of the Division of Commercial Affairs at the State Department. Board of Economic Warfare; Colonel Poland and Jim Foley as Special Investigators; Colonel Lord as assistant director, charged with "the functions and responsibility for the proper control of goods, other than arms, ammunition, and implements of war, leaving the United States." Red Cross: Maurice Pate in charge of the War Prisoners' Department; George MacDonald in charge of War Prisoners packages; Van Arsdale Turner as head of the Communications Department; Ted Sabine as head of the Personnel Department. Other Agencies: Elbert Baldwin at Lease-Lend agency; OPA Chief of Drugs, Chemicals, and Health Supplies, Frank Delgado; Arthur Ringland with the President's Committee on Relief Administration.

individual in particular highlight the changed nature of the ARA Association by World War II. Edward Eyre Hunt, who had previously received an appointment to the Committee on Elimination of Waste in Industry from Hoover in 1922, charted a slightly different trajectory from other Aramites in the interwar years. After serving on Hoover's committee, Hunt became a noted author on scientific management principles, coal industry management, and national economics. He continued his career in public service in 1930 when he received another appointment from the Chief, this time as Secretary of the President's Emergency Committee for Employment. Although he served the government, Hunt remained dedicated to promoting private business interests, much like the rest of the ARA Association. After Hoover left the presidency, Hunt returned to publishing. When the U.S. declared war, however, Hunt became a key player in managing and defining America's wartime relief practices: first as Chief Industrial Economist of the War Production Board and later, in 1943, as Assistant Director of Field Operations for the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFFRO). In the early stages of the war, Hunt reconnected with his erstwhile comrades on the War Production Board. In his account of the days preparing to go overseas, Hunt commented "[The United States] had taken no official steps toward setting up either a food administration or a relief administration…" Using his connections with the Aramites on the WPB, Hunt convinced OFFRO to use the WPB as a source of stockpiled food, leading to the establishment of the Food Requirements Committee, which would provide millions of dollars' worth of relief goods for UNRRA. [49] In OFFRO, and its successor organization UNRRA, Hunt would go on to play a crucial role in connecting the managers of wartime relief with those who had experience from World War I. Hunt's work in UNRRA will be a focal point of the next chapter. Some members of the ARA had stayed active within the humanitarian community, these Aramites quickly joined state relief

organizations like OFRRO; however, the vast majority had shifted their focus away from humanitarian work towards logistics and planning techniques.[348] No longer disciples of voluntarism, the Aramites joined the U.S. state apparatus willingly, seeking to use their hard-won logistical skills to help the military.

Conclusion

In the space of two decades, thousands of men who had served under a voluntarist mandate to conduct humanitarian operations abroad—including hundreds who had gained enormous private discretionary authority in Russia—joined the growing bureaucratic humanitarian state under Franklin D. Roosevelt with hardly a second thought. This change had been long in the making, of course. At the start of the ARA Association, the Aramite's Chief, Herbert Hoover, had neatly excised the expansive humanitarian vision of the ARA in Russia in favor of a narrative of the ARA that cast the organization solely as a logistical system that had rehabilitated Europe's economy. Out of the conflict and fracture of the Wall Street crash and the Great Depression, the *ARA Association Review* charted a new course forward for the Aramite community. In the light of the massive economic failings of the United States, private citizens and voluntarist organizations could not be the solution to widespread financial disaster. Instead the *Review*, under Fleming, built a new conception of the ARA community: a group of technical "Iron Men" who solved problems scientifically. These new men willingly flocked to Washington to become the leaders and managers of America's bureaucracy in a time of war. ARA alumni

[348] Maurice Pate and William Hallam Tuck, two important members of the ARA community, continued to engage in international humanitarian projects during the interwar years, albeit in roles that focused heavily on logistics and transportation. Their work will be touched on in Chapter Six.

would continue to operate in refugee aid, reconstruction projects, and humanitarian relief campaigns well into the second half of the twentieth century, but they no longer laid claim to voluntarist ideology espoused by their Chief. They no longer claimed that private control over economic rehabilitation could be the only path towards reconstruction. A long process of politics, mythology-building, and financial ruin had removed global economic reconstruction, in their mind, from the purview of voluntarist organizations. That problem now belonged to the state. And the Aramites, fractured by economic depression but brought together by war, now sought to serve the state proudly.

Chapter 6

"We Failed Once, We Dare Not Fail Again:" UNRRA, Expertise, and the Legacies of Refugee Relief

Over the course of World War II, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) produced a series of videos championing its work in Europe. Like most wartime propaganda, these films are self-congratulatory and simplistic. However, they also reveal some of the anxieties and ambitions that drove UNRRA over the course of their work. A 1944 video, "In the Wake of Armies" details UNNRA's vision of the historical precedents for their work. The film begins with a short history of the organization, highlighting the corrupting power of fascism and how UNRRA's aid would rehabilitate the destroyed countries of Europe. This video offers a longer narrative of global history, claiming that Allied humanitarianism after World War I contributed to the rise of fascism in Europe. Over a wide panning shot of the League of Nations headquarters, a voiceover booms, "In the tragic days of 1918 the Allied Relief Administration faced the task of rehabilitation after WWI. This body of which the small and defeated nations had no working part, provided relief for Europe's starving millions on the principle of well-intentioned philanthropy." Although well-intentioned, this philanthropy, "failed to recognize the dangers implicit in bread without jobs. In relief without rehabilitation. Embittered Europeans remember Allied charity as a symbol of their defeat and humiliation as individuals. It remained only for men like Hitler to exploit that bitterness on a national scale for their political ends."[349] This historical narrative pervaded their films. The following year, shortly

[349] "In the Wake of Armies" is narrated by Lorne Greene, the eventual star of Bonanza and Battlestar Galactica. See "U.N.N.R.A. Presents: In the Wake of the Armies…" Produced by the National Film Board, Canada. 1944.

after the end of the war, UNRRA produced "Now--the Peace." This film highlighted the potential pitfalls of a new reconstruction project in Europe, claiming that hunger and disease were so widespread in war-torn Europe that many could easily return to fascism. The most in danger, the film posits, were the displaced people under UNRRA's care. A voiceover declares, "UNRRA is grappling with an even greater problem: the care of some 20 million people whom the tide of war has swept from hearth and home." UNRRA maintained that liberal internationalism, however, would eventually win the day. The narrator also states, "And throughout the camps set up to house these men and women there has swept, as if by magic, that forward-looking sprit which turns each canvas town into a self-governing community preparing its citizens for the day when they will take their place in the new community of nations."[350] Although couched in the language of propaganda, these films reveal the anxieties and logics of the United Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. These twin narratives articulate UNRRA's goals of relief and moral uplift, intertwined with the organization's reservations about displaced people as potentially dangerous.

This chapter traces how decades of American humanitarian policy and practice informed the work of UNRRA during World War II, and how the organization came to see refugees as vessels for Allied hopes and fears. As explained in the previous chapters, American humanitarian organizations continued to refine theories and practices of relief, rehabilitation, and refugee management into the interwar years. "Now--The Peace" claims that humanitarianism after World War I, at best, relieved a small amount of suffering and, at worst, contributed to the rise of fascism. Historians have adapted parts of this narrative into their accounts of early Cold War

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UNRRA's wartime films have been digitized by the Indiana University Media Collections Archive, and can be accessed here: https://media.dlib.indiana.edu/media_objects/jh343s46b

[350] "Now--the Peace" Produced by the National Film Board, Canada. 1944.

internationalism, positing that the humanitarian institutions of the interwar years laid little foundation for the global initiatives of organizations like UNRRA and the United Nations.[351] However, this narrative obscures the ways that UNRRA drew its staff from humanitarian networks established in the wake of World War I and how the administration shaped its policies around rehabilitation techniques emerging from Progressive Era relief organizations. When UNNRA formed in 1943, leaders in the organization initiated a series of historical studies to analyze the work of earlier humanitarian organizations and how UNRRA could adapt their policies and techniques in the 1940s. Personnel played an enormous role in this process—UNRRA recruited heavily from the networks of humanitarian workers who had worked in Europe and the Middle East after World War I. One of these workers, Edward Eyre Hunt from the ARA, served as a critical link to the past in the organization. UNRRA relied on Hunt to condense and distill the techniques and practices from earlier decades. In its relief and rehabilitation practices, UNRRA implemented a wide variety of programs informed by Hunt's analysis, emphasizing both economic self-sufficiency and moral uplift as the goal of short-term relief. UNNRA's emphasis on fostering independence all drew from humanitarian logics refined in the interwar years by organizations like Near East Foundation and the American Relief Administration.

[351] For examples of this grand historical narratives that decenters World War I and the interwar years see Amos Yoder, *The Evolution of the United Nations System* , 2nd edn (Taylor & Francis, 1993). For more sophisticated versions of this narrative, see e.g. Akira Ariye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore, 1997); Zara Steiner, *The Lights that Failed: European International History, 1919–1933* (Oxford, 2005). For a more thorough historiographical review of how this mode of thinking became so dominant in scholarship see, Jessica Reinisch, "Internationalism in Relief: The Birth (and Death) of UNRRA" *Past & Present* 210:6 (2011), Pages 258–289. For an exampl of this phenomenon in another subfield see Patricia Clavin, *Securing the World Economy: The Reinvention of the League of Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). Clavin argues that economists and economic historians have largely ignored the interwar work of the League of Nations due to an overwhelming emphasis within the field on World War II as the critical moment that reshaped economic history. A similar process occurred within the history of humanitarianism, where a first generation of scholars minimized the importance of crucial information networks established in the wake of World War I.

The Allied nations designed UNRRA to be an organization for global rehabilitation. In practice, this ambition often fell behind military priorities. UNRRA primarily interacted with postwar Europe and the Middle East through the management of refugee camps. UNRRA helped administer hundreds of Displaced Persons (DP) camps, funneling millions of refugees through their camps in the wake of the advancing Allied armies.[352] Informed by the techniques and practices of earlier humanitarian organizations, UNRRA directed DP camps with varied measures of paternalism and logistical efficiency, focused on "dispersing" refugees by any means possible. Many of these refugees came to be seen by UNRRA workers as potential threats, people who had been morally eradicated by the cruel policies of Nazi Germany. At UNRRA headquarters, diverging theories on how to manage refugees resulted in repeated clashes between administrators that sought to create new, globalized resettlement plans and others who deferred to national sovereignty. Organizational breakdown and personnel difficulties eventually forced UNRRA to transfer the remaining millions of displaced persons into the care of the newly created International Refugee Organization (IRO). Helmed by William Hallam Tuck, a former ARA manager and longtime confidant of Herbert Hoover, the IRO instituted rigorous, logistical methods to identify, categorize, and resettle refugees intermixed with programs to "morally uplift" refugees and make them self-sufficient. Although UNRRA only existed for a few years, it had an enormous effect on the lives of millions of people in Europe and the Middle East.[353] Its dissolution would also lead to the formation of the modern humanitarian world order. The after-effects of the massive wartime mobilization of humanitarian

[352] To UNRRA, displaced persons were strictly defined as, "civilians outside of the national boundaries of their country by reason of war who are desirous of but unable to return home without assistance." Administrative Memo from the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) "On Displaced Persons and Refugees" Reel 2. Records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Columbia University.

[353] This chapter employs the term "Middle East" in the place of "Eastern Mediterranean." This is in recognition of changing patterns of terminology among humanitarian actors, UNRRA geographically categorized its "Middle East" projects along the same lines as contemporary mapping.

networks that spawned UNRRA were felt for decades resulting in programs ranging from the embedding of logistics into the White House to the creation of longstanding humanitarian aid and development agencies.

The Precedent of American Relief

At the signing of the treaty that created UNRRA on November 9th, 1943 newly named Director-General Herbert Lehman issued a dire warning to the Allied leaders in the room. He cautioned, "We have been called upon twice within this span of a lifetime to devise a peace in which all men can live in freedom from fear and from want. We failed once, we dare not fail again."[354] From UNRRA's inception, its leaders repeatedly reiterated the historical significance of their work, especially in relation to the perceived failures of their predecessor organizations. However, from its organization to its staffing, UNRRA relied on U.S. humanitarian networks that had been organized in the interwar years. Although titled the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, UNRRA predated the founding of the United Nations by two years, instead the administration was started by the Allied powers, which U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt had termed "the United Nations."

Although UNRRA employed staff from a variety of countries, most staff on the ground and in the administrative hierarchy were American. This disparity in national personnel resulted from UNRRA's absorption of an American aid agency created a year earlier In 1942, the Allied invasion of North Africa prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt to create a state-sponsored

[354] *First Session of the Council of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944)

American relief organization to administer aid to territories occupied by the U.S. military, resulting in the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO). Roosevelt named Herbert Lehman, the governor of New York and a close ally of the president, as Director-General of OFRRO and placed the organization within the State Department.[355] Although housed within the State Department, OFRRO existed separately from the U.S. diplomatic apparatus, Roosevelt directed the organization to function as an interagency program, designed to move between the various wartime bureaucracies established in the preceding years.[356] Immediately after its founding, OFRRO clashed with clashed with other wartime agencies, especially the Office of Foreign Economic Coordination (OFEC), Lend-Lease Administration, and the Board of Economic Warfare (BEW), as well as the State Department proper. Roosevelt had tasked OFRRO with managing America's relief supplies and preparing for operations in reconstruction overseas. Lehman immediately set out to procure the goods needed for relief. He quickly ran afoul of the rapidly growing wartime apparatus. OFEC claimed control over all non-military goods that would be sent overseas, limiting Lehman's purchasing power. Additionally, the State Department claimed that it had sole authority over "providing for the transportation and distribution of supplies." Secretary of State Cordell Hull wrote to the president, arguing that "relief and rehabilitation represented but one segment of our total foreign policy and that responsibility for total coordination was, in his opinion, properly place in the Department of State."[357] Without power to procure or distribute, Lehman questioned Roosevelt over the purpose of OFRRO.[358] A series of increasingly hostile meetings between the leaders of the agencies

[355] Lehman resigned as governor of New York to accept the position less than one month before his term ended.
[356] For a full acount of these interdepartmental conflicts see *The United States at War: Development and Administration of the War Program by the Federal Government* (Washington D.C., Bureau of Budgets, 1946), 415-421.
[357] Ibid., 420.
[358] Ibid., 419.

resulted, in June of 1942, to OFRRO being relegated solely to the nebulous role of "planning."[359] Only the founding of UNRRA months later would allow Lehman to finally coordinate purchasing and implement distribution.

In 1943, after the Soviet victory at Stalingrad, the Allied powers convened a meeting to formalize a global rehabilitation organization to plan for post-war reconstruction, resulting in the creation of UNRRA. In November of 1943, the U.S. transferred OFRRO into the new administration, transplanting its American staff and organizational structure. Herbert Lehman remained director of the new organization, with a coterie of other political insiders from Roosevelt's circles around him. Lehman and the other directors organized UNRRA into "Bureaus," each of which claimed ownership over some part of the relief and rehabilitation process, from refugees to transportation to social welfare. Although it only had limited powers before being absorbed into UNRRA the following year, OFRRO set some important foundations for how the administration would eventually be organized. As gestured to in the previous chapter, Edward Eyre Hunt and the War Production Board, (WPB) heavily staffed by former members of the American Relief Administration, played a crucial role in the creation of food and aid stockpiles that would eventually form the core of UNRRA's relief distribution network. The WPB directed millions of dollars' worth of excess goods from military stockpiles to OFEC. These stockpiles would be absorbed into UNRRA the following year.[360] As Assistant Director of OFRRO, Hunt implemented personnel requirements and organizational charts, embedding the institutional logics of the American Relief Administration into the international organization. Drawing from his experience in the ARA, Hunt created three "classes" of workers within the organization: full-time professional workers; local agents hired to distribute goods; and non-

[359] Ibid., 419.
[360] "Relief Needs and Programs" by Edward Eyre Hunt, May 1944. Box 6, Folder – European Relief. Edward Eyre Hunt Papers.

agency personnel under the supervision of OFRRO. These organizational policies of OFRRO would be replicated almost exactly in UNRRA, where they would become Class I, II, and III personnel respectively.[361]

UNRRA began recruitment campaigns shortly after their incorporation. Although the organization represented all the Allied nations, the majority of UNRRA's workers came from the United States, with a significant minority from Britain. Similar to the American Relief Administration, UNRRA's hierarchy had two main levels: organizational management and distribution. UNRRA hired hundreds of Class I workers, many of them young and college-educated, to distribute food overseas. The managerial level drew the most heavily from interwar networks of humanitarians. UNRRA compiled a list of its managers with the most foreign policy experience, of the sixteen men listed, ten had worked either for the American Relief Administration or Near East Relief.[362] Young distributors during World War I, these humanitarians were now the managers and organizers of the World War II relief apparatus. A critical problem remained, however. UNRRA soon set up the European Regional Office (ERO) in London to facilitate easier access for their relief work. With Europe still a warzone, however, UNRRA personnel could congregate in Britain but were unable to begin any serious relief operations. In the meantime, the organization turned to the past for examples and techniques

[361] Official UNRRA records detail the "classes" as follows:
Class 1: International employment.
Class 2: Local employees.
Class 3: Volunteers working full-time for an agency other than UNRRA.

[362] Of the sixteen men on the list, these ten had served in the ARA or NER:
ARA: Karl Borders, Spurgeon M. Keeny, Frank A. Delgado, and Edward Eyre Hunt
NER: John Cover, Lincoln D. Kelsey, Laird Archer, George Rooby, Carl G. Compton, Francis R. Appelbee
These men held posts in UNRRA ranging from the Chief of Requirements and Allocations in the Bureau of Supplies to UNRRA's Principal Transportation Officer. "Biographical Sketches of All UNRRA Personnel of Paygrade $7000 or Above: Foreign Policy Experience" Reel 17, Side 1. Papers of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

On the ground relief workers in UNRRA consistently marveled at the organization's novelty. One of these, American Susan Pettiss summarized this view, recounting after the war that UNRRA had been "a magnificent, unprecedented feat"[363] Among the administrators of UNRRA, however, their work had many precedents from which they were eager to learn. While the leaders of UNRRA debated with the military over the exact extent of their purview, the managers and organizers of the administration looked to past examples of humanitarian work for inspiration and guidance. In May of 1943, before the first official meeting of the UNRRA council, Lehman commissioned Roy Veatch, the Chief of the US Division of International Relations, to help UNRRA prepare material to inform the work of the administration. In a lengthy dispatch, Veatch informed Lehman of the progress he had been making, writing, "An effort is being made to make available useful materials on the past experience of governmental and private agencies."[364] Veatch tasked the Division of Studies and Progress Reports to "analyz[e] the experience of the American Relief Administration and of the Committee for Relief in Belgium which operated under Mr. Hoover during and following the last war," even sending researchers to the Hoover War Library that had been established at Stanford. UNRRA's historical exploration led to a wide variety of precedents ranging from how the ARA maintained a working relationship with the American Red Cross to how the Commission for Relief in Belgium paid its workers. Dr. Grace Fox, one of Veatch's researchers, pushed UNRRA to adopt the American Relief Administration's dedication to strict record-keeping and historical thinking, writing, "UNRRA might well adopt as basic to its record procedures the philosophy of history

[363] Susan T. Pettiss and Lynne Taylor, *After the Shooting Stopped: The Story of an UNRRA Welfare Worker in Germany, 1945–1947* (Trafford, 2004), 7. See also Jessica Reinisch, "Internationalism in Relief: The Birth (and Death) of UNRRA"

[364] Correspondence from Roy Veatch to Herbert Lehman, May 15, 1943. Reel 1, Side 1. Office of the Historian Records. Records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

embodied in the Hoover program."[365] UNRRA incorporated ARA methods into its most granular techniques: record-keeping.

The results of these historical studies were placed into the hands of Edward Eyre Hunt to condense and distill into workable information for UNRRA. Veatch continued in his letter to Lehman, "It will be his task to bring together materials on pertinent past experience, to draw up recommendations regarding the policy decisions covering this field which should be made by the Council of UNRRA..."[366] As the former Assistant Director of OFRRO, Hunt held an enormous amount of sway over the early organization of UNRRA, and his recommendations would shape the structure of the organization, shifting the administration's priorities towards logistics and managerial planning. Hunt prepared a lengthy memorandum entitled "Relief Needs and Programs," which would go on to directly inform UNRRA's program planning for their future work overseas.[367] Hunt's memo distilled the work of the ARA into the narrowed vision championed by the *ARA Association Review.* Hunt began, "it is good we have the experience of the first World War and its aftermath as examples," for they would go on to directly inform his recommendations. Europe, Hunt concluded, would be the greatest destination for UNRRA's relief efforts, not due to sympathy for the continent, but rather matters of logistics and planning. "The concentration of our attention on Europe is due to the enormous complexity of the transportation, storage, and distributing problems of the mother continent and its great distances from major sources of supply."[368] To respond to this logistical nightmare, Hunt, keeping in lines with his ARA roots, emphasized the need for the U.S. to continue stockpiling food and putting it

[365] Memorandum from Grace Fox to P.W. Kuo, "On the Relationships Between the American Red Cross and the American Relief Administration" October 19, 1944. Reel 1, Side 1. Secretariat Executive Office Records. Records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
[366] Correspondence from Roy Veatch to Herbert Lehman, May 15, 1943. Reel 1, Side 1. Office of the Historian Records. Records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
[367] "Relief Needs and Programs" by Edward Eyre Hunt, May 1944. Box 6, Folder – European Relief. Edward Eyre Hunt Papers.
[368] Ibid.

into the hands of UNRRA. Following a series of, in Hunt's eyes, disastrous policies by the Department of Agriculture encouraging farmers to sell excess food, "America had ceased to be an exporting nation and had become a food importer."[369] Even though Europe was heavily stockpiled, it was still "the most dependent on imported foodstuffs despite its formidable efforts at agricultural self-sufficiency." For UNRRA to be of any use in rehabilitating the continent, Hunt argued, the organization would need to focus its planning efforts on managing, "not human needs but geography, relative distances, accessibility to the source of supply, problems of ocean transport, rail and highway facilities, storage facilities, and organized agencies of distribution—these are what will determine who lives and who dies." In other words, planning should be focused around logistics and the creation of durable transportation networks. Following Hunt's recommendations, UNRRA engaged in a drawn-out conflict with Allied military forces over the organization's scope and responsibilities, with the administration insisting on having control over the transportation and distribution of its relief goods. The Allied armies, particularly the U.S. military, refused to allow UNRRA into military locations--where most of the relief work would likely occur. After lengthy debate, UNRRA signed a formal agreement with the U.S. military that would allow them to coordinate all relief aid in areas reclaimed by the Allied forces. UNRRA would get its first chance to implement relief policies not in Europe, as Hunt focused on, but in the Middle East.

MERRA to UNRRA

[369] Ibid.

Over the course of UNRRA's first year of operation, a series of internal conflicts within the administration over the proper methods of managing refugees would reveal differing visions over how international organizations should interact with nation-states. Soon after signing the treaty with the Allied armies, UNRRA established a base of operations in Europe—the European Regional Office in London. As Allied armies advanced into northern Africa and the Middle East, UNRRA confronted the possibility of potentially millions of people being displaced once the war reached Europe. UNRRA conceived of refugee work as central to its organizational mission. Although it had no sense of the exact scope of refugee management needs as global war raged on, the administration created the Bureau of Displaced Persons (BDP) to prepare for the eventuality of managing and resettling the millions of displaced persons, which they termed DPs, that would be created by war on the continent. Lehman named Fred Hoehler as the head of the BDP, empowering the bureau to requisition any materials it would need. Before entering into foreign aid, Hoehler had served as the president of the American Public Welfare Association, and social work principles informed his plans for administering DP camps.[370] As head of the Bureau of Displaced Persons, Hoehler consistently agitated for more authority and few layers of bureaucratic organization between him and Lehman.[371] One UNRRA historian characterized Hoehler's belief in the mission of refugee management, writing, "Hoehler saw the participation of UNRRA in the care and repatriation of displaced persons as an undertaking of great scope and

[370] Correspondence from Fred Hoehler to John Reynolds, October 15, 1942. Box 1, Folder – Correspondence and Papers, General, 1935-1943. Fred K. Hoehler Papers.

[371] While serving as the president American Public Welfare Association, Herbert Lehman offered Hoehler a position in OFRRO as the head of the North African Mission. Hoehler turned down the offer, citing his work in the United States as too important. Lehman offered the job to another man. In December, 1943 (shortly after UNRRA became incorporated) the man who took the position in OFRRO was killed in a plane crash caused by enemy fire en route to Algeria. The following week, Lehman pleaded for Hoehler to take the position, claiming he would be needed now more than ever. Hoehler accepted, going on to work as the head of OFRRO's North African Mission and then as the Chief of the London OFRRO Office before his appointment to the Bureau of Displaced Persons. For more on Hoehler's life before his work in UNRRA see "Wartime Journal" by Fred K. Hoehler. Box 94, Folder – OFRRO/UNRRA War-Time Journal. Fred K. Hoehler Papers

importance, second to no other phase of UNRRA's programs."[372] Working in the UNRRA European Regional Office (ERO) in London, Hoehler hired a small, decentralized staff and began planning for eventual DP operations. Changing events in the United States, however, necessitated his return to the American headquarters in Washington D.C. in March of 1944.

UNRRA's leadership agreed that managing refugees would be an important aspect of their postwar relief efforts, however another bureau within the organization sought to control the terms of refugee resettlement. The Bureau of Areas held a unique position within UNRRA. Separated from the other bureaus that focused on individual aspects of relief and rehabilitation, the Bureau of Areas consisted of "country desks" for each nation that UNRRA dealt with. Each other bureau would go through the individual country desk of the Bureau of Areas before proceeding with relief projects. This added layer of bureaucracy irked Hoehler who envisioned refugee resettlement as a global process rather than a national one. Hoehler believed that refugees left in the wake of the Allied advance should be given a choice of residence, a plan he developed in contrast to the ethnic separation after World War I.[373] The Bureau of Areas, in Hoehler's mind, embodied a rigidly nationalistic way of thinking that would result in refugees being left stranded in countries that might not reflect their values. A contemporary history of this conflict recounts, "[Hoehler] and his London deputy, Scott, viewed with alarm the growing tendency at Headquarters, championed by such 'professional administrators' as the Director General's Special Assistant, Hugh Jackson, 'to underplay the importance of the displaced persons problem'"[374] Jackson, one of Lehman's subordinates, supported the Bureau of Areas' plans for national rehabilitation on a case by case basis, and he pushed Lehman to reorganize

[372] "UNRRA Headquarters and the Displaced Persons Operations" by Dorothy K. Clark. Reel 13, Side 1. Office of the Historian Records. Records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.
[373] Ibid., 82.
[374] Ibid., 48.*

UNRRA to put the Bureau of Areas in charge of the BDP. These contrasting visions of global and national resettlement also had logistical features. The Bureau of Areas encouraged, what they termed, "speedy dispersal" of refugees—sending displaced people out of camps as quickly as possible to facilitate more efficient rehabilitation. Drawing from his welfare experience, Hoehler believed that refugees should be allowed agency in their movement, moving out of camps when they deemed fit.[375] These ideological and logistical disputes reached their zenith when UNRRA began its first relief projects and refugee camps in the spring of 1944.

The first refugee camps administered by UNRRA were not in Europe, where Lehman and Hoehler alike imagined the organization would be most present, but in the Middle East. In 1942, the British had established the Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration (MERRA) to deal with refugee flows out of Yugoslavia into British colonies in the Middle East. MERRA set up three camps in modern day Syria, each of which held thousands of Yugoslav refugees. Much like OFRRO, UNRRA absorbed the British transitioned the refugee camps set up by MERRA in May, 1944. This transition process received help from a network of humanitarian organizations operating in the Middle East, most notably the Near East Foundation. When Yugoslav refugees first arrived in Syria, the NEF coordinated with MERRA to build the refugee camps, implement social welfare programs, and initiate programs that would "cultivate local leadership" among the refugees.[376] The NEF also offered medical assistance and public health infrastructure: the organization remanded dozens of doctors and nurses to the camps, where they continued with many of the development-based projects they had begun implementing the decade before. The NEF's connections to the League of Nations Health Organization helped facilitate MERRA's

[375] Ibid., 96.*
[376] Correspondence from HB Allen, Director of Education for NEF, to Paul McCormick of UNRRA Welfare Division, September 11, 1945.

transfer to UNRRA by offering extensive data on health records.[377] Since the Allies had given UNRRA the power to coordinate all non-governmental relief agencies, the doctors and nurses of the Near East Foundation, trained over years of the foundation's public health engagement, transferred to UNRRA's control along with the MERRA camps.

At the headquarters in Washington, UNRRA leaders viewed this transition as the beginning of their long-planned operations. On the urging of his Special Assistant Hugh Jackson, Lehman assigned the management of the former MERRA camps to the Bureau of Areas rather than to Hoehler's division on the logic that the BDP had not yet fully prepared for the scope of European refugee needs. Jackson recounted this process, writing, "Of the bureaus or divisions to which this unit might logically be attached, the Bureau of Areas is most fully organized and it was successful in pushing its claims for the assumption of these responsibilities."[378] UNRRA created an emergency division in Cairo led by the Bureau of Areas to oversee the camps. When Hoehler returned to Washington he found that UNRRA had sidestepped his bureau and placed the Bureau of Areas in charge of displaced people, his bureau's sole purview. In Washington, Hoehler and Jackson engaged in a series of debates over the scope of their organization, with each side trying to draw Lehman to their camp. One day before D-Day, June 5th, Hoehler, the Bureau of Areas and Lehman reached an uneasy peace. The Bureau of Areas would retain control over the former MERRA camps as well as the personnel remanded by the Near East Foundation and Hoehler's division would control any displaced persons camps in Europe, which would then be termed "assembly centres" to avoid confusion. Although only a small portion of their eventual refugee management program, UNRRA's first humanitarian projects in the Greece and the Middle East highlight the ways that the organization mapped its programs on top of

[377] Ibid.
[378] Ibid., 99.*

networks that had been established decades earlier. The center of conflict between two differing visions of refugee management, the former MERRA camps were integrated into UNRRA through the organizational structure of the Near East Foundation. By the end of World War II, the former MERRA camps would be UNRRA's most longstanding refugee centers. Despite UNRRA granting the BDP control over European camps, Hoehler and the Bureau of Areas would continue to clash as UNRRA escalated its refugee management programs in Europe. The Bureau of Areas would find a potent ally against Hoehler in the U.S. army, which supported their conceptions of national sovereignty and "speedy dispersal."

The Refugee Pipeline: Displaced People Under UNRRA

Over the course of the war, Nazi Germany had forcefully displaced millions of people through violence, persecution, and migration to forced labor camps. As Hunt had predicted, responding to the refugee crises in Europe would be a massive logistical endeavor. In the wake of the Allied armies' advance through Western Europe in the summer and fall of 1944, UNRRA began its first European operations, confronting millions of DPs newly freed from Nazi controlled territories. These DPs would become vessels for Allied hopes and fears. Backed by new psychological studies, UNRRA treated the DPs in its camps like children, believing that Nazi violence had damaged their moral and psychological identities. Internal conflicts within UNRRA would also result in the implementation of a profoundly rapid "dispersal" process that focused on moving refugees out of camps as quickly as possible.

As the Allied armies advanced into Western Europe, UNRRA began its first large-scale refugee management operations. While Hoehler remained in charge of the Bureau of Displaced Persons, he found his directives increasingly overruled by the Bureau of Areas. Working in tandem with the U.S. Army, UNRRA began to construct "assembly centres" in freed territories within Western Europe to facilitate refugee resettlement. When the first DPs began to arrive in these centers, UNRRA workers expected gracious thanks and praise. One report claimed that UNRRA workers anticipated, "that the individuals would be tractable, grateful, and powerless, after their domination from two to five years as the objects of German slave policies."[379] Instead, many of the DPs were starving, angry, and skeptical about UNRRA relief. The UNRRA workers termed this "liberation complex," a psychological reaction to intense oppression. UNRRA headquarters commissioned a psychological study to try and understand "liberation complex;" the study's results would inform UNRRA's camp management and radically reshape Hoehler's plans for a globalized resettlement regime.

The Inter-Allied Psychological Study Group published its findings in June, 1945. The study, based off interviews with DPs, posited that the violence of the Nazi regime had reduced DPs to the mental faculties of children, claiming "they are hurt children who the world has let down."[380] The report encouraged UNRRA members to act as parents to DPs and forbid them any adult agency. In relief, the report argued, UNRRA distributors should be withholding, not providing excess food, or else the DPs "demands would become insatiable, like a greedy baby."[381] This conception cemented a ruthless paternalism among UNRRA distributors, where aid was often withheld in order to force refugees to conform to certain types of behavior. The

[379] "Guide to the Care of Displaced Persons," May 18, 1945. NARA Record Group 331.3.8. Reel 24, Records of Allied Operational and Occupational Headquarters, World War II. National Archives and Records Administration.*
[380] June 1945 Report, "Psychological Problems of Displaced Persons" prepared by European Regional Office of UNRRA (ERO). UNNRA, PAG-4/1.3.0.3.1, box 1
[381] Ibid.

report even encouraged UNRRA camp workers to police the refugees' sexuality. The brutality of the Nazi regime, the report argued, "forced [the DPs] into a world where there can be no feeling of affection or responsibility towards the object of erotic interest. They were humiliated, robbed of their ideals as well as becoming physically diseased."[382] In practice, this led to the institution of increasingly rigid regulations on the DPs agency, including curfews, unannounced camp checks, and bodily inspections. The psychological study also contained aspirations for the future. The programs of paternalism, the report concluded, would help bring refugees "back into the modern, democratic order," restoring their "fundamental sense of right and wrong, their social potential, and the possibility of self-government."[383] If the DPs were children, the report suggested, then they could still grow up to believe in liberal internationalism. As mentioned in the introduction, UNRRA captured this optimistic outlook throughout their propaganda machine, with "Now--the Peace" proudly declaring that UNRRA's aid would prepare the DPs "for the day when they will take their place in the new community of nations."[384] UNRRA widely adopted the recommendations of the Inter-Allied psychological study, welding it onto a new method of resettling refugees pioneered by the Bureau of Areas.

Against Hoehler's recommendations, the Bureau of Areas instituted a process of "speedy dispersal" for the refugees. Working in tandem with the U.S. Army, which viewed the DPs as a major security risk, the Bureau of Areas organized all refugees incoming to UNRRA camps into national groups and ran them through a streamlined registration and resettlement program. Army guidelines included a flow chart that ran the refugees through a six-step process. First, new refugees received a DP card; they were assigned accommodations; registered; divided into national categories; and then gathered in a "holding tank" for anywhere from a few days to

[382] Ibid.
[383] Ibid.
[384] "Now--the Peace" Produced by the National Film Board, Canada. 1944.

months. This "tank" would be an excess military bunker where refugees lived in tight quarters, sharing beds. Finally, the DPs would be "dispersed," which meant anything ranging from they left the camp, to repatriation, to transfer to another camp. This process, historian William Hitchcock concludes, "left the impression that DPs were human refuse in need of waste treatment."[385] This program turned Hoehler's "assembly centres," which he had imagined as sites of refugee care into sites to process and ship out DPs.[386] The conflicts with the U.S. Army and the Bureau of Areas finally overwhelmed Hoehler; he resigned on January 1st, 1946. UNRRA replaced him with Myer Cohen, a former director in the Bureau of Areas, cementing their approach to refugee management within the organization.

IRO Takeover

In the year following the end of World War II, UNRRA became the source of a series of controversies, both internal and external. Increased criticism over its relief tactics and its inability to disperse nearly a million remaining refugees led to the organization transferring its operations to a new international organization. Over the course of the war, UNRRA had managed both relief and rehabilitation projects ranging from food distribution to the rebuilding of vital infrastructure like railroads and roadways. This work, however, had often been stymied by local governments, wary of allowing UNRRA too much access. Sir Arthur Salter, a onetime

[385] William Hitchcock, *Bitter Road to Freedom*, 212.
[386] One contemporary observer noted that the Bureau of Areas' "speedy dispersal process" moved behind the front lines of the Allied advance and, at one point, was moving 80,000 DPs a day off of their rolls. By early fall, 1945, "one of the largest and fastest migrations in European history was nearly over." "UNRRA Headquarters and the Displaced Persons Operations" by Dorothy K. Clark. Reel 13, Side 1. Office of the Historian Records. Records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

assistant director of UNRRA who had resigned after disagreements with Lehman, summarized his opinion of the organization in a speech to the House of Commons in 1945, "I think the governments who created UNRRA started it too early, organized it too cumbrously, circumscribed it too narrowly and advertised it too enthusiastically. It is no advantage for a new institution to be given the job of planning many months beforehand if the planning is in vacuo, if the time when you can operate it is an indefinite time ahead, if the plans have to be adapted, not only to unforeseeable future conditions, but to invitations, consents and decisions of external authorities whom you cannot control."[387] Edward Eyre Hunt, who had coordinated UNRRA's early organizational structure, shared Salter's critique, arguing that the administration had abandoned his principles of efficiency as it sought to engage in more ambitious relief projects. He wrote, in a summary of his experiences during the war, "By its very nature UNRRA is cumbersome, especially if it is compared with the American Relief Administration and associated bodies after World War I. The divorce between organizations responsible for supply and those which handle relief and rehabilitation is a serious weakness." Ultimately, this disconnect between supply and distribution, in Hunt's estimation led to "somewhat more than relief and somewhat less than reconstruction," which could not satisfy the needs of war-torn Europe.[388] In addition, despite the Bureau of Areas' quick and efficient DP "dispersal" in the beginning of their work, there remained roughly one and a half million DPs who, for a variety of reasons, could not be easily removed from UNRRA's rolls. These last displaced persons, termed the "hard-core" by contemporary observers, encompassed a variety of nationalities, including

[387] " Experience with European Relief since 1939, EE Hunt, 1946. Box 6 Folder – European Relief. Edward Eyre Hunt Papers.
[388] Ibid.

Holocaust survivors, Baltic state anti-Communists, and Poles that the Nazis had conscripted as slave laborers.[389]

In recognition of this problem, the newly formed United Nations decided to remove DP management from UNRRA's ambit, moving that power to the newly organized UN. On December 31, 1946 the UN voted to form the International Refugee Organization (IRO) to take over UNRRA's refugee responsibilities. Helmed by William Hallam Tuck, the IRO sought to resettle the "hard-core" of DPs remaining after UNRRA's rapid dispersal of millions of people. The United Nations empowered the IRO with "direct responsibility for the "care and maintenance of refugees" in US occupied zones of Germany and Austria "for the operation of assembly centers, for the functions of repatriation, resettlement and legal protection, and for the provision of supplementary supplies and facilities." In consultation with Herbert Hoover and Arthur Ringland, Tuck moved away from many of UNRRA's more repressive policies and instituted a series of new policies to manage the "last million" refugees in DP camps across Europe.[390] Tuck administered the IRO with an intense focus on logistics, centralized control, and administrative oversight—the hallmarks of his long humanitarian career under Hoover. Tuck built four pillars into his new management regime: registration, relief, vocational training, and moral education.

Much like his former cohort Arthur Ringland had implemented in Constantinople more than two decades earlier, Tuck began his tenure at the IRO by ordering a complete registration of

[389]Gerard Cohen classifies these DPs as the "last million," an analytical term more than a specific descriptor as the numbers of the DPs often went up or down depending on shifting geopolitics in the postwar world. Cohen categorizes these DPs as the final "outcome of Nazi imperial rule and genocide.. For more on the "last million" and how they reshaped the politics of the early Cold War see Gerard Cohen, *In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1-11.

[390] Correspondence from William Hallam Tuck to Herbert Hoover, May 13, 1948. Box 4, Folder International Refugee Organization 2 of 2. After World War II, Ringland worked closely with Hoover to found C.A.R.E. a care package distribution organization for the people of Europe. When Tuck reached out to Hoover for advice on the political situation in Washington over the passage of the DP Act, Hoover relayed information about Ringland's refugee resettlement program in 1923.

each refugee in UNRRA's camps. The "speedy dispersal" plans of the Bureau of Areas, Tuck concluded, did not offer any way to gauge long-term resettlement plans for refugees. For any refugee deemed capable of long-term relocation, the IRO provided, "a comprehensive programme providing food, clothing, personal items, health services, hospital care, employment and vocational training, educational, individual counseling, and child welfare services..."[391] This program relied on a new flow of supplies to the IRO. In order to facilitate this relief program, Tuck began to import expanded stocks of food and medicine, increasing the daily allotment of food to refugees in IRO camps. In his report to the United Nations, he wrote that he changed UNRRA's previous policy of a standardized calorie count per refugee, instead arguing, "The diet should not be lower than that of the local population and should meet the minimum emergency standards approved by medical and nutritional authorities."[392] Tuck borrowed this plan from his days at the ARA, where nutritional statisticians posited that national diets reflected different caloric necessities.[393]

A devout Quaker, Tuck shaped many of the IRO's education policies around his personal concepts of moral development and education. During this time, the IRO still operated under the multilateral agreements organized by UNRRA. Refugees were vetted by potential resettling nations predominantly for their possible labor value. Through their surveys, the IRO determined that refugees in the DP camps were, on average, younger than most nations in Europe. In his report, Tuck noted, "displaced persons offer youth as well as skills to the world."[394] Tuck, however, was deeply uncomfortable with the commodification of DP labor. In a circular to the

[391] "First Annual Report of the International Refugee Organization to the United Nations, March 3, 1949" Box 8, Folder – International Refugee Organization. William Hallam Tuck Papers.
[392] Ibid.
[393] Alonzo Englebert Taylor, "World War I Civilian Relief Statistical Report", Box 26, Folder – Statistical Reports. Alonzo Englebert Taylor Papers.
[394] "First Annual Report of the International Refugee Organization to the United Nations, March 3, 1949" Box 8, Folder – International Refugee Organization. William Hallam Tuck Papers.

organization, Tuck urged IRO members to remember that vocational training would be in the best long-term interest of the refugee, "the continuing objective of the employment and vocational training programme has been to ensure that as many refugees and displaced persons as possible shall be employed up to the time of their reestablishment."[395] To help in this process, the IRO instituted two educational programs that focused on long-term, personal development of the refugees. First, as part of the comprehensive program of aid, the IRO offered vocational training and education programs throughout its camps. Next, Tuck instituted a comprehensive "moral education program" targeted at DPs between the ages of 16 to 21. Reminiscent of the Near East Foundation's program of "re-creation," the IRO placed hundreds of young DPs into "youth centers," where the IRO oversaw every aspect of their daily life. This process of "moral education" did not include vocational training, but instead "a basis for good physical and moral health, civic training and vocational guidance, following individual tests of aims, skills, and aptitudes." The IRO sought to retrain young DPs to become "outstanding members of their community, wherever they might end up."[396]

In 1948, the politics of global refugee resettlement changed radically. The U.S. Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act, for the first-time allowing refugees into America through special channels outside of immigration quotas. Tuck had long urged the United States to relax its restrictive migration laws, even reaching out to Hoover to try and work his remaining political connections to change the policies.[397] The DP act granted spots in the United States for tens of thousands of refugees, on the condition that they could attain sponsors within the United States.

[395] "First Annual Report of the International Refugee Organization to the United Nations, March 3, 1949" Box 8, Folder – International Refugee Organization. William Hallam Tuck Papers.
[396] Ibid.
[397] Correspondence from William Hallam Tuck to Herbert Hoover, May 13, 1948. Box 4, Folder International Refugee Organization 2 of 2.

Reaching out to his contacts within the State Department and in the United States, Tuck secured sponsors for thousands of the refugees within the IRO camps.

For UNRRA and the IRO, the millions of refugees created by World War II were an opportunity to implement varying management projects ranging from "moral uplift" to "speedy dispersal." In all these programs, the international organizations rarely asked for input from the refugees, instead viewing the DPs as vessels for their hopes and fears for a reconstructed Europe. UNRRA workers feared that the violence of the Nazi regime had decimated the culture and identities of DPs, so they initiated radical, paternalistic management policies that led to surveillance and recrimination. These policies led to rapid dispersal, but with few ways to track actual resettlement among refugees, the priority for UNRRA remained "liquidation." Under former ARA manager, William Tuck, the IRO implemented a new series of plans built around his own particular sense of the "moral needs" of the refugees under his care. In stark contrast to the results of the refugee crises of the 1920s, hundreds of thousands of the refugees overseen by the IRO gained sponsorships to resettle in the United States. The shifting possibilities for resettlement reflected a long political debate within the United States that culminated in the 1948 Displaced Persons Act. However, when the time came to actually select, process, and disperse those refugees to the U.S., the American foreign policy apparatus relied upon the expertise of men like Tuck who had established their credentials in the earlier decades, men who developed a praxis of refugee management focused on efficiency and moralizing. This foundation of technocratic practices and ethical mores would become central to America's refugee resettlement process in the twentieth century.

Epilogue: Legacies and Consequences

American engagement with the refugee crises caused by World War II relied on networks of humanitarian infrastructure that had been constructed over the previous decades. In the Middle East, infrastructures built by the Near East Foundation served as the first sites of Allied refugee management. Within UNRRA, the policies of the American Relief Administration were embedded within the organization by personnel drafted from World War I humanitarian organizations. These networks proved far more durable than UNRRA itself even believed, shaping the administration's policies throughout its tenure. The mobilization of global humanitarian networks over the course of World War II led to the creation of modern humanitarian institutions and practices that would reshape global politics during the Cold War. This section briefly charts only a few of these connections.

In U.S. foreign policy, the Near East Foundation formed the core of President Harry Truman's Point Four plan, the progenitor of modern development plans. In a speech on his new policies to try and bring the Third World to the side of the U.S., Truman expounded on the value of the NEF's development policies. "Let me give you another example of what point 4 can mean; this one in Iran. This story concerns not an international organization, but one of our American voluntary groups, the Near East Foundation." Truman recounted how the NEF combined its technological demonstrations with practices that would cultivate local leadership. "Four years ago the Government of Iran asked the Foundation to set up a demonstration project in a group of 35 villages not far from the capital at Tehran. The Foundation brought village leaders to a series of training courses. It won their confidence, and through these leaders it began to carry out agricultural and health improvements. The Foundation met a water shortage by drilling deep

wells. It overcame waterborne diseases with an inexpensive water filter. It sprayed homes with DDT. It sprayed crops with insecticides. It helped to organize schools in each of the 35 villages." Truman praised the NEF's system of local demonstration, echoing the organization's claims that centralized hubs would "radiate" progress out in vast, unexpected ways. "Today, only 4 years later, the village people are at work in new carpentry shops, vegetable gardens, and orchards. And, most startling of all, the yield of grain in this area has tripled." Working with the leaders of the Near East Foundation, Truman installed the practices of the NEF into America's first development-based foreign policy.

The legacy of the American Relief Administration would also be felt throughout the post-WWII humanitarian system. Despite leaving UNRRA early into its tenure and going on to criticize the organization later in his career, Edward Eyre Hunt considered his time in the organization a success for one reason. During his time at the administration, Hunt repeatedly lobbied for his onetime boss Herbert Hoover to be brought back into the political fold to manage the humanitarian response to World War II. After Harry Truman ascended to the presidency, Hunt worked some of his old political connections to bring Hoover to the White House to advise Truman on continued relief efforts. In a letter to a friend, Hunt crooned, "Needless to say, I am proud to have been instrumental to some degree in bringing the Chief again into the picture last summer when he was consulted by President Truman and by various members of the Cabinet."[398] Harry Truman and Hoover struck up an unlikely friendship, in stark contrast to the enmity between Hoover and Roosevelt. In 1949, Truman appointed Hoover to the head of a commission to reorganize the executive branch in order to reduce waste. The Commission on the Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, or the Hoover Commission as it came

[398] Correspondence from Edward Eyre Hunt to unknown, September 29, 1945. Box 2, Folder – Correspondence, 1945-1946.

to be known, recommended a broad array of policies to the White House. Keeping in line with the ARA's dedication to logistics, Hoover recommended that the White House amend the National Security Act to strengthen the Secretary of Defense's power to procure supplies and control distribution networks in the military. This process led directly to modern military logistics infrastructure, a strange consequence for a discipline first tied to the ARA's humanitarian ventures. Hoover helmed another commission during the Eisenhower administration that reinforced many of these policy objectives. Contemporary analysts and political scientists labeled Hoover's commissions as largely a failure in their goal of reducing government spending along ideological lines. However, the commissions cemented Hoover's dedication to managerial tactics and centralized administrative authority in the White House, which led directly to the centralizing of administrative control in the presidency.

The hundreds of Aramites who served in the U.S. foreign policy apparatus during World War II continued to shape American humanitarian institutions during the Cold War. William Hallam Tuck, as mentioned in the introduction of the dissertation, would continue participating refugee management projects, eventually organizing the resettlement of tens of thousands of refugees in the wake of the Hungarian Revolution. Maurice Pate, one of Hoover's closest confidants who had served in both the Commission for Relief in Belgium as well as the ARA, would shape children's relief policy for the following decades. Pate organized the Commission for Polish Relief during World War II and then later joined the American Red Cross as the Director for Relief Supplies for Prisoners of War. In 1947, in recognition of his service in the ARC, the United Nations offered Pate the role of director of the United Nations Children's Fund. Pate led UNICEF until 1965, shaping the global conversation on humanitarian aid to children. Arthur Ringland, who had funneled Russian refugees from Constantinople to the United States in

the 1920s, ventured down a similar path as Pate. In the wake of World War II, Ringland started a care package distribution network, using contacts he had made in the 1920s. This network would eventually evolve into C.A.R.E. International, one of the largest international relief and development organizations operating today. Although only small, personal samples, these cases illustrate the breadth and scope of the aftereffects of interwar humanitarian networks.

William Hallam Tuck resigned after two years at the head of the International Refugee Organization. In his farewell speech, Tuck charted the long historical arc that had led him to the IRO. He said, "During the last 30 years I have been working in connection with the American Relief Administration, the Commission for Relief in Belgium, the Finnish Relief in Helsinki, and the International Refugee Organization. These associations have kept alive the memory of a common effort – for quite apart from the occasional pleasure of such gatherings – they represent the nucleus around which the spirit we all feel grows – and is passed on to others for action."[399] Like many of his fellow humanitarian aid workers, Tuck relied on his experiences from World War I and its aftermath to calibrate his policies during World War II. In the wake of World War I, rebuilding nations granted American private relief organizations immense and unprecedented access to effect their visions of humanitarian aid. The networks of humanitarian organizations established in the wake of World War I proved more durable than depicted in UNRRA's films. From the institution of development policy within the apparatus of the U.S. state to the organizations that would define Cold War humanitarianism, the humanitarian workers and techniques that emerged out of World War I reshaped the politics of aid, administration, and development throughout the twentieth century.

[399] "IRO Newsletter" August 12, 1949. Box 4, Folder – International Refugee Organization, 2 of 2. William Hallam Tuck Papers.

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