What Do You Read?: Comparing Online and Traditional News Media Coverage of Social

Movements

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LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ABSTRACT

Much has been made in the public discourse of the media's involvement in the polarization of politics in the United States. This study analyzes variations in coverage of activists, law enforcement, and corporations involved in the protests of the Standing Rock Sioux against the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline. This study seeks to synthesize the contributions of political economy, work and professions, and social movements frameworks. It analyzes differences between outlets using an online-traditional as well as a right-left comparison. Results indicate that online outlets may be more critical in their coverage of state and corporate actors. In addition, results indicate significant variation in how social movement activists are covered, particularly along the right-left polarity.

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In the age of the Internet, individuals are able to seek out news media that confirm their

previously-held beliefs, thereby reinforcing their political positions and polarizing debate

(Tufekci 2017). The famously successful use of social media by the 2008 Obama campaign

(Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez 2011), Donald Trump's use of Twitter, as well as the elevation

of Breitbart chairman Steve Bannon to the chief strategist of Trump's 2016 election campaign

indicate the power of the Internet as a platform for spreading political messages. Although the

media has played an important role in American and global politics for decades (Gitlin 1980;

McAdam 1982), of particular interest in this study is the recent growth of online news media

outlets such as Breitbart, The Blaze, The Intercept, and Salon that generate content with a

specific political orientation.

 Although there is a general recognition of the importance of online political discourse,

much of media studies, especially within sociology, has tended to focus on traditional broadcast

and print media. Work on the political economy of the media has emphasized how as capitalist

institutions, news outlets serve to reinforce hegemonic structures of power (McChesney 2004,

2013; Herman & Chomsky 1988; Bennet 1982, among others). Alternatively, approaches to

studying the media that focus on work and professions have examined how journalists'

dependence upon official sources and other norms of news production act as the main

determinants of news media content (Gans 1979; Schudson 1989; Molotch and Lester 1974 are

good examples). Another important approach has been that of social movement studies, which

examines both how movements may select actions in order to gain media coverage (i.e. Ferree,

Gamson, Gerhards & Rucht 2002; Gamson 2004; Koopmans 2004), what kinds of movement

actions tend to attract media coverage (Wouters 2013; Amenta, Olasky & Sobaugh 2009), as well as how movements are portrayed differently by different sources at different times (Davenport 2010; Mai 2016). Drawing on these sociological perspectives, this study examines a topic central to political sociology and the media—coverage of social movement action— using a comparative analysis of traditional and online media from the perspectives of both the left and right.

In order to do so, I will examine the coverage of the activists, law enforcement, and corporations involved in the protests of the Standing Rock Sioux and their allies against the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline from news media outlets on both ends of the political spectrum, as well as from both online-based and traditional news outlets will be analyzed. This project will allow for the field of media sociology to be strengthened through the analysis of the variation in coverage of a highly politicized social movement with a variety of interests involved. In addition, the field of social movement studies will be strengthened through the analysis of news media from the media's perspective, rather than that of the social movement itself.

This paper is organized as follows. I first present the state of the literature in media sociology and social movement studies on media coverage, pointing to conceptual gaps. I then review how these different perspectives can be brought together to generate research questions and outline my methodological approach to answering these questions. I will then present my results and discuss the implications and future research.

Literature Review

Several early sociologists, including Karl Marx and Robert Park, began their career as journalists. While these founders of the discipline recognized the importance of the news media, it took until the middle of the 20th century for sociologists to truly interrogate the process of

producing the news. Several major scholars have argued for the importance of a sociology of the media, (Bourdieu 1998; Habermas 1989; Castells 1996; and Luhmann 2000) and several American scholars produced major works in the area (Gitlin 1980; Schudson 2002, 2011; Tuchman 1978; Gamson et al. 1987; Herman & Chomsky 1988). Although the field has had few major recent advances, recent scholars have been calling for more attention to be paid to the development of media sociology in the digital age (Tufekci 2017; McChesney2013; Benson and Neveu2005). Much of the classic and contemporary work in this field can be classified into three major theoretical frameworks that the sociology of the media shares with the broader media studies field: political economy, work and professions, and social movements (Klinenberg 2005; Revers & Brienza 2017).

Research under the political economy framework relates the news-making process to the economic structure of the news media system. The main characteristic of the news media that this theory focuses on is the conservative, system-maintaining character of the news (Benson 2017). Perhaps the seminal piece of work within this theoretical framework is Herman and Chomsky's *Manufacturing Consent* (1988), in which they develop the Propaganda Model. News outlets are seen as "effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda function through reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions, and self-censorship, and without overt coercion." In fact, Herman and Chomsky argue that the *New York Times* is no different than the Soviet state-owned *Pravda.* Jürgen Habermas also considered the commercialization of the public sphere to be a key component to the contemporary production of news. According to his work, when news media became a platform for advertising in the mid 1800s, participation in public life expanded, but since it was commercialized, it lost its critical edge and became sensationalized (1992; 1997).

Some of the more recent work in the political economy framework has included research on the emergence of "new media" and the effects of the Internet on traditional news media and journalism. McChesney (2013) argues that the development of the Internet has coincided with decreasing legitimacy of the journalistic profession, in turn leading to major changes in news media. While some herald the Internet as the savior of civilization, McChesney is ultimately pessimistic about the extent to which the digital media revolution will create a better world for more people if capitalist enterprises retain their power. Scholarship in the field of political communication also emphasizes the importance of political economy in the contemporary media environment. Blumer and Kavanagh (2010) note that centrifugal diversification of the news media environment in the development of online news outlets has coincided with increased competitive pressures between news outlets as well as the rise of anti-elite populism.

Several scholars have used frameworks from the sociology of work and professions to examine how occupational ideology and routines within news organizations shape the way news is created. The central focus of this theoretical framework is the professional autonomy and decision-making power of journalists (Schudson 1989). Foundational work in this area suggests that the news that is produced by media outlets is not a portrayal of a world "out there" but instead reflects "the practices of those who have the power to determine the experiences of others," (Molotch and Lester 1974). Much of the work in this area suggests the importance of sources within the field of journalism. This focus on getting sources that can provide valuable information results in the organization of journalists into "beats" that articulate with government bureaucracy. The government thereby becomes the primary definer of social issues (Fishman 1980; Hall et al. 1978). This relationship is mirrored in public relations firms within corporations that create massive amounts of media-ready content that is then reported as news. These

processes result in a news media that is highly skewed toward the perspective of those in power in the state and corporate realm (Schudson 2000).

In addition to media outlets being structured in a way that privileges elite positions, journalists have also developed routines that significantly impact how the news is constructed. In a classic ethnographic study of several news organizations, Gans (1979) found that American journalists had a system of taken-for-granted values that affected the news they produced. Among these values included individualism, political moderatism, and responsible capitalism. More recently, Boykoff and Boykoff argue that the "fairness doctrine" in American media has resulted in an inordinate amount of coverage for climate change skeptics (2004). By presenting both sides of the argument equally, they argue that the public comes to understand there to be more debate in the scientific community than in actuality.

Following in the tradition of this area of research, several researchers have applied it to the world of online journalism. Downie and Schudson (2009) suggest that the Internet provides a more collaborative model of the news media system, with everyday citizens contributing as much to the published news as professional journalists. As a result, professional journalists have pushed back in order to maintain the boundaries of the occupation (Lewis 2012). The impact of these dynamics on the resulting news content, however, remains unclear.

A third approach to the sociological study of the media is based on social movement studies. Some research in this area focuses on the reasons why garnering media coverage is important for social movements. Protest actions are important for social movements both for the value of the act itself as well as the reaction of others to the protest action (Lipsky 1968). Most people will not witness a protest event in real life. Through media coverage of protest events, however, social movements are able to raise the public salience of an issue, potentially garnering

support from individuals who were previously bystanders (Gamson 1992). In addition, one study found that politicians only react to social movements if they are depicted in the media (Koopmans 2004). Thus, it is important for social movements to garner media attention if they wish to impact on policy.

With this as background knowledge, much social movements scholarship regarding media coverage has to do with the determinants of media coverage. Comparing police archive data of protest demonstrations to newscast data from the largest pubic and commercial television station in Belgium, Wouters (2013) found that only 11% of demonstrations were actually able to get coverage. The most important factor in determining if a demonstration received television coverage was size. Other factors that were important for garnering news coverage were disruptiveness and the use of symbolic actions. This finding was supported by another study that found that in addition to determining whether or not a protest event was covered at all, size and disruptiveness was also determinative of the amount of news coverage (Amenta, Caren, Olasky, and Stobaugh 2009). While some of the most fruitful work in the study of social movements has used newspaper event data to measure mobilization (i.e. McAdam 1982), some scholars argue that the selection biases listed above prevent these types of analyses from analyzing the full reality of social movement mobilization (Oliver and Myers 1999; Oliver & Maney 2000).

Whereas these studies focus on the importance of media attention for social movements, in one of the defining works on media coverage of social movements, Gitlin (1980) emphasized that when the news media begins to cover a movement, the activists involved in the movement can lose control of their own story. The story ends up being prone to the biases of the outlets themselves. In another study focusing on these types of variations in coverage, Davenport (2010) explores the variation in the coverage of the Black Panther Party. Davenport uses the concept of

6

the "Rashomon Effect" to explain how an event becomes constructed into a narrative that is shaped by the interests of the news source. Coverage of contentious events from specific outlets ends up being inherently one-sided, based on factors such as the outlet's political leaning as well as its physical distance from the event. Mai (2016) also focuses on the content of media coverage, going "beyond the standard practice of explaining news report volume to feature the political valence" of reports on labor issues from the *New York Times*, with factors such as ownership and price changes influencing the content. This study seeks to build upon this work by exploring the variations in coverage of a more recent social movement based on the expectation that the type of media outlet (online-based or traditional) may have some effect on the content of the coverage.

There have been several recent studies that have examined the types of media that surround social movements. Morrison and Isaac (2011) extend the framework of social movement theory on media by examining the use of cartoons used by the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). In this study, the authors argue that social movement scholars are typically not sensitive to the question of genre and fail to ask how cultural forms shape a movement's message. They find that the IWW used cartoons because they visually personified and concretized abstract ideas, ideologies, grievances and tactics in a compact visual form. Other recent work in this area has focused on similar issues specifically with regard to online media. For example, Tufekci and Wilson (2012) argue that rising cultural forms such as social media sites were essential tools used by protesters during Arab Spring.

This area of research has sparked interdisciplinary collaboration between social movement scholars and communications researchers (Earl 2015; Earl and Garret 2017; Mitchell and Weisel 2014). Research in this area has been fruitful in its criticism of technological determinism (Earl

and Kimport 2011), its acknowledgment that activists recognize risks in online communications such as information overload (Gillan, Pickerill, and Webster 2008), and its discussion of the personalization of politics that occurs online (Bennett and Segerberg 2013). However, in their discussion of the technology-media-movements complex, Flesher Fominaya and Gillan (2017) argue that social movement scholars have yet to train "an analytic gaze on the ongoing influence of those institutions which generate, select, frame, and disseminate 'the news'", especially with regard to news outlets that have been born online.

Together, the three main approaches to the sociology of media—political economy, work and professions, and social movements—provide rich insights into the problem of examining the relationship between media and society. Political economy theory provides a framework for explaining how news media outlets fit into large structures of power and domination, but it struggles to explain the mechanism by which the desires of elites become manifest in news coverage and can overemphasize the propaganda function of the news media (Schudson 2000). A work and professions approach provides a complementary perspective on the ways in which the demands of the occupation shape news, but it can leave the broader social structural questions in the background. Social movement studies can provide a balance to both approaches by showing how the media respond not only to structures of power and profession but also to challenges to political and other societal regimes. However, this area, along with the others, has focused less specifically on the variation in the content of news coverage of social movements, especially with regard to the entrance of online news outlets.

As discussed above, all three frameworks all do recognize the emergence of the effects of the Internet and online media. Political economy approaches such as the work of McChesney suggest that aspirations for a democratic potential of the Internet are overstated. The sociology of

work and professions suggests that the Internet is generating a rapid diversification of the journalistic field that challenges the organizational patterns and routines of journalists. Finally, work in social movement studies suggests that activists seek to utilize online media for their benefit. I argue that these approaches can be improved by thinking more systematically about the relations between new, Internet-based news media and traditional media.

Background and Hypotheses

One polarity in this study involves the division between left-and right-leaning news organizations. Although Fox News recently dropped their slogan of "Fair and Balanced," the goal was clearly to differentiate the network from what it perceived to be other politically-biased (in the liberal direction) news outlets in order to market itself for conservative viewers.. When right-wing activist Andrew Breitbart founded Breitbart.com, he thought of it as railing against the "Democratic media complex" (Rainey 2012).

Similar patterns have appeared on the left. For example, Salon was founded in the mid 1990s as an explicitly left-leaning online news outlet and continues to be highly critical of Fox News and other conservatives (Sutton & Sterne 2016). In addition, MSNBC has been consistently accused of having a liberal bias (Steinberg 2007) and the New York Times took criticism from the Trump campaign during the 2016 presidential race (Morin 2017).

Another polarity in this study is the division between online and traditional news media. On the one hand, although outlets such as the *New York Times* and the *Wall Street Journal* are understood to have political leanings, they also present their work as having journalistic objectivity. As seen in the work and occupations literature, the traditional nature of these organizations requires them to adhere to traditional norms and expectations. In addition, from a political economy perspective, traditional news outlets must maintain an audience in order to

continue operations as a capitalist institution. The audiences of these outlets expect them not to be overly political on any given issue. In addition, the journalists working for these organizations must maintain relationships with sources within the government and private sector in order to continue producing the news, thereby fulfilling the expectation of the previous work in the field of work and organizations.

On the other hand, online news outlets exist in an almost entirely different world. An outlet such as Breitbart is unlikely to attract the mass audience that the *New York Times* has and therefore has to target specific groups. One way we might expect these outlets to do this is by being more extreme in their political coverage. In addition, the new and radical nature of online outlets has the potential to make them less reliant on official sources. Without entrenched beats and long-standing relationships with government and corporate PR offices, online outlets may end up getting a wider variety of perspectives.

This article in no way seeks to join the debate regarding which news outlet offers a more accurate picture of the world "out there". Instead, it conceptualizes the media field according to two polarities; the left-right distinction that is generally understudied in studies of traditional broadcast and print media, and the traditional media-new media distinction that has emerged in the frameworks discussed above but has not yet been conceptualized in an encompassing framework. With these distinctions, I propose the following hypothesis (all controlling for the political orientation of the media outlet and the year of the president):

1a. Online news outlets will be more critical in their coverage of state actors compared to traditional news outlets.

1b. Traditional news outlets will be more supportive in their coverage of state actors compared to online news outlets.

1c. Online news outlets will be more critical in their coverage of corporate actors compared to traditional news outlets.

1d. Traditional news outlets will be more supportive in their coverage of corporate actors compared to online news outlets.

2a. Online news outlets will be more critical of social movements than their traditional counterparts.

2b. Online news outlets will be more supportive of social movements than their traditional counterparts.

Data and Methods

These hypotheses were tested through an analysis of the coverage of a single movement, this study analyzed variation in how different media outlets portray the law enforcement, corporation, and activists involved. The social movement that was used as a case study for this research is the protest of the Standing Rock Sioux against the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL). This social movement was chosen for several reasons. The first is that while the movement has contemporary relevance with its extensive use of social media (#NoDAPL on Twitter and "Checking In at Standing Rock" on Facebook), it is deeply rooted in the history of the United States with the rights of a powerful corporation going head to head against the rights of indigenous groups[1] (Rogin 1980). This mixing of new media technologies with this quintessentially American story produces perspectives from supporters and opponents of the

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[1] This author recognizes that there is variation in opinions regarding the appropriate terminology for groups such as the Standing Rock Sioux. In order to respect these groups' status as first nations, I will refer to them as "indigenous groups." Other terms may be used in quotes from other sources.

Table 1. Study Design (N=378)

	Left-Leaning	Right-Leaning
Online	Salon (N=94) The Intercept (N=30)	Breitbart (N=40) The Blaze (N=21)
Traditional	MSNBC (N=16) *New York Times* (N=41)	Fox News (N=77) *Wall Street Journal* (N=59)

movement that line up with the hypotheses for this study including pro- and anti-law enforcement, pro- and anti-corporation, and pro- and anti-activist.

In addition, the protests at Standing Rock spanned a critical moment in American history during which the presidency transitioned from the Obama administration (under which the protest was successful in delaying the construction of the pipeline) to the Trump administration (which reversed the Obama administration's halting of DAPL almost immediately upon entering office). Due to the opposing ideological positions of the two administrations, the timeframe allowed for the possibility that coverage of state actors might change depending on who is in office.

The study design for this project is represented in the two-by-two table shown in Table 1. Each cell includes two outlets for variation. For this study, Salon Magazine and the Intercept represented the left-leaning, online-based news outlets while Breitbart and The Blaze represented their right-leaning equivalents. For traditional news outlets, MSNBC and the *New York Times* make up the left-leaning side while Fox News and the *Wall Street Journal* make up the right-leaning side.

Articles were selected from each outlet based on the following process: first, I searched each outlet's website using the search term "Dakota Access Pipeline" in order to obtain the totality of articles that referenced the pipeline (the search term "Standing Rock" was also tested but yielded fewer articles for each of the eight outlets). Articles were then excluded if they, a) never discussed the protest against the DAPL, b) only briefly referenced the DAPL in discussion of a different pipeline, or c) discussed the protests against the DAPL strictly as part of broader recent activism such as Black Lives Matter and the Women's March. Through these exclusion criteria, the articles that were included directly addressed the DAPL, the protests against it, and the events and legal decisions that occurred as a result. These inclusion and exclusion criteria resulted in a total of 378 articles. The earliest article on the topic was published on January 6, 2016, and the latest article, based on the time of the study (some legal actions are ongoing) was published on April 23, 2018.

Each article was then content-analyzed at the paragraph level using MaxQDA. Content from each paragraph was coded into one of three categories: law enforcement (state actors), corporate actors, and activists. These were then sorted into either pro- or anti- based on the definitions for each category that appear in Appendix 1.

Each article was then coded holistically based on whether it had a higher proportion of pro- or anti- coverage. For example, if an article was greater than 50% pro-law enforcement, it was assigned as pro-law enforcement. In reality, very few of the articles had both pro- and anti-coverage for any of the categories (none had equal amounts of both). Importantly, many articles had no coverage in some of the categories. Therefore, the pro- and anti- variables are not perfectly correlated with one another, and do not add up to 100%. This resulted in six dichotomous dependent variables: pro- and anti-law enforcement, pro- and anti-corporation, and

pro- and anti-activist. Table 2 shows the correlations of these variables (using Pearson's r) as well as the proportion of the articles that were assigned each category.

The independent variables for the analysis include the political leaning (1=Right) and type of outlet (1=Traditional) as indicated in Table 1. As a control, a variable for the sitting president at the time of publication (1=Trump) was also created. These variables are also included in table 2, with the proportions listed at the bottom.

Each research question was analyzed using two statistical methods. First, Chi-squared tests were used to examine differences between the different levels of the independent variables in the proportion of the dependent variables. The results from these analyses appear in tables 3 and 4. Logistic regression was then used to measure the effect of the independent variables on the likelihood of each of the dependent variables being equal to 1. Separate models were run for the interactions of each of the independent variables (outlet type×president, outlet type×political leaning, and political leaning×president). The results from these analyses are presented in tables 5-12.

The results of the Chi-squared tests provided initial tests of the two hypotheses. In addition, the Chi-squared tests allowed me to confirm an underlying assumption of this study – that right-leaning outlets had more pro-corporation, pro-law enforcement and anti-activist coverage whereas left-leaning outlets had more anti-corporation, anti-law enforcement, and pro-activist coverage. In order for Hypotheses 1a and 1c to be supported, I expected the Chi-squared tests to also show that online outlets had significantly more anti-corporation and anti-law enforcement coverage whereas for hypotheses 1b and 1d to be supported, I expected traditional outlets to have had significantly more pro-corporation and pro-law enforcement coverage. I expected results of the Chi-squared tests indicating any difference between online outlets and

traditional outlets on either the pro-activist or anti-activist variables to provide early evidence of

support for hypotheses 2a and 2b.

Table 2. Correlations and Proportions for Dependent and Independent Variables.

	Pro-Corporation	Anti-Corporation	Pro-Law Enforcement	Anti-Law Enforcement	Pro-Activist	Anti-Activist	Traditional	Right	Trump
Pro-Corporation	--								
Anti-Corporation	-0.212***	--							
Pro-Law Enforcement	0.087	-0.207***	--						
Anti-Law Enforcement	-0.153**	0.272***	-0.196***	--					
Pro- Activist	0.070	0.086	-0.128*	0.283***	--				
Anti-Activist	0.084	-0.214***	0.197***	-0.287***	-0.718***	--			
Traditional	0.136**	-0.133**	0.298***	-0.155**	-0.081	0.225***	--		
Right	0.174***	-0.324***	0.297***	-0.404***	-0.348***	0.482***	0.375***	--	
Trump	-0.056	-0.012	-0.116*	-0.021	-0.132**	0.080	-0.066	0.004	--
Proportion of Variables = 1	0.381	0.114	0.283	0.235	0.532	0.460	0.511	0.521	0.389

16

The logistic regressions provided further evidence of whether the hypotheses were supported or not. For hypothesis 1a and 1c to be supported, I expected the models predicting pro-corporation and pro-law enforcement coverage to show that traditional outlets were significantly more likely to have supportive coverage of those actors. In addition, in order for hypothesis 1b and 1c to be supported, I expected the opposite to be the case for the anti-corporation and anti-law enforcement variables. In the base models (no interactions), any significant effect of the type of outlet on pro- or anti-activist indicated support for hypotheses 2a and 2b. However, the more specific test of hypothesis 2a and 2b were in the models with the interaction between political leaning and type of outlet on pro- and anti-activist coverage. For hypothesis 2a to be supported, I expected the model predicting anti-activist coverage to have a negative interaction effect between political leaning (1=right). and type of outlet (1=traditional). This would have indicated that the (presumably positive) effect of an outlet leaning right on likelihood of anti-activist coverage was decreased by an outlet being traditional. For hypothesis 2b to be supported, I expected the model predicting pro-activist coverage to also have a negative interaction between political leaning (1=right) and type of outlet (1=traditional). This would have indicated that the (presumably negative) effect of an outlet leaning right on the likelihood of pro-activist coverage was decreased by an outlet being traditional.

Results

Coverage of State and Corporate Actors

Table 3. Bivariate Analysis of Pro- Variables and Independent Variables Using Chi-squared Tests[a]			
Independent Variables	Proportion Pro-Corporation	Proportion Pro-Law Enforcement	Proportion Pro-Activist
Online	0.153	0.071	0.573
Traditional	0.228**	0.212***	0.492
X^2	(6.988)	(33.570)	(2.473)
Left	0.293	0.144	0.713
Right	0.462***	0.411***	0.366***
X^2	(11.439)	(33.266)	(45.676)
Obama	0.403	0.325	0.585
Trump	0.347	0.218*	0.449*
X^2	(1.180)	(5.067)	(6.618)
[a]All Chi-squared Tests have DF=1			
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001			

Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the Chi-squared tests measuring the proportion of each

dependent variable in each level of the independent variables. The results of these tests are

consistent with general expectations for the control variable of left-right polarity. Right leaning

outlets had a significantly higher proportion ($X^2 = 11.439$, DF=1) of pro-corporation coverage

(0.462) compared to left-leaning outlets (0.293), a significantly higher ($X^2 = 33.266$, DF=1)

proportion of pro-law enforcement coverage (0.411) compared to left-leaning outlets (0.144),

and a significantly lower ($X^2 = 45.676$, DF=1) proportion of pro-activist coverage (0.366)

compared to left-leaning outlets (0.713). The pattern is mirrored for the anti- variables, with left-

leaning outlets having a significantly higher ($X^2 = 39.616$, DF=1) proportion of anti-corporation

coverage (0.221) compared to right-leaning outlets (0.015), a significantly higher ($X^2 = 61.758$,

Table 4. Bivariate Analysis of Anti- Variables and Independent Variables Using Chi-squared Tests[a]

Independent Variables	Proportion Anti-Corporation	Proportion Anti-Law Enforcement	Proportion Anti-Activist
Online	0.157	0.303	0.346
Traditional	0.073**	0.171**	0.570***
X^2	(6.645)	(9.104)	(19.079)
Left	0.221	0.414	0.210
Right	0.015***	0.071***	0.690***
X^2	(39.616)	(61.758)	(87.636)
Obama	0.117	0.242	0.429
Trump	0.109	0.225	0.510
X^2	(0.06)	(0.689)	(2.410)

[a]All Chi-squared Tests have DF=1
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

DF=1) proportion of anti-law enforcement coverage (0.414) compared to right-leaning outlets (0.071) and a significantly (X^2= 87.636, DF=1) lower proportion of anti-activist coverage (0.210) compared to right-leaning outlets (0.690). In addition, the control variable for sitting president showed asignificantly (X^2 = 5.067, DF=1) higher proportion of pro-law enforcement coverage during the Obama administration (0.325) compared to the Trump administration (0.218) and a significantly higher (X^2 = 6.618, DF=1) proportion of pro-activist coverage during the Obama administration (0.585) compared to during the Trump administration (0.449).

In support of hypothesis 1, Table 3 indicates that online outlets also had a significantly higher (X^2 = 9.104, DF=1) proportion of anti-law enforcement coverage (0.303) compared to traditional outlets (0.171), In addition, online outlets had a significantly higher (X^2 = 6.645, DF=1) anti-corporation coverage (0.157) compared to traditional outlets (0.073), supporting hypothesis 1c. Traditional outlets also had a significantly (X^2 = 33.570, DF=1) higher proportion of pro-law enforcement coverage (0.212) compared to online outlets (0.071), providing support for hypothesis 1b. Finally, in support of hypothesis 1d, traditional outlets had a significantly (X^2

= 6.988, DF = 1) higher proportion of pro-corporation (0.288) coverage compared to online

outlets (0.153).

The results of the logistic regressions tell a slightly more nuanced story. Table 5 shows

the results of the logistic models with the pro- variables regressed on the independent and control

variables with no interactions. Results again indicate that the expectations for the control variable

of political leaning of the outlets were supported. Based on odds ratios, right leaning outlets were

84.4% more likely to have pro-corporation coverage (b=0.612, se=0.233) and 207% more likely

to have pro-law enforcement coverage ((b=1.122, se=0.0.274). However, although traditional

outlets were 188% more likely to have pro-law enforcement coverage (b=0.612, se=0.233),

results indicated no significant effect of outlet type on likelihood of pro-corporation coverage

(b=0.332, se=0.232). These results provide support for hypothesis 1b but not for 1d.

Table 6 shows the results of the logistic models in which the anti- variables were

regressed on the independent variables. Odds ratios indicate that the right-leaning outlets were

94.3% less likely to produce anti-corporation coverage (b=-2.872, se=0.624), and 89.1% less

likely to produce anti-law enforcement coverage (b=-2.212, se=0.333), further supporting the

expectation for the political leaning of the outlets. However, results indicate no significant

effects for outlet type for either likelihood of anti-corporation coverage (b=-0.102, se=0.374),

nor anti-law enforcement coverage (b=-0.035, se=0.0.287). These results do not support

hypotheses 1a and 1c.

The control variable for president indicated significant effects for pro-law enforcement

coverage with a 45.6% lower likelihood of pro-law enforcement coverage during the Trump

administration relative to the Obama administration (b=-0.573, se=0.564). The control variable

did not have significant main effects for any of the remaining dependent variables.

Table 7 shows the results of the logistic models with the pro-variables regressed on the independent variables as well as the interaction of outlet type and president. Although the individual variables that were significant in Table 5 remain significant, the interaction term is not significant, indicating that the sitting president did not moderate the effect of outlet type. Table 8 shows the results of the logistic models with the anti-variables regressed on the independent variables and the interaction of outlet type and president. The main effects remain significant in the same manner as model 6, and in addition, the interaction term is significant for anti-law enforcement coverage (b=-1.414, se=0.618). These results indicate that the sitting president (1=Trump) decreased the effect of outlet type on likelihood of producing anti-law enforcement coverage. As shown in Figure 1, during Trump administration, the effect size of traditional outlets is more negative than online outlets. In other words, during the Trump administration, traditional outlets were less likely to produce anti-law enforcement coverage. The reverse is true during the Obama administration, during which online outlets were less likely to produce anti-law enforcement coverage.

Table 9 shows the logistic models with the pro-variables regressed on the independent variables and the interaction of outlet type and political leaning. Results show a significant interaction effect for likelihood of pro-corporation coverage (b=1.528, se=0.497), indicating that the political leaning of an outlet (1=Right) increases the effect of outlet type on the likelihood of pro-corporate coverage. As show in Figure 2, right-leaning traditional outlets are actually likely to produce pro-corporation coverage while right-leaning online outlets are not likely to produce pro-corporation coverage. In addition, for left-leaning outlets, traditional news was actually more unlikely to produce pro-corporation coverage than left-leaning online outlets.

Table 10 shows the results of the anti-variables regressed on the independent variables and the interaction of outlet type and political leaning. The model for anti-corporation coverage was unable to converge because not enough articles were in the "1" category for outlet type, political leaning, and anti-corporation. In other words, there were too few anti-corporation articles from traditional, right-leaning outlets for the model to adequately model the effect of the interaction. The interaction was not significant for anti-law enforcement coverage (b=0.200, se=0.695).

Table 5. Pro- Variables Regressed on Independent Variables via Logistic Regression

	Pro-Corporation		Pro-Law Enforcement		Pro-Activist	
	b (se)	Odds Ratio	b (se)	Odds Ratio	b (se)	Odds Ratio
Outlet Type[a]	0.332	1.395	1.059***	2.884	0.228	1.256
	0.232		0.271		(0.245)	
Political Leaning[b]	0.612**	1.844	1.122***	3.071	-1.579***	0.206
	0.233		0.274		(0.246)	
President[c]	-0.228	0.796	-0.573*	0.564	-0.603**	0.547
	0.223		0.262		(0.229)	
Constant	-0.906		-2.024		1.092	
Wald X^2	14.277		46.177		48.679	
DF	3		3		3	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
[a] 1=Traditional
[b] 1=Right
[c] 1 = During the Trump Administration.

Table 6. Anti- Variables Regressed on Independent Variables via Logistic Regression

	Anti-Corporation		Anti-Law Enforcement		Anti-Activist	
	b (se)	Odds Ratio	*b* (se)	Odds Ratio	*b* (se)	Odds Ratio
Outlet Type[a]	-0.102 (0.374)	0.903	-0.035 (0.287)	0.965	0.297 (0.252)	1.345
Political Leaning[b]	-2.872*** (0.624)	0.057	-2.212*** (0.333)	0.109	2.043*** (0.254)	7.711
President[c]	-0.91 (0.356)	0.913	-0.113 (0.275)	0.893	0.440 (0.245)	1.553
Constant	-1.194		-0.291		-1.605	
Wald X^2	22.949		49.762		80.619	
DF	3		3		3	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
[a] 1=Traditional
[b] 1=Right
[c] 1 = During the Trump Administration.

Table 7. Pro- Variables Regressed on Independent Variables and Interaction of Outlet Type and President via Logistic Regression

	Pro-Corporation		Pro-Law Enforcement		Pro-Activist	
	b (se)	Odds Ratio	*b* (se)	Odds Ratio	*b* (se)	Odds Ratio
Outlet Type[a]	0.243 (0.285)	1.275	1.026** (0.325)	2.791	0.216 (0.301)	1.242
Political Leaning[b]	0.607** (0.233)	1.834	1.120*** (0.274)	3.064	-1.580*** (0.247)	0.206
President[c]	-0.358 (0.329)	0.699	-0.641 (0.459)	0.527	-0.618 (0.324)	0.539
Interaction Outlet Type × President	0.242 0.449	1.274	0.101 (0.559)	1.107	0.030 (0.458)	1.030
Constant	-0.853		-2.001		1.099	
Wald X2	14.455		45.943		48.672	
DF	4		4		4	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
[a] 1=Traditional
[b] 1=Right
[c] 1 = During the Trump Administration.

Table 8. Anti- Variables Regressed on Independent Variables and Interaction of Outlet Type and President via Logistic Regression

	Anti-Corporation		Anti-Law Enforcement		Anti-Activist	
	b (se)	Odds Ratio	*b* (se)	Odds Ratio	*b* (se)	Odds Ratio
Outlet Type[a]	-0.078 (0.452	0.925	0.427 (0.350)	1.533	0.365 (0.315)	1.441
Political Leaning[b]	-2.869*** (0.624)	0.057	-2.210*** (0.336)	0.110	2.049*** (0.255)	7.757
President[c]	-0.683 (0.426)	0.934	0.374 (0.345	1.454	0.531 (0.351)	1.702
Interaction Outlet Type × President	-0.075 (0.778)	0.928	-1.414* (0.618)	0.243	-0.178 (0.489)	0.837
Constant	-1.203		-0.503		-1.649	
Wald X^2	22.944		51.994		80.601	
DF	4		4		4	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
[a] 1=Traditional
[b] 1=Right
[c] 1 = During the Trump Administration.

Figure 1. Effect of Outlet Type by President On Anti-Law Enforcement Coverage

Table 9. Pro- Variables Regressed on Independent Variables and Interaction of Outlet Type and Political Leaning via Logistic Regression

	Pro-Corporation		Pro-Law Enforcement		Pro-Activist	
	b (se)	Odds Ratio	b (se)	Odds Ratio	b (se)	Odds Ratio
Outlet Type[a]	-0.513 (0.371)	0.599	0.863* (0.433)	2.370	-0.035 (0.360	0.966
Political Leaning[b]	-0.134 (0.341)	0.875	0.933* (0.425)	2.542	-1.814*** (0.348)	0.163
President[c]	-0.268 (0.227)	0.765	-0.582* (0.263)	0.559	-0.616** (0.230)	0.540
Interaction Outlet Type × Political Leaning	1.528** (0.497)	4.608	0.324 (0.559)	1.382	0.480 (0.491)	1.616
Constant	-0.631		-1.928		1.176	
Wald X2	23.700		47.849		49.358	
DF	4		4		4	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
[a] 1=Traditional
[b] 1=Right
[c] 1 = During the Trump Administration.

Figure 2.Effect of Outlet Type by Political Leaning on Pro-Corporation Coverage

25

Table 10. Anti- Variables Regressed on Independent Variables and Interaction of Outlet Type and Political Leaning via Logistic Regression

	Anti-Corporation[d]		Anti-Law Enforcement		Anti-Activist	
	b (se)	Odds Ratio	b (se)	Odds Ratio	b (se)	Odds Ratio
Outlet Type[a]	--	--	-0.081 (0.328)	0.923	0.063 (0.396)	1.065
Political Leaning[b]	--	--	-2.335*** (0.549)	0.097	1.855*** (0.347)	6.395
President[c]	--	--	-0.117 (0.275)	0.890	0.431 (0.245)	1.539
Interaction Outlet Type × Political Leaning			0.200 (0.695)	1.222	0.398 (0.513)	1.489
Constant			-0.276		-1.524	
Wald X^2	--		49.779		81.170	
DF	--		4		4	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

[a] 1=Traditional

[b] 1=Right

[c] 1 = During the Trump Administration.

[d] This model failed to converge because too few articles were traditional, right-leaning, and anti-corporation.

Table 11. Pro- Variables Regressed on Independent Variables and Interaction of President and Political Leaning via Logistic Regression

	Pro-Corporation		Pro-Law Enforcement		Pro-Activist	
	b (se)	Odds Ratio	b (se)	Odds Ratio	b (se)	Odds Ratio
Outlet Type[a]	0.326 (0.232)	1.386	1.063*** (0.271)	2.893	0.221 (0.245)	1.247
Political Leaning[b]	0.527 (0.284)	1.693	1.154*** (0.324)	3.170	-1.686*** (0.308)	0.185
President[c]	-0.366 (0.346)	0.694	-0.498 (0.480)	0.697	-0.746* (0.336)	0.474
Interaction President × Political Leaning	0.238 (0.454)	1.269	-0.106 (0.573)	0.899	0.268 (0.458)	1.307
Constant	-0.856		-2.047		1.159	
Wald X^2	14.377		46.515		48.732	
DF	4		4		4	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

[a] 1=Traditional

[b] 1=Right

[c] 1 = During the Trump Administration.

Table 12. Anti- Variables Regressed on Independent Variables and Interaction of President and Political Leaning via Logistic Regression

	Anti-Corporation		Anti-Law Enforcement		Anti-Activist	
	b (se)	Odds Ratio	b (se)	Odds Ratio	b (se)	Odds Ratio
Outlet Type[a]	-0.101 (0.374)	0.904	-0.019 (0.288)	0.981	0.312 (0.252)	1.366
Political Leaning[b]	-2.808*** (0.759)	0.060	-1.904*** (0.383)	0.149	2.278*** (0.331)	9.757
President[c]	-0.076 (0.372)	0.927	0.093 (0.311)	1.098	0.766* (0.372)	2.152
Interaction President × Political Leaning	-0.180 (1.288)	0.835	-1.005 (0.737)	0.366	-0.572 (0.490)	0.564
Constant	-1.200		-0.376		-1.762	
Wald X^2	22.865		48.059		80.170	
DF	4		4		4	

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
[a] 1=Traditional
[b] 1=Right
[c] 1 = During the Trump Administration.

Coverage of Activists

Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the Chi-squared tests measuring the proportion of each

dependent variable in each level of the independent variables. Results indicate further support for

the expectation for the right-left control variable, with right leaning outlets having a significantly

lower (X^2=45.676, DF=1) proportion of pro-activist coverage (0.366) compared to left-leaning

outlets (0.713) as well as a significantly higher (X^2=87.363, DF=1) proportion of anti-activist

coverage (0.690) compared to left-leaning outlets (0.210). In addition, the control variable for

president was significant for pro-activist coverage, with significantly more (X^2=6.618, DF=1)

pro-activist coverage during the Obama administration (0.585) compared to the Trump

administration (0.499).

Although the interaction terms in the logistic regression provided the true test of

hypothesis 2a and 2b, Table 4 provided a surprising result, with traditional outlets having a

significantly higher (X^2=19.079, DF=1) proportion of anti-activist coverage (0.570) compared to

online outlets (0.346).

Results of the base model logistic regressions in Tables 5 and 6 with no interactions

reflected the results from the Chi-squared tests. Right-leaning outlets were 79.4% less likely to

produce pro-activist coverage (b=-1.579, se = 0.246) and 671.1% more likely to produce anti-

activist coverage (b=2.043, se = 0.254). In addition, results from Table 5 indicate that there was a

45.3% lower likelihood of pro-activist coverage during the Trump administration relative to the

Obama Administration. Outlet type was not significant for either the pro- or anti-activist models,

indicating that the effect seen in the Chi-squared test in Table 4 was potentially spurious.

Tables 9 and 10 show the results of the logistic models for the pro- and anti-activist

variables regressed on the independent variables as well as the interaction of outlet type and

political leaning. Hypotheses 2a and 2b were not supported in either model, with the effect of the interaction not being significant in both the model for pro-activist (b=0.480, se = 0.491) and the model for anti-activist (b=0.398, se = 0.513). These results indicate that the main cause of differential coverage of activists is the political leaning of the news outlet.

Tables 11 and 12 show the results of the logistic models for the pro- and anti-activist variables regressed on the independent variables as well as the interaction of political leaning and president. These models were essentially run to check if, for example, right leaning outlets were more supportive of state actors during the Trump administration. The results of these interactions were not significant, indicating that the larger political environment did not impact the likelihood of an outlet supporting law enforcement. Again, the main driver of pro- and anti-law enforcement coverage seems to be the right-left polarity.

Discussion

Hypothesis 1 was partially supported. In general, I expected that online news outlets would be more critical of state and corporate actors and traditional news outlets would be more supportive of state and corporate actors. Results of the Chi-squared tests provide support for all sub-hypotheses of hypothesis 1. Results of the logistic regression model supported hypothesis 1b, which predicted more pro-law enforcement coverage from traditional outlets. However, hypothesis 1a, which predicted more anti-law enforcement coverage from online outlets, was not supported. These base models also did not support hypotheses 1c and 1d, which predicted more anti-corporation coverage from online outlets and more pro-corporation coverage from traditional outlets, respectively.

The two significant interaction effects provide some nuance to these results. As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the sitting president moderated the effect of outlet type on the likelihood of

producing anti-law enforcement coverage, and the political leaning of an outlet moderated the effect of outlet type on the likelihood of pro-corporation coverage. The first result, shown in Figure 1, shows that during the Obama administration, online outlets were less likely to produce anti-law enforcement coverage than traditional outlets were. During the Trump administration, however, traditional outlets were less likely to produce anti-law enforcement coverage than online outlets were. This is likely influenced by a series of in-depth articles produced by the Intercept on police misconduct and law enforcement's collaboration with a private security firm called TigerSwan. These articles required detailed investigative reporting and were not published until the spring and summer of 2017, potentially explaining the effect seen in Figure 1. The opening lines of the first article of The Intercept's series is a good representation of the way they portrayed the situation.

> A shadowy international mercenary and security firm known as TigerSwan targeted the movement opposed to the Dakota Access Pipeline with military-style counterterrorism measures, collaborating closely with police in at least five states, according to internal documents obtained by The Intercept. The documents provide the first detailed picture of how TigerSwan, which originated as a U.S. military and State Department contractor helping to execute the global war on terror, worked at the behest of its client Energy Transfer Partners, the company building the Dakota Access Pipeline, to respond to the indigenous-led movement that sought to stop the project.

It should be noted that in almost every other case in which outlets other than the Intercept mentioned the security that was tasked with protecting the construction of the DAPL, they are presented as "unarmed" victims of attacks by protesters. The Intercept spent an entire series of

full-length articles discussing the collaboration of law enforcement with TigerSwan, including

their use of social media, aerial surveillance, and infiltration, likely having a large influence the

quantitative results.

The second interaction effect, shown in Figure 2, shows that although left-leaning outlets

were overall less likely to produce pro-corporation coverage, right-leaning online outlets were

also unlikely to produce pro-corporation coverage. In fact, the only group that had a positive

effect on likelihood to produce pro-corporation coverage was traditional right-leaning outlets. It

is likely the case that the *Wall Street Journal*'s coverage played a large role in this pattern. The

Wall Street Journal is effusive in its support of the corporations involved, emphasizing

repeatedly that, "the company Dakota Access went above and beyond the law's requirements to

mitigate its environmental impact." As an outlet that is specifically marketed to Wall Street

insiders, it makes sense that they would be likely to produce pro-corporation coverage.

Contrast this to an example of Salon's critical coverage of the corporation's ownership

and business practices:

> Kelcy Warren is the honcho of Energy Transfer Partners and its parent financial
>
> outfit, Energy Transfer Equity, a fossil fuel colossus that also owns Sunoco oil
>
> and Southern Union gas. Warren's company — with such an unkempt
>
> environmental record plus national notoriety for bulldozing over opposition from
>
> outraged landowners and communities — regularly has state and federal
>
> regulatory authorities to clear its path. This is done the old-fashioned way:
>
> Warren, ranked by Forbes as the 86th richest American, pumps big bucks into the
>
> campaign coffers of key politicos, drawing from corporate funds as well as his
>
> personal $5.45 billion fortune.

Whereas the *Wall Street Journal* portrayed Energy Transfer Partners as a benevolent corporation that followed the rules, Salon largely presents the corporation as greedy, destructive, and corrupt.

These results show how this study complicates the traditional understandings of the media through political economy frameworks. Theoretically, traditional news media outlets support corporate and state actors. They support the system as it exists by essentially producing propaganda for state and corporate elites. However, these models show consistently that right-leaning outlets produce more pro-corporate coverage than left-leaning outlets. The interaction effect shown in Figure 2 demonstrates that in addition to the left-right polarity influencing the amount of pro-corporate coverage, there is an effect of the online-traditional polarity. The effect of right-leaning outlets on the likelihood of producing pro-corporate coverage is carried mostly by the traditional right-leaning outlets, not the online ones. At least for corporate actors, the answer is more complicated than the media serving as propaganda for the ruling class.

Hypotheses 2a and 2b were not supported. In fact, the online-traditional polarity did not produce a significant main effect nor interaction effect in predicting pro- or anti-activist coverage in any model. According to these results, support and opposition to the activists remains an effect of the political leaning of an outlet. This finding complicates both the political economic perspective of the media as well as the understanding that social movement scholars have had of the media. The effect of political leaning on pro- and anti-activist coverage goes both ways; left-leaning outlets are also more likely to produce pro-activist coverage and less likely to produce anti-activist coverage. These results are consistent across all analyses. The fact that there were no significant interaction effects for the variables concerning the coverage of activists is significant because it indicates that even traditional left-leaning outlets are significantly more pro-activist than right-leaning outlets. These results are inconsistent with the

33

conceptualization of an outlet such as the *New York Times* as simply a propaganda tool for corporate and government elites when they are consistently more supportive of activists protesting the construction of a valuable pipeline. At the very least, the consistent difference shown by the left-right polarity on the coverage of activists validates the task of exploring the mechanisms for this variation in coverage.

For social movement scholars, these results indicate that it not only matters whether or not a movement receives coverage, but who produces the coverage. These results support Gitlin's concept that once the mainstream media begins covering a story, it's at the will of the biases of that outlet. These differences can manifest in all sorts of ways. For example, Breitbart describes the success of the movement in President Obama's decision to postpone the construction of the DAPL in the following way:

> Obama's action was seen at the time as "strengthening his hand" for what proved
> to be utterly worthless climate talks in Paris. The American people are thoroughly
> sick and tired of sacrificing their prosperity so left-wing leaders can act like big
> shots at luxuriously catered climate conferences.

Breitbart sees the protests against the DAPL as part of the "worthless" attempts to combat climate change. Breitbart's criticism of the Obama administration shows that it is part of a larger conservative political agenda that includes climate denialism and anti-environmentalism, going as far as to call it "The Church of Global Warming" in one article. Alternatively, outlets that lean left celebrated this decision across the board as a victory for the environment and the rights of indigenous groups. Here we see the impact of Davenport's "Rashomon Effect."

Conclusion

The Internet is changing our world. Results from hypothesis 1 indicate the type of outlet can create significant variation in the coverage of state actors. Although the remaining hypotheses were not supported, future research will hopefully examine these issues more closely.

The results from these analyses indicate that a traditional political economy framework understanding of the news media as pawns of government and corporate elites is limited. As different news outlets compete for readers, each must attempt to distinguish itself from the rest. The Intercept's unique criticism of private security and law enforcement in general as well as Salon's criticisms of corporate actors can be seen as examples of online news outlets seeking to distinguish themselves as a source of critical journalism that aligns with a specific portion of the population's previously held beliefs about law enforcement and corporations. In addition, the consistent effect of the left-right polarity indicates the larger political polarization that exists in the United States.

This study was limited in that although it sought to examine the routines and practices of journalists, the data was limited to the output of journalists, rather than a broader observation of their behavior, as would be possible in an ethnography. In addition, although part of the goal of this study was to examine the variety of news media, some outlets were simply not well-suited for the type of analysis done here. MSNBC creates much more video content than text articles, resulting in the amount of data from that source being significantly less than from the others. The Blaze also had a fairly small number of articles on the topic at hand. It is unclear whether the Blaze simply puts out less content than the other outlets or there was some other reason that they happened to cover the protests against the DAPL less than the other outlets. Regardless, collecting more data from a larger number of sources is an opportunity for future research. It

would also be valuable to engage in ethnographic research of journalists from a variety of different media outlets in order to develop a deeper understanding of the variation in their practices and routines.

Despite these limitations, this study contributes to the existing literature in a variety of ways. By examining differences in coverage of state and corporate actors between online and traditional outlets as well as outlets that lean left and right, this study complicates the traditional understanding of the news media as agents of state and corporate elites. Results from the analyses indicate that these variations in coverage are meaningful and deserve more attention. The consistent results of the political leaning variable may indicate that even traditional outlets are becoming increasingly partisan with regard to political activism. A broader historical analysis of the changing nature of the news media field would be needed to examine that question. Finally, this article shows that social movement tactics for generating media coverage can be portrayed in a variety of ways by media outlets. It will be important for social researchers to continue to analyze variation in coverage within the journalistic field in order to develop our understanding of the technology-media-movement complex.

Although all journalists now have to operate in the online world, outlets like Breitbart and Salon were born there. As the media field continues to change, social scientists have the opportunity to use this changing field to our advantage. How do these new organizations create news differently? How is the profession of journalism changing? What affects does this have on the relationship between social movements and the media? These are essential questions to our continued understanding of the digital world.

APPENDIX

Appendix 1. Definitions of Coding Categories

Pro-Corporation	Quotes from corporation, benefits of the pipeline, corporation portrayed as benevolent and following the rules.
Anti-Corporation	Discussions of the dangers of pipelines, misconduct of the corporation, and general criticisms of the corporation.
Pro-Law Enforcement	Law enforcement quotes, law enforcement portrayed as either victims, benevolent, or acting justifiably.
Anti-Law Enforcement	Law enforcement portrayed as violent and aggressive, discussions of historical injustices, and misconduct of private security forces.
Pro-Activist	Presentation of Activists' view, Successful activist, Coalition building, and discussion of Native Rights.
Anti-Activist	Activists portrayed as destructive, anti-American, disingenuous, lawbreaking, or factually incorrect.

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