Contesting Language(s):
Heteroglossia and the Politics of Language in the Corinthian Church

By

Ekaputra Tupamahu

Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the

Graduate School of Vanderbilt University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

Religion

May 10, 2019

Nashville, Tennessee

Approved:

Fernando F. Segovia, Ph.D.

Herbert R. Marbury, Ph.D.

Joseph L. Rife, Ph.D.

Tat-siong Benny Liew, Ph.D.

Untuk Mami dan Papi,
Christina Gaspersz and Alexander Tupamahu

Acknowledgments

Growing up in Indonesia taught me to appreciate what we call *gotong royong,* i.e., collective work towards a particular goal. The term recognizes that a person cannot exist and do things in isolation. One is always embedded in a community that supports and sustains one's existence. The reality of "being-in-the-community"–to adapt a term form Martin Heidegger–is the very reason I have reached the point at which I am now. The completion of this project would not have been possible without the support that I received from many people. It did take a community to get this project to the finish line.

I would like to thank my *Doktorvater*, Fernando Segovia, who has been instrumental in shaping me and my scholarship. With generosity and care, he has helped me in many different ways since the first day I arrived at Vanderbilt University in June 2012. I consider it a blessing to have worked with him throughout these years. Also, I would like express my gratitude to my dissertation committee members: Herbert Marbury, Joseph Rife, and Tat-siong Benny Liew. All the constructive comments and questions that I received from them made this project much stronger. Moreover, in the process of researching and writing this dissertation, I also received generous financial and scholarly support from the Forum for Theological Exploration, the Asian Theological Summer Institute, the Wabash Center, and the Louisville Institute. For their help and encouragement throughout this journey, I am deeply grateful!

I am thankful for many fellow doctoral students at Vanderbilt who in the past seven years have become my discussion partners: Sung Uk Lim, Luis Menéndez Antuña, Menghun Goh, Nicholas Schaser, Febbie Dickerson, Amy Allen, Michael Sekuras, Leonard Curry, Kyle Eugene Brooks, Yolanda Norton, and many others. The discussions I had with them helped clarify many of my thoughts. Special thanks also to Greg Carey, Amos Yong, Jonathan Tan, and Brian

Table of Contents

Introduction

I write in English, but I have never lost a feeling of distance from it. There is a tremendous difference between your mother tongue and another language. . . there is no substitution for the mother tongue.

Hannah Arendt[1]

[L]anguage bears within itself the necessity of its own critique.

Jacques Derrida[2]

A Personal Narrative

Since all politics is personal, as the saying goes, I begin this dissertation project with a personal narrative. Writing this dissertation has been not only an academic journey for me, but also a political one. As Hannah Arendt says of herself above, so too for me writing in English remains a great challenge simply because of the "distance" that I have with this language. I concur with Arendt that nothing can replace one's mother tongue. This simple and indeed mundane experience is what brought me to this dissertation project. Language is not only a means of communication, but also a constant struggle. When I was in California working with an Indonesian church, I saw many first-generation immigrants struggling daily to climb the socio-economic ladder, struggling simply because English is not their first tongue.

In 2014, I attended a Forum for Theological Exploration (FTE) summit at Garret-Evangelical Theological Seminary near Chicago. On the first night, we were asked to reflect on the challenges that scholars of color face in academia and I brought up the issue of linguistic barriers, barriers faced especially by first-generation immigrant scholars like myself. Wonhee Anne Joh, a professor of theology at Garret who was also an FTE faculty supervisor, challenged

---

[1] Hannah Arendt, *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, ed. Peter Baehr (New York: Penguin Classics, 2003), 13.
[2] Jacques Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in *Writing and Difference*, trans. Alan Bass (London: Routledge, 2005), 358.

me to think beyond merely submitting myself to a dominant colonial language. She argued that rather than me acquiescing to speak like a native speaker of English, or being forced by others to do so, we needed to think about ways in which we can decolonize English. This experience at the FTE summit was what prompted me to pursue the topic of this dissertation.

I asked myself whether the struggle of language is a universal human phenomenon. If so, I wondered: Was it also the experience of early Christians? However, academic discussion on the politics of language in the early Christian movement is virtually non-existent. Why do biblical scholars not discuss it? I have known from the first semester I learned Greek in Indonesia that the Greek noun γλῶσσα means not only physical tongue but also language. But why is it that when this word appears in Mark 16, Acts 2, and 1 Cor 14, it somehow refers to unintelligible ecstatic speech? Growing up in a Pentecostal tradition, I knew that ecstatic speech is a common way of reading those texts. As I will demonstrate in the first chapter of this dissertation, such a reading is the dominant reading among biblical scholars as well. The text of 1 Cor 14 stood out in particular because there is a demand for 'translation' in this text. But I wondered again: How on earth can ecstatic speech be translated? Echoing Aristotle's insistence that philosophy begins at wondering,[3] these original simple questions continued to bother me profoundly, and I decided to look into this issue of speaking in tongue(s)[4] more closely.

In the Fall 2013 semester, I took a class in the History Department at Vanderbilt on imperialism and colonialism. That class helped me to see that the production of literature is always embedded in and the result of historical processes and struggles. That is why literature is not just a *descriptive* picture of reality, but a space of struggle. As Edward Said has pointed out,

---

[3] "διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν" (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 982b.13)

[4] As I will demonstrate in chapter 4 in more detail, the parenthesis (s) is employed here because the word γλῶσσα appears in 1 Cor 14 in both singular and plural forms.

2

literature is a re-presentation (see chapter 4). With this in mind, I began to read the biblical texts with a very different set of eyes. In this sense, my reading is both historical and political. It aims to ground the reading of a text in the historical struggle and simultaneously look into the political struggle that gives rise to it.

Taking classes and reading texts by my *Doktorvater,* Fernando Segovia, further opened my eyes to the importance of the subject position of a reader in the process of interpretation. Readers are not transcendental, transhistorical, transcultural interpreters of a text. They are shaped, knowingly or unknowingly, by the particularity of their historical locations. An interpretation, therefore, has to be a "reading from this place."[5] This awareness of the inevitability of *reading from a particular place* has impacted profoundly the way in which I approach any biblical text. The text is no longer a stand-alone entity but part of an ongoing dialogical relationship with the reader(s). The dichotomy of objectivity versus subjectivity is a false one, for every reading is simultaneously objective and subjective. I explore this idea further in chapter 2.

This complexity of my personal experiences, which influences the way I interpret biblical texts, resonates quite well with William Arnal's insistence on another way of doing biblical scholarship. In an article published in 2010, Arnal challenges scholars of Christian origins, and *biblical* scholars in general, to go out from the bubble of *mere* historico-philological analysis and engage the broader studies in humanities in serious and meaningful ways.[6] In this dissertation

---

[5] This is an allusion to two volume edited works by Fernando Segovia and Mary Ann Tolbert.

[6] He writes: "As long as we waste our erudition quibbling over the meanings of individual words, or the details of source relationships, or what Paul ''really'' meant, and imagine that definitive conclusions of this sort are the end and ultimate justification for our study, we will continue, justly and correctly, to be viewed as an arcane and irrelevant theological sub-field with little of relevance to contribute to the study of religion or to the humanities in general. But the study of the origins of Christianity does not have to accept this road to irrelevance and obscurity, nor need such an antiquarian, exceptionalist, or purely theological identity be imposed on the field, as a whole, from without. If, rather, we are willing to make the effort to speak to people who are interested in how humans behave, in general, we will demonstrate the potential value of Christian origins for the study of religion as a broader field, as

project, I am attempting to make a case for an alternative mode of reading the linguistic-political dynamics in the church of Corinth by engaging a broader study of humanities: among others, philosophy, sociolinguistics, politics, and archaeology.

The Flow of the Dissertation

My dissertation looks into the issue of language struggle through reception analysis, contextual-theoretical analysis, socio-historical analysis, and exegetical analysis. Each chapter will address each of those four aspects. The first chapter deals with the history of reception; the second chapter, with the theoretical framework; the third chapter, with the socio-historical reconstruction of the linguistic situation of the city of Corinth in the Roman period; and the fourth chapter, with the reading of Pauline discourse on language in 1 Cor 14.

In his lecture responding to Claude Lévi-Strauss at John Hopkins University in 1966, Jacques Derrida argues that the structurality of knowledge production in the social sciences—exemplified particularly in the works of Lévi-Strauss—cannot escape the process of *sign*ification, of making sign, of language. On the basis of this preposition, Derrida insists that the critique of this system of knowledge production is to be found within the language itself because "language bears within itself the necessity of its own critique." [7] He offers two strategies: first, to trace the history of the concepts employed in the system; and second, to examine the concepts and show their limits so that there "no longer [be] any truth value attributed to them."[8] While Derrida primarily employs the second strategy in order to

---

well as the potential value of the study of religion for Christian Origins; at the very least we should insist – and our scholarship should reflect this insistence – that a productive conversation about human practices can be had between scholars with data derived from the New Testament and other ancient Christian materials." See William Arnal, "What Branches Grow out of This Stony Rubbish? Christian Origins and the Study of Religion," *Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses* 39, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 552.

[7] Derrida, "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," 358.

[8] Derrida, 359.

deconstruct the structure from within, in this dissertation I take the first route by examining the history of the concept.

How does the idea of speaking in tongue(s) as an ecstatic speech phenomenon manifest itself in the history of interpretation? This question is the primary concern of chapter 1. That chapter is a genealogical analysis of the concept of speaking in tongue(s), which is framed in what I call the "mode of reading." There are two major mode of readings that have been developed over the course of the history of interpretation: missionary-expansionist and romantic-nationalist modes of reading. The missionary-expansionist mode of reading gave rise to the idea that tongue(s) is a miraculous ability to speak in foreign language. Beginning from the late eighteenth century, German scholars introduced the romantic-nationalist modes of reading that has resulted in interpretation of the phenomenon of speaking in tongue(s) as an explosion of human feeling.

Chapter 2 concerns the situatedness of my reading. First of all, I offer a critique of the dominance of the romantic-nationalist mode of reading. Instead of interpreting the phenomenon of speaking in tongue(s) from a Herderian romantic-nationalist philosophy of language, by going back to an Indonesian conception of language as a social performance this chapter suggests an alternative way in conversation with Mikhail Bakhtin's theory of heteroglossia. Furthermore, I localize the social context of my reading in the language struggle of immigrants in the United States. The alternative mode of reading proposed in this chapter is, thus, a heteroglossic-immigrant one.

Chapter 3 deals primarily with the socio-historical context of the city of Corinth in the Roman period. This chapter begins with a general description of the linguistic situation in the larger Greco-Roman world. I then zoom in on the particularity of the linguistic situation of the

city of Corinth, highlighting the dominance of Latin and Greek there. Yet this chapter goes

further, presenting some evidence for the possibility of multilingual existence underneath the

dominance of Latin and Greek in Corinth. In doing so, I attempt to demonstrate that the city of

Corinth in the Roman era was a multilingual space. This social context, I suggest, would have

had a direct consequence on the sociolinguistic make-up of early Christian believers in Corinth

to whom Paul wrote his letter.

The last chapter is a close reading of Pauline discourse on language, particularly in 1 Cor

14. In this chapter I first present a case for tongue(s) as a heteroglossic instead of glossolalic

(i.e., unintelligible ecstatic speech) problem by revisiting, among others, Pauline appropriation of

Isaiah 28:11–12, the use of singular and plural forms of γλῶσσα, and the issue of Paul's demand

for translation. I then highlight three aspects of linguistic politics that appear in Paul's discourse,

i.e., politics of race-ethnicity, gender, and imperialism. Whereas Paul attempts to unify language

by demanding translation and silencing tongue(s), this chapter reimagines tongue(s) as a site of

resistance and disruption.

The Overall Aim of the Project

The aim of this project is quite simple. Because early Christians came from a diverse

linguistic background, this dissertation attempts to demonstrate that language became an

inevitable site of political struggle for them. The indicator of such struggle appears in how they

dealt with the issue of tongue(s), namely as a heteroglossic phenomenon. Paul's discussion in 1

Cor 14 represents a discursive force of language unification in public gatherings through

silencing minority language speakers. Although tongue(s) speakers have been cast as trouble-

makers in the Corinthian church, this dissertation reimagines the existence of tongues as a

resistance against and disruption of the force of the unified dominant language. With this in mind, let us journey now through the history of interpretation of tongue(s).

Chapter 1

Why on Earth Does Tongue(s) Become Ecstatic Speech?:
The Rise and Dominance of a Romantic-Nationalist Mode of Reading

This darkness [of speaking with tongue(s)], I imagine, can never be perfectly dispelled.
L. J. Rückter[1]

Language distinguishes nations from each other; one does not know where a man is from until after he has spoken. Usage and need make each learn the language of his country.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau[2]

No one understood him [Paul], one might say, but then no one completely misunderstood him either.
Jacob Taubes[3]

1.1. Introduction

This chapter is framed in what I call the "mode of reading." The idea of *mode* is embedded in both the Greek conception of τρόπος (manner/way/character) and the Latin notion of *modus* (measure/extent). That is to say, *mode* signifies both the manner and measure by which reading as an interpretative enterprise is performed. On the one hand, a mode of reading works as a τρόπος, as a manner or character, that shapes the mood, trend, and tendency of interpretation. Once a mode of reading is established, it will consequently turn into a tradition[4] that will be the atmosphere in which a reader breathes and moves. A mode of reading is indeed, to borrow

---

[1] L.J. Rückert, "On the Gifts of Prophecy and of Speaking in Tongues," in *Selections from German Literature*, ed. B.B. Edwards and E.A. Park (Andover: Gould, Newman and Saxton, 1839), 90.

[2] Jean Jacques Rousseau, "Essay on the Origin of Languages," in *Essay on the Origin of Languages and Writings Related to Music*, ed. and trans. John T. Scott, vol. 7 (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2013), 289.

[3] Jacob Taubes, *The Political Theology of Paul*, trans. Dana Hollander (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 57.

[4] See Hans-Georg Gadamer's helpful discussion on hermeneutics and tradition in Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd rev. ed. / translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. (New York: Crossroad, 1989).

Fredric Jameson's words, the "collective consciousness,"[5] a tradition that will haunt every reading; escaping is not an option. On the other hand, *mode* also works as a measuring stick, i.e., a *canon*, by which the arguments of a particular reading are placed in opposition to other ways of interpretation. It is no surprise, therefore, that supporting arguments in a particular mode of reading are often repeated without proper acknowledgement and taken as common knowledge. Just as Thomas Kuhn calls well-established and received [scientific] theories "normal science" that somehow functions as the "puzzle-solving" mechanism,[6] a mode of reading will provide general coherence to the particularity of interpretation that simultaneously eliminates things which do not fit with the overall picture.

As a consequence, a *mode* presupposes that reading is not an isolated endeavor. The optimistic notion that an individual can read and interpret a text objectively without being influenced or shaped by others should be considered deeply problematic. Reading is, and will always be, a collective activity. Mikhail Bakhtin speaks of it in terms of "appropriation";[7] reading in this sense is a project of appropriating of what has already been said. It is a "reworking and imitation of someone else's property," as Paul Lehmann puts it.[8] Not only is

---

[5] Jameson's concept of "model" is similar to what I call *mode* here. For him, "the history of thought, is the history of its models." A model, no matter how coherently established it is, is unstable and filled with dilemmas that each new generation of thinkers would have to struggle with. This wrestling with the weaknesses and instability of the old model often lead to the birth of another model. See Fredric Jameson, *The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), v.

[6] Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Third edition (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 35ff. Khun's major contribution is to see the history of science as "paradigm shifts." A paradigm functions as a hermeneutical lens that determines the shape of scientific research itself. That is to say, every piece of scientific research tends to conform to the dominant paradigm in the given period of time. By examining some "major turning points" or "paradigm shifts" in the history of science, e.g., Copernican, Newtonian, Lavosieran, and Einsteinian paradigms, Kuhn argues that paradigms not only constitute different reference points, but also "models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research." For a helpful discussion on Khun's paradigm and the theory of biblical reception, see David Paul Parris, *Reception Theory and Biblical Hermeneutics* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2015).

[7] See M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004), 293ff.

[8] Paul Lehmann quoted in Bakhtin, 69.

reading always a collective enterprise, it is also embedded in the particularity of both temporal and spatial context.

There are two major modes of reading in the history of interpretation of the phenomenon of speaking in tongue(s) in the New Testament, modes that profoundly shape biblical scholarship: the "missionary-expansionist" and the "romantic-nationalist" modes of reading. The missionary-expansionist mode of reading was the dominant form until about the middle of the nineteenth century. It was a way of reading that understood the concept of tongue(s) to be a *miraculous* ability to speak in foreign languages. Because it was born out of the early Christian expansionist movement prior to the Enlightenment and to the rise of nationalism in Europe, it can be categorized as a pre-modern mode of reading. On the other hand, the romantic-nationalist mode, which is the product of modern scholarship in Europe and especially in Germany, challenged the previous mode of reading, grew stronger in the nineteenth century, until it became the dominant one today.

Given the space constraints of this dissertation, I discuss the first mode of reading only as background for the rise of the second mode. Not that this mode of reading is less important. In fact, whereas much serious research has been conducted on the first (missionary-expansionist) mode, the history of the second (romantic-nationalist) mode is largely neglected in scholarship today. I will spend more time discussing the development of the second mode of reading because of this relative neglect and because it is the dominant approach in biblical scholarship today. Knowing the historical and political contexts in and from which it emerges, helps set the stage for another mode of reading that this dissertation proposes as an alternative. I call it an "alternative" in order to signal the gesture of hospitality. Thus, although sometimes my language can be combative and persuasive, what I am going to propose in this dissertation is not, and

should not be seen as, a refutation or even negation of the already existing modes of readings. The alternative mode, which is a "heteroglossic-immigrant" mode of reading, is introduced and discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. With this in mind, I turn now to the early interpretation of tongue(s), an interpretation that lasted until around the middle of the nineteenth century.

1.2. A Missionary-Expansionist Mode of Reading: A Pre-Modern Interpretation of the Corinthian Tongue(s)

From its early inception in Galilee and Jerusalem, the early Jesus movement was marked by its zeal to spread the news about Jesus' resurrection throughout the Roman empire and beyond. As I. Howard Marshall states, "It cannot be doubted that early Christianity was a missionary movement and that evangelism was practised. The church could not have spread and grown in the way it did purely spontaneously without the Gospel being deliberately communicated to those who had not yet heard it or not yet responded positively to it."[9] When the Jesus movement reached the world outside the Palestine, language barriers obviously became the strongest roadblocks for its expansionist enterprise. The earliest example of this linguistic struggle can be seen in the inability of Paul and Barnabas to understand the Lycaonian language in Acts 14:8-20.

Eusebius of Caesarea in the fourth century vividly described the challenge of crossing linguistic borders when he tried to defend the disciples of Jesus against the accusation that they are a group of deceivers or liars. He portrayed them as "poor and uneducated" people who strongly believed in what they saw in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. "[W]hat lay at the

---

[9] I. Howard Marshall, "Who Were the Evangelists?," in *The Mission of the Early Church to Jews and Gentiles*, ed. Jostein Ådna and Hans Kvalbein, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 127 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 252.

root of their earnestness… is it not the answer clear? . . . How is it possible to think that they

were all in agreement to lie?" asks Eusebius rhetorically.[10] Eusebius's point is clear: they had a

total commitment to Christ and his teaching, to the extent that they were willing to live in

poverty for the sake of spreading the news about Christ.

Referring to Matthew 28:19 in which Jesus commanded his disciples to "make disciples

of all the nations," Eusebius wrote:

> "But how," the disciples might reasonably have answered the Master "can we do it?
> How, pray, can we preach to the Romans? How can we argue with Egyptians? We are
> men bred up to use the Syrian tongue only, what language shall we speak to the Greeks?
> How shall we persuade Persians, Armenians, Chaldaeans, Seythians, Indians, and other
> barbarous nations to give up their ancestral gods, and worship the Creator of all? What
> sufficiency of speech have we to trust in attempting such work as this? And what hope of
> success can we have if we dare to proclaim laws directly opposed to the laws about their
> own gods that have been established for ages among all nations? By what power shall we
> ever survive our daring attempt?"[11]

From this statement it is obvious that Eusebius was fully aware of the linguistic challenges that

early Christians had to face. Language barriers were the real obstacles in the early Christian

evangelistic endeavor. Arguing that they were an uneducated and poor group of people who were

familiar only with their own mother tongue, Eusebius insisted that early Christians' ability to

preach the Gospel throughout the world was evidence of the genuine work of God.[12]

---

[10] Eusebius, *Demonstration of the Gospel,* III.5.109d-110d in Eusebius, *The Proof of the Gospel Being the Demonstratio Evangelica of Eusebius of Caesarea*, trans. W. J. Ferrar, vol. 1, Translation of Christian Literature 1 (London; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920), 127.

[11] Eusebius, *Demonstration of the Gospel,* III.5.136a-c in Eusebius, 1:157.

[12] Eusebius explains: "Granted that they were deceitful cozeners, you must add that they were uneducated, and quite common men, and Barbarians to boot, with no knowledge of any tongue but Syrian, how, then, did they go into all world? Where was the intellect to sketch out so daring a scheme? What was the power that enabled them to succeed in their adventure? For I will admit that if they confined their energies to their own country, men of no education might deceive and be deceived, and not allow a matter to rest. But to preach to all the name of Jesus, to teach about his marvelous deeds in country and town, that some of them should take possession of the Roman Empire, and the Queen of Cities itself, and others the Persian, others the Armenian, that others should go to the Parthian race, and yet others to the Seythian, that some already should have reached the very end of the world, should have reached the land of the Indians, and some have crossed the Ocean and reached the isles of Britain, all this I for my part will not admit to be the work of mere men, far less poor and ignorant men, certainly not of deceivers and wizards." Eusebius, *Demonstration of the Gospel,* III.5.112c-113a in Eusebius, 1:129–30.

Commenting on this passage, Yuliya Minets correctly points out that "Eusebius never overtly declared that one ought to attribute the success of the apostles' mission to their sudden ability to speak in foreign languages."[13] In spite of this, however, I also agree with Minets' observation that Eusebius knew quite well that multilingualism was a serious "challenge for the apostolic mission and for the universal spread of Christianity."[14] He, in other words, provides a clue that early Christians were struggling with language differences as this movement began to step outside their original context. It is in light of this linguistic challenge that many early Christians interpreted the gift of speaking in tongue(s) in the New Testament.[15]

The earliest writer outside the New Testament who referred to the phenomenon of tongue(s) was Irenaeus of Lyons in the second century. We do not have any other explicit reference to speaking in tongue(s) prior to the fourth century.[16] Irenaeus wrote:

---

[13] Yuliya Minets, "The Slow Fall of Babel: Conceptualization of Languages, Linguistic Diversity and History in Late Ancient Christianity" (Catholic University of America, 2017), 234. Minets' dissertation is one of the most comprehensive survey on tongues in the early Christian literature. Although I have a sharp disagreement on her reading of some of the texts, her work has been a tremendous help to this project in highlighting major works on the reception of the New Testament in late antiquity, especially among Greek, Latin, and Syriac authors. Also, Eusebius does talk about the Montanism as a tongue(s) speaking movement. He has a quite negative picture of them as being "like poisonous reptiles crawl[ing] over Asia and Phrygia," in his *Church History*. Both Minets and Forbes have pointed out, Eusebius's discussion on their ecstatic speech is not characterized as "speaking in tongues." Thus, it shouldn't be used as a proof that the Montanist phenomenon is parallel to what Acts 2 or 1 Cor. 14 talk about. Christopher Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 75 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 160–62.

[14] Minets, "The Slow Fall of Babel: Conceptualization of Languages, Linguistic Diversity and History in Late Ancient Christianity," 235.

[15] Minets correctly argues that "the greater interest of the Christian author in the fourth century and later in the apostolic speaking in foreign languages is symptomatic of their increasing awareness of the world's multilingualism." Minets, 237.

[16] Harold Hunter has attempted to establish the case that there are some allusions or echoes to speaking in tongue(s) in the Apostolic fathers, such as Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, the Didache, the Epistle of Barnabas, and Sheperd of Hermas. Since there is no direct reference to tongue(s), Hunter thinks that there should be an allusion to this phenomenon especially when they talk about *charisma* in general or prophecy in particular. This is what Hunter has to say about it: "In view of the association of prophecy with tongues–speech in the book of Acts, and since one form of tongues-speech is listed among the charismata enumerated in 1 Cor 12:8-10, wherever the term *charismata* or various gifts listed in 1 Corinthians 12 are in evidence, especially prophecy, it will be considered to indicate the *possibility* of the presence of tongues-speech." Harold D. Hunter, "Tongues-Speech: A Patristic Analysis," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 23, no. 2 (June 1980): 125–26. In his Ph.D. dissertation at Fuller Theological Seminary, Hunter also dealt with the patristic reference to speaking in tongue(s). Harold D.

> For this reason does the apostle declare, "We speak wisdom among them that are perfect," terming those persons "perfect" who have received the Spirit of God, and who through the Spirit of God do speak in all languages, as he used Himself also to speak. In like manner we do also hear many brethren in the Church, who possess prophetic gifts, and who through the Spirit speak all kinds of languages, and bring to light for the general benefit the hidden things of men, and declare the mysteries of God, whom also the apostle terms "spiritual," they being spiritual because they partake of the Spirit, and not because their flesh has been stripped off and taken away, and because they have become purely spiritual.[17]

Now, if this is the case also with Irenaeus, then how do we understand his comment that the early believers "through the Spirit speak all kinds of languages [παντοδαπαῖς λαλούντων διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος γλώσσαις]"? If one wants to look for unintelligible ecstatic speech, this passage is not clear at all. Stuart D. Currie's argument that "Irenaeus, like Chrysostom, thinks *glōssais lalein* means to speak in human languages one has not learned"[18] is still within a reasonable range of interpretation.

Hunter, "Spirit-Baptism: Evaluated Biblically, Historically and Systematically" (Fuller Theological Seminary, 1979), chap. 5.

Also, there are efforts by scholars such as George W. Dollar and Cleon L. Rogers, who have a cessationist tendency and are affiliated primarily with Dallas Theological Seminary, to argue that the widespread absence of the discussion on tongue(s) before the fourth century becomes a pointer that the gift has completely ceased. It is important to note that these publications are part of the *Symposium on the Tongues Movement* conducted by Dallas Seminary as an effort to respond [negatively] against modern Pentecostal movement and their ecstatic experience of glossolalia. George W. Dollar, "Church History and the Tongues Movement," *Bibliotheca Sacra* 120, no. 480 (October 1963): 316–21; Cleon L. Rogers, "The Gift of Tongues in the Post-Apostolic Church," *Bibliotheca Sacra* 122 (June 1965): 134–43. Dollar's thesis is heavily indebted to the work of George Cutten. (George Barton Cutten, *Speaking with Tongues, Historically and Psychologically Considered* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1927). As a response to this thesis, Hunter notes that their argument is weak because it is based primarily on silence. Hunter, "Spirit-Baptism: Evaluated Biblically, Historically and Systematically," 136. Cf. Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*, 77–78.

[17] Irenaeus, *Against Heresies,* V.6.1.

[18] Stuart D. Currie, "Speaking in Tongues": Early Evidence Outside the New Testament Bearing on 'Glossais Lalein,'" *Interpretation* 19 (1965): 277. Currie himself thinks that Irenaeus might have misunderstood this gift because it never appeared in the time between Luke and Irenaeus. "If the experience had been widespread, one would suppose it should have left some traces in the writings of the early Christians," Currie argues. See also other discussion on Irenaeus in Cecil. M. Robeck Jr., "Irenaeus and 'Prophetic Gifts,'" in *Essays on Apostolic Themes: Studies in Honor of Howard M. Ervin, Presented to Him by Colleagues and Friends on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, ed. Paul Elbert (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2007), 104–14; Currie, "Speaking in Tongues": Early Evidence Outside the New Testament Bearing on 'Glossais Lalein'"; Anthony C. Thiselton, "The 'Interpretation' of Tongues: A New Suggestion in Light of Greek Usage in Philo and Josephus," *The Journal of Theological Studies* 30, no. 1 (April 1, 1979): 29.

Minets argues that it is unclear whether this passage refers to ecstatic speech or speaking in foreign languages. For Minets, due to the ambiguity of the New Testament passages on glossolalia, "it is not a surprise that early Christian authors provided divergent explanations for the linguistic phenomenon, ranging from unintelligible ecstatic speech (1 Cor. 12-14) to meaningful utterances in real foreign languages that enabled missionary activities abroad (following Acts 2)."[19] Since Irenaeus's statement does not directly or explicitly refer to different places of the world, but simply "all kinds of languages," Minets thinks that it is unclear.

The problem with this reading of Irenaeus, I would argue, lies in Minets' interpretation of the biblical text on tongue(s) in Acts 2 and 1 Cor. 12-14. She states that, "the accounts of Acts 2 and 1 Cor. 14 are so different, that one could easily question whether they describe the same phenomenon."[20] Because of this, she then concludes that Acts 2 is an account about the apostles speaking foreign languages, whereas 1 Cor. 14 "refers to unintelligible ecstatic speech."[21] She insists further that the term γλῶσσα, for Paul, "functioned as a technical term for an ecstatic mode of speaking." Acts 2 describes the experience as "the miracle of xenolalia."[22] This particular interpretation of the biblical texts shapes and influences the way she categorizes and interprets the texts from the early Christian authors. This said, there are many unclear data from the early Christian writings, but this does not have to mean that the option is between speaking in foreign languages and speaking in an ecstatic state, as Minets has argued. This is to say, when the texts are clear, they almost all definitely refer to tongue(s) as the ability to speak foreign languages. Also, when they are not clear it is almost impossible to conclude that they are about

---

[19] Minets, "The Slow Fall of Babel: Conceptualization of Languages, Linguistic Diversity and History in Late Ancient Christianity," 229.
[20] Minets, 127.
[21] Minets, 127.
[22] Minets, 128.

the unintelligible ecstatic spiritual experience. Some examples of the other early Christian texts that Minets categorizes as evidence of tongue(s) as an ecstatic experience, such as are Pseudo Macarius[23] and Gergory of Nyssa,[24] are actually very weak because they do not directly point to an ecstatic experience. The idea of ecstasy she imposes on these texts on the basis of her reading of the New Testament texts. Thus, it is probably better to categorize these texts as either unclear or as being about foreign languages, instead of Minets' assumption that they refer to either unintelligible ecstatic speech or foreign languages.

The clearest example of the missionary-expansionist mode of reading of these texts comes from the fourth-century preacher and church leader in Constantinople, John Chrysostom.

---

[23] Regarding Pseudo Macarius, Minets argues that "In a single instance when he cited 1 Cor. 4-5, [he] followed Paul's understanding of 'speaking in tongues' as an unintelligible utterance and asserted that one who prophecies edifies the Church and, therefore, is greater than those who speak in tongues." This is not true at all for three reasons. First of all, Minets does not provide any direct quotation from Ps.-Macarius. There is no close analysis of the text to support this assertion. Second, Minets is correct that "he was definitely not interested in discussing different foreign languages." But the absence of discussion on foreign languages does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he believed in tongue(s) as ecstatic speech. Third, the quotation of 1 Cor. 14 in Ps.-Macarius is in the context of his discussion on prayer. He believes that a true prayer should be conducted in quietness. And then, in order to support this view, he quotes 1 Cor. 14:33 that talks about God being not the God of confusion but of peace. Another quotation of 1 Cor. 14 appears right in the next section of that homily in which he talks about governing one's mind while praying. There are some people, according to Ps.-Macarius, who pray with their own strength without being aware that "their thoughts deceive them." This, I would argue, is a condition of prayer in which a person speaks with fancy and beautiful or flowery words. On the other side, Ps.-Macarius argues that when one prays one has to learn to reject the temptation of relying on one's thoughts by walking "after the will of the Lord." Here is where he quotes 1 Cor. 14:4-5 about speaking in tongues as edifying oneself whereas prophesying edifies the church and, therefore, prophecy is greater than tongues. Ps.-Macarius, on the one hand, equates those who speak with their own thoughts with tongues speakers, and on the other hand, the ones who walk in the path of the Lord with those who prophesy (Pseudo Macarius, *Fifty Spiritual Homilies*, VI.3-4). The text says nothing about ecstatic phenomenon. Yes, Minets is right that "there are no reasons to believe that he understood the gift of tongues as speaking in foreign language," but it is arguable that the gift is not an unintelligible ecstasy either. Minets, 238ff.

[24] Minets insists that "Gregory of Nyssa agreed with Ps.-Macarius's idea that the gift of tongues is the speaking in angelic tongues." In order to make a case for this point, Minets has to demonstrate that the reference to tongues of angels points to an ecstatic experience, which is something that is difficult to establish from Paul's letter. The context of Gregory Nyssa's statement is his discussion on love, so the statement on the tongues of angels must be a direct reference to 1 Cor. 13:1. I tend to agree with Robert Gundry that this is a rhetorical strategy to emphasize a point by using exaggeration. See Gregory of Nyssa, "On The Christian Mode of Life," in *Ascetical Works (The Fathers of the Church, Volume 58)*, ed. Virginia Woods Callahan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 123–58; Robert H. Gundry, "'Ecstatic Utterance' (N.E.B)?," *Journal of Theological Studies* 17, no. 2 (1966): 301.

According to Chrysostom, the apostles needed the gift of speaking in tongue(s) on the day of

Pentecost "because they were to go abroad everywhere." He then explains further:

> And as in the time of building the tower the one tongue was divided into many; so then
> the many tongues frequently met in one man, and the same person used to discourse both
> in the Persian, and the Roman, and the Indian, and many other tongues, the Spirit
> sounding within him: and the gift was called the gift of tongues because he could all at
> once speak various languages (τα χάρισμα ἐκαλείτο χάρισμα γλωττῶν, ἐπειδή πολλαίς
> ἀθρόον ἐδύνατο λαλείν φωναῖς).[25]

As Margaret Mitchell has pointed out, Chrysostom's view of speaking in tongue(s) can be

characterized as a "spontaneous multilinguality,"[26] that is, it is a special gift because multiple

languages are expressed by a single person.[27]

Chrysostom's notion of multilingualism is made very clear in his interpretation of 1 Cor.

14:10 concerning "there [being] many kind of voices in the world" (τοσαῦτα . . . γένη φωνῶν

ἐστιν ἐν κόσμον). For him, this statement simply means, "so many tongues, so many voices of

Scythians, Thracians, Romans, Persians, Moors, Indians, Egyptians, innumerable other nations"

(Τουτέστι, τοσαῦται γλῶσσαι, τοσαῦται φωναὶ, Σκυθῶν, Θρακῶν, Ῥωμαίων, Περσῶν, Μαύρων,

Ἰνδῶν, Αἰγυπτίων, ἑτέρων μυρίων ἐθνῶν).[28] The reference to "ἑτέρων μυρίων ἐθνῶν" shows

that Chrysostom sees a connection between language and ethnic identity. However, as we will

see in the next part of this chapter, the idea of "nation" as a political system did not yet exist in

the time of Chrysostom, so it is likely that he refers to a general and broader notion of a people

---

[25] Chrysostom, *Homily 35 on First Corinthians.* For further discussion on Chrysostom's understanding of speaking in tongue(s), see Chris Len de Wet Chris, "The Homily of John Chrysostom on 1 Corinthians 12: A Model of Antiochene Exegesis on the Charismata" (University of Pretoria, 2007).

[26] Margaret Mary Mitchell, *The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art of Pauline Interpretation* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002), 295 n. 451.

[27] Although Anthony Thiselton agrees that Chrysostom views tongue(s) as a multilingual ability, he also points out that Chrysostom is still uncertain about it especially in light of his homily on 1 Cor. 12. See Thiselton, "The 'Interpretation' of Tongues." Cf. also Carl Clemens, "The 'Speaking with Tongues' of the Early Christians," Expository Times 10 (1898-99): 344-352.

[28] Chrysostom, *Homily 35 on First Corinthians.*

group. The exegetical move to equate kind of voices (γένη φωνῶν) with many tongues (τοσαῦται γλῶσσαι) points to his acknowledgment of the existence of many languages in the world. Thus, speaking in tongue(s) simply means speaking many languages. The list of languages also confirms this view.

As Minets has demonstrated quite well, there are many other instances of early Christian literature that point to a widespread understanding of tongue(s) as speaking in foreign languages. "After Eusebius, the interpretation of [the] Pentecostal gift of tongues as speaking in actual foreign languages became conventional in Christian literature, and found its way into the works of Gregory Nazianzus, Epiphanius of Salamis, Cyril of Jerusalem, and into the anonymous treatise *On the Trinity,*"[29] she explains. A similar trend also can be seen throughout both Latin and Syriac literature in late antiquity.[30]

Some of these authors expressed the missionary-expansionist tendency in a particularly vivid way. Gregory of Nazianzus in the late fourth century, for example, wrote this about the experience of the disciples on the day of Pentecost: "They spoke with strange tongues, and not those of their native land; and the wonder was great, a language spoken by those who had not learned it."[31] Mixing this story of Pentecost and Paul's quotation of Isaiah 28:11 in 1 Cor. 14, Gregory argues that the message is mainly to the unbelievers because its content is "an accusation of the unbelievers."[32]

---

[29] Minets, "The Slow Fall of Babel: Conceptualization of Languages, Linguistic Diversity and History in Late Ancient Christianity," 263.

[30] For a more thorough discussion, see Minets, 264–98.

[31] Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration 41: On Pentecost*, 15. Minets points out that instead of using the expression "ἑτέραις γλώσσαις" in Acts 2:4, Gregory replaces ἑτέραις with ξέναις and contrasted this phenomenon with the native tongue (οὐ οατρίος) of the disciples. He further adds Paul's line on the sign to unbelievers and not to believers to his discussion. Such rhetorical move, according to Minet, "implies that for him γλώσαις λαλεῖν in Acts 2 and 1 Cor 14 refers to essentially the same phenomenon, that phenomenon is speaking in foreign languages." See Minets, 241.

[32] Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration 41: On Pentecost*, 15.

Theodoret of Cyrus' work from the fifth century is probably the best example of this

missionary-expansionist mode of reading. In his commentary on 1 Corinthians 14 on the gift of

tongue(s) he wrote:

> You see, this gift was made to the preachers on account of people's different languages
> so that on reaching the Indians they would use their language in offering the divine
> message; and likewise in speaking with Persians, Scythians, Romans, and Egyptians they
> might use language of each in preaching the evangelical teaching. So for those speaking
> in Corinth it was unnecessary to use the language of Scythians, Persians or Egyptians,
> because they were unable to understand. This was surely the reason the divine apostle
> also said the one speaking in tongues was speaking not to human beings but to God; in
> fact, he went on, no one hears it, and in case the gift be thought useless, they are speaking
> mysteries through the Spirit.[33]

This passage demonstrates that the concern over linguistic difference in the early expansionist

effort was not just found in Eusebius, but also the work of other early Christian writers and

leaders. This gift is clearly seen as a shortcut to the long process of both learning and mastering a

new language. Given the mandate to preach the Gospel to the ends of the earth, with divine help

in the form of tongues, Christians would be able to cross every linguistic boundary without much

difficulty. In addition, Theodoret's reconstruction of the situation in Corinth is also quite

interesting because he sees the problem of tongue(s) as unnecessary use of many languages in a

local public gathering. Commenting on Paul's statement that he wants the Corinthians to

prophesy more than to speak in tongue(s), Theodoret explains: "He clearly explained why he

used *more*: I am not denigrating the gift (he is saying), but looking for its usefulness; with no

translation available, prophecy is better, offering greater value." Theodoret seems to believe that

the only difference between tongue(s) and prophecy is translation.[34]

---

[33] Theodoret of Cyrus, *Theodoret of Cyrus: Commentary on The Letters of St Paul*, ed. and trans. Robert C. Hill (Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2001), 219–20.

[34] Theodoret of Cyrus, 120.

As Minets has pointed out, until around the fifth century the dominant view of speaking in tongue(s) was clearly to speak in foreign languages. In the medieval period, the idea that tongue(s) was the phenomenon of speaking in foreign languages for the purpose of evangelism remained dominant. Answering the objection that the early apostles could not have the divine ability to know all languages, Thomas Aquinas wrote the following response in his *Summa Theologica:*

> I answer that, Christ's first disciples were chosen by Him in order that they might disperse throughout the whole world, and preach His faith everywhere, according to Mt. 28:19, "Going . . . teach ye all nations." Now it was not fitting that they who were being sent to teach others should need to be taught by others, either as to how they should speak to other people, or as to how they were to understand those who spoke to them; and all the more seeing that those who were being sent were of one nation, that of Judea, according to Is. 27:6, "When they shall rush out from Jacob [*Vulg.: 'When they shall rush in unto Jacob,' etc.] . . . they shall fill the face of the world with seed." Moreover those who were being sent were poor and powerless; nor at the outset could they have easily found someone to interpret their words faithfully to others, or to explain what others said to them, especially as they were sent to unbelievers. Consequently it was necessary, in this respect, that God should provide them with the gift of tongues; in order that, as the diversity of tongues was brought upon the nations when they fell away to idolatry, according to Gn. 11, so when the nations were to be recalled to the worship of one God a remedy to this diversity might be applied by the gift of tongues.[35]

It should be obvious that Aquinas connects the command of Jesus in Matthew 28 with tongue(s) as the ability to speak in foreign languages. Such divine linguistic ability is needed in order to reach diverse people who speak diverse languages with the gospel.

The research of Christine F. Cooper-Rompato demonstrates that there was a widespread belief in the so-called the gift of "xenoglossia" – that is, "the sudden, miraculous ability to speak, to understand, to read, or to write a foreign language."[36] Her research highlights an important

---

[35] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica,* Question 176. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

[36] Christine F. Cooper-Rompato, *The Gift of Tongues: Women's Xenoglossia in the Later Middle Ages* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2010), xi.

point: that even until the medieval period, tongue(s) was all about a linguistic phenomenon, rather than an ecstatic-unintelligible speech experience. This gift is believed to be something that God bestows to help missionaries preach the word of God across all linguistic boundaries.

Cooper-Rompato explains that the story that Gary B. McGee recounts about a nineteenth-century missionary named Mary Campbell, who claimed that she received the miracle of speaking in foreign language when she went to Palau island to preach the gospel, [37] is not really different from the stories of the first Franciscans missionaries "who ventured into Germany without knowing any German, hoping that 'God would provide' for them when all they knew was 'Ja' and then meeting disastrous results."[38] In spite of these stories, Cooper-Rompato argues that there is a significant "allure of xenoglossia" because it is a shortcut solution to the hard and long process of learning a new language. This belief about xenoglossia apparently was caused by a widespread understanding in the Medieval period that "all languages came from the same Adamic, pre-Babelian root, a form of Hebrew that existed before the fall of the tower of Babel divided the original language into many."[39] This is why they believed that through some sort of "divine intervention" this linguistic difference can somehow be miraculously bridged.[40]

In the Reformation period, Martin Luther had both an inconsistent and a quite peculiar way of understanding this gift. Concerning the story of Pentecost, which Luther referred to as God's "public sermon," Luther explained:

> And they [the disciples] were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to preach and speak in other tongues. This happened with a great splendor and glorious might, so that thereafter the apostles preached so powerfully that the sermons which we heard in the world today are hardly a shadow compared to theirs, so far as the visible and substance of

---

[37] Gary B. McGee, "Shortcut to Language Preparation? Radical Evangelicals, Missions, and the Gift of Tongues," *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 25, no. 3 (July 1, 2001): 119.
[38] Cooper-Rompato, *The Gift of Tongues*, 189.
[39] Cooper-Rompato, 190.
[40] Cooper-Rompato, 191.

their sermons is concerned. For the apostles spoke in all sorts of languages, performed great miracles, etc.[41]

Luther's interpretation of Acts 2 seems to stay faithfully in the missionary-expansionist tradition. The addition "to *preach*… in other tongues" indicates that Luther believed that the function of this gift is primarily to spread the message of God. Luther's last statement — that the disciples spoke in many different languages — shows that he must have been fully aware of the established interpretation of this passage. However, when he came to 1 Corinthians 14, there is a significant departure from this interpretation. In his 1523 treatise, entitled "Concerning the Order of Public Worship," Luther tied the idea of interpretation of tongue(s) and prophecy to the interpretation of scripture(s), as though the scripture(s) itself were the speaking in tongue(s). In public gatherings, the scripture(s) would be read and a preacher would then explain or interpret it. So, assuming that the scripture is like tongue(s) that requires interpretation, Luther argued that "if this is not done, the congregation is not benefited by the lesson."[42] Even though this interpretation is quite peculiar, we can still see that the theme of "preaching" is very central to his interpretation. This line of interpretation of 1 Corinthians can also be found in Zwingli.[43]

John Calvin clearly understood tongue(s) as a miraculous phenomenon of speaking in foreign languages.[44] In his commentary on 1 Corinthians 12, he pointed out that the difference between the gift of tongue(s) and interpretation pertains mainly to the acquirement of knowledge of foreign languages. Tongue(s) is the ability to speak foreign languages, whereas interpretation

---

[41] Martin Luther, "How Christians Should Regard Moses," in *Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings*, ed. Timothy F. Lull (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 135.

[42] Martin Luther, "Concerning the Order of Public Worship," in *Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings*, ed. Timothy F. Lull, 3 edition (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 446.

[43] For further discussion on Zwingli's understanding of tongue(s), see Bruce Gordon, *The Swiss Reformation* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2002), 241ff.

[44] See Paul Elbert, "Calvin and the Spiritual Gifts," *Journal of Evangelical Theological Society* 22, no. 3 (n.d.): 235–56.

is the ability "to render foreign tongues into the native language."[45] Furthermore, commenting

on "different kinds of tongues" (γένη γλωσσῶν) in 1 Cor. 12:28, Calvin insisted that the gifts of

tongue(s) and interpretation are different "because in some cases an individual spoke in different

languages, and yet did not understand the language of the Church with which he had to do."[46]

Interestingly, Calvin might well have been the first person to argue that the reference to "tongues

of angels" in 1 Cor. 13:1 is an "hyperbolical expression" to stress the point of the great

mutiplicity of languages.[47] Calvin's reconstruction of the problem in Corinth, especially in 1

Cor. 14, centers around the idea that the ability to speak many languages somehow gives a

person high social value that brings respect and admiration.[48] So the idea that the tongue(s)

speakers are speaking something mysterious is understood simply as "*He* speaks what no one

understands," which Calvin calls "a bad sense."[49] It is worth noting that Calvin explicitly

acknowledged that his reading of 1 Cor. 14 was profoundly influenced by Chrysostom.[50] This

means that Calvin's interpretation is also embedded in the long history of the missionary-

expansionist tradition.

Until the first half of the nineteenth century, the dominant view was still that tongue(s)

referred to miraculous speaking in foreign languages. Jonathan Edwards, for example, called this

---

[45] "There was a difference between the knowledge of tongues, and the interpretation of them, for those who were endowed with the former were, in many cases, not acquainted with the language of the nation with which they had to deal. The interpreters rendered foreign tongues into the native language. These endowments they did not at that time acquire by labor or study, but were put in possession of them by a wonderful revelation of the Spirit." John Calvin, *Commentary on Corinthians*, trans. John Pringle, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1848), 338.

[46] Calvin, 1:349.

[47] Calvin, 1:353.

[48] Calvin, 1:367.

[49] Calvin, 1:368.

[50] For further discussion on the influence of Chrysostom on Calvin, especially on his understanding of the phenomenon of tongue(s), see John R. Walchenbach, *John Calvin as Biblical Commentator: An Investigation into Calvin's Use of John Chrysostom as an Exegetical Tutor* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2010), 101ff.

gift, "the power of speaking in languages that had never been learned."[51] Matthew Poole

explained that many kinds of tongues in 1 Cor. 12:10 refers to "a power to discourse with men in

their several languages, as we read in Acts 2:8."[52] The need for the gift of interpretation,

according to Poole, was because "some of those spake with differs tongues could not interpret

what they said."[53] Paraphrasing 1 Cor. 14:6, Poole wrote: "God hath given me an ability to

speak with tongues; suppose I should come to you speaking in the Arabian, Scythian, or Parthian

language, what good would it do you? How should it any way profit you, except I shall speak to

you either by revelation, or by knowledge, or by prophesying, or by doctrine?" In his 1824

commentary, John Locke paraphrased 1 Cor. 12:10 as follows: "To another, the working of

miracles, to another, prophecy, to another, diversity of languages, to another, the interpretation of

languages."[54] Hugh M'Neile asked, "What were these tongues? The answer is, languages of

men. They were not merely sounds, but they were such sounds as that, if one of them was uttered

in the assembly consisting one man out of each of the tribes of the earth, some one individual of

that assembly would recognize his own language wherein he had been born."[55] William Lothian

in his 1828 series of lectures on 1 Cor. explained that this gift is "the power of speaking in

foreign languages… to facilitate the propagation of Christianity."[56] The problem of the

---

[51] Jonathan Edwards, *Charity and Its Fruits; Or, Christian Love as Manifested in the Heart and Life* (New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1854), 438.

[52] Matthew Poole, *Matthew Poole, Annotations Upon the Holy Bible. Wherein the Sacred Text Is Inserted, and Various Readings Annex'd, Together with the Parallel Scriptures. The More Difficult Terms in Each Verse Explained. Seeming Contradictions Reconciled. Questions and Doubts Resolved. And the Whole Text Opened* (London: Parkhurst, 1700), 1 Cor. 12:10.

[53] Ibid.

[54] John Locke, *The Works of John Locke*, 12th ed., vol. 7 (London: C. Baldwin Printer, 1824), 166.

[55] Hugh M'Neile, *Miracles and Spiritual Gifts* (London: James Nisbet, Berners Street, 1832), 32.

[56] William Lothian, *Expository Lectures on Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians* (Edinburgh, UK: Waugh & Innes, 1828), 82.

Corinthian church, according Lothian, was of many people speaking many languages "at once in different parts of [the] house" but having "no interpreter … present." [57]

Writing in the early nineteenth century, B.B. Edwards and E.A. Park stated the obvious when they wrote that speaking in tongue(s) as the miraculous ability to speak foreign languages "has been almost universally received in this country [i.e., Germany] and in Great Britain."[58] David Schulz pointed out the same thing in 1836: "the most widely held position since the earliest centuries is, of course, that these phrases should be understood as . . . the speaking of foreign languages."[59] In sum, seeing tongue(s) as a multilingual phenomenon with a special divine intervention was widely accepted at that time. That changed beginning in the late eighteenth century. My aim here is to demonstrate the profound impact of a German romantic-nationalist philosopher, Johan Gottfried Herder, in changing the course of interpretation.[60]

---

[57] Lothian, 82.

[58] This statement is made in their prefatory note to Rückert, "On the Gifts of Prophecy and of Speaking in Tongues," 87.

[59] "Die seit den frühesten Jahrhunderten angenommene, am weitesten verbreitete Meinung ist freilich diese, dass die erwähnten Phrasen auch bei dem Apostel Paulus vom Reden fremder Sprachen müssten verstanden werden. Bis zur jüngsten Zeit herab kommt eine wesentlich davon abweichende Ansicht, so viel wir wissen, nirgends zum Vorschein." See David Schulz, *Die Geistesgaben Der Ersten Christen Insbesondre Die Sogenannte Gabe Der Sprachen* (Breslau: A. Gosohorsky, 1836), 33.

[60] Herder was not the only person who challenged the established view of tongue(s) at that time. Christoph Gottfried Bardili was also very critical of the traditional view in his 1786 publication on the commentary of 1 Cor. 14. For further discussion on Bardili, see Christoph Gottfried Bardili, *Significatus primitivus vocis προφητης ex Platone erutus, cum novo tentamine interpretandi I. Cor. Cap. XIV.* (Göttingen: I.C. Dieterich, 1736). Bardili argues that tongue(s) is all about incomprehensible tones produced by the physical tongue, based primarily on what Paul says in 1 Cor. 14:7-9. However, his explanation is not as influential as Herder's conception of tongue(s) as the expression of religious exciting feeling. Scholars such as Schulz and others actually rejected his explanation. See also Schulz' critical discussion on Bardili in Schulz, *Die Geistesgaben Der Ersten Christen Insbesondre Die Sogenannte Gabe Der Sprachen*, 37–38.

1.3. The Rise of a Romantic-Nationalist Mode of Reading

Despite its often universalistic or objective claim, post-Enlightenment biblical scholarship is still rooted within the particularity of its context. Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe was not only an exciting intellectual time in Europe, it was also the period of the heightening of their national identity and colonial power.[61] The politics of language in the context of the struggle for national identity and the territories, both within Europe and in distant spaces, shaped the attitudes of scholars toward the phenomenon of speaking in tongue(s).

1.3.1. A Brief Contextual Overview

The invention of the idea of "nation-state" [62] as an imagined political entity is undeniably a genius of *homo modernus*.[63] Even today the influence of this construction of nationhood is still intact. People would identify themselves with the nation to which they belong. Nationalism as a political movement is a distinctive product of European social context in the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century.[64] In the words of Llyod Kramer: "National identities are historically constructed and began to develop their modern forms in late eighteenth century

---

[61] The nineteenth century saw extraordinary intellectual development in European society. Science developed rapidly, marked especially by the publication of Darwin's *The Origin of Species* in 1859. In the area of politics and economics, this was the period that Marx and Engels published *The Communist Manifesto* (1846).

[62] Hugh Seton-Watson distinguishes as follows between "nation" and "state": "A state is a legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizen. A nation is a community of people, whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness." In this sense, Seton-Watson argues further, "the disappearance of state sovereignties has not caused the disappearance of nations, any more than the creation of new state sovereignties has sufficed to create new nations." See Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States: An Enquiry Into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (London: Methuen, 1977), 1–2.

[63] The term "imagined" here is indebted to Benedict Anderson's conception of nation as an "imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." For further discussion, see Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, Rev. Ed. (London; New York: Verso, 2006), 6–7.

[64] The doctrine of nationalism, Hugh Seton-Watson maintains, "was derived from the eighteenth-century notion of popular sovereignty." Seton-Watson, *Nations and States*, 6.

European and America."[65] Eric Hobsbawm described this period of time as "the age of

revolution" in which the idea of nation as an "invented tradition" came into existence.[66] The era

of Enlightenment had brought science and human autonomy for thinking into the prominent

position. The church, which was the unifying structure in the feudal period, began to lose its grip

over this new social landscape.[67] As Benedict Anderson puts it, "in Western Europe the

eighteenth century marks not only the dawn of the age of nationalism but the dusk of religious

modes of thought."[68]

When the ecclesial unifying role began to disappear, there was an emptiness in the social

structure of European society. In the meantime, industrialization and the rise of capitalism were

developing, and these created a deep economic division of labor between people. Within this

context of fragmented individualism, which Liah Greenfeld calls social "anomie,"[69] nationalism

---

[65] Lloyd S. Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures, and Identities since 1775* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 10.

[66] Eric Hobsbawm, "Introduction: Inventing Traditions," in *The Invention of Tradition*, ed. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1–14. By the invention of tradition he means "a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past." This tradition involves "a powerful ritual complex" such as the display of flags, processions, bell-ringing, etc. Hobsbawm also distinguishes between tradition, custom, and routine. "The object and characteristic of 'traditions', including invented ones, is invariance." Custom is not an invented action because it ties itself to the past. Thus, "it does not preclude innovation and change up to a point," but it does simulate change." Routine is a repetition without any cultural significance.

[67] Micheline R. Ishay, "Introduction," in *The Nationalism Reader*, ed. Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1995), 3.

[68] Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 11.

[69] Greenfeld appropriates the concept of "anomie" in her discussion on nationalism mainly from Emile Durkheim. She writes: "[A]nomie is the fundamental structural problem of modernity. Anomie, commonly translated as 'normlessness', refers to a condition of cultural insufficiency, a systemic problem which reflects inconsistency, or the lack of co-ordination, between various institutional structures, as a result of which they are likely to send contradictory messages to individuals within them. On the psychological level anomie produces a sense of disorientation, of uncertainty as to one's place in society, and therefore as to one's identity; of what one is expected to do under circumstances of one sort or another, of the limits to one's possible achievement (i.e., aspirations that would be frustrated) on the social, political, economic, and personal planes." Modern society and modern people who live in the absence of the unifying structural system have to grapple with this condition of anomie. "One cannot have modernity – one cannot have nationalism – without anomie," she writes. See Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006), 212.

was introduced primarily by the members of the aristocracy as the principle by which to unite society. The narrative of equality, togetherness, and belongingness, therefore, was central to early nationalist rhetoric. This is the *locus* out of which 'narration' of the nation took shape in Europe.[70] In spite of the constant employment of religious rhetoric and language, the idea of nationhood as a new entity was believed to transcend religious differences.[71] In a way, as Liah Greenfeld has noted, nationalist movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a response to the deepest despair of the *identity* crisis in Europe.[72]

Though I will not explore this in detail here, it is important to note that nationalist movements took shape in different ways in Europe.[73] However, one common phenomenon that took place during this period was the emergence of national languages. As Kramer put it, "most nationalists… promote a single, unifying language and view this language, like the national land, as an essential aspect of the nation's political and cultural identity."[74] The perpetuation of a

---

[70] The concept of "narration" here is one I borrow from Homi Bhabha's effort to bring linguistic force into the discussion of nationalism. Bhabha insists that "the image of the nation" should be theorized as a "system of cultural signification, as the representation of social *life* rather than the discipline of social *polity*." Nationalism, in other words, is "a form of narrative" which he describes as "textual strategies, metaphoric displacement, sub-texts and figurative stratagems." Homi K. Bhabha, "Introduction: Narrating the Nation," in *Nation and Narration*, ed. Homi K. Bhabha (London; New York: Routledge, 1990), 1–7.Cf. Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), chap. 8.

[71] For further discussion on the interconnectedness of nationalism and religion, see Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America*, chap. 4; Greenfeld, *Nationalism and the Mind*, chap. 5; Carlton J. H. Hayes, *Nationalism: A Religion* (Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2016); Ferran Requejo and Klaus-Jürgen Nagel, "Nationalism and Religon: Friends or Foes?," in *Politics of Religion and Nationalism: Federalism, Consociationalism and Seccession*, ed. Ferran Raquejo and Klaus-Jürgen Nagel (New York: Routledge, 2014).

[72] Greenfeld, *Nationalism and the Mind*, 69–71.

[73] See Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992). The focus of Greenfeld study is mainly England, France, Russia, Germany, and America. The establishment of nation states outside the Euro-American context was mainly the product of the decolonial movements especially after the first and second World War. For the discussion on decolonization and nationalism, see Clive J. Christie, *A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism* (London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 1998); Assa Okoth, *A History of Africa: African Nationalism and the de-Colonisation Process*, vol. 2 (Nairobi: East African Publishers, 2006); Toyin Faloia, *The End of Colonial Rule: Nationalism and Decolonization*, ed. Toyin Falola, vol. 4, Africa (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002).

[74] Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America*, 60.

national narrative can only occur through the standardization of a national language that is taught

and reinforced primarily by the educational system. Anderson speaks of the rise of national

languages in terms of "printed languages" which, for him, arose directly from "print-capitalism."

The fixing of language for printing purposes (in newspapers, pamphlets, books, etc.) acted as a

megaphone for the elite nationalists to spread their message to the common people. This marked

the birth of the period that Anderson calls a "national consciousness."[75]

Undoubtedly, the rise of nationalism in Europe was also foreshadowed by European

colonial expansion since the fifteenth century. In the words of Stefan Berger, colonialization is

"the central ingredient of globalization in the nineteenth century."[76] It is not surprising that

Michael Wintel calls this century, "the age of nationalism and imperialism." Imperialism gave

birth to nationalism. The 3-G slogan, i.e., God, Gold, and Glory, articulates the three major

motivations of colonialism.

First, colonialism is a way to expand Christian religion to the world. The evangelistic

project was profoundly colonial, and vice versa. The history of colonialism as a religious project

took place in two major stages. The first stage was when the Europeans, primarily Catholics,

landed in the "New World" (1492-1792). The second stage was marked by the massive

evangelization of Africa and Asia and remaining areas of the Americas (1792 - present), which is

mainly a Protestant phenomenon.[77]

---

[75] See Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, chap. 3.

[76] Stefan Berger, "Introduction," in *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe, 1789 - 1914*, ed. Stefan Berger (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), xxiv.

[77] Fernando F. Segovia, "Biblical Criticism and Postcolonial Studies: Toward a Postcolonial Optic," in *The Postcolonial Biblical Reader*, ed. R. S. Sugirtharajah (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 39. This is a reprinted version of the earlier published essay in 1998. See Fernando F. Segovia, "Biblical Criticism and Postcolonial Studies: Toward a Postcolonial Optic," in *Postcolonial Bible*, ed. R. S. Sugirtharajah (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 49–65.

Second, as Hanna Arendt has already pointed out, imperialism and colonialism are primarily "propagated by businessmen."[78] In other words, it is economic interest that drives colonial expansion. While politics works within clear borders, it is actually the economic sphere that knows no boundaries, Arendt insists.[79] The economic interests thus deeply motivated the need for European colonial expansion. Fostered by the development of capitalism, especially after the industrial revolution, Europe was in desperate need of cheap raw materials. However, the colonies supplied not only the cheap raw materials to Europe, they also supplied free labor in the form of slaves. It is worth noting that the nineteenth century was also an important period of abolition movements in both America and Europe. [80]

The third motivation [i.e., glory] of colonialism had something to do with the expansion of political territories. As Robert Young observes, "[B]y the eighteenth century, competition between European powers meant that many of the wars of the century were fought in the colonial arena with the purpose of acquiring the riches of each other's colonies, a strategy in which Britain was particularly successful – sometimes to its own cost."[81] Generally speaking, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the Spanish empire had occupied most of both the

---

[78] Hannah Arendt, "Imperialism, Nationalism, Chauvinism," *The Review of Politics* 7, no. 4 (1945): 441–63.

[79] Arendt writes, "Expansion as a permanent and supreme aim of politics is the central political idea of imperialism. Since it implies neither temporary looting nor the more lasting assimilation of conquest, it is an entirely new concept in the long history of political thought and action. The reason for this surprising originality-surprising because entirely new concepts are very rare in politics-is simply that this concept is not really political at all, but has its origin in the realm of business speculation, where expansion meant the permanent broadening of industrial production and economic transactions characteristic of the nineteenth century." Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New Edition with Added Prefaces (New York: A Harvest Book, 1973), 125.

[80] For further discussion on slave trade in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century colonial world, see Herbert S. Klein, *The Atlantic Slave Trade* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Colleen A. Vasconcellos, "Slavery and the Slave Trade," in *Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia*, ed. Melvin E. Page, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003), 534–37; Patrick Manning, *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey, 1640-1960*, African Studies Series 30 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

[81] Robert J.C. Young, *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 23.

Americas, whereas the British and French Empires established their colony primarily in the northern area of America. The Portuguese Empire covered primarily the area of today's Brazil today. The Dutch only occupied Suriname and the western area of Guiana. In Asia, the British primarily colonized South Asia (much of what is now India); the Dutch occupied the Far East areas (today Indonesia); the Spanish, today's Philippines; and the French, the Indo-Chinese area (around today's Vietnam). In Africa, the French colonized most of western Africa, whereas the Belgians colonized today's Congo, and the Dutch colonized the southern part of Africa. The Germans did not come to East Africa until the later part of the nineteenth century.

Thus, by the middle of eighteenth century almost the entire globe had been colonized by Europeans. It is worth noting that with the expansion of European colonial power, European languages also spread throughout the world mainly through the establishment of colonial education, trade, and governmental system. It is no surprise that today, English is the most commonly spoken language in the world, thanks to this long history of colonialism. Spanish and Portuguese are the dominant languages in South America and French is still spoken in Canada and parts of Africa.

Stefan Berger is right: "Colonialization exported Europe to the wider world and, at the same time, it brought the world to Europe. It is therefore impossible to write the history of Europe without constantly reflecting the ways in which colonial empires shaped different nation-states in Europe and thus became part and parcel of the self-understanding of Europe."[82] The European self-identity is implicated not only in the internal differentiation among themselves, but also in its relation to the world. The rise of nationalism, on the one hand, pertains primarily to the internal struggles among the Europeans. Colonialization, however, is how Europeans

---

[82] Berger, "Introduction," xxiv.

relate to the rest of the world. The two are interconnected because the establishment of a nation-state correlates directly to the struggles for territorial occupation.

1.3.2. Herder's Philosophy of Language and Nationalism

At the center of the discussion on national identity in the late eighteenth century was a prominent German philosopher, Johann Gottfried Herder, who was a favorite student of Immanuel Kant.[83] Herder's conception of nationalism is critical because, as George White has argued, the interconnectedness between national identity and language "can be traced back to Herder."[84] In a similar vein, Isaiah Berlin, one on the most important commentators on Herder,[85] points out that Herder should be considered a vital thinker of German "linguistic patriotism."[86] Berlin describes Herder's influence beyond Germany: "Herder is the greatest inspirer of cultural nationalism among the nationalities oppressed by the Austro-Hungarian, Turkish and Russian empires, and ultimately of direct political nationalism as well, much as he abhorred it, in Austria

---

[83] Michael N. Forster, *After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 131. Although Herder studied under Kant, they had some serious disagreements with each other as well. In 1785, Kant published his strong criticism against Herder in his review of Herder's most important book, *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man.* Immanuel Kant, "Reviews of Herder's Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind," in *Immanuel Kant Political Writings*, Cambridge Text in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 201–20. In 1800, Herder published his criticism against Kant's theory of aesthetics in his *Critique of Judgement.* Johann Gottfried Herder, *Kalligone: Vom Erhabnen und vom Ideal* (Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1800).

[84] George W. White, *Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 50. William A. Willson also points out that "the man most responsible for the creation of this romantic-nationalism was German scholar Johann Gottfried Herder. . . Such a man was Herder, whose philosophy of history not only inspired the German nationalistic movement but, for better or for worse, seems to have served as the foundation for most such movements since his time." William A. Wilson, "Herder, Folklore and Romantic Nationalism," *The Journal of Popular Culture* 6, no. 4 (March 1, 1973): 820.

[85] Charles Taylor describes Berlin as a scholar who "helped to rescue Herder from his relative neglect by philosophers." See Charles Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 79. Chapter 5 of this book, entitled "The Importance of Herder," is one of the most quoted essays on Herder of the past two decades.

[86] Isaiah Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder*, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000), 215. Berlin correctly points out that Herder's conception of "the spirit of a nation or a culture" that defines the identity of a nation is not completely new. Herder was deeply influenced by his predecessors such as Giambattista Vico, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, and Frederich Karl von Moser.

and Germany, and by infectious reaction, in other lands as well," he writes.[87] The term

"nationalism" itself appeared for the first time in one of Herder's works published in 1774.[88]

In order to understand Herder's cultural nationalism, we should first note that he rejects

the construction of a national identity on the basis of racial differences. The whole idea of race,

for Herder, is "a laudable zeal for discriminating science." [89] He writes further:

> Some for instance have thought fit to employ the term of races for four or five divisions, originally made in consequence of country or complexion: but I see no reason for this appellation. Race refers to a difference of origin, which in this case does not exist, or in each of these countries, and under each of these complexions, comprises the most different races.[90]

Herder even rebukes the practice of slavery in America with these strong words: "Thou, O Man,

honour thyself: neither the pongo nor the gibbon is thy brother: the American and the Negro are:

these therefore thou shouldst not oppress, or murder, or steal; for they are men, like three: with

the ape thou canst not enter into fraternity."[91] If race cannot be the base for nation building, then

Herder argues that it should be language that becomes the primary identity marker because "each

---

[87] See Isaiah Berlin, "The Counter-Enlightenment," in *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*, ed. Henry Hardy, Second (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 15. Herder's nationalism is based on cultural factors such as language. See Royal J. Schmidt, "Cultural Nationalism in Herder," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 17, no. 3 (1956): 407–17; Frederick M. Barnard, *Herder on Nationality, Humanity, and History* (London and Ithaca: McGill-Queen's Press, 2003); Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment*.

[88] For a discussion on how Herder originated this term, see Peter Alter, *Nationalism* (London; New York: Hodder Education Publishers, 1994), 3.

[89] Johann Gottfried Herder, *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*, trans. T. Churchill, vol. I (London: Luke Handard, 1802), 298. For further discussion on how Herder deals with the issue of race, see Lottes Günther, "China in European Political Thought, 1750-1850," in *China and Europe: Images and Influences in Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. Thomas H. C. Lee (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991), 90–92; George M. Fredrickson, *Racism: A Short History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015), 70–71; Cedric Dover, "The Racial Philosophy of Johann Herder," *The British Journal of Sociology* 3, no. 2 (1952): 124–33.

[90] Herder, *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*, I:298.

[91] Herder, I:297–98. As Sonia Sikka has pointed out, this particular statement is somehow different from the way Herder describes the people in Africa in other parts of this book. "Africans are described as sensual and natural, closer therefore to animals than are most other human types," Sikka observes. This representation of the others is characterized by Sikka as being "Ethnocentric." See Sonia Sikka, *Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference: Enlightened Relativism* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 31–32.

nation speaks in accordance to its thought and thinks in accordance to its speech."[92] Herder's

emphasis on language has led Umut Özkirimli, and other scholars,[93] to characterize his thought

as "ethnic nationalism."[94] Herder himself does not talk about ethnic nationalism. The ethnic

category, thus, might be something foreign to Herder himself. Instead of race, Herder insists:

"every nation is one People, having its own national culture, as also has its own language" (*Denn*

jedes Volk ist Volk; es hat seine National Bildung wie seine Sprache).[95] The concept of *National*

Bildung (national culture) is critical in Herder's overall philosophy which leads Jeffery Church

to describe him as the "'founding father' of culture."[96] Herder's notion of the interconnectedness

between a language and a nation is profoundly informed by what he thinks language is. Thus, in

order to understand Herder's notion of nationalism, it is important to understand his philosophy

of language.

---

[92] Fragments on Recent German Literature, 50.

[93] Brian E. Fogarty writes that Herder is "the father of what is now called ethnic nationalism." Brian E. Fogarty, *Fascism: Why Not Here?* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009), 91. See also Jan Penrose and Joe May, "Herder's Concept of Nation and Its Relevance to Contemporary Ethnic Nationalism," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 18, no. 1/2 (1991): 165–178; Z. Layton-Henry and C. Wilpert, *Challenging Racism in Britain and Germany* (New York: Springer, 2003), 52. Brian E. Fogarty writes that Herder is "the father of what is now called ethnic nationalism." See Fogarty, *Fascism*, 91.

[94] Umut Özkirimli, *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement* (New York: Palgrave, 2005), 23. It is unfortunate that Özkirimli does not provide any detailed discussion on what he means by "ethnicity." This is what he writes about ethnic nationalism: "Ethnic nationalism… emphasizes common descent and cultural sameness. Here the nation is overtly exclusive. What gives unity to the nation, what makes it a home, 'a place of passionate attachment,' is not the cold contrivance of shared rights, but the people's pre-existing characteristics: their language, religion, customs and traditions. . . . Ethnic nationalism claims that an individual's deepest attachments are inherited, not chosen: hence membership in the nation is not a matter of will. It can only be acquired by birth, through blood. Ethnic nationalism is usually traced back to Johann Gottfried Herder, and exemplified by German Romanticism, which arose as a reaction to the Enlightenment and to its unconditional belief in reason. It is largely based on language, culture and tradition, and thus appeals to the objective features of our social lives." The problem with this assessment is, however, in its claim of cultural entities as the "objective features" which has not only misinterpreted, but also misrepresented, Herder's positon on this matter.

[95] Herder, *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*, I:298. See Anderson's discussion on this statement in Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 67–68.

[96] Jeffrey Church, "Culture Beyond Identity: J. G. Herder on the Purpose and Justification of Culture," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 41, no. 8 (October 1, 2015): 791–809.

Herder opens his *Treatise on the Origin of Language* with this strong assertion: "Already

as an animal, the human being has language."[97] Dogs barking, lions roaring, cats meowing, cows

mooing, etc., are the expressions of their inner feeling.[98] Just as animals express their feelings of

pain, sorrow, joy, and passion through the sounds emanating from their mouths as moans and

groans, so too humans express themselves through sounds and language. As human beings are

"feeling bodies,"[99] that can sense pain, joy, sorrow, sadness, and so on, Herder insists: "These

---

[97] Johann Gottfried Herder, "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)," in *Herder: Philosophical Writings*, trans. Michael N. Forster, Cambridge Text in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 65.

[98] Herder asserts: "All animals, down as far as the dumb fish, sound forth their sensation." (Herder, 74.) Taylor basically argues that Herder is important because his "expressivist theory of language" makes a connection between human rationality and language.

Herder, according to Taylor, "originates a fundamentally different way of thinking about language and meaning," and calls it "the Herder revolution." This is by no means a completely new concept. Rousseau had also argued that language is invented out of feeling and not need. This is also what makes Rousseau's philosophy of language different from Herder's. For Herder, human language is originated in both "need," because of the deficiency of human sensuous ability, and "feeling," which humans share with animals.

[99] It should be noted that German romanticist tradition places a strong emphasis on "feeling" as a way of acquiring knowledge. In order to understand romanticism, it is important to locate it in the larger philosophical debate between two major philosophical positions in eighteenth-century Europe, especially after the Enlightenment. I am fully aware that I may run the risk of oversimplifying this debate. It is not my intention, however, to discuss this philosophical debate in detail here. My aim is only to locate Herder's romantic emphasis on feeling in the larger context. This debate is basically between British and continental philosophical traditions. On the one hand, the rationalist school believes that knowledge is constructed in the structure of human reason. In other words, it is human reason that make all the logical connections among things. It gives the priority to human reason. Through reason, humans can attain the truth. In the words of Frank Thilly in his 1912 presidential address before the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association: "The rationalists believed in the possibility of realizing the ideal through reason, that is, of grasping in thought the nature of the thing in itself." (Frank Thilly, "Romanticism and Rationalism," *The Philosophical Review* 22, no. 2 (1913): 107.) Rene Descartes' famous statement, *cogito ergo sum* (I think therefore I am) was the major slogan of rationalist philosophical tradition. Beside Descartes, other eighteenth-century European philosophers such as Leibniz and Spinoza also are part of this rationalist tradition. On the other hand, an empiricist school of thought grew and developed primarily in Britain by philosophers such as David Hume, John Locke, and George Berkley. For British empiricists, knowledge is attained through human sensations of the empirical world. Besides its deep roots in German mystical tradition, the rise of romanticism in Germany also owes its philosophical articulation to Immanuel Kant. The works of Kant, in many ways, opened the space for the birth and growth of romanticism. Kant's proposal of distinguishing between *phenomena* and *noumena* especially in his massive work, *Critique of Pure Reason*, should be seen as an effort to find a middle way between continental rationalism and British empiricism. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), chap. 3. "*Phenomena* and *noumena* correspond respectively to the world of senses and the intelligible world of understanding. Only the sensible entities can be known; the intelligible entities can only be thought," Vinod Lakshmiphaty explains. Vinod Lakshmipathy, "Kant and the Turn to Romanticism," *Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy* 3, no. 2 (December 2009): 92. Herder studied under Kant and pushed Kantian philosophy further by emphasizing not only sensation but also human feeling.

groans, these sounds, are language. Hence there is a language of sensation which is an immediate law of nature. . . the human being originally shares this language of sensation with the animals."[100] In other words, the basic root of language is the expression of feelings and sensations. "[A]ll senses, especially in the condition of human childhood, are nothing but *ways of feeling belonging to a soul*."[101]

Herder therefore strongly rejects the idea that language originates in God:"[T]he whole hypothesis of the divine origin of language is contrary to the analogy of all human inventions, contrary to the history of all world events, and contrary to all philosophy of language," he explains.[102] It is the nature of human beings that feeling and thought produce language. Humans themselves are the origin of language.[103] Observing that people speak differently according to the shape of their organs in the areas or places that they live, Herder explains that humans tend to pronounce or articulate words that are most comfortable to them. This richness of human linguistic variations leads him to the conclusion that language does not point to "a divine origin, [but] quite [the] opposite, to an animal origin."[104]

---

[100] Herder, "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)," 66.

[101] Herder, 108.

[102] Johann Gottfried Herder, "Fragments on Recent German Literature (1767-8) [Excerpts on Language]," in *Herder: Philosophical Writings*, trans. Michael N. Forster, Cambridge Text in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 57.

[103] Herder, 58.

[104] Herder, "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)," 69–71. Herder seems to believe that the further language is from writing, the closer it is to the origin. For those who believe that God is the source of language, Herder takes the example of Hebrew, which he calls the "divine first language," in order to show his point that language cannot be originated in a divine source. Hebrew, Herder argues, is a thoroughly an oral language which cannot be fully written. "It could be written very incompletely, this is shown clearly by the whole structure of its grammar, by its so common confusions of similar letters, and of course most of all by the complete absence of its vowels." The pronunciation of Hebrew language is too rich for letters to represent. This unwritable nature of Hebrew, therefore, is the indicator that God is not the origin of Hebrew and that it arises "from savage sounds belonging to free organs." Herder, 72.

But then what makes human language different from animals' sounds? Although human

language originates in the same animalistic behavior, Herder maintains that it is still essentially

and qualitatively different from the groaning or moaning of animals. Language is what separates

human beings from animals. His position can be seen as another way of explaining the origin of

language in contrast to two opposite views by two French thinkers, Étienne Bonnot de

Condillac[105] and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.[106] Herder insists: "Condillac and Rousseau inevitably

erred concerning the origin of language because they were so famously and variously mistaken –

since the former made animals into human beings, and the latter made human beings into

animals."[107] Herder maintains that human language should be understood in terms of humans'

---

[105] Condillac basically believes that God had already invented language before human beings came to employ it. Condillac begins his thesis with this premise: "Adam and Eve did not owe the exercise of the operations of their soul to experience. As they came from the hands of God, they were able, by special assistance, to reflect and communicate their thoughts to each other." Condillac then gives a famous illustration of two children getting lost in a desert, which Herder strongly rejects. These children would somehow know how to communicate to each other just by observing how the other expresses their feelings through the movements of their tongue, arms, eyes, etc. As long as they live close together, they would be able to use linguistic signs to talk to each other. "The frequent repetition of the same circumstances could not fail… to make it habitual for them to connect the cries of passions and the different motions of the body to the perceptions which they expressed in a manner so striking to the senses." Humans, through their animalistic sensations, discover words to express themselves. "In short, words arose because words existed before they existed," Herder explains Condillac's theory of language. The point is clearly that language exists prior to their communication. See Etienne Bonnot De Condillac, *Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge*, trans. Hans Aarsleff, Cambridge Text in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 113–19. For further discussion on Condillac's conception of language, see Margaret Thomas, *Fifty Key Thinkers on Language and Linguistics* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 76–102; George Albert Wells, *The Origin of Language: Aspects of the Discussion from Condillac to Wundt* (La Salle, Ill: Open Court Publishing Company, 1987).

[106] In Rousseau's *Essay on the Origin of Languages*, he argues that "as soon as one man was recognized by another as a sentient, thinking Being and similar to himself, the desire or the need to communicate his feelings and thoughts to him made him seek the means for doing so." In this sense, language exists for primarily communicative purposes. Rousseau believes that concerning the physical and biological organs, animals actually have the same physical capacity for language, but they do not use it. "Animals have a physical organization more than sufficient for such communication, and none of them has ever made this use of it. Here, it seems to me, is a most characteristic difference. Those two, among them, work and live in common, such as beavers, ants, and bees, have some natural language in order to communicate amongst themselves – I raise no doubt about it. There is even reason to believe that the language of beavers and that of ants are in gesture and speak only to the eyes. . But that as it may, precisely because all such languages are natural, they are not acquired; the animals that speak them do so forth from birth, they all possess them, and everywhere the same one; they do not change them, nor do they make the slightest progress in them. . Conventional language belongs only to man. . That is why man makes progress, whether for good or bad, and why the animals do not at all. This single distinction seems to lead a long way. It is said that it is explained by the difference in organs." See Rousseau, "Essay on the Origin of Languages," 293.

[107] Herder, "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)," 77.

"*innate abilities for and drives to art.*"   This tendency toward arts he directly correlates with their "*forces of representation*," which are the product of their senses. "The sharper animals' senses are and the more marvelous the products of their art, then the smaller their cycle is, and the more limited in kind the product of their art."[108]

Now, Herder interestingly insists that humans' senses are far less sharp than those of animals such as bees, birds, and others.[109] At the same time, he insists that humans' capacity for art is far larger than that of the animals, although their ability for art is inferior to that of animals. "The human being has no single work, in which he would therefore act in a matter subject to no improvement; but he has free space to practice many things, and hence improve himself constantly. Each thought is not an immediate work of nature, but precisely because of this it can become his own work," Herder explains.[110] That is why humans need a special ability to organize the complexity of their senses due to their lack of focus and weakness, and Herder calls it "reason, understanding, taking-awareness [*Besinnung*]."[111]

In a way, reason is a compensation for humans' inferior sensuous ability. "If the human being had animal *senses*, then he would have no *reason*," Herder insists. Reason is thus a positive capacity as it helps humans to organize their senses, but it is also a fundamental negativity because it results from the deficiency of sensuous focus and capacity. Herder unsurprisingly calls nature "the hardest step mother" to humans, and "the most loving mother to each insect."[112] Thus, to say that reason is a separate entity added to human soul is complete

---

[108] Herder, 78.
[109] Herder, 82.
[110] Herder, 82.
[111] Herder, 82.
[112] Herder, 81.

"nonsense."[113] Further, it is worth noting also that this weakness, i.e., the lack of sensuous keenness, allows humans to do more than what animals can do. It frees them from the natural narrowness due to the sharpness of animalistic sensuous ability. Humans, therefore, have a larger level of freedom that animals have.

On the basis of these ideas about human feelings, the deficiency of their sensuous sharpness, and their reason, Herder builds his entire philosophy of language. "The human being, put in the condition of awareness [*Besinnung*] which is his very own, with this awareness operating freely for the first time, invented language. . . The invention of language is hence as natural for him as is his being a human being!"[114] At this point of his argument Herder gives much more emphasis to the idea of awareness and reflection. *Besinnung* is what operates in human beings "so freely that in the whole ocean of sensations which floods the soul through all the senses it can, so to speak, separate off, stop, and pay attention to a single wave, and be conscious of its own attentiveness."[115] It is the ability to "acknowledge" the inputs that humans receive from their senses, which "provides a distinct concept." It is what Herder calls "the first

---

[113] This is what Herder writes: "Human reason has been imagined as a new, quite separate force added into the soul which became the property of the human being in preference to all animals as an additional gift, and which must hence also be considered alone, like the fourth rung of a ladder after the three lowest ones. And that is indeed philosophical nonsense, however great the philosophers may be who say it" (Herder, 83.) This fundamental rejection of ontological dualism has led scholars to think that Herder is a naturalistic philosopher. However, it is worth noting also that although Herder's explanation is thoroughly naturalistic, he still believes in a fundamental distinction between humans and animals. For further discussion on Herder's naturalism, see Anik Waldow, "Between History and Nature: Herder's Human Being and the Naturalization of Reason," in *Herder: Philosophy and Anthropology*, ed. Anik Waldow and Nigel DeSouza (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 147–65; Frederick C. Beiser, *The German Historicist Tradition* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 123–24; Katie Terezakis, *The Immanent Word: The Turn to Language in German Philosophy, 1759-1801* (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 82–88; Avi Lifschitz, *Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 185ff.

[114] Herder, "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)," 87.

[115] Herder, 87.

judgement of the soul."[116] This judgment, which results from human awareness, is the beginning

of language. It is "a word of the soul! With it human language is invented," Herder writes.[117]

When humans see, hear, taste, etc., the world outside them, it leaves an impression on

their souls. An interesting example that Herder provides is when a human recognizes a sheep.

The way human perceives a sheep is different from the "hungry scenting wolf" or "the blood-

licking lion" or "the aroused ram." Human perception, according to Herder, is not distorted or

disturbed by ultra-focused senses like these other animals. "No sense tears him too close to the

sheep or away from him; it stands there exactly as it expresses itself to his senses."[118] Through

human senses, the soul begins to make a connection between the physical experience of the

sheep and the sound of bleating. Herder explains: "This bleating, which makes the strongest

impression on the soul, which tore itself away from all other properties of viewing and feeling,

jumped forth, penetrated most deeply, remains for the soul."[119] So, next time a human being sees

a sheep, the soul immediately recognizes it and says: "Aha! You are the bleating one!"[120]

This recognition of sheep as a bleating being becomes the foundation of human linguistic

expression.[121] The bleating sheep is "a grasped sign" in the human soul that distinguishes human

knowledge of sheep from the others. It is through this recognition of difference, and not by some

---

[116] Herder, 88.

[117] Herder, 88.

[118] Herder, 88.

[119] Herder, 88.

[120] Herder, 88.

[121] Michael Forster calls this insistence on the psychological impression through sensation that leads to the creation of language "a quasi-empiricist doctrine." He uses the qualifier "quasi" in order to demonstrate a significant difference between Herder and Hume's empiricist doctrine that the sensation of the external world is only sufficient to be the basis for the development of a concept. There is an element of psychologism also in Herder's conception of language. This is also what makes Herder different from the anti-psychologism of Wittenstein and Frege. For futher discussion, see Forster, *After Herder*, 135.

divine intervention, that language arises.[122] Again, as Herder puts it: "Language is invented!

Invented just as naturally, and as necessarily for the human being, as the human being was a

human being."[123] The interconnectedness of reason, which works through the awareness of the

senses and the creation of human language, is at the heart of Herder's philosophy of language. It

is no surprise that he declares: "Without language the human being has no reason, and without

reason no language."[124]

It is worth noting that, unlike Condillac's analogy of the two children or Rousseau's

concept of social convention, Herder does not see the origin of language in the natural necessity

for communication. So, even if a person lived alone on an isolated island, Herder insists that

language would still be invented because of the work of human reason interacting and

recognizing nature around that person.[125] Language is rooted in the works of the human soul,

---

[122] Concerning different views of origin of language, Herder explains: "These so numerous, unbearable falsehoods which have been stated about the human origin of language have in the end made the opposite opinion almost universal. . But I hope that it will not remain so. . Here it is no *organization* of the mouth which produces language, for even the person who was dumb all his life, if he was a human being, if he took awareness, had language in his soul! Here itis no cry of sensation, for no breathing machine but a creature taking awareness invented language! No principle of imitation in the soul; the imitation of nature, if it occurs, is merely a means to the one and only purpose which is supposed to be explained here. Least of all is it common-understanding, arbitrary societal convention; the savage, the solitary in the forest, would necessarily have invented language for himself even if he had never spoken it. Language was the common-understanding of his soul with itself, and a common-understanding as necessary as the human being was human being. If others found it unintelligible how a human soul was able to invent language, then it is unintelligible to me how a human soul was able to be what it is without precisely thereby, already even in the absence of a mouth and society, inevitably inventing language for itself." Herder, "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)," 89–90.

[123] Herder, 89.

[124] Herder, 91. To put it in a different way, Herder also writes: "If it is true that we cannot think without thought, and learn to think through words, then language sets limits and outline for the whole human cognition." Herder, "Fragments on Recent German Literature (1767-8) [Excerpts on Language]," 49.

[125] Herder, "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)," 98. This expressionist conception of language is precisely the point that Charles Taylor emphasizes in his essay on the importance of Herder. "Herder's first important insight was to see that expression constitutes the linguistic dimension. . . . Reflection arises in an animal form that is already dealing with the world around it. Language comes about as a new, reflective stance toward things. . . . Speech is the expression of thought." Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments*, 92.

The idea that language is the expression of human soul is later strongly challenged by Jacques Derrida. See Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Corrected Edition (Baltimore; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), chap. 1.

caused by the lack of keenness of senses, as a way to both recognize and express human awareness of the world outside them. Language in its very essence is "a natural organ of the understanding, a sense of the human soul," according to Herder. Communication, therefore, comes later, and for Herder is the result of an "arbitrary societal convention."[126]

The feeling that human souls experience does not only result in the formation of nouns, but above all the formation of verbs. "The sound had to designate the thing, just as the thing gave the sound. Hence from the verbs arose nouns, and not from nouns verbs. The child names the sheep not as a sheep but as a bleating creature, and hence makes the interjection into a verb."[127] Further, after the formation of both verbs and nouns, humans produce language completely on the basis of their nature as feeling and sensuous creatures. "The feelings are woven together in him; what moves lives; what resounds speaks – and since it resounds for you or against you, it is friend or enemy; god or goddess; it acts from passions like you!"

Because this human language is thoroughly based on feeling or experiencing the moving and living world, Herder articulates his strong agreement by saying that *"poetry was older than prose!"*[128] His entire statement on the poetic language is worth quoting here:

> For what was this first language but a collection of elements of poetry? Imitation of resounding, acting, stirring nature! Taken from the interjections of all beings and enlivened by the interjection of human sensation! The natural language of all creatures poetized by the understanding into sounds, into images of action, of passion, and of living effect! A vocabulary of the soul which is simultaneously a mythology and a wonderful epic of the actions and speakings of all beings! Hence a constant poetic creation of fable with passion and interest! What else is poetry?[129]

---

[126] Herder writes: "[E]ven if the human being never reached the situation of conveying the idea to another creature, and hence of wanting or being able to bleat forth this characteristic mark of taking-awareness to it with his lips, still his soul has, so to speak, bleated again when it recognized the sheep by it." Herder, "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)," 89.

[127] Herder, 100.

[128] Herder, 103.

[129] Herder, 103.

Herder tries to explain this poetic nature of language through the idea that human language can be understood as a song-making enterprise. A human being "sing[s] himself a language." Singing is the expression of human feeling and, therefore, marks the originality of language. In other words, the more poetic or expressive the feeling of a language is, the more original that language is.

In Herder's other essay, *On Diligence in the Study of Several Learned Languages*, he posits the idea that originally "all the world was one tongue and language."[130] However, the universal unity of language in the time of "this golden age" (*diese goldne Zeit*) became confused through some kind of catastrophe[131] and human beings and their language(s) were scattered around the world.[132] In any case, Michael Morton is correct that Herder seems to believe that multilingualism is rooted in or caused by a "negative causation."[133] He further points out that this negative cause of multilingualism, in Herder's thought, somehow turns into a positive in the formation of national languages.[134] Because language is thoroughly and profoundly a natural phenomenon, language is shaped and formed in accordance with the climate and environment in which the groups of people live. Different peoples have different languages because of the climate and the environment of their surroundings. "Just as the whole species could not possibly remain a single herd, likewise it could not retain a single language either. So there arises a

---

[130] Johann Gottfried Herder, "On Diligence in the Study of Several Learned Languages (1764)," in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Selected Early Works, 1764-1767: Addresses, Essays, and Drafts; Fragments on Recent German Literature*, trans. Ernest A. Menze and Karl Menges (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 29.

[131] Herder describes this catastrophe as "the chalice of confusion was poured over them." In the essay on the origin of language, he argues that it is the hatred toward one another that separates all human languages.

[132] Herder, "On Diligence in the Study of Several Learned Languages (1764)," 29.

[133] Michael Morton, *Herder and the Poetics of Thought: Unity and Diversity in On Diligence in Several Learned Languages* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), 34–35.

[134] Morton, 38–39.

formation of different national languages," Herder writes.[135] This can explain the diversity of human languages.

As we have discussed above, Herder does not define nation on the basis of skin color. So it is interesting to note that he defines race, as a smaller category under a nation, by their linguistics. "Each race will bring into its language *the sound belonging to its house and family*; this becomes, in terms of pronunciation, a different dialect. . . . Climate [*Klima*], air and water, food and drink, will have an influence on the linguistic organs and naturally also on language."[136] This is why people pronounce words differently even within the same language. However, Herder claims further that climate and other natural factors not only affect people's pronunciation, but also their words, which is "an endless field of differences."[137]

In spite of these differences, Herder insists that there is an inherent unity or interconnectedness in the so-called "familial language," which consists of languages that are close to each other.

> If we take a look at the living, active world, there are motives there which must very naturally give rise to the difference of language among peoples near to each other – only let one not want to force the human being to change in accordance with some pet system. He is no *Rousseauian* forestman; he has language. He is no *Hobbesian* wolf; he has a *familial language*.[138]

---

[135] Herder, "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)," 147. This is what Herder calls the "third natural law." On the basis of the idea that language is a natural phenomenon, Herder argues that there are four major natural laws in the formation of human language. The first natural law pertains to the creativity of language. Human beings are the creator of language because they both are active and think freely. The second natural law pertains to the idea that language is not just invented, but also developed further by human beings. This progression of language somehow leads to the smallest formation of human social life, that is a tribe. Here Herder speaks primarily about the diversity of dialects. Furthermore, the third natural law that is quoted above is about the formation of national languages that are above or larger than local dialects. And lastly, the fourth natural law points to the language and the development of a civilization. See Herder, pt. 2.

[136] Herder, "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)," 148.

[137] Herder, 148.

[138] Herder, 153.

Furthermore, the differences within the family, which Herder argues are often caused by hatred, can somehow be overcome through "familial feeling." This feeling binds them together into a single national language.[139] The unity of the national language should lead to the formation of a civilization [*Bildung*].[140] For Herder, human beings can be seen as "national animals"[141] who need the unity of language in order to build their civilization.

The interconnectedness of language and a nationalism Herder describes as follows: "[E]ach nation speaks in accordance with its thought and thinks in accordance with its speech."[142] The spirit or the character of a nation is profoundly reflected in and through its national language. Hence, Herder insists that literature has to be written in the given national language.[143] He is apparently aware of the reality of hybridity of cultures in which one cultural value or item is often imported and becomes assimilated with another one. Yet Herder rejects such a mixture of cultures:

> Borrowed viewpoints got shifted to a new manner [of thinking and seeing], inherited truths got restricted to the point of unrecognizability, half-understood concepts became ghosts, incorrectly perceived objects became bizarre forms, and a language which has received its literature from various climates and regions, from many sorts of languages and peoples, must naturally be a mixture of equally many foreign manners of representation which have won a place in one science or the other.[144]

This is a strong statement regarding the exclusionary nature of language! It is no surprise that precisely because of the unbreakable connection between a language and the character of a

---

[139] Herder, 153.

[140] Herder, 154. This is the fourth natural law of language.

[141] Herder, 158.

[142] Herder, "Fragments on Recent German Literature (1767-8) [Excerpts on Language]," 50.

[143] Herder writes: "If… each original language which is the native growth of a country develops in accordance with its climate and region, if each national language forms itself in accordance with the ethics and manner of thought of its people, then conversely, a country's literature which is original and national must form itself in accordance with such a nation's original native language in such away that the two run together." See Herder, 50.

[144] Herder, 51.

nation, Herder is convinced that in spite of the endless multiplicity of languages in the world, one's first and foremost responsibility is to learn one's national language. "If, thus, each language has its distinct national character, it seems that nature imposes upon us an obligation only to our mother tongue, for it is perhaps better attuned to our character and coextensive with our way of thinking," Herder argues.[145]

It is imperative to note that Herder does not oppose learning other languages; he just profoundly believes that one's national language should retain the place of greatest importance. Herder himself was clearly a man who knew many languages. It is apparent from his writings that he is familiar with other languages such as Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, English, etc. However, he also thought that because a language embodies the distinctive characteristics of a nation, in learning other nations' language one will never be able to penetrate their idiosyncratic characteristics. In Herder words: "I may perhaps be able to ape haltingly the sound of foreign nations, without, however, penetrating to the core of their uniqueness. I may perhaps, with much effort, learn dead languages word by word, from their monuments, but their spirit has vanished for me."[146]

In spite of the fact that learning the languages of other nations will not penetrate the unique spirit of their nations, Herder thinks that one still needs to learn them as long as they are not mixed together into an unrecognized hybridity. This is where we see Herder's cosmopolitanism. All national languages are equally important although one's main obligation is to one's own national language. The linguistic borders among nations have to be strictly maintained. Learning other languages can be done "so long as the scattered crowd of scholars is

---

[145] Herder, "On Diligence in the Study of Several Learned Languages (1764)," 30.
[146] Herder, 30.

not governed by a monarch who would set one language upon the throne of the ruins of so many others, so long as the plans for universal language belong among the empty projects and journeys to the moon," Herder states.[147] Herder encourages people to learn other languages as long as "we keep our native language on our tongue."[148]

Though Herder uses the tower of Babel as a paradigm for learning other languages, even here we need to remember that for Herder multilingualism is a catastrophe. Herder rhetorically asks these questions:

> How little progress would we have made, were each nation to strive for learnedness by itself, confined within the narrow sphere of its language? . . . And how? Shall they build together without understanding one another, each language remaining for the other a medley of empty sound?–Thus they would toil just as fruitlessly as those at the tower of Babel in their confusion.

The ideal is, for Herder, is that everyone in the world would speak the same language, but this is not the reality at all. The reality is that there are many languages in the world. However, to make progress, people need to reverse the division that happened at Babel by learning other languages.

To sum up: First, Herder believes that human language is at the very basic level similar to animals' expression of their feelings. However, there is an essential difference between human expression of feelings and mere animalistic groans. The difference is that human feelings are expressed through language. The invention of language, Herder argues, is originated in the lack of sharpness of human senses. This deficiency of sensuous keenness is the naturalistic foundation for human reason. Language is eventually produced by the work of human reason. Second, since humans live everywhere in the world, their languages are shaped and formed by the climate and the particularity of the place where they live. The diversity of linguistic expressions, therefore, is

---

[147] Herder, 31.
[148] Herder, 33.

endless, but Herder thinks that there is always "familial language" that somehow unifies some closely related languages into a single national language. Third, every national language reflects a unique characteristic of that given language.[149] While acknowledging the existence of, and the need to learn, other languages, Herder insists that one's primary devotion should be to one's own the national language.

With this in mind, I will now examine Herder's interpretation of the phenomenon of speaking in tongue(s) in the New Testament. I hope to show in this section that there is a close connection between Herder's romantic-nationalist philosophy of language and his notion of speaking in tongue(s). Romanticism and nationalism become the frames of reference or hermeneutic for his interpretation.

1.3.3. Herder's Rejection of Tongue(s) as a Multilingual Phenomenon

In his 1794 essay entitled, *Von der Gabe der Sprachen am ersten christlichen Pfingstfest* (On the Gift of Languages at the first Christian Pentecost), Herder launched a strong criticism of the contemporary common understanding of the nature of speaking in tongue(s). This essay opened the door to a more forceful rejection of foreign language(s) in the subsequent centuries. Herder's basic premise is that language is embedded in human tradition. One cannot invent language, only learn it. He wrote: "Language is the mindset of a people (*eines Volks*) from the ancient time. Whenever languages exist, an individual cannot invent them, he only learns

---

[149] Concerning Herder's contribution to the development of modern hermeneutics, especially via Frederic Schleiermacher, Paul Ricoeur correctly notes: "Something more is added in Romantic philosophy in that, there, the mind is considered as the creative unconscious at work in persons of genius. This philosophical mutation, in turn, is related to an important change of perspective. Whereas Kant studied natural knowledge, philology poses the problem of understanding literary works, i.e., human creations. To cite only one instance, Winkelmann's formidable work of interpretation applied to artistic masterpieces requires a broader philosophy of understanding. And Herder opens the way with his efforts to ground the understanding of cultural works in the soul of epochs and of peoples." See Paul Ricoeur, "Schleiermacher's Hermeneutics," *The Monist* 60, no. 2 (1977): 182.

them."[150] As we have discussed above, this foundational principle is the reflection of Herder's political view.

Focusing primarily on the book of Acts, Herder questions whether the entire story is about a linguistic miracle. First of all, these people are said to be drunk, and Peter seems to affirm that notion. Herder insists that a group of people who are perceived to be drunk because they speak in foreign language is a truly strange story. Not only that, Herder also strongly believes that the Jews are not known as a group of people who speak many languages. In the first century, it is very likely they primarily spoke Greek because according to Herder, "obviously... it was most common and the dominant language, through which they can at that time make themselves understood to all the world and also to their scattered compatriots."[151] In other words, multilingual communication is not necessary at all. Using this logic of dominance, Herder further insists that if the apostles wanted to speak to the multitudes of Jewish people, they easily could have used Greek.[152] He notes that all the names that the book of Acts lists, i.e., Parthians and Medes and Elamites, etc., are not a list of representative languages, but a geographical map of provinces where the Jewish people lived.[153]

Herder further employs the logic of both nationalism and colonialism. He insists that those who are under Hellenistic, Roman, British, or French colonial powers should speak the

---

[150] "Sprache ist die Denkart eines Volks nach gewohnter Weise von alten Zeiten. Sobald Sprachen da sind, kann ein Einzelner sie nicht erfinden; er muß sie lernen." Johann Gottfried Herder, "Von Der Gabe Der Sprachen Am Ersten Christlichen Pfingstfest (1794)," in *Herders Sümmtliche Werke*, ed. Bernhard Suphan, vol. 19 (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1880), 6. The notion of *"das Volk"* is very important in Herder's philosophy. He uses it to refer not only to the literal meaning "the people" in general sense but also to the "nation." *Das Volk* is about nationhood. So, when Herder said "Sprache ist die Denkart eines Volks" he's also referring to language as the mindset or way of thinking of a nation as a political body. It is the common language that unites a nation.

[151] "Offenbar weil es die geläufigste, die herrschende Sprache war, in der sie sich damals aller Welt und auch ihren zerstreuten Landsleuten verständlich machen konnten." Herder, 12.

[152] "Also mußten wenigstens die Apostel, wenn sie mit dieser Menge sprechen wollten, nicht nothwendig in fremden Sprachen reden." Herder, 12.

[153] Herder, 13.

languages of their colonizers, and not their local languages or dialects.[154] As we have discussed

above, Herder believes that in spite of the differences in local dialects, every nation must have a

national language which is formed through what he calls "familial language." People in the

colonies are to conduct their daily activities using the national language exclusively. Because the

first-century Jews lived under the influence of both Hellenistic and Roman dominance, Herder

argued that in all likelihood they spoke Greek. The logic of nationalism runs deep in this line of

argumentation. Noting that the Jews are stubborn,[155] Herder argues that they would likely

communicate in the dominant language instead of in particular local languages.

Concerning the book of Acts, Herder argues that the fact that all the crowds are

astonished and that it is only after Peter spoke in an understandable language that they began to

what had just taken place is an indicator that speaking in tongue(s) is not the same as speaking in

many foreign languages.[156] He notes that after the story of Pentecost, there is nothing in Acts that

points to apostles traveling around the ancient Mediterranean world preaching in a multilingual

way. This is the reason why when people spoke the Lycaonian language (Acts 14:11) Paul did

not understand them. However, when he was asked (Acts 21:37) whether he knew Greek, Paul

affirms that he does.

Also, Herder points out that there are two other instances in the book of Acts that

speaking in tongue(s) appears, and neither of them can be understood as a foreign language

---

[154] "Wenn Griechische, Römische, Französische, Englische Colonien von Dialekten reden, in denen sie gebohren sind; wer verstünde darunter etwas anders als Griechische, Römische, Französische, Englische Dialekte? schwerlich die Sprachen der Völker unter denen sie leben. Gilt dieses nun von Völkern und Zeiten, die unstreitig viel Sprachgelehriger sind, als dieses Volk und jene Zeiten es waren?" Herder, 16.

[155] In Herder's words: "Die Juden waren hierinn ja eigensinniger, als Sinesen, Indier und Japaner es seyn mögen." For further discussion on Herder and anti-Semitism, see Alfred Apsler, "Herder and the Jews," *Monatshefte Für Deutschen Unterricht* 35, no. 1 (1943): 1–15; Anders Gerdmar, *Roots of Theological Anti-Semitism: German Biblical Interpretation and the Jews, from Herder and Semler to Kittel and Bultmann* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2009), 51–60.

[156] Herder, "Von Der Gabe Der Sprachen Am Ersten Christlichen Pfingstfest (1794)," 15.

phenomenon. The first one is the story of Cornelius in Acts 10, especially vv. 44-46, Herder asks these simple questions: "With whom did this Roman family speak foreign languages at home? Who could tell with whom they are able to speak?"[157] The point is that these people are foreigners already, there is no need to speak foreign languages anymore. To say that when they are speaking in tongue(s) they are speaking a specific foreign language is absurd. The other instance is the story of about the twelve disciples of John in Ephesus. The problem with reading this story as being about speaking foreign languages is almost the same as with the story of Cornelius. "With whom do these people speak those foreign languages? There was no other person there except for Paul,"[158] Herder argues. Thus, Herder concludes that people probably have misunderstood this phenomenon as a foreign language experience.[159]

1.3.4. Herder's Constructive Explanation of Tongue(s)

Reading Herder's treatise on this topic, we cannot fail to notice a political nationalist language. The great people of Israel in the Hebrew Bible are called heroes and patriots (*Helden und Patrioten*). In the old constitution, Herder argues, God ruled the kingdom, which Herder calls "a holy nation" (*ein heiliges Volk*) or the republic of God (*einer Republik Gottes*), by the law. So, the festival of Pentecost is the birthday celebration for the patriotic Israelites (*patriotischen Israeliten*). This divine ruling through the law, however, cannot be sustained by the Israelites who lived in the desert. The whole constitution then fell apart completely, Herder explains. The outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the day of Pentecost was the mark of the

---

[157] Herder, 22.

[158] Herder, 23.

[159] Herder writes: "Aus allem diesem wird wahrscheinlich, daß wir den Geschichtschreiber Lucas in seinem Ausdruck „mit Zungen, mit andern Zungen reden" vielleicht mißverstehen, wenn wir ihn auf eine plötzliche Mittheilung ungelernter, fremder Sprachen deuten." Herder, 23.

beginning of the times of another world constitution (*die Zeiten einer andern Weltverfassung*), which is different from the old constitution of the Israelites (*der alten Constitution des Israelitischen Volks*) established by God through their deliverance from the oppressive power of Egyptians.

The experience on the day of Pentecost is all about enthusiasm over this new birth of Israel. Herder points to the enthusiasm that the early disciples of Jesus experienced on the day of Pentecost. In order to explain the disciple's state of excitement, Herder traces the promises of God in the Hebrew Bible concerning the coming of the Holy Spirit. It all begins with the work of the Spirit in the story of creation which, according to Herder, "excited and moved the forces of creation," as has also been pointed out in Haggai 2:6-10.[160] In spite of this creative work of the Spirit, Genesis 6:3 also describes that God's Spirit will not always stay among God's people forever. Instead of working among the people, the Spirit only works through some important people who hold important office, such as prophets and kings.[161]

As a consequence, the Old Testament is full of promises of the coming outpouring of God's Spirit on the people after the coming of the Messiah. Isaiah 11:2-5, for example, speaks about the promise that the Spirit of God will rest on the Messiah, and he will be full of wisdom, understanding, knowledge, and fear of the Lord. Messiah will rule with righteousness. Herder argues further that the discourse in John 16 indicates that Christ will bestow the Spirit through the "feeling of righteousness" (*dies Gefühl der Gerechtigkeit*) as promised by Isaiah.[162] Not only righteousness, the coming of the Spirit is also marked by the giving of wisdom and knowledge, just as in the case of Joseph who was filled with the spirit of wisdom (Genesis 41:38). This

---

[160] Herder, 25–26.
[161] Herder, 28.
[162] Herder, 29.

wisdom and knowledge is also apparent in the story of Bazalel, who is filled with ability, intelligence, and knowledge after receiving the divine spirit (Ex. 31:3)[163] Herder writes: "Above all, prophecy, poetry, high figurative speech . . . was regarded as a manifestation of the mind with higher gifts."[164] These all are going to come as with the outpouring of the Spirit on the "future golden age" (*die künftige goldene Zeit*). It is interesting that in his *On Diligence,* Herder speaks of the golden age as a past reality of the unified origin of all languages. In his discussion on speaking in tongue(s), the golden age is a future reality.

With that in mind, after Christ is exalted by God, an event that fulfills God's promises, Herder insists that it is impossible for the disciples not to get excited about it. They must be filled with enthusiasm, hope, comfort, and joy (*Begeisterung, Hoffnung, Trost und Freude*).[165] This is precisely what happened in Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost. The day marks an explosion of their highly enthusiastic feeling. They praised God and sold their belongings to join this a new community knowing that God's promises of restoration are being fulfilled. They were full of joy and excitement (*Freude und Begeisterung*). The book of Acts describes this heightened state of enthusiasm and excitement as "being filled with the Holy Spirit."[166] Herder argues that if this is the case, then it will be a lot easier to explain why other people would mock them for apparently being drunk.[167]

Herder further describes the day of Pentecost as the beginning of "a new gospel, a new covenant and a new song" that requires a new tongue and a new language (*neue Zunge und*

---

[163] Herder, 30.
[164] Herder, 30.
[165] Herder, 33–34.
[166] Herder, 35–36.
[167] Herder, 45.

Sprache).[168] This new wine demands a new wineskin. These Galileans speak in new tongues to express the enthusiasm that they are feeling. In order to explain this phenomenon further, Herder turns his attention to the nature of the Hebrew language. Hebrew is a language that is characterized by "pure sensuous names" (*lauter sinnlichen Bezeichnungen*).[169] As we have discussed above, Herder believes that the more poetic or sensuous a language is, the closer that language is to its origins. Through the Hebrew language, a speaker is able to express the depth of "emotions and thoughts" (*Regungen und Gedanken*). Herder insists therefore: "Speaking with tongues means nothing but speaking affectedly, enthusiastically, vigorously, and heartily just as [in] the Hebraic style."[170] In a way, we can say that speaking in tongue(s) for Herder is not necessarily a language; it is a style. It is a style that allows for the full expression of the deepest enthusiastic and affective feelings. Herder explains that the idea behind speaking in one's language is about speaking in one's linguistic style. Tongue(s) in this sense, according to Herder, is "the mother of the dialects, the expression, the various linguistic modes."[171] If we understand this statement from the point of view of Herder's philosophy of language, speaking in tongue(s) reflects the very origin of language itself, which is the outburst of internal feeling in one's soul. In other words, this interpretation is thoroughly consistent with an expressivist theory of language which lies at the core of Herder's understanding of language.[172]

---

[168] Herder, 47.

[169] Herder, 61.

[170] "Mit der Zunge sprechen heißt also nach dem Ebräischen Styl nichts anders als im Affect, begeistert, kräftig und herzlich reden." Herder, 63.

[171] Herder, 63.

[172] Following Taylor, Michael Forster also points out correctly Herder's unique contribution to linguistic theory as follows: "Language was originally *expressive* in nature rather than referring or descriptive, and indeed still includes many terms which, while meaningful, have an expressive rather than a referring or descriptive character (e.g., the term "Ah!")." Forster, *After Herder*, 134.

With this in mind, here is how Herder breaks down every phrase that the New Testament uses for this phenomenon. First, that the singular "speaking with a tongue" (γλωσση λαλειν) means simply "to speak enthusiastically." Second, the plural "speaking with tongues" (γλωσσαις λαλειν) signifies to talk more with enthusiasm. And third, "to speak with new or foreign tongues" (ετεραις, καιναις γλωσσαις λαλειν) refers to producing new prophecies, divine pronouncements, and interpretations. To speak in one's own dialect (ιδια διαλεκτω λαλειν) means to bring forth diving oracles, prophecies, and hymns of praise in order to inspire enthusiasm from the audiences.[173]

Herder then employs this new proposal of understanding tongue(s) as enthusiastic expression of feelings to read Paul's discussion in 1 Cor. 14. It is no surprise, therefore, that Herder calls a tongue speaker in the Corinthian church "the enthusiast" (*der Begeisterte*). When Paul speaks about praying in his spirit, Herder argues that this means an enthusiastic prayer (*ein begeistertes Gebet*) because spirit or *Geist* here is all about enthusiasm and happiness, as opposed to "the clear, bright, and peaceful mind" which Paul calls νους.

There is a significant difference, however, between tongue(s) in the book of Acts and in 1 Cor. 14. On the one hand, the enthusiasm on the day of Pentecost is expressed in an intelligible way. Their words are understandable and the hearer know what they are saying. Herder argues that the Corinthians took this state of excitement to another different level. They are so excited to that they behave in a very unintelligible (*sehr unverständig*) way.[174] However, it is worth noting that the unintelligibility of tongue(s) in Corinth is not caused by the babbling of unknown words. Rather, it is a result of the highly poetic nature of tongue(s) itself because, again, Herder believes

---

[173] See Herder, "Von Der Gabe Der Sprachen Am Ersten Christlichen Pfingstfest (1794)," 84.

[174] Herder, 92–95.

that the more original a language is, the livelier and more affectively moving it will be. In other words, the tongue(s) speakers are overly enthusiastic to the extent that they produce eccentric, highly poetic, and parabolic speech that others have a hard time understanding. On top of this eccentric nature, tongue(s) is expressed in "broken oracles, mystic glosses [and] isolated ecstasies."[175] It is thus, Herder insists, spoken uselessly (*unnütz gesprochen*).[176] Paul thinks that it is admirable to be able to compose sentences in highly parabolic, exaggerated, and eccentric forms, but since no one understands what a person means by them, Herder insists that Paul might also see such a phenomenon as "a state bordering on madness."[177]

The influence of Herder in the subsequent biblical scholarship on tongue(s) is enormously important. The mood of nineteenth-century scholarship is the extension of Herder's interpretation. From the discussion above, one should be able to detect the influence of his romantic-nationalist woven in his reading of biblical texts. The nationalistic strategy of reading would employ politics of language in rejecting the multilingualism of early Christian identity. His romanticist slant attributes tongue(s) to the feeling of excitement and enthusiasm that the early Christians experienced on the day of Pentecost. It is important to note that Herder was not by any means the first person to argue that tongue(s) is not speaking in foreign languages. Some other eighteenth century scholars, e.g., Bardili, Eichhorn, Ernesti, had also challenged the idea of speaking in tongue(s) as the miraculous ability to speak in foreign languages.[178] However,

---

[175] Herder, 98.

[176] Herder, 95.

[177] "[E]in solcher Zustand bei manchen wirtlich an Wahnsinn grenzet." The German word "*Wahnsinn*" can mean madness or mania or lunacy. Herder, 99.

[178] For further discussion on them, see Schulz, *Die Geistesgaben Der Ersten Christen Insbesondre Die Sogenannte Gabe Der Sprachen*, 19ff; John McClintock and James Strong, *Cyclopædia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature*, vol. X (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1891), 480; Thomas Charles Edwards, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Hamilton, Adams & Co., 1885), 319.

Herder is likely responsible for attributing tongue(s) to religious feeling. Johann Baptist Anton Englmann correctly observes in 1848 that Herder's influence on Schulz, Neander, and other German biblical scholars is not only on the rejection of tongue(s) as a phenomenon of foreign languages, but also on the idea that this is an ecstatic or enthusiastic state.[179] Indeed, Herder set the trend for the next century of scholarship on speaking in tongue(s), which I discuss in a greater detail below.

1.3.5. German Biblical Scholarship in the Nineteenth Century

The explosion of scholarly works in Germany and Britain about speaking in tongue(s) is a clear indicator that this topic became a serious matter of inquiry. As I have pointed out above, even until the middle of the nineteenth century, the dominant view on tongue(s) was still that it referred to the miraculous ability to speak in foreign languages. However, the nineteenth century was also the critical period of a great shift in the interpretation. Herder's romantic explanation of tongue(s) as a feeling of excitement or enthusiasm provides a new language for European biblical scholars to explain this phenomenon constructively. One thing is certain: once the idea of tongue(s) as a foreign languages phenomenon is rejected, it opens the floodgate of positive or constructive explanation on what it is all about. While agreeing with his rejection of foreign languages, it is clear that many European scholars still find Herder's explanation, tongue(s) as a poetic expression out of one's feeling of excitement or enthusiasm, as insufficient and unsatisfactory.

---

[179] "*ein Reden in einem ekstatischen oder doch mehr oder minder begeisterten Zustande.*" See Johann Baptist Anton Englmann, *Von Den Charismen in Allgemeinen Und von Dem Sprachen-Charisma Im Besonderen, Oder, Historisch-Exegetische Abhandlung Über 1 Kor. 12-14: Eine Gekrönte Preisschrift* (Regensburg: Joseph Manz, 1848), 377–78.

The aim of the following presentation is two-fold. The first aim is to trace the development of German biblical scholarship after Herder, especially from Fredrich Bleek to Heinrich Meyer. It will demonstrate how German scholars, on the basis of Herder's romantic-nationalist interpretation, moved further away from the understanding of tongue(s) speakers as being completely self-aware to being completely unable to recognize their own acts. The second aim is to show that the starting point of early scholarship is always from Acts and then to 1 Corinthians. It was David Schulz and Karl Wieseler who challenged this consensus, and offered a different direction of interpretation — that it should begin with Paul and then consider the book of Acts. This change of starting point is extremely significant in changing the course of biblical scholarship. Wieseler's position influenced Meyer's view of speaking in tongue(s) as a total suspension of human intellectual ability. So toward the end of nineteenth century, scholars have reached a point that is quite far from what Herder proposed in the late eighteenth century.

These different views on tongue(s) are by no means independent of one another. Scholars always build upon what others have done. In many later publications, especially toward the end of nineteenth century and the entire twentieth century, Herder is not mentioned at all. Yet Herder's legacy clearly continues in biblical scholarship. His insistence on equating speaking in tongue(s) with an intense feeling of excitement or enthusiasm lies beneath almost all scholarly discussion in the post-Herderian era. The following primarily highlights major voices in Germany in this period.

Friedrich Bleek: Tongue(s) as Archaic Provincial Expressions

The movement away from understanding tongue(s) as foreign languages began in 1829 with the publication of noted New Testament scholar and philologist Friedrich Bleek's influential essay entitled "Über die Gabe des γλώσσαις λαλεῖν in der ersten christlichen Kirche."

While Herder's rejection of multilingualism on the day of Pentecost and in the Corinthian church was based primarily on a logic of nationalism, Bleek's rejection was primarily on a philological basis.[180] However, we shall see later that Bleek's constructive explanation is still deeply embedded in the romantic tradition initiated by Herder. The word γλῶσσα indeed means language, Bleek explains, but it does not have to be foreign language. The philological difficulty lies in the singular expression "γλώσσῃ λαλεῖν," which cannot be synonymous with the plural "γλώσσαις λαλεῖν" or "ἑτέραις γλώσσαις λαλεῖν." This singularity would seem unnatural in light of its relationship with the plural expression if it is understood as foreign languages.[181]

Concerning the narrative of tongues on the day of Pentecost in the book of Acts, which has been used widely to support the idea that the phenomenon refers to speaking in foreign languages, Bleek first of all argued that Lukan recounting of this story is second-hand material that he received from tradition rather than being present to witness the events himself. Furthermore, though one would imagine that the narrative describes one disciple speaking Latin, the other Arabic, and yet another probably Persian, that is probably not the case at all. For Bleek, the text does not allow such interpretation. The expressions in Acts 2:6, (ἤκουον εἷς ἕκαστος τῇ ἰδίᾳ διαλέκτῳ λαλούντων αὐτῶν) and Acts 2:8-11 (ἡμεῖς ἀκούομεν ἕκαστος τῇ ἰδίᾳ διαλέκτῳ ἡμῶν ἐν ᾗ ἐγεννήθημεν Πάρθοι καὶ Μῆδοι κ.τ.λ. . . . ἀκούομεν λαλούντων αὐτῶν ταῖς ἡμετέραις γλώσσαις τὰ μεγαλεῖα τοῦ θεοῦ) demonstrate that the miracle is not "speaking" per se, but "hearing" in different languages.[182] In other words, it is a miracle on the part of the hearers, not

---

[180] Frederich Bleek, "Über Die Gabe Des Γλώσσαις Λαλεῖν in Der Ersten Christlichen Kirche," in *Theologische Studien Und Kritiken* (Hamburg: Bei Friedrich Perthes, 1829), 14.

[181] Bleek, 15.

[182] Bleek, 18. This idea is by no means a new one. "*Cyprian*, *Erasmus*, and others, have maintained that the miracle was wrought, not on the speakers, but on the hearers; and that the *Jewish* language which the apostles spoke on the day of Pentecost became *Greek* to a *Grecian* hearer, and *Latin* to a *Roman*." See *An Essay on the Gift of Tongues, Proving That It Was Not the Gift of Languages: In a Letter to a Friend.* (London; Bristol: R. Cruttwell, 1786), 1–2.

the speakers.[183] It is, therefore, no surprise that in his speech, Peter did not even mention speaking in different languages. Peter did mention prophecy, but Bleek argues that prophecy and tongues are two different phenomena.

Regarding tongue(s) in the Corinthian church, Bleek constructs his argument on the basis of the multilingual nature of the city of Corinth. As a Greek city, even though Corinth was a Roman colony, the dominant language in the first century was still Greek. By virtue of its political position under Roman empire, however, some people did speak Latin as well. In the Corinthian church, there is a possibility that many could speak different languages other than Greek (such as Aramaic).[184] Consequently, Bleek insists that it would be difficult to believe that no one understands tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 14:2. For if a person under the control of the Holy Spirit speaks in Aramaic when an Aramaic-speaking person is present, Paul's assertion would have been wrong. Concerning Paul's statement that speaking in tongues edifies the speakers only and not the person, Bleek argues further that, if a Roman whose mother tongue is Latin began to speak in Greek, it would have been the congregations who understood Greek that would have been built up instead of the speaker because he would not have understood what he was saying.[185] Paul himself, who said that he speaks in tongue(s) more than anybody else, did not understand Lycaonian language (Acts 4:11).[186] Therefore, tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 14 is likely not a miraculous ability to speak in foreign languages.

---

[183] Bleek writes: "die Jünger zwar ganz nach der gewöhnlichen Weise und in ihrer Mutter sprache geredet, aber von dem herzugelaufenen Volke vermöge eines von Gott in ihnen gewirkten Wunders jeder bei ihnen allen nur seine Sprache und seine Mundart zu hören gemeint hätte." (The disciples had spoken in the ordinary way and in their mother's language, but had heard from the people who had come by a miracle wrought in them by God in their own language and their dialect.) Bleek, "Über Die Gabe Des Γλώσσαις Λαλεῖν in Der Ersten Christlichen Kirche," 18.

[184] Bleek, 20.

[185] Bleek, 21.

[186] Bleek, 26.

Furthermore, Bleek also argues against the view that tongue(s) is an ability to speak in foreign languages through a natural way, i.e., by learning and not a supernatural intervention. This view cannot explain why Paul categorizes such gift as "χάρισμα πνευματικόν" in 1 Cor.[187] For Bleek, it is difficult to understand that someone who learned to speak foreign languages in a natural way could have special religious feelings or sensations (*religiöse Empfindungen*), which is depicted in the New Testament as the sign of the work of the Holy Spirit.[188] In other words, the situation is too extraordinary for it to refer to normal speaking in naturally acquired foreign languages.

If we are not to understand the word γλώσσα in its ordinary meaning, i.e., language or dialect, Bleek proposes that a better way to see it is through the way Greek poets used it, which he calls "the third mode of explanation" (*die dritte Erklärungsweise*).[189] Pointing to the use of the word γλῶσσα, especially in Galen's explanation of the terms (γλωσσας) used by Hippocrates, Bleek explains that those terms probably were ordinary in the ancient time, but now they are no longer recognized.[190] Not only that, the term also is used to denote unknown provincial expressions (*provinzielle Ausdrücke*).[191] Aristotle uses the word γλῶσσαι in this sense of unusual terms or words for a certain group of people, as opposed to κύριον, which refers mainly to the expressions that are familiar to the locals.[192] In this sense, Bleek argues, "one and the same

---

[187] Bleek, 27.

[188] Bleek, 27. As I have pointed out above on Herder, the concept of "*Empfindungen*" (feelings or emotions) is an important concept in German Romantic tradition. See also Moses Mendelssohn, *Über die Empfindungen* (Berlin: bey Christian Friedrich Voß, 1755).

[189] Bleek, "Über Die Gabe Des Γλώσσαις Λαλεῖν in Der Ersten Christlichen Kirche," 32.

[190] Bleek, 33. Bleek also points to M. Antoninus' use of the word γλώσσημα to denote words whose meaning are no longer recognized.

[191] Bleek, 34.

[192] The passage from Aristotle that Bleek uses to support his interpretation is *Poetics*.1457b: "ἅπαν δὲ ὄνομά ἐστιν ἢ κύριον ἢ γλῶττα ἢ μεταφορὰ ἢ κόσμος ἢ πεποιημένον ἢ ἐπεκτεταμένον ἢ ὑφῃρημένον ἢ

word can be γλωσσα and κυριον at the same time, only for different people."[193] Therefore, to speak in tongues should be understood as speaking in glosses (*in Glossen zu reden*), that is, speaking in rare or archaic provincial expressions. Bleek insists that it is the business of a grammarian (i.e., expert) to explain the meaning of these glossaic expressions.[194]

Bleek apparently has already anticipated the question of whether this act of speaking in *glosses* (archaic/provincial expressions) a supernatural phenomenon or not. In order to deal with this issue, he again points to the concept of religious feelings (*religiöse Empfindungen*) and notes that in moments of intense thanksgiving and worship, the disciples can be filled with the Holy Spirit and speak peculiar or unusual words.[195] This insistence on religious feeling of intense excitement is clearly an echo of Herder's explanation that we have discussed above.

The importance of Bleek's essay in the history of interpretation is not necessarily in his constructive proposal. It functioned as a bridge from the traditional view of tongue(s) as miraculous ability to speak foreign languages to the tongue(s) as a complete unintelligible mystical experience. What we see in Bleek, as in Herder, is that tongue(s) still has a meaningful linguistic dimension. In the subsequent years, however, scholars began slowly and gradually to strip away this linguistic dimension from tongue(s).

ἐξηλλαγμένον. λέγω δὲ κύριον μὲν ᾧ χρῶνται ἕκαστοι, γλῶτταν δὲ ᾧ ἕτεροι· ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ γλῶτταν καὶ κύριον εἶναι δυνατὸν τὸ αὐτό, μὴ τοῖς αὐτοῖς δέ· τὸ γὰρ σίγυνον Κυπρίοις μὲν κύριον, ἡμῖν δὲ γλῶττα."

      In the translation of Stephen Halliwell: "Every word is either a standard term, loan word, metaphor, ornament, neologism, lengthening, contraction, or modification. By 'standard term' (κύριον) I mean one used by a community, and by 'loan word' (γλῶττα) one used by outsider; obviously, then, the same word can be both a loan word (γλῶττα) and a standard term (κύριον), though not for the same group; *sigunon* ['spear'] is standard for Cypriots, a loan word for us." Aristotle, *Poetics*, trans. Stephen Halliwell, The LOEB Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 105.

      [193] "ein und dasselbe Wort zugleich γλωσσα und κυριον seyn könne, nur für verschiedene Menschen." Bleek, "Über Die Gabe Des Γλώσσαις Λαλεῖν in Der Ersten Christlichen Kirche," 34.

      [194] "Die Erklärung solcher γλῶσσαι, ward als ein Geschäft der Grammatiker angesehen." Bleek, 39.

      [195] Bleek, 46.

Hermann Olshausen: Tongue(s) as a Sleepwalking-Like Experience

In the same issue of *Theologische Studien und Kritiken* in which Bleek published his essay appeared a response by Hermann Olshausen, a biblical scholar from the University of Königsberg. In that article Olshausen expresses his deep appreciation of the proposal that Bleek has put forward on tongue(s) which he calls this "interesting Charisma" (*dieses interessante Charisma*).[196] While agreeing with Bleek regarding the idea of γλῶσσα as peculiar expressions, Olshausen thinks that this proposal is too limiting in that it cannot fully explain the expression ἑτέραις γλώσσαις λαλεῖν in Acts 2:4, which should be seen as the antithesis of one's mother tongue. For Olshausen, in order to make Bleek's proposal fit to the context, the people who hear should not be able to understand the speech. If the entire phenomenon of tongue(s) is all about speaking in outdated word forms (*Reden in veralteten Wortformen*), then the presence of people who do not understand it makes it a strange phenomenon. In other words, although it is an outdated word form, people should be able to understand it.[197] Hence, *glosses* as archaic expressions cannot fully explain this phenomenon.[198] The expression "ταῖς ἡμετέραις γλώσσαις" (our tongues) posits another difficulty to Bleek's theory knowing the multitudes are the Jews. Not only does Luke describe it as a direct speech of the multitude, he also connects it to "ἤκουον

---

[196] Hermann Olshausen, "Rachträgliche Bemerkungen Über Das Charisma Des Γλῶσσαις Λαλεῖν, in Beziehung Auf Die Abhandlung Darüber Vom Herrn Prof. Bleek.," in *Theologische Studien Und Kritiken* (Hamburg: Bei Friedrich Perthes, 1829), 539.

[197] Olshausen, 542.

[198] While Bleek believes that the miracle in the day of Pentecost is not speaking but hearing, Olshausen is somewhat reluctant to accept this interpretation especially in light of "the expression γενη γλωσσῶν in 1 Cor. 12:28," which pertains mainly to the variety of speaking instead of hearing. See Hermann Olshausen, *Biblical Commentary on the Gospels, and on the Acts of the Apostles, Adapted Expressly for Preachers and Students*, trans. Richard Garvey, Fifth, vol. 19, Clark's Foreign Theological Library 1 (Edinburgh, UK: T & T Clark, 1855), 257.

εἷς ἕκαστος τῇ ἰδίᾳ διαλέκτῳ λαλούντων αῶτῶν."[199] So, Olshausen argues that there must be

some possibility of the involvement of the foreign language.[200]

While both Bleek and Herder attributes tongue(s) to religious feelings of excitement,

Olshausen introduces the idea that tongue(s) speakers are in "an elevated state" (*ein erhöhter*

Zustand), which is parallel to the state of ecstasy (*Zustand des ekstatischen*).[201] The best place to

explain this so-called elevated or ecstatic state, according to Olshausen, is 1 Cor. 14.[202] The

difference between γλώσσαις λαλεῖν and προφετεύειν is that the act of speaking in tongues

involves the fading away of the speaker's consciousness or self-awareness. This state enables the

speakers to pronounce things which they would otherwise not be able to express.[203] In this sense,

the phenomenon of tongue(s) speaking is similar to the phenomenon of sleepwalking

---

[199] Olshausen, "Rachträgliche Bemerkungen Über Das Charisma Des Γλῶσσαις Λαλεῖν, in Beziehung Auf Die Abhandlung Darüber Vom Herrn Prof. Bleek.," 543.

[200] He wrote in his commentary on Acts: "To me it appears to be the fact that the gift of speaking in tongues was frequently manifested, simply in the way Bleek describes, as a kind of elevated speaking in which single uncommon words might be introduced." Olshausen, *Biblical Commentary on the Gospels, and on the Acts of the Apostles, Adapted Expressly for Preachers and Students*, 19:260.

[201] Olshausen, "Rachträgliche Bemerkungen Über Das Charisma Des Γλῶσσαις Λαλεῖν, in Beziehung Auf Die Abhandlung Darüber Vom Herrn Prof. Bleek.," 543–44.

[202] In his commentary on 1 Cor. 14:2-4, Olshausen explains: "According to this representation, we cannot consider the γλώσσαις λαλῶν otherwise than as subdued and overpowered by the operating power of God, so that, as it were, he converses aloud with God (τῷ Θεῷ λαλεῖ, ver. 2). This discourse must, however, be unintelligible to others (οὐδεις ἀκούει, verse 2); and not because the speaker introduces into it a provincial gloss (as Bleek thinks), but as Paul adds πνεύματι (i.e., ecstasy proceeding from the impulse of the Holy Spirit, not, as Wieseler considers, simply inward inspiration without outward expression), μυστήρια λαλεῖ." See Hermann Olshausen, *Biblical Commentary on St. Paul's First and Second Epistles to the Corinthians*, trans. John Edmund Cox, vol. 20, Clark's Foreign Theological Library (Edinburgh, UK: T & T Clark, 1855), 217.

[203] "Der Gegensatz mit dem προφετεύειν, den Paulus a. a. D. durchführt, ist ein deutlicher Beweis davon, daß in dem γλώσσαις λαλεῖν das Bewußtseyn des Redenden zurücktrat, und er durch die Wirkung des Geistes Dinge aussprach und mittheilte, die ihm im natürlichen Zustande seines Selbst unerreichbar waren." Olshausen, "Rachträgliche Bemerkungen Über Das Charisma Des Γλῶσσαις Λαλεῖν, in Beziehung Auf Die Abhandlung Darüber Vom Herrn Prof. Bleek.," 544.

The ecstatic experience is affirmed further by Paul's insistence in 1 Cor. 14 that the mind (νοῦς) of tongue(s) speakers is fruitless. Olshausen insists: "The power of the higher πνεῦμα seized the soul of the inspired person so strongly, that his own consciousness (νοῦς) was depressed, or put down, and he declared things that lay quite beyond his own point of view." Olshausen, *Biblical Commentary on the Gospels, and on the Acts of the Apostles, Adapted Expressly for Preachers and Students*, 19:258.

(*Somnambulismus*).[204] Of course sleepwalking is an imperfect analogy. The idea is that they do not walk in a natural state which is, according to Olshausen, similar to the condition of people who speak in tongue(s).[205]

In this condition of sleepwalking, speaking in tongue(s) can take either archaic, highly poetic expressions – as Bleek has proposed – or even foreign languages. In his concluding remark, Olshausen wrote: "In my opinion, speaking in elevated, poetic language is not the only feature of the γλώσσαις λαλουντῶν, but under certain conditions, the inner intensification of the forces excited by the mind from above was so high in persons that they could speak foreign languages."[206] It is obvious that Olshausen follows in both the Herderian romantic tradition, especially in his view that tongue(s) can take the form of poetic speech, and Bleek's line of thought. However, he departs from Herder and Bleek's positions by posing the idea of a sleepwalking-like condition and the possibility of the involvement of some sort of foreign languages. Olshausen argues further that the presence of an interpreter is absolutely necessary,

---

[204] Olshausen, "Rachträgliche Bemerkungen Über Das Charisma Des Γλῶσσαις Λαλεῖν, in Beziehung Auf Die Abhandlung Darüber Vom Herrn Prof. Bleek.," 545. In his subsequent publications, Olshausen argued that this ecstatic condition is not any way permanent condition. For him, the idea that tongue(s) is "a permanent endowment" through which the apostles not only are able to speak many languages but also eligible to hold the office of apostleship is "repugnant to the history of the church." The main reason for this, according to Olshausen, is because the apostles had interpreters with them and also there are many other people who received this gift in day of Pentecost but did not "preach the gospels to all nations." See Olshausen, *Biblical Commentary on the Gospels, and on the Acts of the Apostles, Adapted Expressly for Preachers and Students*, 19:258.

Olshausen writes: "Of the unsuitableness of this signification in the passage before us there can be no question, for Acts ii. 6, 8. 11, as has already been remarked, the words γλῶσσα and διάλεκτος are manifestly interchanged, of which the latter can never stand for poetical expressions: besides the whole description accords with the supposition, that the apostles spoke in foreign languages. But it appears surprising that in no other part of the New Testament is there anything expressly said of speaking in foreign languages: on the contrary, it is only the sublime and the obscure which are exhibited in the speech of the γλώσσαις λαλῶν. For this reason I differ in my view from the old and certainly untenable supposition, already opposed in these pages, that the gift of tongues was the permanent power of speaking foreign languages." See Olshausen, 19:260.

[205] Olshausen, "Rachträgliche Bemerkungen Über Das Charisma Des Γλῶσσαις Λαλεῖν, in Beziehung Auf Die Abhandlung Darüber Vom Herrn Prof. Bleek.," 545.

[206] "Ist meiner Ansicht zufolge das Reden in erhöhter, poetischer Sprache nicht das einzige Merkmal der γλώσσαις λαλουντῶν, sondern unter gewissen Bedingungen ist die innere Steigerung der durch den Geist von oben angeregten Kräfte in Personen so hoch gestiegen, daß ſie fremde Sprachen reden konnten." Olshausen, 548.

otherwise tongue(s) will be totally unintelligible. At this point, tongue(s) speakers somehow begin to lose their self-consciousness.

Ferdinand C. Baur: Tongue(s) as the Organ of the Holy Spirit

A year after the publication of Bleek and Olshausen's essays, Ferdinand C. Baur of Tübingen University wrote a response to both of them in 1830, entitled: "Ueber den wahren Begriff des γλωσσαις λαλειν, mit Rückficht auf die neuesten Untersuchungen hierüber."[207] In this essay, Baur agrees with them that tongue(s) speech cannot be understood as a foreign languages phenomenon. He attempts to find another way to bridge the differences between Bleek and Olshausen. According to Baur, there are three possible meanings of the word γλῶσσα: a) a physical tongue, b) a language, and c) an archaic expression. Bleek argues for the third meaning of this word and Olshausen insists on the second meaning. While agreeing that speaking in tongue(s) is not primarily speaking in foreign languages, Baur also agrees with Olshausen that in this elevated state the foreign languages may appear. Baur, however, maintains that we should go back to the most basic meaning of the word γλῶσσα as a tongue.[208]

However, Baur takes this basic meaning of γλῶσσα to another different path. The basic argument is that γλωσσαις λαλειν consists of both the action (λαλειν) and the tool of the action (γλωσσαις). Baur argues further that since the phenomenon is described in the New Testament as the work of the Holy Spirit, tongue(s) therefore should be understood as "the organs through which the Holy Spirit expresses itself."[209] One of the biblical supports for this is from the gospel

---

[207] Ferdinand Christian Baur, "Ueber Den Wahren Begriff Des Γλωσσαις Λαλειν, Mit Rückficht Auf Die Neuesten Untersuchungen Hierüber," in *Tübinger Zeitschrift Für Theologie*, ed. Ferdinand Christian Baur and Friedrich Heinrich Kern (Tübingen: bei Ludw. Friedrich Fue'i., 1930), 75–133.
[208] Baur, 77.
[209] "die Organe. . . , durch welche sich der heilige Geist ausspricht." Baur, 101.

of John's description of the παρακλητος, i.e., the Holy Spirit, who will teach the disciples

everything that Jesus has said to them (Joh. 14:26). Baur pays close attention to the use of the

word λαλειν, especially in John 16:13, which says that the Holy Spirit will lead the disciples to

all truth and speak (λαλήσει) about the things that he hears from Jesus. This promise is fulfilled

on the day of Pentecost.[210] However one understands it, at the core of the entire drama on the day

of Pentecost, Baur argues, is the fulfillment of the Holy Spirit (πλησθηναι πνευματος ἁγια).[211]

In order for the Holy Spirit to use the mouth, or more precisely the tongue, of the

disciples, their mind has to be in the total control of the Holy Spirit. Just as the human mind

expresses itself through language and the organ of language is the tongue, Baur explains that the

higher Spirit (*der höhere Geist*) will descend upon them and awaken in them a new

consciousness or new mind so that they will be able to speak in a perfectly organized

language.[212] The γλωσσαι, which is always the organ of the mind to express itself, after being

taken over by the higher Spirit becomes "the tongues of the Spirit, as the higher linguistic

organs."[213] In another place, Baur describes the human tongue as being no longer "an ordinary

human organ" (*das gewöhnliche menschliche Organ*), but "a higher speech organ of the spirit"

(*ein höheres Redeorgan des Geistes*).[214] Furthermore, this new organ of the mind/spirit that is

awakened by a higher power changes the disciples into different beings.[215]

---

[210] "Diese von Jesus seinen Jüngern gegebene Verheissung ging am ersten Pfingstfest in Erfüllung," Baur writes. Baur, 101.

[211] Baur, 101.

[212] See Baur, 103.

[213] It is interesting to note that in German there is a play on words here because the word "Geist" can mean both mind and spirit. This is how Baur expresses it: "Die γλωσσαι aber stehen hier nur für den *Geist*, als das Organ, dessen sich der *Geist*, um sich äußern und mittheilen zu können, nothwendig bedienen muß. Die neuen oder andern Zungen sind dabei immer als die Zungen des Geistes, als höhere Sprachorgane zu denken." (emphasis added) See Baur, 103.

[214] Baur, 117.

[215] Baur, 104.

Following the path of Herder and Bleek, Baur also thinks that this spirit-filled tongue(s) "is a higher expression, an enthusiastic speech."[216] However, it is not just an excitement of human spirit, as proposed by Herder or Bleek. Baur's enthusiasm is thoroughly theological, that is, the excitement desired and animated by the Holy Spirit. While Bleek believes that the content of the speech is mainly archaic and unusual expressions (i.e., glosses), Baur argues that since it is primarily the work of the Spirit, it is actually "also a higher, perfect language, but not a human language, or a speech in different human languages; it is the language of the Spirit."[217]

That said, Baur insists that from what we see in 1 Corinthians that tongue(s) speaking is characterized by a person having "no clear self-consciousness." But neither is a person completely unconscious because Paul still says that tongue(s) speakers themselves are in control of what they are doing.[218] That is why Paul demands they be silent. So, although Paul speaks about tongue(s) experience as "a state affected by the divine spirit" (*ein durch den göttlichen Geist bewirkter Zustand*), it actually is so only "to a very low degree" (*in einem sehr geringen Grade*).[219] Baur insists that this state of being slightly unconscious is precisely what makes tongue(s) speaking different from prophesying.[220] What happens in the church of Corinth is that this "original idea" (*ursprüngliche Idee*)[221] of tongue(s) – that is, a low-level unconscious condition of being controlled by the divine spirit, which is still an intelligible act of speaking[222]

---

[216] German: "eine höhere Ausdrucksweise, ein begeistertes, vom Geiste gewilltes Reden." Baur, 117.

[217] "es ist also eine höhere vollkommnere Sprache, nur keine menschliche Sprache, oder kein Reden in verschiedenen menschlichen Sprachen, sondern es ist die Sprache des Geistes." Baur, 118.

[218] Baur, 124.

[219] Baur, 124.

[220] Baur, 124.

[221] In other places Baur also calls it "original concept" (*ursprünglichen Begriff*) or "original fact" (*ursprüngliche Faktum*) or "original simple fact" (*ursprüngliche einfache Thatsache*).

[222] This is precisely the point that David Schulz correctly finds quite confusing about Baur's exposition. . It is not clear whether the speech is intelligible or not because in his earlier explanation Baur basically said that it is the Spirit who speaks through the disciples "in different human languages; it is the language of the Spirit." For further

as being depicted in the book of Acts – becomes heightened. According to Baur, the Corinthian tongue(s) speakers transformed it into "the production of unintelligible, confused sounds . . . meaningless [or empty] movements with the tongue."[223]

August Neander: Tongue(s) as an Extraordinary Elevation of Mind

In 1832 August Neander published his important two-volume work on the history of the early church movement, *Geschichte der Pflanzung und Leitung der christlichen Kirche durch die Apostel,* which was translated into English and published in a one volume in 1847. Registering his disagreement with the traditional view that the gift of tongue(s) is intended for "the propagation of the gospel," Neander employed the similar nationalistic logic that we find also in Herder's argument. Neader explicitly acknowledged the influence of Herder – and Baur: "The view I have taken is nearly the same as that of Herder in his Treatise on the Pentecostal Gift of Tongues, and particularly Bauer, in his valuable essay on the subject . . . to which I am indebted for some modifications of my own view."[224] He argues that if it is only for the spreading of the gospel, "the knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages sufficed for this purpose, and that the one or the other of these languages, as it was employed in the intercourse of daily life, could not be altogether strange to the Jews."[225] It is no surprise that this phenomenon does not appear in

---

discussion see Schulz, *Die Geistesgaben Der Ersten Christen Insbesondre Die Sogenannte Gabe Der Sprachen*, 43–54.

[223] "ein Hervorbringen unverständlicher, verworrener Laute, . . . inhaltsleere Bewegungen mit der Zunge." Baur, "Ueber Den Wahren Begriff Des Γλωσσαις Λαλειν, Mit Rückficht Auf Die Neuesten Untersuchungen Hierüber," 124.

[224] Augustus Neander, *History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church by the Apostles*, trans. J.E. Ryland (New York: Leavitt, Trow & Co., 1847), 24.

[225] Neander, 21–22.

the subsequent history of the early Christian movement. No trace of this gift of languages has ever been found "in the history of the first propaganda of Christianity."[226]

Echoing Herder, Neander does not understand the list of geographical areas in Acts 2:9 as a list of languages. He writes:

> [W]e cannot possibly think that all these nations spoke different languages, for it is certain that, in the cities of Cappadocia, Pontus, Lesser Asia, Phrygia, Pamphylia, Cyrene, and in the parts of Lybia and Egypt inhabited by Grecian and Jewish Colonies, the Greek would at that time be in general better understood than the ancient language of the country, and as this must have been known to the writer of the Acts, he could not have intended to specify so many different languages. There will remain out of the whole catalogue of languages, only the Persian, Syriac, Arabic, Greek, and Latin. It also deserves notice, that the inhabitants of Judea are mentioned, who spoke the same language as the Galileans, only with a slight difference of pronunciation. Since then, to retain the ancient view of the gift of tongues, creates difficulties in this passage, which is the only one that can serve to support it.[227]

Since this is not a phenomenon of foreign languages, Neander maintains that it is best understood in a more general way as meaning "to speak with such tongues as the Spirit gave them."[228] It is, in other words, the acquirement of new discourses through the Spirit. Again, it does not have to be foreign languages, and can mean what Luke 11:15 says: "I will give you a mouth and wisdom." However, this original meaning of tongue(s) as a "new language of Christians under influence of the Spirit," according to Neander, underwent gradual changes and modifications through time to the extent that it then "became limited to that kind in which the immediate influences of the Spirit predominated, and presented itself in the higher self-consciousness as the specially ecstatic form, while the discursive activity of the understanding with lower self-consciousness for the time lay dormant."[229]

---

[226] Neander, 22.
[227] Neander, 34–35.
[228] Neander, 24.
[229] Neander, 25.

70

On the day of Pentecost, the crowd was attracted by the number of the disciples who

gathered in Jerusalem. Some entered the disciples' gathering probably because they were curious

about what was going on. Neander paints a picture for us:

> The disciples now turn to these strangers, and constrained by the impulse of the Spirit,
> announce to them what filled their heart. The impression made by their words varies with
> the dispositions of their hearers. Some feel themselves affected by the energy of
> inspiration with which the disciples spoke, but can give no clear account of the
> impressions made by the whole affair.[230]

This confusion provoked them to wonder why "these Galileans speak in foreign tongues?"[231]

Others rejected it altogether because of their inability to understand. So, the entire Pentecostal

experience "might be, in fact, only a perception of the predominant inward mental state, a

sensuous objectiveness of what operating inwardly with divine power, similar to the ecstatic

visions which are elsewhere mentioned in Holy Writ."[232] This is the reason why Peter needed to

stand up and explain to the crowd what had just happened.

Is this also the case for tongue(s) in the Corinthian church? Neander argues that Paul's

discussion on spiritual gifts in 1 Corinthians is "something altogether different from" that of Acts

2.[233] "Evidently, the apostle is there treating of such discourse as would not be generally

intelligible, proceeding from an ecstatic state of mind which rose to an elevation far above the

language of ordinary communication," he explains.[234] The ecstatic experience of tongue(s) in the

Corinthian church, in other words, is far more intense, to the extent that the speakers lost their

ability to communicate in an ordinary known language. In such a condition, "the elevated

---

[230] Neander, 25.

[231] Neander, 26.

[232] Neander, 20.

[233] Neander, 22.

[234] Neander, 22.

consciousness of God predominated, while the consciousness of the external world vanished."[235]

This is why for Neander, whatever the speakers utter "was not a connected address like that of a

διδασκαλος, nor was it an exhortation suited to the circumstances of other persons, like that of

the prophets; but without being capable in this situation of taking notice of the mental state and

necessities of others, he was occupied solely with the relation of his own heart to God."[236] In

such a state, the expressions become peculiar to that speaker because they flow from one's "own

individual feelings and intuitions," and thus, the speech is completely unintelligible to those who

hear.[237] Neander believes this condition of "extraordinary elevation of mind" is still the work of

God in human beings, which he calls "a special gift of grace."[238] Paul needs to deal with this

situation because it "overvalues" the interior enthusiasm and thus perpetuates "the danger of self-

deception and enthusiasm." In any case, this experience is suitable for and beneficial only in

one's personal devotion, not in a communal assembly.[239]

Gustav Billroth: The Consciousness of the Speaker is Entirely Suspended

In 1833 Gustav Billroth published his *Kommentar zu den Briefen des Paulus an die*

Korinther, which was later translated into English in two volumes in 1837 and 1838.

Commenting on the gifts of tongue(s) and interpretation in 1 Cor. 12:9-10, Billroth

acknowledges that these are two most difficult gifts to explain than the others, and that "nothing

is to be gained by a mere translation of the words γένη γλωσσῶν and ἑρμηνεία γλωσσῶν."[240]

---

[235] Neander, 87.

[236] Neander, 87.

[237] Neander, 88.

[238] Neander, 88.

[239] Neander, 88.

[240] Gustav Billroth, *A Commentary on the Epistles of Paul to the Corinthians*, trans. William Lindsay Alexander, vol. II, The Biblical Cabinet; or Hermeneutical, Exegetical, and Philological Library, XXIII (Edinburgh, UK: Thomas Clark, 1838), 13–14.

However, he thinks that other previous works by Bleek, Olshausen, Baur, etc., have been "most valuable" on this very topic in spite of he finds their explanations are not satisfactory.[241] The first thing that Billroth argues is that there is no reason to believe that the phenomenon of tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 12-14 is a different gift from that of Mark 16 and Acts 2. It is all about "a token of communication of the Holy Spirit."[242] The word ἑτερογλώσσαις in 1 Cor. 14:21 has to be understood as a parallel expression to the Lukan ἑτέραις and the Markan καιναῖς.[243]

There are a few reasons why Billroth thinks that tongue(s) cannot be foreign languages. First, while this view can explain the adjectives καιναῖς and ἑτέραις, it is hard to see it in light of many instances of γλώσσαις λαλεῖν without the adjectives and the appearance of the dative singular γλώσσῃ in 1 Cor. 12. Some might explain that the γλώσσαις λαλεῖν is a short version of a long expression with adjectives, while the singular γλώσσῃ could mean speaking in "a language," but says Billroth, this explanation cannot be defended "on philological ground."[244] Second, it fails to give a satisfactory explanation of the events in Acts 2. If the disciples were to speak in different foreign languages, it would have been unlikely that the Jews who were there would think that they are all drunk or in "a state of intoxication."[245] Also, it is impossible to think that the disciples all speak different languages at the same time, and yet "each in a connected discourse."[246] Third, it is difficult to understand tongue(s) as foreign languages in light of Paul's statement in 1 Cor. 14:2 that no one understands speaking in tongue(s) because it

---

[241] Billroth, II:14.
[242] Billroth, II:15.
[243] Billroth, II:15–16.
[244] Billroth, II:17.
[245] Billroth, II:18.
[246] Billroth, II:18.

contains mysteries. Related to this, Billroth argues, "there would be no necessity for the ἑρμηνεία being a gift of the Holy Ghost."[247]

Fourth, Paul uses the analogy of languages to explain the γλῶσσαι in 1 Cor. 14:10, which means that these two are not identical. Fifth, Billroth argues that if this is all about speaking in foreign languages, when Paul gives the direction on how tongue(s) should be performed in a public gathering, "he would have made this dependent on the presence of foreign hearers to whom Greek was unknown."[248] However, because everyone in the Corinthian assembly apparently understood Greek, Billroth argues again, "it is very improbable that he would have permitted even two or three individuals to hold such discourses, as they would have been quite useless."[249] In other words, because everyone spoke Greek, there was no need for foreign languages in this public gathering. And lastly, the entire history of the Apostolic church did not give any hint that miraculous speaking in foreign languages ever existed. Even Chrysostom acknowledges, Billroth points out, that "the gifts which had been bestowed in the days of the apostles were… no longer possessed" by people in his time.[250]

Not only does he find the view of foreign languages difficult, Billroth also thinks that the idea of archaic provincial expressions proposed by Bleek, and then followed by Olshausen, is unsustainable. The singular γλώσσῃ λαλεῖν and the adjective καιναί in Mark are difficult to explain from the point of view of archaic expressions, and Billroth calls this his "principal objection."[251] This view also cannot provide a satisfactory explanation for the statement of the

---

[247] Billroth, II:19.
[248] Billroth, II:19.
[249] Billroth, II:19.
[250] Billroth, II:19.
[251] Billroth, II:25.

people who are there that "ἡμεῖς ἀκούομεν ἕκαστος τῇ ἰδίᾳ διαλέκτῳ ἡμῶν." For Billroth, διάλεκτος here must mean "*language*… and not what we call *dialect*."[252] Bleek might say that the miracle is on the hearing rather than speaking, to which Billroth argues that if this is the case then "there would have been no need for an interpreter."[253]

This said, if Olshausen takes a step further from Bleek, Billroth argues that he wants to take a step further from Olshausen.[254] In essence, tongue(s) should be understood as a "lingua secretior" (esoteric language) that only Christians can understand. It is a discourse or body of language/knowledge that the early Christian movement developed and that somehow separates them from both the Jewish and the Gentile contexts. The ideas such as *dikaiosune, logos,* etc., are perfect example of concepts "borrowed partly from the Jewish and partly from the Grecian philosophy and theology," yet they are neither Jewish nor Hellenistic. They are peculiarly hybrid concepts, because according to Billroth, they were "transferred from [Jewish and Hellenistic contexts] to the Christians, but [they aim at a] higher object of unfolding the peculiar re-formation of these notions in Christianity."[255] That way, it can better explain many difficulties that other views have encountered. Billroth writes:

> This view enables us, further, easily to explain why the singular γλῶσσα and the plural γλῶσσαι should be used promiscuously for one and the same thing. The new language was, on the one hand, a definite language, the characteristic of which was, that it was a mixed language; and, on the other hand, the various languages of which it was formed might be regarded separately, and by themselves, which would lead to the use of the plural. [256]

---

[252] Billroth, II:26.

[253] Billroth, II:16, note a.

[254] Billroth, II:29. Interestingly, the English translator of this book, William Lindsay Alexander, wrote a four-page long footnote a) to clarify Olshausen's position, and b) to refute of Billroth's proposal. This shows the force of the dominant view, i.e., that speaking in tongue(s) is a miraculous ability to speak in foreign language, was still very strong in the first half of the nineteenth century.

[255] Billroth, II:30.

[256] Billroth, II:30–31.

This Christian idiosyncratic language, Billroth believes, is a result of an ecstatic state in which "the consciousness of the speaker was entirely suspended."[257] Billroth at least shows us that the issue of the consciousness of the speaker has already become a topic of inquiry at this point.

David Schulz: Tongue(s) as an Intensified Inner Feeling

In 1836, four years after Neander, David Schulz published his book on tongue(s) which became one of the most quoted and discussed work in German scholarship in the nineteenth century —and for good reason. Following the path paved by Bleek and others, Schulz also came to the conclusion that tongue(s) is not to be seen as a linguistic experience. It is not a surprise that the title of his chapter three is "the γλώσσαις λαλεῖν was not speaking in languages" (*Das γλώσσαις λαλεῖν war kein Reden in Sprachen*). Although Schulz's argument against foreign languages is lengthy, his major points are rather very similar to those that have been stated before.

In the opening paragraph of chapter three, Schulz writes: "Above all, it must be our duty to grant the indisputable conviction that the formula λαλεῖν γλώσσῃ or γλώσσαις has nowhere to do with speaking in languages, whether foreign or untrained, or native and previously known; For this is, in our opinion, to be shown in an irrefutable manner."[258] His entire argument rests

---

[257] Billroth, II:32–33. He explains further, "By a state of such exstacy, the spiritual life of the speaker himself might be advanced, and so *immediately*, perhaps, also his efficiency for his own advantage and that of the church *beyond* this state; but the proper and true use for himself and the church, could only then be reached when he spoke in glosses was *understood*. If then γλώσσαις λαλεῖν was to bring forth any advantage, it was necessary either that his own consciousness should return (xiv.13), or that some other, to whom the gift of understanding of these glosses belonged as his part, but who was not thereby thrown into exstacy, should be present, in order that either the speaker himself, or the person last mentioned, might expound the meaning of the otherwise unintelligible address to the hearers, (xiv. 5, 27, &c). The ἑρμενεία γλωσσῶν, thus belonged to what Neander not unsuitably calls the 'receptive or critical powers.'"

[258] "Vor allen Dingen muss es uns darum zu thun sein, die unumstössliche Ueberzeugung zu gewähren, dass die Formel λαλεῖν γλώσσῃ oder γλώσσαις mit dem Reden in Sprachen, gleichviel ob fremden und nicht erlernten, oder einheimischen und vorher gekannten, nirgends etwas zu schaffen habe; denn dieses lässt sich unsers Erachtens auf unwidersprechliche Weise dar thun. . ." Schulz, *Die Geistesgaben Der Ersten Christen Insbesondre Die Sogenannte Gabe Der Sprachen*, 57.

upon the assumption that Paul has to be the primary source for all accounts about tongue(s) in Mark, Acts, and 1 Cor., because he was the only one who had direct experience with the phenomenon. The accounts in Acts 2 and Mark are the result of tradition, and therefore direct knowledge is absent. Their accounts are not an exact presentation of the actual event, but "an already modified representation" (*eine schon modificirte Vorstellung*).[259]

First of all, Schulz thinks that making a foreign language understood by others cannot be attained in such a short period of time. The mastery of a language depends on a person's intellectual ability. But for Schulz, learning a new language is not just about memorizing words and phrases, but also involves knowing the cultural context. Schulz therefore argues that there is no translation that corresponds to the original ([dass] *keine Uebersetzung jemals dem Original gleichkommt*).[260] Even if the story of Acts is about the miracle of hearing, as proposed by Bleek, Schulz thinks that one cannot understand a speech if the speakers themselves do not understand it.[261] Learning to speak and understand other languages, thus, takes a lot of time and cannot be achieved in an instant.

From the rejection of an instant acquirement of new languages, Schulz argues further that if early Christians wanted to communicate with each other, they wouldn't have needed to use foreign languages. They easily could have used the Greek language because almost everyone

---

[259] Schulz, 58. Schulz also finds Lukan representation repetitive, unclear, and full of inconsistencies. For example, Acts 2:12 is repeated in 12:7 and 2:11 is already found in 2:11. He explains further: "Wie passt V. 5. ἀπὸ παντὸς ἔθνους τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανόν zu den nur vierzehn Nationen, welche V. 9–11. wie es scheinen muss, nach blosser Willkür namhaft gemacht werden? Wo bleiben Aethiopier, Indier, Griechen, Macedonier, Gallier u. a. m. un ter denen auch Juden und Proselyten zu finden waren? Wie durften die V. 5. als ἐν Ἰερουσαλὴμ κατοικοῦντες V.9. bezeichnet werden als κατοικοῦντες τὴν Μεσοποταμίαν? Wer sollen denn V. 13. die ἕτεροι, wenn sie, als über das γλώσσαις λαλεῖν verwundert und nichts davon begreifend, doch Andre sein müssten, als die im Vorherigen Erwähnten, gewesen sein? Waren zumal die mannigfaltigsten Sprachen zu hören, warum vernah men nicht auch diese ἕτεροι, wie alle Vorgenannten, ihre eigene Redeweise von den Sprechenden?"

[260] Schulz, 63.

[261] He writes: "Wer also in ein fremdes Sprachgebiet übertritt, kann sich nur allmälig in dessen Organismus hineinleben, nach und nach in der neuen Form der Gedankenmittheilung sich bewegen." Schulz, 63.

understood Greek. Those who did not speak Greek were considered uneducated, barbaric, and thus despised.[262] This is the reason why the entire New Testament and all other Jewish literature were written in Greek, Schulz insists.[263] The knowledge of foreign languages, therefore, is not necessary for mutual understanding either in Jerusalem or in Corinth. [264] Schulz even insists that in places such as Antioch, Ephesus, Athens, Corinth, Macedonia, and Galatia, in which Greek was commonly spoken, "Romans, Jews, and Christians had to use the dominant language and education."[265] It is unthinkable that these early Christians in Corinth would have gathered together just to hear one another speak in foreign languages. Knowledge of foreign languages was useless, and people would not have spent their time and effort to learn them.[266] Schulz writes: "if Christianity were to be advanced beyond the borders of the Jewish country and made known to all peoples/nations . . . this intention could only be attained by the intelligible Greek language."[267]

Following Herder and Bleek, Schulz also argues that the fact that Paul seems not to understand the Lycaonian language in Acts 14:11, and, according to Eusebius's account, needs an interpreter, demonstrates that even Paul and Peter did not benefit from this gift, if it is the ability to speak foreign languages. Not only does this gift appears to have no benefit for the apostles, there is also no indication of foreign expressions or words being used or of their

---

[262] "Wer nicht griechisch redete, galt als ungebildet, barbarisch, wurde verachtet." Schulz, 88.

[263] Schulz, 64.

[264] "Zur wechselseitigen Verständigung der Gläubigen unter einander hatte man weder in Korinth, noch in Jerusalem die Kunde fremder Sprachen nöthig." Schulz, 64.

[265] "Römer, Juden und Christen [mussten] sich der herrschenden Bildung und Sprache fügen." Schulz, 86.

[266] "Um fremde Sprachen kümmerte sich an solchen Orten Niemand, geschweige dass er auf deren Erlernung Zeit und Mühe verwenden oder auf die Fertigkeit, sie zu sprechen, hätte irgend einen Werth legen sollen." Schulz, 86.

[267] "Sollte aber zumal das Christenthum über die Grenzen des jüdischen Landes hinausgebracht und seiner hohen Bestimmung gemäss allen Völkern kund gemacht werden, so war diese Absicht nur durch die überall verständliche griechische Sprache zu erreichen." Schulz, 85.

interpretation anywhere in either the book of Acts or 1 Cor. Even in the story of Pentecost, and

specifically in Peter's speech, he did not mention tongue(s) at all.[268] Every Hebrew/Aramaic

expression in other parts of the Bible, which Schulz calls the national language of the Jewish

people in Palestine (*Nationalsprache der Juden in Palästina*),[269] is translated into Greek.[270]

Therefore, again in agreement with Herder, Bleek, and Baur, Schulz thinks that the list of names

in Acts 2 is not a linguistic list, but a representative list of places from which the Jews came to

Jerusalem to celebrate Pentecost.[271]

Arguing that foreign languages are actually not unintelligible in themselves (*Fremde

Sprachen sind nicht unverständlich an sich*),[272] Schulz points out further that the idea that no one

can understand tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 14 is difficult to interpret in light of foreign languages. If this

is a foreign languages phenomenon, Paul could just have said that some or a great number of

people could not understand what was being said. According to Schulz, it is impossible to rule

out the possibility of the presence of people who speak other languages.[273] Thus, saying that no

one can understand what was being said, not even the speakers themselves, makes the notion that

---

[268] Schulz, 66–68.

[269] Schulz, 68. German biblical scholars in the eighteenth and nineteenth century believed that *syro-chaldäisch* was Jesus's native language. However, according to Guido Baltes, scholars often used the words "Syro-chaldaic" and "Hebrew" interchangeably. See Guido Baltes, "The Origin of the 'Exclusive Aramaic Model' in the Nineteenth Century: Methodological Fallacies and Subtel Motives," in *The Language Environment of First Century Judaea: Jerusalem Studies in the Synoptic Gospels*, ed. Randall Buth and R. Steven Notley, vol. 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 94.
　　The reference to national language is a curious one because the idea of "nation" did not even exist in first-century Palestine. The development of national language is part and parcel of the development of the post-Enlightenment European nation-state. See Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.

[270] Schulz, *Die Geistesgaben Der Ersten Christen Insbesondre Die Sogenannte Gabe Der Sprachen*, 68.

[271] Schulz, 88ff.

[272] Schulz, 70.

[273] "Unmöglich konnte sonst der Fall, dass doch wohl einer oder der Andere von den Anwesenden zum Mindesten Eins und das Andere aus dem fremden Sprachgebiet verstehen und sich aneignen könne, ganz ausser Acht gelassen, geschweige gradezu ausgeschlossen warden." Schulz, 70.

tongues refers to foreign languages difficult to maintain. Related to this, Schulz also takes on the issue of translation. Paul seems to leave an impression in 1 Cor. 14 that the interpretation and the tongue(s) are two separate or different gifts. It is unthinkable that a person cannot translate into his/her own language, according to Schulz. It is impossible that a person who delivers a speech in any foreign language forgets their own mother language.[274]

Since Paul characterizes tongue(s) as speaking mystery to God, Schulz finds it difficult to believe that a person needs to speak in foreign languages to God in order to show his/her deep devotion.[275] High spiritual enthusiasm cannot result in speaking in foreign languages.[276] Speaking in foreign languages does not make sense, not only in terms of communication with God, but also in terms of the people who listen to it. In Acts 2, they were said to be drunk. Schulz insists that there is no drunk person who can miraculously speak in foreign languages, nor would a speaker of a foreign tongue be perceived as being drunk.[277] Even when it relates to the speakers themselves, as Paul claims puts it in contradiction to λαλεῖν τῷ voί, Schulz asserts that no one can speak in foreign languages without the mediation of their mind.[278]

The discussion on prophecy and speaking in tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 14 leads Schulz to believe that tongue(s) cannot be foreign languages. Comparing foreign languages and prophecy is not a parallel comparison. In other words, that would be like comparing apples to oranges. He

---

[274] Schulz, 71–72.

[275] Schulz, 72.

[276] Schulz writes: "Wer verfällt bei gesundem Verstande auf die Idee, dass es besser sei, mit Gott und göttlichen Dingen in fremder, als in der Muttersprache zu verkehren? Gelähmt und verhindert könnte auf diese Weise die Andacht wohl werden, gehoben und gefördert nimmermehr. Von einer Steigerung inbrünstiger Andacht der Seele bis zu so hohem Grade, dass (selbst in der Muttersprache) alles Wortbilden und eigentliche Reden aufhört, nur Gefühle und Gedanken lebendig bleiben, das Gemüth erregen und bewegen, hat man wohl gehört; davon nie, dass aufs höchste gesteigerte Andacht in ausländische Sprachgebiete hinausführe." Schulz, 72.

[277] Schulz, 73–74.

[278] Schulz, 75.

asks a rhetorical question, "Could not prophecy take place in every language?"[279] In other words,

the problem is what language would constitute prophecy if tongue(s) is speaking in foreign

languages? The distinction between those two becomes meaningless.[280]

Concerning the phrases "καιναὶ γλῶσσαι" (Mark 16:17) and ἕτεραι γλῶσσαι (Acts 2:4), it

is interesting that Schulz insists that a language can only be called "new" if it just came into

existence.[281] Already existing languages, regardless of their foreignness, are not new languages.

Thus, both καιναὶ and ἕτεραι, according to Schulz, should only be understood as the antithesis of

language, instead of as other forms of language.[282] In this sense, speaking in tongue(s) is not an

act of speaking in non-native languages. Another phrase that Paul employs is γένη γλωσσῶν in 1

Cor. 12:28. For Schulz, we know very little about this phrase, and thus its meaning is unclear.

The discussion on language in 1 Cor. 13:1 is all about love and not about the specific kind of

foreign language. Furthermore, when Paul speaks on the cessation of language (γλῶσσαι

παύσονται, 1 Cor. 13:8), it is impossible for him to mean the complete cessation of the use of

foreign languages, assuming that Paul still wants the Gospel to be preached in the future.[283]

Just as Baur pointed out, so too Schulz argues that the word γλῶσσα should be

understood in its basic meaning, which is of a bodily tongue (*die Zunge*), and not language (*die*

---

[279] "Konnte etwa das Weissagen (προφητεύειν) nicht in jeder Sprache statt finden?" Schulz, 76.

[280] Along this line of thought, Schulz also finds that speaking in foreign languages makes it difficult to understand the distinction between language of human and angel that Paul makes in 1 Cor. 13:1. "Was fangen wir mit dem Gegensatze, Sprachen der Menschen und Sprachen der Engel an? (1 Kor. 13, 1.) Sollen wir uns die Engel in Völkerschaften, wie die Nationen auf der Erde, getheilt denken, deren jede ihre eigenthümliche, nach Wortformen, Grammatik, Syntax von den übrigen verschiedene Sprachen redet? Die Engellehre unsrer heiligen Bücher weiss nichts von dergleichen Vorstellungen." Schulz, 76–77.

[281] "Neue Sprachen können nur solche heissen, die früher noch nicht existirt, die erst neuerdings entstanden und in Gebrauch gekommen wären." Schulz, 79.

[282] Schulz, 79.

[283] Schulz, 80.

Sprache).[284] This bodily tongue is not only a characteristic of human beings but also of animals.

Echoing Herder's philosophy of language that we have discussed above, Schulz believes that the

tongue is basically an organ through which human beings, and animals for that matter, are able to

express their feelings and sensations (*Gefühle und Empfindungen*).[285] The function of γλῶσσα in

this sense is similar to στόμα, mouth, χειλη, lips, and φωνη, voice.[286] It expresses the inner being

of a human being.[287] This basic function of human γλῶσσα expresses itself in different cultures

and leads to many different ways of articulating human feelings, and thus different languages or

dialects.

With this in mind, Schulz explains further that the ancient peoples tended to see all

aspects of their life as being influenced and affected by hidden spiritual powers.[288] In this sense,

everything religious is perceived as miraculous and therefore the result of a divine

intervention.[289] Conversely, they understood everything bad that happened to have been caused

by evil spirits, or demons, or the devil. He writes, "everything in a religious sense is and was

---

[284] In spite of this agreement, Schulz offers a sharp disagreement with Baur's theological assertion that tongue is the organ used by the Spirit. For Schulz, neither Acts 2 nor 1 Cor. 14 makes a clear distinction between human tongue and spiritual tongue. Schulz, 43–54.

See also Baur's rejoinder to Schulz in Ferdinand Christian Baur, "Kritische Uebersicht: Über Die Neuesten, Das Γλώσσαις Λαλεῖν in Der Ersten Christlichen Kirche Betreffenden Untersuchungen (Mit Besonderer Rücksicht Auf Die Schrift: Die Geistesgaben Der Ersten Christen, Insbesondere Die Sogenannte Gabe Der Sprachen. Eine Exegetischt Entwickelung von Dl. David Schulz. Breslau 1836).," in *Theologische Studien Und Kritiken* (Hamburg: bei Friedrich Perthes, 1838), 618–702.

[285] Schulz, *Die Geistesgaben Der Ersten Christen Insbesondre Die Sogenannte Gabe Der Sprachen*, 100.

[286] Schulz, 100.

[287] Schulz, 102.

[288] Schulz, 122.

[289] Schulz writes: "Galt die Annahme, dass des Menschen Geist durch der Gottheit Macht angeregt und fortbewegt werde, so erschien alles religiöse Wissen, alle Erkenntniss Gottes und göttlicher Dinge nothwendigerweise als Eingebung, Of fenbarung, Gotteslehre; alles religiöse Wirken, alle Thatsachen im Reiche Gottes und für dasselbe liessen sich als Wunder auffassen; alle frommen Gefühle, zu mal die zum Enthusiasmus gesteigerten, konnten als unmittelbare Frucht des Erfülltseins vom göttlichen Geist, als Gottbegeisterung angesehen werden." Schulz, 122.

brought by the hidden powers coming from outside."[290] Not only did ancient peoples attribute

things to divine intervention, they also often felt overwhelmed by feeling and sensation. Schulz

argues that people in modern times are less inclined to do so because they have been able to

explain the works of nature through science.

Ancient peoples encountered the wonders of nature with a deep and strong feeling of

awe. Being overwhelmed by an awe-inspiring sensation or feeling was seen significant for

ancient peoples, while modern people are no longer capable of such exalted conditions (*exaltirter*

Zustände).[291] It is "the field of rapture… the effect and consequence of the Christian feeling of

delight, which is intensified to the highest degree of enthusiasm."[292] In such condition, a person

is often unable to reflect on the experience itself. [293] The "objective self-consciousness more or

less disappeared, . . . the distinguish thoughts and especially the clarity of representation became

impossible… and only immeasurable gestures and sounds, as unrelenting signs and witnesses of

the inner movement… were left."[294] This inner intensified feeling then expressed itself in

"sounds and gestures of pleasure, that is, jubilation and praise singing, hallelujah screams."[295]

This external explosion of the highest feeling of enthusiasm for God, which Schulz understands

as a state of ecstasy,[296] is critical for our understanding of the phenomenon of speaking in

tongue(s).

---

[290] "Alles in religiöser Hinsicht ist und wird er vielmehr durch Fügung der verborgenen Mächte, die von aussen her an ihn kommen." Schulz, 123.

[291] Schulz, 124.

[292] Schulz, 139.

[293] Schulz, 129.

[294] Schulz, 139.

[295] Schulz, 139.

[296] Schulz finds many narratives in both the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament that demonstrate a similar condition of being ecstatic or a state of exaltation (*Zustande der Exaltation*). Paul's statement in 2 Cor. 12:2 that he went up to the third heaven in which he is not sure whether he is present in his body or not is one of these. Paul's experience on his way to Damascus is another example of a condition in which "his inner being was suddenly

This is precisely what happened on the day of Pentecost. The accusation that those there on the day of Pentecost were all drunk, according to Schulz, can make sense if we understand tongue(s) this way. It is a parallel experience to that of the Bacchae members joyfully singing and celebrating Dionysus as depicted by Euripides.[297] In this sense, Schulz believes that the ecstatic and enthusiastic state of people who experience γλῶσσῃ λαλεῖν needs to be understood in light of biblical texts such as Pss. 126:2; 145:21; 100:1; 135, 138, 146, 150 that describe the exalted state of praising, singing, and worshiping God,[298] which he calls the "cheerful exclamation" (*Jubelexclamationen*). It is apparent, therefore, that the language of worship (*die gottesdienstliche Sparche*) that the Jews typically used in their communal gathering is transgressed by Christian enthusiasts (*christlichen Enthusiasten*) in their freedom of speech.[299] What happened in the church of Corinth, according to Schulz, is that the enthusiasm became extreme in that the tongue(s) speakers began to speak in the form of polylogy and battology (*Polylogie und Battologie*), or in boundless deliriums (*massloses Schwärmen*).[300] Some of those present even thought that the Spirit itself was speaking through them in an angelic language (1 Cor. 13:1). This behavior was so disturbing and confusing that Paul had to stop them.

Schulz's work is significant for two reasons. First, it puts the last nail in the coffin of the idea of speaking in tongue(s) as a phenomenon of foreign language speaking. Scholarship after Schulz takes the rejection of the traditional view as established. Second, at this point we can see

---

excited and moved by an outside power" (Acts 9). In some of the New Testament texts, this feeling happens in a form of being out of one's mind (Mark 3:21; Acts 11:5, 22, 17; Rev. 1:10; 4:2; Dan. 2:1, etc.) A similar narrative is also expressed by Ezekiel 1:1, namely that the heavens are opened up and he saw God. Saul had this feeling of exaltation in 1 Sam. 10:10,19, 23, 24; also, Jeremiah in Jer. 29:26. David dances and gets naked praising God (2 Sam.) Schulz, 128–30.

[297] Schulz, 141–42.

[298] Schulz, 144–45.

[299] Schulz, 149.

[300] Schulz, 150.

that the scholarship has moved further in the direction of understanding the speakers of tongue(s) as losing their self-awareness. If Bleek, Olshausen, Baur, and Neander believed that, although tongue(s) is not a foreign language phenomenon, it still contains some remnant of linguistic elements in the forms of archaic expressions or sparking of foreign words. In Schulz, however, what's left in tongue(s) is only an exciting "hallelujah!" screaming or cheering. The next scholar that came to the scene in the nineteenth century is another noted German biblical scholar, *Karl Georg Wieseler,* who took the discussion to another level.

Karl Georg Wieseler: Tongue(s) as Unrecognizable Pronunciation

Wieseler opens his essay on this topic, entitled "Ueber das γλώσσαις λαλειν im neuen Testament. Neuer kritisch-exegetischer Versuch über 1 Kor. 14. in Verbindung mit Ap. Gesch. 2," by disagreeing with Bleek, Olshausen, Neander, and Schluz's position. It is important to note that, unlike all other scholars that we have discussed above, Wieseler did not discuss his rejection of the idea that tongue(s) is the miraculous ability to speak in foreign languages. At this point, especially after Schulz, arguments against the traditional view had been fully explored and the debate now centered primarily on the positive explanation.

The main objection is that these scholars primarily built their understanding on tongue(s) on the account in the book of Acts, and then projected it onto Paul. For Wieseler, it should be the other way around. A better understanding of tongue(s) would start with what Paul says about it, and then one can explain what tongue(s) is in Acts 2.[301] Wieseler calls this "the reverse method" (*die umgekehrte Methode*).[302] The main reason for this is because 1 Cor. 14 is more didactic

---

[301] Karl Georg Wieseler, "Ueber Das Γλώσσαις Λαλειν Im Neuen Testament. Neuer Kritisch-Exegetischer Versuch Über 1 Kor. 14. in Verbindung Mit Ap. Gesch. 2," in *Theologische Studien Und Kritiken* (Hamburg: bei Friedrich Perthes, 1838), 707.

[302] Wieseler, 710.

then the narrative of Acts 2; thus Paul's account should give us a clearer and more intellectual

explanation than that of Luke. This switch in the starting point changes the scholarly

interpretation of speaking in tongue(s) in a significant way.

At the heart of the Pauline discussion on tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 14 is its relationship to the

gift of prophecy. If one can pinpoint the difference between these two phenomena in the church

of Corinth, it will lead to a better understanding of speaking in tongue(s). Wieseler argues that a

prophet is person who "pronounces in penetrating and comprehensible speech for the

exhortation, encouragement, consolation, and edification of the hearers…, or also revealing the

future, consoling, admonishing, or warning."[303] In spite of the leading of the Holy Spirit through

whom the prophetic message is given to the prophet, Wieseler insists that a prophet will always

be "conscious of the revelations." This is the reason why a prophetic speech is intelligible to the

hearers. The content of the speech, according to Wieseler, is given by the Holy Spirit. However,

in spite of its divine source, a prophet is "always conscious of the content of the revelations,"

because prophecy is described by Paul as being "in mind" (τῷ νοΐ). To put it differently, the

human mind is in a state of high excitement (*die höhere Erregung*), but nonetheless "active" in

all prophetic activities.[304]

The distinction between prophets and tongue(s) speakers in the church of Corinth is that

the former speaks perfectly intelligible words and the latter speaks incomprehensible

expressions. Yet based on 1 Cor. 14:15ff, Wieseler insists that the content of speaking in

tongue(s) is exactly the same. Because of Paul's demand that tongue(s) speakers should translate

---

[303] "Der christliche Prophet ist ein ohne Beruf und Amt frei wirkendes Mitglied der Gemeinde, das, so oft
es vom göttlichen Geiste getrieben wird, in eindringlicher und verständlicher Rede das ausspricht, was zur
Ermahnung, Ermunterung, Befestigung und Erbauung der Hörer dient…, mag die Rede sich nun auf die Erkcnntniß
der Tiefen des menschlichen Herzens gründen . . . oder auch die Zukunft enthüllen, tröstend, mahnend oder
warnend." Wieseler, 713.
[304] Wieseler, 713–14.

their speech or remain silent, Wieseler argues that such speech must assume a certain level of

self-consciousness.[305] He explains:

> [T]he authority of the divine principle on the tongues speakers cannot be thought of as if
> the actions and functions of the human soul were rendered ineffective and inoperative in
> and with the action of the πνεῦμα, and in its place the divine spirit the organs of the body,
> direct and govern, which thought is expressed in such a way that the Spirit of God plays
> on the soul as on an instrument.[306]

This is apparently a direct critique of Baur's proposal that we have discussed above. In this

sense, there is no such thing as "an unconsciousness or total inactivity of mind" (*einer*

Bewußtlosigkeit und gänzlichen Unthätigkeit des νοῦς), Wieseler insists.[307] So if it is not the

spirit of God controlling the human mind, then what is it? Wieseler argues that in the

phenomenon of speaking in tongue(s), there is an ecstatic state of being, which he explains as a

condition that the Spirit of God influences and that pulls the human soul by force (*mit Gewalt*)

from its everyday life, but he insists that this influence does not totally diminish the self-

awareness of that soul.[308] "This state was distinguished from the prophetic by a stronger

resignation of self-consciousness and world-consciousness," argues Wieseler.[309]

After examining Paul's demand for interpretation and the audible nature of tongue(s),

Wieseler argues that at least we know that tongue(s) is not a "speaking" in one's heart but speech

that can be heard by others. However, this speech is totally incomprehensible because there is a

---

[305] Wieseler, 716.

[306] "Doch darf man sich wegen dieser Stelle die Herrschaft des göttlichen Princips über den Glossenredner
nicht etwa so denken, als ob in und mit der Einwirkung des πνεῦμα alle Thätigkeiten und Functionen der
menschlichen Seele unthätig und unwirksam gemacht würden und an ihrer Stelle der göttliche Geist die Organe des
Leibes beseele, lenke und regiere, welchen Gedanken man wohl so ausgedrückt hat, daß der Gottesgeist auf der
Seele wie auf einem Instrumente spiele." Wieseler, 715.

[307] Wieseler, 716.

[308] Wieseler, 716.

[309] "Unterschieden von dem prophetischen war dieser Zustand durch ein stärkeres Zurücktreten des Selbst-
und Weltbewußtseyns." Wieseler, 716.

need for an interpreter. What makes it unintelligible? This is the question that Wieseler struggles

with. Is it the content of the speech? Perhaps not, because the content is described as

thanksgiving (14:16), hymn, revelation, etc. (14:26). The difficulty that lies at the heart of the

account of speaking in tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 14 is that "such effusions of religious

feelings/sentiments" (*solche Ergüsse des religiösen Gefühls*), – an expression that can be traced

all the way back to Herder (although Wieseler acknowledges that not everyone has "the same

pious impulses and sensations") – are expressed in a way that no one could understand. [310] The

idea is that at least some people should be able to understand the depth of this religious feeling,

yet Paul clearly insists that no one can understand it. Therefore, for Wieseler, the

incomprehensibility of tongue(s) cannot be explained by its content.[311]

Another possible explanation is that it is a divine gift of speaking in foreign languages.

Wieseler also rejects this explanation, primarily on the basis of Acts 2:10-12.[312] Interestingly, he

says that he does not want to spend much energy on refuting this position because it is already

well expressed by others.[313] Furthermore, Bleek's position that tongue(s) are archaic-provincial

expressions also cannot be accepted because it is not based on the Pauline text but rather on the

etymological development of the word γλῶσσαι in Greek literature.[314] Also, it is hard to explain

archaic-provincial expressions as a result of an elevated state because the Corinthians, especially

the "lower class of people" (*der geringer Klasse des Volks*), would be more comfortable using

---

[310] Wieseler, 722.

[311] Wieseler, 722.

[312] Wieseler, 723.

[313] This is what he has to say about it: "Allein wenn diese Ansicht von den Glossen auch Ap. Gesch. 2. ihre Bestätigung zu finden scheint, so wird sie doch in unserem Abschnitte und zwar V. 10—12. durchaus ausgeschlossen; weßwegen wir auch eine weitläufige Widerlegung dieser Ansicht, die bekanntlich noch an vielen anderen Gebrechen leidet, nicht weiter für nöthig halten." Wieseler, 723.

[314] Wieseler, 723.

the expressions that they are familiar with rather than unusual archaic or provincial words. [315]

"[I]t is sufficient to note that even the ancient and unfamiliar formulas of speech cannot be the characters of the glosses," Wieseler argues.[316]

That said, if tongue(s) is neither a foreign language nor an archaic-provincial expression, Wieseler explains that Paul's analogy of lifeless instruments (flute, harp, and bugle) in 1 Cor. 14:7-9 can give us the best clue to what it is. The point of this analogy, according to Wieseler, is the need for a clear pronunciation, that is to give a εὔσημον λόγον (14:9). In short, a speech that produces εὔσημον λόγον is an understandable or comprehensible speech. "[A]s the flute and the kithara must be intelligible, you must speak intelligibly with your tongue," writes Wieseler.[317] Just like all these lifeless instruments have to produce good sound, a tongue also has to produce good sound in order to be comprehensible by the hearers. If this is the case, that ευσημον λογον is about clear pronunciation, the word ἀκούει in 14:2, which is commonly translated as "understand," actually has everything to do with hearing ευσημον λογον.

To put it differently, people cannot understand tongue(s) speech because their ears don't hear good pronunciation (i.e., ευσημον λογον) from the speakers.[318] So, how is this bad pronunciation produced by these people who are in the elevated state of excitement? Wieseler explains that in this moment of high excitement, the tongue(s) speakers concentrate deeply on themselves in all their thoughts and feelings (*Gedanken und Empfindungen*), and thus they somehow become "completely sunk in the vision of God." (*in der Anschauung Gottes ganz*

---

[315] Wieseler, 724.

[316] "Woraus zur Genüge erhellt, daß auch die alterthümlichen und ungebräuchlichen Redeformeln keine Charaktere der Glossen seyn können." Wieseler, 725.

[317] The German reads: "wie Flöte und Cither verständlich klingen müssen, so müßtauch ihr mit der Zunge verständlich reden." Wieseler, 728.

[318] Wieseler, 730.

versunken).[319] As a result, they produce only "soft, scarcely audible, broken words, tones, and sounds" (*leise, kaum vernehmliche, abgebrochene Wörter, Töne und Laute*).[320] Interestingly, Wieseler thinks that this is precisely the "sigh too deep for words" that Paul talks about in Romans 8:26, or the "ἄρρητα ῥήματα" (unutterable words) in 2 Cor. 12:4. [321] The inability of a tongue(s) speaker to interpret the speech is caused mainly by the fact that glossolalia is "an outpouring of excited religious feeling" (*einen Erguß des aufgeregten religiösen Gefühls*), and in this ecstatic state a speaker is "too much dominated by his feelings (*Gefühlen*)."[322]

In short, Wieseler uses what he found in Paul in reading the event of the outpouring of the Spirit in Acts 2. In this particular framework, Acts 2:4 recounts what he calls "the real or actual speaking in tongues" (*das eigentliche Glossenreden*), whereas Acts 2:6-12 mainly describes tongues that are already being interpreted (ἑρμηνεία γλωσσῶν) into different dialects. Thus, there is no confusion or misunderstanding in Acts 2:6-12.[323] So the sequence of the events in Acts 2 can be reconstructed as follows: Before the coming of the spectators, the disciples had the "true experience" of tongues, i.e., the explosion of religious feelings through scarcely audible, broken words, tones, and sounds (2:4). However, when the audience appears on the scene, the disciples then translate this experience into better pronounced expressions that are intelligible to the ears of this audience. The translation does not have to be in foreign languages. "It is natural that the disciples . . . interpreted in their mother's tongue, for whom they were

---

[319] Wieseler, 732.

[320] Wieseler, 732.

[321] Wieseler, 732.

[322] Wieseler, 733. Wieseler explains: "Denn bestand die Glossolalie in einem Erguß des aufgeregten religiösen Gefühls und einer Aeußerung desselben durch leise und kaum vernehmliche Worte, Töne und Laute, so ist zuerst klar, wie Niemand weiter, als der Zungenredner selbst seine Glossen dollmetschen, dann aber auch, wie dieser, zu sehr von seinen Gefühlen beherrseht und überhaupt des Ordnens seiner Gedanken weniger mächtig, selbst zuweilen das nicht dollmetschen konnte, was ihn in diesem ekstatischen Zustande bewegt hatte."

[323] Wieseler, 744.

concerned with such listeners, who were best to understand them," Wieseler explains.[324] In other

words, they are endowed with both the gift of speaking in tongue(s) and interpretation. [325]

Adolf Hilgenfeld: Tongue(s) as Speech without Self-Awareness

Adolf Hilgenfeld opens his 1850 book, *Die Glossolalie in der alten Kirche, in dem*

Zusammenhang der Geistesgaben und des Geisteslebens des alten Christenthums, with the

acknowledgment that the rejection of speaking in tongue(s) as a foreign language phenomenon

has been settled already.[326] For Hilgenfeld, the Pauline exposition of tongue(s) as

incomprehensible to the people who hear it eliminates the possibility of it referring to foreign

languages used for evangelism. Positing that "Obviously the γένη φωνῶν (v. 10), the various

barbaric languages, are different from the γένη γλῶσσῶν,"[327] Hilgenfeld argues that φωνή is just

the illustration or analogy that describes glossolalia. The real phenomenon of glossolalia in the

Corinthian congregation, instead, is "a speech without inner conviction" (*eine Rede ohne innere*

Ueberzeugung).[328] The separation of mind from tongue is the basis upon which Hilgenfeld builds

his argument.

> Wird also eine von der Gesinnung unabhängige Aussage auf die Zunge zurückgeführt, so
> sieht man, wie ein aus ekstatischer Begeisterung, in welcher der νοῦς, das vermittelte
> Selbstbewußt sein, zurücktrat, hervorgegangenes Reden als ein γλώσσῃ λαλεῖν
> bezeichnet werden konnte, weil eben die Zunge, unabhängig von dem Wissen und
> Wollen des Menschen, gleichsam unwillkürlich zu reden schien.[329]

---

[324] Wieseler, 748.

[325] Wieseler, 749.

[326] "Es ist nun bereits ziemlich allgemein anerkannt, daß die korinthische Glossolalie kein Reden in fremden Sprachen war, und es kann fast genügen, in dieser Hinsicht aus die bereits von Anderen geltend gemachten Argumente zu verweisen." Adolf Bernhard Christoph Hilgenfeld, *Die Glossolalie in Der Alten Kirche, in Dem Zusammenhang Der Geistesgaben Und Des Geisteslebens Des Alten Christenthums* (Leipzig: Drud und Verlag von Breitkopf und Hartel, 1850), 23.

[327] "Offenbar sind also die γένη φωνῶν (v. 10), die verschiedenen barbarischen Sprachen, von den γένη γλῶσσῶν verschieden" Hilgenfeld, 25.

[328] Hilgenfeld, 45.

[329] Hilgenfeld, 45.

Glossolalia is in some respects similar to Bileam's speech, in which the speech is delivered without the full awareness of the speaker. The tongue of the speaker is completely taken over by a supernatural power. The nature of glossolalia, therefore, is involuntary. In Hilgenfeld's words: "Thus, in the original sense of γλώσσῃ λαλεῖν, we can speak both the negative side: involuntarily with the (divinely moved) tongue, as well as the more positive: to speak in a divine linguistic inspiration."[330] He further renders the Greek expression "προσεύχωμαι γλώσσῃ" (1 Cor. 14:14) as speaking with the divine tongue or praying with a divine speech."[331] This view is reinforced by the expression "προσεύχωμαι τῷ πνεύματι" (1 Cor. 14:15) in which "das πνεύμα" is understood "as organ and receptivity of the divine in human being" (*als Organ und Reciptivität des Göttlichen im Menschen*).[332] As in the case of Bileam, Hilgenfeld claims that "only in ecstasy and mania is prophecy possible" (*nur in der Ekstase und Manie ist die Prophetie möglich*).[333]

If scholars prior to Hilgenfeld still maintain that tongue(s) speakers are fully aware of what they are doing, and Olshausen thinks that tongue(s) is a sleepwalking-like experience while still maintaining that the speakers know what they say, Hilgenfeld takes an easy step further by arguing that the speakers actually do not have any awareness of what they are saying or doing when they speak in tongue(s). The next scholar that we are going to discuss is probably the most extreme version of all of them.

---

[330] Hilgenfeld, 47. "In dem ursprünglichen Sinn von γλώσσῃ λαλεῖν dürfen wir somit sowohl die negative Seite: unwillkürlich mit der (göttlich bewegten) Zunge reden, als auch die mehr positive zusammenfassen: in einer göttlichen Sprachinspiration reden."

[331] Hilgenfeld, 47. "mit einer göttlich Besprachten Zunge, mit einer göttlichen Spracheingebung beten."

[332] Hilgenfeld, 47.

[333] Hilgenfeld, 49.

Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer: Tongue(s) as Suspension of Human Intellectual Activity

In his 1877 commentary on the epistles to the Corinthians, which is part of the sixteen-volume *Kritischexegetischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament* series, Meyer took a step further than Hilgenfeld, Bleek, or Baur. Laying out the state of scholarship at that time, Meyer wrote:

> Most commentators, indeed, following Origen and the Fathers generally (with exceptions, however, as early as Irenaeus and Tertullian), have taken γλῶσσαι in this passage [1 Cor. 12:10]… as meaning *foreign languages*" (so Storr, Flatt, Heydenreich, Schlthess, Scharder, Rückter, Ch. F. Fritzsche, Maier), and that, too, in the view of the majority, *unrequired* languages; only a few (among the most recent of whom are Schulthess, *de charismatib. Sp. St.,* Lips. 1818, and Schrader, also Ch. F. Fritzsche in his *Nov. Opusc*. p. 302ff.) regarding them as *acquired by learning*. [334]

First of all Mayer argues that the ability to speak in unlearned foreign languages is psychologically impossible. Human psychological capacity cannot do such a thing. [335] Further, on a textual basis, Mayer presents eight arguments against the view of tongues as foreign languages. First, it will make Paul's statement in 14:2 that no one understands tongue(s) incorrect, especially if someone who understands that language somehow is present in the gathering. It means that tongue(s), for Mayer, has to be unintelligible at all times in order to affirm Paul's statement. Second, the phrase γένη φωνῶν and γένη γλωσσῶν in 14:10,11 should be understood as two different things. The former refers to languages that function as an "analogue" of the latter. Third, Mayer argues that in 14:15 Paul contrasts glossolalia with "employment of understanding" and not "one's native tongue." [336] This is why Paul argues that glossolalia "is characterized as λαλεῖν πνεύματι." [337] Fourth, the contrast in 14:6 is between glossolalia and speaking in revelation, knowledge, etc. Therefore, Mayer insists that "the

---

[334] Heinrich August Wilhelm Meyer, *Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistles to the Corinthians*, trans. William P. Dickson (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1877), 366. Emphasis is his.

[335] Meyer, 366.

[336] Meyer, 366.

[337] Meyer, 366.

unintelligibleness of the *glossolalia* is not to be sought in the *idiom*, but in the fact that what was spoken *contained* neither ἀποκάλυψις nor γνῶσις, etc."[338] Fifth, if this is the foreign languages phenomenon, the possibility of the absence of translation "could not have occurred at all, since every speaker would have been able also to interpret."[339] Sixth, Paul's ability to speak in tongue(s) more than anybody else (14:18) and his refusal to do so in a church gathering cannot be interpreted by saying that "Paul was in the habit of praying in private, before God, in foreign languages!"[340] Seventh, the phrase διά τῆς γλώσσης in 14:9 has to mean "by the tongues." For him, this is another way of expressing unintelligible speech that cannot be understood as languages. Eight, if this is all about foreign languages, Mayer states, "Paul would have discussed the whole subject of the χάρισμα in question from quite another point of view, namely, according to the presence or non-presence of those who understood foreign languages."[341]

Meyer contends that the way to understand this phenomenon is that "γλῶσσαις λαλεῖν expresses *an uttering oneself with tongues.*"[342] While acknowledging that his view is closer to Wieseler's, Meyer maintains that it does not mean that tongue(s) is the "*lisping of inarticulate tones*" because that would not contain thanksgiving to God.[343] He writes:

> We are accordingly to understand by γλῶσσαις λαλεῖν such *an outburst of prayer in petition, praise, and thanksgiving, as was so ecstatic that in connection with it the speaker's own conscious intellectual activity was suspended, while the tongue did not serve as the instrument for the utterance of self-active reflection, but, independently of it, was involuntarily set in motion by the Holy Spirit, by whom the man in his deepest nature was seized and borne away.*[344]

---

[338] Meyer, 366. Emphasis is his.

[339] Meyer, 367.

[340] Meyer, 367.

[341] Meyer, 367.

[342] Meyer, 368.

[343] Meyer, 369. Emphasis is his.

[344] Meyer, 370.

Key to Meyer's interpretation is the disconnection between νοῦς and the act of λαλεῖν, through which "the deepest emotion struggled to express itself, and in whatever other way the tongue might give utterance to the highest surgings and heavings of the Spirit."[345] Since the tongue is being controlled by the Spirit, it "spoke of *itself*." [346]

Summary

It should be obvious that, influenced by the German romantic tradition, in the first part of the nineteenth century scholars began to develop a profound obsession with the internal consciousness of tongue(s) speakers. Bleek, who proposed the idea of archaic-provincial expressions, believed that tongue(s) speakers are filled with religious feelings, which is quite very similar to Herder's explanation. Olshausen, Bauer, Neander, and Schulz are the ones who begin to question the self-awareness of tongue(s) speakers. However, they still maintain that such awareness is at an extremely low level. It was Hilgenfeld and Meyer who came to the more extreme conclusion that tongue(s) speakers are completely unaware of what they are doing and saying for they are completely under the control of the divine power. Meyer is just a scholar who radicalizes what has been slowly developed throughout the nineteenth century, starting at the time that Herder published his essay.

In sum, as one should be able to see throughout this presentation, the entire obsession with the internal consciousness of the speakers is clearly a direct result of the rejection of the notion of tongue(s) as a miraculous ability to speak in foreign languages. Once this idea is rejected, scholars have to scramble to find alternative explanations. The constructive explanations offered in nineteenth-century German scholarship are shaped profoundly by

---

[345] Meyer, 371.
[346] Meyer, 371.

Herder's nationalist-romantic reading of the New Testament. The emphasis on tongue(s) as the expression of religious feeling, excitement, or enthusiasm, finds its root in Herder's conception of language. In other words, Herder paved the way for the birth of a new understanding of speaking in tongue(s). In spite of the diversity of opinions in the nineteenth century, all of the scholars discussed above generally agree on the basic idea that tongue(s) is the expression of religious feelings, excitement, or enthusiasm.

1.3.6. A Glimpse of Nineteenth-Century British Scholarship

While the nineteenth century was a period of significant shifts in German biblical scholarship, biblical scholarship in Britain also underwent the same shift, partly because of the influence of German scholars in the larger context of European scholarship. The works of many German scholars who challenged the traditional view–such as Olshausen, Billroth, and Neander– were translated into English, making it possible for British scholars to access the scholarly discussion in Germany. Not only that, most British biblical scholars at that time were also able to read German literature. Thus, the political and geographical boundary between these two contexts was not rigid at all. This fluidity of scholarly interaction can be seen in how British scholars quoted and responded to their German counterparts.

Before I proceed in discussing the scholarship in Britain, another phenomenon that should be mentioned now is Edward Irving's glossolalic movement in Scotland in the early nineteenth century.[347] While biblical scholars in Britain, agreeing with their German

---

[347] Gordon Scrachan notes: "Most religious revivals to some degree have enjoyed the experience of Pentecost but very few have spoken in tongues. After Montanism there are only isolated cases recorded and it was not until the late seventeenth century that it was claimed to be a 'symptom of divine inspiration' on a large scale. Extensive outbreaks of tongues occurred 'among the Huguenots of the Cevennes and the appellant (but still nominally Catholic) Jansenists.' There are no further instances until those associated with the ministry of Edward Irving. When speaking with tongues did occur in earlier times among the Huguenots and the Jansenists, it was always one of many phenomena generated by religious enthusiasm and intense evangelical feeling. Because of this it

counterparts, began to reject the idea that glossolalia is the miraculous ability to speak in foreign languages, it was the Irvingite movement that gave them the contemporary example of what glossolalia is. As Thomas Charles Edwards put it in his 1885 commentary, speaking in tongue(s) among the Irvingnites is "made to repeat the phenomena of the early Church."[348] It is not a surprise, therefore, that many of them would mention Irving in their discussions. As James Dunn observed, "the reappearance of glossolalia among the Irvingites in the 1830s … brought the subject into topical prominence."[349]

For example, Frederick William Robertson delivered a series of expository lectures of the Bible at Trinity Chapel, Brighton every Sunday afternoon from August 15, 1847 to August 15, 1853. These lectures were then published posthumously in 1959. Lecture XXV, which discussed 1 Cor. 14:1 on the nature of tongue(s), was delivered on May 2, 1852. A week after that, on May 9, Robertson gave another lecture built upon the argument that he had laid out in the previous lecture, this time focusing more on the regulation of tongue(s) in the rest of 1 Cor. 14. These lectures, according to Robertson, were hard to write and indeed he wished to bypass this chapter because "so many have slipped and fallen," but he insisted on dealing with it "with

---

was scarcely distinguished from jumping and jerking, roaring and ranting. It has been thought by many from 1830 to the present day that this was also the case in the West of Scotland, at Regent Square, and among the members of the Catholic Apostolic church. Nothing could be further from the truth, for unlike any previous manifestations of the Spirit, they were occasioned not by the overflow of powerful religious feeling but by faithful response to the systematic study and preaching of the Word of God." Although his statement on Montanism and glossolalia is incorrect, the observation on the importance of tongues in Irvingnite movement is largely true. See Gordon Strachan, *The Pentecostal Theology of Edward Irving* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1988), 41.

For further discussion on the Irving controversy and his glossolalic movement, see Arnold Dallimore, *Life of Edward Irving: Fore-Runner of the Charismatic Movement*, First Edition edition (Edinburgh ; Carlisle, Pa., USA: Banner of Truth, 1983); William S. Merricks, *Edward Irving: The Forgotten Giant* (East Peoria, IL: Scribe's Chamber Publications, 1983); David Malcolm Bennett, *Edward Irving Reconsidered: The Man, His Controversies, and the Pentecostal Movement* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2014); Andrew Landale Drummond, *Edward Irving and His Circle: Including Some Consideration of the "Tongues" Movement in the Light of Modern Psychology* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009).

[348] Edwards, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 321.

[349] James D. G. Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit: A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of Jesus and the First Christians as Reflected in the New Testament* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 398 n. 71.

straightforwardness and simplicity to expound the whole counsel of God."[350] Commenting on the

Irving charismatic phenomenon, Robertson wrote: "It was from a strange and wild

misinterpretation of this chapter, untenable on any sound grounds of interpretation, that the great

and gifted Irving fell into such fatal error."[351]

Concerning Corinthian tongue(s), Robertson was fully aware that the dominant view at

that time was that it referred to "a miraculous gift of speaking foreign languages" for the purpose

of evangelism.[352] However, "after a long and patient examination of the subject," Robertson

wrote, "I humbly doubt this altogether."[353] On the basis of the idea that no one understands the

things that are being spoken by tongue(s) speakers, Robertson insisted that the tongue(s)

phenomenon must be both "inarticulate and incoherent."[354] It, therefore, cannot be any foreign

language because there is a possibility that somebody could understand what's being said, and

hence, those words could be useful to that listener.

Robertson suspects that tongue(s) in the Corinthian church involved an explosive and

passionate utterance, which cannot be foreign languages because tongue(s) tend to be

"impassioned utterance of devotional feeling."[355] In his words, tongue(s) is to be understood as

"the rapt, ecstatic outpouring of unutterable feeling, for which language is insufficient and poor,

in which a man is not trying to make himself logically clear to men, but pouring his soul to

God."[356] Key to his explanation is the idea that often people cannot fully express their deepest

---

[350] Frederick William Robertson, *Expository Lectures on St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians: Delivered at Trinity Chapel, Brighton*, Clark (London: Smith, Elder and Co, 65, Cornhill, 1859), 222.
[351] Robertson, 222.
[352] Robertson, 224.
[353] Robertson, 224.
[354] Robertson, 225.
[355] Robertson, 225.
[356] Robertson, 225.

feelings properly using normal words and so often resort to expostulations etc. "There was an unconscious need of expressing audibly the feelings arising within,"[357] Robertson explains. This, he continues, is the reason why Paul says that tongue(s) only edifies the speakers.

> Have you heard the low moanings of hopelessness? or those airs which to us are harsh and unmelodious, but which to the Swiss mountaineer tell of home, bringing him back to the scenes of his childhood; speaking to him in a language clearer than the tongue? or have you ever listened to the merry, unmeaning shots of boyhood, getting rid of exuberance of life, uttering in sound a joy which boyhood only knows, and for which manhood has no words? Well, in all these you have dim illustrations of the way in which new feelings, deep feelings, irrepressible feelings, found for themselves utterance, in sounds which were called, "Tongues."[358]

In other words, one's tongue or mouth are only instruments that express those unintelligible feelings. For Robertson, "feeling is a precious gift; but when men parade it, exhibit it, and give way to it, it is weakness instead of strength."[359] The place of such a gift is, therefore, not in a public gathering. This is where, according to Robertson, Irving and his followers have fallen into error.

Another noted nineteenth-century biblical scholar worth mentioning here is Arthur Penrhyn Stanley. Besides being a noted biblical scholar, he also was a highly respected Dean of Westminster from 1864 to 1881. In his commentary on 1 Corinthians, Stanley devoted a long section, right before the analysis of 1 Cor. 14, to explain the nature of speaking in tongue(s). Comparing it with prophecy, Stanley acknowledges that "'the gift of tongues' is a much more difficult subject,"[360] partly because it is "something entirely new in the Apostolic age." Its novelty is marked by a distinguished expression of feeling in the absence of understanding. In

---

[357] Robertson, 225.

[358] Robertson, 226–27.

[359] Robertson, 227.

[360] Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians: With Critical Notes and Dissertations*, Third (London: John Murray, Albermarle Street, 1865), 244–45.

this sense, Stanley argues that tongue(s) is "outpourings of the heart and feelings, rather than of the understanding; so that the actual words and meaning were almost always unintelligible to the bystanders, sometimes to the speaker."[361] In the experience of tongue(s), which is marked by "trance or ecstasy," the speakers do not pronounce any instruction or teaching to the church, but rather express an exaltation to God in a way that cannot be understood by either the hearers or the speakers themselves.

Just like other scholars of the nineteenth century, Stanley also rejected the idea that tongue(s) is merely the experience of speaking foreign languages. He did so based primarily on the difference between the words γλῶσσα and διάλεκτος. He wrote: "The use of the word 'tongue' (γλῶσσα) need not necessarily imply a distinct language of a nation, which in the New Testament is usually expressed by διάλεκτος."[362] While διάλεκτος refers to the actual language, following what Bleek had already proposed, Stanley maintains that in Aristotle's works (*Rhet.* iii.3,4; *Poet.* xxi.6) γλῶσσα is used primarily to indicate "strange uncommon expressions."[363] Therefore, when Paul refers to the tongue of angels in 1 Cor. 13:1, he doesn't mean regular human language or dialect, but a very particular way of speech. Stanley explains: "Probably… this peculiarity of style or speech, was, if not always, yet occasionally heightened by the introduction of foreign words or sentences into the utterances thus made."[364]

Thus, when the book of Acts describes that every person on the day of Pentecost acknowledged that they understood the disciples' speech in their own language (τῇ ἰδίᾳ διαλέκτῳ) and at the same time the narrator explains that they spoke in other languages (ἑτέραις

---

[361] Stanley, 246.
[362] Stanley, 247.
[363] Stanley, 247.
[364] Stanley, 248.

γλώσσαις), the only way to explain this situation is "that the writer meant to describe that, at least to the hearers, the sound spoken seemed to be those of distinct languages and real dialects."[365] Stanley explains further:

> If this account is to be taken literally it would imply that the fervent expressions of thanksgiving which on that occasion, as on others, constituted the essential part of the gift, were so far couched in foreign dialects as to be intelligible to the natives of the several countries. The emphatic record of this peculiar gift, viewed in connexion with the general spirit and object of Acts, seems designed to point out the gift of various tongues as the natural result and sign of the first public manifestation of a religion especially designed to break through the barriers which divide man from man and nation from nation. Such a significance, however suitable to the occasion of the first revelation of a Universal Church, would not be appropriate in the more ordinary manifestations of the gift. True, the effect described as occurring on the day of Pentecost might grow out of it.[366]

In other words, Stanley is saying that the story of Pentecost is an extraordinary event. It is the exception, and not the rule. In its extreme form, tongue(s) can take the form of human language, but in general it is completely unintelligible. Thus, in essence tongue(s) is "sometimes intelligible, sometimes unintelligible to those who heard it."[367] With this in mind, Stanley warns that "still it must be observed, that even if foreign words were always part of its existence (of which there is no proof), there is no instance and no probability of its having been ever used as a means of instructing foreign nations, or of superseding the necessity of learning foreign languages."[368]

Beside Robertson and Arthur, there are many other British scholars in the nineteenth century who pushed for a similar position.[369] Thomas Charles Edwards in his 1885 commentary

---

[365] Stanley, 248.

[366] Stanley, 248–49.

[367] Stanley, 249.

[368] Stanley, 249.

[369] Some British scholars were still on the borderline between the traditional position and the romantic-nationalist position. Arthur Wright is the best example of this. He argues that speaking in tongue(s) is probably "the result of an abnormally excited memory." However, this abnormally excited memory produces foreign languages.

on the first epistle to the Corinthians acknowledges that, despite various instances of speaking in

tongue(s) in biblical texts (Mark 18, Acts 2, 10, 19, and 1 Cor. 12-14), he still finds it "difficult

to say what it [tongue(s)] did mean."[370] However, after discussing Herder, Bleek, Meyer, and

others, Edwards comes to a conclusion that "there was undoubtedly an element of ecstasy in the

gift of tongues."[371] Frederic William Farrar, in his highly celebrated 1879 book on the life of

Paul, contends that glossolalia cannot be foreign languages on the basis of the reasons that

German scholars have already proposed, i.e., Paul does not understand the Lycaonian language,

other instances of glossolalia in Acts do not display foreign languages, etc.[372] When the early

disciples gathered together and the Spirit came down upon them, Farrar argues that "the voice

they uttered was awful in its range, in its tone, in its modulation, in its startling, penetrating,

almost appalling power; the words they spoke were exalted, intense, passionate, full of mystic

significance."[373] This change of this vocalization is caused by their "ecstatic devotion" and

"immense emotion."[374] Similarly, in 1891 Marcus Dods pointed out that "it must… be said that

the common opinion of scholars is that the gift of tongues did not consist in [the] ability to speak

---

He writes: "That people should under certain conditions speak passages of considerable length in a language which they do not understand, by recalling and repeating what they have heard others say, it may be years before, is well-[at]tested fact." So when Paul speaks of interpretation, Wright takes it as translation from one language to the vernacular. This is also under some sort of ecstatic state of consciousness. Arthur Wright, *Some New Testament Problems* (London: Methuen & Co., 1989), 291ff.

[370] Edwards, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 319.

[371] Edwards, 321.

[372] Frederic William Farrar, *The Life and Work of St. Paul*, vol. I (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1879), 96ff.

[373] This is the complete quotation from Farrar's book: "Any one who fairly ponders these indications can hardly doubt that, when the consciousness of the new power came over the assembled disciples, they did not speak as men ordinarily speak. The voice they uttered was awful in its range, in its tone, in its modulations, in its startling, penetrating, almost appalling power; the words they spoke were exalted, intense, passionate, full of mystic significance ; the language they used was not their ordinary and familiar tongue, but was Hebrew, or Greek, or Latin, or Aramaic, or Persian, or Arabic, as some over- powering and unconscious impulse of the moment might direct ; the burden of their thoughts was the ejaculation of rapture, of amazement, of thanksgiving, of prayer, of empassioned psalm, of dithyrambic hymn; their utterances were addressed not to each other, but were like an in spired soliloquy of the soul with God." Farrar, I:101.

[374] Farrar, I:101.

a foreign language even temporarily, but in [an] exalted frame of mind which found expression

in sounds or words belonging to no human language."[375] He further explains this phenomenon in

terms of a condition of being extremely excited to the extent that one loses all language to

express that feeling.[376] This said, the trend in nineteenth-century scholarship also followed the

changes that were taking place at almost the same time in Germany.

1.4. A Shift of the Dominant Mode of Reading

Charles William Shumway's Ph.D. dissertation at Boston University in 1919, entitled *A

Critical History of Glossolalia*, describes as follows the state of scholarship in the early twentieth

century: "The writers who believe in the glossolaly at Corinth was in foreign languages are few

and, for the most part, unimportant. . . . There are, on the other hand, many authorities who feel

that the Corinthian glossolalia had little or nothing to do with languages."[377] He adds:

> A consensus of scholarly opinion, . . . supports the theory that the Corinthian speaking in
> tongues was not in foreign languages. . . . The Corinthian glossolalia consisted in
> rhapsodical ecstatic utterances of various kinds, including possible some snatches of
> foreign languages, but for the greater part consisting in meaningless syllables,
> chatterings, and incoherent cries.[378]

This observation is correct because as we shall see in the next part of this dissertation, especially

regarding the development of scholarship in the twentieth century, the idea that speaking in

tongue(s) is an explosion of enthusiastic feeling in the form of unintelligible words is almost

---

[375] Marcus Dods, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The Expositor's Bible (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1891), 316.

[376] Dods, 316. Dods also notes about the contemporary phenomenon that is parallel to the early Christian experience. "At various periods of the Church's history these manifestations have been reproduced. The Montanists of the early Church, the Camisards of France at the close of the seventeenth century, and the Irvingnites gifts. Probably all such manifestations are due to violent nervous agitation. The early Quakers showed their wisdom in treating all physical manifestations as physical," he writes.

[377] Charles William Shumway, "A Critical History of Glossolalia" (Boston University, 1919), 5–6.

[378] Shumway, 7. See also Shumway's discussion on the significance of Iriving to modern understanding on the gift of tongue(s) on pp. 102ff.

taken for granted. By then, biblical scholars have largely abandoned the old understanding of tongues as a foreign language phenomenon.

Not only does Shumway correctly note this change in scholarship, his own definition of glossolalia also can give us an idea of how this phenomenon was understood at the turn of twentieth century. He argues that glossolalia can be defined as "a rhapsodical, ecstatic experience, which can be induced through prayer and earnest seeking, by the use of drugs, by the use of hysteria artificially induced, or by other means to be mentioned later. It is a psychic phenomenon and considered by itself has no religious significance whatever."[379] From this simple definition, he argues that there are six characteristics of glossolalia.

> (1) There is a complete loss of rational control so that the speaker does not know what he does or says. The testimony of the modern 'Pentecostal' people bears out Paul's declaration that when one prays in a tongue his spirit prays but his understanding is unfruitful. (2) The dominance of emotion, which is sometimes very great, producing hysteria. (3) The feeling of prayer and praise, which is feeling merely, not thought or will. (4) The automatic functioning of the speech organs, usually in the utterance of mere jargon and gibberish, but at times in actual foreign language phrases or sentences. (5) The absence of memory as to what took place during the seizure. (6) The experience is sometimes accompanied by physical manifestations of spasmodic character.[380]

This explanation of tongue(s) reveals that, although it still follows the romantic-nationalist tradition, it puts a much stronger emphasis on emotion and feeling than Herder or Bleek in the past centuries. While Herder or Bleek only speak of religious feeling of enthusiasm manifested in poetic or archaic expressions, Shumway speaks of it as hysteria expressed in jargon and gibberish expressions, and rarely in actual linguistic expressions. Tongue(s) speakers have lost their control over their rationality. Not only does this view sum up the trend of the scholarship in

---

[379] Shumway, 19.
[380] Shumway, 19–20.

the twentieth century, it also shows that scholars were beginning to be more curious about the psychology of the speakers.

1.5. Biblical Scholarship of the Twentieth Century: The Era of the Dominance of the Romantic-Nationalist Mode of Reading

In his commentary on 1 Corinthians, Gordon Fee observes that "before 1960 there were basically two studies in the scholarly journals devoted solely on tongues"[381] — C. Clemens' essay in the *Expository Times* and I. J. Martin's essay in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*.[382] This cannot be further from the truth. The romantic-nationalist scholarship on tongue(s) had grown quite mature even before the publication of these two articles. The twentieth-century scholarship, in many ways, extended what has been established in the nineteenth century.

One of the most important events in the twentieth century that had a significant impact on the scholarly understanding of Corinthian tongue(s) was the birth of the modern Pentecostal movement, especially in the United States, as Fee has pointed out.[383] The Pentecostal movement in the United States traces its history back to the Azusa Street Revival of 1906-1915. Rooted primarily in African-American religious tradition,[384] Pentecostalism has grown in the twentieth century as the one of the fastest-growing religious movement today.

The uniqueness of the Pentecostal movement is its heavy emphasis on speaking in tongue(s). Due to Pentecostals' strong belief in evangelism coupled with their sense of

---

[381] Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, Revised Edition, New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 597 n. 80.

[382] Carl Clemens, "The Speaking with Tongues' of the Early Christians," *The Expository Times* 10, no. 8 (1899): 344–352; I. J. Martin, "Glossolalia in the Apostolic Church," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 63 (1944): 123–30.

[383] Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 597 n. 80.

[384] For the discussion on whether American Pentecostalism is originated in Azusa Street revival or Charles Parham's Bethel Bible Institute in Topeka, Kansas, see Walter J. Hollenweger, *Pentecostalism: Origins and Developments Worldwide* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2005).

eschatological urgency, it is apparent from many early Pentecostal publications that they

believed that tongue(s) is a special divine gift to speak in foreign languages.[385] As Garry McGee

observes:

> Participants [of Parham's revival meetings] testified, as others did at later Pentecostal
> revivals (e.g., the Azusa Street revival of 1906-9), that God had given them languages of
> the world, including Greek, Latin, Hebrew, French, Spanish, Italian, German Hungarian,
> Norwegian, Swedish, Bulgarian, Russian, Syrian, Zulu, Swahili, Hindi, Marathi, Bengali,
> Tibetan, Japanese, Cheppewa, 'Esquimaux,' and even sign language for the deaf.[386]

In spite of the dominant view in biblical scholarship having shifted to the romantic-nationalist

interpretation, the remnant of the missionary paradigm was still intact among many early

Pentecostals. However, McGee also points out that such a view could not stand up to empirical

verification, and thus it began to deteriorate.[387] Most recent Pentecostal scholars reject this view

and interestingly began to share the view of the nineteenth-century German scholars that

speaking in tongue(s) is an expression of religious excitement and enthusiasm uttered in an

unintelligible way.[388] It is worth noting, however, that the impact of the Pentecostal movement

has been extremely significant in shaping the discourse on speaking in tongue(s). Many scholarly

works in the twentieth century are produced as a response to glossolalic phenomena among

Pentecostals.

In spite of the other minor voices that I will discuss in detail later, the works of the

majority of Euro-American biblical scholars still follow the Herderian romantic-nationalist

interpretation, interestingly without even mentioning or discussing Herder directly. It is obvious

---

[385] For further discussion, see Ekaputra Tupamahu, "Tongues as a Site of Subversion," *Pneuma* 38, no. 3 (January 1, 2016): 293–311.

[386] McGee, "Shortcut to Language Preparation?," 122.

[387] McGee, 122.

[388] The best examples of the rejection of foreign languages can be seen in the works of more recent Pentecostal biblical scholars, such as Gordon D. Fee, Robert Menzies, etc.

that this Herderian tradition has been not only well established but also widely accepted in

biblical scholarship. As we have seen in nineteenth-century scholarship, it is worth noting that

within this larger interpretative umbrella, there are also internal differences which are manifested

in many different shapes. Some of them will be discussed briefly here. The aim of the following

discussion is to demonstrate that from the same fountain of romantic-nationalist mode of reading,

there flow different streams of scholarship. The two trends that I will highlight here are: 1) the

further psychologizing of the experience of speaking in tongue(s), and 2) the tendency of

viewing tongue(s) speakers primarily as troublemakers in the church of Corinth.

1.5.1. Further Obsession with the Psychological State of the Speakers

The first stream is obviously a *psychological* one because, as we have seen above,

nineteenth-century scholarship had been obsessed with the question of tongue(s) speakers' state

of consciousness. Indeed, twentieth-century biblical scholars extended this curiosity by

employing more cutting-edge psychological research to undergird their interpretative lens. It is

worth noting that outside the world of biblical scholarship, a great number of studies have been

published on the psychology of the contemporary glossolalia phenomenon.[389] In the work of

biblical scholarship, scholars typically apply psychological insights as a hermeneutical lens by

which to read the tongue(s) phenomenon in the biblical texts.

---

[389] For example see Watson E. Mills, "Glossolaia as a Sociopsychological Experience," in *Speaking in Tongues: A Guide to Research on Glossolalia*, ed. Watson E. Mills (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1986), 425–37; John P. Kildahl, "Psychological Observations," in *The Charismatic Movement*, ed. Michael Pollock Hamilton (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), 124–42; H. A. Osser et al., "Glossolalic Speech from a Psycholinguistic Perspective," *Journal of Psycholinguistic Research* 2, no. 1 (March 1, 1973): 9–19; John P. Kildahl, *The Psychology of Speaking in Tongues* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); James T. Richardson, "Psychological Interpretations of Glossolalia: A Reexamination of Research," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 12, no. 2 (1973): 199–207; Nicholas P. Spanos and Erin C. Hewitt, "Glossolalia: A Test of the 'Trance' and Psychopathology Hypotheses," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 88, no. 4 (1979): 427–434; George Barton Cutten, *Speaking with Tongues: Historically and Psychologically Considered*, Reprinted (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2006); E. D. Wittkower, "The Psychology of Speaking in Tongues," *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease* 158, no. 3 (1974): 234–235.

In the late nineteenth century, there had already been some early efforts to explain Corinthian tongue(s) from a psychological point of view. The best example of this is Franz Delitzsch's *A System of Biblical Psychology* published in 1855 and translated and published in English in 1867.[390] At a methodological level, Delitzsch's entire project is based on the assumption that a biblical psychology should be established on the basis of biblical texts only without any intervention from or interaction with contemporary science.[391] Arguing that there are three kinds of ecstasy, i.e., the mystics, the prophetic, and the charismatic, Delitzsch placed tongue(s) in the category of the charismatic, which is marked primarily by the unintelligibility of tongue(s).[392] The unintelligibility of tongue(s) is the result of the speakers operating at the level of πνεῦμα seperated from their νοῦς. The translation of tongue(s), therefore, brings the πνεῦμα down into the realm of νοῦς.[393]

---

[390] Franz Delitzsch, *A System of Biblical Psychology*, trans. Robert Ernest Wallis, Second edition, thoroughly revised and enlarged, Clark's Foreign Theological Library, Fourth (Edinburgh, UK: T & T Clark, 1867).

[391] Delitzsch, 18. He writes: "The biblical psychology thus built up is an independent science, which coincides with no other, and is made superfluous by no other in the organism of entire theology. It is most closely allied with so-called biblical theology, or (since what is accustomed to be most unaptly so called is rightly occupied, partly in the history of salvation, and partly in the history of revelation), with dogmatics. Biblical, or, as may also be said, theological psychology (to distinguish it from the physical-empirical and philosophic-rational science), pervades the entire material of dogmatics, in that it determines all the phases of man's psychical constitution, conditioned upon those facts and relations momentous to the history of salvation which form the substance of dogmatics." (Delitzsch, 18.)

[392] Delitzsch defines the state of ecstasy as a condition that "give[s] to our mind the experience of heavenly blessedness, and the view of the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven." This experience, therefore, goes beyond "the reflecting will and discursive thought." The mystic ecstasy is experienced when a person "loves God above everything" to an extent that "he crucifies his flesh, with the affections and lusts." This love of God is extremely deep and intense that makes the mystic abandons "all earthly things" in order to get these "supra-terrene experiences." The primary aim of the mystic ecstasy, according to Delitzsch, is "the strengthening and recompensing of personal faith." The prophetic ecstasy, on the other hand, is in the same state of heavenly blessedness but it is aimed for the purpose of predicting and announcing the future. See Delitzsch, 417–33.

[393] Delitzsch, 426. Delitzsch launched his critique against Hilgenfeld by saying that he "indeed, is mistaken in explaining the unintelligibility of the γλῶσσαι, only by the transcendent nature of what they expressed to the merely human consciousness; but he observes with great truth, that that which is common to prophecy and to glossolalia consisted in the exaltation of the consciousness above the merely human sphere." He explains further: "But that which is distinct consisted in this: that he who was prophetically inspired was in the full possession of his reflecting spiritual powers; whilst the other inspiration expressed itself only by the agency of the intuitive God-directed side of the human spirit, with suppression of the discursive thought (νοῦς)."

If Delitzsch rejected any interaction with non-theological psychology, the tendency of the twentieth century scholarship was significantly different. Those scholars pushed the biblical exegesis of speaking in tongue(s) by incorporating non-theological psychology into their hermeneutical framework. The two scholars who best exemplify this approach are Gerd Theissen and Colleen Schantz. Theissen's work, on the one hand, deals primarily with behavioral psychology and psychoanalysis of Freud and Jung.[394] Schantz, on the other hand, works within the context of neurobiology.

Throughout the entire discussion on glossolalia in his *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology,* Theissen assumes that speaking in tongue(s) is an ecstatic experience. As an expression of ecstasy, glossolalia should be understood in the context of its parallel to other frenzy religious experience in both Jewish and Greco-Roman contexts, which can be found in three major instances: a) the Dionysian cult as depicted in Euripides' *Bacchae*, b) Plato's doctrine of inspiration, and c) Jewish apocalyptic literature. "Bacchanalian frenzy is a collective phenomenon of motoric ecstasy, whereas Platonic inspiration is a matter of insights in a paranormal condition. In the case of apocalyptic heavenly language, linguistic behavior itself is transformed ecstatically," he explains.[395] From the perspective of a learning theory, Theissen argues further that as a socially learned behavior, glossolalia is directly related to the construction of the social identity of early Christianity.[396] It is the experience that was used by the Corinthians to define both the insiders and outsiders. However, it is Paul's agenda to oppose

---

[394] See the detailed methodological discussion of what he calls "psychological exegesis" in Gerd Theissen, *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology*, trans. John P. Galvin (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1987), pt. 1.

[395] Theissen, 276.

[396] Theissen, 295–97. This proposal is similar to what William Samarin also argues in William J. Samarin, "Glossolalia as Learned Behavior," *Canadian Journal of Theology* 15 (1969): 60–64.

this practice of making glossolalia the defining marker because for Paul "the confession of the Lord Jesus" must be the only criterion of belonging.[397]

Besides its social dimension, Theissen insists that by virtue of its ecstatic nature, glossolalia is also unintelligible, and its unintelligibility resulted from in its nature as the language of the unconscious.[398] "Glossolalia makes the unconscious depth dimension of life accessible. What becomes accessible here escapes us just as it escaped the consciousness of most of those who spoke in tongues."[399] Framing his discussion further in a psychodynamic theoretical tradition, Theissen then explains two important texts in detail, particularly 1 Cor. 14 and Rom 8, by highlighting important characteristics of psychodynamic analysis, such as the unconscious/conscious distinction, the repressed past, and regression.

His analysis is centered around the idea that glossolalia is the "language of the repressed," and the repressed past that glossolalia expresses mainly pertains to the early childhood state of language. Theissen's explanation is worth quoting in full:

> This regression becomes even clearer if we observe the social relationship of speaker and listener. The first babbling monologues of the child are completely egocentric. They are not yet directed to an addressee. In three-to six-year-olds, dialogues are frequently 'collective monologues,' in which each speaks to himself, without listening to the other. The ability of decentered speaking, which abstracts from one's own person and can depict content for every possible addressee, develops only gradually.[400]

The key text that points directly to the regression of glossolalia is 1 Cor. 13:11: "When I was a child, I spoke like a child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child; when I became a man, I gave up childish ways."[401] However, when he speaks of childhood, Theissen refers mainly to the

---

[397] Theissen, *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology*, 296.
[398] Theissen, 304.
[399] Theissen, 106.
[400] Theissen, 312–13.
[401] Theissen, 313–14.

idea of regression to the state of primitive egocentrism.[402] For him, glossolalia is therefore speaking internally to oneself through which one is able to communicate with God. "God is the subject and the addressee of the glossolalic utterances," Theissen explains.[403] He writes further: "From a linguistic perspective, glossolalia is therefore reassumption of a more primitive level of speaking; socially, it is a return to egocentric use of language; psychically, it is a regression to a dual experience of the world."[404]

Moreover, Theissen believes the groans too deep for words that Paul talks about in Romans 8:18-30 are all about glossolalia, and that therefore this text is another record of Paul's understanding of the "language of the unconscious."[405] The repressed past in this passage is traced back to the Fall that Theissen interprets as the conflict of human beings, represented by Adam, with the law (Rom. 7:7ff).[406] In this context, it is not surprising that Paul speaks of the state of childhood in terms of the "children of God" addressing God as "Abba!" It is the image of childbearing and labor pain that is at the center of Theissen's reading of Romans 8. He explains: "the metaphors having to do with birth are … clear. It is true that the image, as so often is the case, is somewhat askew: the sons whose birth and appearance are awaited themselves sigh in labor pains."[407] The eruption of glossolalia, therefore, signifies the deepest structure of the unconscious marked by "an impulse toward human transformation."[408] In short, although it

---

[402] Theissen, 313.
[403] Theissen, 313.
[404] Theissen, 313.
[405] Theissen, 318.
[406] Theissen, 318.
[407] Theissen, 319.
[408] Theissen, 320.

expresses regression to the state of childhood, glossolalia can transfer that "regressive energy into a progressive tendency," but it has to be done through interpretation.[409]

While Theissen works within the psychoanalytical tradition, Colleen Shantz's monograph, *Paul in Ecstasy: The Neurobiology of the Apostle's Life and Thought*, is rooted primarily in neuroscience. The overall project is basically an attempt to explain the so-called "altered states of consciousness" (ASCs) that Paul records in all his letters.[410] The first thing that Shantz demonstrates is that modern biblical scholarship has generally had a negative view of ecstatic experiences. This negative attitude toward ecstasy is the result of some historical, cultural, and political factors. The colonial legacy is one of them, as Shantz explains:

> The European academic study of what came to be identified as shamanism began in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century explorations of Africa and was colored by the worldview that accompanied colonialism: 'we were white, they were black. We were civilized, they were primitive. We were Christian, they were pagan. We used science, they used magic.[411]

The colonial restructuring of scholarly understanding of ecstasy is further manifested in "cognicentrism," which is a kind of prejudice that deems cognition and rationality as more important or higher than all other human aspects.[412] Again, Schatnz argues that this prejudice is

---

[409] Theissen, 320. This necessity of interpretation is precisely the site on which the cognitive aspect of glossolalia is located. The problem occurs with cognition because glossolalia is itself semantically too chaotic for human understanding and its "emotional-connotative contents" are expressed through "cryptosemantic, secondary linguistic, nonverbal, and situative means of communication." But it doesn't mean that there cannot be translation. There is a "cognitive restructuring of glossolalia" that Paul seems to lay out, according to Theissen, in 1 Cor. 12-14, primarily through the restructuring of social environment and a human psychic dynamic. For a more detailed discussion, see Theissen, 320–32.

[410] A greater detail on the altered states of consciousness from the point of view of the neuroscientific research can be seen in Colleen Shantz, *Paul in Ecstasy: The Neurobiology of the Apostle's Life and Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), chap. 2.

[411] Shantz, 22.

[412] Shantz, 26. Similarly, Laura Nasrallah also argues in the introduction of the book, *An Ecstasy of Folly,* that there has been a strong "embarrassment" in the post-Enlightenment scholarly world in dealing with the topic of madness or ecstasy due to their deep commitment to "rationality or progress." "Sometimes," she writes "such scholarly commitments translate into the orthodox or truly Christian as representing rationality, and the heretical or marginally Christian as exhibiting irrational or questionable behaviors." She illustrates this by pointing to the work of Christopher Forbes who "explain[s] why Paul's definition of glossolalia is 'rational' and paradigmatic for

the product of European ethnocentrism. She describes the effect of colonialism, congnicentrism, and ethnocentrism on biblical scholarship as follows: "Of course, the location of biblical studies within academia ensures that some of the cognicentric assumptions just described spill over into this field as well. Paul, in particular, has been vulnerable to being cast in the role of systematic theologian and enlightenment reasoner."[413] Schantz even argues further that the manifestation of this cultural prejudice is apparent through the ecclesial tension of the Catholic church and Protestant movement, as ecstasy is often seen as a Catholic phenomenon.[414] The result is easily predicted, for biblical scholarship has developed a rather negative view of ecstasy. In this understanding Paul is often described as a sane, normal, and reasonable person who fought against the craziness and the chaos of ecstatic experiences.

Among many ecstatic experiences in Pauline letters, glossolalia unsurprisingly gets special attention by Shantz. Again, just like Theissen, whose work I discussed above, Shantz works throughout the book with an assumption that glossolalia is an ecstatic experience. "In Corinth, glossolalia appears to be the predominant form of that spirit possession. In fact, glossolalia continues today as a common phenomenon of possession trance in Christian groups,"[415] explains Shantz. The case is built on the similarities that she finds between

---

Christianity, or, in contrast, why ecstasy in Montanism was frenzied, a barbarian and heretical aberration erupting at the edges of the Roman empire." See Laura Nasrallah, *An Ecstasy of Folly: Prophecy and Authority in Early Christianity*, Harvard Theological Studies 52 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Divinity School, 2004), 7.

I have to express my disagreement with Nasrallah's description of the state of scholarship. Scholars in the nineteenth century, and also throughout the twentieth century, as I have described above, have been obsessed with the question of ecstasy and divine madness. There is no apparent embarrassment at all. That is to say that Nasrallah is only one of many other scholars who do their scholarship in the context of the romantic-nationalist mode of reading. While she is right about Forbes, it is worth noting that Forbes is a minority voice, and thus cannot be used as the best indicator of this trend in scholarship. The weakness of this book, which was originally her Th.D. dissertation at Harvard Divinity School, is the lack of a serious survey of biblical scholarship to locate her work in the larger scope of scholarship.

[413] Shantz, *Paul in Ecstasy*, 27.

[414] Shantz, 33–37.

[415] Shantz, 157.

glossolalia in the Corinthian church and in the cases that Felicitas Goodman examined in her

famous work on glossolalia as an altered state of consciousness.[416] Speaking in tongue(s) in

Corinth, Schantz argues, resembles the altered state of consciousness because it is described by

Paul in terms of being possessed by the spirit.[417] "All of Corinthians 12-14 is set in that context

---

[416] See Felicitas D. Goodman, *Speaking in Tongues: A Cross-Cultural Study of Glossolalia* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1972). At the core of Goodman's research is the idea that there is a certain similar pattern of utterance among speakers of glossolalia and it can be an indicator for their state of consciousness. Samarin has seriously challenged this proposal. This debate between Samarin and Goodman is one of the most important aspects in the studies of glossolalia in 1970s. Although noting that Samarin's linguistic only approach is too narrow (see p. 158, n. 41), it is interesting that Shantz seems to be unaware of or even neglects this debate altogether. The debate began shortly after Goodman published her essay. It is important to remember that Samarin is a linguist whereas Goodman is an anthropologist. While Samarin believes glossolalia to be a regressive form of language, Goodman insists that it is a "vocalization uttered while the speaker is in a state of disassociation," that is to say that the speaker is in a state of trance. Samarin, first of all, argues that Goodman's cross-cultural research is hardly true because "although samples come from St. Vincent Island in Caribbean, a 'tent revival' in Ohio, a television program in Texas, and a church in Mexico City (only the last from her own field experience) – *all* of the settings are Pentecostal." They, of course, will behave the same way, Samarin points out. Linguistically speaking, her research was conducted mainly among English- and Spanish-speaking communities. Thus, Goodman's proposal that glossolalia is perfectly regular is problematic. Furthermore, Samarin also criticizes the idea that only on the basis of linguistic behavior by which a glossolalic speaker produces meaningless or empty speech semantically can one build the case for the state of consciousness of the speaker. In other words, there is no direct correlation between uncommunicative speech and the speaker's state of consciousness. Samarin writes: "In short, Goodman's explanation fails to account for glossolalia, first, because it inconsistently and inaccurately describes the date examined, and secondly, because it is ad hoc. It does not show, for example, that pseudolinguistic utterances produced in a normal state do not have these features." See William J. Samarin, "Sociolinguistic vs. Neurophysiological Explanations for Glossolalia: Comment on Goodman's Paper," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 11, no. 3 (1972): 293–96. Cf. Samarin's negative review of Goodman's book in William J. Samarin, review of *Speaking in Tongues: A Cross-Cultural Study of Glossolalia*, by Felicitas D. Goodman, *Language* 50, no. 1 (1974): 207–12.

Goodman responded to Samarin by pointing out that although she understands Samarin's objection that the correlation between linguistic structure and psychological state should not be assumed, Samarin himself argues that there is a dynamic of intonation in glossolalia. In other words, glossolalia is not only about the formal structure of the utterance. How does one account for this dynamic of speech intonation? "I suggested the hypothesis that it was the altered state of consciousness that had this effect on the utterance and thus directly shaped it, both cross-culturally and cross-linguistically," she explains. Concerning the issue of whether her work is cross-cultural and cross-linguistic, Goodman argues that she has other data also from Uganda, Afro-Brazilian communities, Holland, etc. She concludes her response this way: "Psychologically and neuropsychological approaches, then, while certainly taking full account of the cultural (including the religious) environment of the behavior, address themselves to these important universal aspects, thus adding a significant new dimension to our inquiry." In other words, she argues that hers and Samarin's works should be seen as being complementary to each other. See Felicitas D. Goodman, "Altered Mental State vs. 'Style of Discourse:' Reply to Samarin," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 11, no. 3 (1972): 297–99.

[417] Shantz, *Paul in Ecstasy*, 158–59.

("*now about spiritual things. . .* " 1 Cor 12:1), and speaking, in particular, is also explicitly

identified in this way (ἐν πνεύματι, 1 Cor 12:3)," Shantz points out.[418]

One thing that is quite surprising in Shantz's writing is that she goes a step further and

examines the social aspect of this ecstatic experience of glossolalia. The exercise of glossolalia,

for Shantz, actually reveals "the practitioner's status within the city of Corinth, not within the

assembly itself."[419] This argument is built via Dale Martin's thesis that there are unequal power

relations between tongue(s) speakers and other members of the church,[420] which I will discuss in

the next section. In short, agreeing with Martin that the glossolalic speech displays a different

level of statuses among the Corinthians, Shantz argues that what Paul does is not to equalize the

statuses but to "introduce an added layer of specialization in their worship," which is another

altered state consciousness experience, namely prophecy.[421]

In sum, Theissen's psychodynamic and Shantz's neurobiological analysis both display a

far deeper obsession with the inner condition of tongue(s) speakers than what we have seen so

far in the nineteenth century. If Herder only speaks of the feeling of excitement, in Theissen's

analysis the practice of glossolalia has becomes the regressive state of unconscious, while in

Shantz the tongue(s) speakers are in the altered state of consciousness. This obsession is

understandably the result of rejection of the idea of tongue(s) as the ability to speak in foreign

languages. It is, therefore, arguable that this shift is a movement from the external aspect of

---

[418] Shantz, 159.

[419] Shantz, 162.

[420] Her critique of Martin is that "despite the fact that Martin wants to apply his findings to a social assessment of the Corinthian assembly, he has characterized the phenomenon of glossolalia from a cultural perspective and not within the ecology of the group. In other words, he has successfully analyzed the cultural attitudes that might permit glossolalia, but … he has failed to assess how a particular society enacts the general cultural values by which it is informed." Shantz, 163–64.

[421] Shantz, 164.

tongue(s) as a tool to speak and preach the good news to the world to the internal aspect of the

inner psychological state of the speakers. This said, the trend in the twentieth century is not only

to psychologize the speakers, but also to further cast a negative image about the tongue(s)

speakers.

1.5.2. The Widespread Negative Attitude towards Tongue(s) Speakers

The tendency to blame tongue(s) speakers for the chaos in the church of Corinth in the

scholarship has been there since the nineteenth century. It is partly because Paul himself

obviously depicts them in a pretty negative light. Not surprisingly, Willem C. van Unnik

correctly notes in his article published posthumously in 1993:

> In studying scholarly discussions of these chapters [1 Cor. 12-14] one often gets the
> impression that there was a deep cleavage between Paul and his addressees. The way in
> which the so-called Corinthian enthusiasts are spoken of is often markedly unfriendly:
> they are looked upon as a kind of 'Schwärmgeister' [fanatics] who boasted [of] their
> charismatic superiority and gave a lot of trouble to the poor apostle, who had little more
> in common with them than that they belonged to and spoilt the church at Corinth which
> he had founded.[422]

Although van Unnik argues that this trend is a result of misreading Paul's concern, I think that

since the majority of biblical scholars in the twentieth century, including van Unnik himself, are

driven by the agenda of discovering the authorial intention of the text, and thus the voice of Paul

then becomes the true representation of reality, the negative picture of tongue(s) speakers in 1

Corinthians will surely lead to a negative interpretation. That is to say, such authorial primacy

hermeneutics will consequently establish Paul's opinion as having the final say, which is

unfortunate because we never have heard any voice of these speakers. Tongue(s) speakers are

---

[422] Willem C. Van Unnik, "The Meaning of 1 Corinthians 12:31," *Novum Testamentum* 35, no. 2 (1993): 143. Van Unnik challenges this common interpretation by saying that Paul is concerned more with "building up" the church than with glossolalia. That is, the centrality of building up the church has to be taken seriously in our reading of 1 Cor. 12-14, and not Paul's challenge of glossolalia. Glossolalia is only a means to the end of Paul's main argument.

imprisoned in the eternal words of Paul's representation, which is often perceived as the true picture of their reality. The conclusion that it is tongue(s) speakers that cause the chaos in the community is almost inevitable.

Now, I should note that only a few scholars think that Paul has misrepresented the problem. James Dunn is probably the best example. He argues that the real phenomenon in the church of Corinth is the unintelligible "state of spiritual ecstasy,"[423] but Paul somehow thinks that it is a phenomenon of foreign languages.[424] In other words, Paul has misunderstood this situation. Dunn's exegetical move is hardly a new one, because more than a century ago, or to be more precise in 1836, German biblical scholar L. J. Rückter had already argued similarly that Paul misunderstands this phenomenon as a linguistic one.[425] However, in spite of this minor voice in biblical scholarship, the vast majority of scholars still approach the text as the true representation of what really happened in the church of Corinth. Therefore, when Paul silences the tongue(s) speakers, biblical scholars would do anything they can to justify Paul's political

---

[423] Dunn writes: "These features of Corinthian glossolalia are too reminiscent of the mantic prophecy of the Pythia at Delphi… and the wider manifestation of ecstasy in the worship of Dionysus, so that the conclusion becomes almost inescapable: glossolalia as practised in the assembly at Corinth was a form of ecstatic utterance – sounds, cries, words, uttered in a state of spiritual ecstasy." Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit*, 242–43.

[424] See Dunn, 244.. It is arguable, I think, that Dunn's discussion echoes the early Pentecostals who understood glossolalia as speaking in foreign languages, but the fact is that their experience is not speaking foreign languages. In spite of Paul's misunderstanding of the nature of this phenomenon, Dunn argues that it does not mean that this is in reality a linguistic phenomenon (against Robert Gundry) for three interesting reasons. First, the reference to tongues of human and angel in 1 Cor. 13:1 is a clear indicator, according to Dunn, that Paul expands the notion of tongues of angel in his discussion on glossolalia. In other words, the expression "human tongues" refers to "inspired speech of different kinds in the vernacular… while 'tongues of angels' will be Paul's and/or the Corinthians' description of glossolalia. Human tongues is prophecy, whereas "tongues of angles" is glossolalia. Second, the content of glossolalia is mystery. "μυστήριον in Paul 'always has an eschatological sense'; it means simply God's eschatological secret, God's secret purpose." It is difficult to understand this secrecy of glossolalia, according to Dunn, in terms of linguistic phenomenon. Third, the analogy of between glossolalia and foreign language in 14:10f, Dunn insists, "cannot be taken as evidence that Paul thought glossolalia as foreign language. Paul would not have used foreign or 'different languages' (γένη φωνῶν) as an *analogy* (both unintelligible speech) if he had thought glossolalia was itself a foreign language." (p. 244) This is where the inconsistency of Dunn's argument lies. One the one hand he thinks that Paul thought that it is foreign language, but on the other hand, he also argues that the case of linguisticality of this experience cannot be established on the basis of Paul's words.

[425] See Rückert, "On the Gifts of Prophecy and of Speaking in Tongues," 93ff.

rhetoric, and thus put all the blame on the tongue(s) speakers. In fact, to my knowledge none of the modern scholars finds Paul's act of silencing tongue(s) speakers problematic.

Arguing that glossolalia is the evidence of the spirit possession, Ira Jay Marin contends that the purpose of glossolalia in its ecstatic demonstration is to display (or "sign" – cf. 1 Cor. 14:22) to the unbelievers in the world that God is at work among Christians,[426] or, to put it differently, glossolalia is a sign of God's presence. But for Paul, Martin insists, it is more than just a spiritual experience; it also has a social implication. This social dimension of glossolalia becomes his central concern in 1 Corinthians. Because the practice of glossolalia does not deliver any "coherent message… either at Pentecost or at any later manifestation of tongue-speech in the New Testament,"[427] this experience in its social function is thus useless, and even dangerous.[428] Glossolalia does not contribute anything to the edification of the church.

Max Turner insists that at the root of the problem in 1 Cor. 14 is the prideful attitude of tongue(s) speakers. They think that glossolalia is more important than all other gifts, and that therefore it is practiced without "the cardinal virtue of love."[429] They display "elitism" that they are more 'spiritual' than others on the basis of the belief that their experience is directly

---

[426] Martin, "Glossolalia in the Apostolic Church," 127.

[427] Martin, 128.

[428] Martin writes: "The glorification of ecstatic speech above all other manifestations of the spirit was denounced by Paul because glossolalia proved the presence of Spirit by outward sings lacking intrinsic value, useless for preaching the faith, and unessential for building it up; because it 'puffed up' with vanity the ecstatic (1 Cor 13), without contributing to the edification of others and expressing Christian love… As the test for the indwelling of the Spirit – hence of Christian experience – glossolalia for Paul was dangerous. He drastically checked the tendency to substitute ecstasy and uncontrollable orgiastic experience for joy, peace, long-suffering, and above all love, as the standard of Christian life; and the verdict of history has vindicated the wisdom of Paul's attitude." Martin, 130.

[429] Max Turner, "Tongues: An Experience for All in the Pauline Churches?," *Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies* 1, no. 2 (1998): 35–36. Turner challenges common understanding, especially among Pentecostals, that there are two kinds of tongue(s) in 1 Cor., namely, the public and private tongue(s). Public tongue(s) is expressed mainly in public gathering, whereas private tongue(s) is for personal prayers.

connected to the apostles (Acts 2).[430] In a similar vein, Gordon Fee argues that because Paul

refers to the "tongues of angels,"[431] these speakers "seem to have considered themselves to be

already as the angels."[432] This problem is often called "over-realized eschatology,"[433] a view

that other scholars such as C.K. Barrett,[434] Anthony Thiselton,[435] and D.A. Carson[436] have also

proposed. Since Paul understands glossolalia as a sign of weakness,[437] the Corinthians who think

---

[430] Turner, 237.

[431] Fee is a one of the strongest proponents of the idea that tongue(s) is an ecstatic and unintelligible speech. In spite of its controversy, Fee explains: "What is less certain [about glossolalia] is whether Paul also understood the phenomenon to be an actual language." Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 598.

[432] Gordon D. Fee, *God's Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 150. It is important to note that one of Fee's major approaches in reading the text is to build a theology. In his work on Paul's pneumatology, Fee points out in a forceful way that "without apology… this is primarily a book on Paul's theology, that is how Paul understood God and his ways and the role of the Spirit in that theology." Why is a theological analysis necessary for Fee? It is simply because he is firmly convinced that "theology is what Paul is doing all the time." While insisting that the kind of theology that Paul constructs is categorically different from "the reflective theology of the scholar or classroom" because his is "task theology," that is to say his theology is contextual. Fee believes that Paul's main concern was to grapple with the theological implication of the status of both the Jew and Gentile as "one people of God." This insistence is based on a shared cultural assumption that Euro-American (especially white male) theologies are universal and transcendental, and thus not contextual. As a consequence, only Feminist theology, Asian theology, Black theology, Hispanic theology, etc., are contextual. This gesture of "contextual-amnesia" has been widely challenged and rejected today. Needless to say, although he recognizes that there is a racial-ethnic issue in the text, theology retains priority. See Gordon D. Fee, *Paul, the Spirit, and the People of God*, Reprint edition (Baker Academic, 1994), 1–2.

[433] Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 573.

[434] C. K. Barrett, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, Black's New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 109.

[435] Anthony C. Thiselton, "Realized Eschatology at Corinth," *New Testament Studies* 24, no. 4 (1978): 510–526. Thiselton has been at the center of the discussion on tongue(s) in the past few decades because of his attempt to propose a possible solution to the difficult issue of translation or interpretation (Greek: ἑρμενεία and διερμηνευτής) in the romantic-nationalist mode of reading. If speaking in tongue(s) is a non-linguistic, unintelligible and ecstatic outburst of gibberish, or what Dunn calls "wordless groans,"[435] how is it possible to be translated? Through an analysis of the usage of the word ἑρμενεία and διερμηνευτής in Philo and Josephus, Thiselton argues in his 1979 article that instead of "translation" or "interpretation" these two Greek words [ἑρμενεία and διερμηνευτής] have to be understood as "to put into words." See Thiselton, "The 'Interpretation' of Tongues," 36.

Thiselton's thesis has been challenged by Christopher Forbes. See Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*, 65–72.

[436] D. A. Carson, *Showing the Spirit: A Theological Exposition of 1 Corinthians 12-14* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987), 16ff.

[437] Fee bases this argument primarily on the idea that 1 Cor. 14 is parallel to Romans 8. They both point to the same phenomenon, namely glossolalia. See Gordon D. Fee, "Toward a Pauline Theology of Glossolalia," in *Listening to the Spirit in the Text* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 105–20. It is worth noting that this connection between 1 Cor. 14 and Romans 8 is not by any means Fee's novel idea. As early as 1838, Wieseler had already made this connection (see the discussion above). Ernst Käsemann also lays out a robust argument for this connection in his commentary on Romans. Ernst Käsemann, *Commentary on Romans*, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 241ff.

that they have achieved a high level of spirituality by speaking in tongue(s) have actually missed the whole point.

Krister Stendahl insists that "the gift of glossolalia is not a sign of spiritual accomplishment."[438] Their misconception of the gift as superior, according to Stendahl, leads to them displaying an attitude of "triumphalism."[439] It should be clear that the word "triumphalism" has never appeared in the text. It is how Stendahl interprets Pauline discourse on it. Similarly, D. Moody Smith also argues that "these Corinthian Christians put a high premium specifically on glossolalia."[440] Robert M. Grant's 1946 essay takes a huge leap in arguing that the enthusiasts (i.e., tongue(s) speakers) use Jesus' saying about being like a child in Mark 10:15 and Luke 18:17 in order "to justify their emphasis on... glossolalia."[441] Grant insists that "it seems like that they have been claiming that their childish behavior has the sanction of the Lord's command."[442] Although Grant builds his case on a larger connection between 1 Cor. 12-14, Gal. 3 and Rom. 8, the only indicator of the reference to child is in 1 Cor. 13:11, and this test is actually a negative rebuke, not a positive endorsement. But this is precisely also Grant's insistence that by claiming the status of children, the tongue(s) speakers have been behaving in a childish way. That is why Paul has to rebuke them.

---

[438] Krister Stendahl, *Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and Other Essays* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 111.

[439] Stendahl, 112.

[440] D. Moody Smith, "Glossolalia and Other Spiritual Gifts in a New Testament Perspective," *Union Seminary Review / Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology* 28, no. 3 (July 1, 1974): 312.

[441] Robert M. Grant, "Like Children," *The Harvard Theological Review* 39, no. 1 (1946): 71.

[442] Grant, 71. J.P.M. Sweet challenges Grant's interpretation. Sweet notes that the "cry" [of God as Abba Father] in Rom. 8:15 is still intelligible whereas the glossolalia in 1 Cor. 14 is unintelligible foreign tongues and the tongues of angels. Therefore, these two passages cannot be referring to the same thing. See J.P.M. Sweet, "A Sign for Unbelievers: Paul's Attitude to Glossolalia," in *Speaking in Tongues: A Guide to Research on Glossolalia*, ed. Watson E. Mills (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1986), 147 n. 21.

While other scholars are oriented primarily to the historico-theological aspect of this problem, some other twentieth-century scholars begin to bring the socio-political aspect of glossolalia to the surface.[443] Dale Martin's 1995 publication, *The Corinthian Body*, places Paul's conception of "body" as the central theme in his analysis of the ideological structure in the Corinthian correspondence.[444] In chapter 4 of this book, Martin dedicates a long discussion on glossolalia because Paul relates this phenomenon to an analogy of body in 1 Cor. 12. "Use of the human body as an analogy for human society is ancient and widespread. The macrocosm of the body was used to explain how unity can exist in diversity within the macrocosm of society," Martin explains.[445]

Martin further analyzes two Greek words, namely *nous* and *pneuma*, to demonstrate the hierarchical structure of the community in Corinth. So, the tension in 1 Cor. 12-14 is not between rational and irrational gifts, as many other scholars have suggested, but rather the "nous/pneuma dicothomy."[446] Building upon his analysis of the use of these words in Plato, Imblicus, and Philo, Martin argues that tongue(s) speakers share the same ideological belief that by being possessed by the *pneuma,* they somehow are in a higher social position.[447] Although the idea that nous is inactive in the process of inspiration is commonly held as something acceptable, Paul finds it

---

[443] Just like other scholars in the romantic-nationalist tradition, Martin also believes that tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 12-14 is an ecstatic experience. Interestingly, he builds the case on the basis of the reference of tongues of angels in 1 Cor. 13:1. Glossolalia, for Martin, is "a divine discourse," in which the mind (*nous*) is inactive because of the presence of the spirit (*pneuma*). See Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 88–92. A more robust argument for glossolalia as an ecstatic experience can be seen in an article that he published seven years earlier: Dale B. Martin, "Tongues of Angels and Other Status Indicators," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 59, no. 3 (October 1, 1991): 547–89.

[444] Martin defines ideology as "the system of symbols that supports and enforces the power structures of the dominant class and ruling groups; it therefore retains a generally negative tone with good reason, without implying that it can be overcome by recourse of some objective truth." Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, xv.

[445] Martin, 92.

[446] Martin, 96–97.

[447] Martin, 101.

problematic. This is precisely the point: "Paul disrupts these assumptions of higher-class ideology by arguing that the nous and the pneuma must work in tandem."[448] We need to remember that Martin sees all the discussion in 1 Cor. 12-14 as an ideological argument. Thus, the concern is not necessarily about the practice of glossolalia and prophecy themselves. Glossolalia and prophecy, which are directly connected to *pneuma* and *nous,* are representations of social struggle.

By doing this, Martin argues, Paul has become a social reformer, or more precisely a social revolutionist. His statement about this is worth quoting in full:

> To us, this sounds like simple, just equality. But to a person of ancient times imbued with upper-class ideology, to say that a slave and a master should work in tandem or that a patron should not expect his client to give way to him would have sounded revolutionary. At the very least, it would have been perceived as overturning traditional status expectations. Conservative ideology portrayed equality as the enslavement of higher-class persons to "the many" – that is, to the lower class. Thus, Paul's insistence on an equal partnership of the higher- and lower-status entities would have been heard as a reversal of their statuses. To say that the pneuma should give up its claim to rule unchallenged when it comes upon the scene – that it should join the nous in a mutually cooperative arrangement – is to imply a lowering the status of the pneuma to the level of or below the nous. It is to disrupt the expected status expectations of the two 'politicians' who rule the polis of the human person.[449]

As we have discussed above, other scholars argue that tongue(s) speakers think that they are superior because of their higher level of spirituality. Martin takes the entire discussion to a whole different level. He suggests that tongue(s) speakers believe that they are in the higher social status than other Christians in the Corinthian assembly. By doing this, Paul, on the one hand, becomes a social reformist, while tongue(s) speakers, on the other hand, are the social oppressors.

---

[448] Martin, 101.

[449] Martin, 101–2.

Here it is important to remember that Martin's proposal lies within the tradition paved by

his doctoral advisor at Yale University, Wayne Meeks. It was Meeks who argued in 1983, long

before the publication of Martin's JAAR article and his *The Corinthian Body*, that glossolalia

was the easiest way to achieve higher social status in the Corinthian church.[450] Meeks's

reasoning is somewhat similar to that of Martin. For Meeks, since speaking in tongue(s) is a

divinely inspired experience, it is believed that God speaks through them. It thus comes with

extraordinary authority, social status, and also money. Borrowing from Peter Brown, Meeks

contends that glossolalia is a form of "inarticulate power," that is to say that tongues speakers

gain power not through a normal channel accepted in a given society.[451] Since not everyone in

the church of Corinth spoke in tongue(s) and those who did underestimated those who did not,

Paul's act of silencing them in bringing some sort of peace in this community can be understood

as his support of the normal social authority, which is the "authority of the householders and

patrons like Stephanas (16:15-18)."[452]

Martin and Meeks are not the only scholars who offer a negative image of the tongue(s)

speakers from a social perspective. Looking at this issue also from a socio-scientific point of

view, Philip F. Elser's *The First Christians in their Social World,* particularly from the point of

view of socio-scientific approaches, builds his theory on tongue(s) on Goodman's theory that the

---

[450] Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul*, Second Edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 119ff. Just like many other scholars, Meeks' definition of glossolalia is also profoundly influenced by Goodman's conception of the altered state of consciousness. "Glossolalia occurs in a trance that exhibits most fully the loss of conscious control and at the same time extraordinary levels of energy, poured out in involuntary utterances and in rapid or sudden bodily movements, profuse sweating, salivation, and so on," Meeks writes.

[451] Meeks, 120. Agreeing with both Martin and Meeks, Neil Elliott also insists on the same idea, that glossolalia is "an alternative means to achieve status through speech for those untrained in rhetoric." Neil Elliott, *Liberating Paul* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Publishers, 2006), 206.

[452] Meeks, *The First Urban Christians*, 120.

speakers are in the altered state of consciousness.[453] Esler rejects the traditional view (i.e., of

tongue(s) as miraculous speaking in foreign languages) in a quite strong way and calls it "the

wide spread fiction."[454] He insists: "Paul's presentation of glossolalia as unintelligible utterance

rather than xenoglossy vouches for his dispassionate accuracy on this topic and lays the

foundation for establishing the comparability of the Corinthian position with the findings from

modern research."[455] Just as Wieseler has pointed out a century ago, Esler also insists that the

priority has to be given to Paul in determining the nature of this phenomenon. That is to say, the

description in Acts 2 that the disciples apparently speak foreign languages (xenoglossy) is an

indicator that "Luke is in error here."[456] Arguing that glossolalia should be placed in the cultural

context of shame and honor where the ability to gain mystical and ecstatic experience is related

to one's honor, Esler thinks that it is not surprising that the tongue(s) speakers boast of their gift.

Consequently, although Paul does not talk about those who do not speak in tongue(s), it is

arguable that "they were regarded as inferior in honour and status, perhaps on the modern

analogies even sinful" by the tongue(s) speakers.[457] Just like what Meeks and Martin also

---

[453] Philip F. Esler, *The First Christians in Their Social Worlds: Social-Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 39–42.

[454] Esler, 44.

[455] Esler, 44.

[456] Esler, 48. Esler adds: "In all probability, the earliest outbreak of 'tongues' took the form of glossolalia and not xenoglossy. . Luke may be relying on earlier traditions which have become distorted over time as glossolalia died out among the Christian communities and the nature of the phenomenon became misunderstood in the absence of the first outbreak of glossolalia, which involved only Jewish disciples and occurred very early in the history of the Christian movement, quite possibly among the first Aramaic-speaking community in Jerusalem. . When one takes into account the overwhelming impression made upon those who experience dissociative states which are interpreted as possession by the Holy Spirit, and the rarity, perhaps even uniqueness, of such experiences among urban religious groups of this period, the Pentecost may well have triggered the enthusiastic spread of the Christian message just as Luke described. Nor indeed should we doubt that auditory and visual phenomena akin to those reported in Acts 2:2-3 accompanied the onset of glossolalia at that time."

[457] Esler, 46.

proposed, tongue(s) speakers are placed in the position of higher status, which is also a place of their great fall.

1.6. Summary

This long history of interpretation of speaking in tongue(s) shows that this issue is indeed a complex one. There are several points that I should like to reemphasize now. First, the idea that speaking in tongue(s) is an ecstatic and unintelligible utterance was almost non-existent before the eighteenth century. Tongue(s) was primarily understood as the ability to speak in foreign languages for the purpose of preaching the gospel to the world. This mode of reading penetrates deeply the way people understood what Paul discusses in 1 Cor. 12-14. Indeed, there are some slight variations in the way people interpret 1 Cor. 12-14, but the stream of missionary-expansionist tradition flows without significant challenge. Second, since the appearance of Johann Herder on the scene of scholarship, which scholars today have either forgotten or unfortunately no longer discuss, there was a critical switch in the scholarly understanding of tongue(s). The influence of Herder on German biblical scholarship throughout the nineteenth century especially is apparent in other scholars' heavy emphasis on the idea that tongue(s) is the expression of exciting and enthusiastic feeling. Such emphasis did not exist prior to Herder's romantic-nationalist interpretation. The shift, therefore, can be summarized as going from viewing tongue(s) as a linguistic phenomenon to tongue(s) as an expression of human feeling. Third, while in the missionary-expansionist mode of reading the orientation is external and communicative, the orientation of the romantic-nationalist mode of reading is mainly internal and spiritual. This trend of "internalization" of tongue(s), that is, making tongue(s) an internal feeling experience, has understandably led scholars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to a more serious interest in the psychological state of the speakers. Fourth, the tendency to view

tongue(s) speakers negatively intensified in the twentieth century. The scholarly views range

from such speakers being spiritually prideful to boasting of possessing a higher social status.

This negative tendency I will below revisit.

Chapter 2

A Heteroglossic-Immigrant Mode of Reading:
An Alternative Theoretical Framework

> The very concept of an international, or world, language was an invention
> of Western imperialism.
> Njabulo Ndebele[1]

> Language is a central area of concern in the twentieth century.
> Charles Taylor[2]

2.1. Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed Herder's role in initiating a new mode of reading that profoundly shaped not only German scholarship in the nineteenth century but also all twentieth-century western biblical scholarship. Scholarly readings of the phenomenon of tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 12-14 have been a part of this tradition. In this chapter, I shall introduce an alternative mode of reading that is rooted in the linguistic struggle of immigrants in the United States who speak minority languages, meaning languages other than English. Here, Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia is a helpful theoretical concept for articulating the tension between the force of the dominant language and the force and value of a multiplicity of languages. Thus, I call it a "heteroglossic-immigrant" mode of reading.

To this end, I divide this chapter into four major sections. In the first, I discuss why I think a romantic-nationalist mode of reading problematic. In the second, I discuss the heteroglossic nature of language, a notion deeply rooted in Bakhtin's philosophy of language. In

---

[1] Njabulo Simakahle Ndebele, *South African Literature and Culture: Rediscovery of the Ordinary* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1994), 101.

[2] Charles Taylor, *Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Human Agency and Language* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 215.

the third, I broadly examine the linguistic struggle in the United States. In the fourth, I then offer some hermeneutical strategies for reading the biblical text from a heteroglossic-immigrant point of view.

2.2. The Problem with a Romantic-Nationalist Mode of Reading

Herder's notion of language does not start from the need for communication but from an individual's need to express his or her feelings. For him, communication logically comes after such expression, and results in a unifying linguistic community. This Herderian philosophical strategy of imposing a unity of language is best understood in the historical context of the struggle with the hegemony of the French Empire after the first Revolution in 1789.[3] There was a long history of the "bitter anti-French legacy" among the Prussians prior to the late eighteenth century.[4] As Alistair Cole puts it, "the French Revolution and German unification each contained within them the aspiration of national unification."[5] Hence, Lloyd Kramer is correct that the construction of a national identity in the late eighteenth century was thoroughly relational. "The meaning of a nation depends on definitions of difference and on interactive relations with people in other cultures, so that the nation's imaginary essence evolves as definitions of difference and cultural boundaries also evolve," Kramer writes.[6]

---

[3] For further discussion on the relationship between the rise of German nationalism as a response to the hegemonic power of the French Empire, see Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*, trans. Robert B. Kimber, Princeton Legacy Library (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 28ff; Alan John Percivale Taylor, *The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of German History Since 1815* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), chap. 2.

[4] Alistair Cole, *Franco-German Relations*, Political Dynamics of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2000), 2.

[5] Cole, 2.

[6] Lloyd S. Kramer, *Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures, and Identities since 1775* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 21.

In this case, German national identity construction had a lot to do with differentiating Germans from the French, and thus the dominance or colonialism of the French. Because of this, one can understand Herder's works as an anti-colonial project.[7] However, this anti-colonial origin of German nationalism subsequently became a xenophobic force that manifested itself in a horrific and violent erasure of the other, and during the World War II period, especially of Jews, homosexuals, and others considered different.[8] The colonized somehow turned remarkably quickly into the colonizer.

It is worth noting that there was not yet a German nation when Herder published his works.[9] So Herder's works are an effort to construct a new national identity. He saw the core of

---

[7] Joshua A. Fishman, one of the greatest figures in the study of sociolinguistics in the twentieth century, correctly points to Herder's anti-racist tendency in his resistance against French. He writes, "Herder, though anti-French to the hilt (like many German intellectuals struggling against French cultural hegemony within disunited German princedoms at the beginning of the nineteenth century), is rarely, if ever racist." However, Fishman also notes that "Herderian views must be understood as a plea and a rhapsody for an ethnically pluralistic world in which each ethnicity can tend its own vineyard as a right, a trust, and a point of departure for new beauty and creativity yet undreamed of. Such pluralism is, however, strange to racism, since the dynamics of racism represents a call and rationale for domination rather than coexistence. While ethnicity can proclaim live and let live, racism can proclaim only bondage or death to the inferior." Joshua A. Fishman, *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective*, Multilingual Matters 45 (Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 1989), 18. I agree with Fishman's assessment to a certain extent. Fishman is right that Herder acknowledges the diversity of cultures. However, the Herderian concept of a national culture is reflected in suppression, repression, and worse, the exclusion of internal differences. Fishman seems to overlook this issue of internal differences.

[8] For further discussion on the historical interconnectedness between romanticism, nationalism, fascism, and the rise of The third Reich in Germany in the twentieth century, see Louis L. Snyder, *Roots of German Nationalism* (New York: Barnes Noble Books, 1996), chap. 9 and 10; Peter Viereck, *Metapolitics: From Wagner and the German Romantics to Hitler* (London and New York: Routledge, 2017); William M. McGovern, *From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1995); Brian E. Fogarty, *Fascism: Why Not Here?* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009).

Pointing out to the complexity of romanticism itself, Michael Löwy and Robert Sayre's observation is correct that scholars have been too obsessed with this interconnectedness between Romanticism and fascism, to the extent that they write about Romanticism only "as a preparation to Nazism." They write, "while the Nazi ideologues were unquestionably inspired by certain Romantic themes, this influence does not justify rewriting the entire history of political Romanticism as a simple historical preface to the Third Reich. . . . Even more serious works which do not try to explain everything in terms of the universal tendencies of the German soul, have a hard time resisting the temptation to assimilate Romanticism to prefascism." I am fully aware that they try to demonstrate that Romanticism is far larger and more complex than the 'prefascism' narrative. However, the direct historical and political connection between Romanticism and fascism is almost undeniable. Michael Löwy and Robert Sayre, *Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity*, trans. Catherine Porter (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 6–7.

[9] In his introduction to Fichte's *Address to the German Nation,* Gregory Moore makes an important historical observation, namely that at the time Fichte and also Herder wrote their works, "there was no unitary

a national identity in this linguistic unity, a unity he considered to be a thoroughly natural phenomenon. Language grows naturally from an individual to civilization [*Bildung*].[10] He suggested that whenever people live close to each other in the same climate and environment, their culture and language are the same too.[11] In other words, it is the natural unified language that gives birth to a nation (*das Volk*) and not the other way around. The people (*das Volk*) have a unified culture because this is the natural consequence of being a people. It is, thus, not surprising that many readers of Herder today categorize him as a "cultural nationalist" instead of a political nationalist. This philosophy of language had profoundly shaped the German nationalist movement, in short, a movement that privileged one group of people at the expense of all others, and some in particular.[12]

German state. Nor was it by any means clear – even to the inhabitants of central Europe – whether there was such a thing as 'German nation.'" Gregory Moore, "Introduction," in *Fichte: Addresses to the German Nation*, ed. Gregory Moore, trans. R.F. Jones and G.H. Turnbull, Cambridge Text in the History of Political Thought (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), xii.

[10] The German noun *Bildung* signifies a broad range of meanings including culture, civilization, cultivation, and education. In his discussion on four natural laws, which I have discussed in the previous chapter, he argues that language should not stay at the level of individuality. This is how Herder explains it: "If language were as innate to the human being as producing honey is to bees, then this greatest and most splendid of buildings would immediately fall apart in ruins! Each person would bring his little bit of language into the world for himself, or rather, since "bringing into the world" for a [faculty of] reason means nothing but inventing language for itself immediately – what a sad isolated thing each human being becomes!" Johann Gottfried Herder, "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)," in *Herder: Philosophical Writings*, trans. Michael N. Forster, Cambridge Text in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 127–64.

[11] Herder never insisted on a forceful systematic effort to create a national language. Language unification of a community is as natural as the production of language itself. In other words, it is the natural unified language that gives birth to a nation (*das Volk*) and not the other way around. In his highly polemical 1792 essay against French, "Letters concerning the Progress of Humanity [excerpts on European politics]," Herder argues that religious and church institutions in the feudal age as "branch of human arrangements" have with their hypocrisy had failed the society. He argues, "That we no longer live in the fifth, ninth, eleventh century is certain; that the vassals who were then powerful are no longer ours is established; that the old system of feudalism and conquest does not suit our times is clear." If this is the case, what would a new and better human arrangement look like for a modern world? Herder argues the only thing that remains in the modern society is the people (*das Volk*). "Nature creates noble, great, wise men, education and occupations form their abilities – these are heads and leaders of the people (aristodemocrat) arranged by God and the state," he argues. Johann Gottfried Herder, "Letters Concerning the Progress of Humanity (1792) [Excerpts on European Politics]," in *Herder: Philosophical Writings*, trans. Michael N. Forster, Cambridge Text in the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 364.

[12] Snyder, *Roots of German Nationalism*, 59.

Herder did acknowledge the existence of other national languages, but, as I have

discussed in the previous chapter, these languages are also separated from one another.[13] Here is

precisely where the interconnectedness between his nationalism and cosmopolitanism lies.

However, Herder strongly opposed any mixing or hybridization of languages.[14] Language, he

said, separates one group of people from others and this separation is impenetrable. Herder's

cosmopolitanism might have been helpful in the acknowledgement of the existence of other

cultures, but when it comes to the presence of the internal others, i.e., those who speak

differently within a given nation, Herderian logic can easily slip into a destructive force of

silencing multiplicity of languages for the sake of a collective national identity.[15]

---

[13] One the one hand, Herder notes that there is a great diversity of languages in the world. For this very reason in Isiah Berlin's discussion on whether Herder is a relativist, he argues that Herder "condemns and praises entire civilizations." See Isaiah Berlin, *Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder*, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000), 223. On the other hand, Herder also observes that people who live in a certain geographical and climactic space are bound by their language and tend to construct their national identity on the basis of that singularity of language. In the context of national language, the unity out of multiplicity is at the heart of Herder's linguistic nationalism. Alan Patten, "'The Most Natural State': Herder and Nationalism," *History of Political Thought* 31, no. 4 (January 1, 2010): 657–89.

[14] Brian Vick has strongly opposed the idea that the early German nationalist movement, especially within the Romantic tradition, refused the hybridity of culture or language. He notes, "It will become clear that German nationalists of the first half of the nineteenth century had a definite appreciation of their mixed ethnic and cultural heritage, and that they were more open to the borrowing of foreign ideas and institutions even in their own day than might have been expected on the basis of the existing literature on German nationalism. This was true alike of the romantic nationalists and of those associated with the more radical and politicized national movement proper." See Brian Vick, "The Origins of the German Volk: Cultural Purity and National Identity in Nineteenth-Century Germany," *German Studies Review* 26, no. 2 (2003): 241–256. In the case of Herder, and also Fichte, this statement is partially true. Herder's emphasis on the impenetrable and pure core of linguistic uniqueness is an essentialist and exclusivist view of culture. Fichte is even more extreme because he argues that German language is pure because it emerges from the people whereas French is a borrowed (i.e. hybrid) language from Latin.

[15] Just like Herder, Fichte also believes that at the core of a national identity is their language. In his *Addresses to the German Nation*, Fichte argues at great length how the German language is far superior to other languages that are derived and adopted from Latin (i.e., Romance languages: French, Spanish, Italian, etc.). In a highly polemical way against other Teutonic people, Fichte argues that German language, "remained in the uninterrupted flow of an original language which has developed continuously out of the actual life of the nation." Because it emerges out of the life of people themselves, he states that "the Germans still speak a living language and have done so since it first streamed forth from nature." Other languages, for Fichte, "adopted foreign language which under their influence has become dead." Language is the primary foundation of the "German spirit" in Fichte's thoughts.

It is precisely this logic of silencing at the core of the Herderian romantic-nationalist tradition that I find deeply problematic, and particularly this tradition's interpretation of the phenomenon of tongue(s) in the Corinthian church. Scholars of this tradition go beyond just a linguistic stage of silencing, but also include the subjective and socio-political stages. First, assuming that early Christians were a single group people who lived in a society dominated by the Greek language, these scholars argue that early Christians must have spoken only Greek because it is the language of the dominant group. By doing so, they deny the existence of other languages in the early Christian movement. Second, not only do such scholars eliminate the possibility of a multiplicity of languages being in use in this movement, they also go a step further by arguing that the tongue(s) speakers are in the state of unconsciousness, that is they are not aware of what they are doing. I categorize this as a subjective silencing. It is either by arguing that the speakers are in a state of highly ecstatic or their tongue is controlled by the Spirit of God, the move of eliminating their agency can still be detected. Third, the socio-political silencing appears later in the twentieth century when scholars argue that tongue(s) speakers were the source of chaos and problems in the Corinthian church. They present these speakers as spiritually prideful and socially oppressive. Thus, to bring peace and order back to the community, Paul needs to silence them.

That being said, in order to resist such force of silencing, I am going to propose an alternative hermeneutical strategy to read Paul's discourse on tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 14. At the heart of this hermeneutical strategy is an attempt to bring the diverse minority voices that exist in the Corinthian community to the surface. While the romantic-nationalist mode finds its root in the Herderian philosophy of language, this alternative mode of reading seeks to build its foundation on both an Indonesian and Bakhtinian philosophy of language.

2.3. Language as *Heteroglossia*

Asking the question "What is language?" is difficult and complicated. John Lyons even argues that it is like asking the question "What is life?".[16] Lyons maintains that it is a fiction to think that language is a complete or holistic system. However, the idea that language is an abstract synchronic system of signs remains the "mainstream linguistic's version of language," according to Alastair Pennycook.[17] This view was introduced by a Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure.

2.3.1. Saussurean Language as an Abstract-Immutable System of Signs

Before Saussure, linguistic study in the nineteenth century was dominated mainly by comparative philology, and especially by the so-called "neo-grammarian" school led by prominent German linguists such as Karl Brugmann, Hermann Paul, and Hermann Osthoff, who focused their study of language on its diachronic aspect, that is the historical development of language. They developed the idea of an "Indo-European" family tree as their primary concern of their linguistic analysis, a move that is historically understandable, because the nineteenth century was the era in which German nationalism grew strong.

Neo-grammarians' rootedness in German nationalism can be found in the works of their linguistic predecessors, such as Wilhelm von Humboldt[18] or Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm (widely

---

[16] John Lyons, *Language and Linguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1.

[17] Alastair Pennycook, *Critical Applied Linguistics: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 29.

[18] Wilhelm von Humboldt's work was centered around the interconnectedness between national identity and languages focusing mainly on languages in Southeast Asia such as Sanskrit, Javanese, Malay, and Burmese. The influence of Herder on von Humboldt has been discussed widely among scholars of language. Michael Forster even argues that "Herder inspired Wilhelm von Humboldt to found modern linguistics." Michael N. Forster, "Introduction," in *Herder: Philosophical Writings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), vii. Michael Mack contends, "the most significant and influential reception of Herder's version of pluralist cosmopolitanism may be found in Wilhelm von Humboldt's political writings as well as in Hegel's philosophy of spirit." Michael Mack, "The Other," in *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, ed. Michael N. Forster and

known as the Grimm brothers of fairy tale and dictionary fame). As Woodruff D. Smith notes, "comparative philology . . . became popular because of its association with German nationalism during the war of liberation against Napoleon."[19] It is not surprising that these German philologists were interested in examining the philological connection among Germanic-like languages. Chris Manias explains, "The acknowledgement of the importance of language for cultural and political identity led to a prolonged reconsideration of what the Indo-European family identified by philologists actually was."[20] Saussure was educated within this context at the University of Leipzig in the late nineteenth century.[21]

Although Saussure is often called "the father of modern linguistics"[22] his theory of language as a system of signs was also instrumental in shaping the structuralist philosophical tradition in Europe. In *Course in General Linguistics*, which was compiled and published posthumously by two of his students, Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, he argued that there are two components in linguistics: language (*langue*) and speech (*parole*). "Language is not a function of the speaker; it is a product that is passively assimilated by the individual."[23] Speech

---

Kristin Gjesdal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 747. For further discussion on the influence of Herder on von Humboldt, see also Roger Langham Brown, *Wilhelm von Humboldt's Conception of Linguistic Relativity* (Paris: Mouton, 1967), 32ff. On the other hand, Koerner rejects this common knowledge that von Humboldt was influenced by Herder. See E. F. K. Koerner, *Practicing Linguistic Historiography* (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989), 33ff.

[19] Woodruff D. Smith, *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 1840-1920* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 61.

[20] Chris Manias, *Race, Science, and the Nation: Reconstructing the Ancient Past in Britain, France and Germany* (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), 185.

[21] The best biography on the life of Saussure today is the one penned by John E. Joseph. See John E. Joseph, *Saussure*, 1 edition (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[22] For example, see Jonathan D. Culler, *Ferdinand de Saussure*, Revised (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 104; M. P. Sinha, *Modern Linguistics* (Delhi, India: Atlantic, 2005), 3; Guilio Lepschy, "European Linguistics in the Twentieth Century," in *Studies in the History of Western Linguistics*, ed. Theodora Bynon and F. R. Palmer (London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 189.

[23] Ferdinand de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), 14.

(*parole*) is basically the phonetic production of language (*langue*).[24] This separation of speech

and language is fundamental to Saussurean linguistics.[25] Language is basically the collective

system constructed through the means of speaking. While speech is heterogeneous because it

differs from individual to individual, language is homogeneous because it is the system that

binds various individuals' speech.[26] "Language is speechless speaking. It is the whole set of

habits which allow an individual to understand and to be understood."[27] Or to put it differently,

language is what makes speaking intelligible.

Saussure further argues that his "definition of language presupposes the exclusion of

everything that is outside its organism or system–in a word, of everything known as 'external

linguistics.'"[28] Although he acknowledges that the dynamics that are external to language (e.g.,

politics, economic, race, etc.) influence the shape of language, they are not a requirement for

studying language. "I believe that the study of external linguistic phenomena is most fruitful; but

to say that we cannot understand the internal linguistic organism without studying external

phenomena is wrong,"[29] Saussure argues. In short, the internal linguistic structural system can be

separated from external factors, and can be studied *an sich*. For him, "external linguistics can

add detail without being caught in the vise of a system."[30]

---

[24] This Saussurean linguistic distinction is often described as general language (*langue*) and particular language (*parole*). See Lyons, *Language and Linguistics*, 8.

[25] Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 18.

[26] Saussure writes: "language is necessary if speaking is to be intelligible and produce all its effects; but speaking is necessary for the establishment of language, and historically its actuality always comes first." Saussure, 15.

[27] Saussure, 77.

[28] Saussure, 20.

[29] Saussure, 22.

[30] Saussure, 22.

Saussure also criticizes the idea of language as being to name objects. For him, the

connection is not between the object and the name, but the psychological state of giving

something a name and the sound image it produces. In other words, "the linguistic sign unites,

not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image,"[31] The sound image he calls the

signifier, the concept the signified. A sign is the combination of signifier and signified. Yet the

connection between the signifier and the signified, according to Saussure, is arbitrary.[32] The

arbitrariness of this relationship does not mean that "the choice of signifier is left entirely to the

speaker."[33] Saussure argues instead that it depends mainly on the consensus in the linguistic

community of speakers. However, he does not explore this line of thought any further. He

therefore leaves unexplored questions such as: Whose signifier is the dominant one? Why that

signifier and not the other one? Since Saussure thinks that external linguistics has nothing to do

with the internal structure of language, these questions become irrelevant for Saussure.

Concerning the dynamic of time and change Saussure makes another important

distinction between two "inner dualit[ies]"[34] of language: diachronic and synchronic linguistics.

The synchronic aspect is basically "the axis of simultaneities" that comprises the system of

language in which "the intervention of time is excluded,"[35] whereas the diachronic is "the axis of

successions" that relates to the development of language system in its evolutionary process. It is

a duality of "evolutionary linguistics" and "static linguistics."[36] Saussure, rejecting the

diachronic analysis, argues that "the multiplicity of signs… makes it absolutely impossible to

---

[31] Saussure, 66.
[32] Saussure, 67.
[33] Saussure, 69.
[34] Saussure, 79ff.
[35] Saussure, 80.
[36] Saussure, 81.

study simultaneously relations in time and relations within the system."[37] That is to say, it is impossible to study language from both axes at the same time. As such, Saussure emphasizes the importance of the synchronic system over the temporal or diachronic one. The diachronic nature of language is the fact of speaking (*parole*), and not language (*langue*). "It is in speaking that the germ of all change is found," argues Saussure.[38] It is important to remember again that Saussure was educated within the neogrammarian school of linguistic, which concentrated mainly on the historical development of language, and thus on the reconstruction of Indo-European languages. His emphasis on the synchronic system of language is therefore "a new departure"[39] from that of his contemporaries.

If, as he insists, language is an ahistorical synchronic system, then the way language produces knowledge is not through the expression of one's soul, as we saw in the Herderian and Romantic philosophy of language. Although Saussure thinks that the "signified" (i.e., concept) is rooted in the psychological state of the speaker, he insists that the relationship between signified and signifier (i.e., sound-image) remains completely arbitrary. This means that the connection between signified and signifier cannot be the locus of meaning where knowledge is constituted. Here is where another critical contribution of Saussurean linguistics lies: "Without language, thought is a vague, uncharted nebula. There are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language,"[40] Saussure explains.

---

[37] Saussure, 81.

[38] Saussure, 98.

[39] April M. S. McMahon, *Understanding Language Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 24. McMahon divides theories of language change into three schools of thought: a) the neogrammarian school, b) the structuralist school, and c) the generativist school. These schools are ordered chronologically. Saussure was educated among neogrammarian scholars in Leipzig. His structuralist theory of language further influenced the generativist school. McMahon notes that the emphasis of generativists on the linguistic system is an indication that they have not fully departed from the structuralist school.

[40] Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 112.

Since thoughts and ideas are vague and uncharted, the task of language is to give clarity and distinguish one idea from another. The clarification of thought is constituted through differences. This is what Saussure calls the "mysterious fact" of language, that it always "implies division."[41] Language in this sense is thoroughly differential, meaning that "in language there are only differences," without which there is no possibility for thought or knowledge whatsoever because "differences carry signification."[42] When signified or signifier is analyzed separately, the differential nature of language is always in negative terms. Or to put it another way, "in language there are only differences *without positive terms.*"[43] This means that neither signifier nor signified has positive content or value in itself.[44] The value of either a signifier or a signified is determined by its difference from other signifiers or signified. The signifier or signified works through the systemic chain of differences.[45] It is in "difference" that

---

[41] Saussure, 112.

[42] Saussure, 118.

[43] Saussure, 120. Emphasis is his. This is directly connected to his chess analogy as well. The value of pieces on a chessboard depends on "its opposition to all the other terms." See ibid., 88. David Holdcroft's explanation of this analogy is quite helpful. He writes, "There are three main points of comparison seen by Saussure between chess and a language. First, just as in a given state of the game the value of a piece depends on its position on the board, and *a fortiori* on its relations to other pieces, so in given language state the value of a word depends on its relations to other words in that state. Second, since any given state is momentary, the value of a piece varies from state to state; the same is true of language states and words. Third, in a chess game only one piece has to be moved pass from one state to another. This is a strict counterpart of the phenomena studied by diachronic linguistics in a number of respects: In language too, change affects only 'isolated elements.' Nevertheless, in both cases the move has repercussions for the whole system. In chess an actual move is part of neither the preceding nor the succeeding system; it links them." David Holdcroft, *Saussure: Signs, System and Arbitrariness* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 78–79.

[44] John E. Joseph points out that Saussure's insistence that language is "a form and not a substance," can cause a contradictory problem in his overall philosophy of language because he believes that language is the system of signs. Joseph writes, "Might he mean that signs do not exist within a language, but are generated out of it? This could contradict many other statements… which maintain that signs are precisely what a language consists of. How is it, then, that two pure abstractions combine to form a concrete entity, while the whole conglomeration of these concrete entities is devoid of substance?" John E. Joseph, "The Linguistic Sign," in *The Cambridge Companion to Saussure*, ed. Carol Sanders (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 64.

[45] Concerning the way differences are related and constructed, Saussure makes another distinction between syntagmatic and associative relations. "In a language-state [synchronic state] everything is based on relations," he explains. Saussure describes the difference between syntagmatic and associative relation as being like the columns of a building. He distinguishes between *in presentia* (syntagmatic) and *in abstentia* (associative). The syntagmatic is *in presentia* because the relation is constructed between signs that are put together (before or after a sign) like in a

language works.[46] Saussure points out further, that when signifier and signified are considered together as a unit, then "their combination is a positive fact."[47] Without the linking combination between signifier and signified, unsurprisingly, Saussure insists that language is a "mere abstraction."[48]

To be clear, Saussure acknowledges that languages undergo changes, but he insists that these changes do not take place at the level of the system of language. Language (*langue*) will stay the same. Language is immutable because it is embedded in community, and thus social convention. He writes, "no individual, even if he willed it, could modify in any way at all the choice that has been made; and what is more, the community itself cannot control so much as a single word; it is bound to the existing language."[49] Furthermore, the embeddedness of language in the social fabric is also connected to its temporal nature. Saussure states:

---

sentence. It is a successive relation, to put it differently. The associative is *in absentia* because it is about the relation between a sign with other comparative signs. Saussure describes these two relations as being historical and vertical axes. This distinction is developed further by Russian linguist, Roman Jacobson in his discussion the way language works through selection (*in absentia*) and combination (*in presentia*). See Roman Jakobson, *Fundamentals of Language* (Leiden, Netherlands: 'S-Gravenhage, Mouton, 1956).

[46] The idea is that the signifier is free of value content without difference; the same is true also with the signified. The signified cannot contain any value without difference. The example that Saussure uses is the signifier "juger" (a French word) and the signified as "to judge." He explains, "in French the concept 'to judge' is linked to the sound-image *juger*; in short it symbolizes signification. But it is quite clear that initially the concept is nothing, that is only a value determined by its relations with other similar values, and that without them the signification would not exist. If I state simply that a word signifies something when I have in mind the associating of a sound-image with a concept, I am making a statement that may suggest what actually happens, but by no means am I expressing the linguistic fact in its essence and fullness." That is to say, we always use language in its completion of combination between signifier (sound-image) and signified (concept). But prior to this arbitrary combination, language does not have any positive value. It is in the combination of the signifier and the signified that we can create meaning. The signified somehow – in an arbitrary way – becomes the positive value or content of the signifier. This is why he said that when they both are considered together, then you will have language in positive terms.

[47] Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 120.

[48] Saussure, 103. Concerning signs in their totality (i.e., the combination of signifiers and signified), Saussure argues "language are not abstractions but real objects;. . . sings and their relations are what linguistics studies; they are the *concrete entities* of science." (Saussure, 102.)

[49] Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 71. The argument that language is immutable because it thoroughly exists in the historical processes is strange. It is somehow logically odd to base the argument of immutability on the historicity of language. Saussure is clearly aware of the problem when he discusses the mutability of language. He writes: "Time changes all things; there is no reason why language should escape this

No society, in fact, knows or has ever known language other than as a product inherited from preceding generations, and one to be accepted as such… A particular language-state is always the product of historical processes, and these processes explain why the sign is unchangeable., i.e., why it resists any arbitrary substitution.[50]

Boris Gasparov is correct that in the Saussurean linguistic system, both individual and the community are "powerless" because they are incapable of changing their language.[51]

This said, the influence of Saussure on the study of language in the Western intellectual life has been significant. In the area of philosophy, Jacques Derrida's peculiar term *différance*, which became the trademark of his project of deconstruction, is built on the Saussurean concept of the differential nature of language.[52] In the area of anthropology, it was Claude Lévi-Strauss who extended the Saussurean philosophy of language in his analysis of kinship.[53] Saussure also

---

universal law." How does he deal with this apparent contradiction? Saussure interestingly points out to the unawareness of the speakers of the laws of language when they utter speech. "If they are unaware of them, how could they modify them? Even if they were aware of these laws, we may be sure that their awareness would seldom lead to criticism, for people are generally satisfied with the language they have received." Furthermore, the arbitrary nature of the sign makes it extremely difficult to discuss the possible change. For example, since the relationship between the sound image "tree" and the concept of tree is arbitrary, the basis for the discussion of the questions such as "why do we have to use 'tree' instead of 'true' or 'trea'?" is completely absent. As such, the arbitrariness of sign enforces and reinforces the immutability of language. Signs are enormous and the system that ties those signs is very complex, Saussure argues, that render change to the point of impossibility. He writes, "we can conceive of a change only through the intervention of specialists, grammarians, logicians, etc.; but experience shows us that all such meddlings have failed."

[50] Saussure, 71.

[51] Boris Gasparov, *Beyond Pure Reason: Ferdinand de Saussure's Philosophy of Language and Its Early Romantic Antecedents* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 82.

[52] While Saussure believes that in the combination of signifier and signified we can find language in positive terms, Derrida points out that "the signified concept is never present in itself, in an adequate presence that would refer only to itself. Every concept is necessarily and essentially inscribed in a chain or a system, within which it refers to another or to other concepts, by the systemic play of differences. Such a play, then–difference–is no longer simply a concept, but the possibility of conceptuality, or the conceptual system and process in general. For the same reason, difference, which is not a concept, is not a mere word; that is it is not what we represent to ourselves as the calm and present self-referential unity of a concept and sound [*phonie*]." Jacques Derrida, "Differance," in *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, by Jacques Derrida, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 140. Derrida's emphasis on a chain of signifiers and the systemic play of difference leads to his insistence that the relationship between a signified and a signifier is not positive because a signified in itself is actually a signifier for another signified. Consequently, what's left in language is the "signifying trace" of difference. See Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 23.

[53] Claude Lévi-Strauss is one of the most significant followers of Saussure's conceptual framework in the field of anthropology. Lévi-Strauss, arguing that linguistics is the highest form of science, maintains that the study of anthropology finds its framework in structural linguistics. Focusing primarily on the study of kinship relations,

shaped the field of linguistic studies in America, as we see especially in the works of Edward

Sapir, Leonard Bloomfield, and Benjamin Lee Whorf, and thus the intellectual life of the

Western world.

However, the major problem with the Saussurean concept of language lies precisely in its

insistence on the abstractive, or as Jameson describes it, the "anti-historical," nature of

language.[54] When Saussure treats language as a system of sign (*lague*) separate from the

speaking subjects, he inevitably removes language from historical processes. Thus, language is

immutable. As John E. Joseph has pointed out, this separation of language (*langue*) from the

historical and temporal speaking (*parole*) has consequently apoliticized language.[55] The second

stage is his heavy emphasis on the synchronic aspect of language which has divorced language

from its historical struggles.[56]

2.3.2. An Alternative View from Indonesia: Language as a Social Performance

The Saussurean concept of language as an abstract system of signs has undeniably

become the mainstream view in linguistic studies today.[57] Chomsky's generative grammar and

---

Lévi-Strauss states: 'In the study of kinship problem (and, no doubt, the study of other problems as well), the anthropologist finds himself in a situation which formally resembles that of the structural linguist. Like phonemes, kinship terms are elements of meaning; like phonemes, they acquire meaning only if they are integrated into systems. 'Kinship systems,' like 'phonemic systems,' are built by the mind on the level of unconscious thought. Finally, the recurrence of kinship patterns, marriage rules, and so forth, in scattered regions of the globe and in fundamentally different societies, leads us to believe that, in case of kinship as well as linguistics, the observable phenomena result from the action of laws which are general but implicit. The problem can therefore be formulated as follows: Although they belong to *another order of reality*, kinship phenomena are *of the same type* as linguistic phenomena" (emphasis is his). As we see in this statement, Lévi-Strauss stresses the importance of the unconscious system. Just like Saussure, he also rejects the traditional way of analyzing the kinship system in terms of its place in history, which is based thoroughly on a diachronic analysis. See Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Structural Anthropology*, trans. Claire Jacobson (New York: Basic Books, 1977), 34.

[54] Fredric Jameson, *The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), 7.

[55] John Earl Joseph, *Language and Politics*, Edinburgh Textbooks in Applied Linguistics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 64.

[56] It is worth noting that Saussure still discusses the role of the geographical dynamic of language.

[57] McMahon, *Understanding Language Change*, 32.

Derrida's deconstruction can be seen as extensions rather than as rejections of the Saussurean philosophy of language. Now, although I find both Chomskyan generative grammar and Derridean poststructuralist extension and critique of Saussure enlightening and helpful, in this project I will take a different analytical route: I return to Indonesia, where linguistics has been studied for centuries, and demonstrate that there was direct colonial contact between Western discourse on language and the Indonesian people, especially the Javanese people. A close examination of the Indonesian view of language paves the way to incorporate Mikhail Bakhtin's idea of heteroglossia into this project.

The study of Indonesian languages became prominent long before Saussure. Wilhelm von Humboldt was among the first modern European scholars who studied languages in Indonesia. The first volume of his *Über die Kawi-sprache auf der insel Java* was published in 1832. Humboldt was a highly influential nineteenth-century German linguist[58] who was deeply influenced by Herder and whose linguistic work paved the way for that of both Saussure and Chomsky.[59] Humboldt's philosophy of language is built on a study of the Malay peoples and their languages, especially the Kawi language, an old Javanese language. His analysis of the Kawi language pays particular attention to the synchronic rather than diachronic aspect of language.[60] Indeed, the Saussurean distinction between *parole* and *langue* can be traced back to

---

[58] Wilhem von Humboldt's influence on modern Western study of language is described very well in this statement by Stephanie Walson: "Under the influence of Wilhelm von Humboldt, philology had become central to the curriculum in German universities." Stephanie Lawson, *Culture and Context in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 70.

[59] Chomsky's generative grammar can be seen as being in the tradition of Humboldt's idea that every language is somehow generated by an "inner structure of language" embedded in the rationality of human beings. The German word "*erzeugen*" is central to von Humboldt's philosophy of language. Acknowledging the appropriateness of the term "generative grammar" and that he will continue to use it, Chomsky explains, "Furthermore, 'generate' seems to be the most appropriate translation for Humboldt's term *erzeugen*, which he frequently uses, it seems, in essentially the sense here intended. Since this use of the term 'generate' is well established both in logic and in the tradition of linguistic theory, I can see no reason for a revision of terminology." Noam Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 38 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), 9.

[60] Milka Ivic, *Trends in Linguistics* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970), 48.

Humboldt's *energeia* and *ergon*. [61] The only difference between Humboldt and Saussure,

apparently, is that Saussure pushes the idea of *langue* as a system whereas Humboldt never took

such a theoretical step. Chomsky thinks that Humboldt's view is better than Saussure's because

it allows for infinite possibilities for linguistic creativity.[62]

---

[61] This is how Humboldt explains the distinction between *energia* and *ergon*: "*Language*, regarded in its real nature, is an enduring thing, and at every moment a transitory one. Even its maintenance by writing is always just an incomplete, mummy-like preservation, only needed again in attempting thereby to picture the living utterance. In itself it is not the product (*Ergon*), but an activity (*Energia*). Its true definition can therefore only be a genetic one. For it is the ever-repeated *mental labour* of making the *articulated* sound capable of expressing *thought*. In a direct and strict sense, this is the definition of *speech* on any occasion; in its true and essential meaning, however, we can also regard, as it were, only the totality of this speaking as the language." He further points out that, "What is uttered at any time *differs* from *language*, as the body of its product" (Italics his). Wilhelm von Humboldt, *On Language: On the Diversity of Human Language-Structure and Its Influence on the Mental Development of Mankind*, ed. Michael Losonsky, trans. Peter Heath (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 49, 61. For further discussion on how Saussure builds his understanding of language on Humboldt, see Huber W. Ellingsworth, "The Shadow of Benjamin Lee Whorf: Continuing Issues in Linguistic Relativism," *Intercultural Communication Studies* II, no. 2 (1992): 43–44. In this article, Ellingsworth traces Benjamin Lee Whorf's linguistic determinism all the way to Vico, Herder, and Humboldt, Neo-grammarians, and Saussure. It is arguable that even the distinction between signified (concept) and signifier (sound image) in Saussure is also not a completely new idea. Humboldt has discussed this as well. Words, according to Humboldt, consist of "a dual unity" which is *sound* and *concept.* (Humboldt, *On Language*, 70–71.)

[62] Chomsky, *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*, 4. While Saussure distinguishes between *parole* (speech) and *langue* (language system), Chomsky thinks that a distinction should be made between competence and performance. This distinction pertains primarily to the knowledge of grammar by language users (competence), and how that knowledge of grammar produces actual speech (performance). We can argue that Chomskian performance is similar to Saussurean *parole* and competence is similar to *langue*. However, Chomsky clarifies further this similarity with Saussure. He writes, "The distinction I am noting here is related to the *langue-parole* distinction of Saussure; but it is necessary to reject his concept of *langue* as merely a systemic inventory of items and to turn rather to Humboldtian conception of underlying competence as a system of generative processes." For further discussion on Humboldt's influence on Chomskian emphasis on creativity and language generation, see Noam Chomsky, *Current Issues in Linguistic Theory*, ed. Cornelis H. van Schooneveld, Janua Linguarum: Studia Memoriae Nicolai van Wijk Dedicata 38 (Paris: Mouton, 1988), 17.

John E. Joseph locates Chomsky not only in European tradition but also in the American context, especially in the tradition of linguistic structuralism of Leonard Bloomfield and Roman Jakobson. Chomsky's teacher Zellig Harris is influenced by Leonard Bloomfield. Chomsky's contact with Jakobson is mainly through Morris Halle. Concerning Chomsky's relation to Humboldt and Saussure, Joseph's analysis is helpful in revealing the development in Chomsky's thought. According to Joseph, in Chomsky's early works (mainly prior to the 1960s), especially his proposal that a distinction should be made between I-language (*I-nternalized language*) and E-language (*E-xternalized language*), he still attempts to adapt and explain further Saussurean idea that *langue* is embedded in social relations. In his 1963 article, "Formal Properties of Grammars" Chomsky has become a thoroughly Saussurean linguist. *Langue*, for Chomsky is "a grammar that generates sentences with structural descriptions; that is to say, . . . the speaker's linguistic intuition, his knowledge of the language." This, Joseph argues, is evidence that Chomsky "explicitly equates Saussure's system with his own." Between 1962-1964, furthermore, Chomsky began to trace the tradition further back to Humboldt (and also Hermann Paul) and distance himself from Saussure. In the period between 1965 and 1979, Chomsky not only embraced Humboldt but also somehow became "the Anti-saussurean." However, Chomsky enters a new stage in 1986 when he seems to revisit and revise his old position on Saussure. See John E. Joseph, *From Whitney to Chomsky: Essays in the History of*

Key to the Humboldtian conception of language is the idea that language is produced by an internal human ability of thinking, a special capacity that he calls an "inner form of language" (*innere Sprachform*). Similar to Herder, Humboldt considers that the human capacity for thinking (i.e., human mental power)[63] is interrelated with and reflected through their language. He even goes so far as to equate human intellectual power and language. Further, because language evolves, Humboldt unsurprisingly believes that some groups of people are not as capable as other groups to think and grasp knowledge at a higher level.

Humboldt was particularly interested in the Kawi language because it displays the intersectionality between Indian culture and local Javanese culture.[64] In his three-volume works, *Über die Kawi-sprache auf der Insel Java*, he dug into the structure of Kawi language, an Old Javanese language in Indonesia, and argued that this language reflects the Javanese people's inherent lack of intellectual capacity and thus their inherent incapacity to produce advanced scientific knowledge or philosophical concepts. To put it more directly, for Humboldt the Europeans through their Indo-European languages are more capable of higher forms of knowledge than the Javanese. While acknowledging that civilization (*Bildung*) can progress from within, Humboldt argues that the best and fastest way to improve the inferiority of non-European civilizations is by cultural implantation from without. "It is a splendid privilege of our own day to carry civilization into the remotest corner of the earth, to couple this endeavor with every undertaking, and to utilize power and means for the purpose, even apart from other ends,"

American Linguistics, Studies in the History of the Language Sciences 103 (Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002), 143–55.

[63] Humboldt, *On Language*, 26.

[64] Humboldt, 20.

writes Humboldt.[65] In other words, what necessitates colonialism in Humboldt's view is the

unequal level of linguistic disposition for thinking.

Unlike Herder, Humboldt views culture as displaying human intellectual differences. "It

lies in the nature of language to be a progressive development under the influence of the

intellectual power of its speakers in every case," he argues.[66] The reason Herder acknowledges

the existence and the right of other nations to have their own cultures is because he wants the

Germans to have their own unique cultural identity. Herderian cosmopolitan, in a way, is

constructed without much insistence on cultural superiority. This was not the case for Humboldt,

and to a large extent Fichte too, who viewed some cultures as being inferior or superior to

others.[67]

Yet many non-Germans, like Khaidir Anwar, a prominent Indonesian sociolinguist, finds

the Humboldtian linguistic project to be profoundly problematic and offensive. He writes:

> The phrase "innate intellectual power" could also be disturbing – if one accepted the
> assumption behind it. Are the Minangkabau or the Javanese for instance endowed with
> sufficient innate intellectual power? If they were not, they would not, in Humboldt's
> view, be able to improve their level of intellectual development satisfactorily and by
> implication they would forever remain a second or third class people. That is why
> Humboldt's view is also a challenge to the Indonesian people.[68]

For this reason, in the past few decades Indonesian scholars have begun to explore how language

is locally understood in Indonesia instead of relying on the European philosophy of language.

---

[65] Humboldt, 35.

[66] Wilhelm von Humboldt, *Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development*, trans. George C. Buck and Frithjof A. Raven (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972), 121.

[67] I am referring here mainly to Edward Said's seminal work on orientalism, which discusses how the construction of knowledge in the West has a direct relation to the establishment and perpetuation of European colonial power. Although Said does not discuss von Humboldt's philosophy of language in detail, he puts von Humboldt's name in the middle of what he calls "the official intellectual genealogy of Orientalism." See Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 99.

[68] Khaidir Anwar, *Indonesian: The Development and Use of a National Language* (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1980), 11.

Among them, the works Ariel Heryanto, an Indonesian sociologist from Monash University, Australia, have been instrumental in articulating the Javanese philosophy and sociology of language.

The first thing that Heryanto points out is that there is no word for "language" in Indonesia.[69] The Sanskrit root of the word "*bahasa*" does not mean language. Instead, he explains, "It took European colonialism to introduce the idea of 'language' before the old word *bahasa* came to articulate this newly-acquired concept."[70] That is to say, the word *bahasa* became language as part of the colonizing project of subjecting other cultures to the European epistemic category.

Heryanto demonstrates further that the word *bhãsa,* which later became *basa* in modern Javanese language, "strictly refers to the Javanese speech act, and more specifically to *Krama* (high-level Javanese)."[71] So instead of looking at language as a synchronic system of signs that is generated in and through a human psychological condition, the concept of language in the Indonesian context is a thoroughly socially performative act. Contrasting the way Malay and Javanese communities view language to the dominant conception of language in the West, Heryanto writes:

> In vernacular Malay and Javanese communities, the term *bahasa* (or bhãsa; basa) did not refer to something abstract and neutral. It was neither a handy tool of communication nor a system of codes or symbols that arbitrarily signified something else (a reality) as 'language' has come to be most commonly understood. It was overtly – more so than today's 'languages' – a social activity. It was explicitly a socially bound practice, rather than secularly and logically rule-governed.[72]

---

[69] Ariel Heryanto, "Then There Were Languages: Bahasa Indonesia Was One Among Many," in *Disinventing and Reconstituting Languages*, ed. Sinfree Makoni and Alastair Pennycook (Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 2007), 43.

[70] Heryanto, 43.

[71] Heryanto, 44.

[72] Heryanto, 47.

Heryanto here frames his observation in both negative and positive terms. Negatively, language is not "something abstract and neutral." Although Heryanto does not mention Saussure by name, this statement is clearly a response to Saussure's linguistic structuralist idea. Heryanto further explains by pointing to three other aspects of structuralist conception of language, i.e., language as a handy tool of communication, as a system of codes, and as symbols that arbitrarily signify something else. The idea that language is a "handy tool of communication" is directly related to Saussure's insistence that "the place of language [is] in the facts of speech."[73] It is about how a person communicates with another person. This communication, according to Saussure, is the result of the production of signs (the combination of signifiers and signified). Signs are then employed in social relations as a means for communication. It is not surprising that in the same breath Heryanto then speaks of system of signs and symbols that work in an arbitrary way. Although Heryanto does not mention Saussure by name, his comments seem clearly directed to Saussure and the Western linguistic tradition.

On the other hand, positively, Heryanto demonstrates that language in the Javanese community is perceived as "a social activity." It is certainty true that Saussure acknowledged this social aspect of language, as he explicitly states that "language is a social fact."[74] However, we need to make an important distinction between Saussure's and Heryanto's analysis of the Javanese conception of language. While Saussure's entire project moves away from the sociality of language to the abstraction of synchronic *langue*, Heryanto's argument demonstrates that the Javanese conception of language does not make such a move. The prime location of language, in other words, remains in the social realm. While Saussurean language is a product of mental

---

[73] See Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, 11ff.
[74] Saussure, 6.

147

exercise, Javanese language is a social performance. To quote Heryanto again, language is "explicitly a socially bound practice, rather than secularly and logically rule-governed."[75] One does not produce language; one performs it socially.

This is certainly true of the *krama inggil* (high-level Javanese) that Heryanto referred to in his essay. Performing *karma inggil* is a way in which a person "cultivates a higher social status."[76] As Bagoes Wiryomartono puts it, "The word *krama* is derived from Sanskrit meaning manner, way, fashion, step, performance, and, in the broadest sense, citizen, within the domain *kadatwan*, where the court language *krama-inggil* was practiced."[77] There is a clear social stratification in language in the Javanese context. In East Java, people on the street tend to speak in *Ngoko*. *Ngoko*, however, is more than just a common way of speech, for it is above all the speech performed by Javanese elders when they talk with the younger people or when a friend talks with another friend. The words in *karma-inggil* and *ngoko* are very different even though they are used by the same speech community. The second person singular "you," for example, in *karma inggil* is *panjenengan*, whereas in *ngoko* it can be *kon* or *koe* depending on the locality.

Furthermore, the social stratification of language is expressed in a vivid way in the Javanese context. Benedict Anderson correctly points out that even some words (i.e., *jaran, kapal, and turangga*) in *krama-inggil* are not about *the content* (or the *what being said,* or "signified" in a Saussurean sense), "but rather indicat[e] the relationship between speaker and interlocutor."[78] In other words, it is not in the semiotic connection between signified and signifier

---

[75] Heryanto, "Then There Were Languages: Bahasa Indonesia Was One Among Many," 47.

[76] Asif Agha, *Language and Social Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 333.

[77] Bagoes Wiryomartono, *Javanese Culture and the Meanings of Locality: Studies on the Arts, Urbanism, Polity, and Society* (New York and London: Lexington Books, 2016), 56.

[78] Benedict R. O'g Anderson, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006), 208.

that language finds its significance, but rather through social performance. Anderson explains:

"*Aku arep mangan* and *kula badhé nedha* both 'mean' 'I am going to eat,' but the first can only

be said between intimates and social near-equals or by a high-status person to someone of higher

status."[79] Anderson is correct that in English such social performance of language does not

appear as vividly as it does in Javanese. Thus, the main concern in the construction of Javanese

language is not its grammatical correctness, but rather the social relation within which the speech

is performed. Am I speaking to an older person? Am I speaking to a friend? Am I speaking to a

person of higher social position? What is my relationship to the interlocutor? It is not surprising

that people often ask their interlocutor's age because by knowing such information they can pitch

their linguistic behavior accordingly.

In reality, unfortunately, the Saussurean view of *bahasa* has dominated inguistic

discourse in Indonesia. Heryanto points out that Indonesian linguists such as Simatupang,

Modjanto, Moeliono, and many others see the social structures in which language is embedded

only as a peripheral matter.[80] To make things worse, Heryanto writes:

> Modern Indonesians are familiar with the English aphorism 'what's in a name' (in
> translation *apalah artinya sebuah nama*), emphasizing the arbitrary relationship between
> a name and the person or thing being named. By contrast, more traditionally-inclined
> Malays and Javanese acknowledge certain divine links between at least selected words
> and events. Theirs is a world where proper names and formulaic words have real or
> potential supernatural power. Their *mantera*, 'magic formulas,' charms and spells are
> deployed to create, prevent, negotiate or control events of major importance. There are
> taboos on uttering certain names (e.g. of deities, royal families, spirits, heirlooms and
> certain animals).[81]

---

[79] Anderson, 209.

[80] An example that Heryanto gives is the definition of *bahasa* in the *Ensiklopedi Indonesia*: "Kumpulan kata dan aturannya yang tetap di dalam menggabungkannya berupa kalimat. Merupakan system bunyi yang melambangkan pengertian-pengertian tertentu. . . Secara umum bahasa tak tergantung kepada susunan masyarakat. Perubahan struktur social dan ekonomi sedikit saja pengaruhnya kepada perkembangan bahasa." This definition thoroughly reflects the Saussurean notion of *langue* as an immutable system. Discussing this definition, Heryanto interestingly does not mention Saussure by name at all. See Heryanto, "Then There Were Languages: Bahasa Indonesia Was One Among Many," 47.

[81] Heryanto, 49.

Although Heryanto apparently has misunderstood the notion of the arbitrary nature of sign,[82] his

point still stands: Indonesians somehow have adopted the Western view of language. This,

Heryanto argues quite forcefully, is the product of colonial influence.[83] Indeed, it is easy to cast

the Javanese view as "traditional" or "under-developed" and the Western (i.e., Saussurean) view

as "modern" or "developed."[84] However, a serious study of a local view of language has to

examine how locals perceive language without imposing a Western colonial category such as

underdevelopment or development.[85]

The political effects of adopting the Saussurean view of language is apparent in the rise

of a unified national language, especially through the standardization of the language in

Indonesia. Heryanto again explains:

> The demise of the old *ba(ha)sa* and the rise of *bahasa* as 'language' can be seen as part
> of the process of both globalisation and Westernisation. In this we see not only the
> application of industrialised definitions of language and human beings globally, but we
> also see a particularly Western mode of language practice occupying the dominant
> positions in the global social hierarchy. Western languages –Western standardized
> languages, to be more precise – become the model for language studies.

A clear example of the egalitarian-universalizing tendency of the Western notion of language in

Indonesia is the use of the generic version of the second-person pronoun *Anda* ("you"). This

---

[82] Here I think Heryanto has misrepresented the Saussurean notion of "sign." The arbitrary relationship
between signifier and signified is not the relationship between a thing and the name, but a concept (signified) and its
sound image (signifier). The insistence on the arbitrariness of sign is a Saussurean critique of the classical
Augustinian notion of language as an act of naming.

[83] Heryanto refers to the work of Benedict Anderson that traces the history of the nationalist movement in
Indonesia. Since the early inception of Indonesian national identity, the local view of time, space, etc., have been
replaced by the Western calendar, maps, etc. For further discussion, see Heryanto, "Then There Were Languages:
Bahasa Indonesia Was One Among Many," 50; Benedict R. O'g Anderson, "Language, Fantasy, Revolution: Java
1900-1950," in *Making Indonesia*, ed. Daniel S. Lev, George McTurnan Kahin, and Ruth Thomas McVey (Ithaca,
NY: SEAP Publications, 1996), 25–39.

[84] Heryanto, "Then There Were Languages: Bahasa Indonesia Was One Among Many," 49.

[85] See Heryanto's lengthy discussion on how these categories have affected Indonesian language in Ariel
Heryanto, *Language of Development and Development of Language: The Case of Indonesia* (Canberra, Australia:
Department of Linguistics, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 1995).

invention of the word *Anda* in modern Bahasa Indonesia as a standardized pronoun is a political

move to erase the social dynamic of a great variety of second-person pronouns in Indonesia (e.g.

kamu, kau, engkau, koe, kon, panjengenan, awak, ale, etc.) that people employ differently in

different social contexts.[86] When language is standardized and flattened in accordance to the

Western doctrine of language, it becomes far easier for Westerners to translate and adopt

Indonesian language.[87] Not only does it make translation easier, the unification of a national

language system also has an inevitable economic dimension. "In global capitalism,

industrialization requires a significant degree of standardization to make mass production and

market exchange faster, easier and more economical," Heryanto explains.[88]

In sum, I highlight again these three points as a way of summarizing this discussion,

points that we will find again in a more vivid way in Bakhtin. First, the Javanese community

exemplifies the multilinguality of social relations. That is to say, the Javanese people speak

many languages. They have no standardized or unified language.[89] Second, because of the

multilinguality of this community, they perceive language not as an immutable, ahistorical, and

synchronic system; the Western linguistic obsession with constructing a grammatical system of

language does not exist among the Javanese. Instead, for them language is a social performance.

They distinguish between *karma-inggil* and *ngoko* not because these ways of speaking are

different at a systemic or grammatical level, but because they are performed differently

according to the social relationship between the speakers. Third and last, since language is

---

[86] Heryanto, "Then There Were Languages: Bahasa Indonesia Was One Among Many," 52.

[87] Heryanto, 57.

[88] Heryanto, 53.

[89] Employing Ferguson's analysis of diglossia, Janet Holmes categorizes *karma-inggil* as the H type and *ngoko* L type. In terms of social stratification, this analysis is certainly true. However, *karma-inggil* has never been considered the "standard" way of speech. See Janet Holmes, *An Introduction to Sociolinguistics*, 4th edition (London: Routledge, 2013), 259–60.

socially embedded, language is both multiple and stratified according to the social relations within which the speech is performed.

These three points should lead us to Bakhtin's notion of heteroglossia. What we see in Bakhtin is quite similar to the one in Heryanto, i.e., Javanese context. However, the most important contribution of Bakhtin to my project here is his notion of centripetal and centrifugal forces of language. Language in Bakhtin is not only many, but also politically contested especially between the dominant language speakers and the minority language speakers. In other words, the dialogical is also political.

2.3.3. Mikhail Bakhtin's Philosophy of Language

Mikhail Bakhtin is widely known as one of the major thinkers on study of humanities in the twentieth century. Thanks to growing up in Moscow and being educated by a German teacher, he was able to speak fluently in both German and Russian.[90] As Michael Holquist puts it, "His life up to 1918, when he left Petersburg (or, as it then was, Petrograd) University, could not have been more in character for a man who was to become a student of heteroglossia (many-languagedness)."[91] It is no surprise, therefore, that he pays close attention to the radical multiplicity of language. Awareness of Bakhtin's broad familiarity with the writings of Western European thinkers helps the modern reader to understand him better. His philosophy of language should be seen as a response to the trend of linguistic studies in western Europe at that time. I

---

[90] Michael Holquist, *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World*, 2nd ed. (London; New York: Routledge, 2003), 1.

[91] Holquist, 1. Holquist explains further: "Since his father's job required frequent transfers, the adolescent Bakhtin spent his gymnasium years in Vilnius and Odessa, two cities that stood out even in the patchwork Russian empire as unusually heterogeneous in their mix of cultures and languages. Vilnius was part of the ancient Lithuanian kingdom that had been ceded to the Romanovs after the third partition of Poland in 1795; thus the "official language" was Russian, but the majority of citizens spoke Lithuanian or Polish. Vilnius was also the intellectual center of East European Jewry, the "Jerusalem of the North" famous for its Talmudic exegetes, so Yiddish and Hebrew were also in the air. Odessa, a busy port on the Black Sea, was another of East Europe's large Jewish enclaves, and a city in whose streets mingled several different cultures, each with its own language."

frame my discussion of Bakhtin with this dialogic relation to the linguistic trends of western

Europe.

Yet the study of Bakhtin can be challenging because Bakhtin strangely did not bother to

publish many of his writings, "with the exception of the work on Dotoevsky" as Tzetan Todorov

notes.[92] Several of his early works were allegedly published under other names (e.g. Voloshinov

and Medvedev)[93] and his dissertation, *Rabelais and his World*, was published twenty-five years

---

[92] Tzvetan Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*, trans. Wlad Godzich, Theory and History of Literature 13 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), xi.

[93] I intentionally use the term "allegedly" here because of the heated debate among Bakhtinan scholars on the authorship of Vološinov's two books, namely *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* and *Freudianism: A Critical Sketch,* and Medvedev's book, *The Formal Method of Literary Scholarship*. According to Todorov, the debate began with an interview by a journalist from Poland, named V.V. Ivanov, who said that he knew Bakhtin and had heard from Bakhtin himself that he wrote those books. This interview was conducted about thirty years after the death of Vološinov and Medvedev. Todorov explains, "the only witness was Bakhtin himself; but were we even to suppose that he did claim to be the author of these works, what proof do we have that in the twenties his words hid the truth, while in the sixties they revealed it, and not the other way around? For the time being at least, there is no external criterion to establish that Bakhtin wrote these books." (Todorov, 7.)
    On the one hand, beside Todorov, the most important proponents of Bakhtinian authorship in the English-speaking world are Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist. They build their case both in a negative and positive way. Negatively, Clark and Holquist argue that "nothing has established that Bakhtin could *not* have written the disputed texts and published them under friends' name." (italic is theirs) Positively, they point out that although there is no direct written reference to Bakhtin in either those books or other Bakhtinian surviving documents, it was the witnesses close to Medvedev, like Medvedev's wife, son, and daughter, who dispute his authorship. They also argue that Bakhtin's reached the climax of his productivity in the late 1920s. "He had no children and few job obligation. He was not ambitious, nor was he professionally active in the sense of making contacts and going to meetings. The practical side of his life was taken care of by his wife, who also handled much of the drudgery of manuscript preparation," they explain. The point is that these books could have been the product of his productive hand during that time. Above all, they argue that the "key" to solving this problem lies in the use of notebooks especially among members of Bakhtin circle. Clark and Holquist argues, "The material that Bakhtin put in his notebooks was often stimulated by discussions he had had with other members of his circle. It seems highly likely, then, that much of the material in the disputed texts is worked over from notebooks, either from Bakhtin's, or from Medvedev's, or from Voloshinov's." There are many other arguments that they lay out, such as the method of composition, style of writing, and the content of these books, reflect heavily Bakhtin's intellectual tendency. See Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, *Mikhail Bakhtin* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986), chap. 6.
    On the other hand, the strongest opposition to Bakhtinian authorship comes from I. R. Titunik. Titunik basically disputes Ivanov's testimony. "For this claim Ivanov supplies now proof, simply stating that there is 'eyewitness testimony' to that effect and that the writings themselves (that is, the writings of Vološinov, Medvedev, and Baxtin, taken together) testify to the authorship of one man – Baxtin. Obviously, Ivanov must know more than he is willing or able to divulge at the present time, but as things now stand there is absolutely no reason to accept his claim at its face value," he argues. Beside Marxist thoughts are largely absent in Bakhtin's undisputed works, Titunik also insists that within the period of 1926-1929, it is impossible for Bakhtin to write all these books. See I. R. Titunik, "Preface," in *Freudianism: A Marxist Critique*, by V. N. Voloshinov (Academic Press, 1976), vii–xiv. In 1986, not long after Clark and Holquist published their book, Titunik wrote a quite negative review of that book. He basically said that the entire project is not more than a *hagiography*. See I. R. Titunik, "The Baxtin Problem:

153

after it was written, while many other important works were first published posthumously.[94]

Moreover, Bakhtin's works are extremely complicated. Rather than being a comprehensive

exposition of his works,[95] in what follows I highlight only one of his key ideas, namely

heteroglossia, in order to frame my reading of 1 Cor 14 theoretically. However, to understand

heteroglossia, we should foreground our discussion in Bakhtin's overall philosophy of

language.[96]

Concerning Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist's Mikhail Bakhtin," *The Slavic and East European Journal* 30, no. 1 (1986): 91–95. Cf. I.R. Titunik, "Bakhtin &/Or Vološinov &/Or Medvedev: Dialogue &/Or Doubletalk?," in *Language and Literary Theory: In Honor of Ladislav Matejka*, ed. Benjamin A. Stolz, I. R. Titunik, and Lubomir Dolezel, Papers in Slavic Philology 5 (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1984), 535–64.

      Morson and Emerson are, understandably, very critical of Clark and Holquist's negative argument that the burden of proof is on those who reject Bakhtinian authorship. They write: "This [negative] argument is crucial, because in fact very little of Clark and Holquist's chapter on 'The Dispute Texts' presents evidence that Bakhtin *did* write the works in question. The preponderance of the chapter either attempts to discredit arguments against Bakhtin's authorship or else offer motives why Bakhtin would have wanted to publish under others' names if indeed he did so." The also point out that the reference to Marxism cannot be originated from Bakhtin. Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, "Introduction: Rethinking Bakhtin," in *Rethinking Bakhtin: Extensions and Challenges*, ed. Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, Series in Russian Literature and Theory (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1989), 34.

      This said, I find this debate profoundly ironic because it still operates within a monologic way of thinking, which runs against everything that Bakhtin argues about dialogism. No one can claim sole ownership of knowledge as a private property because just like language, discourse also works through appropriation. Bakhtin should not be considered to be the sole producer, and thus owner, of these books. They are the product of the dialogical processes that took place by Bakhtin and those who were in his circle. Thus, the question of whether they come from Bakhtin or Medvedev or Vološinov, in light of Bakhtin's dialogism, is somewhat irrelevant. This point has also been made by Morson and Emerson when they write: "Oddly enough, defenders of the great proponent of dialogue have themselves monologized a deeply dialogic relationship. As Bakhtin often observed, real dialogue is destroyed by an attempt to make a 'synthesis' (dialectical or otherwise) that conflates distinct voices. We believe that the relations among Bakhtin, Voloshinov, and Medvedev were genuinely dialogic. Their readers can only be the poorer for losing the chance to choose among them." Morson and Emerson, 48.

    [94] Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*, xi.

    [95] Charles I. Schuster writes about studying Bakhtin: "The problem Bakhtin poses for an author attempting to write a prolegomena to his work is how *not* to explain him while 'explaining' him, that is, how to create an understanding that maintains an awareness of the multiplicities of nuance, value, accent, and meaning that exist between 'explainer,' 'explained,' and 'explainee.'" See Charles I. Schuster, "Mikhail Bakhtin: Philosopher of Language," in *The Philosophy of Discourse: The Rhetorical Turn in Twentieth-Century Thought, Vol. 1*, ed. Chip Sills and George H. Jensen (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1992), 164.

    [96] Clark and Holquist divide Bakhtin's works into four periods. First, the early period which they call his "philosophical period" from 1918 until 1924. This was the time when he immersed himself in neo-Kantianism and phenomenology. The second period was 1925 to 1929, in which "Bakhtin moved away from metaphysics and entered into a dialogue with current intellectual movements, such as Freudianism, Soviet Marxism, Formalism, linguistics, and even physiology." The third period was between 1930s to 1950s when "Bakhtin searched for a historical poetics in the evolution of the novel." And lastly, the period of his return to metaphysics, which is from the 1960s to 1970s (Clark and Holquist, *Mikhail Bakhtin*, 3.) It is important to remember that, as we have discussed above, the reference to Marxism and Freudianism is based on their conviction that Bakhtin was the author of the

At the heart of his understanding of language is the idea that "language is realized in the form of individual concrete utterances (oral and written) by participants in the various areas of human activities," which Bakhtin calls "speech genres."[97] Bakhtin's starting points are always the reality of concrete utterances,[98] and that any conception of language has to take seriously the endless diversity of human utterances. As he insists, "Special emphasis should be placed on the extreme *heterogeneity* of speech genres (oral and written)." In contrast to Saussure, and to a certain extent Chomskyan linguistics too, Bakhtin refuses to reduce this richness of speech to a unified syntactic and semantic system.[99] The reality of the extreme heterogeneity of utterances poses a serious problem to general linguistics because of the tendency of general linguistics to construct a coherent structure of language. Thus, the insistence that these multiplicity of speech genres somehow have some commonalities, is "excessively abstract and empty," Bakhtin argues.[100] Allan Bell is thus correct when he points out that "much of Bakhtin's linguistic

---

three books attributed to Vološinov and Medvedev. Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson also divide Bakhtin's life around the same time periods. See Morson and Emerson, "Introduction: Rethinking Bakhtin," 5–6.

[97] M. M. Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson, trans. Vern W. McGee (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986), 60.

[98] For Bakhtin, "To ignore the nature" language enters life through concrete utterances (which manifest language) and life enters language through concrete utterances as well. The utterance is an exceptionally important node of problems." Bakhtin, 63.

[99] A more robust discussion and criticism on Saussure can be found in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, a book that scholars have argued that Bakhtin penned but that was then attributed to Valentin Nikolaevich Voloshinov, one of the important figures in the so-called the "Bakhtin circle." According to Bakhtin (or Voloshinov?) in this book, there are two trends in the study of language: 1) *individualistic subjectivism*, and 2) *abstract objectivism*. The former comes from the works of von Humboldt, while the latter is the Saussurean philosophy of language. The critique of Saussure in this book is very similar what has been presented in Bakhtin's undisputed works, that is Saussure has failed to take the utterance (*parole*) seriously and "decisively cast [it] aside from linguistics." See V. N. Vološinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, Studies in Language (New York, Seminar Press, 1973), chap. 1.

[100] Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 61. Bakhtin mentions Saussure and his followers in this context of discussion on the limitation of general linguistics. He writes: "[E]veryday speech genres have been studied (mainly rejoinders in everyday dialogue), and from a general linguistic standpoint (in the school of Saussure and among his later followers–Structuralists, the American behaviorists, and, on a completely different linguistic basis, the Vosslerians). But this line of inquiry cannot lead to a correct determination of the general linguistics nature of the utterance either, since it was limited to specific features of everyday oral speech, sometimes being directly and deliberately oriented toward primitive utterances (American behaviorists)." Concerning Bakhtin's discussion on Saussure, Sue Vice's observation that Bakhtin mentions Saussure by name only once in his essay,

theorizing was explicitly against Saussure; against structuralism, which was well known in the

Soviet Union in the 1920s."[101] As I will discuss in more detail below, the apparent unified form

of language is a result of external political force imposed upon the diversity of languages.

Active Response, Polyphony, and Unfinalizability of Dialogism

As Clark and Holquist state, "Bakhtin's dialogism is essentially a philosophy of

language."[102] To put it differently, language is thoroughly dialogic. The radical multiplicity of

utterances exists in a complex dialogue with each other. To understand Bakhtin's dialogism,

these four basic conceptual ingredients need to be discussed.

First, dialogism assumes the primacy of the communicative function of language. That

is, language is always constructed in the context of a dialogue, thus a speaker and a respondent.

Bakhtin registers his strong disagreement with Humboldt and the subsequent Romantic tradition,

when he writes, "Nineteenth-century linguistics, beginning with Wilhelm von Humboldt, while

not denying the communicative function of language, tried to place it in the background as

something secondary."[103] Indeed, Humboldt argues that language is the expression or production

of "inner form of language" (*innere Sprachform*). This philosophical position, which can be

---

"Discourse in the Novel," is not correct because Bakhtin also mentions Saussure in his "The Problem of Speech Genres." See Sue Vice, *Introducing Bakhtin* (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 11. For further discussion on Bakhtinian critique of Saussure, see Jørgen Bruhn and Jan Lundquist, "Introduction: A Novelness of Bakhtin?," in *The Novelness of Bakhtin: Perspectives and Possibilities*, ed. Jørgen Bruhn and Jan Lundquist (Copenhagen, Denmark: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2001), 32.

[101] Allan Bell, "Style in Dialogue: Bakhtin and Sociolinguistic Theory," in *Sociolinguistic Variation: Theories, Methods, and Applications*, ed. Robert Bayley and Ceil Lucas (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 95. Because of Bakhtin's heavy emphasis on the social aspect of language, and his works precede early sociolinguistic scholars such as Dell Hymes and William Labov, Bell calls him "a frontrunner of contemporary sociolinguistics."

[102] Clark and Holquist, *Mikhail Bakhtin*, 212.

[103] Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 67.

traced back to Herder, is often called expressivism.[104] Communication, therefore, becomes only

the secondary aspect or function of language. Bakhtin rejects an expressivist view of language

because it reduces language to "man's need to express himself, to objectify himself," which is

thoroughly individualistic.[105]

He further explains: "Language is regarded from the speaker's standpoint as if there were

only *one* speaker who does not have any *necessary* relation to *other* participants in speech

communication. If the role of the other is taken into account at all, it is the role as a listener, who

understands the speaker only passively."[106] Bakhtin strongly objects to the idea that a listener is

a passive recipient in a conversation. In this sense, he is critical of the Humboldtian philosophy

of language for denying the role of the "others" as subjects of speech. "Linguistics and the

philosophy of language acknowledge only a passive understanding of discourse, and moreover

this takes place by and large on the level of common language, that is, it is an understanding of

the utterance's *neutral significance* and not its *actual meaning*," Bakhtin writes.[107] Listeners

---

[104] See Charles Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 90–91. It is worth noting that Forster agrees with Taylor's proposal that Herder's philosophy of language is expressivist, but then clarifies that there are two different kinds of expressivism: narrow expressivism and broad expressivism. The narrow expressivism is dependent "on language and words" whereas the broad one on "a broader range of symbolic media that includes, besides language and words (in the usual sense), also such things as painting, sculpture, and music." For Forster, while Herder's expressivism is mainly about language and words, it cannot be limited to this narrow sense. It has to include other symbolic media as well. "[L]anguage's expressiveness is in certain areas deeply dependent on that of the non-linguistic arts… [A]nd *spoken and written* language is not only a possible fundamental vehicle for thought and meaning, but other forms of language, including some which at least border on art, could, and perhaps even to some extent actually do, serve as such a fundamental vehicle as well," explains Forster. See Michael N. Forster, *After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 102–14.

[105] Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 67.

[106] Bakhtin, 67. Apparently the Bakhtinian concept of the dialogical function of language between I as a subject of speaking and the other subjects as responders is grounded in his familiarity with the works of Martin Buber's on Ich-Du relations. For further discussion on this connection between Buber and Bakhtin, see Maurice Friedman, "Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogue of Voices and the Word That Is Spoken," *Religion & Literature* 33, no. 3 (2001): 25–36.

[107] Italics are his. M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004), 281. Bakhtin also explains: "A passive understanding of linguistic meaning is no understanding at all, it is only the abstract aspect of meaning. But even a more concrete *passive* understanding of the meaning of the utterance, an understanding of the speaker's

should not be perceived as mere objects to whom a speaker expresses a speech, in which listeners' role is only to passively understand the speech. More properly, on should understand them as subjects as well, who actively respond in a conversation. Language, in Bakhtinian philosophy, is therefore a thoroughly intersubjective dialogue.[108] "A passive understanding of linguistic meaning is no understanding at all, it is only the abstract aspect of language."[109]

Not only does Bakhtin reject what he terms Humboldt's egocentric linguistic theory, he also extends the criticism to its communal version, contending that the expressivist position logically leads to a "collective personality," which is framed in terms of national character.[110] Without naming him, Bakhtin alludes to Herder when he criticizes the slogan "the spirit of the people" (*Volksgeist*) which can also be translated as "the national character/spirit." Despite Romantics' efforts to make a philosophical move from individuality to communal theory, Bakhtin argues that "the *plurality* of speakers, and others with respect to each given speaker, is denied any real essential significance."[111] That is, to Bakhtin, the Herderian national collectivity denies the real significance of the plurality or diversity of speeches and utterances, for it reduces the plurality to a collective singularity, and disavows internal difference.

---

intention insofar as that understanding remains purely passive, purely receptive, contributes nothing new to the word under consideration, only mirroring it, seeking, at its most ambitious, merely full reproduction of that which is already given in the word – even such an understanding never goes beyond boundaries of the word's context and in no way enriches the word."

[108] The notion of "subject" is important for Bakhtin. It is no surprise that he calls individuals who speak, "speech subject" because "speech is always cast in the form of concrete utterances belonging to a particular speaking subject, and outside this form it cannot exist." (Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 71.) This is also precisely why Bakhtin thinks that the study of humanities is different from natural sciences. Concerning Bakhtin's position on the nature of the study of humanities, Todorov writes: "The human sciences, the literary studies especially, suffer from an inferiority complex with respect to natural sciences, and they would like to follow the latter's lead; but to do so is to sacrifice their specificity, forgetting that their 'object' is precisely not an object but another subject." See Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*, 19. This is apparent also in Bakhtin's literary theory that the characters in a novel have to be treated not as an objects controlled by a sovereign author, but an independent subjects who exist in a complex unfinalized dialogical relations.

[109] Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 281.

[110] Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 68.

[111] Bakhtin, 68. Italics mine.

Second, after depicting the Herderian/Humboldtian Romantic-nationalist theory of language as being inadequate, Bakhtin then proposes the idea of "active response" as a better way of understanding language. A dialogue necessitates the active involvement of speakers and listeners. Every speech or discourse is, therefore, always oriented toward an answer or a response.[112] It anticipates active feedback and responses through which a listener incorporates the word into their "conceptual system," and then delivers an answer/response.[113] Just like the speaker, a listener is an active participant in dialogue and always responds to the speaker. Speakers and responders are not objects but rather active subjects, active persons who respond in a dialogical way. That is to say, a listener does not play a passive role in understanding the message sent by a speaker, because in a real conversation there is no such thing as a passive listener and a speaker. As Bakhtin puts it, "In the actual life speech, every concrete act of understanding is active."[114] Dialogism is a conceptual space in which "the listener becomes the speaker."[115] Dialogism thus, constitutes "a series of complex interrelationships, consonances and dissonances with the word and enriches it with new elements."[116] As Michael Gardiner puts it, "Language competence is not simply a matter of the production of grammatically-correct sentences, but rather indicates the creative and reflexive adaptation of a given speech-act by

---

[112] In his early works, answerability and subjectivity are Bakhtin's major concern. He argues that it is answerability that marks an individual's subjectivity. He writes: "[W]hat guarantees the inner connection of the constituent elements of a person? Only the unity of answerability. I have to answer with my own life for what I have experienced and understood in art, so that everything I have experienced and understood would not remain ineffectual in my life. But answerability entails guilt, or liability to blame." In the context of the construction of a novel as a literary work, Bakhtin insists that both the author and the heros (or characters) are answerable subjects. See M. M. Bakhtin, *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Vadim Liapunov and Kenneth Brostrom (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990).

[113] Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 282.

[114] Bakhtin, 282.

[115] Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 68.

[116] Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 282.

particular social agents to fluid and changing social situations."[117] The Bakhtinian alternative to the well-established view of language in West Europe is therefore dialogism.

This theme also appears in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, especially when Vološinov (or/and Bakhtin) emphasizes the role of "persons" in language production. A "sign" is always "a construct between socially organized *persons* in the process of their interaction."[118] The reference to *persons* here is critical because it reinforces the idea of an intersubjective interaction in Bakhtinian tradition. On the basis of its intersubjective nature, language is thus understood primarily as a social phenomenon. "Every sign *as* sign is social, and this is no less true for the inner sign than for the outer sign… [E]very sign, even the sign of individuality, is social."[119] Todorov explains that both objective (Saussure) and subjective (Humboldt) philosophies of language have led to the idea of the "ideal image of an imaginary audience,"[120] but that such an ideal, universal, and ahistorical image of the listener does not exist in the Bakhtinian philosophy of language. With him, the speaker is as real as the listener. Both are persons, and thus free subjects, who are actively involved in the dialogical production of discourse. In Bakhtin's words: "Responsive understanding is a fundamental force, one that participates in the formulation of discourse, and it is moreover an *active* understanding, one that discourse senses as resistance or support enriching the discourse."[121]

---

[117] Michael Gardiner, *The Dialogics of Critique: M. M. Bakhtin and the Theory of Ideology* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 11.

[118] Emphasis is mine. Vološinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, 21.

[119] Vološinov, 34.

[120] Todorov borrows from G.H. Mead the term "generalized other" to reemphasize his point. Although Todorov mentions "Vossler and his disciples" as the proponents of the subjective view of language, Vološinov explicitly points to Humboldt as the source of this view. See Todorov, *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*, 43.

[121] Italics are his. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 280–81.

The theory of language that only emphasizes the role of speaker and makes the listener a passive agent, is for Bakhtin, "a completely distorted idea of the complex and multifaceted process of active speech of communication."[122] Bakthin criticizes Saussure's diagram of the speaker (producing signs) and the listener (understanding signs) for leaving the impression that this constitutes the entirety of communication process. He calls this theoretical model "a scientific fiction."[123] Bakhtin further explains:

> The fact is that when the listener perceives and understands the meaning (the language meaning) of speech, he simultaneously takes an active, responsive attitude toward it. He either agrees or disagrees with it (completely or partially), augments it, applies it, prepares for its execution, and so on. And the listener adopts this responsive attitude for the entire duration of the process of listening and understanding, from the very beginning — sometimes literally from the speaker's first word. Any understanding of live speech, a live utterance, is inherently responsive, although the degree of this activity varies extremely. Any understanding is imbued with response and necessarily elicits it in one form or another: the listener becomes the speaker.[124]

Thus, when a word is pronounced, it opens itself toward the listener and the listener will actively respond and create meaning.[125] The listener appropriates the speaker's speech into his/her own world. In short, "As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing, as heteroglot opinion, language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the other," Bakhtin writes. [126]

Third, when Bakhtin analyzes the construction of novels, especially Dostoevsky's novels, in light of his dialogical philosophy of language, he argues that what is unique about Dostoevsky's novels is their polyphony, a concept from musical theory[127] that highlights the

---

[122] Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, 68.
[123] Bakhtin, 68.
[124] Bakhtin, 68.
[125] Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 280.
[126] Bakhtin, 293.
[127] Bakhtin borrows the term "polyphony" from the work of L.P. Grossman. Grossman basically argues that other novels in Dostoevsky's time are short (on average three chapters long) and unified. Those other authors

plurality and independency voices, and thus, multiplicity of subjects.[128] Bakhtin relies on A.V.

Lunacharsky's essay "On Dostoevsky's Multivoicedness," that does a comparative analysis of

the autonomy of the "voice" of characters in Shakespeare, Balzac, and Dostoevsky. On the basis

of Lunacharsky's analysis, Bakhtin argues that Dostoevsky is the only novelist that "can be

considered the creator of genuine polyphony."[129] On the one hand, by emphasizing the

polyphonic nature of Dostoevsky's novels, Bakhtin argues that the plurality of voices is not, and

should not be, reduced to a single consciousness of the author.[130] Although these novels are

constructed by a single author, "a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and

consciousness, a genuine polyphony of fully valid voices is in fact the chief characteristic of [that

---

compose their novels in a simplistic way. "The first chapter is apparently idle chatter; but suddenly this chatter is resolved, in the last two chapters, by an unexpected catastrophe," Grossman writes. It was Dostoevsky who "transfers onto the plane of literary composition the law of musical modulation from one tonality to another." In Dostoevsky's novels, the characters are "*different voices singing variously on a single theme*." Grossman continues, "This is indeed 'multivoicedness,' exposing the diversity of life and great complexity of human experience." See Mikhail Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 41–42. Immediately after discussing Grossmann, Bakhtin acknowledges that "Grossman's observations on the musical nature of Dostoevsky's compositions are very true and subtle." He explains, "Transposing Glinka's statement that 'everything in life is counterpoint' from the language of musical theory to the language of poetics, one could say that for Dostoevsky *everything in life was dialogue, that is dialogic opposition*. And indeed, from the point of view of philosophical aesthetics, contrapuntal relationships in music are only a musical variety of more broadly understood concept of dialogic relationship." Bakhtin, 42. For further discussion on the musical theory and Bakhtinian concept of polyphony, see Aino Mäkikalli, "Concepts of Novelistic Polyphony: Person-Related and Compositional-Thematic," in *Bakhtin and His Others: (Inter)Subjectivity, Chronotope, Dialogism*, ed. Liisa Steinby and Tintti Klapuri (London, New York, and Delhi: Anthem Press, 2013), 37–54.

[128] Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 72.

[129] Bakhtin, 34.

[130] Bakhtin discusses Leo Tolstoy's short story, "Three Death," as an example of a monologic novel. Tolstoy is different from Dostoevsky because his construction of novel is thoroughly monologic. "This work, not large in size but nevertheless tri-leveled, is very characteristic of Tolstoy's monologic manner," Bakhtin explains. The meaning of entire story, which portrays three paths of lives, has already been finalized by Tolstoy's intention and design. "Tolstoy's world is monolithically monologic; the hero's discourse is confined in the fixed framework of the author's discourse about him. Even the hero's final word is given in the shell of someone else's (the author's) word; the hero's self-consciousness is only one aspect of his fixed image and is in fact predetermined by that image, even where thematically consciousness undergoes a crisis and the most radical inner revolution (as in "Master and Man")." Bakhtin, 56. One thing that we should note about Tolstoy in Bakhtin's writings. On the one hand, in *The Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics,* Bakhtin depicts Tolstoy as a monologic author who finalizes all the characters in accordance to his intention. On the other hand, in his "Discourse in the Novel," Bakhtin interestingly describes Tolstoy as an author "characterized by a sharp internal dialogism." Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 283. Some Bakhtinian scholars have noticed this complexity of Bakhtin's relationship with Tolstoy. See for example Caryl Emerson, "The Tolstoy Connection in Bakhtin," *PMLA* 100, no. 1 (1985): 68–80; Ann Shukman, "Bakhtin and Tolstoy," *Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature* 9, no. 1 (September 1, 1984).

author's] novels."[131] On the other hand, although Bakhtin recognizes both the plurality and the independence of characters in novels, they all exist in the complexity of the interconnected dialogical relations. "The polyphonic novel is dialogic through and through," he stresses.[132]

Fourth, unlike Hegelian dialectical philosophy, the dialogism in Bakhtin is unfinalized meaning that it is always open-ended.[133] Pointing to the complexity of dialogical interconnectedness of dialogized characters in Dostoevsky's novels, Bakhtin insists that dialogism cannot be simply "reduced to thesis, antithesis, and synthesis."[134] That is, in Dostoevsky's novels do not express a teleologically "unified spirit,"[135] for such a unified spirit or synthesis would result in a monological system of thought. "The unified, dialectically evolving spirit, understood in Hegelian terms, can give rise to nothing but a philosophical monologue," he writes.[136]

---

[131] Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 6. Bakhtin explains further, "In a monologic design, the hero is closed and his semantic boundaries strictly defined: he acts, experiences, thinks, and is conscious within the limits of what he is, that is, within the limits of his image defined as reality; he cannot cease to be himself, that is, he cannot exceed the limits of his own character, typicality or temperament without violating the author's monologic design concerning him. Such an image is constructed in the objective authorial world, objective in relation to the hero's consciousness; the construction of that authorial world with its points of view and finalizing definitions presupposes a fixed external position, a fixed authorial field of vision. The self-consciousness of the hero is inserted into this rigid framework, to which the hero has no access from within and which is part of the authorial consciousness defining and representing him —and is presented against the firm background of the external world." (Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 52.)

[132] Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 40.

[133] In Dostoevsky's novel, Bakhtin points out that even the author, i.e., Dostoevsky, does not have an "end" of "final" point in mind. Bakhtin observes, "In Dostoevsky's rough drafts the polyphonic nature of his work, the fundamental open-endedness of his dialogues, is revealed in raw and naked form. He further notes, "We do in fact observe in Dostoevsky's novels a unique conflict between internal open-endedness of the characters and dialogue, and the *external* (in most cases compositional and thematic) *completedness* of every individual novel." However, Bakhtin still insists that this external factor cannot exhaust the "essential dialogicality of Dostoevsky" that appears in a vivid way in "dialogues carried on by the characters." Bakhtin, 39–40.

[134] Bakhtin, 26.

[135] Bakhtin, 26.

[136] Bakhtin, 26. Concerning Bakhtin's concept of dialogism in relation to Hegelian dialectics, Michael Holquist states, "Dialogism's drive to meaning should not be confused with the Hegelian impulse toward a single state of higher consciousness in the future. In Bakhtin there is no one meaning being striven for: the world is a vast congeries of contesting meanings, a heteroglossia so varied that no single term capable of unifying its diversifying energies is possible" (Holquist, *Dialogism*, 22.). Comparing Bakhtin with Hegel and Georg Lukács, Holquist explains that while Bakhtin agrees with Hegel and Lukács that the construction of "novel" has something to do with

For Bakhtin, the multiplicity of voices, i.e., polyphony, and its unfinalizability is a social

fact that has to be taken seriously and should not be reduced to a single consciousness of an

author.[137] The monologic structure is produced by an authorial intention, or what Bakhtin calls

"a fixed authorial field of vision."[138] In this design, a hero does not have independence. A hero

is like a puppet who is completely controlled by the author. In the words of Caryl Emerson, "In

a monologic world, truth is impersonal. It is placed in a character's mouth by the author.

Characters are not creators of ideas but merely carriers."[139] For Bakhtin, Dostoevsky

demonstrates in a clear way that the author of a novel is not the sovereign consciousness that

finalizes, totalizes, and monoligizes the multiplicities of voices.

> In Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel we are dealing not with ordinary dialogic form, that is,
> with an unfolding of material within the frame-work of its own monologic understanding
> and against the firm back-ground of a unified world of objects. No, here we are dealing
> with an ultimate dialogicality, that is, a dialogicality of the ultimate whole. The dramatic
> whole is, as we have pointed out, in this respect monologic; Dostoevsky's novel is
> dialogic. It is constructed not as the whole of a single consciousness, absorbing other
> consciousnesses as objects into itself, but as a whole formed by the interaction of several
> consciousnesses, none of which entirely becomes an object for the other; this interaction
> provides no support for the viewer who would objectify an entire event according to

---

"the history of human consciousness," Bakhtin's human consciousness has never been finalized and unified. "In Bakhtin's history, the criteria by which higher degrees of consciousness can be judged are not singularity and unity as in Hegel and Lukács, but rather multiplicity and variety" (Ibid., 72). Cf. Gardiner, *The Dialogics of Critique*, 97.

[137] This is what Bakhtin writes about different levels of contradictory spirits in Dostoevsky's novels: "If multi-leveledness and contradictoriness were present to Dostoevsky or perceived by him solely as a fact of his personal life, as the multi-leveledness and contradictoriness of the spirit – his own and others – then Dostoevsky would be a Romantic, and he would have created a monologic novel about the contradictory evolution of the human spirit, very much in keeping with the Hegelian idea. But in fact Dostoevsky found and was capable of perceiving multi-leveledness and contradictoriness not in the spirit, but in the objective social world. In this social world, planes were not stages but *opposing camps*, and the contradictory relationships among them were not the rising or descending course of an individual personality, but the *condition of society*. The mutileveledness and contradictoriness of social reality was present as an objective fact of the epoch." See Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 27.

[138] Bakhtin, 52. In this fixed authorial field of vision, Bakhtin basically argues, "the self-consciousness of the hero is inserted into this rigid framework, to which the hero has no access from within and which is part of the authorial consciousness defining and representing him–and is presented against the firm background of the external world."

[139] Emerson, "The Tolstoy Connection in Bakhtin," 69.

some ordinary monologic category (thematically, lyrically or cognitively) —and this consequently makes the viewer also a participant.[140]

Bakhtin's idea of consciousness and therefore "person" is significantly different from the western European unified philosophical consciousness because it highlights this radical unfinalizability and multiplicities. Consequently, a finalized and unified person is an object, not a subject. "As long as a person is alive he lives by the fact that he is not yet finalized, that he has not yet uttered his ultimate word."[141] This he applies not only to the way an author should let the characters (i.e., the others) in a novel be unfinalized and dialogical; Bakhtin even argues that a person cannot be finalized either.[142] In this sense, I as a person never know myself in totality.[143] My existence is always dialogical and unfinalized.

In sum, Bakhtin's ideas of active response, dialogism, polyphony, and unfinalizability are an essential foundation upon which his philosophy of language is built. As we discuss these concepts, we will have to remember always that Bakhtin incorporates and discusses all these concepts together throughout his works and that I separate them only for analytical purposes. In the following I examine his concept of polyglossia and heteroglossia, ideas that are again clearly rooted in the themes that we have discussed above.

---

[140] Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 18.

[141] Bakhtin, 59.

[142] Bakthin explains: "A man never coincides with himself. One cannot apply to him the formula of identity A = A. In Dostoevsky's artistic thinking, the genuine life of the personality takes place at the point of non-coincidence between a man and himself, at his point of departure beyond the limits of all that he is as a material being, a being that can be spied on, defined, predicted apart from its own will, 'at second hand.' The genuine life of the personality is made available only through a *dialogic* penetration of that personality, during which it freely and reciprocally reveals itself." Bakhtin, 59.

[143] Bakhtin's notion of dialogic self and subjectivity that cannot be finalized are indeed very similar to that of the idea of face, other, and infinity in Emmanuel Levinas. For further discussion on Bakhtin and Levinas, see Jeffrey T. Nealon, "The Ethics of Dialogue: Bakhtin and Levinas," *College English* 59, no. 2 (1997): 129–48; Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan, "Between the Face and the Voice: Bakhtin Meets Levinas," *Continental Philosophy Review* 41, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 43–58; Jeffrey W. Murray, "Bakhtinian Answerability and Levinasian Responsibility: Forging a Fuller Dialogical Communicative Ethics," *Southern Communication Journal* 65, no. 2–3 (March 1, 2000): 133–50.

Polyglossia and Heteroglossia

Although Bakhtin's major works deal primarily with Dostoevsky and François Rabelais,

Bakhtin was educated as a philologist and classicist in St. Petersburg,[144] and grew up studying

both Greek and Latin literature.[145] The polyphony and Carnivalesque of both Dostoevsky and

Rabelais is the acme of a long historical development since the Hellenistic period. Before the

coming of modern novels, Bakhtin argues that in the so-called "prehistory of novelistic

discourse,"[146] there are two important factors that contribute to the formation of a literary work:

laughter and *polyglossia*.[147] The fluidity and diversity of parody that provoke laugher, for

Bakhtin, is intended to "ridicule the straightforward, serious word in all its generic guises."[148]

After spending page after page analyzing both the Greek and the Roman cultures of laughter,

Bakhtin insists that "It was Rome that taught European culture how to laugh and ridicule."

However, laughter can only work, according to Bakhtin, "under the condition of thoroughgoing

---

[144] Michael E. Gardiner and Michael Mayerfeld Bell, "Bakhtin and the Human Sciences: A Brief Introduction," in *Bakhtin and the Human Sciences: No Last Words*, ed. Michael E. Gardiner and Michael Mayerfeld Bell (London: SAGE, 1998), 1.

[145] For further discussion of Bakhtin and classical literature, see Robert Bracht Branham, *Bakhtin and the Classics* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2002).

[146] Modern study of novels, according to Bakhtin, is marked by the works of Abbé Huet, Wieland, Blankenburg, and German Romantic thinkers (Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis). A more significant development in the study of novels and novelists happened after 1920s. There are five distinctive ways of stylistic analysis of novels that Bakhtin proposes: "(1) the author's portions alone in the novel are analyzed, that is only direct words of the author more or less correctly isolated – an analysis constructed in terms of the usual, direct poetic methods of representation and expression (metaphors, comparisons, lexical registers, etc.); (2) instead of a stylistic analysis of the novel as an artistic whole, there is a neutral linguistic description of the novelist's language; (3) in a given novelist's language, elements characteristic of his particular literary tendency are isolated (be it Romanticism, Naturalism, Impressionism, etc.); (4) what is sought in the language of the novel is examined as an expression of the individual personality, that is, language is analyzed as the individual style of the given novelist; (5) the novel is viewed " See Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 41–42.

[147] Bakhtin, 50.

[148] Bakhtin, 52.

polyglossia," because "only polyglossia fully frees consciousness from the tyranny of its own language and its own myth of language."[149]

Now, what does it mean when Bakhtin speaks about *polyglossia*? In the next paragraph, right after Bakhtin argues for the role of *polyglossia* in enhancing and provoking laughter, he contends that "Roman literary consciousness was bilingual." What are these languages? Bakhtin speak particularly about Latin and Greek. "From its very first steps, the Latin literary word viewed itself in the light of the Greek word, *through the eyes* of the Greek word;. . . Latin literary language in all its generic diversity was created in the light of Greek literary language."[150] These languages, i.e., Latin and Greek, are national languages. Polyglossia is a term that Bakhtin employs to explain the co-existence and interconnectedness of many national languages in a literary production, especially parody. "Its national distinctiveness and the specific verbal thought process inherent in it were realized in creative literary consciousness in a way that would have been absolutely impossible under conditions of monoglossia."[151] Not only bilingual, Bakhtin also talks about "*tri*lingualism" (Greek, Oscan, and Latin) in Latin literary tradition, especially in the Calabrian Ennius.[152]

Bakhtin further argues that the polyglossia of the Roman world of literature is the further cultivation of what had already taken place in the Hellenistic period. The Roman polyglossia, in his words, was the "concluding phase of Hellenism" because the Greek world was characterized

---

[149] Bakhtin, 61.

[150] This particularly refers the presence of Greek influence in Roman literature, even "in such a great Roman creation as *Aeneid*." Bakhtin, 62.

[151] Bakhtin, 62.

[152] Bakhtin, 63.

by "a complex polyglossia."[153] The Greeks were surrounded by a polyglot barbarian world. The

example of this polyglossic reality in the larger Greek civilization is in Samosata (now Syria),

the hometown of the satirist, Lucian. Concerning this town, Bakhtin writes:

> The original inhabitants of Samosata were Syrians who spoke Aramaic. The entire
> literary and educated upper classes of the urban population spoke and wrote in Greek.
> The official language of the administration and chancellery was Latin, all administrators
> were Romans, and there was a Roman legion stationed in the city. A great thoroughfare
> passed through Samosata (strategically very important) along which flowed the languages
> of Mesopotamia, Persia and even India. Lucian's cultural and linguistic consciousness
> was born and shaped at this point of intersection of cultures and languages. The cultural
> and linguistic environment of the African Apuleius and the writers of Greek novels–who
> were for the most part Hellenized barbarians–is analogous to Lucian's.[154]

Again, it is clear that Bakhtin uses the term "polyglossia" in a way that is similar to the modern

term multilingualism, that refers primarily to the different established national unified languages.

Polyglossia is the social reality in which the "major national languages" are interconnected.[155]

However, in spite of the great diversity of languages (*polyglossia*) in the Greek world,

Bakhtin insists that the tendency of Greek novels and literary production is profoundly

monoglossic. The Greeks constructed their literature from within their mother tongue because

the Hellenistic period was marked linguistically by a "stable and monologic" state.[156] Bakhtin

notes that, "[I]mages of languages that are capable of reflecting in a polyglot manner speakers of

the era are almost entirely absent in the Greek novel. In this respect certain varieties of

Hellenistic and Roman satire are incomparably more 'novelistic' than the Greek novels."[157] This

---

[153] Bakhtin, 63. "From the point of view of polyglossia, Rome was merely the concluding phase of
Hellenism, a phase whose final gesture was to carry into the barbarian world of Europe a radical polyglossia, and
thus make possible the creation of a new type of medieval polyglossia."

[154] Bakhtin, 64.

[155] Bakhtin, 66.

[156] Bakhtin, 66. This is why Bakhtin points out that "all plots, all subjects and thematic material, the entire
basic stock of images, expressions and intonations, arose from within the very heart of the native language."

[157] Bakhtin, 65–66.

literary tendency is indeed something that baffles Bakhtin because for him there is no such thing as pure *monoglossia*. "After all, one's own language is never a single language: in it there are always survivals of the past and a potential for other-languagedness," Bakhtin asserts.[158] That is to say, monoglossia is never absolute in its essence.

Conceptually, in order to shake further the myth of the stability or purity of monoglossia, Bakhtin adds another layer of linguistic category, namely *heteroglossia*. Heteroglossia is different from *polyglossia*. *Heteroglossia* refers to the stratified languages, which Bakhtin describes as "the problem of internal differentiation," within a perceived unified national language.[159] This subtle distinction between *polyglossia* and *heteroglossia* lies primarily in the relationship between national languages and stratified languages. *Polyglossia* refers to the multiplicity of national languages, whereas *heteroglossia* refers to the multiplicity of stratification within a particular national language. Recall that Bakhtin believes that a unified national language, such as French, Spanish, Greek, etc., is unstable. This instability is because a national language is the work of centripetal forces of language, a concept that I will explain further below.

The theme of heteroglossia Bakhtin explores in more detail in his other essay "Discourse in the Novel," where he wrestles with the question of the stylistic diversification of the novel. This diversification is a direct result of the multiplicity of existing speeches in a novel (i.e., the voices of the author, characters, narrators, etc.). Bakhtin defines a novel as "a diversity of social speech types (sometimes even diversity of languages) and diversity of individual voices, artistically organized."[160] In this sense, a novel is basically a reworking and reorganizing of the

---

[158] Bakhtin, 66.
[159] Bakhtin, 67.
[160] Bakhtin, 262.

169

multiplicity of speeches and utterances. "The novel as a whole is a phenomenon multiform in style and variform in speech and voice," Bakhtin writes.[161] This diversity is deeply embedded in the reality of social stratification itself.[162]

Now, the diversity of *heteroglossia* in a single national language covers a great diversity of linguistic types and kinds. *Heteroglossia* is the basic reality of language, and a novel dialogically incorporates it in portraying a complex dialogical interrelationship among characters. That is to say, the incorporation of *heteroglossia* is a distinctive feature of the novel as a genre. Here is how Bakhtin breaks this down:

> The internal stratification of any single national language into social dialects, characteristic group behavior, professional jargons, generic languages, languages of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of the authorities, of various circles and of passing fashions, languages that serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the day, even the hour (each day has its own slogan, its own vocabulary, its own emphases)–this internal stratification present in every language at any given moment of its historical existence is the indispensable prerequisite for the novel as a genre. . . . These distinctive links and interrelationships between utterances and languages, this movement of theme through different languages and speech types, its dispersion into the rivulets and droplets of social heteroglossia, its dialogization–this is the basic distinguishing feature of the stylistics of the novel.[163]

From elaboration, we can pinpoint several important points. First, the concept of *heteroglossia* is directly related to Bakhtin's discussion on speech genres, as I have discussed in the previous section. Language, as expressed through human utterances, is inherently and radically diverse., i.e. *heteroglot*. Second, the *heteroglossia* takes many different shapes. It takes the form of different dialects, different class-specific or status-specific languages, different age-specific speeches, etc. Long before Pierre Bourdieu speaks of "the specialized languages,"[164] Bakhtin

---

[161] Bakhtin, 261.

[162] Bakhtin, 263.

[163] Bakhtin, 263.

[164] See Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), chap. 6.

had already discussed it in terms of *heteroglossia*. Arguable, Bakhtin's *heteroglossia* is categorically broader than and different from the Bourdieuan specialized languages as Bourdieu speaks only about the "alteration of the common language."[165] For Bakhtin, *heteroglossia* is not just a specific change to the unified language: it is the original state of language. Third, the diversity of *heteroglossia* is the multiplicity of stratified languages does not exist in isolation, but in a dialogical way. The style of a novel, therefore, should not be reduced and subordinated to a set of general patterns or structures.[166] To put it differently, the *heteroglossia* is not only dialogical but also unfinalized.

Having discussed these two important concepts about language, i.e., *polyglossia* and *heteroglossia*, the question that one might ask is: How does the diversity of *heteroglossia* relate to the unified national language? Bakhtin explains the connection between heteroglossia and a unified national language by making a distinction between between centripetal and centrifugal forces of language. To stress its immense importance in Bakhtin, Holquist (and dialogically with Emerson?) insists that the tension between centripetal and centrifugal forces lies "at the heart of

---

[165] Bourdieu, 137.

[166] The traditional stylistic analysis fails to articulate the complex interconnectedness between the multiple voices and the holistic unity of a novel. Bakhtin states that the traditional approach "has no method for approaching the distinctive social dialogue among languages that is present in the novel." The failure takes place in two different forms, according to Bakhtin. The first failure is to replace the existing multiplicity of languages in a novel to the voice or language of the novelist. The second one is to take a single [subordinated] voice within a novel and use it as the representation of the entirety of the novel. Concerning the first failure, Bakhtin points out that the view that the particularity of an author's language is the style of the entirety of the novel is "doubly imprecise." Such an approach will consequently lead to a selective and eclectic analysis in order to fit the already constructed "frame of a single language system." As such, Bakhtin writes, "the whole of the novel and the specific tasks involved in constructing this whole out of heteroglot, multi-voiced, multi-styled and often multi-languaged elements remain outside the boundaries of such a study." (Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 265.) With regards to the second failure, the analysis moves from the author to the novel itself. Taking a particular element from a novel to be the representation of the whole is "inadequate to the style not only of the novelistic whole but even of that element isolated as fundamental for a given novel–inasmuch as that element, removed from its interaction with others, changes its stylistic meaning and ceases to be that which it in fact had been in the novel." (Bakhtin, 266.) Bakhtin's discussion on how scholars have interpreted Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel is precisely his critique of these two inadequate approaches to novel.

171

everything Bakhtin ever did–from what we know of his very earliest (lost) manuscripts to the very latest (still unpublished) work."[167]

The Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces of Language

A tension between the diversity of languages and the unified language emerges out of and related to two forces operative spontaneously in language — what Bakhtin calls "two poles in the life of language."[168] The first pole are the forces that unify language into a central system are the "centripetal forces of language."[169] This, Bakhtin argues, is not the natural condition of language, for he insists that language is never unitary. He writes:

> Language – like the living concrete environment in which the consciousness of the verbal artist lives – is never unitary. It is unitary only as an abstract grammatical system of normative forms, taken in isolation from the concrete, ideological conceptualizations that fills it, and in isolation from the uninterrupted process of historical becoming that is characteristic of all living language. Actual social life and historical becoming create within an abstractly unitary national language of a multitude of concrete worlds, a multitude of bounded verbal-ideological and social belief systems; within these various systems (identical in the abstract) are elements of language filled with various semantic and axiological content and each with its own different sound.[170]

Thus, a monologic system of language is an abstraction. The centripetal forces of language would flatten languages into a single system. As Bakhtin points out in the quotation above, a "national" language is the best example of the centripetal force of language. The efforts to centralize language into a unitary system "is conditioned by the specific sociohistorical destinies of European languages." The establishment of nation-state in the European post-Enlightenment period requires both standardization and unification of language. Modern European political

---

[167] Michael Holquist, "Introduction," in *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, by M. M. Bakhtin, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004), xviii.

[168] Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 269.

[169] Bakhtin, 270.

[170] Bakhtin, 288.

bodies are established in and through these "processes of sociopolitical and cultural centralization."[171] Mary Klages puts it this way: "The centripetal force of monologia is trying to get rid of differences among languages (or rhetorical modes) in order to present one unified language. Monologia is a system of norms, of one standard language, or an 'official' language, and which would then be enforced by various mechanisms."[172] The centripetal forces of language, consequently, have to "operate in the midst of heteroglossia."[173] Thus, without heteroglossia, there is no need for any unifying efforts.

The second pole are the forces that decentralize language or break language apart. Bakhtin calls them "centrifugal forces of language." Both forces work simultaneously in every enunciation of a speech. Bakhtin states:

> Every concrete utterance of a speaking subject serves as a point where centrifugal as well as centripetal forces are brought to bear. The processes of centralization and decentralization, of unification and disunification, intersect in the utterance; the utterance not only answers the requirements of its own language as an individualized embodiment of a speech act, but it answers the requirements of heteroglossia as well; it is in fact an active participant in such speech diversity... Every utterance participates in the 'unitary language' (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces).[174]

Though he acknowledges that both forces work simultaneously, Bakhtin also points out that the studies of linguistics and philosophy of language have been "born and shaped by the current centralizing tendencies in the life of language," and "have ignored this dialogized heteroglossia, in which is embodied the centrifugal forces in the life of language."[175]

---

[171] Bakhtin, 271.

[172] Mary Klages, *Literary Theory: A Guide for the Perplexed* (New York and London: Continuum, 2006), 138.

[173] Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 271.

[174] Bakhtin, 272.

[175] Bakhtin, 273.

This observation is particularly true in the work of Saussure that we have discussed above. While Saussure argues that the system of unified language can be constructed in its synchronic axis, Bakhtin contends that language is "heteroglot from top to bottom" both diachronically and synchronically. "It [heteroglot] represents the co-existence of socio-ideological contradictions between the present and the past, between differing epochs of the past, between tendencies, schools, circles, and so forth, all given a bodily form."[176] Thus, the centripetal force will never be able to eliminate the heteroglossia altogether. Language will always remain diverse and multiform because, as Bakhtin insists: "a unitary language is not something given [*dan*] but is always in essence posited [*zadan*]."[177] It is heteroglossia that is the true characteristic of language, not the unitary language.

As we should well expect, Bakhtin insists that the multiplicity of utterances does not exist in a vacuum or isolation, but always intersects in a dialogical way with one another. Bakhtin states, "[L]anguages do not *exclude* each other, but rather intersect with each other in many different ways (the Ukranian language, the language of the epic poem, of early Symbolism, of the student, of a particular generation of children, of the run-of-the-mill intellectual, of the Nietzschean and so on)."[178] This assertion demonstrates that in Bakhtin the line that distinguishes between *polyglossia* and *heteroglossia* is somewhat blurred. *Polyglossia* and *heteroglossia* all intersect with one another in a dialogized way. Hence, within such a theoretical context of a radical dialogized multiplicity and intersectionality of language, Bakhtin acknowledges that "it might even seem that the very word of 'language' loses all meaning in this

---

[176] Bakhtin, 291.
[177] Bakhtin, 270.
[178] Bakhtin, 291.

process." [179] This is the very reason that instead of speaking of the unitary language, in Saussurean terms, Bakhtin prefers the idea of intersectionality of language.

For Bakhtin, "the word in language is half someone else's. It becomes 'one's own' only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention."[180] Language works through this appropriation of the other's word. Every time one speaks, one has to appropriate, or exapproriate, a linguistic unit that has already existed in other worlds or contexts. Intention and meaning, in other words, is thoroughly contextual. Language, therefore, "is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker's intention; it is populated–overpopulated–with the intentions of others. Expropriating it, forcing it to submit to one's own intentions and accents, is a difficult and complicated process."[181] For Bakhtin, "each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all words and forms are populated by intentions. Contextual overtones (generic, tendentious, individualistic) are inevitable in the word."[182]

Since Bakhtin insists on the idea that "language is not an abstract system of normative forms but rather a concrete *heteroglot conception of the world*,"[183] one can detect in Bakhtin a significant departure from the concept of language as system to language as discourse. Language is not the *means* through and in which an individual conceptualizes his/her own world; rather, language is the conceptualization of one's world itself. It is thus crucial to note that the

---

[179] Bakhtin, 291.

[180] Bakhtin, 293.

[181] Bakhtin, 294.

[182] Bakhtin, 293.

[183] Bakhtin, 293. Emphasis is mine.

unification of language, through the works of centripetal forces, does not just pertain to the standardization of speech, but above all, "the unification of the verbal-ideological life of the nation and the epoch."[184] It is the repression of the heteroglossia, the multiplicity of conceptions of the world. Here Bakhtin clearly expands, or revises, the Saussurean notion of *parole*. Speech event is not an arbitrary enunciation of sign. A word, as a sign, is crowded with intentions. One has to appropriate others' intentions into one's world, which is a complex process in itself, according to Bakhtin. As such, speech is the expression of one's conceptualization, contextualization, and appropriation of the world.

It is in the carnivalization of language in the form of satire, comedy, and parody that Bakhtin sees the potential of the subversive element of language. It is through the playful use of these stratifications of language that the powerful unifying structure of language is mocked and ridiculed. It is parody that makes language come alive.[185] For example, of the Middle Ages, Bakhtin observes, "[The] satire is a complex intentional linguistic hybrid. The language of obscure people is parodied, that is, it coalesces into stereotype, it is exaggerated, reduced to a type–when measured against the standard of the proper and correct Latin of the humanists."[186] It is in the "slippery slope" use of language that a parody or satire becomes a revolutionary force.

That said, one can see that Bakhtin's critique of Saussure is rooted in his understanding of the unified system of language still being thoroughly historical. It is the result of European political struggle, especially in their efforts to build their sovereign nation-states. The centripetal forces come primarily from external directions for a certain political end. Language(s),[187] by

---

[184] Bakhtin, 273.
[185] Bakhtin, 80.
[186] Bakhtin, 81.
[187] See ibid., 291.

contrast, do(es) not exist in a unified form of system, but rather in an extreme diversity. Heteroglossia will constantly resist the authority and forces of linguistic unification.

However, while I understand that Bakhtin worked in the context of Europe in the early twentieth century, one thing that he seems to have overlooked is that the centripetal forces of language are not the phenomena only of internal European nation-state politics. Such forces are also a global force spurred by Europeans' colonial power. The global spread of English, French, and Spanish is the direct result of the global centripetal forces of language whose weight I, who grew up in Indonesia and now live in the United States, experience every day. The dominance of English in the United States of America is not just a product of a local nation-state building process, but also a result of the history of British colonialism in America.

Before I discuss the reality of language struggle in the United States, I need to clarify the use of the terms *heteroglossia* and *polyglossia* in this dissertation. I prefer to use the term *heteroglossia* throughout because it is a far broader category than *polyglossia*.[188] *Polyglossia* refers mainly to the multiplicity of national languages. *Heteroglossia*, however, is at the heart of Bakhtinian philosophy of language that stresses the social reality of human utterances or speeches. *Heteroglossia* is not only about multiplicity of language, but also the stratification of speech. *Polyglossia* is in a way a particular expression of *heteroglossia*. Because *polyglossia* expresses the reality of *heteroglossia*, it is thoroughly stratified as well. We can see this clearly in the United States, as I will discuss in more detail below.

---

[188] Concerning the issue of the diversity of speech habits within the context of a larger dominant language, Charles Ferguson introduced a rather similar concept to Bakhtinian *heteroglossia* in 1959, a concept that has been used widely in sociolinguistic study. It is called *diglossia*, which appears when "two or more varieties of the same language are used by some speakers under different conditions." Ferguson bases his diglossic analysis on the variety of dialects that exist within the larger category of four "defining languages," i.e., Arabic, Modern Greek, Swiss German, and Haitian Creole. The dynamic between the defining, or standardized, language and its internal variety is described by the H (high) and L (low). The H category refers to the standardized language while the L category the regional dialects. See Charles A. Ferguson, "Diglossia," *WORD* 15, no. 2 (January 1, 1959): 325–40.

2.4. Immigration and Language Struggle in the United States: A Contextual (Re)collection

In the political climate of 2017, language is critical in the politics of both national and ethnic identity. Dennis Baron, in his discussion of the English-Only movement in the United States, points out that "language is central to national culture, as well as to the more genetically defined ethnos. When language functions as an essential token of cultural identification, changes in linguistic status quo can produce disruption."[189] This cultural identification through the political effort of unifying language is always disrupted by the stubborn presence of the multiplicity of languages, that is the *heteroglossia*.

It is always important to remember that the US Constitution does not designate English as the official language.[190] Although the House of Representatives passed "The English Empowerment Act" on August 1, 1996, the bill failed in the Senate.[191] A similar attempt to constitute English as the official language of the US reoccurred under "The English Unity Act" bill introduced in 2005. Yet none of these bills has become the law of the land, and so one could say that English has never been the official language of the United States. Instead, the dominance of contemporary English must find its roots in the long history of America as a former British colony. In fact, the reputation of English as an international language cannot be separated from

---

[189] Dennis E. Baron, *The English-Only Question: An Official Language for Americans?* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 6.

[190] Dennis E. Baron correctly states, "Although many Americans assume that English is the official language of the United States, it is not. That is, no-where in the U.S. Constitution is English privileged over other languages, and while a few subsequent federal laws require the use of English for special, limited purposes — air traffic control, product labels, warnings, official notices, service on federal juries, and naturalization of immigrants… no law establishes English as the language of the land." See Baron, 1.

[191] See Thomas K. Ricento, "Partitioning by Language: Whose Right Are Threatened?," in *Language and Politics in the United States and Canada: Myths and Realities* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998), 322–23.

its connection to the historical expansion of the British imperial power.[192] Therefore, although on the surface America may appear to be a multicultural society and the land of immigrants, people here are still subjected to the dominance of the imperial language. The idea of becoming American is both politically and socially tied to the ability to speak English. The propaganda of a "melting pot" society simply means that one needs to subject oneself to the dominant culture rooted in the hegemony of English. As an immigrant whose native language is not English, echoing Frantz Fanon's sentiment that "to speak a language is to take on a world, a culture,"[193] I see English not only as a means of communication but also as a political apparatus imposed on others by the dominant culture. Language is thus a site of political struggle.

At a basic level, to be political means to be a part of and to engage in polis. Politics is directly related to human relations as a community. The community can be small or large in size, local or international. In this project, I use the term "politics" in this general sense. It refers to both formal and informal processes that determine the structures, policies, and decisions of human life as a community.[194] As Ellen Grigsby puts it: "politics encompasses all those

---

[192] David Crystal, a British linguist, blatantly denies the impact of colonialism on the politics of English as a global language today. His argument is simple: English is a dominant language today because it peculiarly "found itself in the right place at the right time." He contends that although colonialism is a historical reality, "the emphasis is now on *discontinuity*, away from power and towards functional specialization." In other words, instead of looking into the globalized spread of English as a direct historical impact of colonialism, Crystal thinks that we should see more into how English has been useful economically, socially, and politically, in many parts of the world. He writes further: "It is a model which sees English playing a central role in empowering the subjugated and marginalized, and eroding the division between the 'haves' and the 'have nots.'" English is not only a neutral language that expands because it finds itself in the right place at the right time, but English also has become a sort of "superhero" that saves human civilization. David Crystal, *English as a Global Language*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also my discussion on Crystal in Ekaputra Tupamahu, "Tongues as a Site of Subversion," *Pneuma* 38, no. 3 (January 1, 2016): 266.

[193] Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann, Get Political (London: Pluto Press, 1991), 25.

[194] Ruth Lister points out that the distinction between formal and informal political processes is directly related to the gender struggle. In the formal political processes, men are the dominant players. Women are still underrepresented in the formal structure of politics. Women, however, play a critical role in an informal political space. Even though they do not occupy formal political positions, women actively work through their maternal role at home or other social activism at local community to influence formal political processes. However, Lister simultaneously argues "if political citizenship is to promote women's equality as well as their difference, women

decisions regarding how we make rules that govern our *common* life…. politics is based on the

recognition that our lives are shared, as long as we live in common, public spaces such as state

territories."[195] Since politics pertains to human communal life, it is always a site of complex

struggle of interests, agenda, priorities, cultures, and so on. In other words, political space is

thoroughly an arena of contestation. Thus, the idea that "communities are marked by

homogeneity and cohesion; [that] their members share language, culture, and beliefs of a moral

and religious nature; and [that] their lives are govern[ed] by common norms and customs," as

Larry Johnston points out, is not always true. Any of the items that Johnston lists above can only

become a shared item through a process of struggle for domination and control. Political

theorists often employ the term "power" to signify dominance and control. Power and politics

are interconnected.[196]

The aim of the following discussion is to locate the particularity of my struggle within the

larger context of the politics of language in America. The overall guiding premise of this

discussion is that linguistic struggle among immigrants in the United States had taken place since

the very beginning of the history of this nation. The struggle appears not only among the

Europeans themselves, but also between the Europeans and the native Americans, African

Americans, and other non-European immigrants. This country is not a melting pot but rather a

---

will also have to engage with the formal political system. The value of informal politics does not provide an alibi for
the continued under-representation of women and 'minority groups' in the formal structures of power." See Ruth
Lister, *Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives* (New York: NYU Press, 2003), 153. For further discussion on the issue
of gender and formal-informal politics, see Martha E. Thompson and Michael Armato, *Investigating Gender*
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), chap. 6; Barbara Hobson, Jane Lewis, and Birte Siim, "Introduction: Contested
Concepts in Gender and Social Politics," in *Contested Concepts in Gender and Social Politics*, ed. Barbara Hobson,
Jane Lewis, and Birte Siim (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub, 2002), 1–22.

[195] Ellen Grigsby, *Analyzing Politics: An Introduction to Political Science*, 4th edition, Cengage
Advantage Books (Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning, 2008), 6.

[196] Scholars differ greatly in their understanding of power. Without ignoring the complexity of the
discussion on power, this project is indebted to the works of French philosopher, Michel Foucault. Foucault's
theory of power encompasses the complexity of human relations both in the formal and informal spaces. I will
discuss his conception of power in more detail in the next section of this chapter.

boiling pot, a space of struggle, a contested pot. It is worth noting also that I am not going to

pretend that this presentation is a comprehensive analysis of the politics of language in the

United States. Far from it! However, I hope that by describing the reality of language as a site of

struggle, I can highlight the Bakhtinian concept of centripetal and centrifugal forces of language

that I just discussed above.

2.4.1. For an Immigrant Like Me, Language is Always a Struggle

I set foot on US soil for the first time in 2009 when I arrived at Los Angeles airport as an

international student to study at Claremont School of Theology.[197] While I was at Claremont, I

also worked with a local Indonesian congregation in Redlands, California, which was in many

ways an eye-opening experience and opportunity for me to understand the struggle of many

immigrants, especially first-generation Indonesian immigrants. In spite of having had good

careers back home, I saw many of them having to struggle to survive in the United States

because they did not speak English well. Many had to take low-paid jobs that do not require

much English proficiency. This linguistic struggle thus does not just pertain to one's inability to

express oneself in another language, it also seriously affects one's socio-economic condition.

Participation in American socio-economic life requires one to be proficient in English.

Language also often becomes the mark of one's foreignness in this society. As Sze-kar

Wan describes his experience with speaking English, language is the site of his perpetual

otherness.[198] After listening to the way I speak, I often receive this response from people: "From

---

[197] These two paragraphs are included in the essay that will be published in "Lost and Silenced in Translation: Reading 1 Cor. 14:26-30 from an Asian American Perspective" in Seung Ai Yang and Uriah Kim (eds.) The T&T Clark Handbook to Asian American Biblical Hermeneutics. London: T&T Clark, 2018. [forthcoming]

[198] See Sze-kar Wan, "Asian American Perspectives: Ambivalence of the Model Minority and Perpetual Foreigner," in *Studying Paul's Letters: Contemporary Perspectives and Methods*, ed. Joseph A. Marchal (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2012), 175–90; Sze-kar Wan, "'To the Jew First and Also to the Greek': Reading Romans as Ethnic Construction," in *Prejudice and Christian Beginnings: Investigating Race, Gender, and Ethnicity*

your accent, I can tell that you are not from around here. Where is your home?" Caught with the feeling of perplexed, I sometimes find it hard to explain where my "home" really is, since I have moved and lived in many different places. Not only that, overcoming the language barrier by taking up English to some extent always means sacrificing one's linguistic heritage. My son was three when he arrived in the US and he spoke mainly *Bahasa Indonesia*. However, after about two years in the States, he began to speak English and to lose his fluency in speaking *Bahasa Indonesia*. It is both a challenge and pain to see the children growing up speaking English fluently while often having a hard time expressing themselves in the language of their heritage. I am not surprised that James Crawford states, "The facts are that, except isolated locales, immigrants to the United States have typically lost their native languages by the third generation."[199] To me, the loss of language is a real experience.

Echoing the way Derrida puts it, I can say that I now speak a language that is not mine. It is the language of the other. This goes straight to the problem of not only linguistic belonging, but also origin. In *Of Hospitality*, looking at the significance of the death and burial of the outcast Oedipus in the land of the Eumenides, Derrida argues that we should define a person as a "foreigner" according to where he dies rather than where he is born. The common understanding of the word foreigner refers to one's place of birth (as being different from one's place of living).

---

in *Early Christian Studies*, ed. Laura Salah Nasrallah and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 129–55.

[199] James Crawford, *At War with Diversity: US Language Policy in an Age of Anxiety* (Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 2000), 6. John Baugh also makes a similar observation about the loss of language after the third generation of immigrant. He writes, "Immigrants to the United States arrive typically with little money and no knowledge of English, often preferring to speak only with others who share fluency in their mother tongue — not because they are lazy but because learning a second language can be difficult, especially if you do not have access to English language instruction. Having experienced linguistic prejudice firsthand, most of these first-generation immigrants insist that their children become 'real' Americans by learning English. Such children speak to their parents in the language of their parents' native country but use English in school and with their peers. By the third generation, most immigrant families have made a complete transition to English." See John Baugh, *Out of the Mouths of Slaves: African American Language and Educational Malpractice* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), 3.

Derrida instead insists that the experience of a foreigner must be tied to one's death and mourning. "The question of the foreigner concerns what happens at death and when the traveler is laid to rest in a foreign land,"[200] Derrida writes. The dead ones, indicating "the resting place of family," signifies the social relations (mother, father, relatives, friends, etc.) and the spatial location from which a foreigner has come. This point of departure, for Derrida, becomes the yardstick by which "measure all the journeys and all the distancings."[201] Like Antigone longing for the burial site of her father, immigrants often yearn for a "fixed position in space."[202]

Not only is the place of death the mark of foreigners. Derrida also points out that one of the "two sighs, two nostalgias" that foreigners or "'displaced persons,' exiles, those who are deported, expelled, rootless, nomads" share is "their language."[203] Their language or their mother tongue is "their ultimate homeland, and even their last resting place." In other words, mother tongue will follow a person throughout one's life. It is what Derrida calls a "mobile home" or the "home that never leaves us."[204] On the flip side, however, mother tongue is also an "immobile home" because it goes along with them.[205] "Language resists all mobilities *because* it moves about with me,"[206] Derrida writes. Yet, he further calls into question the very idea of possessing a language. For Derrida, "what is called the 'mother' tongue is already 'the other's

---

[200] Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, *Of Hospitality*, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 87.

[201] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 87.

[202] Richard Kearney and Kascha Semonovitch, *Phenomenologies of the Stranger: Between Hostility and Hospitality* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 63.

[203] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, *Of Hospitality*, 87. The term "displaced persons" is commonly used to describe the postwar Jewish refugees in and from Europe. For further discussion, see Angelika Königseder and Juliane Wetzel, *Waiting for Hope: Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-World War II Germany* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001); Gerard Daniel Cohen, *In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[204] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, *Of Hospitality*, 89.

[205] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 89.

[206] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 91.

language.'"[207] So, the example of Hannah Arendt's remark that "she no longer felt German except in language, as though the language were a *remain* of belonging,"[208] is immediately erased. That is, even though German is Arendt's mother tongue, it is still simultaneously the other's language. Language, thus, is "the experience of expropriation, of an irreducible *exappropriation*."[209]

Again, at the center of the struggle for language domination is always the issue of immigration. When different groups of people migrate from one place to another, the linguistic encounter is almost inevitable. This is certainly true also with the United States. As John Horton and José Calderón write, "the rise of the Official English movement in the United States could well signal a growing nativism and anti-immigrant backclash. Like the nativist movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the campaign for Official English coincides historically with the period of massive immigration."[210] Immigration and linguistic struggle are interconnected and interrelated.

While I am writing this paragraph, I see on my Facebook newsfeed a story about an incident that took place in Durant, Oklahoma, between a white man and a Mexican-American woman named Maty Roberts. Roberts, according to the report, came as an immigrant to the United States in 1979 and has become a naturalized citizen herself. However, after listening to her speaking Spanish, this white man got very irritated and said to Roberts' daughter who happened to be with her in the Goodwill at that time: "I hate wetbacks, why don't you go back to

---

[207] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 89.

[208] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 89. Emphasis is his.

[209] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 89. Emphasis is his.

[210] John Horton and José Calderón, "Language Struggles in a Changing California Community," in *Language Loyalties: A Source Book on the Official English Controversy*, ed. James Crawford (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 186.

Mexico, speak English!" Roberts confronted him right away and recorded the rest of the

incident with her cellphone. After calling her "you lousy-speaking immigrant," the white man

left the store and went to his car. Arriving at his car, he screamed again, "We speak English,

English only!"[211] Immigrants are seen as people who bring different languages to this

monolingual space called the United States. To put it differently, being immigrant is often

marked by being unable to speak the dominant language in what English-speakers deem to be the

proper way. Even speaking English with an accent demonstrates one's foreignness in this

society.

Similarly, in August 2005 when a woman spoke Spanish to his son at an iHop restaurant

in Highland Park, California,[212] a white woman who was waiting in line with them interrupted

them and said: "We speak English in America." The woman further insisted: "Go back to Spain!

Spanish is from Spain. I've been to Spain, so I know."[213] The video of the exchange was

published on Facebook, and went viral. Carlos Vasques, the son of the Spanish-speaking

woman, told NBC Los Angeles: "Inside, I wasn't upset. I got more upset when my mom started

to cry. It wasn't fair for my mom to cry to a stranger just because my mom was speaking

Spanish."[214] For the woman who speaks the dominant language, apparently, this mother's

---

[211] See the complete report of this incident in "'Lousy Speaking Immigrant,': Oklahoma Woman Records Racist Rant at Goodwill," *WREG.Com* (blog), September 7, 2017, http://wreg.com/2017/09/07/lousy-speaking-immigrant-oklahoma-woman-records-racist-rant-at-goodwill/; Josh Magness, "He Yelled Racial Slurs at a Woman for 'Speaking Immigrant,' Video Shows," miamiherald, accessed September 7, 2017, http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article171518347.html.

[212] "California Mom Berated Publicly for Speaking Spanish in Restaurant," NBC News, August 4, 2015, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latina-mom-berated-speaking-spanish-restaurant-n403901.

[213] The original version of the video was posted on Facebook on July 31, 2015. See "Carlo Stefan," accessed July 19, 2016, https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=532661783550190&permPage=1.

[214] John Cádiz Klemack and Jonathan Lloyd, "Caught on Camera: Customer Berated for Speaking Spanish," NBC Southern California, accessed July 19, 2016, http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/IHOP-English-Spanish-Rant-320609602.html.

language marks her cultural otherness, otherness being perceived not only as different but as less-than. Being "American" is identified with the ability to speak English.

In March 2015, during the celebration of National Foreign Language week, a student of an upstate New York high school named Dana recited the pledge of allegiance in Arabic. Dana explained, "The point of reading it in another language is that it doesn't matter what language you speak... America is defined by what you believe, not what you speak or how you look. I wanted everyone to see this so we could see that deep cultural divide."[215] Caught by surprise, however, it sparked a huge controversy. The school was immediately divided in half, according to Joan Carbone, the school's superintendent.[216] As Dana recited the pledge in Arabic, BBC News reported, "Many students reportedly shouted their disapproval... and later complained on social media."[217] Alex Krug, one of the students who was not happy with Dana for reciting the pledge in Arabic told Time Warner Cable News: "It's the pledge of allegiance, we're saying it to the American flag. I think it should be said in English. It is foreign language week but we don't even offer Arabic in Pine Bush High School."[218] Despite the fact that it was only performed by one student, an online magazine Right Wing News provocatively and incorrectly reported that the school "has forced kids to recite the Pledge in Arabic."[219]

---

[215] Jason Silverstein and Melissa Chan, "School Divided Over Reading Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic," NY Daily News, accessed April 27, 2016, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/school-divided-reading-pledge-allegiance-arabic-article-1.2154933.

[216] Todd Starnes, "One Nation Under Allah: Fury After School Recites Pledge In Arabic," Fox News, March 20, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/03/20/one-nation-under-allah-fury-after-school-recites-pledge-in-arabic.html.

[217] "US Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic Leads School to Apologise," BBC News, accessed April 27, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/31989874.

[218] Briggette Sayegh, "Controversy Over Pine Bush CSD Pledge of Allegiance Language," TWC News, accessed April 27, 2016, http://www.twcnews.com/nys/hudson-valley/news/2015/03/18/controversy-over-pine-bush-csd-pledge-of-allegiance-language.html.

[219] Todd Huston Warner, "NY High School Makes Kids Recite Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic Featuring 'One Nation Under Allah,'" Right Wing News, March 19, 2015, http://rightwingnews.com/democrats/ny-high-school-makes-kids-recite-pledge-of-allegiance-in-arabic-featuring-one-nation-under-allah/.

The controversy swept through the nation like a wild fire. On the one side was Zuhdi Jasser of the American Islamic Forum for Democracy, who equated the Arabic recitation of the pledge of allegiance to speaking German during the World War II. He told Fox News that even though Arabic is his mother tongue, translating the words "under God" to "under Allah" could play well into the hands of ISIS.[220] Similarly, responding to the controversy, Mike Anagnostakis stated in a meeting held by Pine Bush American Legion Post 1308 that "It is disrespectful to every one of you to recite the Pledge of Allegiance or the national anthem in another language."[221] On the other side was Khaled A. Beydoun of the Barry University Dwayne O. Andreas School of Law, who argued that the controversy displays a deeply-rooted Islamophobic sentiment. He wrote that "the very utterance of the language instantly evoked this imagery, and the translation of the pledge of allegiance from English to Arabic signaled hostility, imminent takeover, and the 'clashing civilizations' discourse permeating through every pore of American society."[222] Moreover, highlighting further the difference in the social perception between Arabic and European languages such as Italian and France, Beydoun argues that "Arabic, in [the] past and present in the US, does not only signal foreignness, but also an inextricable nexus to Islam, the Middle East, and the Orient. Spheres positioned as America's geopolitical and normative rival[s]."[223]

---

[220] "Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic Draws Backlash Against NY High School," FOX News Insider, March 20, 2015, http://insider.foxnews.com/2015/03/20/pledge-allegiance-arabic-draws-backlash-against-ny-high-school. See also Tina Nguyen, "Fox Guest: Reciting Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic Is Like Speaking German During WWII," Collection, Media ITE, March 20, 2015, http://www.mediaite.com/tv/fox-guest-reciting-pledge-of-allegiance-in-arabic-is-like-speaking-german-during-wwii/.

[221] Mary Elizabeth Williams, "It's Not Unpatriotic to Say the Pledge in Arabic," Salon, accessed April 27, 2016, http://www.salon.com/2015/03/20/its_not_unpatriotic_to_say_the_pledge_in_arabic/.

[222] Khaled A. Beydoun, "Pledging Allegiance to Islamophobia in US Classrooms - Al Jazeera English," March 23, 2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/03/pledging-allegiance-islamophobia-classrooms-150322050951640.html.

[223] Beydoun.

After receiving enormous pressure especially from the residents in the district who had lost family members in the Afghanistan war, the school finally issued a public apology "to any students, staff or community members who found this activity offensive," while promising that from that point forward the pledge of allegiance "will only be recited in English as recommended by the Commissioner of Education."[224]

On April 18, 2016, Khairuldeen Makhzoomi, a University of California at Berkeley student, was asked to get off a Southwest Airlines plane, in spite of the fact that he did not break any law,[225] simply because he spoke Arabic with his uncle on the phone. Makhzoomi was then investigated further by three FBI agents in a separate room at the airport. According to the New York Times, "Mr. Makhzoomi said an F.B.I. agent told him the Southwest Airlines employee who was upset by the allegation of anti-Muslim bias said a passenger reported hearing him talk about martyrdom in Arabic, using a phrase often associated with jihadists."[226] As Susan Beckman puts it, "language conditions the way people perceive, and the way they think... language becomes the symbolic representation of ancestral heritage and home."[227] The Arabic language somehow marks otherness in the American historic collective identity. This particular story, however, highlights very well the transnational, ethnic, and religious complexity of the

---

[224] "New York School Apologises for Reciting Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic," *The Guardian*, March 19, 2015, sec. US news, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/19/ny-school-apologises-reciting-pledge-of-allegiance-arabic.

[225] The Associated Press, "A Spokesman for Los Angeles International Airport Police Says Officers Have Concluded a University of California, Berkeley Student Broke Now Laws When He Spoke in Arabic on His Cellphone While Seated on a Southwest Airlines Plane," US News & World Report, April 18, 2016, http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2016-04-18/the-latest-lax-police-say-arabic-speaking-man-broke-no-law.

[226] Liam Stack, "College Student Is Removed From Flight After Speaking Arabic on Plane," *The New York Times*, April 17, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/us/student-speaking-arabic-removed-southwest-airlines-plane.html.

[227] Susan Beckmann, "Language as Cultural Identity," in *Language and Literature in Multicultural Contexts*, ed. Satendra P. Nandan, ACLALS Fifth Triennial Conference Proceedings (Suva, Fiji: University of the South Pacific, 1983), 66.

politics of language. Thus, for example, in spite of the fact that in some countries, like Indonesia, the word "*Allah*" is used for God, it is still not perceived to be the same as "God" in English. "Allah" is deemed as a false deity of Islam,[228] and thus the statement "one nation under *Allah*" as something that should be rejected. The otherness then leads to the act of silencing those who speak Arabic in a predominantly English-speaking society. One can only use this "other" language at home; it is not accepted in the public square.

These four anecdotal stories are not by any means unique. They are only the tip of the iceberg of a deeper linguistic struggle in the United States. According to a Census Bureau finding of 2015, there are "at least 350 languages spoken in U.S. homes."[229] Of these languages, English is the dominant language spoken by the majority of Americans. The Pew Research Center affirms that English dominates most of mass media in the US, and almost all educational systems and governmental affairs.[230] English is seen as the essential marker of being a "true" American. The insistence that immigrants, especially non-White immigrants, learn English is stronger among conservative politicians in the Republican party. Donald Trump, for example, was not happy with Jeb Bush in September 2015 for speaking Spanish during his primary campaign trail. "I like Jeb," Trump said, "He's a nice man. But he should really set the example by speaking English while in the United States."[231] Two days after Trump blasted Jeb Bush,

---

[228] The debate on whether Muslims and Christians worship the same God is clearly rooted in this linguistic struggle.

[229] See United States Census Bureau, "Census Bureau Reports at Least 350 Languages Spoken in U.S. Homes," The United States Census Bureau, accessed August 1, 2018, https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-185.html.

[230] See Erica Feldherr and Amy Mitchell, "U.S. English Language Print," *Pew Research Center's Journalism Project* (blog), May 28, 2009, http://www.journalism.org/2009/05/28/usenglish-language-print-new-york-times-washington-post-los-angeles-times/.

[231] Matthew Boyle, "Exclusive: Donald Trump Fires Back at Jeb Bush," Breitbart, September 2, 2015, http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/09/02/exclusive-donald-trump-fires-back-at-jeb-bush-he-should-lead-by-speaking-english-while-in-the-united-states/.

Sarah Palin made this remark on CNN: "We can send a message and say, 'You want to be in America, A, you'd better be here legally or you're out of here. B, when you're here, let's speak American. Let's speak English, and that's a kind of a unifying aspect of a nation is the language that is understood by all."[232] The inability to speak English is connected directly to the legal status of immigrants and would-be immigrants. After being elected president, Trump gave a speech on August 2, 2017 on his immigration plan, called "the RAISE Act and Green Card Reform," to cut the number of legal immigrants coming to the U.S. He said, "This competitive application process will favor applicants who can speak English, financially support themselves and their families, and demonstrate skills that will contribute to our economy."[233] Thus English once again, becomes a politically 'imposed' identity marker of what constitutes being a true American.

2.4.2. The Centripetal Force of "Anglicization" in America

Given that English has never actually become the "official language" of the United States, this question should be asked: How has English become so powerful in both the political and social landscape of American life? A clue comes from John Algeo, who writes: "The history of a language is intimately related to the history of the community of its speakers, so neither can be studied without considering the other."[234] The history of the English language in America can be traced all the way to back to the early history of America itself. The discussion of the

---

[232] Eugene Scott, "Palin Praises Bush for Being Bilingual," CNN, accessed July 19, 2016, http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/06/politics/sarah-palin-diversity-spanish/index.html.

[233] "Remarks by President Trump, Senator Tom Cotton, and Senator David Perdue on the RAISE Act and Green Card Reform," whitehouse.gov, August 2, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/02/remarks-president-trump-senator-tom-cotton-and-senator-david-perdue.

[234] John Algeo, "External History," in *The Cambridge History of the English Language:*, ed. John Algeo, vol. Volume 6: English in North America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1. Alego narrates the history of American English into three different historical phases: a) the colonial period, b) the national period, and c) the international period.

expansion of language cannot afford to overlook the expansion of the group of people who speak that language. As Michael Clyne notes: "Languages in contact are, after all, the result of people in contact and of communities of people of different language background in contact."[235]

The beginning of English language in the United States has its roots in the historical ties with the British Empire. America was a British colony until the Revolutionary War and the Declaration of Independence in 1776. When early settlers began to move from Europe to America, "more than 95 percent of immigrants to the original colonies were from Great Britain."[236] Alexis de Tocqueville, a French historian and political thinker who traveled around America in the early nineteenth century, pointed out the importance of language for the British settlers in the New World: "The bond of language is perhaps the strongest and most durable that can unite men. All the emigrants spoke the same language; they were all children of the same people."[237] Joey Lee Dillard in his seminal work *All-American English* points out that these immigrants, who were escaping religious persecution, actually did not came straight from Britain. They first stayed in the Netherlands for about two years (1607-1608) before sailing to the New World. What triggered them to leave Holland is particularly interesting: "They were breaking under the great labor and hard fare; *they feared to lose their language*."[238] Arguably, language preservation was central to the establishment of America itself.

---

[235] Michael Clyne, *Dynamics of Language Contact: English and Immigrant Languages*, Cambridge Approaches to Language Contact (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1.

[236] John Hurt Fisher, ed., "British and American, Continuity and Divergence," in *The Cambridge History of the English Language: English in North America*, vol. 6 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 59.

[237] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America: Historical-Critical Edition of De La Démocratie En Amérique*, ed. Eduardo Nolla, trans. James T. Schleifer, vol. I (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2010), 49.

[238] J. L. Dillard, *All-American English* (New York: Random House, 1975), 46.

The English language story is not the only story in the early Republic. There were of course other people including other European immigrants, Native Americans, and Black Americans. As Stephen May describes it:

> [T]he USA is not and never has been a monolingual country. Indeed, multilingualism has been a feature of US society since the colonial times of the eighteenth century. . . a feature which should not surprise us given the USA's much vaunted status as the largest immigrant country of them all. In American colonies between 1750 and 1850, non-English speaking European settlers made up one quarter of the white population and Dutch (New York), Swedish (Delaware) and German (Pennsylvania) were widely spoken. . . . Native Americans, and their languages, were also still enormous. . . . And Black Americans – mostly slaves, and with their many languages – numbered more than one-fifth of the total population.[239]

Therefore, the idea of American *monoligualism* truly is a myth.[240] German immigrants in Pennsylvania are particularly an interesting case because the German language became one of the major competitors to the English language in this area.[241] "Germans were the nation's largest non-English-language-speaking group at the beginning of the Republic, therefore, they attracted the most attention from the founders of the new country," writes Carol Schmid.[242]

As early as 1720s, Germantown in Pennsylvania became the place in which German literature was printed.[243] This situation, of course, became a concern among the leaders in the English settlements. In his letter to James Parker on 20 March, 1753, Benjamin Franklin noted

---

[239] Stephen May, *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language* (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), 229.

[240] For further discussion on the myth of monolingualism, see Joshua A. Fishman, "Positive Bilingualism: Some Overlooked Rationales and Forefathers," in *The Rise and Fall of the Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on Language and Ethnicity*, ed. Joshua A. Fishman et al., Contributions to the Sociology of Language 37 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), 445–56.

[241] Rodney P. Carlisle and J. Geoffrey Golson, *Colonial America from Settlement to the Revolution* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 124. It is worth noting that other European languages besides German, such as Spanish, Dutch, and French, also existed in the early history of the United States.

[242] Carol L. Schmid, *The Politics of Language: Conflict, Identity, and Cultural Pluralism in Comparative Perspective* (Oxford University Press, 2001), 15.

[243] Carlisle and Golson, *Colonial America from Settlement to the Revolution*, 129. Carlisle and Golson note that the expansion of German-language through publishing was simultaneous with the push to make Pennsylvania a German province.

his concern about the impact of so many German immigrants and their language on the Union of the Colonies. He wrote: "The Observation concerning the Importation of Germans in too great Numbers into Pennsylvania, is, I believe, a very just one. This will in a few Years become a German Colony: Instead of their Learning our Language, we must learn their's, or live as in a foreign Country."[244] Underlying Franklin's fear of non-English speaking immigrants was his racist view of the Germans. He saw the Germans as one of the "swarthy complexion" groups of people, meaning they are not white enough.[245] In his 1753 letter to Richard Jackson, Franklin expresses his deep frustration of the Germans rejecting English language, saying:

> Few of their children in the Country learn English; they import many Books from Germany;… In short unless the stream of their importation could be turned from this to other colonies, as you very judiciously propose, they will soon so out number us, that all the advantages we have will not in My Opinion be able to preserve our language, and even our Government will become precarious.[246]

Franklin's statement demonstrates that he was profoundly anxious about the political expansion of German immigrants. This xenophobic reaction is directly tied to their inability and unwillingness to speak the English language. The German language is deemed to be a threat to the stability of British colonies in the New World. As Stephen May notes: "While the process of anglicization and assimilation had reduced the influence of German in public life by 1815, the language remains a strong, unofficial presence throughout the nineteenth century, both in

---

[244] The entire letter can be read in "Founders Online: From Benjamin Franklin to James Parker, 20 March 1751," accessed July 15, 2016, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-04-02-0037.

[245] Franklin divided groups of people in the world according to their skin color, and the whitest among them are the Anglo-Saxons. He wrote: "All Africa is black or tawny. Asia chiefly tawny. America (exclusive of the new Comers) wholly so. And in Europe, the Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians and Swedes, are generally of what we call a swarthy Complexion; as are the Germans also, the Saxons only excepted, who with the English, make the principal Body of White People on the Face of the Earth." See Benjamin Franklin, "Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, Etc.," accessed July 15, 2016, http://www.columbia.edu/~lmg21/ash3002y/earlyac99/documents/observations.html.

[246] Benjamin Franklin, *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, ed. Albert Henry Symth, vol. III (New York: Ardent Media, 1970), 140.

Pennsylvania and elsewhere."[247] The linguistic struggle continued in spite of the serious political efforts from the dominant Anglo culture to overcome or prevent use of the German language.[248]

The idea of America as a "melting pot" has been from the beginning a strategy of subjugating non-English speaking immigrants, in this case by insisting that they speak English and/or be dominated by Anglo immigrants and their language–that is, the language of the British Empire. The effort to silence the German language climaxed in the aftermath of War World I. Everything German, including the language, was perceived as a threat. Sandra Del Valle explains, "The war effort hardened what began as 'free-floating nationalist anxiety' into an all-encompassing campaign against 'hyphenated-Americanism' generally and particularly German-Americans."[249] At the climax of this anti-German euphoria, state after state passed laws to restrict schools from teaching the German language. One of them was the Siman Act that was passed in Nebraska to restrict schools from teaching foreign language. "The penalty for each offense was a fine of between $25 - $100 dollars or imprisonment for not more than 100 days."[250] A teacher named Robert Meyer at a local Lutheran school in Nebraska who challenged this law was fined $25 for teaching the Bible in German. Yet in 1923, through the Meyer v. Nebraska case, the US Supreme Court struck down such laws for violating the Equal rights Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

---

[247] May, *Language and Minority Rights*, 211.

[248] While Franklin perceived other language as a threat to the stability of colonies, Carol Schmid argues that Thomas Jefferson "took a different view toward language minorities." Jefferson is indeed known for his incredible ability to master multiple languages. However, in spite of his multilingual ability, Schmid points out that "Jefferson was a staunch believer in white Anglo-Saxon supremacy." Schmid, *The Politics of Language*, 16.

[249] Sandra Del Valle, *Language Rights and the Law in the United States: Finding Our Voices*, Bilingual Education and Bilingualism (Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 2003), 32–33.

[250] Valle, 34.

This linguistic struggle is true not only of European immigrants but also of other minority groups, especially non-Europeans. Although German language, for example, is not the dominant language, its survival is not only supported by many European nation-states such as Germany, Belgium, and Austria, but also the existence of Germanic language departments in American universities, as well as the requirement for almost all Ph.D. students in humanities to pass a German language exam. By contrast, this is not at all the case for Native American languages. Since Anglo-Europeans and other Europeans invaded America, the Native American languages have been repressed, and thus their extinction is nearly unavoidable partly because there is no strong political structure that sustains those languages. As Jacob Mey puts it: "Naturally, the life of a society is not only a matter of language and language use. However, the way language is used may give a fairly accurate representation of the way society functions, in particular as far as the structure and division of power among its members."[251]

Marianne Mithun, in her extensive work on native American languages, reports that "Nearly 300 distinct, mutually unintelligible languages are known to have been spoken north of the Rio Grande before the arrival of Europeans. Many more have disappeared with little trace."[252] Of these three hundred languages Michael E. Krauss, in his 1991 testimony as the President of Society for the Study of the Indigenous Languages of the Americas before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs of the United States Senate, estimates that about half of them (around 190 languages) are still used by native Americans; thirty-five of these languages are used exclusively in Canada, which leaves about 155 native languages in the United States. This

---

[251] Jacob Mey, *Whose Language?: A Study in Linguistic Pragmatics* (Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1985), 30.

[252] Marianne Mithun, *The Languages of Native North America* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1.

number might look big, but Krauss argues that in reality there are only about twenty native American languages that are still spoken by children in the United States. He categorizes them class A languages.[253]

It is obvious that the issue of language death or extinction is closely related to the issue of language shift.[254] The question is why do these languages become extinct? Have all the speakers died naturally, leaving no one to speak them? Why does a group of people shift their language use? Is there any systematic effort to repress these languages and replace them with the language of the repressor? These questions concerning language loss have been widely debated among linguists.

On the one hand, some scholars (e.g., Norman Denison and David Crystal)[255] speak of this phenomenon as "language suicide." Crystal, for example, thinks that the reason why languages are dying out is because "people make a conscious decision to stop using their language, or not to pass it on to their children, seeing it as an intolerable burden." Therefore, it is "a gross oversimplification of a complex situation" if one talks about English as a "killer

---

[253] Krauss classifies the extinction of Native American languages into four categories (Class A, B, C and D). Class A is "those languages that are still spoken by all or many or most of the children." Under this category, Krauss estimates that there are about 20 languages left in the United States. Class B is languages that the children do not use anymore but are still spoken by adults. There are about 30 languages are in class B. Class C is languages that are "spoken only by middle-aged or older adults, grandparental generation, and up. Lastly, class D covers those languages that are used "only by a very few of most elderly, say age 75 and only a small handful, say by one to a half-dozen elderly individuals." 30% (45 languages) of the existing Native American languages fall into class D. Krauss predicts that "at the rate things are going, of the present 155 languages, by the year 2000, 45 will be gone; by 2025, 60 more will be gone; and by 2050, 30 more – 135 of 155 languages extinct." Michael E. Krauss, "Statement of Mr. Michael Krauss, Representing the Linguistic Society of America in U.S. Senate.," § Hearing before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs (1991).

[254] Heinz Kloss, a German linguist, points out that there are three different "types of language death: (a) language death *without* language shift (i.e., the speech community dies out); (b) language death because of language shift (the speech community does not exist within a 'compact speech area,' or the language succumbs to 'the intrinsic hostility of the technology-based infrastructure of modern civilization')…; (c) *nominal* language death through a metamorphosis (e.g., a language is downgraded to dialect status when the speech community stops writing it and begins to use another, closely related variety or the language undergoes 'partition')." Heinz Kloss quoted in John R. Edwards, *Language, Society and Identity*, The Language Library (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 49.

[255] See Norman Denison, "Language Death or Language Suicide?," *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 1977, no. 12 (1977): 13–22.

language." [256] Language death is to be seen as a result of an intentional or conscious decision of a speech community to abandon their language and adopt a new one.

On the other hand, some other scholars argue that the linguistic loss is primarily the result of linguistic oppression and murder–that is a systemic effort to suppress, and thus, to put to death minority languages by a dominant linguistic force. For instance, John Edwards, in his analysis of the shift from Irish language to English language in Ireland, notes that "in linguistic suicide… there is *always* a significant other (language) which creates the pressures leading to language shift and decline; there is always a murderer."[257] Although Edwards prefers not to use terms such as linguistic 'murder' or 'suicide' due to the complexity of the issue at hand, he still argues that "if English had not arrived in Ireland, it could hardly have displaced Irish." In other words, it is the presence of English with its socio-political and economic influence as a part of the governmental, educational systems, etc., that leads to the decreased use of Irish. Edwards argues further that many efforts to revive Irish language fail because of the political unwillingness on the part of the governing structure.[258] Language does not die out naturally, but dies because it is systematically oppressed to the point of extinction.

---

[256] David Crystal, *Language Death* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 86–87. This point is particularly directed against John Edwards's assertion that dominant languages have killed minority languages. See Edwards, *Language, Society and Identity*, 51–53.

[257] Edwards, *Language, Society and Identity*, 52.

[258] Joshua A. Fishman has done significant research and publishing that explores the possibility of reversing language shift in order to save minority languages from extinction. Fishman's interest in the issue is particularly motivated by his struggle as a native speaker of the Yiddish language. He writes: "The field of Sociolinguistics was founded summer 1964 in Bloomington, Indiana, the same year this article was published. I was then almost 37 years old. But my entire interest in topics related to this field began long before that and is strongly related to my commitment and activities pertaining to the maintenance of my own minority language – the Yiddish language and culture – as noted in articles written before 1964." Joshua A. Fishman, "Language Maintenance and Language Shift as a Field of Inquiry: A Definition of the Field and Suggestions for Its Further Development," *Linguistics: An Interdisciplinary Journal of the Language Sciences* 51, no. Jubilee (2013): 9. See also Joshua A. Fishman, *Reversing Language Shift: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Assistance to Threatened Languages* (Clevedon ; Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1991); Joshua A. Fishman, "Why Is It so Hard to Save a Threatened Language?," in *Can Threatened Languages Be Saved?*, ed. Joshua A. Fishman, Multilingual Matters 116 (Clevedon England ; Buffalo: Multilingual Matters, 2001), 1–22; Fishman, *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic*

Arguing against the use of the biological metaphor,[259] Stephen May writes: "Language loss is not only, perhaps not even primarily, a linguistic issue – it has much more to do with power, prejudice, (unequal) competition and, in many cases, overt discrimination and subordination."[260] Since language is a social entity and thoroughly embedded in social relations, language extinction has to be explained in its social context beyond the structure of the language itself. It is a complex issue, the result of a dynamic of both socio-political and economic oppression and the internalization of an inferiority complex on the part of the oppressed. Both internal and external factors are at work. In the words of James Crawford: "Languages die from both internal and external causes, operating simultaneously."[261]

Now, concerning native American languages again, politically speaking, their extinction cannot be fully explained without taking seriously into consideration the long history of the brutal massacre and systematic efforts to impose the language of the Anglo-European invaders (i.e., English) on the new generation of native Americans. That is to say that the native American communities do not just give up their languages voluntarily for the sake of their love of English language. The fact that they were murdered in a large numbers must contribute to the

---

Perspective, chaps. 2–9; Joshua A. Fishman, *Language in Sociocultural Change*, Language Science and National Development (Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, 1972), chap. 2.

James Crawford rightly points out that Fishman "has gone farther than anyone else" in exploring the issues of language shift and reversing the shift. James Crawford, "Seven Hypothesis on Language Loss Causes and Cures" (Symposium on Stabilizing Indigenous Languages, May 4, 1995), 46. Cf. Tiffany S. Lee, "Beyond Sociolinguistics: Joshua Fishman's Influence on Students in Native American Studies. (In Memoriam)," *Journal of American Indian Education* 54, no. 2 (2015): 6.

[259] A biological metaphor is often used by scholars (e.g., James Crawford, Steven Pinker, etc.) to explain the issue of language extinction. It is embedded in the concept of Darwinian evolution through natural selection. A language is extinct because it fails to adapt with the environment and therefore is forced by nature to disappear. May explains: "This form of linguistic social Darwinianism is widely articulated by majority-language speakers – conveniently secure in their own linguistic and cultural heritage – but it is by no means limited to them. Many minority-language speakers likewise see their social, cultural and economic advancement, or evolution, in the guise of a majority language." So, this view is sustained by both parties. See May, *Language and Minority Rights*, 3.

[260] May, 3–4.

[261] James Crawford, "Endangered Native American Languages: What Is to Be Done, and Why?," *Bilingual Research Journal* 19, no. 1 (January 1, 1995): 26.

extinction of their languages. After recounting how the Europeans treated native Americans, Alexis de Tocqueville made this incredibly painful remark: "I have just recounted great evils, I add that they seem irremediable to me. I believe that the Indian race of North America is condemned to perish, and I cannot prevent myself from thinking that the day the Europeans settle on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, that race will have ceased to exist."[262]

Although noting the rarity of genocide as the cause of language loss, Crawford, a linguist whose research is primarily on native American languages, notes that it did happen to native American languages. He explains: "How does a language die? One obvious way is that its speakers can perish through disease or genocide. This was the fate, for example, of most languages spoken by the Arawak peoples of the Caribbean [1492], who disappeared within a generation of their first contact with Christopher Columbus."[263] Furthermore, the history of

---

[262] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America: Historical-Critical Edition of De La Démocratie En Amérique*, ed. Eduardo Nolla, trans. James T. Schleifer, vol. II (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2010), 529. Right before he makes this statement, Tocqueville writes this about the experience of native American communities in the face of the brutality of the European colonial settlers: "The dispossession of the Indians often takes place today in a regular and, so to speak, entirely legal manner. When the European population begins to approach the wilderness occupied by a savage nation, the government of the United States commonly sends to the latter a solemn embassy. The whites assemble the Indians in a great field and, after eating and drinking with them, say to them: 'What are you doing in the land of your fathers? Soon you will have to dig up their bones to live there. How is the country where you live better than another? Are there woods, marshes and prairies only here where you are, and can you live only under your sun? Beyond these mountains that you see on the horizon, beyond the lake that borders your territory on the west, you find vast countries where wild game is still found in abundance; sell us your lands and go to live happily in those places.' After giving this speech, firearms, woolen clothing, casks of brandy, glass necklaces, tin bracelets, earrings and mirrors are spread out before the eyes of the Indians. If, at the sight of all these riches, they still hesitate, it is insinuated that they cannot refuse the consent demanded of them, and that soon the government itself will be unable to guarantee to them the enjoyment of their rights. What to do? Half persuaded, half forced, the Indians move away; they go to inhabit new wildernesses where whites will not leave them in peace for even ten years. In this way the Americans acquire at a very low price entire provinces that the richest sovereigns of Europe could not afford." (Tocqueville, II:527–28.)

[263] Crawford, "Endangered Native American Languages," 22. Crawford sees the issue of language death as a far more complex one than just the debate of linguistic murder vs. suicide. Just likes May, Crawford also believes that the Darwinian evolutionary explanation is insufficient to explain the issue. He states: "Unlike natural species, languages have no genes and thus carry no mechanism for natural selection. Their prospects for survival are determined not by any intrinsic traits, or capacity for adaptation, but by social forces alone… Conceiving language loss as a Darwinian process implies that some languages are fitter than others, that the 'developed' will survive and the 'primitive' will go the way of dinosaurs. While I know of no linguist who makes such an argument, there are plenty laypersons who do. (And such voices are heeded by legislators, as testified by the advance of the English Only movement in the 1980s)." (See p. 23) Crawford wrote this article in 1995, so it is understandable that he

native American massacre is painful to recount. I will not discuss each massacre in detail here because enormous historical works have been produced to deal with them. However, the impact of this oppression on their languages should not be overlooked since it is the social reality of the speech community.

Of course, such massacres are the most extreme form of oppression and they alone cannot fully explain the extinction of native American languages. There were other systematic efforts to enforce English language among young native Americans that eventually led to the inevitable language shift and the swift decline in the numbers of persons who could speak native American languages. As April M. S. McMahon explains:

> Language murder… has its own specific sociological context. Typically, a new language will be introduced into an area, entering into competition with an established, indigenous language. The speakers of the incoming language will tend to be more powerful socially and economically, and often more numerous, leading to an association of their language with wealth and power. Speakers of the indigenous language will become bilingual, and begin to absorb these judgments and denigrate their own language. Seeing the dominant language as a passport to greater prestige, parents will stop passing [on] the minority language on their children, who will become semi-speakers at best. There is also typically a lack of institutions to support or determine a norm for the minority language;… Gradually, over several generations, the dying language will become associated with older people and an old-fashioned, vanishing way of life, and with poverty and lack of opportunities, eventually surviving only in in-group usage. [264]

The establishment of boarding schools to educate young native Americans also contributed significantly to the expansion of English and the death of native American languages.

> In the 1860s, young American Indian girls and boys were taken to boarding schools outside the reservations to "civilize" them and to discard the "Savage Indian." In the forced assimilation, the young American Indian girls and boys were subject to physical and sexual abuse in addition to the loss of their native language and culture. By the time they were able to visit their families, many of the young American Indians felt like

---

apparently was unaware of the works of linguists like David Crystal. Cf. Crawford, "Seven Hypothesis on Language Loss Causes and Cures."

[264] McMahon, *Understanding Language Change*, 308.

outsiders since many could not communicate with their loved ones due to the language gap.[265]

The efforts to silence native American languages were systematic and structural. Therefore, in the case of the American context, it is not true to say that languages died out because of natural causes, because these communities of speakers did not voluntarily give up their languages. When a generation of a community of speakers is taken away from their community and brainwashed with the dominant language, a loss of language is almost unavoidable, especially when the existing generation who still speak the language die. Stephen May is right that "it should come as no surprise that the vast majority of today's threatened languages are spoken by socially and politically marginalised and/or subordinated national minority and ethnic groups."[266]

The polyphonic or radical multiplicity of languages in the United States is not only apparent among the existing national languages brought by immigrants, but also within English itself. In his analysis of the phenomenon called *diglossia*, which is theoretically similar to Bakhtinian heteroglossia, Ferguson argues that the H (high) category, i.e., the standardized language*,* is always considered as possessing a higher prestige than the L (low) category, i.e., the regional dialects. "Sometimes the feeling is so strong that H alone is regarded as real and L is reported 'not to exist.' Speakers of Arabic, for example, may say (in L) that so-and-so doesn't know Arabic. This normally means he doesn't know H, although he may be a fluent, effective speaker of L."[267] On the one hand, according to Ferguson the H form of language is usually represented in dictionaries, grammars, treatises on pronunciation, style, schools, etc. On the other

---

[265] Steven Chermak and Frankie Y. Bailey, *Crimes of the Centuries: Notorious Crimes, Criminals, and Criminal Trials in American History [3 Volumes]: Notorious Crimes, Criminals, and Criminal Trials in American History* (Santa Barbara, CA; Denver, CO: ABC-CLIO, 2016), 859.

[266] Stephen May, "Rearticulating the Case for Minority Language Rights," *Current Issues in Language Planning* 4, no. 2 (April 1, 2003): 120.

[267] Ferguson, "Diglossia," 330.

hand, the "descriptive and normative studies" of the L are almost non-existent. [268] This is the reason the H version is always perceived as the standard or the real language, whereas the L variety is the defiant version of it. Ferguson's diglossic category has become one of the essential tools in sociolinguistic study since it was first introduced.

English itself never was nor is a unified language. The diversity of Englishes in the world is clearly apparent in the differences between, say, American English, British English, Australian English, Singaporean English, Filipino English, and so on.[269] English borrows, collaborates, and adapts with the environmental conditions in which it is used. In the United States, there is a great variety of dialects, which are commonly divided according to their regional locations (New England, Middle America, etc) and by state.[270] The most vivid stratification of language in the United States, however, runs along racial lines, especially between Black Americans[271] and White Americans.

---

[268] Ferguson, 332.

[269] See Peter Trudgill and Jean Hannah, *International English: A Guide to Varieties of English Around the World* (New York: Routledge, 2017); Jenny Cheshire, *English around the World: Sociolinguistic Perspectives* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Jennifer Jenkins, *World Englishes: A Resource Book for Students* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

[270] For a further discussion on this variety of dialects, see Zoltan Kovecses, *American English: An Introduction* (New York: Broadview Press, 2000), chap. 5; William Labov, *Dialect Diversity in America: The Politics of Language Change* (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2014), chap. 3.

[271] For a helpful overview of lexical, syntactical, phonological, and social analysis of African American English, see Lisa J. Green, *African American English: A Linguistic Introduction* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

Although the issue of the origin of African American English (AAE)[272] is a topic of hot debate among modern linguists,[273] the difference between AAE and Standard American English (SAE) is not only a lexical or syntactical matter, but also a matter of social stratification. Thus AAE is clearly "not an endangered dialect but a living and thriving language," as William Labov points out.[274] Yet politically speaking, AAE is often treated as the L language, thus inferior than the white English which is commonly perceived as the standard one, i.e., the H language.[275] Although all the varieties of speech should be perceived as equal, Rusty Barrett notes that to say that AAE is incorrect is a form of social othering because "there is nothing inherently 'right' or

---

[272] Concerning the label, there is a great variety of different views among scholars., i.e., Black English, Ebonics, African American Vernacular English, African American English, etc. Sinfree Makoni, Geneva Smitherman, Arthea F. Ball, and Arthur K. Spears, for example, decide to use the term "Black language" for the following reason: "It may come as a surprise to many that some speakers of Black languages do not have a specific name or label for their form of speech. However, languages without names are not an oddity. Naming languages is a type of consciousness, an artifact embedded in the consciousness of Western formal education. Communities with limited or very little formal Western education sometimes do not possess the type of consciousness of which language naming is a component. . . . Naming, or more accurately namelessness, is not a criterion for excluding or categorizing a language as a 'Black language.' What is of central importance in Black Linguistics is that we describe and analyze the ways members of communities relate to their speech, so that we do not rely exclusively on outside analytical categories." Sinfree Makoni et al., *Black Linguistics: Language, Society and Politics in Africa and the Americas* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

[273] The debate is mainly between scholars who argue for the AAE as a dialect that grew out of English which is divergent from white English (often called "Anglist hypothesis" or "dialogist hypothesis") and scholars who argue that the AAE grows out of a different pidgin and creole root than English (often known as "creole hypothesis"). For the Anglist position, see Raven I. McDavid and Virginia Glenn McDavid, "The Relationship of the Speech of American Negroes to the Speech of Whites," *American Speech* 26, no. 1 (1951): 3–17; William Labov and Wendell A. Harris, "De Facto Segregation of Black and White Vernaculars," in *Diversity and Diachrony*, ed. David Sankoff (John Benjamins Publishing, 1986), 1–24. For the creole's view, see John R. Rickford, "The Creole Origins of African American Vernacular English: Evidence from Copula Absence," in *African-American English: Structure, History and Use*, ed. Guy Bailey et al. (Routledge, 2013), 154–200; J. L. Dillard, *Black English: Its History and Usage in the United States* (New York: Random House, 1972), chap. 4; Beryl Loftman Bailey, "Toward a New Perspective in Negro English Dialectology," *American Speech* 40, no. 3 (1965): 171–77.

[274] See William Labov, "Unendangered Dialect, Endangered People: The Case of African American Vernacular English," *Transforming Anthropology* 18, no. 1 (April 1, 2010): 15–27.

[275] Concerning the marginalization of the AAE, the works of William Labov's study on the African American Vernacular English (AAVE) demonstrates that while white English dialects have become more divergent, "the AAVE shows remarkably little variation across the great cities where it is spoken."

'wrong' about any given linguistic form."[276] Rightness and wrongness in language, therefore, is a political matter, something imposed from without, typically by those with power.

Thus William Labov, in his research on African American communities in New York, finds that the reading ability of the majority of children (21 out of 32) is below their grade level as articulated by the New York Metropolitan Achievement Test Reading score. What is more surprising is that even students who are "unusually gifted with verbal skills, in argument, narrative, exposition, or singing," are also below their grade.[277] Labov reports that "reading failure may not be a cognitive problem of language learning but rather is rooted in social behavior."[278] That is to say, there is a significant difference between their daily social behavior embedded in the African American Language and the classroom English. Quoting the view of Bereiter and Engelmann that "the language of culturally depraved children . . . is not merely an underdeveloped version of standard English, but a basically non-logical mode of expressive behavior," Labov argues that such attitude toward AAE has a profound effect on student's learning experience. Their low performance in reading, in short, is a result of the repression of their linguistic expressions.[279] Further, Labov points out that the decision on what language ("Black English, Standard English, or something in between?") should be used in the context of education is "a political one, motivated by the history… of defeated efforts to introduce Black English into the classroom."[280] Indeed, the very notion of what "a standard English" looks like is a political struggle.

---

[276] Rusty Barrett, "African American English and the Promise of Code-Meshing," in *Other People's English: Code-Meshing, Code-Switching, and African American Literacy*, ed. Vershawn Ashanti Young et al. (New York: Teachers College Press, 2013), 19–20.

[277] Labov, *Dialect Diversity in America*, 69.

[278] Labov, 70.

[279] Labov, 71.

[280] Labov, 91.

Similar to the African American experience of linguistic marginalization, the Englishes spoken by immigrants in the United States differ from the H language, especially in their accents, and thus are often considered to be improper English. As Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut write in their discussion on language and immigrant experience, "Unlike many European nations, which are tolerant of linguistic diversity, in the United States the acquisition of nonaccented English and the dropping of foreign languages represent the litmus test of Americanization."[281]

Many Asian American communities have undergone such experience in different forms and ways. For example, a 2015 report by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) found that out of 61.1 million people who speak languages other than English, the linguistic ability of 41 percent of them fell into the category of Limited English Proficient (LEP). [282] According to this report,

> Spanish was the predominant language spoken by both immigrant and U.S.-born LEP individuals. About 64 percent (16.2 million) of the total LEP population spoke Spanish, followed by Chinese (1.6 million, or 6 percent), Vietnamese (847,000, 3 percent), Korean (599,000, 2 percent), and Tagalog (509,000, 2 percent). Close to 80 percent of the LEP population spoke one of these five languages. [283]

---

[281] Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, *Immigrant America: A Portrait*, 3rd edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 209. When I was teaching a Sunday School at a local church in Nashville. There was a white man who came to my class and introduced himself. In that short introduction, he revealed the reality of my linguistic otherness. I paraphrase what he said: "When I hear you speaking, I often do not get what you say. So, I have to pay very close attention every time you speak because I have hard time understanding you." Knowing that he was trying to be honest and also realizing that I speak English with a different accent than what is widely accepted in this society, I just looked at him and pretended that what he said had not affected me at all. I know that English is still the language of the other for me, and my accent marks a perpetual otherness and an impreciseness that I will very likely carry throughout my life.

[282] "The Limited English Proficient Population in the United States," migrationpolicy.org, July 7, 2015, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/limited-english-proficient-population-united-states.

[283] Ibid.

It should be noticeable that right after Spanish speakers, all the others are Asian Americans. This limited proficiency in English obviously has serious consequences for Asian Americans in their daily lives.[284]

There are two significant Supreme Court cases concerning language rights directly connected to Asian American communities. The first one is the 1974 *Lau v. Nichols* case which disclosed a deep underlying linguistic struggle among Asian Americans in San Francisco. The imposition of English in the educational system left behind many Chinese Americans who did not know much English, and it had negative effects on their learning.[285] Certainly racial resistance was particularly high in the sixties and seventies, and the *Lau v. Nichols* case brought into the open "that language discrimination was inordinately harming racial minorities, particularly Asian Americans and Latino Americans."[286] But such harm and discrimination continues. The other Supreme Court case was brought in 1989 and was known as *Asian American Business Group v. City of Pomona*. It pertained mainly to advertising signs. Asian American business owners brought the case against the city of Pomona for issuing an ordinance that "required that business in the City that had advertising signs up with 'foreign alphabetical

---

[284] For instance, the Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence (CAAV) reported in 2015 that many Asian American tenants of the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) do not receive "translation help they need to request repairs or discuss rent payments." It impacts them significantly and "many end up signing English-language paperwork that they don't understand." See Erica Pearson, "Asian Immigrant NYCHA Tenants Struggle to Get Translation Aid," NY Daily News, accessed January 2, 2017, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/asian-immigrant-nycha-tenants-struggle-tranlation-aid-article-1.2360649.

[285] For further elaboration on this case, see Ling-chi Wang, "Lau v. Nichols: The Right of Limited-English-Speaking Students," *Amerasia Journal* 2, no. 2 (October 1, 1974): 16–45; Stephanie Sammartino McPherson, *Lau V. Nichols: Bilingual Education in Public Schools* (Berkeley Heights, NJ: Enslow Publishers, 2000). Wang writes: "It is easy but unjustifiable to blame the language problem solely on recent Chinese immigrants. Research indicates that the language problem has long been prevalent among Chinese students, both native-born and foreign-born, in San Francisco…. Most Chinese children, both foreign-born and native-born, enter school with insufficient or no background in the English language. Native-born Chinese students with this language problem are found at every level, including City College, San Francisco State University and the University of California, Berkeley." See Wang, "Lau v. Nichols," 18.

[286] Haivan V. Hoang, *Writing against Racial Injury: The Politics of Asian American Student Rhetoric* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), chap. 1.

characters' needed to devote at least one half of the signs' area to 'English alphabetical characters.'"[287] The business owners perceived the law to be a way of deliberately silencing their languages, which would violate the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. The mundane linguistic experience is unsurprisingly translated into the larger political arena as well.

2.4.3. Summary

To sum up, it is important to state that my experience of seeing the immediate loss of language in my children and the othering of my accented English is not by any means a unique experience. Other non-Anglo Europeans, Native Americans, Hispanics, Asian Americans, and Black Americans, among others, also have historically undergone similar experiences. As an immigrant, I live with this constant struggle between (to borrow from Bakhtin again) the heteroglossic-centrifugal forces of language and the Anglo-centripetal forces of language. This has not been anything like a comprehensive exposition of the politics of language in the United States, nor is that my primary goal. Instead, the purpose of this discussion is to explain the socio-political location from which I read the biblical texts, particularly Paul's discussion on speaking in tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 14.

2.5. Some Hermeneutical Strategies

Aristotle, writing his treatise on politics about four centuries before Paul penned his letter to the Corinthians, realized the interconnectedness of language and politics. His statement that "the human being is by nature a political animal" (ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον)[288] is

---

[287] Valle, *Language Rights and the Law in the United States*, 61.

[288] Aristotle, *Politics*, I.1.9. The translation is mine. See Agamben's argument that the word "zōē" signifies bare or raw life in Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen, Homo Sacer Series (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998).

widely known. The accusative adjective πολιτικόν is derived from the noun πόλις, which mainly refers to the Greek city-state. The πόλις is a necessary aspect of humanity because for Aristotle human beings always live together in a community (κοινωνία). The reason why human beings are political is because only human beings possess language (λόγον δὲ μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων).[289] Contrasting λόγος to other animals' ability to express pain and pleasure through φωνή, Aristotle argues that human beings are able to construct their morality or to know right and wrong. Language, in this sense, is the absolute requirement for a community (κοινωνία) to operate in the πόλις, and thus politics. Without language, there is no politics; they are intimately interconnected. It is language that makes politics possible. Conversely, however, it is also true that politics is the house of language. That is, language is not a neutral medium of communication, but a site of political struggle.

My experience as an immigrant to the United States, my Indonesian background, and also my reading of Bakhtin's philosophy of language have profoundly shaped my hermeneutical lens. As should be obvious now, I do not see language as an apolitical system or structure of signs, but as a social, and most importantly political, phenomenon. This is not to say that I deny there is a pattern of structure in language. However, it is important to note simultaneously that linguistic

---

[289] Ibid. The basic meaning of λόγος is "word" but it can also refer to utterance, account, explanation, theory, argument, or discourse. See Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, s.v. "λόγος." As for how Aristotle uses this word, Deborah Modrak has pointed out that the concept λόγος in Aristotle does not merely refer to the ontological principle that organizes reality, as in Heraclitus, the Stoics, and the Church fathers, but is also used "variously for term, sentence, definition, premise, formula, form, principle, speech, rationality." See Deborah K. W. Modrak, *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Meaning* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 259, n.20. In the context of the Aristotelian philosophy of language, Modrak explains: "A word, unlike other sound made by living creatures, is what it is precisely because it has a meaning. By employing *logos* for both speech and definition, Aristotle expresses the necessary connection between the two notions. Making statements is fundamental to language and truth, and thus Aristotle uses *logos* for what is asserted by a sentence. He traces meaning, assertion, and truth back to the states of mind. The sameness of the faculty and its object is captured by the common use of *logos* for the faculty of reason as well as the content of thoughts." (Modrak, 160.) Aristotle explains the connection between word and soul [or mind] in his *On Interpretation*, I.1. Hans Arens also points out that although many times Aristotle uses *logos* for sentence, it can also mean "speech or even language." See Hans Arens, *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Its Tradition*, Studies in the History of Language Sciences 29 (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 1984), 56.

structure is profoundly unstable and that it varies greatly from one utterance to another. It means that an effort to create, or worse to impose, a unified system of language will inevitably lead to an aggressive political act of suppressing the inherent radical multiplicity of differences in the life of language.

By way of closing this chapter, I should like list some critical hermeneutical strategies on the basis of my discussion above. These strategies of a heteroglossic-immigrant mode of reading will guide my entire interpretative journey into Pauline discourse on tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 14.

First, a heteroglossia-immigrant mode of reading takes seriously the Bakhtinian notion of active dialogized conversation. A reader is not a passive object on whom a text imposes or discloses its meaning. Meaning is constructed in the active dialogized interaction between an author and a reader. Thus, the purpose of a reading is not only to discover the psychological and intentional state of an author. As an intersubjective activity, reading is an act of engaging with an author of a text. To read is to enter into a dialogical relationship. As Bakhtin puts it, "Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born *between people* collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction."[290] Since language cannot be reduced to the production of a psychological state, but is, above all, a social phenomenon, meaning is a constant negotiation between the speaker and the reader. This is not necessarily a denial of the authorial intention. It is, however, a rejection of the supremacy of authorial intention in the process of reading. The author is a partner, and not a ruler, of conversation.

Second, a heteroglossic-immigrant mode of reading recognizes not only the importance of a dialogical relations, the text itself expressed in and through language is the space in which

---

[290] Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 110. Italics his.

the dialogue takes place. Again, embedded in the Bakhtinian notion of dialogical appropriation, when a word is pronounced the reader would appropriates that given into the reader's world. To put it in a more concrete way, when Paul writes something in his letter, I obviously cannot enter into Paul's mind to seek out his intentions. But what I can do is to appropriate his words into my world.

Bakhtin insists that language is never "neutral," because words are already filled with "intentions and accents."[291] However, such intention and accents never belong solely to the world of the author. As Bakhtin explains:

> As a living, socio-ideological concrete thing, as heteroglot opinion, language, for the individual consciousness, lies on the borderline between oneself and the other. The word in language is half someone else's. It becomes "one's own" only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. Prior to this moment of appropriation, the word does not exist in a neutral and impersonal language (it is not, after all, out of a dictionary that the speaker gets his words!), but rather it exists in other people's mouths, in other people's contexts, serving other people's intentions: it is from there that one must take the word, and make it one's own.[292]

As embodied in the experience of many immigrants who have to constantly re/ex/appropriate the language of the others on a daily basis, a heteroglossic-immigrant mode of reading recognizes in a profound way this intersubjective nature of language. In a sense, the act of reading is the act of appropriating another's words and making them one's own, of course in a dialogical way. This means that an author's words are also the result of the appropriation. For words that the author uses have already existed in the complex intersection of the intentions and accents of others. When Paul wrote the words of the letter to the Corinthians, he appropriated the language of

---

[291] Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 293.
[292] Bakhtin, 293–94.

210

others. When I read Paul's words, I not only appropriate Paul's words into my own world, but I also appropriate the world around me into my reading of Paul's words.

Third, unlike the Romantic-nationalist mode of reading that has implicated in Pauline Paul's silencing of tongue(s), the heteroglossic-immigrant mode of reading is suspicious of such monoglossic force. It insists that as a phenomenon of heteroglossia in the Corinthian community, tongue(s) cannot be understood as an ecstatic experience. Tongue(s) in this sense is the representation of multiple languages, multiple speech acts, multiple social performances, and multiple lives. As such, this mode of reading recognizes the existence of both the centripetal and centrifugal forces of language. Tongue(s) is a space of conflict and struggle. It is a site where the dominant culture forces its monoglossic structure into the heteroglossic reality of language.

Fourth and finally, the heteroglossic-immigrant mode of reading will read a text from the point of view of the minority language speakers in a dialogical relation with Paul's discourse. It reads from the perspective of the heteroglossic reality instead of the linguistic-unified reality. Thus, the primary question is not "What does Paul mean?" but rather "How was/is Paul's rhetoric and discursive episteme read and understood by tongue(s) speakers?" It is the strategy of reading from below, to put it in differently.

At the heart of my project lies Elizabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza's concern that biblical scholars, especially white male European scholars, have for too long identified themselves with the voice of the master, that is, with Paul's voice.[293] In its place, she proposes the so-called "hermeneutics of *ekklesia*" through which a reader would examine the text from the perspective of the silenced and marginalized in order to discover the multiple voices that exist under the

---

[293] Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, "Paul and the Politics of Interpretation," in *Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation*, ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg, PA: T & T Clark, 2000), 53.

Pauline regime of discourse. In other words, Schüssler-Fiorenza argues that hermeneutics of

ekklesia "seeks to displace the politics and rhetoric of subordination and otherness which is

inscribed in the 'Pauline' correspondence with a hermeneutics and rhetoric of equality and

responsibility."[294] It is to this end, marked by "a radical democratic assembly (*ekklesia*) of

differing theological voices and sociorhetorical practices,"[295] that I pursue this project. My

reading tries to bring to the surface the voices of the oppressed and marginalized in the text.[296]

To sum up, I am in a full agreement with Frederic Jameson's insistence that the "political

perspective" should not be seen only as a "supplementary method" in interpretation but "the

absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation."[297] With this in mind, let us now weigh

anchor and sail into the sea of interpretation and explore the political dimension of the Pauline

letter to the Corinthians.

---

[294] Schüssler Fiorenza, 54. Cf. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *Rhetoric and Ethic: The Politics of Biblical Studies* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999), 188ff.

[295] Schüssler Fiorenza, "Paul and the Politics of Interpretation," 54–55. See also Barbara R. Rossing, "(Re)Claiming Oikoumenē: Empire, Ecumenism, and the Discipleship of Equal," in *Walk in the Ways of Wisdom: Essay in Honor of Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza*, ed. Shelly Matthews, Cynthia Briggs Kittredge, and Melanie Johnson-DeBaufre (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2003), 85.

[296]This strategy of reading resonates closely with what a feminist literary theorist, Judith Fetterley calls the "resisting reader," a strategy of reading that resists the ideology of the text. See Judith Fetterley, *The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American Fiction* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978).

[297] Fredric Jameson, *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 1.

Chapter 3

The Heteroglossia of Immigrants in Roman Corinth:
A Socio-Historical Reconsideration

In einer Handelsstadt, wie Korinth, war gewiß die Kenntniß einiger andern Sprachen, ausser der griechischen, gar nichts Ungewöhnliches.
Ferdinand Baur[1]

The person who studies a language must be indebted first of all to the people who speak that language.
J.L. Dillard[2]

There are clear ancient analogous with the modern processes of colonialism in the expansion of Greek and Latin around the shores of the Mediterranean from the Hellenistic period through the late antiquity. As in the colonial case, in many areas of the ancient world local languages coexisted alongside Greek and Latin, the dominant languages of the army, imperial officials and merchants.
James Clackson[3]

3.1. Introduction

As I noted in the previous chapter, I am going to approach Paul from the point of view of my experience as an immigrant who speaks one of the minority languages in the United States. In order to capture the richness of immigrant linguistic experiences, I employ the Bakhtinian concept of "heteroglossia," which postulates language as not only stratified but also diverse through and through. The following discussion particularly reconsider the sociolinguistic situation of the city of Corinth in the Roman period. By doing so, I hope to demonstrate that the members of the Corinthian churches would likely reflect the social makeup of the city. Thus, the

---

[1] Ferdinand Christian Baur, "Ueber den Wahren Begriff des Γλωσσαις Λαλειν, mit Rücksicht auf die neuesten Untersuchungen hierüber," in *Tübinger Zeitschrift Für Theologie*, ed. Ferdinand Christian Baur and Friedrich Heinrich Kern (Tübingen: bei Ludw. Friedrich Fue'i., 1930), 79.

[2] J. L. Dillard, *Black English: Its History and Usage in the United States* (New York: Random House, 1972), xiii.

[3] James Clackson, *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 131.

tongue(s) in 1 Cor. 14 can be seen as a reference to the multiplicity of languages being spoken in the Corinthian churches. It is a text that demonstrates how early Christians, particularly Paul, wrestled with the multiplicity of languages.

In order to achieve this goal, I divide this chapter into three sections. The first section will offer a broad overview of the linguistic situation in the Greco-Roman world. In the second section, I will attempt to make a case that Roman Corinth was a multilingual city. Third and lastly, I will consider two biblical scholars who have tried to bring language back into our understanding of the tongue(s) phenomenon in Corinth. This last section will function as a bridge to the fourth chapter in which I will read Paul's discourse on multilinguality in 1 Cor. 14 from the point of view of a heteroglossic-immigrant mode of reading.

3.2. A Broad Overview of Linguistic Situation in the Greco-Roman World

Before I proceed to discuss the heteroglossic nature of the city of Corinth, it is worth noting (as Baur does of Corinth in the quotation that opens this chapter) that the first-century world was a space of many languages. The dominant languages were clearly Latin and Greek. But many more languages than those were spoken. The following discussion is not intended in any way to be a comprehensive analysis of the sociolinguistic situation of the Mediterranean world. It simply aims to demonstrate that the Mediterranean world was far from monolingual or bilingual (Latin and Greek); instead, it was a thoroughly heteroglossic space.

Ramsay MacMullen, in his important essay on the provincial languages in the Roman Empire, demonstrated that "several languages in the Roman empire proved their ability to sustain themselves in spoken and even in written form against the competition of Greek and Latin."[4]

---

[4] Ramsay MacMullen, "Provincial Languages in the Roman Empire," *The American Journal of Philology* 87, no. 1 (January 1, 1966): 1.

MacMullen particularly focuses his attention on four of these languages: Syriac, Coptic, Punic, and Celtic.[5] Although almost all of the textual evidence that he uses is from the second century, there is no reason to deny that the situation of the second century was in continuity with the first-century world.[6] That is to say, these minority languages did not suddenly appear out of nowhere in the second century. Nonetheless, what MacMullen demonstrates in his essay is that in a society dominated by two major imperial languages, i.e., Latin and Greek, other local languages were still used and alive. The following discussion is a general overview of the linguistic dynamic in the larger Greco-Roman world.

3.2.1 Bilingualism

One particular linguistic phenomenon that classical scholars have widely explored in Greco-Roman society is that of bilingualism, and the most common example of bilingualism there is obviously Greek and Latin. The history of the connection between Greek and Latin can be traced to as early as the eighth century BCE; it reached its peak usage in the imperial period.[7] As Frédérique Biville puts it, "The existence of Greek-Latin bilingualism is now beyond dispute. It had indeed received official recognition in Roman times, as demonstrated by expressions such

---

[5] MacMullen, 1–14.

[6] Cavan Concannon employs a similar strategy of using second- and third-century data to explain the world of the first century. He explains: "It is important to note that I make use of materials from before and after the time of Paul. I do this because I am attempting to lay out the various options for deploying the rhetoric of ethnicity within the landscape of Corinth, broadly construed. The evidence for life in Corinth is spotty and haphazard, as it is for many other cities in the ancient world. We thus have to be open to the fact that many of the dynamic that applied to the formation and articulation of identity in the second century could also have been present in the first. The goal here is not to argue for some kind of causality or dependence, but to imagine possibilities available to a Corinthian audience." Cavan W. Concannon, *"When You Were Gentiles": Specters of Ethnicity in Roman Corinth and Paul's Corinthian Correspondence* (Yale University Press, 2014), 188, n. 65.

[7] Frédérique Biville, "The Graeco-Romans and Graeco-Latin: A Terminological Framework for Cases of Bilingualism," in *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, ed. J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 130. Biville points out to the existence of Greek alphabets found at Gabii, an ancient town about eleven miles from Rome, in "a few letters scrawled on a grave gift."

as *Graece/Latine scire, loqui,* and that celebrated badge of classical learning, *ultraque lingua eruditus*, 'versed in both languages.'"[8]

This Latin-Greek bilingualism appeared in almost every segment of social interactions in the Greco-Roman world.[9] For example, Latin-Greek and Greek-Latin glossaries dating from the first and second centuries AD have been discovered in the city of Oxyrhynchus in Middle Egypt. J. David Thomas suspects that these glossaries were used as some sort of textbooks for language learning in schools. "Since some of the early texts are word-lists or glossaries, this might suggest that some effort was made to teach Latin in the schools and that the local schoolmasters at any rate would be literate in Latin and might have possessed copies of Virgil," he explains.[10] Since Latin and Greek are major players, it is no surprising that they "competed with each other for dominance in the public sphere."[11] Another thing concerning the cohabitation of Greek and Latin, as J.N. Adams points out, is that speaking Latin with a Greek accent might have been a sign of higher class. The Greeks often make fun of people who speak with incorrect accent.[12]

---

[8] Biville, "The Graeco-Romans and Graeco-Latin," 77.

[9] Brono Rochette notes: "Greco-Roman bilingualism is without doubt one of the clearest manifestations of the close cultural ties between Greece and Rome. The scope of this phenomenon, extending to numerous aspect of the ancient world, including diplomacy, literature, law, medicine, religion, administration, the military, commerce, and philosophy, reveals it as one of the principal foundations on which Greco-Roman cultural unity is based." Bruno Rochette, "Greek and Latin Bilingualism," in *A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language*, ed. Egbert J. Bakker (West Sussex, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 281–93.

[10] J. David Thomas, "Latin Texts and Roman Citizens," in *Oxyrhynchus: A City and Its Texts*, ed. K. Bowman et al. (London: Egypt Exploration Society, 2007), 236. Thomas argues that the main language in Egypt in the Roman period was Greek. While many may be "literate in *Greek*," Thomas explains, "I have found no proof that any of them were literate in Latin, though no doubt some were." J.N. Adams similarly points out that "Latin had only a marginal place in Egypt; it has been estimated that only about 1 percent of documents from the Roman period that have survived are in Latin, proportionate to those in Greek. Even in military finds, only about 10 percent of texts are in Latin." For further discussion on Latin language in Egypt, see J. N. Adams, *Bilingualism and the Latin Language* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 5.

[11] Warner Eck, "The Presence, Role and Significance of Latin in the Epigraphy and Culture of the Roman Near East," in *From Hellenism to Islam: Cultural and Linguistic Change in the Roman Near East*, ed. Hannah M. Cotton et al., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 17.

[12] For a detailed explanation on this, see Adams, *Bilingualism and the Latin Language*, 16–17, 432–37. Aulus Gellius recounted the story of a rhetor named Antonius Julianus who came to a Greek banquet. Julianus spoke Latin in a Spanish accent. Gellius wrote: "Then several Greeks who were present at that dinner, men of refinement and not without considerable acquaintance also with our literature, began to attack and assail Julianus the rhetorician as altogether barbarous and rustic, since he was sprung from the land of Spain, was a mere ranter of

However, the linguistic struggle went beyond just Latin and Greek. The other form of bilingualism was the co-habitation of the imperial (Latin or Greek) and the local languages. Because the local languages had to do business in the shadow of the imperial language, bilingualism understandably became a widespread phenomenon in Greco-Roman society. This is similar to many places in the world today. Most people in the Philippines, for example, are bilingual or even multilingual (English, Tagalog, Ilocano, Cebuano, etc.), because of the co-existence of English as part of the historical legacy of American neo-colonial influence in the Philippines, Tagalog as the national language, and many other local languages. This is also the case with Greco-Roman society. Bilingualism was a common phenomenon between, say, Latin and Oscan Umbrian, Vanetic, Messapic, etc.,[13] or Greek and Hebrew, Syriac, Demotic, Carian, Phrygian, etc.[14] Since bilingualism is directly related to language contact, the complexity of bilingualism in the Greco-Roman society also involves common phenomena such as diglossia,[15]

---

violent and noisy speech, and taught exercises in a tongue which had no charm and no sweetness of Venus and the Muse; and they asked him more than once what he thought of Anacreon and the other poets of that kind, and whether any of our bards had written such smooth-flowing and delightful poems; except, said they, perhaps a few of Catullus and also possibly a few of Calvus; for the compositions of Laevius were involved, those of Hortensius without elegance, of Cinna harsh, of Memmius rude, and in short those of all the poets without polish or melody. Then Julianus, filled with anger and indignation, spoke as follows in behalf of his mother tongue, as if for his altars and his fires…" (Gellius, Attic Nights, 19.9-10)

[13] See Adams, chap. 2.

[14] See Mark Janse, "Aspects of Bilingualism in the History of Greek Language," in *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, ed. J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 332–90; Claude Brixhe, "Interactions between Greek and Phrygian under the Roman Empire," in *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, ed. J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 246–66.

[15] See David G.K. Taylor, "Bilingualism and Diglossia in Late Antique Syria and Mesopotamia," in *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, ed. J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 298–331; Sang-Il Lee, *Jesus and Gospel Traditions in Bilingual Context: A Study in the Interdirectionality of Language* (Göttingen, Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), pt. II.

code-switching,[16] and borrowing and mixed language,[17] which scholars of ancient society have already explored.

In his study of Latin language in the epigraphy and culture of the Roman east, Werner Eck points out that most of the epigraphic remains we have from Asia Minor come from urban contexts and were almost exclusively written in Latin.[18] He argues that there is always a "discrepancy between reality and survival in epigraphic texts."[19] That is to say, language dynamics in the ancient world were far more complex that what is represented in the epigraphical inscriptions. His elaboration of this situation is worth quoting in full:

> The German language left no trace in the thousands of inscriptions from Roman times on the Rhine. . . The native language of the city of Side, in the southern Asia Minor, was in common use well into the first or even second century AD, but only a few, extremely short texts in this language have survived this day. According to Jerome, the Celtic language was spoken in Galatia even in the fourth century, just as in Gaul, but there is no epigraphic evidence for this. Inscriptions in Old Syriac are relatively few. . . although it was already a written language at the latest with Bardesanes in the second century AD. The languages were there but they have not survived in the inscriptions except in a very significant manner, certainly in no way reflecting reality.[20]

Although Eck argues that the inscriptions that survive are mainly written on durable materials such as stones and bronze, and were placed in public spaces, I suggest that this discrepancy says a lot about the politics of language in the Roman world. For since language is always a site of contestation, the lack of non-Latin and non-Greek inscriptions at the very least reflects the

---

[16] See D.R. Langslow, "Approaching Bilingualism in Corpus Languages," in *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, ed. J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 36–39; Simon Swain, "Bilingualism in Cicero? The Evidence of Code-Switching," in *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, ed. J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 128–67; George E. Dunkel, "Remarks on Code-Switching in Cicero's Letters to Atticus," *Museum Helveticum* 57, no. 2 (2000): 122–29; Adams, *Bilingualism and the Latin Language*, chap. 3.

[17] See Martti Leiwo, "From Contact to Mixture: Bilingual Inscriptions from Italy," in *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, ed. J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 168–94.

[18] Eck, "The Presence, Role and Significance of Latin in the Epigraphy and Culture of the Roman Near East," 16.

[19] Eck, 17.

[20] Eck, 16–17.

imperial force of silencing. The people who spoke minority languages were not able to express their languages in public spaces for the obvious reason that these languages were politically pushed aside by the power of the empire.

3.2.2. The Rule of the Imperial Languages

Another linguistic aspect that needs to be examined here is related to Bakhtin's proposal that there are two forces that are simultaneously at work in the life of languages: centripetal and centrifugal forces.[21] Centripetal forces, on the one hand, unify, regulate, and standardize languages. Centrifugal forces, on the other hand, separate, decenter, and diversify languages. In linguistic studies, the issue of standardization of language has become central topic of discussion, especially in light of the politics of the unified language. These studies, interestingly, refer back to Bakhtin's notion of the tension between heteroglossia and the unified language.[22] Although Bakhtin focuses mainly on the modern phenomenon of the rise of national languages especially in western Europe, classicists today are beginning to discuss this tension between variety and standardized language in the ancient Greco-Roman world.

James Clackson has done extensive work on describing not only the diversity, but also the politics of language in the Greco-Roman world. At the core of his argument is the assertion that Greek and Latin were the dominant languages because of the Hellenistic and Roman

---

[21] See chapter 2 of this dissertation.

[22] For example, see John E. Joseph, a University of Edinburgh linguist, who argues that it was Saussure's notion of language as a system of signs that has led to the apoliticization of language. The politics of language, according to Joseph, is made apparent through the works of Bakhtin and Voloshinov. He writes: "Sassure and Voloshinov offer two clearly differentiated modes for approaching the social and political in language. Saussure is based on an understanding of the social as what binds people together, Voloshinov's as what keeps them apart. The latter accords better with what 'social' has now come to signify in sociolinguistics and social science generally." John Earl Joseph, *Language and Politics*, Edinburgh Textbooks in Applied Linguistics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), chap. 4. . See also Alastair Pennycook, *The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language* (London; New York: Routledge, 1994), 30–31; T. Crowley, *Standard English and the Politics of Language* (New York: Springer, 2003), 3–9; William Gould, *Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 11–12.

colonization that worked through the standardization of language. To put it differently, one of

the imperial power's methods of implementing their power in the ancient Mediterranean world

was to standardize language and reinforce that language in order to unify the empire. The politics

of linguistic unification or standardization is not only a modern phenomenon especially in the

formation of 'national' language but also an ancient one in the formation of the "imperial"

language.[23] Yet Clackson understands the idea of "standard language" not as an essential and

fixed entity, but rather as a process of standardization of language.[24] "Linguists have… tended

to define standard languages in terms of a shared process of becoming, rather than any essential

features of their nature. A standard language hence is best described as a form of language that

has undergone the process of standardization," he writes.[25] That is to say, in spite of the imperial

establishment of linguistic standards, language will always be unstable or in flux.

Although words such as *Latinitas* and Ἑλληνισμός commonly have been understood as

the correct form of Latin or Greek, for Clackson this interpretation "is overtly simplistic and

distorts the complexity of the ancient terms."[26] Relying primarily on Einer Haugen's four stages

of linguistic standardization,[27] Clackson explains further,

---

[23] James Clackson and Geoffrey Horrocks, *The Blackwell History of the Latin Language* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 78.

[24] Clackson theoretically relies on the works of sociolinguists such as John E. Joseph. For Clackson's discussion on the meaning of language "standardization" in the Greco-Roman world, see Clackson and Horrocks, chap. 3.

[25] James Clackson, *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 37. . For the discussion on the idea that ancient written language is the reflection of the process of linguistic standardization, see Kees Versteegh, "Dead or Alive?: The Status of the Standard Language," in *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, ed. J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 64–66.

[26] James Clackson, "Latinitas, Ἑλληνισμός and Standard Languages," *Studi e Saggi Linguistici* 53, no. 2 (2015): 321.

[27] Einar Haugen argues that a language evolves from a dialect to standardized language through four stages: 1) selection, 2) codification, 3) elaboration, and 4) acceptance. He explains: "The first two refer primarily to the form, the last two to the function of language. The first and the last are concerned with society, the second and third with language." See Einar Haugen, "Dialect, Language, Nation," *American Anthropologist* 68, no. 4 (1966): 922–935. The distinction that Haugen makes between dialect (i.e., an undeveloped language) and language is problematic.

From the Hellenistic period on, grammarians, scholars and members of the educated elite paid increasing attention to the Greek and Latin language, and it is possible to link much of the intellectual activity with four stages identified by Haugen. . . The process of standardization was, however, to take centuries, and neither language progressed as far as modern standard language. For Greek, the *koine* never gained the general 'acceptance' that is a feature of modern standards, and Latin debates over what forms were *Latinus* were to continue for centuries.[28]

This process of linguistic standardization took place under the control of an imperial power, i.e., of Koine Greek in the Hellenistic period and of Latin in the Roman period.[29] One of the tasks of an empire is to erect, establish, and sustain a certain way of speech.

The variety of dialects within Greek language and its history of development is indeed complex one.[30] As Jonathan Hall puts it, "Every region of Greece possessed its own distinctive dialect."[31] The issue of categorization of ancient Greek dialects itself has been a long topic of debate. Even ancient authors did not have a unified opinion of such classification. According to a Hesiodic fragment, Hellen had three sons: Doros, Xoutos, and Aelos.[32] Strabo describes Greek communities in four different groups according to their dialects: Ionic, Attic, Doric, and Aeolic.[33] Later in the second century, Clement of Alexandria wrote:

A dialect is a mode of speech which exhibits a character peculiar to a locality, or a mode of speech which exhibits a character peculiar or common to a race. The Greeks say, that among them are five dialects— the Attic, Ionic, Doric, Æolic, and the fifth the Common

---

[28] Clackson, "Latinitas, Ἑλληνισμός and Standard Languages," 321.

[29] See Clackson, *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds*, chap. 2.

[30] Clackson, 41.

[31] Jonathan M. Hall, "The Role of Language in Greek Ethnicities," *The Cambridge Classical Journal* 41 (January 1996): 85. See also Jonathan M. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 153–76.

[32] Ἕλληνος δ᾽ ἐγένοντο φιλοπτολέμου βασιλῆος Δῶρός τε Ξοῦθός τε καὶ Αἴολος ἱππιοχάρμης. (*Fragmenta Hesiodea*, 9). See R. Merkelbach and M.L. West, *Fragmenta Hesiodea* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 7.

[33] Strabo, *Geography,* 8.1.2. "There have been many tribes in Greece, but those which go back to the earliest times are only as many in number as the Greek dialects which we have learned to distinguish. But though the dialects themselves are four in number, we may say that the Ionic is the same as the ancient Attic, for the Attic people of ancient times were called Ionians, and from that stock sprang those Ionians who colonised Asia and used what is now called the Ionic speech; and we may say that the Doric dialect is the same as the Aeolic, for all the Greeks outside the Isthmus, except the Athenians and the Megarians and the Dorians who live about Parnassus, are to this day still called Aeolians."

(τὴν κοινήν); and that the languages of the barbarians, which are innumerable, are not called dialects (διαλέκτους), but tongues (γλώσσας)."[34]

Modern scholars of the Greek language, however, on the basis of the isoglossic analysis[35] of Greek language, often divide the dialects into four major divisions: West Greek, Attic-Ionic, Aiolic, and Arkdo-Cypriot.[36]

In spite of these different ways of dialect classification, it is still worth noting that the ancient Greeks did recognize the existence of great variety of speech forms. Herodotus, for example, explains the dialects spoken by the Ionians (οἱ δὲ Ἴωνες οὖτοι) as follows:

> They use not all the same speech but four different dialects. Miletus lies farthest south among them, and next to it come Myus and Priene; these are settlements in Caria, and they use a common language; Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedos, Teos, Clazomenae, Phocaea, all of them being in Lydia, have a language in common which is wholly different from the speech of the three cities aforementioned. There are yet three Ionian cities, two of them situate on the islands of Samos and Chios, and one, Erythrae, on the mainland; the Chians and Erythraeans speak alike, but the Samians have a language which is their own and none other's. It is thus seen that there are four fashions of speech.[37]

The remark about the Samians is particularly interesting as it shows quite vividly that the awareness of the difference in speech was present in the ancient world. That is to say, in spite of the variety of classification of Greek dialects, the internal linguistic differences were not only recognized but also deliberately acknowledged.

---

[34] Clement of Alexandria, The Stromata, 1.21.142.3–143.1. "διάλεκτος δέ ἐστι λέξις ἴδιον χαρακτῆρα τόπου ἐμφαίνουσα, ἢ λέξις ἴδιον ἢ κοινὸν ἔθνους ἐπιφαίνουσα χαρακτῆρα. φασὶ δὲ οἱ Ἕλληνες διαλέκτους εἶναι τὰς παρὰ σφίσι ε΄, Ἀτθίδα, Ἰάδα, Δωρίδα, Αἰολίδα καὶ πέμπτην τὴν κοινήν, ἀπεριλήπτους δὲ οὔσας τὰς βαρβάρων φωνὰς μηδὲ διαλέκτους, ἀλλὰ γλώσσας λέγεσθαι."

[35] Hall uses the term 'isoglosses' mainly to describe "the *limits* of the geographical extent of a certain linguistic phenomenon." The linguistic features employed to draw such geographical lines are among others, lexical, phonological, morphological, and syntactic. See Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*, 153.

[36] Hall, 155–60. For a more detailed discussion on the variety of Greek dialects, see D. Gary Miller, *Ancient Greek Dialects and Early Authors* (Berlin; Boston: De Gruyter, 2013); Carl D. Buck, *The Greek Dialects* (London; Newburyport: Bristol Classical Press, 1998); J. B. Hainsworth, "The Greek Language and the Historical Dialects," in *The Cambridge Ancient History*, ed. John Broadman, I.E.S. Edwards, and E Sollberger, vol. 3, Part. 1 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Robert Coleman, "The Dialect Geography of Ancient Greece," *Transactions of the Philological Society* 62, no. 1 (November 1, 1963): 58–126.

[37] Herodotus, *Histories*, I.142.

The historical development of the Greek language goes through roughly six major periods: the Myceanean period (1500–1100 BCE), the Early Greek period (800–600 BCE), the Classical period (600–300 BCE), the Hellenistic period (300 BCE–300 AD), the Middle Greek period (300–1600 AD), and the Modern Greek (1600 AD–present).[38] While it is hard to argue for any standardization prior to the Classical period, Clackson points out that the movement toward standardization can be detected since the classical period "especially in areas under a central political and administrative control, or where there was a shared culture and commerce."[39] The Classical period, in many ways, was the period of formation that would lead toward a more well-established and standardized Hellenistic culture in the following periods. The influence of Homeric Greek was significant in this period.

> The first traces of this process [of standardization] appear in the Ionian *poleis* of the eastern Aegean where, judging from the scanty epigraphic remains and survival of literary prose works of the fifth century BCE, the variation between the spoken varieties (as mentioned by Herodotus I.142-3) appears to have been largely levelled out in the written language.[40]

It was in the Hellenistic period that the Greek language began to spread like a flame of fire throughout the Mediterranean world. We know from Plutarch, for instance, that reinforcing language was the way Alexander solidified his empire, especially among the Macedonians where he picked thirty thousand children (παῖδας) and then ordered them to learn the Greek language (μανθάνειν Ἑλληνικὰ).[41] According to Plutarch, Alexander believed that by mixing the cultures of the Hellens with the Macedonians, he could bring these different group of people together— instead of using force. The lasting submission to his authority he thought could be achieved

---

[38] See Miller, *Ancient Greek Dialects and Early Authors*, 26–27.
[39] Clackson, *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds*, 51.
[40] Clackson, 51.
[41] Plutarch, *Alexander*, 47.3.

through the reinforcement of a common language. Indeed, Alexander brought about a new age in which the Greek language was enforced throughout the empire.

Since Athens was the center of the political activities in the Greek world after Alexander, the Attic dialect from Central Greece became the dominant language in the Hellenistic period although it did not completely silence other Greek dialects.[42] As Kees Versteegh points out, "After the establishment of the Attic naval empire and Athens' growth as a colonial power, the Attic variety of Greek spread rapidly as the language of wider communication throughout the Greek world."[43] However, it is equally important to note that Attic itself was not a unified form of language.[44] Attic Greek was basically the foundation for *Koine* Greek, a common language that was universally used in administrative affairs, education, and literature.[45] Because of its widespread influence, *koine* can be seen as a standardized form of speech, of course in spite of the instability of such a notion as 'standard.'[46] In this sense, *koine* was used broadly in the first century Roman period.

A similar process of standardization also took place with the Latin language. Diachronically, although often contested, the history of the Latin language is commonly divided into five major periods: 1) Archaic Latin (700–325 BCE), 2) Old Latin (325–120 BCE), 3)

---

[42] Claude Brixhe, "Linguistic Diversity in Asia Minor during the Empire: Koine and Non-Greek Languages," in *A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language*, ed. Egbert J. Bakker (West Sussex, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 230.

[43] Kees Versteegh, "Latinitas, Hellenismos, ˈArabiyya," in *The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period*, ed. Daniel J. Taylor (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1987), 253.

[44] For further discussion on the diversity of Attic, see Miller, *Ancient Greek Dialects and Early Authors*; Clackson, *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds*, 51–54.

[45] Clackson, *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds*, 54. Clackson explains further: "Papyrus finds from Egypt mean that we can track the *koine*'s rapid encroachment upon local dialects spoken by incomers from the Greek mainland to the newly wealthy Hellenized cities of Egypt. . . . Papyri further reveals that *koine* was the form of Greek which speakers of Egyptian Demotic acquired when they learnt Greek. The *koine* was the language of trade, business and administration, and both local elites and merchants in mainland Greece and western colonies gradually adopted it in place of their former vernaculars. From the third century BCE on, both public and private inscriptions all over Greek would increasingly show the influence of the *koine*, if they are not written entirely in the language." Clackson, 55.

[46] Clackson, *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds*, 56.

Classical Latin (120 BCE–250 AD), 4) Vulgar Latin (250–600 AD), and 5) Transitional Latin (600–850 AD).[47] The standardization of Classical Latin began, according to Clackson, in around the third century BCE and continued to the second century AD as a work of the empire to unify its territory.[48] This process continued all the way through the Byzantine period, as we can see especially in the production of a group of texts using what was commonly called "Vulgar Latin," which then led to the formation of Romance languages.[49]

The early effort to standardize Latin, according to Clarkson, appeared between 200 BCE and 100 CE. "It is known that already in the middle of the second century BCE, literary figures such as Lucilius and Accius had formulated orthographic rules and proposals, and had also instituted a vocabulary for referring to mistakes and faults in Latin, testifying to an ongoing debate about which words and forms should be judged as 'correct,'" he explains.[50] This was the political situation of the late republic and early imperial periods in which the Roman empire began to consolidate and concentrate its power, while at the same time expanding its influence to

---

[47] For further discussion of this periodization and the debates around it, see Nigel Vincent, "Continuity and Change from Latin to Romance," in *Early and Late Latin: Continuity or Change?*, ed. J. N. Adams and Nigel Vincent (Cambridge University Press, 2016), 1–13.

[48] Clackson, *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds*, 37.

[49] It is worth noting that the process of deviating from the Classical Latin had already taken place even in the first centuries AD. Versteegh explains: "The deviations from grammar of Classical Latin in the texts are supposed to reflect the everyday speech of ordinary people. The earliest deviations are found in texts from the first centuries of the Common Era. The texts in which they occur contain only a few features that cannot be explained within the grammatical system of Classical Latin, but the number of 'errors' or deviations from Classical Latin increase over time. Accordingly, it is usually assumed that this progression reflects the gradual development of the colloquial language." These 'errors' were in fact the beginning of the formation of the Romance languages. "Certainly, they do not contain deviations from Classical grammar, some of which have their origin in the colloquial speech of the authors. But they also contain hypercorrections, showing their authors' wish to write according to the norm." Versteegh explains further, "Incidentally, the centripetal force of the Imperial standard may be one of the reasons why there is hardly any regional fragmentation in the earliest example of Vulgar Latin texts," See Versteegh, "Dead or Alive?: The Status of the Standard Language," 63–65. For further discussion on Vulgar Latin texts, see József Herman, *Vulgar Latin* (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000), 1–8; Charles Hall Grandgent, *An Introduction to Vulgar Latin* (Boston, New York and Chicago: D.C. Heath & Company, 1907); James Noel Adams, *The Vulgar Latin of the Letters of Claudius Terentianus (P. Mich. VIII, 467-72)* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1977); Clackson and Horrocks, *The Blackwell History of the Latin Language*, chap. VIII.

[50] Clackson, *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds*, 38.

distant spaces. "[T]he virulent opposition to Roman power characteristic of the early period of Roman expansion in the fifth and fourth centuries had already started to give way to a growing sense of unity."[51] Within this socio-political context of imperial consolidation, the unification of speech became an absolute necessity.

Another important historical fact that we need to note is that, as the Romans invaded the eastern part of the Mediterranean world, contact with the Greek language became almost inevitable.

> By the time Roman rule spread eastwards, therefore, Greek was already established as the official language of government, education and high culture in the affected territories, while the long-term presence of important Greek colonies in southern Italy and Sicily had, from the late fourth century onwards, already introduced the Romans and their Italian allies to the many tantalizing possibilities opened up by Greek culture, a culture which became increasingly influential as Rome became more and more involved in the East. Widespread Roman respect and admiration for the Greek language and Greek culture, at least in its 'higher' forms, therefore meant that the eastern part of the Empire was never required to change its established linguistic habits. While Roman provincial officials and colonists naturally communicated with Rome and with one another in Latin, much of the day-to-day business of local administration involving Greek-speaking communities continued to be carried out, using both original and translated documents, in the standardized Koine, just as new developments in Greek intellectual life continued to play a major role in the evolution of Roman culture. [52]

Thus, the cohabitation of Greek and Latin was politically unavoidable. This linguistic trend is precisely what we find in the city of Corinth. However, as I will discuss further in the next section of this chapter, Corinth underwent a different historical process because of its destruction in 146 BCE. For now, I turn briefly to explain the deadly political impact on local languages of the spread of imperial languages as people in the Mediterranean world began to take Greek and Latin as their main language.

---

[51] Clackson and Horrocks, *The Blackwell History of the Latin Language*, 81.
[52] Clackson and Horrocks, 87.

3.2.3. The Fate of Minoritized Languages

The impact of these efforts to impose imperial language or languages on the colonies, particularly Greek and then Latin, was significant to the survival of the local minoritized languages. Clackson maps the linguistic situation in 500 BCE, which is prior to the Hellenistic expansion by Alexander the Great, and he then compares it with the linguistic map in 400 CE, toward the end of the Roman period. The differences between these two maps are striking.[53]

Map 1. 500 BCE

---

[53] See Clackson, *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds*.

Map 2. 400 AD

These two maps demonstrate two related aspects of linguistic struggle: first, the disappearance of many local languages, and second, the dramatic sweeping through the Mediterranean basis of Latin and Greek.

These two factors are interconnected. The death of local languages was a direct result of the expansion of imperial languages. It is not surprising that only a few non-Greek and non-Latin texts survived into the fifth century AD. As Clackson puts it:

> Most of the historical evidence for this period comes from texts written in two of the major languages of the Mediterranean in the period [800 BCE – 400 CE], Greek and Latin. . . But, . . . these were not the only languages spoken in the area – indeed, before the conquests of Alexander (356-323 BCE), Greek was but one of many languages spoken along the shore of the eastern Mediterranean, and, until the last century of the Roman Republic, Latin was a minority language even in Italy. For the bulk of the period under consideration. . . the majority of the inhabitants of the lands around Mediterranean spoke neither Greek nor Latin as their first language. By the end of the Roman Empire, this earlier linguistic diversity had largely disappeared, and a now unquantifiable number of languages had given way to Greek or Latin (in the eastern half of the Empire, and along the coast of North Africa, Greek and Latin were themselves later to yield ground in

the face of migrations and conquest by speakers of Slavic languages, Turkish and Arabic).[54]

Why did we have such a massive extinction of minority languages during the Greco-Roman period? The answer is colonization. "As Greek colonists and traders, and later Roman soldiers and settlers, spread to the new territories, they imported their languages with them, and Greek and Latin spread around the shores of the Mediterranean and further afield, replacing nearly all the indigenous languages of the west and of Asia Minor and much of North Africa," Clackson writes.[55] One of the local cases of colonization in the Roman period was the city of Corinth to whose sociolinguistic situation we turn now.

3.3. The Heteroglossia of the Roman Corinth

3.3.1. Pre-Roman Corinth

Before discussing the situation of Roman Corinth, a brief discussion on the city prior to the advent of the Romans is important as a background to our discussion. Corinth was undoubtedly one of the most important cities in the pre-Roman period. We know from the results of the extensive excavation work of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens in Corinth since 1896, that this area known as Corinth had already been inhabited since the Early

---

[54] Clackson, 2.
[55] Clackson, 65.

Neolithic period.[56] It then came under Mycenaean rule in the Bronze age.[57] The name κόρινθος itself, according to R. J. Hopper, might have its root in a "pre-Greek -νθ- element, which perhaps connects Greece before the Achaean immigration with the south-western Asia Minor."[58] Thus, this name probably emerged in the Mycenaean period. In around the eleventh century BCE, the Dorians came and conquered Corinth.[59]

The geographical location of Corinth meant this city became a crucial center of commerce in the ancient Mediterranean world. The city Corinth is in close proximity not only to the Isthmus which connects southern and central Greece, but also to two major harbor towns, i.e., Lechaion and Kenchreai on each side of the gulfs (Saronic and Corinthian gulfs) connecting the

---

[56] Carl W. Blegen, "Corinth in Prehistoric Times," *American Journal of Archaeology* 24, no. 1 (1920): 1–13; John C. Lavezzi, "Prehistoric Investigations at Corinth," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 47, no. 4 (1978): 402–451. See also James R. Harrison, "Introduction: Excavating the Urban Life of Roman Corinth," in *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, ed. James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), 1–2. Harrison, for whatever reason, cites Walter Leaf's essay as his reference in the footnote (see p. 1, n. 1). It is actually Blegen's thesis that Corinth had existed and was already inhabited even from the Neolithic period, not Leaf. Blegen argues that Leaf proposed in his *Homer and History* that Corinth did not exist in Mycenaean times. Leaf and Blegen's essays have exactly the same title. This probably can explain why there is such a confusion between those two on Harrison's part. See Walter Leaf, *Homer and History* (London: Macmillan and Company, limited, 1915); Walter Leaf, "Corinth in Prehistoric Times," *American Journal of Archaeology* 27, no. 2 (1923): 151–56.

The stratigraphy of the archaeological excavation in prehistoric Corinth is as follows: Early Neolithic (6500–5700 BCE), Middle Neolithic (5750–5250 BCE), Late Neolithic (5250–3250 BCE), Early Helladic I (3250–2800 BCE), Early Helladic II (2800–2200 BCE), Early Helladic III (2200–2000 BCE), Middle Helladic (2000–1557 BCE). The early effort to excavate the Early Neolithic layer was conducted by Alice Leslie Walker in 1914; they mainly found pottery from this period. Lavezzi explains, "She and later Saul Weinberg gathered additional EN pottery from the same locale, and EN material has also been recovered from the west end of the Forum and from the valley of Peirene, the area along the excavated stretch of the Lechaion Road. A small body of pottery recovered in 1973 west of the Lechaion Road is important for the unusual shapes and fabrics it includes. Smatterings of EN occur elsewhere too; for example EN material was excavated in 1981 east of the Theater of Greek and Roman Corinth." John C. Lavezzi, "Corinth before the Mycenaeans," in *Corinth, the Centenary, 1896-1996*, ed. Charles K. Williams II and Nancy Bookidis, vol. XX (Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2003), 66. For further discussion on wares discovered from the early and later Neolithic periods, see Saul S. Weinberg, "Remains from Prehistoric Corinth," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 6, no. 4 (1937): 492–515. Sacks is right that no structural or architectural remains have been found from this period. David Sacks, *Encyclopedia of the Ancient Greek World*, Revised edition (New York: Facts on File, 2005), 91.

[57] Harrison, "Introduction: Excavating the Urban Life of Roman Corinth," 1.

[58] R. J. Hopper, "Ancient Corinth," *Greece & Rome* 2, no. 1 (1955): 3. "The name Korinthos is not originally Greek, containing as it does the *nth* sound that identifies certain words that survive from the language of the pre-Greek inhabitants of Greece." See Sacks, *Encyclopedia of the Ancient Greek World*, 91. Cf. H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Greek Mythology* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 222.

[59] Michael Grant, *The Rise of the Greeks* (New York: Collier Books, 1987), 80.

eastern and western part of the Mediterranean world. These gulfs clearly "gave Corinth its real importance."[60] Above all, it is commerce that gave Corinth its prominence and fame. As Carl W. Blegen notes "The prosperity of this region was no doubt largely due to commerce. The results of the excavations… make it clear that Early, Middle, and Late Helladic Periods alike, Corinth was consistently a center of trade."[61] It is no surprise that remains of Corinthian pottery were found in many different places in the Mediterranean world, especially in the western area.[62]

The commerce of ancient Corinth was also enriched and strengthened by the existence of the so-called *diolkos*, a paved trackway road across the narrowest section of the Isthmus that connects the Saronic and Corinthian gulfs.[63] While the real function of the *diolkos* has been a topic of debate among scholars,[64] its contribution to strengthening the Corinthian economy was

---

[60] Richard A. Tomlinson, *From Mycenae to Constantinople: The Evolution of the Ancient City* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 75. .

[61] Blegen, "Corinth in Prehistoric Times," 8.

[62] Frederick G. Naerebout and Henk W. Singor, *Antiquity: Greeks and Romans in Context* (West Sussex, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 96. Mary C. Roebuck also puts it this way: "At the outset we should understand that Corinth cannot be equated with sanctuaries like Delphi and Olympia, nor with a city such as Athens. Corinth was essentially an industrial city." See Mary C. Roebuck, "Archaic Architectural Terracottas from Corinth," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 59, no. 1 (1990): 47.

[63] The textual references to *diolkos* are attested in, among others, Thucydides (*Histories* 3.15.1), Polybius (*Histories* 5.101), and Strabo (*Geography*, 8.2.1). Archaeologically, *Diolkos* was uncovered by an excavation team led by Nikos Verdelis in 1956 and 1962. For further discussion on the archaeology of *Diolkos,* see M.N. Verdelis, "How the Ancient Greeks Transported Ships over the Isthmus of Corinth; Uncovering the 2550-Year-Old Diolcos of Periander," *Illustrated London News*, October 19, 1957, 649–51.

[64] R.M. Cook argues that *diolkos* was not used to haul ships from one side to the other. Instead, they unloaded cargo on the one side, moved them through *diolkos*, and then reloaded them on other ships on the other side. Pointing out that the main purpose of *diolkos* is commercial rather than military, Cook explains: "It is, I suppose, possible that the original purpose and use of the *diolkos* was to transport cargoes and not ships and that that was why the Spartans had to construct ὁλκος in 428 B.C." See R. M. Cook, "Archaic Greek Trade: Three Conjectures," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 99 (1979): 153 n. 20. .While agreeing with Cook that the *primary* purpose was to transfer cargo, MacDonald insists that because commercial ships are significantly heavier than warships, there is still the possibility that warships were hauled through *diolkos*. "Warships were usually lighter in weight, were long and narrow, carried little cargo, and were manned by large crews. Warships were regularly drawn up on shore or into slips by their crews. . . . Warships capable of being hauled overland could also serve as merchant ships," he explains. See Brian R. MacDonald, "The Diolkos," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 106 (1986): 192. Pettegrew refutes this "thoroughfare thesis" on the basis only of his his re-interpretation of all relevant textual evidence but also of archaeological evidence of potteries. If there was portaging activity at all at the *diolkos*, it was only "on a very limited scale" and primarily "the portage of the building materials during particular construction projects." See David K. Pettegrew, "The Diolkos of Corinth," *American Journal of Archaeology* 115, no. 4 (2011): 562.

undeniable even until the Roman period.[65] "Merchants benefited by this shortcut in long-distance trade, while Corinth received revenues on the tolls, transport fees, and services to passengers in transit," David Pettegrew explains.[66]

Closely connected to its geographical and economic aspects, the religious life of Corinth was also equally vibrant. Among others, it was the home of the temples of Apollo, Aphrodite (built around the fifth century BCE), Asclepius (built around the fourth century BCE), and Poseidon at Isthmus (build around the eight century BCE). The temple of Aphrodite was particularly prominent in the pre-Roman Corinth. Strabo describes it as being "so rich that it owned more than a thousand temple-slaves, prostitutes, whom both men and women had dedicated to the goddess." It attracted people from many places to visit the city.[67] This particular religious attraction, Strabo continues, was what made Corinth a wealthy city.[68] However, the social structure of Corinth was dramatically changed in 146 BCE when the Romans completely leveled this city.

3.3.2. The Destruction and Rebuilding of Corinth

The Romans, led by general Lucius Mummius, destroyed Corinth when they waged war against the Achaean league in 146 BCE.[69] Of all other cities in Achaea, it was only Corinth that

---

[65] See Pettegrew's discussion on the importance of *diolkos* and canals in the Roman period, David K. Pettegrew, "The Changing Rural Horizons of Corinth's First Urban Christians," in *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, ed. James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), 153–83.

[66] Pettegrew, 158.

[67] Strabo, *Geography*, 8.6.20c.

[68] "Another source of Corinth's wealth, we are told, was the crowds attracted by the delights offered by one thousand-plus sacred prostitutes who served the temple of Aphrodite." Murphy-O'Connor notes that the context of this statement is pre-146 BC. See Jerome Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth: Texts and Archaeology*, Third Revised and Expanded Edition (Collegeville, MN: Michael Glazier Book, 2002), 56.

[69] Strabo suggests that it was actually the mistake of the Corinthians that provoked the Romans to destroy the city. He wrote: "The Corinthians, when they were subject to Philip, not only sided with him in his quarrel with the Romans, but individually behaved so contemptuously towards the Romans that certain persons ventured to pour down filth upon the Roman ambassadors when passing by their house. For this and other offences, however, they soon paid the penalty, for a considerable army was sent thither, and the city itself was razed to the ground by

the Romans left in severe ruin.[70] According to Pausanias, who wrote about this battle in the

second century AD, "When the Romans won the war, they carried out a general disarmament of

the Greeks and dismantled the walls of such cities as were fortified. Corinth was laid waste by

Mummius." He further explains: "Corinth is no longer inhabited by any of the old Corinthians,

but by colonists sent out by the Romans."[71] Another second-century AD historian, Dio Cassius,

recorded that after winning the battle he freed all cities that were part of the Achaean league

except for the Corinthians. "He [Mummius] sold the inhabitants, confiscated the land, and

demolish the walls and all the buildings, out of some fear that some states might again unite with

it as the largest city."[72] In other words, Mummius employed this brutal treatment, or what

Richard I. Deibert describes as a "miniature Corinthian 'genocide'," to be a political warning to

other Hellenistic cities of what the Romans was capable of doing if any of them rebelled against

Rome in the future.[73]

    The level of severity of the depopulation after the war has been an issue of scholarly

debate. However, most scholars agree that the city was not completely depopulated. We know

from Cicero's testimony that the land was still populated despite the ruin.[74] Thus, in all

likelihood, the Romans deported the upper class and then repopulated Corinth with a new set of

aristocrats in 44 BCE. There is therefore a continuity between the Hellenistic and Roman

---

Leucius Mummius;1 and the other countries as far as Macedonia became subject to the Romans, different
commanders being sent into different countries; but the Sicyonians obtained most of the Corinthian country."

    [70] Pausanias, *Description of Greece: Corinth,* 2.1.2.

    [71] Pausanias, *Description of Greece: Corinth,* 2.1-2.

    [72] Dio Cassius, *Roman History,* 21.

    [73] Richard I. Deibert, *Second Corinthians and Paul's Gospel of Human Mortality: How Paul's Experience of Death Authorizes His Apostolic Authority in Corinth* (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017), 21.

    [74] Cicero writes: "Many Carthaginians were slaves at Rome, many Macedonians after the capture of King Perses. I have seen too in the Peloponnese in my youthful days some natives of Corinth who were slaves. All of them could have made the same lament as that in the Andromacha: "All this did I see ….," but by the time I saw them they had ceased, it may be, to chant dirges. Their features, speech, all the rest of their movements and postures would have led one to say they were freemen of Argos or Sicyon; and at Corinth the sudden sight of the ruins had more effect upon me than upon the actual inhabitants, for long contemplation had had the hardening effect of length of time upon their souls." See Cicero, *Tusculan Disputation* 3.53.

Corinth.[75] As David Gilman Romano observes, "there was continuous occupation in Corinth

between 146-44 BC for farming and grazing activities, and numerous agricultural interests may

have existed in the area."[76] In spite of the remnants of the old city, it was unlikely that there

were political activities in Corinth. One of the indicators of this political inactivity was that there

was no coin minted in Corinth in this interregnum period.[77] Romano writes, "the Greek city was

deprived of its civic and political identity." [78] Corinth basically became "an almost-deserted

ghost town" during this period.[79]

Some buildings from the former old city still survived, but, says Nancy Bookidis, "they

probably lack roofs and timbers."[80] Not long after its destruction, the Roman Empire issued a

law called *Lex Agraria* in 111 BCE. One of the regulations in this law dealt primarily with the

deserted land of Corinth which was considered *ager publicus*, or a public land.[81] According to

Lex Agraria, Corinth was to be completely surveyed and sold.[82] "This text is important because

---

[75] For further discussion on this issue of continuity and discontinuity of Hellenistic aspects of the Corinthian society after the destruction of the city by the Romans in 146 BCE, see Sarah A. James, "The Last of the Corinthians? Society and Settlement from 146 to 44 BCE," in *Corinth in Contrast: Studies in Inequality*, ed. Steven J. Friesen, Sarah A. James, and Daniel N. Schowalter (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 17–37.

[76] David Gilman Romano, "Post-146 B.C. Land Use in Corinth, and Planning of the Roman Colony of 44 B.C.," in *The Corinthia in the Roman Period: Including the Papers Given at a Symposium Held at the Ohio State University on 7-9 March, 1991*, ed. Timothy E. Gregory, Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary Series 8 (Ann Arbor, MI: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 1994), 13.

[77] See Elizabeth R. Gebhard and Matthew W. Dickie, "The View from the Isthmus, ca. 200 to 4 B.C.," in *Corinth, the Centenary, 1896-1996*, ed. Charles K. Williams II and Nancy Bookidis, vol. XX (Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2003), 268.

[78] David Gilman Romano, "A Roman Circus in Corinth," *Hesperia* 74, no. 4 (2005): 585; David Gilman Romano, "City Planning, Centuriation, and Land Division in Roman Corinth: Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis & Colonia Iulia Flavia Augusta Corinthiensis," in *Corinth, the Centenary, 1896-1996*, ed. Charles K. Williams II and Nancy Bookidis, vol. XX (Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2003), 280; Romano, "Post-146 B.C. Land Use in Corinth, and Planning of the Roman Colony of 44 B.C.," 13.

[79] G.D.R. Sanders, "Urban Corinth: An Introduction," in *Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, ed. Daniel Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 22.

[80] Nancy Bookidis, "Religion in Corinth: 146 B.C.E. to 100 C.E.," in *Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, ed. Daniel Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 141.

[81] James, "The Last of the Corinthians? Society and Settlement from 146 to 44 BCE," 19.

[82] The complete statement of item 58 of *lex agraria* is as follows: "The duumvir appointed in accordance with this law shall within ... days after being created duumvir in accordance with this law that land or place which belonged to the Corinthians ... except for that land or place ... land or place which is to be sold in accordance with

---

it may establish the date when at least a part of the land of the former Greek city of Corinth was formally divided up into Roman plots," Romano explains.[83] Related to the land division, the Romans built several new roads in Corinth at around this time of destruction and rebuilding (146-44 BCE), especially the ones that connected the northern and southern parts of the new city.[84]

The Romans also intentionally erected a monument in honor of Marcus Antonius in the middle of the old city (around 101–100 BCE).[85] In spite of the debate on who exactly this M. Antonius was, the inscription is the earliest Roman political presence found in Corinth after its destruction and prior to its rebuilding. The mention of Isthmus on the fourth line of the inscription has led some scholars to think that it was probably first built as a private inscription on the Isthmus and then moved to the city.[86] In contrast, Mary Walbank argues that "the inscription in honour of M. Antonius was originally erected in the centre of Corinth. At that time,

---

this law he shall provide that it shall be completely surveyed and markers shall be erected ... which land ... and he shall let out the work and shall set a day for its completion; and he shall cause ... whatever of this land, place, or building is sold to anyone, he ... of such money ... the purchaser and his surety shall not be freed thereby, and the quaestor who has as his province the treasury shall have the names of the purchasers and the sureties registered in the public accounts ... exaction shall be made from the aforesaid persons or their heirs." See "Agrarian Law; 111 B.C.," The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, accessed December 13, 2017, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/agrarian_law.asp.

[83] Romano, "City Planning, Centuriation, and Land Division in Roman Corinth: Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis & Colonia Iulia Flavia Augusta Corinthiensis," 280.

[84] See Romano, 281–83.

[85] The inscription was found in a 1926 excavation and mentioned briefly by B.H. Hill in his report in early 1927. "The inscription is to be published in a special article by Professors L. R. Taylor and A. B. West, who believe that it dates from about 100 B.C. If this is true and if the stone was originally set up at all near the place of its discovery, the fact would obviously tend to modify the accepted view as to the completeness of the desolation of Corinth in the century between Mummius and Julius Caesar." B. H. Hill, "Excavations at Corinth 1926," *American Journal of Archaeology* 31, no. 1 (1927): 79. See also Jean-Sébastien Balzat and Benjamin W. Millis, "M. Antonius Aristocrates: Provincial Involvement with Roman Power in the Late 1st Century B.C.," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 82, no. 4 (2013): 651–72; Mary E. Hoskins Walbank, "What's in a Name? Corinth under the Flavians," *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 139 (2002): 257–258; Lily Ross Taylor and Allen B. West, "Latin Elegiacs from Corinth," *American Journal of Archaeology* 32, no. 1 (1928): 9–22. There is a debate among scholars whether this is M. Antonius father of the triumvir or M. Antonius the younger. Sherwin-White argued that this is the father of the triumvir. See A. N. Sherwin-White, "Rome, Pamphylia and Cilicia, 133-70 B.C.," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 66 (1976): 1–14. .

[86] Taylor and West, "Latin Elegiacs from Corinth," 21. "It is easy to understand its transference from the Isthmus to Caesar's new colony on the site of ancient Corinth, especially in the years when Mark Antony had command of the eastern half of the Empire."

it was still a ruined city and the natural explanation for such a monument is that in 101–100 BC

there were plans to refound Corinth as a Roman colony."[87] Regardless of its original location,

there are well-cut Greek words dating back to the fourth century BCE under the Latin words. It

was not an uncommon practice in ancient times to erase an older inscription and write a new one

on top of it, but within this context of brutal political transition, this act of erasing and rewriting

of inscription could also have sent a strong message reaffirming and reinforcing the Roman

imperial power in Corinth.

In 44 BCE, however, Julius Caesar transformed this crown jewel of the Hellenistic

culture into a Roman colony by sending to it freedpersons and veterans from Rome.[88] Corinth

was given a new name: *Colonia Laus Julia Corinthiensis*.[89] During the Flavian period especially

under the reign of Vespasian, the name of the city was changed again into *Colonia Iulia Flavia*

Augusta Corinthiensis.[90] The details of land divisions, the difference between Hellenistic and

Roman Corinth(s), and the extent of Roman transformation have been a topic of debate among

---

[87] Walbank, "What's in a Name?," 258.

[88] Strabo, *Geography,* 8.6.23; Appian, *History: Punic Wars*, 8.136; Plutarch, *Caesar*, 57.8; Pausanias, *Description of Greece,* 2.1.2; Dio Cassius 43.50–3-5. In the next section of this chapter, I will discuss in more detail the demography of Roman Corinth.

[89] This name occurs in an inscription found near South Stoa in a 1936 excavation. The text in that inscription is as follow: "Quintus Granius Bassus, son of Quintus, procurator of Augustus, (dedicated this monument) at his own expense, and with the authority of the City Council, to (the city) *Colonia Laus Julia Cointhiensis*" (Kent, #130). See John Harvey Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*, vol. VIII, Part III, Corinth: Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens (Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1966), 60. See also Oscar Broneer, "Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 10, no. 4 (1941): 388–90; David Gilman Romano, "Roman Surveyors in Corinth," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 150, no. 1 (2006): 66–67; Harrison, "Introduction: Excavating the Urban Life of Roman Corinth," 10–11.

[90] The indicator of this change of name is apparent in two fragmented inscriptions (Kent, #82) that read: "[*Imp*(*eratori*) *Cae*[*sari Vespa*]*siano* [*Aug*(*usto*) - - - - - -]*so*[- - - - - - *col*(*onia*) *Iul*(*ia*)] *Flav*(*ia*) *Aug*(*usta*) [*Corinthiensis*]." Kent explains: "Since the name of Flavius never occurs in the official title of any of the Flavian emperors, the last line of the text must preserve part of the name of Corinth. From the coins of Corinth we know that under the Flavians the official name of the colony was changed to *Colonia Iulia Flavia Augusta Corinthiensis . . .* but hitherto epigraphical evidence for the change was lacking." Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*, VIII, Part III:42.

archaeologists. However, Walbank notes, "The important point for planning of early Roman

Corinth is not so much the details of the land division but the fact that it exists."[91]

Concerning the transformation of the central part of Corinth, we know that three

Hellenistic buildings, i.e., the theatre, the South Stoa, and the Archaic Temple, were renovated

and reused by the Romans.[92] The South Stoa and the Archaic Temple were particularly located

within a larger Roman structural construction called the Forum. The Forum functions as a central

site for all the social, economic, and governmental activities in Roman Corinth.[93]

From the Romano's analysis of the Roman Forum, three things are worth mentioning

now. First, this area would go through further development later in the Roman period.[94] Second,

as Romano points out, the orientation of the Forum is intentionally constructed not to accord

---

[91] Mary E. Hoskins Walbank, "The Foundation and Planning of Early Roman Corinth," *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 10 (January 1997): 102.

[92] Walbank, 111. Walbank notes, "One of the characteristics of the new colony is the extent to which early settlers renovated existing buildings. A feature of the city which is often not clear from the plans and is sometimes difficult to appreciate on the ground is that it was laid out on two levels: an upper plateau, which is really the slope of Acrocorinth, and the lower plateau, which then drops to the costal plain . . . Sometimes the drop between the plateaux is quite steep, in other places there is a shallow gradient. The forum and amphitheatre are on the upper plateau, the theatre is cut into the hillside between the two, and the Asclepieum is on the level ground of the lower plateau. These two levels are an important factor in the layout of the city and the line of the roads."

[93] Romano, "City Planning, Centuriation, and Land Division in Roman Corinth: Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis & Colonia Iulia Flavia Augusta Corinthiensis," 287. Regarding the socio-economic importance of the Forum, Engels imagines a traveler would have the following experience: "The forum itself was a vast, open space thronged with merchants, street-hawkers, travelers, and local residents. Varicolored tents covered the market stalls. Surveying the scene, he would see important works of public art: the paintings, marble sculpture, and works of bronze by renowned artists. The Forum was the religious as well as commercial core of the city, and contained numerous shrines, sanctuaries, and temples, the greatest of which was the Archaic Temple, perhaps dedicated to Corinth's founding dynasty, the Gens Julia. Surrounding the Forum were the temples, shops, stoas, and administrative offices in the imposing South Stoa. Perhaps the governor was present at a public hearing at his tribunal near the center of the Forum." Donald Engels, *Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 13.

For further discussion on the building of Roman Forum in Corinth, see Charles K. Williams and Joan E. Fisher, "Corinth, 1971: Forum Area," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 41, no. 2 (1972): 143–184; Walbank, "The Foundation and Planning of Early Roman Corinth."

[94] For further discussion on the structural development of the Forum, see Romano, "City Planning, Centuriation, and Land Division in Roman Corinth: Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis & Colonia Iulia Flavia Augusta Corinthiensis."

with the layout of the old city.[95] That, at the very least, is a clue that the Romans did not want to leave an impression that they were just relying on the old structure. Third, the area of the Forum is significant to this present study because many of the Latin inscriptions are from this part of the city, especially in the South Stoa area.

In the Roman era, Corinth regained its fame as a wealthy commercial city in the Peloponnesian peninsula, but it was now a subjected, a colonized city. It might appear peaceful and thriving from the outside, but underneath the glory of the magnificent Roman structures and buildings lay the remains of the old city, the mute witnesses of the brutality and ruthlessness of the Roman Empire. As Walbank puts it, "in Roman eyes *Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis* was an entirely new foundation. Greek Corinth had ceased to exist with the destruction of its political functions and civic buildings; although approximately the same site was used, the Romans were founding a new city, not rehabilitating an old one."[96] Although there are many other structural, socio-economic, and political transformations that the Romans made in Corinth which I do not mention here,[97] one major aspect of transformation that I will discuss further now is *language*.

---

[95] David Gilman Romano, "Urban and Rural Planning in Roman Corinth," in *Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, ed. Daniel Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 53–55.

[96] Walbank, "The Foundation and Planning of Early Roman Corinth," 107.

[97] For further discussion on structural transformation see Romano, "City Planning, Centuriation, and Land Division in Roman Corinth: Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis & Colonia Iulia Flavia Augusta Corinthiensis," 293–98; David Gilman Romano, "A Tale of Two Cities: Roman Colonies at Corinth," in *Romanization and the City: Creations, Transformations, and Failures : Proceedings of a Conference Held at the American Academy in Rome to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Excavations at Cosa, 14-16 May, 1998*, ed. Susan E. Alcock, Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary 38 (Portsmouth, RI: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2000), 83–104. For further discussion on religious transformation, see Betsey A. Robinson, "Fountains and the Formation of Cultural Identity at Roman Corinth," in *Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, ed. Daniel Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Divinity School, 2005), 101–40; Bookidis, "Religion in Corinth: 146 B.C.E. to 100 C.E." For further discussion on socio-economic transformation, see Engels, *Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City*, 16–21; G.D.R. Sanders, "Landlords and Tenants: Sharecroppers and Subsistence Framing in Corinthian Historical Context," in *Corinth in Contrast: Studies in Inequality*, ed. Steven J. Friesen, Sarah A. James, and Daniel N. Schowalter (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 103–25; Marcin N. Pawlak, "Corinth After 44 BC: Ethnical and Cultural Changes," *Electrum* 20 (2013): 143–162.

3.3.3. The Dominance of Latin and Greek in the Roman Period

Prior to the destruction in 146 BCE and the rebuilding of Corinth in 44 BCE, Greek was apparently the main language in Corinth. The archaeological excavation of this period, however, has been "a great disappointment" as John Harvey Kent puts it, because it seems like both the earthquake in 70 BCE and the sack of the city caused a lot of damage to the city and the inscriptions there.[98] Not only is the context of these texts not clear, Kent points out that their number is also small. "Corinth herself has yielded only forty-five fragmentary Greek texts during twenty-five years of extensive excavation in the heart of the ancient city, and only an even hundred since the excavations began more than half a century ago," he writes.[99] However, in terms of language use, it is abundantly clear that the dominant one was Greek.

The presence of the M. Antonius inscription discussed above, at the very least demonstrates two things: First, that the Latin language began to make its way to the public spaces of Corinth even before the rebuilding of the city. Second, that Latin-speaking people probably began to be present among the ruins of Corinth. These people were likely "Italians who were engaged in trade and commerce," as Elizabeth Gebhard and Matthew Dickey suggest.[100] A more widespread linguistic transformation of Corinth, however, took place after the rebuilding in 44 BCE.

In his report on the archaeological excavation in Corinth from 1926 to 1950, John Harvey Kent demonstrates that out of 104 inscriptions discovered from the time of Augustus until Hadrian, 101 are in Latin and only three in Greek.[101] This vivid structural makeover is clearly a

---

[98] Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*, VIII, Part III:1.
[99] Kent, VIII, Part III:1.
[100] Gebhard and Dickie, "The View from the Isthmus, ca. 200 to 4 B.C.," 277.
[101] Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*.

political strategy of displaying of Roman control over the land of the Greeks.[102] The increasing

number of Greek inscriptions during and after the time of Hadrian is striking. Kent concludes

from this that "at Corinth the practice of erecting official dedications in the Greek language first

became common in Hadrian's reign."[103] The discovery obviously shows that the public image of

the city of Corinth in the pre-Hadrian period had been almost thoroughly Romanized. This is

understandable; such a public makeover was evidence of a political strategy of displaying their

imperial might and authority in the land of the Greeks. The enforcement of Latin language was

important in the Roman empire because as Eck puts it: "Latin was their [emperors'] own tongue,

the language which expressed Rome's greatness and will to survive."[104] The Romans

consequently displayed Latin in public areas of the colonies not only "to assert Rome's power"

but also because many of them were unable to communicate fluently in Greek.[105]

However, does this also mean that Latin language somehow became the official language

in Corinth? Some scholars apparently think that Latin was the official language in the Roman

---

[102] In Egypt, Latin was even reinforced through the documentation of legal citizenship. Adams explains, "A connection between the citizenship and Latin emerges in Egypt in the insistence that certain types of legal documents concerning Roman citizens should be in Latin, even if the citizens did not know the language. The requirement was presumably not particular to Egypt, but it is especially clear there because of the survival of many legal documents on papyrus, and because there were Roman citizens present who were Greek. . . . complications in the drawing up of the documents. If a Roman citizen did not know Latin and wanted to write a will, he would have to resort to translators to have the Latin version done; and since he would have to sign, his signature would be in a language different from that of the rest of the document. The result of this policy is the survival of a cluster of documents in a mixture of languages, with the Latin having official status and the Greek provided only for the information of the Greek speaker. Having such documents drafted must have imposed a burden on Roman citizens, as will be seen from the complicated nature of the mixed-language texts . . . Citizens will have been aware that a linguistic demand was being made of them which symbolized the obligations carried by possession of the citizenship, great though the benefits might be." See J. N. Adams, "'Romanitas' and the Latin Language," *The Classical Quarterly* 53, no. 1 (2003): 186.

[103] Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*, VIII, part III:19.

[104] Eck, "The Presence, Role and Significance of Latin in the Epigraphy and Culture of the Roman Near East," 27. Concannon puts it this way, "the use of Latin in honorary inscriptions and dedications making one's euergetism was itself an argument about one's ability to claim the label *Roman*, in so doing altering and coproducing Romannesss. . . Monumental writing in Latin in the city center was a strategic mode for the city and its elite to present themselves as bearing a unified Roman identity, despite the realities." See Concannon, *When You Were Gentiles*, 2014, 66.

[105] Eck, "The Presence, Role and Significance of Latin in the Epigraphy and Culture of the Roman Near East," 27.

period because it was primarily used for governmental administrative purposes.[106] Benjamin

Millis challenges this proposition by arguing that the notion of the "official language" is an

anachronistic one, and the idea that Latin was a "dominant language" needs further qualification.

Millis insists that Latin needs to be described as a "dominant public language."[107] That is to say,

the dominance of Latin does not necessarily mean that the majority of the Corinthians spoke this

language. It was evidently the language of public affairs, because it appears in almost all public

inscriptions erected in public spaces. Millis explains: "In a recently founded Roman colony,

using a language other than Latin in this way would have been unthinkable, for the public face

and the public entity of the colony were thoroughly Roman."[108]

Drawing upon the evidence from the Greek inscriptions about Isthmian Games, funeral

inscriptions, graffiti, and, interestingly, Paul's letter to the Corinthians,[109] Millis maintains that

---

[106] This claim was originally made by Kent in his first report of the inscriptions discovered in Corinth. However, it is then followed by many biblical scholars. See Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*, VIII, Part III:18. These are some biblical scholars who have claimed that Latin was the official language in Corinth: Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, The Anchor Yale Bible 32 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 30; V. Henry T. Nguyen, *Christian Identity in Corinth: A Comparative Study of 2 Corinthians, Epictetus and Valerius Maximums* (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 122; Andrew D. Clarke, *Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth: A Socio-Historical and Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 1-6* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2006), 13; John K. Chow, *Patronage and Power: A Study of Social Networks in Corinth*, The Library of New Testament Studies 75 (London and New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 1992), 152; Robert McQueen Grant, *Paul in the Roman World: The Conflict at Corinth* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 19; L. L. Welborn, "Inequality in Roman Corinth: Evidence from Diverse Source Evaluated by a Neo-Ridarcian Model," in *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, ed. James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), 72; Oscar Broneer, "Corinth: Center of St. Paul's Missionary Work in Greece," *The Biblical Archaeologist* 14, no. 4 (1951): 82; Stanley E. Porter, "Did Paul Speak Latin?," in *Paul: Jew, Greek, and Roman* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009), 299. For Classical scholar, see James H. Oliver, "Panachaeans and Panhellenes," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 47, no. 2 (1978): 191.

[107] Benjamin W. Millis, "The Social and Ethnic Origins of the Colonists in Early Roman Corinth," in *Corinth in Context: Comparative Studies on Religion and Society*, ed. Steven J. Friesen, Daniel N. Schowalter, and James C. Walters (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 23.

[108] Millis, 23.

[109] Murphy-O'Connor similarly maintains that the dominance of Latin in public spaces does not necessarily lead to a conclusion that the Greeks did not exist in Paul's time because The letter of 1 Corinthians was after all written in Greek. See Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth*, 8.

the language spoken on the ground was not Latin, but Greek.[110] Concerning the letter to the

Corinthians, he argues that Paul's use of Greek "was deemed appropriate" because Greek was

the *lingua franca* of the eastern Mediterranean world.[111] Also building upon the work of

Anthony Spawforth, which I will discuss further in the next section of this chapter, Millis insists

that the majority of the population in Roman Corinth were Greek speakers.[112] As such, Kent's

suspicion that Greek had somehow disappeared after the coming of the Romans and suddenly

reappeared after Hadrian is not fully correct. As Bradley Bitner points out on the basis of his

analysis of the Priscus stela, this sharp linguistic division of the pre- and post-Hadrian period

"should be seriously questioned, even abandoned."[113] Greek and Latin apparently co-existed as

the dominant languages in first-century Roman Corinth, but Greek was pushed away from public

spaces by Roman imperial power.

The existence of bilingual inscriptions also functioned as a way of translation especially

for people who do not speak either Latin or Greek. The example of bilingual inscription that

contains both Latin and Greek texts is on a marble slab discovered at Solomon Village in

1938.[114] As Kent explains, "The text records a dedication made at a cost of two thousand

sesterces (line 4) willed by a freedwoman Theodora, the wife of D[- - - -] (lines 3,7,9)."[115] The

name of Theodora's husband is not clear in Latin because only the letter D that survives, but four

letters actually do survive in Greek, i.e., Δηλμ. Thus, although the reconstruction of the complete

text of both languages is extremely hard, because we only have a small fragment of this marble

---

[110] For a database of Greek inscriptions, see Benjamin Dean Meritt, *Corinth: Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Greek Inscriptions 1896-1927*, vol. VIII, Part I (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, published for the American School of Classical Studies, 1931).

[111] Millis, "The Social and Ethnic Origins of the Colonists in Early Roman Corinth," 25–26.

[112] Millis, 22–23.

[113] Bradley J. Bitner, "Mixed-Language Inscribing at Roman Corinth," in *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, ed. James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), 207.

[114] Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*, vol. VIII, Part III, no. 276.

[115] Kent, vol. VIII, Part III, no. 276.

slab, from the existing reconstructed text, we know that the Greek is actually the translation of Latin, or vice versa.[116] As Michael Dixon points out, this is "a literal translation from the one language to the other."[117]

The interconnectedness and intermingling of Greek and Latin in Roman Corinth is clearly a very complicated matter to discuss here.[118] However, the dominance of these two languages was very obvious. In the next section, I will demonstrate that the linguistic situation of Roman Corinth went far beyond Latin and Greek.

3.4. The Case for a Heteroglossic Roman Corinth

In his inventory work of Corinthian inscriptions, Kent points out that 1600 inscriptions were collected during the excavation projects from 1926 to1950. Of these 1600 inscriptions, 653 cannot be reconstructed, and are designated as being "unedited fragments." Even the language of most of these inscriptions is unclear. However, five inscriptions dated after 44 BCE are suspected to be in Hebrew (92, 257 [=1173]), 807, 957, one is probably a Coptic inscription (2208), and five are probably Turkish or Arabic inscriptions (919, 1907, 2200, 2204).[119]

The idea that Roman Corinth is a multilingual city should thus not be a controversial thesis. The scholarship on Corinth, however, has been centered primarily around both Greek and Latin, which is understandable because these are two major languages. What I am proposing here

---

[116] The Latin expression "liberta [tHEODORA]" appears in Greek "ἀπελευθέρα Θεοδώρα."

[117] Michael D. Dixon, "A New Latin and Greek Inscription from Corinth," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 69, no. 3 (2000): 338, n. 5. Knowing that literacy level in the Roman world is not high, we can say that the knowledge of many languages was a cultural capital that obviously the elite can afford. As Frédérique Biville reminds us, "Whether an individual had mastered both languages or had short-comings in either one of them was, then, a matter of fundamental importance in the Roman world. It is usually claimed, a little too hastily, that bilingualism was a universal phenomenon. This was possibly the case in the upper echelons of society, as the example of Crassus, Cicero, and the first Roman emperors suggest." Biville, "The Graeco-Romans and Graeco-Latin: A Terminological Framework for Cases of Bilingualism," 82.

[118] Bradley Binter's essay has flashed out the complexity of this interrelationship between Greek and Latin in Corinth through his analysis of mix-language inscriptions. See Bitner, "Mixed-Language Inscribing at Roman Corinth," 185–218.

[119] Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*, vol. VIII, Part III, pt. V.

is that Roman Corinth is culturally, and thus linguistically, far richer than just Greek-Latin. As Pawlak puts it, "the population of Roman Corinth was ethnically and socially diverse from the very beginning."[120] On the basis of both textual and physical evidence, it seems that Roman Corinth was also a multilingual space. Hence, focusing only on Greek-Latin will not do justice to the entirety of the social dynamic in Corinth. Beyond just Greek and Latin, Roman Corinth was a heteroglossic city.

Before I proceed with this discussion, it is crucial to note the invisibility of many non-Greek/Latin languages in Corinth. While Latin pushed Greek to the sidelines, both Latin and Greek did the same to other languages. This situation is parallel to the dominance of English and Spanish in the United States. Both of them are the languages of the empire, i.e., of the British-American and Spanish Empires. Although English has largely pushed Spanish away from public spaces, it does not mean that the only language spoken in the US is English, or only Spanish and English. There are still other languages that have been silenced completely in public spaces. If a scholar living two thousand years from now does an excavation in Nashville, the result of the excavation will overwhelmingly find the existence of English and Spanish in 2018. Evidence for the existence of the Indonesian language in Nashville would likely be really hard to find. However, as an old rule of historical research goes, the absence of evidence is not the evidence of absence. That is, the fact that I and many other Indonesians who live in Nashville today speak primarily English, especially in public spaces, and the fact that there may be little or no evidence of written Indonesian in Nashville, does not necessarily mean there was no Indonesian living nor

---

[120] Pawlak, "Corinth After 44 BC: Ethical and Cultural Changes," 145. Similarly Millis writes, "as an international port and a rapidly growing city, Corinth must have attracted fairly large numbers of such people [Greek speaking people] who stayed for varying amounts of time, many perhaps settling there permanently but who often remained on the margins of the governing society and who had little involvement in the political life of the city." Millis, "The Social and Ethnic Origins of the Colonists in Early Roman Corinth," 30.

Indonesian language spoken in Nashville in 2018. The same is true also of Roman Corinth. The absence of written evidence of languages other than Greek and Latin does not mean that these languages were completely non-existent. The case for multilingualism, therefore, cannot be established only on the basis of explicit epigraphic documentation, but can be supposed on the implicit references and indicators that point to their existence.

Another note on language and the speech community needs to be stated as well. As I have argued in the previous chapter, language is not an abstract and ahistorical system of signs in a Saussurean sense but a social performance in all its complexity and diversity. As such, the existence of language cannot be separated from its community of speakers. Language is thoroughly embedded and dialogized in the speech community. On the basis of this assumption, it is important to note that although the epigraphic evidence of languages other than Greek and Latin is almost non-existent, any indication of the existence of a non-Greek and non-Roman group of people in Roman Corinth should be sufficient to establish the case for the presence of their languages.

3.4.1. Who were the Freedpersons in Corinth?

In the process of rebuilding Corinth, it is commonly known that Julius Caesar sent two groups of people, i.e., veterans and freedpersons., to inhabit the city[121] However, on both a

---

[121] Strabo, *Geography,* 8.6.23; Appian, *History: Punic Wars*, 8.136; Plutarch, *Caesar*, 57.8; Pausanias, *Description of Greece,* 2.1.2; Dio Cassius 43.50–3–5.

literary[122] and an onomastic[123] basis, it is likely that the number of veterans was significantly less than that of freedpersons in Roman Corinth. That means that Strabo's statement is largely correct that "now after Corinth had remained deserted for a long time, it was restored again, because of its favorable position, by the deified Caesar, who colonized it with people that belonged for the most part to the freedmen class."[124] Spawforth demonstrates through his prosopographic study of the names found in duoviral coinage and epigraphy of Roman Corinth that these freedpersons were "Greeks returning home" and that they occupied the elite class of the society.[125]

Millis elaborates Spawforth's thesis by arguing that these Corinthian freedpersons were not Romanized Greeks but "entirely Greek in origin."[126] Millis insists that these people who lived in Corinth were "a very special group of people" because they were able to navigate the interconnectedness of both Romanness and Greekness. Millis argues,

> It was not one which had so thoroughly identified itself with Roman culture as to lose its facility for Greek language and culture, but neither was it an immigrant group in the process of assimilation which had acquired merely a veneer of Romanness while remaining essentially Greek. Instead, it was a hybrid of both cultures – a group in which

---

[122] Millis, in his analysis of the information about the rebuilding of the city from Strabo, Appian, and Plutarch, has demonstrated that because the rebuilding of Carthage and Corinth took place at the same time, the statements that these authors made are a general description both what Caesar did to both cities, and not necessarily about Corinth only. "[T]he literary evidence characterizing Corinth as a veterans' colony appears to be the result of either of conflating Carthage and Corinth in an unwarranted manner, or of an attempt to make rhetorical point about Caesar, or both," he explains. Millis, "The Social and Ethnic Origins of the Colonists in Early Roman Corinth," 18–20. For example, Apian wrote: "But at a still time it is said that Caesar, who afterwards became dictator for life . . . when he was encamped near the city of Carthage, he was troubled by a dream in which he saw a whole army weeping, and that he immediately made a memorandum in writing that Carthage should be colonized. Returning to Rome not long after, and the poor asking him [Caesar] for land, he arranged to send some of them to Carthage and some to Corinth. But he was assassinated shortly afterward by his enemies in the Roman Senate, and his son Julius Caesar, surnamed Augustus, finding this memorandum, built the present Carthage, not on the site of the old one, but very near to it, in order to avoid the ancient curse. I have ascertained that he sent at most 3000 colonists from Rome and collected the rest from neighbouring country." See Appian, *Punic*, 8.136.

[123] A.J.S. Spawforth only finds 6 percent of the names that he can categorize as veterans. See Anthony J.S. Spawforth, "Roman Corinth: The Formation of a Colonial Elite," in *Roman Onomastics in the Greek East: Social and Political Aspects*, ed. A. D. Rizakis, ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ 21 (Athens and Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1996), 170.

[124] Strabo, Geography, 8.6.23. For a further discussion on the political status of the freedpeople in the Roman colony, see A. D. Rizakis, "Roman Colonies in the Province of Achaia: Territories, Land and Population," in *The Early Roman Empire in the East*, ed. Susan Alcock (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2010), 15–36.

[125] Spawforth, "Roman Corinth: The Formation of a Colonial Elite," 175. .

[126] Millis, "The Social and Ethnic Origins of the Colonists in Early Roman Corinth," 30.

one language became the mode of expression within the public sphere and another within the private.[127]

Though aware that the eastern part of the Mediterranean world from which these freedpersons originated was a multilingual region in spite of the dominance of Greek language, it is still likely that Greek was not the only language they spoke. As such, the binary of Greek and Latin often employed in the social analysis of Roman Corinth is inadequate to explain the complexity of sociolinguistic situation of the city.

Slavery was a common phenomenon in the ancient society in general.[128] The practice of rounding up the people who lost in a war and enslaving them, particularly, had been a practice since the Hellenistic through the Roman periods.[129] In fact, Aristotle, for example, explains that there is a consensus understanding that the conquering party has the right to own or sell the conquered into slavery after the war, although he also insists that only the barbarians are slaves by nature and that the Greeks will never be slaves.[130] Moreover, Plato hints at the interconnectedness of language and slavery in the debate on the issue of slave ownership between Megillus, Cleinias, and Athenian.

Athenian explains that there are two opposite opinions on slavery: some oppose it while others exploit it. Cleinias then asks what to do, knowing that there are different views on this issue. Instead of arguing for the abolition of slavery, Athenian states that, because slaves are "not

---

[127] Millis, 31.

[128] Dale Martin describes the pervasiveness of slavery in the early imperial period as follows: "In the early Roman Empire people could see slaves everywhere they looked. Slaves occupied all sorts of jobs, and they mingled rather freely with nonslaves, both freeborn people and freedpersons. Many slaves were, of course, in desperate positions, destitute, mistreated, and oppressed. But others seem to have lived relatively normal lives—normal, that is, compared with other people in the highest class." Dale B. Martin, *Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 1.

[129] For further discussion on the similarities and differences between Hellenistic and Roman practice of slavery, see Peter Hunt, *Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017).

[130] Aristotle, *Politics,* I.2.16-22. For further discussion on Aristotle's theory of natural slavery, see Benjamin H. Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 169–87; Peter Garnsey, *Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine*, The W. B. Stanford Memorial Lectures (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

easy chattel" who would not accept the existing social distinction between slaves and masters, they will likely revolt against their owners if they speak the same language (μιᾶς φωνῆς), just as what happened in Messenia.[131] Thus, in order to maintain the stability of slavery, two important strategies need to be employed: "the one is, not to allow the slaves, if they are to tolerate slavery quietly, to be all of the same nation (πατριώτας), but, so far as possible, to have them of different races (ἀσυμφώνους),—and the other is to accord them proper treatment, and that not only for their sakes, but still more for the sake of ourselves." [132] The word ἀσυμφώνους should literally be translated "not the same languages" instead of "different races" because in the immediate context the word φωνή is also employed to refer to their language.

We do not have explicit evidence of the intentional effort to purchase slaves from different languages in the Roman period. However, on the basis of the sociolinguistic diversity of the Mediterranean world, as I have discussed above, it is still arguable that the slaves who were recruited and sold after the war and who bore Greek names were likely people who spoke diverse languages other than Greek. The slave trade in the Roman period was mainly conducted by Greek slave-dealers who, according to Mary Gordon, "threw their net very wide." She further notes, "slaves reached Greece from Italy, Illyria, Armenia, Arabia, Palestine, Egypt and even Ethiopia. But the great majority of barbarian slaves came from two principal regions, the one comprising Asia Minor and Syria, the other Thrace, the valley of the lower Danube, and the northern coast of the Black Sea."[133] This practice of recruiting slaves from a diverse ethnolinguistic background can be traced back to the late republic period. Thus, linguistically

---

[131] Plato, *Laws,* VI.777b.
[132] Plato, *Laws,* VI. 777c.
[133] Mary L. Gordon, "The Nationality of Slaves under the Early Roman Empire," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 14 (1924): 93.

speaking, the practice of slave-trading in the Roman world apparently still followed the general

principle that Plato laid out in *Laws*.

Bearing a Greek name, thus, does not mean that one came from Greece and thus spoke

Greek as one's main or only tongue. A.M. Duff's explanation of slave-naming practice in the

early Roman period is worth quoting in full:

> In the first place the Greek name is not an infallible sign of Greek birth. Quite one-third
> of the Emperor's Germanic guardsmen bore Greek names. Moreover among the
> inscriptions which record explicitly slave's nationalities many show Spaniards or Gauls
> whose names are Hellenic. So it is certain that some Greek names represent westerners.
> Slave-merchants, being generally Greek, probably used their own language to name their
> slaves whatever their nationality, and the purchasing masters must of the have allowed
> the name thus given to remain. A slave might even be called after the dealer himself.
> Thus, we hear from Varro, a slave was called Artemas after Artemidorus the merchant
> from whom he was bought. Other masters might give a Greek name through an interest in
> Greek literature. Moreover certain names were appropriate to particular occupations.
> Asclepiades was thus a favourite name with doctors. Actors assumed names of celebrated
> predecessors, as Pylades or Paris, or else names appropriate to the stage like Apolaustus
> or Thymele.[134]

Ancient slave-naming practice is far more complex than parents giving a name to a person, as

commonly happened in the modern times. Since becoming a slave is an experience of social

death,[135] "the enslaved person lost social and familial affiliations, became a thing—a *res*

manicipî—and could be owned, sold, rented, mortgaged, etc."[136] Every time a person was

bought and sold into slavery, that person likely received a new name.[137] Assigning a new name

---

[134] A. M. Duff, *Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire* (Cambridge, UK: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd, 1958), 5–6.

[135] The seminal work of a Harvard sociologist, Orlando Patterson, has been quite influential in framing slavery as a social death. See Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).

[136] Richard Gamauf, "Slavery: Social Position and Legal Capacity," in *The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society*, ed. Paul J. du Plessis, Clifford Ando, and Kaius Tuori (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 386.

[137] Varro suggests that slaves were often named after their master with an additional suffix –*por*. Varro, *On the Latin Language*, 8.9.

is a violent erasure of one's original identity and the enforcement a new identity. Slavery is a mark of a significant shift in one's social identity.

Since most slaves bore Greek names, having a Greek name in Rome was more an indication of "slavery or low status" [138] than one of Hellenic linguistic or social origin. As Bradley McLean puts it, "despite the fact that Greek names predominate among freedmen in imperial inscriptions, one cannot presume that the freedmen all came from the Greek-speaking part of the empire."[139] In her extensive study of the freedpeople in the late republic period, Susan Treggiari argues that, instead of Eastern and Western origins, it is much better to divide these people into two other categories: civilized and uncivilized peoples or cultured and uneducated people. The reason is simply that the idea that Greek names would somehow indicate their eastern origin is often misleading. "'Eastern' origin did not automatically carry with it those allegedly Greek qualities," she argues.[140] The example of this linguistic struggle among non-Greek slaves is exemplified through Cicero's grandfather who thinks that a Syrian must not know Greek better than Syriac.[141] She concludes, "Many Syrians, then, had little knowledge of the language [i.e. Greek]."[142] One's name could of course be an indication of one's Greek-speaking origin, but this was not always the case. Roman parents, unsurprisingly, often did not want to give their child a Greek name.[143]

---

[138] Hunt, *Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery*, 134.

[139] Bradley Hudson McLean, *An Introduction to Greek Epigraphy of the Hellenistic and Roman Periods from Alexander the Great Down to the Reign of Constantine (323 B.C.-A.D. 337)* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 130.

[140] Susan Treggiari, *Roman Freedmen During the Late Republic* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 8.

[141] Treggiari, 9. "To take another instance, the eminent Marcus Cicero the elder, father of the best man of our time, our own friend, said that our contemporaries were like the Syrian slave-market: 'the better knowledge they had of Greeks, the more worthless were their respective characters.'" See Cicero, *De Oratore*, II.265.

[142] Treggiari, 9.

[143] Hunt, *Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery*, 134.

Many names found in Corinth would have a Latin *praenomen* and *nomen*, but a Greek *cognomen*.[144] The most famous and highly influential one is obviously Cn. Babbius Philinus, who donated a fountain honoring Poseidon in the Forum.[145] The absence of his filiation, i.e., the lack of mention of his father's name, in all the inscriptions modern scholars have taken to indicate his status as a former slave (i.e., freedperson) or a descendent of a slave.[146] The *cognomen* Philinus is a Greek one and probably a name that he had kept since he was a slave.[147] Since bearing a Greek name does not necessarily guarantee a Hellenic origin, we cannot limit our analysis of this person to either Latin or Greek. It is still possible that the name Philinus was given to this person by his previous owner or seller.

---

[144] Millis, "The Social and Ethnic Origins of the Colonists in Early Roman Corinth," 22. For a complete list of *cognomina* that are found in Corinth. See Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*, VIII, Part III:231–34. Concerning Roman nomenclature practice, it is worth noting that it developed through centuries. The *tria nomina* was a very common practice in the first and second century CE. By the end of the second century, while *nomen* continues, the practice of giving *praenomen* and *nomen* began to largely disappear. See Alison E. Cooley, *The Cambridge Manual of Latin Epigraphy* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 409–13; Benet Salway, "What's in a Name? A Survey of Roman Onomastic Practice from c. 700 B.C. to A.D. 700," *The Journal of Roman Studies* 84 (1994): 124–45.

[145] This name is found in many Latin inscriptions, i.e., West #2, #3, #98, #99, #100, #101, #122 (possibly), #131, #132. In Kent's catalogues, it is found in Kent #155, #241; #21, #25, #27, #81, #100, #106, #130, #133. See Allen Brown West, *Latin Inscriptions, 1896-1926*, Volume VIII, Part 2 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, published for the American School of Classical Studies, 1931), 5–6, 82–83, 107–8. See also Robert L. Scranton, *Corinth: Monuments in the Lower Agora and North of the Archaic Temple*, vol. I, part III (Princeton, NJ: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1951); Charles Kaufman Williams, "A Re-Evaluation of Temple E and the West End of the Forum of Corinth," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, no. 55 (1989): 156–62; Bradley J. Bitner, *Paul's Political Strategy in 1 Corinthians 1-4* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 236–39.

[146] West, *Latin Inscriptions, 1896-1926*, 108. Cf. Cavan W. Concannon, "Negotiating Multiple Modes of Religion and Identity in Roman Corinth," in *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, ed. James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), 58. For further discussion on Philinus' socio-political status and role in Roman Corinth, see Harry Stansbury, "Corinthian Honor, Corinthian Conflict: A Social History of Early Roman Corinth and Its Pauline Community" (University of California, Irvine, 1990), 254–58.

[147] James S. Jeffers explains: "Slaves had only one name, either the name they had before enslavement or a name assigned to them by their master. With the consent of the master, a slave could name his or her child. Upon receiving their freedom and Roman citizenship, male slaves of Romans normally took the *praenomen* and *nomen* of their master. Rather than take the *cognomen* of his master, a former slave usually kept as *cognomen* the name he had been called as a slave. Some changed their personal name to a Roman name and made their name more Latin sounding, probably seeking greater respectability." James S. Jeffers, *The Greco-Roman World of the New Testament Era: Exploring the Background of Early Christianity* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 204.

A small hint of the alterity of his social identity lies in his *nomen* Babbius, which is an unusual one because it was almost non-existent in the Latin or Greek world. It is not surprising that West mentions that Babbius is a rare *nomen*.[148] There are two possible explanations: either first, that this Babbius is Philinus' former master from Italy, who had now become his patron;[149] or second, since a Roman *nomen* often refers to one's clan or tribe (Lat: *gens*),[150] the rareness of Babbius could also demonstrate that he is not from any Latin or Greek family. Indeed*,* Millis suggests that "Babbius has no obvious connection with Romans prominent in the East such as the numerous mercantile families or generals. His lack of discernable origins, aside from his previous servile status, and his steady upward progression through the local cursus honorum create the impression of a man succeeding and prospering in spite of humble beginnings."[151] The *nomen* Babbius could be a small hint to us that perhaps his identity slips outside the Greek-Latin binary category in spite of the fact that he bore a Greek *cognomen.* For this reason, I disagree with Concannon's insistence that Philinus "was [of] Greek origin."[152] The complexity of Babbius' identity is beyond a mere hybridity of Romanness and Greekness, I suggest.

That said, this discussion is intended to show that the social make-up of Roman Corinth must be far richer and more diverse than the simple Latin or Greek binary that has commonly

---

[148] West, *Latin Inscriptions, 1896-1926*, 108. Spawforth argues that because this *nomen* is rare, the appearance of the nomen Babbius at Delphi (i.e., Babbius Magnus and Babbius Maxiums) "leaves no doubt that father and son belonged to the socially mobile descendants of Philinus." Spawforth, "Roman Corinth: The Formation of a Colonial Elite," 169.

[149] Stansbury, "Corinthian Honor, Corinthian Conflict," 256. Millis interestingly calls this explanation dubious without giving any explanation why. See Benjamin W. Millis, "The Local Magistrates and Elite of Roman Corinth," in *Corinth in Contrast: Studies in Inequality*, ed. Steven J. Friesen, Sarah A. James, and Daniel N. Schowalter (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 40 n. 10.

[150] See Salway, "What's in a Name?," 124–25.

[151] Millis, "The Local Magistrates and Elite of Roman Corinth," 40.

[152] "The cognomen Philinus further hints that Babbius was Greek origin. Babbius, then, was probably a Greek freedman who came to the colony (perhaps at its inception) and build up enough wealth both to act as a major benefactor to the city and to take up various magistracies." Concannon, *When You Were Gentiles*, 2014, 59. The main framework throughout Concannon's project is the ethnic negotiation between Romanness and Greekness. See his discussion on fluidity, hybridity and "malleable body" in Concannon, chap. 1.

become the major framework of scholarly discussion. This multicultural, and thus multilingual,

nature of Roman Corinth can further be affirmed by some other indicators to which I turn now.

3.4.2. Roman Corinth at the Crossroads of Trade

Strabo described the contribution of Corinth's geographic position to the vibrancy of its

economy as follows: "Corinth is called 'wealthy' because of its commerce, since it is situated on

the Isthmus and is mater of two harbors, of which the one leads straight to Asia, and the other to

Italy; and it makes easy the exchange of merchandise from both countries that are so far distant

from each other."[153] Although Welborn was correct that Strabo's description of the Corinthian

economy is drawn from a pre-146 period,[154] Roman Corinth was still a crucial center for export-

import activities in the Mediterranean world.[155] As a matter of fact, Corinth's economy was

---

[153] Strabo, *Geography*, 8.6.20.

[154] Welborn, "Inequality in Roman Corinth: Evidence from Diverse Source Evaluated by a Neo-Ridarcian Model," 49.

[155] Donald W. Engels's work has highlighted the importance of Corinth as an urban center. At the heart of his project is the rejection of the idea that the economy of Roman cities was consumerist and dependent on the agricultural section of the society, which becomes a test case, for Engels, in this larger scholarly concern. That is, Corinth exemplifies a different model for understanding urban economic life in the Roman world. Rejecting the idea that urban communities exploited rural communities, Engels argues that such exploitation did not take place in a large scale as portrayed by many ancient scholars. Because there was no severe exploitation, the rural communities still had surplus products to sell in the urban market of Corinth. They did not consume all their products for their own subsistence. "A market economy, therefore, influences to a large extent the price of land, the types of crops produced, and the type of settlement pattern near a city," Engels argues. The market economy of Roman Corinth goes beyond just the economic exchange between urban and rural communities, but also with other places in the Mediterranean world. One characteristic of Roman Corinth that Engels argues is the higher import than export activities. Corinth imported, for example, lamps from Ephesus, Attica, and Italy, while local industries also produced cheap and poor quality of products especially for people who could not afford to buy the expensive ones from outside. Engels builds his case further on the basis of bronze manufacture and marble sculpture in Corinth.

The other aspect of Roman economy that Engels explores is "the service economy." Since Corinth is the connecting city at the crossroads of Mediterranean world, the Corinthian economy depends on services that they provided to the visitors, merchants, and travelers. "These services may be divided into two types, primary, or attractive services, and secondary services. Primary services would include religious, educational, cultural, and judicial activities that brought rural residents into the city. While in the city, these individuals would need secondary services such as food, temporary lodging, or the use of a public bath or latrine. Secondary services would not attract the rural residence to the city (few presumably would travel to the city to use a latrine), but would fulfill needs during his stay. Of course, services offered by the city were also used by city residents, but this activity would only serve to redistribute funds in the city and not earn the city new wealth. It is the services offered to non-residents which earned the city income." For further discussion on these two aspects of Corinthian economy (i.e., market and service), see Engels, *Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City*, chap. 2 and 3.

thoroughly centered around trade.[156] As Pettegrew notes, "While there were certainly other

different kinds of markets in Corinth, the emporion places the harbors at the center of the

region's commercial economy. Kenchreai and Lechaion, at least were the place of large scale-

trade in the territory."[157]

These two major ports that connect the city to Saronic and Corinthian gulfs were really

the key to the Corinthian transnational economy. They kept this city busy and full of merchants

and visitors. The ceramic evidence in Corinth is probably the best way to illustrate this

transnational nature of Corinthian economy. Kathleen Slane's study on the ceramic trade is

particularly revealing of how this city functioned as "a market in the trade between the east and

the west" in the first and second centuries. Focusing primarily on the import aspect of trade, [158]

Slane observes that there was a "changing pattern of imports to Corinth" between the first to the

second centuries.[159] In the first century, the import was dominated by the western goods while

---

Antony Spawforth published a strong critique against Engels' project in 1992. The entire review rests on Spawforth's insistence that Engels "is not at home with the evidence," which leads him to many misleading conclusions. Concerning Engels' revisionist proposal, Spawforth argues that Corinth cannot and should not be used as a model for Roman cities. "How many would want to claim that this Mexico City of Roman Greece was in any sense the typical ancient city which Finley sought to characterize in *The Ancient Economy*?" Spawforth writes. Also, he points out that Engels seems to confuse the difference between ancient "Classical *poleis* and provincial Greek cities." This confusion "allows him to make the unsubstantiated claim (p. 126) that, even under the principate, the 'law prevented the peasant and tenant from being exploited by extortionate landlords or tax collectors,' leaving them (so E.'s argument goes) to spend their plentiful surplus in his service-cities." See A. J. S. Spawforth, "Roman Corinth and the Ancient Urban Economy," *The Classical Review* 42, no. 1 (1992): 119–120.

[156] Concannon, *When You Were Gentiles*, 2014, 54.

[157] David K. Pettegrew, "The Diolkos and the Emporion: How a Land Bridge Framed the Commercial Economy of Roman Corinth," in *Corinth in Contrast: Studies in Inequality*, ed. Steven J. Friesen, Sarah A. James, and Daniel N. Schowalter (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 139.

[158] Concerning the export of Corinthian goods, Slate explains, "For the moment I will ignore the difficult problem of exports, except to point out that we have evidence of ceramic exports only for the mid second and third centuries. (I refer to Corinthian lamps of Broneer's type XXVII, which are widely distributed in the eastern Mediterranean during this period, and to Corinthian relief bowls, of which examples reached as far as Mallorca and northeastern Spain.) For this period one should consider also, aside from ceramics, the Corinthian dyeing industry based on the purple fishing of Bulis mentioned by Pausanias (10.37.3). Corinthian bronzes may still have been manufactured into the Roman period as well. Presumably this marks the *floruit* of Corinthian trade; it is slightly later than the period in which I am interested here, the period from the founding of the colony through the second century." Kathleen Warner Slane, "Corinthian Ceramic Imports: The Changing Pattern of Provincial Trade in the First and Second Century AD," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 55 (1989): 219–220.

[159] Slane, 219.

the local products were also on the rise. In the second century, however, the trade was dominated by goods from the east. [160]

The flow of goods from the west in the first century is understandable because it was still the early period of the establishment of Corinth as a Roman colony. Many different kinds of western goods came to Corinth during this time. "Arretine sigillata, an occational piece of decorated Late Italian terra sigilata from Luni or Pisa, Campanian (and possible Ostian) cooking pots and pans, and at least two types of Campanian amphorae (both for wine and fruit) show strengthened ties to Eturia and Campania; lamps and thin-walled wares are still from unidentified central western Italian sources, too," she explains.[161] However, it is also worth noting that in spite of the dominance of the western foods, eastern products were still discovered in the first century. She notes, "from the eastern Mediterranean come still Syrian and Pamphylian material, also very occasional fine-ware from Cyprus (?) and Egyptian faience."[162] Also, many products such as fine-ware and amphorae from the north, particularly from Black Sea area, came to Corinth in the first century.[163]

---

[160] Slane's thesis has been used by Pettegrew as evidence that the main function of *diolkos* is not to transfer cargo or boats from the west to the east, and vice versa. See Pettegrew, "The Diolkos of Corinth," 560.

[161] Slane, "Corinthian Ceramic Imports," 222.

[162] Slane, 222.

[163] Slane, 222. Slane insists that Corinth did not receive ships and products directly from these various places. She explains: "A comparison of ceramics found at Pompeii and at Ostia with those found at Corinth makes clear that the similarities are strongly with Ostia in the second half of the first century. Perhaps the Corinthians did more business with the northern port. This seems less evident in the second century; at the time that Trajan refurbished the port at Ancona, eastern goods appear in the central Adriatic, inland Etruscan fine-wares are found along the east (but *not* the west) coast of Italy and in Corinth, and eastern Italian amphorae reach Corinth. The common forms of second-century Çandarli ware are the same as the late forms of Italian sigillata. At present in the east we know these late forms only at Corinth and Benghazi (from different production centers); Corinth seems the logical transmitter to Çandarli. Difficulties exist as well. The western finds from Athens do not match those from Corinth, at least in the late first century BC and early first century. Athens must have at least one additional supplier. And, at least until the mid-third century, Attic goods are almost unknown in Corinth, Corinthian not quite as rare in Athens." The various ceramics in Corinth, therefore, "arrived via intermediary ports, Ostia and the South Aegean through the early second century, and perhaps Ancona and a northern Aegean port in the later second century." Thus, the goods were collected first in these intermediary ports and then transported to Corinth. See Slane, 224. On the basis of this proposal, Concannon argues that "we should not… overestimate the extent of Corinth's trading partners." See Cavan W. Concannon, *"When You Were Gentiles": Specters of Ethnicity in Roman Corinth and*

That said, the first-century Roman Corinth that Paul visited was economically quite

vibrant and rich. It is not surprising that in Dio Chrysostom's speech, which was probably

penned by Favorinus, he states that many people such as "traders or pilgrims or envoys or

passing travelers" visited Cenchreae every year.[164] Murphy-O'Connor points out that the

mention of traders shows an emphasis on the importance of the economic life in Roman

Corinth.[165] Clearly, the vibrancy of Roman economy is far beyond that of local exchange

between the rural and urban communities. Although the trade probably was not direct, as Slane

has pointed out, that does not negate the fact that traders visited Corinth from many different

places. Knowing the multilingual nature of the larger Mediterranean world, it shouldn't be too

difficult to imagine that these traders and merchants from the west, the east, and the north who

came to Corinth would speak their own languages while also using Greek as the *lingua franca*.

3.4.3. The Isthmian Games

Another aspect that contributes to the richness of linguistic life in Roman Corinth are the

famous Isthmian games. The festival was celebrated every two years to honor the god of the sea,

Poseidon, to whom a temple was built in the Isthmus.[166] The games became a famous attraction,

---

Paul's Corinthian Correspondence, Synkrisis: Comparative Approaches to Early Christianity in Greco-Roman Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 54.

[164] Dio Chrysostom, *Discourses*, 37.8.36.

[165] Murphy-O'Connor, *St. Paul's Corinth*, 103. Gerd Theissen similarly observes, "Dio Chrysostom (*Or.* 37,8) was right in putting the merchant at the head of the list of Corinthian visitors. Thus it fits with the general picture of Corinth to like the frequent travelers of members of the Christian community with business matter." Gerd Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2004), 101. Cf. Welborn, "Inequality in Roman Corinth: Evidence from Diverse Source Evaluated by a Neo-Ridarcian Model," 49.

[166] Pausanias writes about the origin of Isthmian games: "In the Corinthian territory is also the place called Cromyon from Cromus the son of Poseidon. Here they say that Phaea was bred; overcoming this sow was one of the traditional achievements of Theseus. Farther on the pine still grew by the shore at the time of my visit, and there was an altar of Melicertes. At this place, they say, the boy was brought ashore by a dolphin; Sisyphus found him lying and gave him burial on the Isthmus, establishing the Isthmian games in his honor." Pausanias, *Description of Greece: Corinth*, 1.3. Cf. Strabo, *Geography*, 8.6.22.

a pan-hellenic festival, probably since the sixth century BCE.[167] Even after the sack of Corinth

by the Romans, Pausanias recounts that "the Isthmian games were not interrupted. . . but so long

as it lay deserted the celebration of the games was entrusted to the Sicyonians, and when it was

rebuilt the honor was restored to the present inhabitants."[168]

This festival was important for the socio-economic life of Roman Corinth. Plutarch

writes that when M. Antonius Sopsis was the ἀγωνοθέτης of Isthiman games, "he entertained a

great many foreign visitors (ξένους) at once, and several times entertained all the citizens

(πολίτας)."[169] The reference to both foreigners and citizens are a good hint that the visitors to

Corinth were beyond just local inhabitants of Corinthian or even Roman citizens.[170] It is not

surprising that Strabo also attested that the Isthmian games were not just the source of the wealth

in Corinth, but also "wont to draw crowds of people."[171] These visitors, of course, would bring

their local languages to Corinth.

Concerning the multiplicity of languages of those who attended the Isthmian games,

Polybius writes the following: "the most distinguished men from almost the whole world having

assembled there owing to their expectation of what would take place, many and various were the

reports prevalent during the whole festival."[172] Evelyn S. Shuckburgh renders the clause "πολλοὶ

καὶ ποικίλοι καθ᾽ ὅλην τὴν πανήγυριν ἐνέπιπτον λόγοι" as "there was a great deal of talk on the

subject from one end of the assembled multitude to the other, and expressed in varied language."

---

[167] Oscar Broneer, "The Isthmian Sanctuary of Poseidon," *Archaeology* 8, no. 1 (1955): 56.

[168] Pausanias, *Description of Greece: Corinth,* 2.2.

[169] ". . . ἑστιῶντος αὐτοῦ πολλοὺς μὲν ἅμα ξένους, πάντας δὲ πολλάκις τοὺς πολίτας." Plutarch, *Quaestiones Conviviales,* 8.4.1. (723a). For further discussion on the role and responsibilities of ἀγωνοθέτης, see James R. Harrison, "Paul and the Agōnothetai at Corinth," in *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, ed. James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016), 271–326.

[170] For further discussion on Plutarch's notion of citizenship, see Bradley Ritter, *Judeans in the Greek Cities of the Roman Empire: Rights, Citizenship and Civil Discord*, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 170 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015), 58.

[171] Strabo, *Geography*, 8.6.23.

[172] Polybius, *Histories*, 18.46.

The issue at stake now is how we understand the word λόγοι in this context. On the one hand, W. R. Paton (revised by F. W. Walbank) in LOEB relies on the sentences after this statement. In the next part, Polybius reports that there were "some saying that it was impossible for the Romans to abandon certain places and cities, and others declaring that they would abandon the places which were considered famous, but would retain those which, while less illustrious, would serve their purpose equally well, even at once naming these latter out of their own heads, each more ingenious than the other." Because there are different opinions on what the Romans would do, Paton and Walbank then decide to translate the word λόγοι as "reports."

Shuckburgh, on the other hand, seems to translate this word on the basis of the preceding statement about the assembly of highly respected people from almost the whole world at the Isthmian games. However, she thinks that πολλοὶ καὶ ποικίλοι . . . λόγοι represents two different ideas. First, "πολλοὶ . . . λόγοι" is translated as "a great deal of talk." Second, "ποικίλοι . . . λόγοι" is understood as "varied language." In short, Shuckburgh apparently attempts to combine both statements before and after this clause. This is the strength of Shuckburgh's translation. The word λόγοι means reports or talk and languages. If this is the case, although Polybius's report is from before the sack of Corinth in 146 BCE, it can give us a small hint that the ξένοι (foreigners) that Plutarch talked about in the first century CE could possibly have been people from many different parts of the world who spoke multiple languages.

The existence of the impressive structure South Stoa located in the Forum area during the Roman period is a testimony to the great influx of people who visited Corinth. Oscar Broneer argues that the original function was "as a Grand Hotel, in which the important delegates and other distinguished guests could be housed and entertained in a manner suitable to the high

purpose of Pan-hellenic organization."[173] After the Romans restored the South Stoa, they used Room C as offices for Roman administrators and Rooms A and B for officers of the Isthmian games, especially the *agonothetes*.[174] Room F was later erected later, around the middle of first century, at the same time as the construction of the South Basilica and the Julian Basilica.[175] While these projects were going on, an entrance was built into the Agora with a paved roadway that led from the South Stoa to the port in Kenchreai.[176] Whether the Romans still used the South Stoa as a sort of hotel for visitors is not clear from the evidence. However, by constructing this new entrance to the Agora and the roadway to the port, they seemed to provide a space for visitors particularly from the east to do engage in economic interactions in the Agora.[177] As Joseph Fitzmyer points out, it is not too difficult to imagine that some or many of these visitors who attended the Isthmian games "may have become resident aliens" of Corinth.[178]

At this point, at least we know that the freedpeople in Corinth were probably not just Greek speaking people and that both trade and the Isthmian games brought people to Corinth from all over Mediterranean world. The following discussion aims at presenting more detail indications of non-Greek and non-Latin speaking people in Corinth.

3.4.4. The Jewish and Samaritan Communities in Corinth

The presence of the Jewish community in Corinth is attested in both literary sources and archaeological evidence. We know from both the New Testament and Philo that there was a

---

[173] Oscar Broneer, *The South Stoa and its Roman Successors*, vol. I part IV (Princeton, NJ: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1954), 157.

[174] Broneer, I part IV:158.

[175] Broneer, I part IV:159.

[176] Broneer, I part IV:159.

[177] Broneer explains, "After the construction of the road leading into the Agora through the middle of the Stoa this would offer the most convenient approach to the city to visitors arriving from the harbor at Kenchreai." Broneer, I part IV:129.

[178] Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 33.

Jewish community in Corinth. Philo listed Corinth as one of the colonies to which Jews migrated in the Roman world.[179] Further, a stone was discovered on the Lechaeum Road in an 1898 excavation,[180] with a relatively large Greek inscription: [Συνα]γωγὴ Ἑβρ[αὶων]. Although archaeologists have not found any synagogue structure in Corinth, this stone suggests that such a building might have existed in Roman Corinth. Interestingly, when Paul was in Corinth, according to the account in the book of Acts, he went to synagogue every Sabbath in order to talk to Jews and Greeks (Acts 18:4). Although Powell seems to suspect that this stone might have been part of the synagogue that Paul attended, we do not have enough evidence to make such a direct assertion.[181] Also, on a paleographical basis, Meritt argues that the inscription was probably from a later period than Paul's time.[182]

Whatever the case, the inscription is evidence of the presence of Hebrew-speaking people in Roman Corinth. Commenting on this inscription, Solomon Zeitlin argues that the appearance of the word "Hebrews" instead of "Jews" is an indication that "the people who lived in Judaea were called Judaeans—Jews, and that those who lived in the Diaspora were called Hebrews or Israel."[183] To Zeitlin, the word "Hebrew"[184] itself had been commonly used in the Tannaitic

---

[179] Philo, *Embassy to Gaius*, 281-2. "As for the Holy City, I must say what befits me to say. While she, as I have said, is my native city she is also the mother city, not of one country Judaea, but of most of the others in virtue of the colonies sent out at divers time to the neighbouring lands Egypt, Phoenicia, and Syria (the so-called Coele Syria as well as Syria proper), to lands lying far away, Pamphylia, Cilicia, most of Asia up to Bithynia and the corners of Pontus, similarly also into Europe, Tessaly, Boetia, Macedonia, Aetolia, Attica, Argos, Corinth, and most of the best parts of the Peloponnese."

[180] Height: 0.22m; Width: 0.93m; Thickness: 0.42m. Benjamin Powell, "Greek Inscriptions from Corinth," *American Journal of Archaeology* 7, no. 1 (1903): 60. Cf. Meritt, *Greek Inscriptions 1896-1927*, VIII, Part I:78.

[181] Powell, "Greek Inscriptions from Corinth," 61.

[182] Meritt, *Greek Inscriptions 1896-1927*, VIII, Part I:79. Cf. David. G. Horrell and Edward Adams, "The Scholarly Quest for Paul's Church at Corinth: A Critical Survey," in *Christianity at Corinth: The Quest for the Pauline Church*, ed. Edward Adams and David G. Horrell (Louisville and London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 10; Concannon, *When You Were Gentiles*, 2014, 143.

[183] Solomon Zeitlin, "The Names Hebrew, Jew and Israel: A Historical Study," *The Jewish Quarterly Review* 43, no. 4 (1953): 371.

[184] Cf. Testament of Solomon, 6:8; 14:7; Letter of Aristeas 35-40; Philo, *On Ambraham*, 27-75; Jubilee, 12:26; Acts 6; Testament of Naphtali 8:6.

literature from the second commonwealth period to refer to the language that they spoke.[185] That is to say, language might have become the primary identity marker of this group of people. In the same vein, while being cautious because the evidence is inconclusive, Margareth Thrall contends that "this [inscription] might have indicated a synagogue where the languages used were Hebrew and Aramaic, rather than Greek."[186]

Although there is no conclusive evidence that the word "Hebrew" in the inscription refers to the language, the appearance of the "Samaritan amulet" in the database of minor objects indicates that the language might have been used in Corinth.[187] While the lower part of the amulet is missing, the Hebrew inscription can still be read.

The Samaritan Amulet[188]

---

[185] "It is evident from this that the expression Judaeans was used in the official documents current among the people in Judaea during the Second Commonwealth, and not the words Israel or Hebrew. We never find the term Israel denoting the people of Judaea, in the entire tannaitic literature of the time of the Second Commonwealth. The term Israel was used only in contrast to the priests and Levites. The country was called Judaea, or sometimes the land of Judaea. The tannaitic literature of that period used the term הארץ the "land." The language of the people was called 'Hebrew.'" Zeitlin, 369.

[186] Margaret Thrall, *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, Vol. 2*, ed. Christopher M. Tuckett and Graham I. Davies (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001), 725. For arguments against the idea that this inscription refers to Hebrew language, see Graham Harvey, "Synagogues of the Hebrews: 'Good Jews' in the Diaspora," in *Jewish Local Patriotism and Self-Identification in the Graeco-Roman Period*, ed. Siân Jones, Sarah Pearce, and Lester L. Grabbe, The Library of Second Temple Studies 3 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 132–47.

[187] Gladys R. Davidson, *The Minor Objects*, vol. XII, Corinth: Results of Excavations Conducted by The American School of Classical Studies at Athens (Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1952), 260.

[188] This picture is taken from Jacob Kaplan, "A Samaritan Amulet from Corinth," *Israel Exploration Journal* 30, no. 3/4 (1980): 196.

The expression ואת שר צבאו (and with the commander of his army), according to J. Kaplan, is an indication that "this type of amulet was worn by followers and sympathizers of the 'commander of his army,' the reference being to Baba Raba, the well-known Samaritan leader, fighter and reformer in the second half of the fourth century C.E., who was exiled by the Byzantine authorities to Constantinople where he died."[189] In spite of Kaplan's suspicion that it might come from a later period, he further points out that the amulet is a hint that the "Samaritan immigrant communities" moved not only to Athens or Rome, but also to Corinth, and had probably done so since the early Roman period.[190]

3.4.5. The Egyptians in Corinth

Besides the Jews, there are also traces of the existence of Egyptians in Roman Corinth. The major mark of the presence of Egyptians in Corinth is in the religious realm. Pausanius reports about the temple of Isis in Corinth as follows: "As you go up to Acrocorinth you see two precincts of Isis, one of Isis surnamed Pelagian, and the other Egyptian Isis, and two sanctuaries of Serapis, one of them being of Serapis called 'in Canopus.'"[191] Not only in Arcocorinth, he also states that "In Cenchreae are a temple and a stone statue of Aphrodite, after it on the mole running into the sea a bronze image of Poseidon, and at the other end of the harbor sanctuaries of Asclepius and of Isis."[192] Archaeological explorations have clearly confirmed the existence of this Isis temple in Kenchreai while the one in Acrocorinth has not yet been discovered, although some indication of its existence may be around, such as the three sculptures of Serapis in

---

[189] Kaplan, 197–98.
[190] Kaplan, 198.
[191] Pausanias, *Description of Greece: Corinth*, 4.6.
[192] Pausanias, *Description of Greece: Corinth*, 2.3.

Corinth.[193] Moreover, a column with one word inscription "ὄργια" found in the middle of the

destruction of the Christian basilica, according to Joseph Rife, is "direct evidence for the

Egyptian cult" in Roman Kenchreai.[194] he word ὄργια itself, in Rife's estimation, can be

interpreted as a neuter plural noun meaning "mysteries," which is a word that was commonly

used to described the Egyptian cult.[195] Thus, he suspects that the complete inscription would

have read Ἶσις Ὀργία or Ἴσιδι Ὀργίαι.[196]

Dennis Edwin Smith has catalogued extensive evidence of the presence of Egyptian cults

in Corinth from as early as third century BCE in the Hellenistic period through the late Roman

period.[197] That evidence includes sanctuaries, inscriptions, sanctuary arts, coins, lamps,

terracottas, prosopography, festivals, and decorative acts. Concerning the sculptures, while Smith

pays more attention to the sculpture of the head of Serapis, especially the ones discovered in the

Forum area near Temple D and along the Lechaion Road, we should also note that many of the

Corinthian sculptures were made of imported raw materials. The statuary marble, according to

Sturgeon, "comes from Paros, Naxos, Thasos, and Asia Minor, though marble from the Pentelic

---

[193] For further discussion, see Dennis Edwin Smith, "The Egyptian Cults at Corinth," *The Harvard Theological Review* 70, no. 3/4 (1977): 201–216. Three sculptures of the head of Serapis were found: a) in the east of Theater, b) in the South Stoa area, and c) near the Basilica on the Lechaion Road. See Elizabeth J. Milleker, "Three Heads of Sarapis from Corinth," *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 54, no. 2 (1985): 121–35; Mary C. Sturgeon, "Sculpture at Corinth, 1896-1996," in *Corinth, the Centenary, 1896-1996*, ed. Charles K. Williams II and Nancy Bookidis, vol. XX (Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2003), 352–53..

[194] Joseph L. Rife, "Religion and Society at Roman Kenchreai," in *Corinth in Context: Comparative Studies on Religion and Society*, ed. Steven J. Friesen, Daniel N. Schowalter, and James C. Walters (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 407.

[195] Rife points to the use of this word in Plutarch, an epithet for Isis at the Sarapeion in Thessalonica, etc. See Rife, 409.

[196] Rife's translation: "Isis (inscribed or understood) of the Mysteries" or "To Isis (inscribed or understood) of the Mysteries." Concerning the function of this column, Rife explains: "We cannot know how this column functioned as a dedication, or what was its original architectural setting. But it does confirm both the proximity of the Iseion to the harbor's southern limit and the existence of the mysteries. The use of the unusual epithet exemplifies the bountiful polynymy that characterized this popular Egyptian goddess, a multiform deity especially susceptible to representation in different guises." .

[197] The complete catalogue list can be seen in Smith, "The Egyptian Cults at Corinth," 225–26.

quarries predominates."[198] She notes further, "Statuary of basalt and porphyry was brought from Egypt. Examples include part of an Osiris Hydrios jar with symbols of Anubis, Hathor, and other Egyptian deities, and a fragment of an Egyptian female statuette in porphyry."[199]

Rejecting the idea that the presence of the Egyptian cults was insignificant in Corinth, Smith argues that such an idea "is misleading" because it is based on an incomplete survey of the evidence. While the Egyptian cults had already existed in Corinth since the Hellenistic period, he explains:

> For the Roman period the evidence is more substantial. Not only are the cults firmly established in Corinth at this time, they appear to have been popular in the 2nd century, since almost all the Roman evidence comes from that time. This corresponds to the development of the cults at Athens, where a resurgence of interest also took place in the 2nd century. Their influence in Corinth continued down to the 4th century, when Isis sanctuary at Kenchreai was renovated for further cultic use.[200]

It is important to note that Smith's project focuses primarily on the religious aspect of Egyptian presence in Corinth. Hence, it is not surprising that, when he talks about Egyptian figurines, he only mentions two figurines of Isis.[201] There are actually more Egyptian figurines than the Isis ones in the Roman period.

In the catalogue of minor objects compiled by Gladys Davidson, there are at least eight figurines that are suspected as having been imported from Egypt.[202] All of them are female heads from first and second centuries AD. Expressions such as "probably [or perhaps] imported from Egypt" or "may have been imported from Egypt," shows that Davidson is unsure whether these figurines originated in Egypt or were locally made. Another question worth asking now is: who

---

[198] Sturgeon, "Sculpture at Corinth, 1896–1996," 357.
[199] Sturgeon, 357.
[200] Smith, "The Egyptian Cults at Corinth," 227.
[201] Smith, 224.
[202] Davidson, *12*, vol. XII, nos. 386, 387, 409, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415. Smith only focuses on figurines nos. 386 and 387.

were these people who used these figurines in Corinth? Knowing that figurines were intended

primarily for domestic use,[203] there is a possibility that merchants might have used them in their

homes as "a display of well-traveled cosmopolitanism."[204] It is also possible that these figurines

were used by Egyptian immigrants in Corinth. Since the intermarriage between Egyptians and

Greeks was quite common since the Hellenistic period, the racial boundaries were not rigid at

all.[205]

3.4.6. Specific Names of Immigrants in Corinth

Besides the indications of immigrant communities from outside Greece in Corinth, we

also have some specific names of foreigners that further signify and confirm the presence of non-

Greek or non-Latin linguistic communities. The first case is the graffito inscription on a slab of

blue marble discovered right beside the Bema in a 1936 excavation.[206]

<div align="center">

Φίλοι
Ἀλεξᾶς
Σαραπιὰς
εὐφροσύνης
("Alexas and Sarapias are lovers of merriment")[207]

</div>

This inscription is significant because it contains two non-Greek names. One is a female

Egyptian name, and the other is a Syrian masculine name. Sarapias is a common female

Egyptian name, following the name of Sarapis or Serapis.[208] As Kent has pointed out, Charles

---

[203] See Caitlín E. Barrett, *Egyptianizing Figurines from Delos* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011), 3ff.

[204] Barrett, 38.

[205] Barrett correctly writes: "Evidence for mixed marriages suggests that many people in Ptolemic Egypt had both Greek and Egyptian ancestry, and there are reasons to think that at least in some sectors of society, people exercised some degree of choice in identifying as members of one or more groups." Barrett, 18.

[206] Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*, vol. VIII, Part III, no. 361.

[207] Translation is provided by Kent.

[208] For a more detailed discussion on the name Sarapis and all its variants, see Willy Clarysse and Mario C. D. Paganini, "Theophoric Personal Names in Graeco-Roman Egypt. The Case of Sarapis," *Archiv Für Papyrusforschung Und Verwandte Gebiete* 55, no. 1 (2009): 68–89. See also Smith, "The Egyptian Cults at Corinth," 223.

Morgan's proposal that the word Ἀλεξᾶς should be read Ἀλιζᾶς[209] is unlikely because the name

Alizas is unknown.[210] Alexas in all likelihood is a masculine name from Syria.[211] Although it is

not decisively clear, they were probably a mixed marriage couple.[212] This said, Concannon is

correct in suggesting that in spite of Millis' argument that the language on the street was Greek,

this does not mean that everyone in Corinth came from "Greece." Concannon uses the names

Sarapis and Alexas as evidence that people from outside Greece were living in Roman

Corinth.[213] Linguistically speaking, however, although he is sure that these two people are not

from Greece, Concannon's reluctance to move beyond the Greek-Latin binary reflects the

limitation of his overall research strategy in analyzing the social dynamics of the city of Corinth.

The second case of a foreigner in Corinth is found in five inscriptions consisting of 85

lines in Greek honoring a woman named Junia Theodora. The entirety of what we know about

this person comes from these inscriptions.[214] Theodora is described not only as a "fine and

---

[209] Charles H. Morgan, "Excavations at Corinth, 1935-1936," *American Journal of Archaeology* 40, no. 4 (1936): 471. This inscription was actually first published by Morgan, and then Kent revised the reading of the text.
[210] Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*, vol. VIII, Part III, no. 361.
[211] Kent, vol. VIII, Part III, no. 361. Kent particularly finds the hint to the origin of this name from Plutarch's reference to Alexas of Laodicea. Cf. Smith, "The Egyptian Cults at Corinth," 223. Another name that might indicate some connection to Syria is found in "three fragments of a cream-colored marble plague." The inscription on the plaque reads: "Attilia Rufa, for herself and [----] Scribonius Agatho and [----] Scribonius Syriacus (?)." The *cognomen* Syriacus however is incomplete. Since it is only SYR…, Kent suspects that the complete version should be Syriacus.
[212] Morgan actually argues that Alexas and Sarapias are two male names, and both of them are "two admirers" of a woman named Euphrosune. See Morgan, "Excavations at Corinth, 1935-1936," 471. Kent rejects this proposal on the basis of the argument that Sarapias is a female name. Kent, *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*, vol. VIII, Part III, no. 361. See also Concannon, "Negotiating Multiple Modes of Religion and Identity in Roman Corinth," 90, n. 12.
[213] Concannon, *When You Were Gentiles*, 2014, 65. He writes: "The evidence analyzed by Millis suggests that Greek, as opposed to Latin, was the language of daily life in Corinth and shows that the inhabitants of the city were predominantly Greek speakers or bilingual in Greek and Latin. This does not mean that the bulk of the inhabitants were from "Greece," as the example of Alexas and Sarapias attests. In all likelihood, it was the local elite who were the most bilingual part of the population, as this flexibility allowed them to better negotiate the complicated trade routes on which Corinth sat, while the non-elite, the craftsmen, builders, merchants, farmers, and others sitting at or below the poverty line were primarily Greek speakers."
[214] Steven J. Friesen, "Junia Theodora of Corinth: Gendered Inequalities in the Early Empire," in *Corinth in Contrast: Studies in Inequality*, ed. Steven J. Friesen, Sarah A. James, and Daniel N. Schowalter (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 204.

worthy woman" (l. 2)[215] but also as "a Roman living at Corinth" (Ῥωμαιαν κατοικοῦσαν ἐν

Κορίνθῳ).[216] Concerning her place of origin, which is critical to this study, scholarly opinions

are also divided. D.I. Pallas, S. Charitonidis, and J. Venencic argue that the description that Julia

Theodora is a citizen of Corinth[217] demonstrates that the Myrians were confused between living

in Corinth and having a Corinthian citizenship,[218] and thus conflated the two. So, they suspect

that she was probably from Rome and belonged to the "*cives Romani consistentes*" who were the

negotiators, or the business people, in Corinth.[219]

Friesen argues that the *cognomen* Theodora "indicates that she was almost certainly not

Italian, and thus the references in the inscription to her as a Roman were legal and perhaps

cultural indicators rather than ethnic one[s]."[220] Also, the expression φιλολύκιος in line 24 likely

indicates that she is not a Lycian. The parallel expression, according to Friesen, is φιλορώμαιος,

---

[215] Translation is provided by R.A. Kearsley. See R.A. Kearsley, "Women in Public Life in the Roman East: Iunia Theodora, Claudia Metrodora and Phoebe, Benefactress of Paul," *Tyndale Bulletin* 50, no. 2 (1999): 204–9. I use Kearsley's translation in this dissertation instead of Friesen because hers is more literal. For example, Friesen renders the expression γυνὴι καλὴι καὶ ἀγαθὴι καὶ εὔνους τῶι ἔθνει διὰ παντὸς ἐνδείκνυται τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἔθνους as follows "a woman noble and good and benevolent toward our nation, continually displays zeal on behalf of our nation." The added pronoun "our" is unnecessary. Kearsley thus renders it simply as "…to the nation… toward the nation." Another thing that I should point out about Friesen's treatment of the text is his footnote that "the inscription misspells ΣΕΧΤΥΣ as ΣΕΚΤΥΣ." See Friesen, "Junia Theodora of Corinth: Gendered Inequalities in the Early Empire," 225, n. 60. This assertion is profoundly problematic. A spelling that does not follow the common (or dominant) spelling does not necessarily mean that it is wrong. It simply indicates that the word is spelled differently! This difference is a witness to the fact that language is far more dynamic, rich, and diverse than we might think.

[216] The expression "a Roman living in Corinth" (Ῥωμαιαν κατοικοῦσαν ἐν Κορίνθῳ) appears twice in lines 63 and 66. Concerning her Roman identity, Junia is mainly addressed as "a Roman" in lines 22 and 72. In line 16, the Myrians call her "your citizen" (τῆι πολείτιδι ὑμῶν). The pronoun "your" here refers to the Corinthians in the previous line.

[217] Line 15-17: "Πλεῖστοι τῶν ἡμετέρων γεγονότες ἐν τοῖς καθ᾽ ὑμᾶς τόποις ἐμαρύρουν Ἰουνία Λευκιου Θεοδώρα τῆι πολείτιδι ὑμῶν..." Kearsley's translation: "Many of our (citizens) who traveled in your territory testified concerning a citizen of yours, Iunia Theodora, daughter of Lucius…."

[218] D.I. Pallas, S. Charitonidis, and J. Venencic, "Inscriptions Lyciennes Trouvées a Solomos Près de Corinthe," *Bulletin de Correspondence Hellenique* 83 (1959): 503. For further discussion on Roman negotiators, or Roman business people, see Spawforth, "Roman Corinth: The Formation of a Colonial Elite," 171–73.

[219] Pallas, Charitonidis, and Venencic, "Inscriptions Lyciennes Trouvées a Solomos Près de Corinthe," 503.

[220] Friesen, "Junia Theodora of Corinth: Gendered Inequalities in the Early Empire," 213. Friesen points out that although the inscriptions only give one name of her father, Lucius, his complete name can still be constructed as "Lucius Junius Theodorus."

"which was used for non-Romans who supported Roman interests."[221] In spite of this, Friesen does not completely deny the possibility that there was a familiar connection between Junia and the Lycians, although he also acknowledges that the public description does not demonstrate it because she is depicted mainly as a Roman.[222] Just like Pallas and Kearsley, Friesen further agrees that Julia is probably a Roman businesswoman who has economic interests in the eastern Mediterranean.[223] That is to say, Friesen seems to argue that the main connection between Julia and Lycia was economic rather than familial.

A better explanation, in my opinion, is Kearsley's proposal. Disagreeing with Pallas, Charitonidis, and Venencic, she points out that having multiple citizenship "was not unusual in the Greek part of the Roman empire and can be documented by many other inscriptions."[224] It is therefore not impossible that Julia possessed multiple citizenship. Furthermore, Kearsley insists that we should take seriously the connection between Julia and Sextus Iulius described in lines 12 and 53-54 in trying to explain Julia's origin. Yet interestingly many scholars do not take this connection as a clue to Junia's origin.[225] "This relationship surely points to Sextus Iulius being a

---

[221] Friesen, 214.

[222] Friesen, 214.

[223] Friesen, 213. Cf. Hans-Josef Klauck, *Religion und Gesellschaft im frühen Christentum: Neutestamentliche Studien* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 237.

[224] Kearsley, "Women in Public Life in the Roman East: Iunia Theodora, Claudia Metrodora and Phoebe, Benefactress of Paul," 192. The example that she uses is Tiberius Claudius Agreippinus who was a Roman and "was described as a citizen of three Lycian city (Patara, Xanthos and Myra) as well."

[225] Friesen disagrees with Kearsley, but he strangely does not mention that Kearsley's argument is based on this connection with Sextus Julius. See Friesen, "Junia Theodora of Corinth: Gendered Inequalities in the Early Empire," 213. Friesen further states that Sextus is probably "the one who compiled the texts and commissioned the inscription." Focusing primarily on the economic connection between him and Julia, Friesen explains: "The rising fortunes of Sextus Julius also reveal a good deal about the agenda and role of Junia Theodora. The rise of this elite male to become her successor suggests that her significant accomplishments were possible because she dedicated herself to the promotion of dominant imperial interests. Her powerful regional network could function with a female or male at the helm. Gender still mattered, but the disadvantages of womanhood were mitigated by the advantages of family, wealth, and legal standing. For Junia crafted a subject position well within the patriarchal parameters of her social context. When it came time for her to approach the gods, elite men took over her imperial project. The Lycian koinon received part of her estate, and Sextus Julius must have received a good portion as well. Her deification and departure (l. 44) apparently made little difference in the reproduction of inequalities." See Friesen, 220. .

Hans-Josef Klauck sees the role of Sextus Julius as Junia's heir to be a clue that Junia is probably an unmarried person, or even a widow. He writes: "Seine Hervorhebung als Mittelsmann bestätigt eine Vermutung, zu

Lycian citizen and, since he was also Theodora's heir, his origin provides support for the view that Theodora, too, was a native of Lycia," she writes.[226]

Aside from the debate about whether Junia is a Lycian or not, these inscriptions also reveal and confirm my general suspicion that Roman Corinth was a multicultural space. While pointing out that Corinth was the place where Junia's home was located, these inscriptions give us a clue that many Lycians actually migrated to Corinth and stayed at her home. For all these inscriptions are centered primarily around Junia's generous hospitality toward the Lycians in Corinth.[227] The Lycian immigrants in Corinth are described in many different ways: "many of our (citizens) who travelled in your territory" (lines 15–16), "all travelers [or visitors]" (line 50), "our people in exile" (line 58), "Lycian travelers and our [Telmessos's] citizens" (line 75). On the basis of this hospitality and generosity (lines 24–28) that she displayed toward the Lycian immigrants in Corinth, they honor Junia as their "benefactress" (line 72).

Two other names of eastern Mediterranean immigrants in Corinth that are worth mentioning here are Nicostratus and Flavii Troeli. The name Nicostratus appears in an epitaph from the Roman period discovered in the Isthmus. His complete name is Lucius Julius Nicostratus. The epitaph describes him as a child of a wrestler (παῖς παλαιστής) and a person who comes from Sardis (Σαρδιανός).[228] The name Flavii Troeli also appears in a Roman epitaph.

---

der man auch schon aufgrund der herausgehobenen, isolierten Position, die diese und die folgenden Dokumente der Junia Theodora zubilligen, gelangen wird: Junia war unverheiratet, Vielleicht verwitwetls." See Klauck, *Religion und Gesellschaft im frühen Christentum*, 238.

[226] Kearsley, "Women in Public Life in the Roman East: Iunia Theodora, Claudia Metrodora and Phoebe, Benefactress of Paul," 193. Joseph Rife also thinks that Junia is a Lycian. See Rife, "Religion and Society at Roman Kenchreai," 424.

[227] See Bruce W. Winter, *Roman Wives, Roman Widows: The Appearance of New Women and the Pauline Communities* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 286; James Walters, "'Phoebe' and "Junia(s) - Rom. 16:1–2,7," in *Essays on Women in Earliest Christianity*, ed. Carroll D. Osburn, vol. 1 (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2007), 174; Susan Mathew, *Women in the Greetings of Romans 16.1–16: A Study of Mutuality and Women's Ministry in the Letter to the Romans*, Library of New Testament Studies (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013), 80.

[228] *Inscriptiones Graecae*, IV.206.

He is called "a brother" (ἀδελφῷ). The inscription also includes a female name, Apphys the

cowherd (Ἀπφύδι βουκόλᾳ).[229] Troeli is described as a Phocaean. We do not have other

information about Nicostratus and Troeli beyond these two epitaphs.

3.4.7. Summary

Having discussed all the indications of foreigners in Roman Corinth, it is arguable to say

that it was a linguistically rich space. I concur with Baur's suspicion that: "In einer Handelsstadt,

wie Korinth, war gewiß die Kenntniß einiger andern Sprachen, ausser der griechischen, gar

nichts Ungewöhnliches."[230] The dominance of Greek on the street of Corinth and Latin in the

realm of governmental administration does not necessarily mean that other languages were

absent. Just like many immigrants in the United States speak their (non-English) languages at

home, it is likely that non-Greek speaking people from the west or the east or the north would

use their own language among themselves or at home.

3.5. The Insufficiency of the Latin-Greek Binary Framework

In spite of the multilinguality of Roman Corinth, scholars of the early Christian

movement have focused their analysis mainly on Greek and Latin. The work of Concannon,

"When You were Gentiles": Specters of Ethnicity in Roman Corinth and Paul's Corinthian

Correspondence, provides the best illustration of this tendency. Describing Paul's body as a

hybrid malleable body, Concannon's project primarily proposes the idea that both Paul and the

Corinthians constantly had to negotiate the hybridity of their ethnic identities. "Paul's body is

constantly in flux, perennially in motion," he writes.[231] Concerning the influx of people and

---

[229] *Inscriptiones Graecae*, IV.207.
[230] Baur, "Ueber den Wahren Begriff des Γλωσσαις Λαλειν, Mit Rücksicht auf die neuesten Untersuchungen hierüber," 79.
[231] Concannon, *When You Were Gentiles*, 2014, 46.

culture in to Corinth, Concannon points out that this city "is flooded with things from all directions, bringing culture from far and wide and storing it in the very streets."[232] With this statement, it would be expected that he would continue to follow the logic of there being an enormous multiplicity of cultures in his analysis of Roman Corinth. Not so: instead he argues that Corinth somehow "absorbs the new without diluting its Hellenistic identity."[233] The absorption of many cultures into a heuristic panhellenistic unity lies precisely at the core of Concannon's notion of Greek identity in Corinth.

Nevertheless, in spite of his acknowledgement of "the ethnic diversity of Corinth,"[234] this diversity unfortunately does not make its way into Concannon's analysis and disappears under the larger categories of Greek and Latin. The major concern of his research is expressed quite well by the question "Are you Greek or are you Roman?" that Concannon further explains:

> Corinth's trading relationships offered new economic and political possibilities for those who could negotiate between and among Greek and Latin traders, merchants, and other social networks. When we look at the demographic of the Corinthian elite, we see individuals and families who were adept at negotiating these possibilities, able to navigate the lines between Greek and Latin identities.[235]

The sociolinguistic hybridity in Roman Corinth, therefore, was expressed only in the forms of "GreekLatins and LatinGreeks."[236] This unwillingness to grant the multiplicity of linguistic expression leads him to focus only on the dominant cultural expressions. As I have shown above, cultural exchange in Roman Corinth was far richer than just Greek or Latin.

---

[232] Concannon, 48.
[233] Concannon, 48.
[234] Concannon, 64.
[235] Concannon, 56.
[236] See Concannon, 69–72.

3.6. Taking Seriously Heteroglossia and Immigration

Because Roman Corinth was a place filled with immigrants, in all likelihood they would

have been familiar with the play "Medea" by Euripides, a famous Greek tragedian from the fifth

century BCE. In the first century AD, Seneca the Younger recreated and reproduced this play in

Latin. Since there was a theater for public entertainment at Corinth during both the Hellenistic

and Roman periods,[237] it is likely that Medea, either the version of Euripides or Seneca, was

performed in Corinth. The main setting of the play is in the city of Corinth. Medea is a character

whom Euripides describes as coming from Colchis,[238] an ancient kingdom by the coast of the

Black Sea. Although in Euripides Medea speaks Greek, people like Medea from Colchis very

likely spoke a different language from Greek.

The description of Medea, the wife of Jason, resonates quite well with the experience of

many immigrants. Her deep sense of sorrow, pain, and suffering are all too familiar to those who

live in a foreign land. After being abandoned by Jason, in her grief she compares her life

condition as a foreigner to that of the women of Corinth. Medea says:

> But your story and mine are not the same: you have a city and a father's house, the
> enjoyment of life and the company of friends, while I, without relatives or city, am
> suffering outrage from my husband. I was carried off as booty from a foreign land (ἐκ γῆς
> βαρβάρου λεληϊσμένη) and have no mother, no brother, no kinsman to shelter me from
> this calamity.[239]

The verb λεληϊσμένη (or ληΐζομαι) can be also translated "plundered" because it carries a

negative semantic range.[240] Immigration often takes place because of negative life

---

[237] For a more detailed discussion on the architecture of the theater in the city of Corinth, see Richard Stillwell, "The Theatre at Corinth," *American Journal of Archaeology* 33, no. 1 (1929): 77–97.

[238] Euripides, *Medea*, 2.

[239] Euripides, *Medea*, 250–258.

[240] LSJ lists the wide range of meaning: to seize as booty, to carry off as prey, to get by force, to plunder, despoil, esp. by raids or forays, etc. See Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon, Ninth Edition with a Revised Supplement*, 9 edition (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1996), s.v. "ληΐζομαι."

circumstances that are beyond one's personal control. It could be political, social, or economic struggles, or even natural disasters. These external factors would uproot people from their homes, displace them, and force them to live in a foreign land. In the case of the Corinthians, one thing we can tell for sure is that many of these people were the descendants of freedpeople that were uprooted from their original homes, were given Greek names, and placed in Corinth.

In her debate with Creon, the King of Corinth, Medea cries out: "O fatherland, how I think of you now!"[241] Immigrants can relate to this deep longing for the homeland especially in the face of life challenges or social prejudice and discrimination. For instance, reflecting on the role of a ballad that recounts the unfair treatment, low wages, and bad life conditions Mexican immigrants have to face, Alma M. García of Santa Clara University writes: "More than anything, the ballad tells [of] the homesickness of the immigrants as they worked in the fields, longing to return to their homeland but always holding on to the American Dream of making a better life for themselves and, most important, for their children, who eventually will form a generation of US-born citizens – Mexican Americans."[242]

It is no surprise that Luis Alfaro, a playwright from the University of Southern California, recently revived Medea in the American context and adapted it to the story many Mexican immigrants in his "Mojada: A Medea in Los Angeles."[243] The rejection by the city (and citizens) of Corinth that Medea experiences displays in a vivid way the xenophobia that many immigrants have to face on a daily basis. When Creon says to her "Go, foolish woman, and rid me of my

---

[241] Euripides, *Medea*, 328. The expression "ὦ πατρίς, ὥς σου κάρτα νῦν μνείαν ἔχω" can also be translated "Oh fatherland, how I really remember/miss you now!"

[242] Alma M. García, *The Mexican Americans* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002), 21.

[243] See April Baer, "Luis Alfaro's Medea Takes On The Mexican Immigrant Experience At Oregon Shakespeare Festival," accessed October 19, 2017, http://www.opb.org/radio/programs/state-of-wonder/article/oregon-shakespeare-festival-luis-alfaro-medea-mojada-immigration/; Jason Derose, "Set In Los Angeles, Greek Tragedy 'Medea' Gets A Modern Twist," NPR.org, accessed October 19, 2017, http://www.npr.org/2015/09/19/441701784/set-in-los-angeles-greek-tragedy-medea-gets-a-modern-twist.

trouble!" Medea answers, "Trouble I have already. I have no need of more."[244] Medea's is the

story of undocumented, unwanted, and rejected immigrants. Medea recounts the troubles,

despair, anguish, and sorrow of immigrants.

Edith Hall points out that Medea also describes in a vivid way the xenophobic attitude of

the Greeks against those whom they deem to be barbarians. Medea is an example of "how some

mythical figures were 'barbarized' in tragedy."[245] In other words, Medea's brutality and monster-

like behaviors are actually the reflection of the way the Greeks perceive others. Explaining the

cruelty of murdering one's own family, Hall contends that "Euripides' Colchian Medea is the

paradigmatic 'transgressive' woman, and her overbearing nature cannot fully be understood

without reference to her barbarian provenance."[246] She is prone to such atrocity because she is a

foreigner, a barbarian.[247]

This play is important to my reading of Paul's letter to the Corinthians. Given the

immense influence of Euripides in the Hellenistic world especially in the Roman period,[248] it is

very likely that the Corinthians were familiar with, or at least had heard about, Medea. If it is

true that "ancient Greek tragedies were written to be performed,"[249] then it is still possible to

imagine that the many people in Corinth at one point had watched a theatrical performance of

Medea. They could relate to this story because they were able to see foreigners every day on the

---

[244] Euripides, *Medea*, 342-3.

[245] Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford England; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 103.

[246] Hall, 203.

[247] It is interesting to note that Suzanne Saïd, agreeing with B.M.W. Knox and P.E. Easterling, insists that in spite of Medea's immigrant status, i.e., barbarian, she "conforms on all counts to the Greek heroic ideal." This is precisely the point of irony in the Medea play. In this sense, Medea expresses an ambivalent relationship that the Greeks have with the others. See Suzanne Saïd, "Greeks and Barbarians in Euripides," in *Greeks and Barbarians*, ed. Thomas Harrison, Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 85.

[248] For the discussion on the popularity of *Medea* in the Roman period, see Robinson, "Fountains and the Formation of Cultural Identity at Roman Corinth," 133.

[249] Rosie Wyles, "Staging Medea," in *Looking at Medea: Essays and a Translation of Euripides' Tragedy*, ed. David Stuttard (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 41.

street, at the Agora, the South Stoa, the Isthmus, Kenchreai port, and in many other public spaces.

Although Corinth is a city of immigrants, it is unfortunate that the discussion on the interconnectedness between migration and language experience in 1 Corinthians has been largely absent in biblical scholarship.[250] Surprisingly, however, in spite of the silence of biblical scholars, Jonathan Z. Smith, a noted scholar of religion, suspects that there must be some sort of connection between language and immigrant experience in 1 Corinthians. Based on his anthropological data of a religious situation in Papua New Guinea,[251] Smith attempts to rethink Paul "as intrusive on the native religious formations of the Corinthians, analogous, to some degree, to the intrusions on the Atbalmin."[252] Smith even insists that since Corinth is a coastal city, Corinth must be a space filled with multiplicities of religious expressions. Not only that, he also suggests that "the Corinthians are the result of a relatively recent displacement and re-placement: the resettlement of Corinth (44 B.C.E.), involving the movement of non-Roman populations of freed slaves from Greece, Syria, Juda and Egypt. In this respect they bear some

---

[250] Cavan Concannon's essay, "Negotiating Multiple Modes of Religion and Identity in Roman Corinth," places the issue of im/migration at the center of his analysis of religious and identity negotiation in the church of Corinth focusing primarily on 1 Cor. 10 and 2 Cor. 3. Language struggle, however, is not his focus. See Concannon, "Negotiating Multiple Modes of Religion and Identity in Roman Corinth."

[251] Smith focuses primarily on the Atbalmin people who live on the border between Indonesian Irian Jaya and Papua New Guinea. Smith notes the dilemma that the Atbalmin people had to face when Christian missionaries came to their villages and demanded that they abandon their local religion. "Clearly, indigenous religion was so intercalated into the fabric of everyday Atbalmin social and material relations that such abandonment was, practically, impossible," he explains. So what really takes place is the rise of what Smith calls two new religious expressions, i.e., Christian revival and a nativistic religion. Christian revival religion, on the one hand, involves a total destruction of temples, rituals, and all other things related to the indigenous religion. Nativistic religion, on the other hand, emphasizes the return to the indigenous religious practices. Smith insists, however that both religions do not negate each other; instead they are interconnected, especially around their interest in the Holy Spirit. See Jonathan Z. Smith, "Re: Corinthians," in *Redescribing Paul and the Corinthians*, ed. Ron Cameron and Merrill P. Miller, Early Christianity and Its Literature 5 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011), 21–27.

[252] Smith, 29.

situational analogy to the West Papuan refugees."[253] In other words, Corinth is a city of immigrants and displaced people.

Further, Smith makes an unusual move, on the basis of his ethnographic comparative methodology, of interpreting the concept of *pneuma* in 1 Corinthians as referring to spirit(s) of the dead. Thus, "for some Corinthians with whom Paul interacts, such usages, linking spirit(s) with the dead, are by no means aberrant but rather constitute the norm."[254] Smith therefore detects two possible ritual practices that took place in the church of Corinth. One ritual pertains to "cultic relations with the spirit(s) of now dislocated ancestors left behind in the homeland," and the other to "cultic relations with the more immediate dead, now buried in Corinth, and would include a range of activities from memorial meals with the dead to oracles guiding present behavior, including moral guidance."[255] And for Smith, Paul has misunderstood all these rituals as somehow related to his pneumatology and "his already formed notion of tripartite anthropology."[256] That is to say, there is a conceptual clash, or better miscommunication, between Paul and the Corinthians.

For this very reason, Smith suspects that the practice of speaking in tongues might have had something to do with the practice of connecting with the spirits of the dead. Here is how he explains it:

> I suspect that Paul himself is straining to understand the phenomenon [of speaking in tongues] that he encounters in Corinth as suggested by his (surprising?) appeal to the Delphic model of ecstatic speech interpreted by a prophet. Paul may well have misunderstood the practice. I am tempted to suggest that if the communication is with the spirits of the ancestral dead, and if the Corinthians are, at most, second generation immigrants to Corinth, then perhaps the ancestral spirits are being addressed in their native, homeland language. Such language is frequently maintained for ceremonial and

---

[253] Smith, 29.
[254] Smith, 29.
[255] Smith, 29.
[256] Smith, 31.

religious purposes by second-generation immigrants. If this be the case, Paul has taken "xenoglossia" (the *lalein heterais glōssais* of Acts 2:4) to be 'glossolalia.'[257]

Two things came to mind as I was reading Smith's proposal. First, his insistence that Paul has misunderstood the phenomenon is not by any means a new way of reading. However, Smith takes a significantly different position from that of Rückter or Dunn that I discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation. While Rückter and Dunn, on the one hand, think that the phenomenon is an ecstatic one and Paul misunderstands it as a linguistic one, Smith, on the other hand, argues that the Corinthians who are immigrants actually speak in their native, homeland language. But Paul thinks that their speech is *glossolalia*, i.e., ecstatic utterances. I share Smith's interpretative suspicion. I also think that Paul has misrepresented the Corinthians' experience.

Second, while I am quite sympathetic to Smith's assertion that tongue(s) has something to do with communication with dead ancestral spirits of one's homeland, his suggestion lacks textual support and rationale. It is no surprise that even Smith seems to be somewhat hesitant in making his case. Knowing that the main point of Smith's essay is actually about how Paul's Christ myth is "meaningless to some Corinthian groups,"[258] the discussion on speaking in tongue(s) is just a marginal issue from the point of view of his larger argument. From the point of view of a heteroglossic-immigrant mode of reading, Smith's suspicion that the Corinthian tongue(s) are the mother tongues or native languages of the immigrants is precisely an idea that I not only agree with, but will advance below.

Let me return to Concannon briefly to demonstrate how his binary Greek-Latin framework makes it difficult for him to deal with Smith's proposal. Although Concannon suggests that we should "follow the lead of J.Z. Smith,"[259] he seems unable to grasp the fuller

---

[257] Smith, 31.
[258] Smith, 32.
[259] Concannon, *When You Were Gentiles*, 2014, 77.

implication of Smith's suspicion that the immigrants in the church of Corinth spoke in their native or homeland languages. While positing that "some" people in the Corinthian church were "im/migrants," Concannon remains reluctant to take the further step of having them speak in their own native languages. Again, Concannon primarily works at the level of the dominant languages. To him, these people were monolingual, i.e., "Greek-speaking im/migrants to Corinth."[260]

The following statement strikingly appears self-contradictory: "This is not to say that Paul's audience in Corinth was itself made up of immigrants as we use the term today, nor that it was an ethnic association, like associations of Syrian and Phoenicians in places such as Delos or Athens; rather, I am using the term *im/migrant* as a way of focusing on trade, mobility, and movement in the city."[261] To me, this is a self-contradictory statement because Concannon simultaneously acknowledges and disavows the presence of immigrants in the Corinthian church. Now, this move should not be surprising because he thinks in Roman Corinth people only spoke Greek or Latin. These immigrants must be Greek-speaking people. Thus, he places the richness of linguistic diversity in Corinth under the larger monolingual category, Greek.

In order to be faithful to Smith's suggestion, Concannon then makes an unfortunate step of redefining who the Corinthian "im/migrants" were. The slash (/) is strategically inserted in order to demonstrate that these "some Corinthians" were immigrants, but in the same breath, they were not. They traveled to Corinth from various non-Greek speaking places, but they all spoke Greek. This limited analytical linguistic category is not only inadequate to explain the possible richness of the linguistic expressions beyond the Greek-Latin binary, it also reflects the

---

[260] Concannon, 77.
[261] Concannon, 77. Italics are his.

larger tendency of ignoring the existence of minoritized languages in modern scholarly interpretation.

The irony of Concannon's work becomes worse if we examine it in light the overall intention of his project. He states at the end of the book that he intends to conjure some Corinthians – a strategy that he borrows from Jacques Derrida[262] – and thus "pay attention to the ghosts that haunt our interpretations of early Christian texts."[263] These Corinthian ghosts are hidden and silenced under Paul's regime of representation and he intends to bring their diverse voices to the surface. He hopes to "find a home" to these ghosts. Concannon writes:

> Rather than looking to Paul as the norm, the yardstick against which to measure thought and theology, I have tried to cast him as one among many, a move that privileges diversity. In this sense, I have sought to conjure other spectral voices, to invite spirits to a séance, rather than to perform an exorcism on Paul's ghost. My interpretative work does not look for Paul's interpretation, lingering over other voices only long enough to label, criticize, and then ignore them. By privileging diversity, I assume that there are many voices, disagreements, misunderstandings, viewpoints, and opinions behind every text, particularly a text directed to a vibrant collective of active agents.[264]

By positing that these immigrants are Greek-speaking people, unfortunately, Concannon's effort to conjure their voices not only has failed but they will also haunt him. If these people come from many different parts of the Mediterranean world, as Concannon himself has argued, they must also bring their local languages with them although in reality these languages are silenced under the regime of Greek and Latin. Concannon's refusal to provide a home to them is precisely the failure of his conjuring effort. In a way, Concannon's project is quite similar to Paul's silencing strategy of minority language speakers in Corinth, as I will demonstrate in more detail in the next chapter of this dissertation.

---

[262] See Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning & the New International*, trans. Peggy Kaumf (New York: Routledge, 2006).

[263] Concannon, *When You Were Gentiles*, 173.

[264] Concannon, 172–73.

Furthermore, it is worth noting also that in spite of his insistence that we should follow Smith's suggestion, Concannon still operates within the long tradition of a nationalist-romantic mode of reading. He clearly wants to follow the hint Smith has provided regarding the presence of immigrants in the Corinthian church, but he does not follow through with Smith's logic that tongue(s) is a site in which these immigrants relate to their homeland. Concannon instead thinks that tongue(s) is an ecstatic speech phenomenon. He explains further that "Paul seeks to rein in this practice, subordinating it to prophecy and regulating it according to what Paul deems to be proper order and control."[265] This is clearly the safest bet, especially if he does not want to grant a space for multilinguality in Roman Corinth beyond Greek and Latin. Tongue(s) cannot be the hint to this multilinguality but an ecstatic experience. In the following, I will show that some other biblical scholars have tried to challenge the dominant mode of reading, that is the nationalist-romantic one, but that they do not take the experience of immigrants in Corinth as seriously as Smith does.

3.7. The Specters of Other Languages in 1 Cor. 14

One of the specters of the diversity of linguistic life in Roman Corinth is actually recorded by Paul in 1 Cor. 14. However, because of the long dominance of a nationalist-romantic mode of reading today, it has turned this phenomenon into an explosion of human feeling and an ecstatic-unconscious experience. The linguistic nature of this phenomenon has consequently been hidden from the sight of modern readers. Nevertheless, a small number of scholars have challenged the dominance of the nationalist-romantic mode of reading by arguing for a return to the pre-modern missionary-expansionist mode of reading. I will turn my attention now to two such major voices, Robert Gundry and Christopher Forbes.

---

[265] Concannon, 88.

Robert Gundry published his essay "'Ecstatic Utterance' (N.E.B)?" over fifty years ago and is still at the center of the debate on tongue(s) today. The essay challenges the translation of 1 Cor. 12 to 14 in the New English Bible that uses the phrase "ecstatic utterance" for tongue(s). Gundry correctly notes that the NEB translation represents a widely-accepted view of speaking in tongues. Since the entire article is designed as a critique of the idea of tongue(s) as "ecstatic utterance," Gundry lays out his case that "Paul as well as Luke viewed tongues as bona fide foreign languages."[266] Now, it is important to note that at the heart of Gundry's argument is the association of the Lukan narrative of Pentecost in the book of Acts and the Pauline discourse on tongue(s) in his letter to the Corinthians. Key to Gundry's argument, the Pentecost narrative should be employed as a framework to understand what Paul is talking about in 1 Cor. 14. "The association of Luke with Paul makes it very likely that Luke's presentation of glossolalia reflects Paul's own understanding of the phenomenon," he writes.[267] Those who think that Luke and Paul present two different phenomena, thus, have the "burden of proof" to make their case.[268] Gundry believes that both narratives should refer to the same phenomenon of speaking in foreign languages.

In order to establish his thesis, Gundry first argues that, etymologically speaking, the words γλῶσσα (commonly used for "meaningful human speech) and διερμηνεύω (commonly used to express "translating a language") employed both in Acts and 1 Cor. are clear hints that the phenomenon is "human languages."[269] Also, the close connection between the terms γλῶσσα

---

[266] Robert H. Gundry, "'Ecstatic Utterance' (N.E.B)?," *Journal of Theological Studies* 17, no. 2 (1966): 299.

[267] Gundry, 300.

[268] Gundry, 301 n. 3.

[269] Gundry, 299–300.

and διάλεκτος in Acts 2:6–11 demonstrates that Luke sees them as identical. As such, it is not some sort of unintelligible mumbling phenomenon, but "speaking in foreign languages."[270]

Furthermore, the reference to tongues of angels in 1 Cor. 13:11 is not about an ecstatic experience. The conditional clause beginning with ἐαν in the subjunctive for Gundry indicates that it is a "suppose-so" claim and that it is "not necessary to infer that he claims to speak in the tongues *of angels*."[271] This is basically an exaggerative rhetoric to communicate the importance of love. Not only that, when Paul speaks about tongue(s) speakers speaking to God and not to human beings because it is the utterance of "mysteries in the Spirit" (1 Cor. 14:2, 28b), this is not to be interpreted as ecstatic experience. The concept of "mystery" in Pauline theology, according to Gundry, is mainly about "spiritual truth regardless the mode of communication" instead of ecstatic speech.[272] So even when Paul speaks of tongue(s) as being "unintelligible" to the speaker (1 Cor. 14:14), it does not mean that "it is an ecstatic language." It instead signifies that "neither the speaker nor anyone else in the congregation happens to have the gift of interpretation."[273] Precisely because of the absence of the interpretation, Gundry insists, that Paul has to forbid speaking in tongue(s). "Without the translation the tongue might appear to be meaningless gibberish," Gundry states.[274]

This is the point where he thinks that the social context of Acts 2 differs from that of 1 Cor. 14. On the one hand, Gundry argues that everyone in Corinth must speak Greek and thus interpretation is absolutely needed. But, on the other hand, the context of the Jerusalem church was cosmopolitan, and thus interpretation is not necessary at all. "At Corinth interpretation was

---

[270] Gundry, 300.
[271] Gundry, 301.
[272] Gundry, 302.
[273] Gundry, 301.
[274] Gundry, 303.

necessary because the audiences were local. On the day of Pentecost interpretation was unnecessary because of the audience was cosmopolitan," he writes. [275] It has to be noted, though, that Gundry does not think that tongue(s) is a gift of breaking linguistic boundaries, but rather "a convincing miracle." That is to say, the function of tongue(s) is to convince others of the presence of God because the communication with people from other languages can still be easily established "without other tongues."[276]

In this sense, when tongue(s) is left without translation, it will leave an impression on others that the tongue(s) speakers are mad. Again, Gundry does not think that the insertion of the idea of "madness" in 1 Cor. 14 is an indication of ecstasy. His explanation is worth quoting in full:

> The fear that unbelievers will think glossolalists are mad stems solely from the Corinthian failure to require accompanying translation at all times, with the result that Paul regarded as genuine human languages [that] sounded to unbelievers like meaningless successions of syllables similar to the ecstatic speech in Hellenistic religions familiar to the hearers and thus led to an equation Paul did not want to be drawn.[277]

This is to say that Paul is preventing others from supposing that tongue(s) without interpretation is an ecstatic experience. Therefore, the ordering of these foreign speeches and their interpretations, according to Gundry, becomes absolutely necessary. If not, tongues will be turned into a nothing but chaos. This act of putting things in order also involves the silencing of women. "In neither prophecy nor questioning by women does the need for orderliness stem from incoherence of speech, but rather from confusion as a result of simultaneous speaking and insistence of being allowed to speak," he explains.[278]

---

[275] Gundry, 303.
[276] Gundry, 303–4.
[277] Gundry, 305.
[278] Gundry, 305.

The last point that Gundry emphasizes is Paul's use of the term βάρβαρος in 1 Cor. 14:11. For him, this word "should clear away any vestige of doubt that he thinks of the gift of tongues as miraculous speaking in unlearned human languages."[279] This conclusion is then confirmed by Paul's musical analogy and the quotation from Isaiah. In short, Gundry thinks that the NEB translation of the word *glōssa* as "ecstatic utterance" is not correct. It is rather an ability to speak in foreign languages in a miraculous way.

Christopher Forbes' book, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and its Hellenistic Environment*, was a revised version of his 1987 dissertation at Macquarrie University, Australia. The core thesis of his argument concerning tongue(s) is captured in this statement: "I am confident that Paul, like Luke, understands glossolalia as the miraculous ability to speak unlearned human and (possibly) divine or angelic languages." Although Forbes says that Gundry's rejection of the idea of ecstatic speech is "well taken,"[280] he has a small reservation that Gundry does not provide a strong argument to his suspicion that tongue(s) without interpretation will look like ecstatic phenomenon in Hellenistic religions and thus Paul needs to condemn it. What Forbes attempts to do in this book is to reexamine all the parallels that scholars have built between tongue(s) in the New Testament and its Hellenistic counterparts. Thus, he constructs the case primarily in a negative way. That is to say, he dedicates the majority part of the book to refuting arguments that tongue(s) is an ecstatic experience, and for him the term "ecstasy" itself is one of the most misused terms in the vocabulary of New Testament scholarship in our era."[281] Both the Hellenistic prophetic speeches and the New Testament

---

[279] Gundry, 306.
[280] Christopher Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 75 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 20.
[281] Forbes, 53.

tongue(s) are not ecstatic and unintelligible. What makes the New Testament's tongue(s) unique in the first century, however, is that the early Christians believed that it is an ability to speak in foreign languages in a miraculous way. Such belief and practice were completely absent in the Greco-Roman world.[282]

Forbes work, I should acknowledge, provides the most comprehensive challenge—and probably refutation—of the present scholarly consensus that tongue(s) is an ecstatic experience. Forbes basically revisits all instances that biblical scholars have commonly used as parallels to glossolalia, such as the Delphic oracle, the Homeric hymn, Euripides' Bacchae, Virgil, and others. Hellenistic Jewish sources, such as Philo, the magical papyri, Josephus, the Testament of Job, and others, he also analyzes in detail. Space does not permit me to explain his negative arguments in a great detail here, but it is worth noting that what he intends to demonstrate throughout the project is that none of these sources on ancient inspired speech points to ecstatic-unintelligible religious phenomena. Thus, "any attempt to show that either the terminology or the

---

[282] Forbes notes that a scholarly consensus has emerged in the twentieth century that "the inspired speech phenomenon that we find within the New Testament, and the terminology that it is used to describe them, can be, in many respects, closely paralleled within the world of Hellenistic popular religion." He then continues: "As I worked through the literature on this matter I became more and more convinced, on exegetical grounds, that this consensus was basically correct. However, as I turned to the primary Hellenistic evidence I began to have doubts, and these grew as my reading continued. I have now become convinced that the consensus is based on only the flimsiest of evidence, and must be abandoned, at least in its present form. It is extremely difficult to parallel many of the features of early Christian enthusiasm *at all* within Hellenistic religion and culture." See Forbes, 5. .

Dale Martin finds Forbes' entire project problematic because he seems to look only for exactly the same parallel as glossolalia in the Hellenistic religion and culture. Therefore, he didn't find any. Instead, Martin argues, the task of a biblical scholar, or scholar of religion in general, is to find "comparable activities by means of which some outsider could have conceivably made sense of early Christian glossolalia." He explains further: "In other words, I am not concerned about the 'essence' of the phenomenon but simply how speech acts would have been socially 'placed' by most observers within the society." See Dale B. Martin, "Tongues of Angels and Other Status Indicators," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 59, no. 3 (October 1, 1991): 548 n. 4. As I have explained in chapter one, Martin's major concern is how the construction of these ideas reflect the socio-political structure and relations in early Christian movement.

phenomena of glossolalia are to be understood on the basis of Hellenistic parallels is fundamentally unlikely to succeed," Forbes declares.[283]

This does not mean, however, that Forbes does not provide positive arguments. At the core of his positive argument is simply the insistence that the phenomenon in the book of Acts and in the Corinthian church are the same miraculous linguistic phenomenon. The difference, however, is that in the Corinthian church it appears among both Christians and non-Christians whereas the story of Acts occurs "within Christian *groups*." In Acts, thus, it is a communal or social experience that does not require translation, but in 1 Corinthians "Paul limits its value to individual use, and insists on interpretation or silence within the assembly."[284] They both portray the same phenomenon, i.e., a linguistic miracle, and thus there is no significant tension between the two. In 1 Cor 14, according to Forbes, the meaning of term γλῶσσα as language is further strengthened by Paul's insistence for "translation." At this point, he registers his disagreement with James Dunn who argues that the actual phenomenon was an ecstatic one and Paul understood it as a linguistic one. Calling Dunn's explanation "entirely false," Forbes writes, "Foreign languages, or, more precisely, the *miraculous ability* to speak foreign languages otherwise known to the speaker (the analogy, *pace* Williams, is not mere redundancy), is *precisely* what it suggests."[285] The reference to "tongues of men" in 1 Cor 13:1 strongly suggests that the Paul had this phenomenon of speaking in foreign languages in his mind when he wrote chapter 14.

---

[283] Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*, 170. . Cf. Christopher Forbes, "Early Christian Inspired Speech and Hellenistic Popular Religion," *Novum Testamentum* 28, no. 3 (1986): 257–270.

[284] Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*, 52–53.

[285] Forbes, 63. Emphasis is his.

As he argues against all other scholars that tongue(s) is not an ecstatic experience, Forbes still shares a scholarly dominant view that tongue(s) has been seen by some Christians "as the marks of a spiritual elite." These "elitists" think that the gift of tongue(s) that they have is "decisive evidence of the work of τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον in truly mature Christians." Thus, 1 Cor 14 is a hint to how Paul combats such an elitist theology in the Corinthian church.[286] Not only is it elitist, the tongue(s) speakers have also turned glossolalia into a criterion or boundary that separates believers and non-believers, insiders and outsiders.[287] "Such a view explains Paul's double objection to glossolalia used without interpretation: it excludes and alienates 'unbelievers and those who do not understand', and does not 'build up' believers," writes Forbes.[288] How did this exclusion work? To him, because strange language without interpretation could be viewed as a spooky divine phenomenon, it would scare these unbelievers and "exclude them from the fellowship of the Christian assembly."[289]

This said, Gundry and Forbes are two major modern scholars who have seen the problems in the dominant way of understanding the phenomenon of speaking in tongue(s) found in the scholarship today. Their works consequently should be understood as an effort to bring language back to our discussion of tongue(s). They correctly insist that tongue(s) means foreign languages. While I agree with them that tongue(s) is a linguistic phenomenon, my view differs significantly from theirs mainly because they did not take seriously the cultural and linguistic situation of the city of Corinth in the Roman period. Gundry's insistence that the Corinthians are local, and thus only speak a single language, is historically and geographically problematic.

---

[286] Forbes, 172–73.
[287] Forbes, 174.
[288] Forbes, 174.
[289] Forbes, 174.

Making tongue(s) a *miraculous,* and thus spiritual, phenomenon is clearly the easiest and safest reading, because Paul seems to frame his discussion in spiritual terms. As I have discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, the authorial intention framework has led Gundry and Forbes to take Paul's statement at face value. Forbes for instance refuses to "correct Paul" because he is convinced that the task of a reader is only "to try to understand him."[290] It is not surprising that they both join the choir of modern scholars to place of the blame on tongue(s) speakers and to affirm Paul's political aggression.

This dissertation project agrees with Gundry and Forbes that we need to bring linguistics back to our interpretation of the phenomenon of tongue(s). However, it differs from them because it is an attempt to reconsider and reconstruct this phenomenon by paying attention to the sociolinguistic situation of Roman Corinth as a heteroglossic space. Also, it will problematize Paul's representation and aggression against tongue(s) in a public space from the point of view of the minority language speakers.

3.8. Some Closing Remarks

I close this chapter by showing the inadequacy of Wayne Meeks' assessment of the linguistic situation in Mediterranean societies. Meeks explains that one of the major differences between villages and cities in the ancient times was the linguistic situation. Just like English is today, Meeks points out that Greek was "the universal urban language of the eastern Roman provinces, but not far beyond the city walls." This means, he argues, that people would speak diverse languages other than Greek in Mediterranean villages.

> When the author of Acts wants to depict an encounter of Paul and Barnabas with people of a real backwater town, he has the locals shout their amazement in Lycaonian. Still, it was with Greek gods, Zeus and Hermes, that they identified the two miracle-workers; Lystra was after all a Roman colony. It is no accident that all the documents of the New

---

[290] Forbes, 178.

Testament and virtually all other extant writings from the first two centuries of Christianity were written in Greek. Yet, in the villages of Galilee, Aramaic was presumably still the dominant language.[291]

The problem with this reconstruction is an assumption of a clear separation of villages and cities forgetting the reality that when people move from one place to another, or from village to city, they still take their native language with them. They never just abandon their native language and adopt the language of the dominant group. In other words, language maintenance is a serious business among immigrants and language shift requires serious effort. Many immigrants understand this experience.

On the basis of the dominant group point of view, Meeks unsurprisingly states: "Greek was the language of *all* Jewish diaspora communities within the Roman Empire from which evidence has survived."[292] First of all, the surviving evidence in the dominant tongue does not mean that these communities have somehow stopped speaking their language and shift to Greek. Second, the word "all" is quite striking because it leaves the impression that Meeks does not seriously think through the reality of interaction between the native language of the immigrants and the dominant or universal language (i.e., bilingualism, language maintenance, etc.). For him, "all" who migrate will undergo a complete linguistic shift. It is not surprising that when he talks about Egyptian, Anatolian, and other immigrants in the city of Philippi, he makes the blanket statement that "the language of all these groups was Greek."[293]

The problem with biblical scholars who operate from the point of view of the dominant group is that they do not take seriously the experience of minoritized linguistic communities. They think that when people move, they will just pick up the dominant language. Learning and

---

[291] Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul*, Second Edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 15.
[292] Meeks, 37. Emphasis is mine.
[293] Meeks, 45–46.

operating in a new language is a constant struggle. Unfortunately, this daily linguistic struggle of

living under the regime of the dominant culture does not get any serious attention by these

biblical scholars. In the next chapter of this dissertation, I invite you to embark with me on the

journey of reconstructing precisely this linguistic struggle of minoritized language communities

in Corinth.

Chapter 4

A Linguistic Struggle in the Corinthian Church

I am indeed wrestling here with Paul – a metaphor that I think he would have appreciated – in two senses: I am wrestling alongside of him with the cultural issues with which he was wrestling, and I am also wrestling against him in protest against some of the answers he came up with.
Daniel Boyarin[1]

Past and present inform each other, each implies the other and... each co-exists with the other.... how we formulate or represent the past shapes our understanding and views of the present.
Edward Said[2]

The history which bears and determines us has the form of a war rather than a language: relations of power, not relations of meaning. History has no 'meaning', though this is not to say that it is absurd and incoherent. On the contrary, it is intelligible and should be susceptible [to] analysis down to the smallest detail—but this is in accordance with the intelligibility of struggles, of strategies and tactics.
Michel Foucault[3]

4.1. Introduction

Given my view on language and my socio-historical reconstruction of Roman Corinth, I now narrow my focus to examine closely the linguistic struggle in the Corinthian church. Taking seriously two of Jonathan Z. Smith's suspicions–namely: a) that some connection should exist between immigrants in Corinth and the phenomenon of speaking in tongue(s); and b) that there was a miscommunication between Paul and the Corinthians–the aim of this chapter is to pursue both of them further. However, instead of placing the linguistic struggle in the context of cultic

---

[1] Daniel Boyarin, *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), 3.

[2] Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1994), 6.

[3] Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972–1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Vintage, 1980), 114.

ritual,[4] as has become a trend in biblical scholarship today, I will discuss it in the context of the politics of language.

In order to achieve this goal, instead of analyzing this text verse by verse like a running commentary, I will divide this chapter into four major sections. First, I will attempt to make a case for why tongue(s) in 1 Corinthians can be read as Paul's representation of the multilingual situation in the Corinthian church. Second, I will discuss Paul's construction of stratified language through the distinction between prophecy and tongue(s). Third, I will examine Paul's strategy of silencing minority languages by highlighting the politics of race, gender, and imperialism. Finally, reflecting on Homi Bhabha and Rey Chow, I will reimagine tongue(s) as a site of subversion against the centripetal force of the dominant language.

Before I proceed with the discussion on Paul's relationship with many languages in the Corinthian church, a few words on the nature of literature as representation are in order. Historically speaking, as Antoinette Clark Wire has pointed out, "particularly in the Lutheran and Reformed traditions where Paul's theology is absolutized because it was persuasive to the Reformers, every study begins and ends with the assumption that Paul's view is normative."[5] Absolutizing Paul's theology has inevitably led to the flattening of both reality and texts. It fails to see the embeddedness of text in language. As I shall show in this chapter, some of Paul's

---

[4] Clint Tibbs's work provides the best example of scholarly pursuit of the idea that both prophecy and tongue(s) are practices through or in the realm of the spirit. Such "religious experience" takes place in "a world 'beyond' the human world." Thus, he unsurprisingly talks about to these experiences in terms of "spiritism" which a preferred translation of the Greek expression τῶν πνευματικῶν in 12:1. See Clint Tibbs, *Religious Experience of the Pneuma: Communication with the Spirit World in 1 Corinthians 12 and 14*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 230 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). As I shall demonstrate in the next part of this chapter, my reading is significantly different from that of Tibbs. I do not see the word "spirit" in as non-human entity or realm. The word πνεῦμα, especially in 1 Cor 14, should be understood as human "breath" which is an integral part of language production just like lip, tongue, and voice.

[5] Antoinette Clark Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul's Rhetoric* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1990), 10.

arguments are not the reality at all, but Paul's own imagination, especially when he employs a subjunctive conditional sentence.

Writing about the Western production of literatures about the Orient, Edward Said points out that the production and circulation of "cultural discourse and exchange" is "not 'truth' but representations."[6] That is to say, the production of knowledge is always filtered in and expressed through language. Said then reminds us again that, when we deal with written language, "there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but a *re-presence*, or a representation."[7] Now, if we understand Paul's letters as representations, then we should keep these characteristics of representation in mind every time we read his texts.

First, representation is never a "neutral" depiction of the others.[8] Representation is loaded with the author's desires, hopes, fears, aspirations, hates, prejudices. The non-neutrality of literature is also a result of the fact that any production of knowledge is embedded in the relations of power. As Michel Foucault puts it, "We are subjected to the production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth."[9] In other words, literature as a form of knowledge production is thoroughly ideological, and thus political. Second, representation will work both ways; it reveals both the self and the others. In this sense, Paul's letters are not only about the church in Corinth or Galatia or Philippi, i.e., a representation of the others, but also a representation of himself. Lastly, representation is always partial. There

---

[6] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 21.

[7] Said, 21. Emphasis is his.

[8] Said, 21.

[9] Foucault, *Power/Knowledge*, 93. Concerning the interconnectedness between knowledge and power Foucault also notes: "We should admit... that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations." Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, 2nd ed. (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 27.

are both presence and absence in every representation. To put it differently, a literature cannot reveal reality in its fullness. Because of its partiality, there are many aspects of reality absent from any representation. Paul's letter to the Corinthian, therefore, is not a revelation of everything about the Corinthians or the Corinthian church. Literature is rather a "reveilation"— to borrow a term from Mark C. Taylor.[10] There are aspects that the text may reveal, but there are many that remain hidden. Hence, Paul's letters "re-veil" the reality, meaning they simultaneously open and conceal the reality.

Since this chapter deals with the social situation in the Corinthian church, I will rely rather heavily not only on the social context of the city of Corinth, but also on the representation of Paul. From the point of view of the politics of language, I will address the conflict described in 1 Corinthians 14 over the practice of tongue(s) in community gatherings. I shall argue, first, that Paul's strategy in dealing with the complex problem of multilingualism or tongue(s) in the Corinthian church may be seen as a political act of unifying language in public gathering, resulting in an ethnic othering–silencing, negating and subjugating tongue(s). I shall further argue that the disruption and disorder that the practice of tongue(s) brings to the ordered language of the communities may be viewed as a form of decolonial resistance against the hegemony of a colonial language. Within such a seemingly chaotic and disordered multilingual space, therefore, the repressed voices of *ekklesia*, by way of tongue(s), can be heard.

---

[10] Mark C. Taylor, *Altarity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 41.

4.2. The Case for Heteroglossic Struggle in the Corinthian Church

The Corinthian church has been known as a community filled with conflict.[11] In the nineteenth century, the Tübingen School, led by Ferdinand Baur, began to incorporate Hegelian dialectical philosophy as a framework by which to analyze the tension between groups in the early Christian movement. Baur proposes that Peter and Paul, the former representing the Jewish group and the latter the gentile group, were in great tension.[12] This conflict between an open-universalistic theology of the gentile group and a close-particularistic theology of the Jewish group is the root of the problem in Corinth. James Dunn has pointed out that this is a retrojection of the tension between European Catholicism and Protestantism.[13]

Laurence Welborn poses a significant challenge to Baur's theological reconstruction of Corinthian conflict by pointing to the vocabulary that Paul employs in 1 Cor. 1–4, such as σχίσμα, ἔρις, and διχοστασία. Through establishing the connection of such terms with parallel use in Greco-Roman literature, Welborn concludes: "It is a power struggle, not a theological

---

[11] See Gerd Theissen, *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth* (Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2004); Wayne A. Meeks, *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul*, Second Edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003).

[12] Baur traces the schism in the Corinthian church all the way back to the conflict between Greek-speaking and Hebrew-speaking groups in the church of Jerusalem recounted in Acts 6. Baur argues that the theology of the early Hellenist church in Jerusalem can be reconstructed through the sermon that Stephen delivers in Acts 7. The main thing that Baur notices in Stephen's message is his strong attack against temple worship. Other Jews in Jerusalem persecuted the Hellenist church, according to Baur, because of this strong rejection of Jewish tradition. The difference between the Hellenist church and other Jewish churches is, therefore, thoroughly theological. Baur argues that the Hellenist church tried to "set aside the Jewish monopoly of religion, and substituted for it a universal system, in which Jew and Gentile stood equal side by side." In other words, the Gospel does not belong exclusively to the Jewish people. Christian faith is universal, whereas Jewish belief is particular. With this line of historical reconstruction, Baur maintains that it is basically at the root of Paul's universal theology. So, the puzzling passage in Acts 8:1, that there was a great persecution against the church in Jerusalem and Christians were fleeing Jerusalem except for the Apostles, Baur interprets as a limited persecution against the Hellenist church and not against the entire church in Jerusalem. See Ferdinand Christian Baur, *Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ: His Life and Works, His Epistles and Teachings* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003), 61ff; Ferdinand Christian Baur, *The Church History of the First Three Centuries*, trans. Allan Menzies, vol. 1 (London: Williams and Norgate, 1878).

[13] See James D. G Dunn, "Introduction," in *The Cambridge Companion to St. Paul*, ed. James D. G. Dunn, Cambridge Companions to Religion (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 4.

controversy that motivates the writing of 1 Corinthians 1–4."[14] For Welborn, the Corinthian

power struggle is manifested in three ways: the socio-economic, rhetorical, and epistemological

struggles.[15]

In a similar vein, Margaret Mitchell also suggests that Paul's employment of

"deliberative rhetoric" in 1 Corinthians is mainly to urge people "to pursue a particular course of

action in the future."[16] Deliberative rhetoric is thoroughly political. Although disagreeing with

Welborn that the conflict is motivated by political parties, especially in her interpretation of the

Greek word σχίσμα,[17] Mitchell still maintains that the conflict in Corinth is a political strife.[18]

Mitchell sees tongues as "a *topos* for divided groups."[19] In order to deal with this factionalism in

worship, "Paul grounds his argument for unity in an appeal to the nature of deity who is to be

imitated" (1 Cor. 14:33).[20] The contrast that Paul makes between ἀκαταστασία and εἰρήνη is

crucial in Mitchell's analysis. On the one hand, ἀκαταστασία, a political term used commonly to

denote "political upheaval" or "civil strife" or even "social instability," is "the perfect

counterpart to Paul's positive image of the unified community, οἰλκοδομή, which is prominent in

chap. 14 (14:3–5, 12, 17, 26)."[21] On the other hand, εἰρήνη is the "opposite of factionalism."[22]

She insists, therefore, that "14:13 contains an implicit appeal by Paul to the Corinthians to turn

---

[14] L. L. Welborn, *Politics and Rhetoric in the Corinthian Epistles* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1997), 3.

[15] Welborn, 16–36.

[16] Margaret M. Mitchell, *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1991), 24.

[17] Mitchell, 71ff.

[18] Mitchell, 55–56.

[19] Mitchell, 172.

[20] Mitchell, 172.

[21] Mitchell, 173.

[22] Mitchell, 174.

from faction and instability towards peace and unity, in imitation of the deity (cf. 11:1)."[23] What

Mitchell does not consider, however, is that the stability and peace that Paul is imagining is at

the expense of silencing foreign language speakers. This chapter aims to surface this politics of

language.

If one reads this text carefully, one can scarcely fail to notice that Paul frames his entire

discussion in 1 Cor 14 in theological terms. As David Schulz pointed out in 1836, Paul and all

other biblical writers believed in the superhuman and hidden spiritual power. This imagination

(*Vorstellung*) affected the way they saw the world, and consequently also how they worshipped

and behaved religiously. According to Schulz, "Everything in a religious sense is and was

brought about by hidden powers coming from outside."[24] Thus, it is no surprise that Rudolf

Bultmann has noted that Paul's theology is always also anthropology, meaning it always reveals

his understanding of human beings. Bultmann writes:

> [P]auline theology is not a speculative system. It deals with God not as He is in Himself
> but only with God as He is significant for man, for man's responsibility and man's
> salvation. Correspondingly, it does not deal with the world and man as they are in
> themselves, but constantly sees the world and man in their relation to God. Every
> assertion about God is simultaneously an assertion about man and vice versa. For this
> reason and in this sense Paul's theology is, at the same time, anthropology.[25]

Indeed, Paul never thinks about humanity and human social relations outside of or apart from his

theology.   Paul understands social issues and human relations through a theological lens.   This

is also the case when he deals with the issue of language conflict: he theologizes it. In this sense,

---

[23] Mitchell, 174.

[24] "Alles in religiöser Hinsicht ist und wird er vielmehr durch Fügung der verborgenen Mächte, die von aussen her an ihn kommen." David Schulz, *Die Geistesgaben Der Ersten Christen Insbesondre Die Sogenannte Gabe Der Sprachen* (Breslau: A. Gosohorsky, 1836), 123.

[25] Rudolf Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, trans. Kendrick Grobel, vol. I (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), 190–91.

Paul is a theologian through and through. But his theology is not only anthropology but also ideology.

As I argued in the first chapter of this dissertation, scholars have long debated the nature of the problem of tongue(s) in the Corinthian church. If the picture of multilingual Roman Corinth in the previous chapter is correct, then the social make-up of the Corinthian church would likely reflect this larger situation of the city. As Donald Engels puts it, Corinth "received immigrants; not from one or two regions, but from all over the Mediterranean world."[26] When Paul walked around the city, he would likely have heard people speaking in many different languages, not only Greek or Latin. In the same way, because the early Christin community in Corinth consisted of diverse cultural backgrounds, when they gathered together they likely would have spoken in their own native languages. The hint of the heteroglossic situation of both the Corinthian church and the larger Roman Corinth can be found in 1 Cor. 14. I turn to this phenomenon now.

4.2.1. Pauline Appropriation of Isaiah 28:11

Instead of starting from the first occurrence of the word γλῶσσα in 1 Corinthians 12, I draw attention to the middle of Paul's discussion, where he coins a *hapax legomenon* (in the New Testament only) to explain the situation of tongue(s) in the Corinthian church. [27] He does so by quoting and adapting a passage from Isaiah 28:11, which he introduces by the formula "ἐν τῷ νόμῳ γέγραπται" (it is written in the law), which is quite a unique way to start a quotation

---

[26] Donald Engels, *Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 73.

[27] This quotation and its following explanation, according to B.C. Johanson, "has long posed several *cruses interpretationis* for commentators." B. C. Johanson, "Tongues, a Sign for Unbelievers?: A Structural and Exegetical Study of I Corinthians XIV. 20–25," *New Testament Studies* 25, no. 02 (January 1979): 180.

from the Hebrew scriptures.[28] Since the much more common formula that Paul uses is

"γέγραπται" only, the additional "ἐν τῷ νόμῳ" here might be "intended to add force to Paul's

argumentation," as Michael Theophilos and A. M. Smith put it.[29] The Isaiah quotation reads as

follows: "ἐν ἑτερογλώσσοις καὶ ἐν χείλεσιν ἑτέρων λαλήσω τῷ λαῷ τούτῳ καὶ οὐδ᾽ οὕτως

εἰσακούσονταί μου, λέγει κύριος" (1 Cor. 14:21).

This text is an important key with which to open the Pandora's box of this phenomenon

from a heteroglossic-immigrant point of view. It points to the reality that the phenomenon of

tongue(s) in the Corinthian church was not glossolalia (i.e., unintelligible utterances) nor

xenololia (i.e., miraculous ability to speak in foreign languages), but heteroglossia (multiple

stratified languages). Also, the compound words glossolalia and xenolalia do not even exist in

any biblical text; they are modern constructions. The word heteroglossia does exist, and we

should start from there, because it is an important hint at the diverse reality of linguistic relations

in the Corinthian church.

Here, a step in the right direction is Keener's hunch that, "Against many interpreters

today, Paul seems to believe that the gift employs genuine languages: he uses a term that

normally means 'languages'; speak of 'interpretation' (12:10, 30; 14:5, 13, 26–28); and

compares human and angelic languages (13:1)."[30] However, Keener does not take the further

step of following this hunch to see this phenomenon as a linguistic problem. Just like James

---

[28] This is the only place in the entire Pauline epistles that he uses the expression "It is written in the law." The common formula that Paul uses is γέγραπται (Rom 1:17; 2:24; 3:4; 3:10; 8:36; 9:13, 33; 10:15; 11:8, 26; 12:19;14:11; 15:3, 21; 1 Cor 1:19, 31; 2:9; 3:19; 15:45; 2 Cor 8:15; 9:9; Gal 3:10, 13; 4:22). Other ones are quite rare, such as τῷ Μωϋσέως νόμῳ γέγραπται (1 Cor 9:9) or γενήσεται ὁ λόγος ὁ γεγραμμένος (1 Cor 15:54).

[29] Michael P. Theophilos and A M. Smith, "The Use of Isaiah 28:11-12 in 1 Corinthians 14:21," in *Religious Conflict from Early Christianity to the Rise of Islam*, ed. Wendy Mayer and Bronwen Neil, Arbeiten Zur Kirchengeschichte, Band 121 (Berlin Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), 63.

[30] Craig S. Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, The New Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 113.

Dunn,[31] Keener follows a romantic-nationalist mode of reading that suggests what is occurring is unintelligible speech, in spite of Paul's thinking that they are real foreign languages. Unlike Keener and Dunn, I argue that Paul's "belief" that he is hearing foreign languages corresponds directly to the linguistic problem in this church. Paul thinks that they are foreign languages because they are indeed foreign languages. It is worth noting that, while almost everything in 1 Cor 14 points to linguistic struggle, the two texts that scholars have used to argue for the unintelligibility of tongues are Paul's statements that "no one understands" (14:2) what is being said and "the fruitlessness of mind" (14:14). I will discuss these two texts in the next part of this chapter, but first turn to the Isaiah quotation.

The expression ἑτέραις γλώσσαις appears in Acts 2:4, but 1 Cor. 14:21 is the only place in the entire New Testament that it appears in compound form as *heteroglossia*. The Markan longer version has the expression γλώσσαις λαλήσουσιν καιναῖς (they will speak in new languages) in Mark 16:17. A comparison of the Hebrew version, Septuagint, and Paul's version might reveal the particularity of Paul's appropriation of his source.

Masoretic Text (Isa 28:11-12)	LXX (Isa 28:11-12)	Paul (1 Cor. 14:21)
כי בלעגי שפה ובלשון אחרת ידבר אל העם הזה	11. διὰ φαυλισμὸν χειλέων διὰ γλώσσης ἑτέρας, ὅτι λαλήσουσιν τῷ λαῷ τούτῳ	ἐν ἑτερογλώσσοις καὶ ἐν χείλεσιν ἑτέρων λαλήσω τῷ λαῷ τούτῳ
אשר אמר אליהם זאת המנוחה הניחו לעיף וזאת המרגעה ולא אבוא שמוע	12. λέγοντες αὐτῷ Τοῦτο τὸ ἀνάπαυμα τῷ πεινῶντι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ σύντριμμα, καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησαν ἀκούειν.	καὶ οὐδ᾽ οὕτως εἰσακούσονταί μου, λέγει κύριος.
For in a stammering lip and in a foreign tongue, he will speak to this people,	Through the stammering lips, through another tongue, for they will speak to this nation	In *heteroglossia* and in the lips of other people I will speak to this nation

---

[31] See my discussion on Dunn's view on this phenomenon in chapter 1.

which he said to them, "this is the rest to the weary/hungry and this is repose," but they do not want to hear.	saying to it [i.e., this nation]: "this is the rest to the hungry, and this is the calamity," and they did not want to hear.	Yet even then they will not hear me, says the Lord.

The differences between Paul and LXX or MT are quite significant. It is no surprise that Christopher D. Stanley even calls those differences "one of the greatest challenges in the entire corpus of Pauline citations."[32] Among others,[33] three very significant differences are worth mentioning here. First, Paul changes the expression from the singular noun of "another tongue" (לשון אחרת, γλώσσης ἑτέρας) to the plural "other tongues/heteroglossia" (ἑτερογλώσσοις). Paul replaces the expression "stammering lips" in LXX (φαυλισμὸν χειλέων) or "a stammering lip" in MT (לעגי שפה) with χείλεσιν ἑτέρων (lips of other people).[34] Third, while the Hebrew text is narrated in the third person singular (in Hebrew, ידבר) or plural (in Greek λαλήσουσιν), Paul transforms it into a singular form (λαλήσω) while adding the "λέγει κύριος" expression. These differences at least display a high level of freedom on the part of Paul in changing, redacting, and adapting the textual tradition that he receives. Also, as Albert L. A. Hogeterp points out, this is evidence that "Paul's use of Scripture did not depend exclusively on a fixed Septuagintal text tradition."[35] However, some important questions still remain unanswered: Why did Paul need to make such changes or redactions? Of the aforementioned three differences, the first two are the

---

[32] Christopher D. Stanley, *Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature*, Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series 69 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 198.

[33] There are some other minor alterations. For example, while Septuagint uses the preposition διὰ, Paul's use of ἐν shows that he follows the Hebrew version more closely. Also, the order in Paul (tongues and lips) is different from both Hebrew (lip and tongue) and LXX (lips and tongue).

[34] In many other manuscripts (P[46], Ds, F, G, K, L, P, 365, 630, 1175, 1505, 1881, Majority Text, lat, sy[(p)] co; Mcion[E]), the reading is "χειλεσιν ετεροις," (other lips, foreign lips) instead of "χείλεσιν ἑτέρων" (lips of other people, lips of foreigners).

[35] Albert L. A. Hogeterp, *Paul and God's Temple: A Historical Interpretation of Cultic Imagery in the Corinthian Correspondence* (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2006), 259.

changes that scholars tend to avoid or ignore altogether, while the third one has been discussed more widely. Thus, I begin by focusing on the first two, and then explain its implication by turning to the third.

First of all, in the original quotation from Isaiah, it is likely that the phrase "in a foreign tongue" (לָשׁוֹן אַחֶרֶת; LXX, γλώσσης ἑτέρας) refers to the Assyrian language.[36] The text clearly is not alluding to some sort of unintelligible ecstatic experience or an explosion of human feeling. It refers to a foreign language, a language other than one's mother tongue, with the emphasis on its foreignness. Through this foreign language, God pronounced a message to "this people" (הָעָם הַזֶּה), but they did not want to hear. Paul was fully aware of this tradition.[37] However, by changing the singular expression of tongue in both MT and LXX into a plural noun

---

[36] "From the background of PI [Proto-Isaiah] as a whole we may infer that the words 'with a foreign tongue' are aimed at the Assyrians (33:19; 36:11)." W. Beuken, *Isaiah Chapters 28-39*, vol. 2, Part 2, The Historical Commentary on the Old Testament (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 38.

[37] Theophilos and Smith's essay has provided a very good discussion on the history of reception of the text of Isaiah 28:11–12. In spite of the similarities between MT and LXX, they note the difference between the third person pronoun in MT (he will speak) and third plural pronoun in LXX (they will speak). "In the Septuagint, Ephraim refuse to listen to the Assyrian's instructions, while in the Masoretic Text they refuse to listen to the clear command of the Lord." In their analysis, Qumranic and Targumic version maintain the MT tradition, "while the Septuagint picture these verses as an example of Israel's valiant endurance against the Assyrians' accusations." Having said that, they argue further that Paul follows the MT, Qumranic, and Targumic tradition instead of the Septuagital tradition. This is obvious because Paul transforms the passage in a vivid way by turning the expression into "I will speak."

The problem with their analysis, however, is when they begin deal with Paul's transformation of the word "tongue" from singular to plural, and further employing a compound word heteroglossia. Here is how they write about it: "Paul's text is unique in several ways. In place of the Septuagint/Masoretic Text's 'stammering lips' and 'strange tongues,' his quotation inverts their order to aid his argument in focusing on the issue of tongues. He therefore places 'other-tongues' (ἑτερογλώσσοις) in the first place as a focus of attention. Second, in place of 'stammering lips' (LXX/MT), Paul has 'lips of others.' Within the context of 1 Cor 14, the 'others' refers to the Corinthian believers who are speaking in tongues as a sign of their spirituality. These tongues, as we will see shortly, have a negative effect on the believers. Thirdly, Paul uses λαλήσω ('I will speak') (cf. MT), as opposed to the λαλήσουσιν ('they will speak') of the Septuagint. Paul puts the speech into the mouth of God and reveals that it is no longer Assyrians babbling, but Yahweh himself who speaks and thus brings judgment." See Theophilos and Smith, "The Use of Isaiah 28:11-12 in 1 Corinthians 14:21," 65.

The main problem with this analysis is that they seem to ignore, or choose not to speak about, the change from singular to plural of the word "tongue." This inability of speaking about the difference between singular and plural tongue(s), I argue, is caused by the way they see "tongues" as a singular phenomenon of babbling unintelligible utterances. Since "tongues" has become a singular experience, it is logically hard to speak about the internal differences. It makes them unable to speak about the strategic change that Paul intentionally makes here from singular form to plural form. Thus, instead of speaking about this singular-plural difference, they unsurprisingly pay attention on the placement of heteroglossia in the beginning of the quotation.

ἑτερογλώσσοις, Paul adapts, appropriates, and transforms the received Isaiah tradition about a singular foreign language into the multilingual situation of the Corinthian church.[38]

The compound word ἑτερογλώσσος (or ἑτερογλώττος) appears quite rarely in Greek literature, indeed only four times. However, every time it is used, it describes the otherness of foreign languages. The earliest occurrence is in book XXIII of Polybius's *Histories* when he describes Hannibal, a military general from Carthage. According to Polybius, Hannibal is "by nature a real leader and far superior to anyone else in statesmanship." The proof of Hannibal's superiority is that although he has traveled through barbarous places (βάρβαρα διεξελθὼν) and received aid from foreigners and speakers of other languages (ἀλλοφύλοις καὶ ἑτερογλώττοις), no one has ever plotted against him and all of them have submitted to his authority.[39] This word (ἑτερογλώττος) clearly refers to languages other than Greek, at least from the point of view of Polybius, a Greek-speaking person. I will discuss further the interconnectedness of language and being a barbarian in the next part of this chapter.

The other three occurrences of the word ἑτερογλώσσος (or ἑτερογλώττος) are from the first century, which is around the same time that Paul composed the letter to the Corinthians. First, Strabo in his *Geography* explains four different Greek dialects (διάλεκτοι)[40]: Ionic, Attic, Doric, and Aeolic. After describing the interconnectedness of these dialects, Strabo describes the Athenians as different from other Greeks in both language (τοῦ ἑτερογλώττου) and customs.

---

[38] At this point I disagree with Joop Smit that we have to ignore the Isaiah context altogether and that it is "entirely irrelevant here." Yes, the text has been significantly altered, but I will argue that such alteration can enlighten us about Paul's struggle with multilinguality in the Corinthian church. See Joop F. M. Smit, "Tongues and Prophecy: Deciphering 1 Cor 14,22," *Biblica* 75, no. 2 (January 1, 1994): 186.

[39] Polybius, *Histories,* 23.13

[40] For a discussion on how the Greeks understood the notion of dialect, see Anna Morpurgo Davies, "The Greek Notion of Dialect," in *Greeks and Barbarians*, ed. Thomas Harrison, Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 153–71; J. B. Hainsworth, "Greek Views of Greek Dialectology," *Transactions of the Philological Society* 66, no. 1 (November 1, 1967): 62–76.

This state of otherness is primarily the result of the shape and condition of their land and soil. No one, says Strabo, wants to invade their place of living. Thus, the Athenians remain pure.[41]

The second appearance of this word is in the work by Greek philosopher Onasander on the roles and duties of a general. This treatise was written in the 50s AD,[42] at about the same time Paul wrote the first letter to the Corinthians. Onasander explains that one of the roles or duties of a general is to give clear signs to the soldiers, both by words and bodily gestures, so that "when confusion arises the soldiers may not have to trust [in] the spoken watchword alone."[43] He continues: "This is most useful in the case of allies who speak a different language (τὰς ἑτερογλώσσους συμμαχίας), for, unable to speak or to understand a foreign tongue, they differentiate between friends and enemies by this countersign. One should instruct the army in these signals in camp, even if it is not about to fight, as a protection against confusion and uncertainty."[44] The expression "τὰς ἑτερογλώσσους συμμαχίας" should be rendered literally as "different linguistic allies" because the adjective ἑτερογλώσσους here functions as a modifier of the noun τὰς συμμαχίας (allies). Again, the emphasis here is on the alterity, the foreignness, and the plurality of their languages.

Third, the word occurs in Philo's discussion on the confusion of tongues at the tower of Babel. Having recounted the story of the book of Genesis, Philo then takes on an apologist role

---

[41] Strabo, *Geography,* 8.1.2.

[42] See C. J. Smith, "Onasander on How to Be a General," *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement*, no. 71 (1998): 151–66.

[43] Onasander, *The General,* 26.1 Concerning the role of a general in giving a countersign, Onasander writes, "The general should give every command or watchword or countersign through his officers, for to come and give orders personally to the whole army is the act of an unpractised and inexperienced commander. Time is lost in passing orders down the line, and confusion arises, as all the soldiers question each other at the same time."

[44] Onasander, *The General,* 26.2

of refuting the opinions of some objectors[45] who argue that it is very much the same story as the

fable of all animals originally speaking the same language (ὁμόφωνα), just like the Greeks

speaking with other Greeks and the barbarians speaking with other barbarians.[46] Thanks to their

sameness of language, they were all happy and blessed. So, in order to maintain such happiness,

"they sent an ambassador to demand immortality, asking that they might be exempted from old

age and allowed to enjoy the vigor of youth forever."[47] According to the tale, the serpent was

chosen to be the ambassador. Philo recounts further: "However, for this audacity they were

punished as they deserved. For their speech at once became different (ἑτερόγλωττα γὰρ εὐθὺς

ἐγένετο), so that from that day forward they could no longer understand each other, because of

the difference of the languages (ἐν ταῖς διαλέκτοις) into which the single language which they all

shared had been divided."[48] Philo later offers his allegorical interpretation of the story of how

unity of language is all about unified wickedness, which I will not explain in detail here. At any

rate, this exposition of the fable demonstrates that Philo uses the word ἑτερόγλωττα in direct

opposition to that of the original ὁμόφωνα. Heteroglossia introduces differences into the unity of

---

[45] Philo, *On the Confusion of Tongues,* 2. Philo calls these objectors, "persons who cherish a dislike of the institutions of our fathers and make it their constant study to denounce and decry the Laws."

[46] He explains "The tale is that in old days all animals, whether on land or in water or winged, had the same language (ὁμόφωνα), and just as among men to-day Greeks talk with Greeks and barbarians with barbarians if they have the same tongue (Ἕλληνες μὲν Ἕλλησι, βαρβάροις δὲ βάρβαροι νῦν οἱ ὁμόγλωττοι διαλέγονται), so too every creature conversed with every other, about all that happened to be done to them or by them, and in this way they mourned together at misfortunes, and rejoiced together when anything of advantage came their way." Philo, *On the Confusion of Tongues,* 6.

The analogy of the Greeks and barbarians is problematic, as though every barbarian only speaks one language. It is a shared opinion among the Greeks that those who do not speak Greek babble unknown utterances. The same racial-ethnic sentiment is also expressed in Paul's discourse on tongue(s) in 1 Cor 14. While Philo uses the term descriptively, Paul uses it prescriptively. I will explore this topic further in the next part of this chapter. In addition, Paul also uses the word ὁμόφωνα to describe the same language.

[47] Philo, *On the Confusion of Tongues,* 7.

[48] Philo, *On the Confusion of Tongues,* 8.

languages. It is a term that is used by Philo to describe the breaking apart of the unified language into many different διαλέκτοι.

To sum up, we can see that all four occurrences of the word heteroglossia affirm the sense in which Bakhtin employs it.[49] We can see in Polybius, Strabo, Onasander, and Philo that heteroglossia denotes the radical multiplicity of languages as opposed to a unified language. The association of barbarians with heteroglossia in Polybius is an indication of heteroglossia's stratified aspect. The interconnectedness of being the other, or being a barbarian, and speaking different languages becomes more vivid in Paul's discourse on languages in 1 Cor 14.

Several observations on Paul's redactional activity in transforming the received Isaiah tradition deserve attention next. First, if we understand Paul's use of the term heteroglossia in light of how it was used in Polybius, Strabo, Onasander, and Philo, then we can postulate that Paul is adapting the singularity of another language (in this case the Assyrian language) into the plurality of other languages in the Corinthian context. Why? Apparently because Paul is dealing not only with one foreign language in the Corinthian church, but with many foreign languages. *Heteroglossia* should not be regarded as "words that have no meaning understandable to human beings" as Stendahl and other scholars have argued.[50] Rather, the term refers to the multiplicity of languages. It is Paul's struggle with linguistic diversity in the Corinthian church that led him

---

[49] See chapter 2 for a more detailed exposition of the Bakhtinian notion of heteroglossia.

[50] Krister Stendahl, *Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and Other Essays* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), 114. Fitzmyer acknowledges that the quotation is about "foreign language that is not understood" but then "Paul applies it to the incomprehensible speaking in tongues in his technical sense." Joseph A. Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, The Anchor Yale Bible 32 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 520. Hans Conzelmann, commenting on this Isaiah quote on *heteroglossia*, advances the idea that "Scripture predicts speaking with tongues as a God-given sign." Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1975), 242. Witherington's suspicion that "there may actually a sort of Hebraic imitation of glossolalia" is probably the most unlikely suggestion. See Ben Witherington III, *Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 285.

to alter and adapt the Isaiah literary tradition from "a foreign tongue" (MT) or "another tongue" (LXX) to *heteroglossia.*

Second, the change from "stammering lip(s)" in MT and LXX to "lips of other people" (χείλεσιν ἑτέρων) can also be explained through the lens of heteroglossia. The lip, just like the tongue, is seen as an instrument of speech. It is no surprise that Philo, for example, writes, "The lips are the boundaries of the mouth and a kind of hedge to the tongue (γλώττης) and through them the stream of speech (τὸ τοῦ λόγου ῥεῦμα) passes when it begins its downward flow."[51] The story of the tower of Babel in the Septuagint begins with this statement: "And all the earth was one lip (χεῖλος ἕν), and there was one language (φωνὴ μία) to all."[52] In MT, it reads somewhat differently. Instead of "one sound," the MT has "same words" (ודברים אחדים). It is interesting that the Septuagint does not use the word λόγος, but instead φωνή to refer to this unified speech. In short, in this tradition, language is understood as a thoroughly bodily performance, and not simply as a Saussurean system of signs. Thus, when Paul employs the expression χείλεσιν ἑτέρων, the lips of other people, he is very likely thinking about the people who perform foreign languages, people whose languages he does not understand. The removal of the word "stammering" (MT/LXX) demonstrates that Paul apparently is not concerned about "how" those languages are spoken, but rather "who" speaks those languages: the speakers are different (ἑτέρων); they are the others, the foreigners. In the context of Roman Corinth, they are the immigrants.

This leads us to the third alteration, which is from "he will speak" (MT) or "they will speak" (LXX) to "I will speak." This alteration of pronoun is significant in demonstrating the

---

[51] "χείλη δὲ στόματος μέν ἐστι πέρατα, φραγμὸς δέ τις γλώττης, δι᾽ ὧν φέρεται τὸ τοῦ λόγου ῥεῦμα, ὅταν ἄρξηται κατέρχεσθαι." Philo, *On the Confusion of Tongues,* 33.

[52] The LXX version of Genesis 11:1 reads "Καὶ ἦν πᾶσα ἡ γῆ χεῖλος ἕν, καὶ φωνὴ μία πᾶσιν."

intensity with which Paul theologizes his source. Paul sees God as the source of all the

languages (cf. 1 Cor 12:10). So, the phenomenon of heteroglossia in the Church of Corinth

should be placed directly in the mouth of God. This theologizing move is further enforced by the

typical formula of "λέγει κύριος" in the Jewish scriptures to express the direct message from

God. In the Septuagint, the common formula is τάδε λέγει κύριος, a translated version of the

Hebrew expression כה אמר יהוה. He basically says that even when foreign language speech comes

from the mouth of, or is inspired by, God, it will not be effective. Paul writes, "Yet even then

they will not listen to me" (καὶ οὐδ᾽ οὕτως εἰσακούσονταί μου). By virtue of its otherness,

which implies unintelligibility, Paul insists that foreign language speakers (χείλεσιν ἑτέρων) will

never be effective. To put it in a positive way, to be effective, speech should be uttered in the

dominant language that, according to Paul, everyone can understand. This effectiveness of

speech is the key to understanding Paul's next rhetorical move, namely that tongue(s) is a "sign"

for unbelievers.[53] I will continue examining the issue of "signs" later in this chapter, but for now

I will look closely into a peculiar appearance of singular and plural forms of γλῶσσα in 1 Cor

that points directly to the reality of linguistic struggle.

4.2.2. Concerning the Singular and Plural Forms of γλῶσσα

An important feature of the noun γλῶσσα in 1 Cor. 12–14 is that it appears in both

singular and plural forms. What are the differences between them? Below, I list all the

appearances of both singular and plural forms of γλῶσσα in 1 Cor. 12–14.

Plural	Singular
12:10 ἑτέρῳ γένη *γλωσσῶν*	
12:10 ἑρμηνεία *γλωσσῶν*	
12:28 γένη *γλωσσῶν*	
12:30 μὴ πάντες *γλώσσαις* λαλοῦσιν	

---

[53] See the discussion on "sign" below.

13:1 Ἐὰν ταῖς *γλώσσαις* τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαλῶ 13:8 εἴτε *γλῶσσαι*, παύσονται 14:5 θέλω δὲ πάντας ὑμᾶς λαλεῖν *γλώσσαις* 14:6 ἐὰν ἔλθω πρὸς ὑμᾶς *γλώσσαις* λαλῶν 14:18 πάντων ὑμῶν μᾶλλον *γλώσσαις* λαλῶ 14:22 ὥστε αἱ *γλῶσσαι* εἰς σημεῖόν εἰσιν 14:23 πάντες λαλῶσιν *γλώσσαις* 14:39 τὸ λαλεῖν μὴ κωλύετε *γλώσσαις*	14:2 ὁ γὰρ λαλῶν *γλώσσῃ* οὐκ ἀνθρώποις λαλεῖ ἀλλὰ θεῷ 14:4 ὁ λαλῶν *γλώσσῃ* ἑαυτὸν οἰκοδομεῖ 14:9 ὑμεῖς διὰ τῆς *γλώσσης* ἐὰν μὴ εὔσημον λόγον δῶτε 14:13 Διὸ ὁ λαλῶν *γλώσσῃ* προσευχέσθω ἵνα διερμηνεύῃ 14:14 ἐὰν [γὰρ] προσεύχωμαι *γλώσσῃ* 14:19 ἢ μυρίους λόγους ἐν *γλώσσῃ* 14:26 *γλῶσσαν* ἔχει 14:27 εἴτε *γλώσσῃ* τις λαλεῖ

In short, in chapters 12–13, the word appears exclusively in plural form. That changes suddenly at the beginning of chapter 14. When Gordon Fee translated the word *γλώσσῃ* (in 14:2 and 14:4), for no apparent reason he changed both of them into the plural, "the one who speaks in tongues."[54] Yet when the phrase ὁ λαλῶν *γλώσσῃ* appears again in 14:13, he renders it as "anyone speaks in in a tongue." This ambiguity is not surprising because in English, the term "tongues" in plural form has become a technical term for an ecstatic trance experience, one often used interchangeably with glossolalia.[55] By contrast, its singular form, "tongue," is usually used to describe either a language or a body part. Fee seems to be confused about maintaining the Greek expression or his idea of tongue(s) as an ecstatic experience. Similarly, Joseph Fitzmyer, puzzled by the sudden appearance of the singular form in 14:2, writes:

---

[54] The plural translation appears in the original version of the book, but then was revised into singular in the newest edition. See Gordon D. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, Revised Edition, New International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014), 655.

[55] Dale Martin's article, "Tongues of Angels and Other Status Indicators" is the best case for this interchangeable use of tongues and glossolalia. While the title of the article uses the term "tongues," he writes, "I have chosen the term 'esoteric speech acts' as an umbrella term (which includes what phenomenologists call "glossolalia") in order to emphasize those aspects of the activity I consider most important from a social point of view." He ignores altogether the use of this term in the singular form. See Dale B. Martin, "Tongues of Angels and Other Status Indicators," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 59, no. 3 (October 1, 1991): 548.

The Greek words, *ho lalōn glōssē*, lit. "the one speaking with a tongue," are ambiguous—how else would one speak? See Jas 3:5a. Given the context of these chapters, esp. 12:10, 28, however, the words have become a technical term . . . and refer to what has come to be called glossolalia (see TDNT, 1:722–26; cf. ABD, 6:596–600 for its possible relation to similar phenomena in the Greco-Roman world [where it is never referred to as "speaking in tongues"]).[56]

This statement at least displays Fitzmyer's effort to avoid the issue altogether, although he refers to the term as "glossolalia." This is hardly a new interpretative move. In the early nineteenth century Gustav Billroth had already argued the same point.[57]

The question remains: is the use of singular and plural in this text arbitrary? Why in some cases does Paul use the plural form and why in other cases does he switch to the singular? These questions become even more difficult when scholars reject the linguistic nature of tongue(s). If this phenomenon is not linguistic, how can we explain its plural and singular forms? Is there any ecstatic speech experience that can be explained by both a singular form and a plural form? Herder strangely argues that the singular form refers to enthusiastic speech and the plural to more enthusiastic speech.[58] Anthony Thiselton's solution is even worse. He suggests that Paul does not make "any clear difference of nuance" at all.[59] Carl Holladay similarly notes, "But precisely what it meant to speak in a tongue is unclear. Apparently, there is no difference between speaking in a tongue and speaking in tongues; the two expressions appear to be used

---

[56] Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 510.

[57] See Gustav Billroth, *A Commentary on the Epistles of Paul to the Corinthians*, trans. William Lindsay Alexander, vol. II, The Biblical Cabinet; or Hermeneutical, Exegetical, and Philological Library, XXIII (Edinburgh, UK: Thomas Clark, 1838), 30.

[58] Johann Gottfried Herder, "Von Der Gabe Der Sprachen Am Ersten Christlichen Pfingstfest (1794)," in *Herders Sümmtliche Werke*, ed. Bernhard Suphan, vol. 19 (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1880), 84.

[59] Anthony C. Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, The New International Greek Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013), 941.

interchangeably."[60] Is Paul indeed using the singular and plural in a complete arbitrary and

meaningless way?[61]

Nils Engelsen's 1997 Yale University dissertation provides what to me is the most

detailed analysis of the difference between the singular and plural of γλῶσσα in 1 Corinthians.

He argues that Paul uses the expressions "γλῶσσα/γλώσσαις λαλεῖν . . . as technical terms."[62]

He seems to think that these expressions indicate a specific phenomenon in the early Christian

movement. Concerning the singular and plural forms, Engelsen points out that, when the

singular form is employed, "Paul refers to the charism as a definite or fixed phenomenon," which

means that it points to the "unintelligibility" of the experience. In other words, Paul uses the

singular form of γλῶσσα to emphasize the reality that this phenomenon is unintelligible. If Paul

had intended to talk about "the gift as such," says Engelsen, he would have used the singular

form. This explanation is weak because, for one, the idea that the singular γλῶσσα is a technical

term for unintelligible speech is strikingly arbitrary. This word γλῶσσα in the singular is never

used in other extant Greek literature to refer to the unintelligibility of speech.

In 14:5, the term appears in plural form, according to Engelsen because the "the plural

subject requires a plural of the dative object."[63] This explanation is also unsatisfactory because

---

[60] Carl R. Holladay, *The First Letter of Paul to the Corinthians*, The Living Word Commentary (Austin, TX: Sweet Pub. Co, 1979), 175.

[61] Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1108.

[62] Nils Ivar Johan Engelsen, "Glossolalia and Other Forms of Inspired Speech According to I Corinthians 12-14" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1970), 183. The case of γλῶσσα here is incorrect; it should be the dative γλώσσῃ form. Engelsen's dissertation is probably the most influential unpublished work on glossolalia in the twentieth century. Christopher Forbes, although mistakenly saying that it is a Harvard dissertation, states this about it: "N.I.J. Engelsen, *Glossolalia and other forms of Inspired Speech according to 1 Cor. 12–14,* Unpublished Ph.D., Harvard, 1970: this is the most detailed attempt to justify the hypothesis [i.e., tongues as unintelligible phenomenon] known to me, and its conclusion that Paul was first to distinguish between intelligible and unintelligible forms of inspired speech, has made its way into the footnotes of others." Christopher Forbes, "Early Christian Inspired Speech and Hellenistic Popular Religion," *Novum Testamentum* 28, no. 3 (1986): 269.

[63] Engelsen, "Glossolalia and Other Forms of Inspired Speech According to I Corinthians 12-14," 185.

grammatically the plural subject in Greek language never requires a plural dative object. That is

to say, a plural subject can perform an action to a singular object. A singular subject also does

not require a singular indirect (dative) object. The challenge is to explain Paul's statement

"γλώσσαις λαλῶ," which consists of singular subject and plural indirect object. Because the

grammatical explanation apparently falls apart here, Engelsen offers another alternative

explanation. "Either Paul uses this charisma every time he speaks, or he envisions himself as

producing only unintelligible utterances," he contends.[64] This still does not explain the question

of whether there is such a thing as a singular unintelligible speech and plural unintelligible

speeches? Both the 'technical term' and the grammatical explanations are unsatisfactory.

There must be another explanation that lies in the duality of the object, i.e., the tongue,

itself. If we understand this word as "language" (in the singular) and "languages" (in the

plural), we can make perfect sense of Paul's wordplay. As I have explained in chapter two, there

is always a tension between the singularity (i.e., the univocity) and the plurality in language.

Bakhtin calls this the centripetal and centrifugal forces of language.[65] Again, this can explain

why Paul uses both plural and singular forms of γλῶσσα in 1 Cor. 12–14. Namely, Paul is here

switching from the plurality of languages to the particularity of a certain foreign language.

When he uses the plural noun, he is referring to the diverse reality of languages, but when he

uses the singular he is focusing on a particular native language other than Greek that some of the

Corinthians were using in public gatherings.

If my reading is correct, then we can reconstruct the linguistic situation of the Corinthian

church as follows: when early Christians gathered in their house church in Corinth, some

---

[64] Engelsen, 85.

[65] See my discussion on Bakhtin in chapter 2.

Corinthians spoke and prayed in their native languages. From these immigrants, some are able to speak many languages and others speak only their own native language. Now, if we see the situation in the Corinthian church through the lens of immigrants, this also makes perfect sense. The first-generation immigrants tend to struggle more with the foreign language. Thus, when they meet other people from their homeland, they tend to speak their native tongue. Some of the second-generation immigrants lose their parent's native language facility and speak the language of the dominant group, while others become either bilingual or multilingual. By the third generation, the complete loss of language is almost unavoidable.[66] If this sociolinguistic reconstruction is correct, then we can imagine that the first-generation immigrants would likely speak in their native languages when they talked to each other and prayed in the Corinthian church. The second generation would likely have a more dynamic linguistic experience because they are able to speak not only Greek, but also Latin and their native language. The third-generation immigrants, however, would primarily use Greek. This is the linguistic situation that Paul is dealing with in 1 Cor. 14.

---

[66] For further discussion on the loss of native language among immigrants, see Richard Alba et al., "Only English by the Third Generation? Loss and Preservation of the Mother Tongue among the Grandchildren of Contemporary Immigrants," *Demography* 39, no. 3 (2002): 467–84. In this article Alba et al. demonstrate a degree of varieties in the language shift among immigrants in the United States. They note: "For groups such as the Dominicans and Mexicans, just a tenth of the second-generation children are exclusively English speakers at home, whereas for the Cubans, the proportion is about one-fifth. The children in many Asian families, however, either have grown up in families where the use of English is common or have shifted to English. For instance, in the Filipino group, many of whose immigrants are familiar with English when they arrive in the United States, 4 of every 5 second-generation children speak only English. Even in some Asian groups that come from countries where English is not in common use, the percentage of monolingual English speakers is high: among the Koreans, 2 of every 5 second-generation children speak only English at home."

Concerning language maintenance and shift in the Greco-Roman world, see James Clackson, "Language Maintenance and Language Shift in the Mediterranean World during the Roman Empire," in *Multilingualism in the Graeco-Roman Worlds*, ed. Alex Mullen and Patrick James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 36–57. Clackson, unfortunately, does not discuss immigrant experience with language in the Roman world. He even states that the kind of study that Joshua Fishman did among immigrant families is "of course impossible" because "no surviving documentary evidence can be used to determine exactly how a range of individuals in the same community varied their spoken behavior according to the context." Clackson, 38.

Thus, by placing "kind of tongues" (γένη γλωσσῶν) under the category of diverse gifts (διαιρέσεις χαρισμάτων, 12:4), Paul acknowledges the existence of the plurality of languages. However, he attributes this plurality of languages to a divine source. The source of these languages, according to Paul, is "the same Spirit" (τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα), "the same Lord" (ὁ αὐτὸς κύριος) and "the same God" (ὁ αὐτὸς θεός). As I will explain further below, Paul sees almost every social phenomenon through a theological lens. Thus, he understands language as originating in God. Not only the languages, but also the ability to translate those languages (ἑρμηνεία γλωσσῶν, 12:10) is from God. Another thing that we should note about the discussion in chapter 12 is that Paul seems to argue that not only the plurality of languages has a divine origin, but also that the ability to speak many languages is a divine endowment. For Paul, this endowed ability to speak many languages should be expressed in love (13:1).[67] The claim that tongues will cease (γλῶσσαι παύσονται) is indeed a problematic one. Since he believes that these languages are of a divine origin, he imagines that one day God will remove all these languages.

---

[67] Concerning tongue(s) of angels in 13:1, many scholars argue that it should be a kind of speech that has some connection to the ecstatic glossolalia. For example, Héring insists that "tongues of angel" is the best expression of glossolalia. See Jean Héring, *The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians*, trans. A. W. Heathcote and P. J. Allcock (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2009), 135. Gordon Fee thinks that tongues of angels reflects the reality that the Corinthians have seen themselves as being angels. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 573. John Poirier writes: "In the end, the likeliest view is that Paul *does* identify angeloglossy with glossolalia. The fact that he refers to angeloglossy in the midst of a discussion about prophesy and λαλεῖν γλώσσαις supports this view." See John C. Poirier, *The Tongues of Angels: The Concept of Angelic Languages in Classical Jewish and Christian Texts*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 287 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), 52–53. This interpretation, again, is based on the assumption that tongue(s) is an ecstatic and unintelligible experience.

Robert Gundry presents a better interpretation of this line of 1 Cor 13:1. He argues that the employment of the word ἐάν with subjunctive in vv. 1–3 is an indication that they are " 'suppose-so' statements only partially true of Paul's experience." In other words, Paul "does not speak in angelic tongues." See Robert H. Gundry, "'Ecstatic Utterance' (N.E.B)?," *Journal of Theological Studies* 17, no. 2 (1966): 301. Additionally, the conjunction καὶ in the sentence "ἐὰν ταῖς γλώσσαις τῶν ἀνθρώπων λαλῶ *καὶ* τῶν ἀγγέλων" can also be translated as "even" which implies that Paul is exaggerating the situation. New Century Version (NCV) renders it this way: "I may speak in different languages of people or even angels." In this sense, the reference to the tongues of angels is only intended to be a rhetorical strategy of saying that the ability to speak *any* language without love is meaningless.

After discussing the necessity of love in chapter 13, in chapter 14 he focuses particularly on one's use of foreign native language in public gatherings. So, when Paul states that the one (or anyone) who speaks in a tongue (ὁ γὰρ λαλῶν γλώσσῃ) does not speak to human beings but to God, he is focusing his attention on the use of a particular foreign language of Corinthian immigrants. Unfortunately, the text does not specify what language Paul was thinking about when he wrote this. It could be Syriac, Coptic, Punic, Celtic, or any other particular foreign language. Philo likewise often uses the singular γλῶσσα to refer to one's native language, such as Hebrew/Aramaic,[68] Egyptian,[69] and Chaldean.[70] The statement in 14:13 thus can be understood this way: "Anyone who speaks in his/her particular native tongue, s/he should pray so that s/he can interpret." Since Paul believes that God is the origin of all languages, he insists that the foreign-language speaker ask God for the ability to translate it into the dominant language.

Paul further argues that, since language originates in God, the person who speaks that language can only be understood by God and not by human beings.[71] The statement that

---

[68] Several examples can be listed here: 1) "He [Dan] did not liken the faculty to the serpent that played the friend and gave advice to "Life"—whom in our own language (πατρίῳ γλώττῃ) we call "Eve"—but to the serpent made by Moses out of material brass." (Philo, *On Husbandry*, 95); 2) "Therefore, I think, did one of Moses' disciples, who is named a man of peace, which is in our ancestral tongue (πατρίῳ γλώττῃ) Solomon, say as follows: 'My son, despise not the discipline of God, nor faint when thou art rebuked by Him, for whom the Lord loveth He rebukes and scourges every son whom He receiveth.'" (Philo, *On Mating with the Preliminary Studies,* 177); 3) "Naturally, therefore, next to the repentant he sets the lover of virtue and beloved by God, who in the Hebrew language (ὃς Ἑβραίων μὲν τῇ γλώττῃ) is called Noah but in ours "rest" or "just," both very suitable titles for the Sage." (Philo, *On Abraham,* 27); 4) "Its high position is shewn by the name; for the nation is called in the Hebrew tongue (Ἑβραίων γλώττῃ) Israel, which, being interpreted, is 'He who sees God.'" (Philo, *On Abraham*, 75)

[69] "He [the king of Egypt] also gave him another name in the language of the country [ἐγχωρίῳ γλώττῃ], based on his art of dream interpretation, and betrothed him to the most distinguished of the ladies of Egypt, the daughter of the priest of the Sun." (Philo, *On Joseph*, 121)

[70] "In ancient times the laws were written in the Chaldean tongue (γλώσσῃ Χαλδαϊκῇ), and remained in that form for many years, without any change of language, so long as they had not yet revealed their beauty to the rest of mankind." (Philo, *Moses II,* 26) I will expound on this text further in my discussion on ἰδιῶται below.

[71] Here I disagree with Elim Hiu's insistence that "the fact that uninterpreted tongues is directed to God rather than people, does intimate that Paul was not thinking exclusively of foreign languages." Elim Hiu, *Regulations Concerning Tongues and Prophecy in 1 Corinthians 14.26-40: Relevance Beyond the Corinthian Church* (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2010), 46. Paul says that God can understand simply because Paul is

"nobody understands/hears" (οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀκούει) in 14:2 rhetorically is intended to reemphasize the foreignness of that particular language rather than to serve as a universal ontological statement. It is Paul's rhetoric of othering.[72] This is quite similar to the way immigrants are described in the United States as "aliens." It does not mean that these people are so different from other human beings in the US that they are literally "aliens." Unlike Roy Ciampa and Brian Rosner, who think that the reference to speaking to God is "a clear indication that glossolalia was seen as a prayer language or as a way to talk to God, not as a human language,"[73] I argue that it should be read as a discursive strategy of othering. I will explore this further in the next part of this chapter, especially when I deal with Paul's employment of the word βάρβαρος.

The use of the plural form in chapter 14 can also be explained quite well through the lens of a heteroglossic-immigrant mode of reading. When Paul states "θέλω δὲ πάντας ὑμᾶς λαλεῖν γλώσσαις" (14:5) he is saying that he wants all of the Corinthian immigrants to be able to speak many languages. This is again directly related to his demand for translation because right after that he argues that foreign languages without interpretation will not build up the church. In v. 16, when addressing a general audience indicated by the employment of the vocative ἀδελφοί, Paul again uses the plural form of γλώσσαις. Imagining himself coming to the Corinthians speaking all kinds of foreign languages, Paul posits a rhetorical question: "What will you gain…?" (τί ὑμᾶς ὠφελήσω). This statement is quite similar to v. 18 in which Paul boasts that he can speaks more languages than the Corinthians, a typical Pauline attitude that Krister

---

convinced that language is originated in the divine. Thus, this statement has little to do with whether the language itself is ecstatic or not.

[72] The Greek word commonly used for the idea of "to comprehend" or "to understand" is συνίημι. Cf. Mark 7:14 "Καὶ προσκαλεσάμενος πάλιν τὸν ὄχλον ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς· Ἀκούσατέ μου πάντες καὶ σύνετε." Sometimes "to hear" and "to understand" are contrasted. For example, Mark 13:14 reads "ἀκοῇ ἀκούσετε καὶ οὐ μὴ συνῆτε" [Markan citation from Isaiah]. Rom 15:21 reads "οἳ οὐκ ἀκηκόασιν συνήσουσιν."

[73] Roy E. Ciampa and Brian S. Rosner, *The First Letter to the Corinthians*, The Pillar New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010), 670.

Stendhal finds quite "annoying."[74] The generality of the audience indicated in vv. 20–25, just like v. 16, is also marked by the use of the vocative ἀδελφοί in v. 20. Thus, it is not surprising that Paul employs the term tongues in the plural form in vv. 22 and 23, for he is addressing in a general way the appearance of all kinds of languages in the Corinthian gathering.

4.2.3. Concerning "Translation"

The appearance of the noun ἑρμηνεία (12:10), the verb διερμηνεύω (12:30; 14:5, 13, 27), and the noun διερμηνευτής (14:28) has become one of the greatest interpretative challenges for those who hold the view that tongue(s) here refers to the unintelligible ecstatic experience. If it is completely unintelligible, how can it be translated? What idea will it be translated? Translation, especially from one language to another, generally assumes and requires some degree of intelligibility of both the source and the target languages. It is an act of making an intelligible source language understandable to the target language. To put it differently, if the source utterance is not intelligible language at all, how can a translator make it understandable in the target language? Translating an unintelligible utterance is an act of making stuff up on the part of the translator. This poses a quite serious problem to the idea that tongue(s) is an ecstatic-unconscious and intelligible utterance.

The most compelling explanation from the romantic-nationalist mode of reading is that of Anthony Thiselton in his 1979 article, "The 'Interpretation' of Tongues: A New Suggestion in the Light of Greek Usage in Philo and Josephus." As the title of this article suggests, Thiselton examines how ἑρμηνεύω and διερμηνεύω (and their variations) are used in Philo and Josephus's writings. His suggestion is that ἑρμηνεύω and διερμηνεύω should not be understood as meaning

---

[74] Stendahl, *Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and Other Essays*, 110.

interpretation or translation, but rather as "to put into words."[75] This is not the only way Philo

uses the term. Thiselton intends to show that the word is "also" used for the idea of putting into

words. The same is true also in Josephus. Thiselton himself acknowledges that out of twenty-

four appearances of ἑρμηνεύω in Josephus' writings, the majority of them (fifteen) mean "to

translate" because "Josephus has a special interest in the Greek translation of the Jewish

Scriptures."[76] Thiselton notes that Josephus primarily employs the term ἑρμηνεύω as "to

translate" because he writes in detail in the *Antiquities* about the translation of the Septuagint.[77]

However, Thiselton then argues that Josephus "also" uses the terms to refer to "putting into

words."

It is not my intention here to dispute Thiselton's analysis, for that has been done in a

great detail by Christopher Forbes.[78] Besides, I agree with Forbes that "there are a reasonable

---

[75] Thiselton calls this "a third alternative" to interpretation and translation. Thus, he translates 1 Cor 14:13 as follow: "He who speaks in a tongue should pray for the power to produce articulate speech." 1 Cor. 14:5 is translated, "He who prophesies is greater than he who speaks in tongues, unless he (the latter himself) can put it into words." Anthony C. Thiselton, "The 'Interpretation' of Tongues: A New Suggestion in Light of Greek Usage in Philo and Josephus," *The Journal of Theological Studies* 30, no. 1 (April 1, 1979): 15–16. Now, when Thiselton looks into how Philo uses the term, he observes that out of twenty-two appearances of διερμηνεύω and its two other variations (διερμηνευτέον and διερμήνευσις), "no less than three-quarters of the uses refer to the articulation of thoughts or feelings in intelligible speech" and fifteen of them can only mean "the articulation of thoughts or feelings in intelligible speech." He adds, "'interpret' or 'translate' would be almost impossible in these instances." Regarding ἑρμηνεύω without -διά prefix, Thiselton explains: "Out of the over-all total of 225 occurrences, 127 refer either to interpretation or translation. Sixty-four uses clearly relate to the production of articulate speech, whilst thirty-four instances cannot be classified with certainty." (Thiselton, 18.) When he looks into Josephus, Thiselton finds that the compound word διερμηνεύω does not appear at all. The only expression is ἑρμηνεύω.

[76] Thiselton, "The 'Interpretation' of Tongues," 25.

[77] Thiselton, 25.

[78] Forbes basically argues that from the data that Thiselton presents, "what Thiselton does not say is that if one includes all the various ἑρμηνεύω terms without the διά prefix as well, the statistics are turned round fairly radically. Thiselton's narrowing of the case in his emphasis on the terms with the διά prefix is unsound." Forbes demonstrates that there are about 240 appearances of various ἑρμηνεύω terms in Philo, and "144 obviously and straightforwardly mean 'to translate' or 'to interpret/explain/expound.' Most of these cases are the form 'Such and such (usually the name of a Biblical character or place), being interpreted, means . . .' Thirteen of these cases include the use of the verb μεταλαμβάνω, Philo's other regular term for linguistic translation, and several include phrases such as 'in our language' or 'in the Greek language.' The word is used thirty times in similar contexts, and its meaning in these cases is not in doubt. Clearly, by ἑρμηνεύω Philo must mean something in the range between 'to translate' and 'to interpret, expound.' This usage is far and away the most common in Philo. In eight other cases the straightforward use of a translator between speakers of different languages is indicated by the terms."

318

number of cases in which Thiselton is correct: ἑρμηνεύω, διερμηνεύω etc. clearly can take the meaning he suggests."[79] However, I should like to point out here that since the context of Paul's discussion is the translation of γλῶσσα, it is most appropriate and reasonable for us to look into how Philo employs both words, i.e., ἑρμηνεύω and διερμηνεύω, in conjunction with γλῶσσα. That way, the parallel between Paul and Philo's use of the terms becomes more vivid and clear. Neither Thiselton nor Forbes pays close attention to this.

The following discussion is intended to fill that gap in their analysis. I omit Josephus from the discussion simply because the word διερμηνεύω does not appear in his writings. Philo is the most relevant counterpart to Paul in this case. I will focus this discussion primarily on Philo's recounting of the translation of Septuagint, a passage that Thiselton omits in his analysis,

---

Furthermore, Forbes correctly points out that when Philo uses the term ἑρμηνεύω with the διά prefix, "60% of Philo's usage of the terms does not support Thiselton's case." He adds, "Further, not even all the cases claimed by Thiselton can be shown to support his connotation." The examples that Forbes examines are *De Sobrietate* 33, *de Vita Mosis* 2.34, *Quis Rerum* 63, and *de Vita Mosis* 84. See Christopher Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 75 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 65–67.

In his defense, Thiselton responds to Forbes that "The only effective rejoinder that Forbes offers is that when ἑρμηνεύω is considered alongside its compound forms the ratio between the two possible meanings shifts. But I am only arguing that the verbs *can* mean *to produce* **articulate speech** in appropriate context, and that 1 Corinthians 12–14 provides such a context." (both bold and italic are Thiselton's) See Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 976. The word "can" here is the key to Thiselton's proposal. He is not refuting the idea that the words mean to translate or interpret; he is offering another possible meaning. Thiselton further refers to the works of Thomas Charles Edwards, H. A. W. Meyer, and L.T. Johnson as "the most powerful objections to the 'linguistic translation' view," which Forbes ignores. Thiselton, however, seems to be unaware that these scholars work from within the tradition of the romantic-nationalist mode of reading. I have discussed Meyer in the first chapter of this dissertation, and it should not be surprising that Thiselton relies heavily on him; that he does so can be seen from many of his quotations of Meyer's works in his commentary. I have also dealt with Edwards in the first chapter. However, I would like to point out that Edwards's insistence that Thiselton quotes, "*it is evident that the Corinthians did not use their gift of tongues to evangelize the heathen world*," should be placed in this long tradition of rejecting the traditional view of tongue(s) as miraculous ability to speak in foreign language for the purpose of evangelizing the world. However, the idea that they did not use the tongue(s) does not necessarily mean that it is an ecstatic experience. Rather, I would argue that they didn't use it because it was a local struggle of the co-existence or co-presence of immigrants in the Corinthian church. See Thomas Charles Edwards, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (London: Hamilton, Adams & Co., 1885), 319. Johnson's argument that the tongues in Acts is not a miracle of speaking but of hearing is hardly a new proposal. Friedrich Bleek from early nineteenth century had already argued for this point. It was widely discussed among German scholar in that period. See L.T. Johnson, "Tongues, Gift Of," ed. David Noel Freedman, *Anchor Bible Dictionary* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 596–600.

[79] Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*, 1995, 65.

presumably because it is clearly about transferring from one language to another. Thiselton only looks into passages that confirm his romantic-nationalist mode of reading. As I stated in the first chapter, a *mode* of reading usually functions as a filter of selecting and interpreting the text. To be fair, however, Thiselton does talk about a passage from *De Migratione Abrahami* (*On the Migration of Abraham*) in which the two terms are used in conjunction with γλῶσσα. However, the context is clearly not about the translation of tongue as it is in Paul.

What Philo argues instead is that the idea of the "blessing" (εὐλογία) that Abraham receives from God should be understood as εὐ-λογία (well/excellent and logos). He further explains that the *logos* consists of two aspects: the spring and its outflow.[80] The spring is the "reason" (διάνοια), whereas the outflow is the "speech" that comes out from the mouth and the tongue (στόματος καὶ γλώττης). "Tongue" here is clearly understood as a tool of speech. Now for Philo these two aspects of *logos* have to work together in an excellent way, thus εὐλογία. On the one hand, Philo points out that many people are excellent in their reasoning, "but find speech a bad interpreter of thought."[81] (The expression ὑπὸ δὲ ἑρμηνέως κακοῦ προὐδόθησαν can be translated "they are surrendered under bad translator.") On the other hand, there are many people who are able speakers but are "most evil thinkers, such as the so-called sophists."[82] God's gift, however, is complete on both sides, i.e., reason and speech. "He does not send the blessing or 'logos-excellence' in one division of logos, but in both its parts, for He holds it just that the recipient of His bounty should both conceive the noblest conceptions and give masterly expression to his ideas (τοῦ τε ὑποβάλλοντος τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καθαρῶς καὶ τοῦ διερμηνεύοντος αὐτὰ ἀπταίστως)," writes Philo. The word "αὐτά" refers back to "τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καθαρῶς"

---

[80] Philo, *On the Migration of Abraham*, 71.

[81] Philo, *On the Migration of Abraham*, 72.

[82] Philo, *On the Migration of Abraham*, 72.

(pure thoughts). The participle τοῦ διερμηνεύοντος Philo uses to explain the ability to

thoroughly translate those pure thoughts into excellent (lit. not stumbling or jumbled) speech.

Further, the example of Moses and Aaron, the former representing reason and the latter

speech, is also about the interpretation of thoughts by mouth or tongue. Both of them, according

to Philo, are born from the same mother, i.e., from the logical nature. That Aaron speaks for

Moses signifies how speech interprets mind. "For the mind, unable to report the thoughts stored

up in it, employs speech which stands hard by as an interpreter (ἑρμηνεῖ), for the making known

of its experiences," he explains.[83] Within the same frame of reference Philo also interprets the

story of Moses speaking on behalf of the people (esp. Ex 4:15f).

> Not only does he say 'he shall speak to them for thee,' as much as to say 'he shall put thy
> thoughts into words' (διερμηνεύσει τὰ σά); but he adds 'he shall be thy mouth'; for the
> stream of speech flowing over tongue and mouth (γλώττης καὶ στόματος) carries forth the
> thoughts with it. But, whereas speech is understanding's interpreter manward (ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν
> λόγος ἑρμηνεὺς διανοίας πρὸς ἀνθρώπους), understanding occupies toward speech the
> position of its God ward things, namely thoughts and intents, which are in God's charge
> solely.

Notice how Philo employs the term διερμηνεύσει, γλώττης, and ἑρμηνεὺς here. Moses is the

mouth and tongue of God who speaks to the people. Thus, the function of the tongue is to

express God's thoughts and intents. Moses will interpret God's thoughts and intents thoroughly

(διερμηνεύσει) to the people. This passage is not about the interpretation of tongue, but rather

about the tongue as interpreter. These are two different things. Philo's discussion here is not at

all about the translation of tongue(s) as in 1 Cor 12–14, but rather about the full rendering of

one's thoughts.

For our purposes, the most appropriate discussion on translating tongue can be found in

Philo's recounting of the history of the Greek translation of the Mosaic law. He explains that the

---

[83] Philo, *On the Migration of Abraham*, 78.

Jewish law was very famous not only among the Jews but also among all other nations. However, the law was originally written in the Chaldean language (γλώσση Χαλδαϊκῇ) and remained in the same language (ἐν ὁμοίῳ τὴν διάλεκτον) for many years.[84] Philo uses the word διάλεκτος as a synonym and interchangeably with γλῶσσα. The word γλῶσσα here thus cannot mean anything but a foreign and still intelligible language. It is not an ecstatic unintelligible explosion of human feeling as scholars of a romantic-nationalist mode of reading believe.

We do not know for certain whether this claim is true but one thing that we can say is that Philo probably relied on the tradition that Abraham is a man from Ur of the Chaldees (אוּר כַּשְׂדִּים; Gen. 11:28, 31). He recounted further that the fame of the laws spread over time.

> Then it was that some people, thinking it a shame that the laws should be found in one half only of the human race, the barbarians (μόνῳ τῷ βαρβαρικῷ), and denied altogether to the Greeks, took steps to have them translated (πρὸς ἑρμηνείαν τὴν τούτων ἐτράποντο). In view of the importance and public utility of the task, it was referred not to private persons (ἰδιώταις) or magistrates, who were very numerous, but to kings, and amongst them to the king of highest repute.[85]

In short, after giving extended praise to Ptolemy II Philadelphus of Egypt (285–246 BC), Philo said: "This great man, having conceived an ardent affection for our laws, determined to have Chaldean translated into Greek (εἰς Ἑλλάδα γλῶτταν τὴν Χαλδαϊκὴν μεθαρμόζεσθαι διενοεῖτο)."[86] Thus, when the language of the laws, originally in the Chaldean language (γλώσση Χαλδαϊκῇ), was transferred to the Greek language (Ἑλλάδα γλῶτταν), Philo uses the term ἑρμηνεία parallel with μεθαρμόζομαι, a compound word of μετά and ἁρμόζω, meaning "to change the arrangement/regulation." Thus, the noun ἑρμηνεία, in this context, refers to translation (or transferring the arrangement) from one to another, rather than "to put into words"

---

[84] Philo, *Moses II*, 5.26.
[85] Philo, *Moses II*, 5.27.
[86] Philo, *Moses II*, 5.31.

as Thiselton proposes. The term here is used in a general sense of "translation" without an emphasis on the thoroughness of the work. However, when he explains the particularity of the project of translation itself, interestingly Philo switches from ἑρμηνεία to διερμηνεύω.

Philo recounts that Philadelphus urged the high priest and king of Judaea, which Philo says are two offices held by one person, to choose skillful people, especially the Hebrews that have been educated in Greek, in order "to make a full rendering of the Law into Greek" (τοὺς τὸν νόμον διερμηνεύσοντας). The participle of the verb διερμηνεύσοντας here is correctly translated as "making a full rendering." The prefix διά clearly adds a stronger sense to the verb (i.e., translating), which leaves the impression that the work is done thoroughly, fully, and exhaustively. The verb διερμηνεύω is employed to emphasize not only the thoroughness but also the seriousness of the work of translation.[87] The seriousness of the word appears when Philo employs this compound term to describe how the process of translation took place. He writes: "Reflecting how great an undertaking it was to make a full version (διερμηνεύειν) of the laws given by the Voice of God, where they could not add or take away or transfer anything, but must keep the original form and shape, they proceeded to look for the most open and unoccupied spot in the neighbourhood outside the city."[88] The way Philo describes the seriousness and thoroughness of the work of translation (διερμηνεύειν) is a) by the translators' careful maintenance of the original form, and b) by the isolated venue outside the city in which they did their work.

---

[87] LSJ points out that one of the functions of the preposition διά when used in a compound verb is "to add strength." Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon, Ninth Edition with a Revised Supplement*, 9 edition (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1996), s.v. διά.

[88] Philo, *Moses II*, 6.34.

Back to Paul's use of the terms: Paul uses the noun ἑρμηνεία (without the prefix διά) only once in 12:10. The context is a general explanation on different kinds of χαρίσματα (12:4). Paul uses the expression ἑρμηνεία here as a generic term to explain a person's χάρισμα to translate. There is no emphasis on the seriousness or thoroughness of the translation. It is a general statement of such χάρισμα. However, Paul begins to switch to the verb διερμηνεύω (and later to the noun διερμηνευτής) when he focuses on the seriousness of the translation. Again, the prefix διά is strategically added, just as in Philo, in order to emphasize the thoroughness of the translation.

Thus, in 12:30, when he repeats the list of functions in the body of Christ, instead of using ἑρμηνεία only, Paul employs the term διερμηνεύω. The expression, "μὴ πάντες γλώσσαις λαλοῦσιν; μὴ πάντες διερμηνεύουσιν;" can be rendered as follows: "Do all speak in foreign languages? Do all translate thoroughly?" Gordon Fee is right when he calls it "a crescendo of rhetorical questions,"[89] because this is the climax of his argument on the need for everyone to work as one body. The verb διερμηνεύουσιν here is in line with this 'crescendo' kind of mood. Verses 29–30 mostly repeat the items listed in v. 28 (i.e., apostles, prophets, teachers, deeds of powers, and healers). For whatever reason, Paul leaves out abilities to ἀντιλήμψεις (helpers) κυβερνήσεις (guide/lead), and adds translation to the list, putting it right after speaking in foreign languages. He closes the discussion with the statement "ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ χαρίσματα τὰ μείζονα" (v. 31). The idea of seeking or striving for greater gifts is a statement that he will repeat again in 14:1 (i.e., ζηλοῦτε δὲ τὰ πνευματικά, μᾶλλον δὲ ἵνα προφητεύητε) when he deals with the issue of prophecy and tongue(s). With that in mind, we can argue that the inclusion of διερμηνεύω in the list here is intended to prepare the readers for his discussion of tongue(s) and prophecy in

---

[89] Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 622.

chapter 14. As such, this is not a general statement as in 12:10, but rather a statement about the thorough translation of foreign languages in the Corinthian church that Paul will demand from tongue(s) speakers in chapter 14.

The discussion on διερμηνεύω (or διερμηνευτής) is critical, because it demonstrates the intensity of Paul's demand from tongue(s) speakers. In 14:5, for example, when Paul states that he wants everyone to prophesy instead of speaking in foreign languages, he adds this statement: "ἐκτὸς εἰ μὴ διερμηνεύῃ"[90] (unless [the speaker] translates it thoroughly). The subject of the subjunctive διερμηνεύῃ must be the ὁ λαλῶν γλώσσαις (the person who speaks in foreign languages). Paul does not just demand a translation; he wants the speaker to translate the native language thoroughly into Greek. The prefix διά demonstrates the intensification of the statement. The same is true also of 14:13, where the speaker is urged to pray so that he/she is able to translate the native language thoroughly. The same demand for thorough translation appears again in 14:27 and 28.

Paul's discussion on translation here has to be understood from the overall mood of 1 Cor 14. He is working with a clear assumption that the dominant language is understood by everyone. He demands translation of foreign languages not from other people, but rather from the speakers themselves. It should not be surprising that not everyone can "speak" or actively operate in the dominant language. Therefore, Paul encourages a foreign language speaker to pray that they can translate (see 1 Cor 14:13). Understanding and proficiency of speaking in a foreign language are two different things.[91] Paul apparently knows that.

---

[90] Fee notes that the expression ἐκτὸς εἰ μή is "a redundancy that belongs to the Hellenistic period (found, e.g., in Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, Lucian)." See Fee, 730.

[91] See for example Abdullah Coskun, "Causes of the 'I Can Understand English but I Can't Speak' Syndrome in Turkey," *Journal on English Language Teaching* 6, no. 3 (2016): 1–12.

4.2.4. Concerning φωνή

The appearance of the word φωνή in 1 Cor 14 can be a pointer to the linguistic nature of this phenomenon. Paul uses this word six times: four times in 1 Cor 14:7–10, once in Gal 4:20, and once in 1 Thess 4:16. In 1 Thess 4:16, Paul speaks about the sound of the archangel and trumpet of God (ἐν φωνῇ ἀρχαγγέλου καὶ ἐν σάλπιγγι θεοῦ). In Gal 4:20, the use refers to more than just a sound. Paul writes: ἤθελον δὲ παρεῖναι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἄρτι καὶ ἀλλάξαι τὴν φωνήν μου, ὅτι ἀποροῦμαι ἐν ὑμῖν (I want to be present with you now and change my sound because I am perplexed about you). The clause "ἀλλάξαι τὴν φωνήν μου" is commonly translated as "change my tone." The tone or sound here must have something to do with the language that he uses. In this sense, he wishes to be present with the Galatians and change the harsh language that he has used throughout the letter. Since Gal 4:12–20 is one of the most emotionally intense sections in the entire book of Galatians, this remark is probably not about changing the intensity of his voice, because text does not have a physical voice, but about the linguistic expressions or the words that Paul has used in this letter.

The context of the appearance of this word in 1 Cor 14 is the analogy with musical instruments. The text in 1 Cor 14:6 starts with the expression "νῦν δέ ἀδελφοί," which marks a new section or argument. After stating his basic thesis that tongue(s) is practically useless unless it is fully or thoroughly translated (14:1–5), Paul then makes a case for such argument from the "lifeless" instruments. The word ὅμως in v. 7 is an indicator that Paul is making a comparison or establishing an analogy. This analogy from musical instruments (i.e., flute, harp, bugle/trumpet) in vv. 7–8 makes the point that Paul states in vv. 9–12. Later in this chapter, I will return to how this discourse fits Paul's larger political strategy of silencing tongue(s). For now, I will discuss

why I think the analogy and its explanation are a hint that this is a linguistic issue rather than an unintelligible ecstatic spiritual issue.

Aristotle has a discussion on how voice (φωνή) produced by soul relates to the constitution of the intelligible sound or language. It is not my intention to establish some sort of connection or direct act of quoting.[92] However, as we shall see, there are many striking similarities and differences between Paul's discussion on sound (φωνή) and that of Aristotle. Thus, to understand what Paul is discussing in this text it might be helpful to look at Artistotle's *On the Soul*, in which he argues that one of the features of the soul is to produce voice, and not just noise or sound (ψόφος). Why? Because for him, "inanimate things never have a voice; they can only metaphorically be said to give voice" (τῶν γὰρ ἀψύχων οὐθὲν φωνεῖ, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα λέγεται φωνεῖν).[93] The example of these lifeless things (τὰ ἄψυχα) that produce 'voice-like' sound is musical instruments. Two instruments that Aristotle explicitly mentions are

---

[92] The musical analogy was commonly used among Greek writers to describe language. Another example closer to the time Paul is Dionysus of Halicarnassus's work on literary composition. In this treatise, he basically argues that there are four sources of beauty and attractiveness of a literary composition: "melody, rhythm, variety, and appropriateness accompanying the use of these three." The entire discussion clearly assumes the idea that a literature will be read aloud through the sound of a tongue (Cf. *On Literary Composition*, 14.8–9). Thus, Dionysus places "melody" in the first position. He explains: "Well, I said that the ear took pleasure first of all in melody, then in rhythm, thirdly in variety, and finally in the appropriateness with which all these qualities are used." Melody is important because, for Dionysus, it touches human feeling. Just like music, a composition has to hit the right notes. Here Dionysus finds musical instruments as the best analogy to explain his point. He writes: "I have seen an able and very renowned harpist (κιθαριστήν) booed by the public because he struck a single false note and so spoiled the melody. I have also seen a reed-pipe player (αὐλητήν) who handled his instrument with supreme skill suffering the same fate because he blew thickly, or through not tightening his embouchure produced a discordant sound or what is called a "broken note" as he played." See Dionysus of Halicarnassus, *On Literary Composition,* 11. There is a significant difference between Dionysius and Paul. Dionysius is concerned about the strategic use of long or short vowels, syllables, etc., in order to move people's feeling of awe. Hitting the wrong vowel, for example, will ruin the composition. Paul, on the other hand, seems to be not concerned with composition. See also Nicolas Wiater, *The Ideology of Classicism, Language, History, and Identity in Dionysius of Halicarnassus* (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2011), 246–57.

[93] Aristotle, *On the Soul,* 2.420b. Cf. Aristotle, *On Things Heard*, 801b. See Thomas Kjeller Johansen, *The Powers of Aristotle's Soul*, Oxford Aristotle Studies Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 282.

the flute and the lyre, "but also other lifeless things which have a musical compass, and tune, and modulation."[94] He apparently picks these two examples in a random way.

Furthermore, Aristotle argues that voice can only be produced by living animals (φωνὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ ζῴου ψόφος). Notice the use of the word ψόφος here: lifeless things can produce ψόφος (noise or mere sound), but only living animals can turn ψόφος into φωνή. In other words, living beings not only have a capacity to produce ψόφος, but also have a potential to turn it into φωνή. Sound or noise (ψόφος), for Aristotle, happens when there is an encounter or clash between two things through a medium. And, the medium is "air" (ἀήρ) when voice is produced.

> As air is breathed in Nature makes use of it for two functions: just as she uses the tongue [τῇ γλώττῃ] both for taste and for articulation [τὴν διάλεκτον], of which taste is essential to life (and consequently belongs to more species), and articulate speech is an aid to living well; so in the same way she employs breath both to conserve internal heat, as something essential (why it is so will be explained in another treatise), and also for the voice, that life may be of good standard.[95]

Aristotle here establishes a parallel between the function of air and of breath (πνεῦμα) in producing voice on the one hand and the tongue (γλῶττα) in tasting and producing language on the other. Two things we should note about Aristotle's concept of sound and voice: First, since voice requires the medium of air, not all living beings can produce voice. Fish, according to Aristotle, are voiceless animals because "they have no throat." He adds further, "They have not this organ because they do not take in air or breathe." Second, although living beings can produce voice, not all sound produced by living beings is voice. "Coughing" is an example of noise, but it is not a voice. This distinction between mere noise/sound and voice is important for Aristotle

---

[94] "...οἶον αὐλὸς καὶ λύρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἀψύχων ἀπότασιν ἔχει καὶ μέλος καὶ διάλεκτον." It is also worth noting that Aristotle argues that not only musical instruments do not have voice, "many animals—e.g., those which are bloodless, and of animals which have blood, fish—have no voice." Aristotle, *On the Soul,* 2.420b.

[95] "ἤδη γὰρ τῷ ἀναπνεομένῳ καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα, καθάπερ τῇ γλώττῃ ἐπί τε τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὧν ἡ μὲν γεῦσις ἀναγκαῖον (διὸ καὶ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχει), ἡ δ᾽ ἑρμηνεία ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ, οὕτω καὶ τῷ πνεύματι πρός τε τὴν θερμότητα τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον ἐν ἑτέροις εἰρήσεται) καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνήν, ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ τὸ εὖ." Aristotle, *On the Soul,* 2.420b.

because for him "the voice is a sound which means something."[96] Concerning the significance (σημαντικός) of the voice, Aristotle writes, "that which even causes the impact, must have a soul, and use some imagination." That is to say, the soul produces imagination (φαντασίας), which is reflected and expressed through voice. The voice is meaningful because it reflects the imagination that the soul produces.

While Aristotle uses γλῶττα to explain φωνή, we should note that Paul reversely uses φωνή to explain γλῶσσα. In both cases, however, φωνή is seen as analogous to γλῶσσα. At a verbal level, there are many strikingly similar terms that both Paul and Aristotle employ, among them ἄψυχα, φωνή, γλῶσσα, πνεῦμα, and ἀήρ. Beyond this verbal parallel, I observe that: First, unlike Aristotle, Paul is not too concerned about the difference between mere sound (ψόφος) and voice (φωνή). Such a distinction does not even exist in Pauline discourse. Paul flattens this distinction especially when he says that "οὐδὲν ἄφωνον" (nothing or no one is without voice. 14:10). To put it in a positive way, everything that exists has voice. Voice is a universal phenomenon including the voice of lifeless musical instruments. In Aristotle, however, the voice of lifeless things is not voice, but something that is analogous to voice.

Second, Paul's analogy is centered around the idea that musical instruments should produce "distinct voice" (διαστολὴν τοῖς φθόγγοις μὴ δῷ).[97] Paul's concern is about whether the production of a voice represents or reflects the producer of that voice. A flute (αὐλός) should produce the "fluty-kind" of voice so that people who hear it can know that it is a flute that is being played (τὸ αὐλούμενον). This is also the case with the harp and the trumpet. If a flute produces the sound of a harp, then the hearers will not know that it is actually a flute because the

---

[96] "σημαντικὸς γὰρ δή τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή." Aristotle, *On the Soul,* 2.420b.

[97] Aristotle actually employs the term φθόγγος when discussing the voice that a mouth articulates. See Aristotle, *On Things Heard*, 800a, 801b, 802b.

voice is not distinctively flute-like. Apparently, Paul is very concerned about those who hear. Aristotle does talk about hearing, but when it comes to the analogy with musical instruments, hearing them is not his concern.

Third, although Paul does not make a distinction between sound and voice, both Paul and Aristotle share the same idea that voice is meaningful, and thus intelligible. For Aristotle, on the one hand, the intelligibility of voice is constituted by the work of the soul in producing σημαντικός (significance) and imagination (φαντασίας).[98] Paul, on the other hand, seems to believe that intelligibility should be determined by the hearers and its distinct voice.

For example, if I want to express the concept of "tree" but I produce the sound image "pohon" (the Indonesian word for "tree") to an exclusively English-speaking person, then says Paul, it will not be understood by the hearer. This is because "*pohon*" might be meaningful to an Indonesian speaker but it is not meaningful to an English speaker. Just as a flute has to produce a distinct sound so people can know that it is a flute being played, the concept (*signified* in a Saussurean sense) of "tree" has to be expressed through a distinct sound (signifier) so that the

---

[98] The idea that soul produces language is very fundamental in Aristotle's philosophy of language. It is no surprise that he states in the opening part of his *On Interpretation*: "Words spoken are symbols or signs of affections or impressions of the soul; written words are the signs of words spoken" (Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ). Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, 1.1.

hearers may know that "tree" is being said and meant. Otherwise, the word spoken will be just a speaking into the air, a meaningless speech, a meaningless sound. Indeed, this analogy profoundly expresses Paul's philosophy of language.[99] Although Paul's understanding of language seems to be quite similar to that of Saussure, Paul seems to be unaware of the arbitrary nature of language.[100] If Saussure were to hear about this analogy, he would probably say that the sound of a flute itself is completely arbitrary. Its distinctive voice is, therefore, arbitrary and thoroughly depends on its difference to other signifiers.

Fourth, Paul's concern about the intelligibility of the sound image that a speaker produces is more clearly apparent in 14:9. The word "οὕτως" (thus, in this way) that opens this verse is an indication that Paul is now attempting to explain the meaning of his analogy. He states, "οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς διὰ τῆς γλώσσης ἐὰν μὴ εὔσημον λόγον δῶτε, πῶς γνωσθήσεται τὸ λαλούμενον; ἔσεσθε γὰρ εἰς ἀέρα λαλοῦντες" (Thus, if you do not produce an intelligent word through the tongue, how will it be known the thing that is being said? For you will be speaking into the air). The entire analogy is intended to make this point! Just like the flute gives a distinct voice (v. 7–8), a foreign language speaker should also give an intelligible word (εὔσημον λόγον). In other words, a foreign language speaker has to produce a "word" that is a good one (i.e., a good sign) so that it can be understood by the hearers. The issue of the intelligibility of a word, or whether a word is a good sign or not (εὔσημον λόγον), is determined not by the speaker but by the hearer.

---

[99] Thiselton states this when he comments on this analogy: "Communicative acts of speech entail a transactive engagement between speaker, writer or 'sender', and addressee, hearer, or 'receiver.' If the receiver cannot comprehend (γινώσκω) the content of what is being said (τὸ λαλούμενον), communication does not occur. Paul incisively sums up modern communicative and hermeneutical theory in a terse, succinct aphorism, in a way that was ahead of his time. In such a case, the sender is merely **speaking into empty air** (εἰς ἀέρα), he says. The speech-event is fruitless and pointless, except as self-affirmation or as a benefit to the speaker at the expense of generating negative effects for others (vv 4a and 11)." (bold is in the original) See Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1105. I should note, however, that Paul is hardly ahead of his time. Aristotle has already talked about speaking and hearing in the production of meaningful speech hundreds of years before Paul.

[100] See my discussion on Saussurean philosophy of language in chapter 2.

The subject "I" (Paul) in v. 11 indicates the primacy of the hearer in Paul's understanding of the social function of language.[101] Now, this is quite different from the way Aristotle employs the analogy. For Aristotle, the function of the analogy is to make sure that the readers understand that there is distinction between sound and voice. For Paul, the analogy is employed to show that foreign sounds (or indistinct sounds), thus foreign languages, will not be understood by the hearers.

It is unfortunate that many scholars think that even verses 9 and 10 are part of the description of analogy. This exegetical move is almost unavoidable for them, because they think that the issue with which Paul is dealing is not a linguistic one but a spiritual one. Paul, for them, only uses language as an analogy to explain his point about ecstatic speech. Raymond Collins, for example, acknowledges that Roman Corinth is a place of rich economic and cultural exchange, and thus, "transient merchants. . . exposed the city's population to a variety of languages."[102] However, he argues that the discussion here is "Paul's use of the experience of different languages to make a point about the gift of tongues."[103] This is what he writes under the title "polyglot culture": "Hellenistic rhetors valued the use of [the] literary device of comparison (*sygkrisis*) as a way of making their point. Having used the comparison of musical instruments to make his point about the relative lack of value of the gift of tongues, Paul uses the analogy of the different languages spoken in the world to make a similar point."[104] Thus, Collins basically says that Paul employs two analogies: that of musical instruments and that of different

---

[101] Here I agree with Fee that "All of this, of course, assumes the perspective of the hearer in the community at worship." Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 736.

[102] Raymond F. Collins, *First Corinthians*, ed. Daniel J. Harrington, Sacra Pagina Series 7 (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 497.

[103] Collins, 497.

[104] Collins, 497.

languages. Collins is not the only one who thinks this way. He is just one singer in a great choir

of scholars today who say that Paul uses different languages (multilingualism) as an analogy.[105]

I disagree. The analogy is not language but about language. The analogy is musical instruments.

Just like Aristotle, Paul is using musical instruments to explain what language is and how it

works. The description of the analogy is only in vv. 7–8. The word "οὕτως" in v. 9 marks the

transition from the description to the explanation of the analogy.

Fifth, Paul's statement in 14:10 can be understood in light of his shared belief with

Aristotle that voice is meaningful sound. Paul writes, "τοσαῦτα εἰ τύχοι γένη φωνῶν εἰσιν ἐν

κόσμῳ καὶ οὐδὲν ἄφωνον." This is where I believe that the entire discussion on voice is about

language use and that the statement should be literally translated as follow: "If there is doubtless

so many kind of languages in the world, then no one is without language." A reader will note a

parallel expression between γένη φωνῶν here and γένη γλωσσῶν in 12:10. Just like Aristotle,

Paul sees tongue and voice as a parallel way of describing the articulation or the production of

meaningful human speech, or language. It is not surprising that the word φωνή, just like

γλῶσσα, has been commonly used to describe a language.[106] Thus, the Revised English Bible

(REB) renders the phrase "γένη φωνῶν" as "number of different languages" and "ἄφωνον" as

---

[105] Edwards argues that in this discussion on many languages, Paul describes "an illustration to the same effect from natural sound." Edwards, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 363. Keener similarly writes, "To underline his point, Paul illustrates at length that what is unintelligible cannot communicate (14:7–11), whether with music (14:7–8) or languages (14:10–11)." Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 113. Fee argues that there are three analogies that Paul employs: lifeless instruments (flute and harp), battle (bugler), and the phenomenon of foreign languages. Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 735–36.

[106] Edward Anson points out that the word φωνή is often used to describe a different way of speech. He observes: "While Herodotus routinely refers to 'Greek speech,' he is, nonetheless, cognizant of the many variations of the Greek language during the fifth century, and while Plato has Socrates speak of 'Greek speech' (*Crat.* 409e, 410a), he also acknowledges that Greek differed in their speech (*Crat.* 385e). Our sources routinely refer to 'Boetian speech' (φωνή), 'Laconian speech' (φωνή) (Plut. *Pyrrh.* 26.11), 'Dorian speech' (φωνή), 'Aeolian speech' (φονή) (Paus. 9.22.3), 'Chalcidian speech' (φωνή) (Thuc. 6.5.1), 'Phecian speech' (φωνή) (Aesch. *Supp.* 563-4), 'Arcadian speech' (φονή) (Paus. 8.23.3), and 'Attic speech' (φωνή), etc." See Edward M. Anson, "Greek Ethnicity and the Greek Language," *Glotta* 85 (2009): 7–8.

"without language."[107] In this sense, Paul is vividly acknowledging the existence of many languages. The clause not only points to the idea that Paul flattens the difference between sound and voice, but also to Paul's acknowledgement of the diversity of languages.

Further, verse 10 is a conditional statement. For whatever reason, the word εἰ (if) is not translated in many English Bibles. Now, since this is an indicative, and not subjunctive, conditional statement, the protasis (the "if" clause) is the statement of fact, while the apodosis (the "then" clause) is the statement of consequence. So, when Paul states "if there is doubtless so many kinds of languages in the world…", he seems to be acknowledging a common understanding or common knowledge with the Corinthians that there are many languages in the world. This statement makes sense to these people because many of those languages are represented in that church. If this is the fact, then what is the consequence? The apodosis is "καὶ οὐδὲν ἄφωνον." The word οὐδὲν can mean nothing or no one. Although it can go either way, since the context is about people speaking different languages, the best translation would be "no one." Some ancient manuscripts (ℵ^2, D^2, K, L, Ψ, 104, 603, 1505, Majority Texts, and some other ancient versions) add the genitive pronoun αὐτῶν in between οὐδὲν and ἄφωνον. The omission of αὐτῶν, however, is supported by stronger manuscripts such as P^{46}, ℵ, A, B, D, F, etc. However, this variant reading at least demonstrates that some ancient scribes felt the need to clarify the statement by turning it into: "no one is without their own language." In this sense, through the discussion in vv. 10–11, Paul seems to be saying to the Corinthians who speak foreign languages: "I know for a fact that there are many languages in the world, and you know that too. Thus, none of you is without a language; you have your own native language.

---

[107] German scholars in the nineteenth century had already pointed out that the discussion on "γένη φωνῶν" is all about the multiplicity of languages. As Edwards points out, "Chrys, Estius, De Wette, Meyer, Heinrici restrict the meaning of φωνή to human languages here. See Edwards, *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 363.

However, if I come to you and I do not understand what you say, then you will be a barbarian to me, and you will make me a barbarian as well."

To sum up, this simple understanding of what language is lies at the heart of Pauline way of handling multiple languages in the Corinthian church. If one speaks in a foreign language, Paul argues, one is producing indistinct voice, and thus will not be understood by the hearers. Or to it put in Paul's words of 14:11, the hearer does not know the "ability of the voice" (τὴν δύναμιν τῆς φωνῆς). Such a situation results not only in a failure of communication, but also in othering, the formation of βάρβαρος, on the parts of both the speakers and hearers. Let me now deal with some critical passages that scholars have commonly used to argue that not only do the hearers not understand, even the speakers themselves do not understand.

4.2.5. Concerning the Issue of the Unintelligibility of Tongue(s)

It is important to deal with the issue of the unintelligibility of tongue(s), because scholars have used it the past two centuries to argue that the phenomenon is an ecstatic one. The key text is 1 Cor 14:2— that when someone speaks in a tongue (or in a native language), "nobody understands" (οὐδεὶς … ἀκούει). Biblical scholars from the late eighteenth century on have taken this statement at face value. On the basis of that reading, they have come to the conclusion that the speakers are in an ecstatic or even a totally unconscious state of mind.[108] The other passage that has commonly been used to argue for unintelligible ecstatic speech is Paul's statement, "my mind is fruitless" (ὁ δὲ νοῦς μου ἄκαρπός ἐστιν) in 14:14. This statement, according to many scholars, points to the reality that not only the hearers cannot understand, but

---

[108] See my discussion on this history of interpretation in chapter one.

the speakers themselves are unaware of what they are saying.[109] I would argue, however, that these statements can be read in a different way, for the following reasons.

First, the unintelligibility of tongue(s) reflects Paul's *perception* and thus his *representation* of these languages, rather than the actual reality of those foreign languages *per se*. That is to say, they are unintelligible because Paul, as a hearer, cannot understand them. Paul seems to share a common racial prejudice among the Greeks against people who speak other languages. The Greeks see these people as speaking *bar-bar-bar,* or in English bla-bla-bla,[110] because their speech sounds like gibberish to the Greek's ears. It is no surprise then that Paul portrays his relationship with tongue(s) speakers as being "*bar*barian" in 11:14.

Second, the "οὐδεὶς … ἀκούει" is not about the languages themselves but the hearers. Paul does not say that their speech in itself is unintelligible. Rather, the hearers do not understand what is being said. This statement is quite consistent with the overall mood of 1 Cor 14. Assuming that everyone understands Greek, Paul wants every public speech to be understood by the dominant group, i.e., by Greek-speaking people. That is why he employs the musical analogy, discussed earlier.

Third, concerning the statement on the fruitlessness of mind in 14:14, a heteroglossic-immigrant mode of reading would understand the term ἄκαρπος from the immediate discussion on the musical instruments analogy in vv. 6–12. So instead of reading this statement as being

---

[109] For example, see John Paul Heil, *The Rhetorical Role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians* (Atlanta, GA: SBL Press, 2005), 198, n. 15; Gerald F. Hawthorne, Ralph P. Martin, and Daniel G. Reid, eds., *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters: A Compendium of Contemporary Biblical Scholarship* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009), s.v. "The Charismata"; Gordon D. Fee, *Paul, the Spirit, and the People of God*, Reprint edition (Baker Academic, 1994), 169; Claire S. Smith, *Pauline Communities as "Scholastic Communities": A Study of the Vocabulary of "teaching" in 1 Corinthians, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus* (Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 259. Similarly, Andreas B. Du Toit argues that "the speaker's mind is inactive" is the idea behind this statement. See Andreas B. Du Toit, *Focusing on Paul: Persuasion and Theological Design in Romans and Galatians* (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007), 142.

[110] Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1106.

about the "inactivity" of mind or the inability of the speakers to understand what they are saying, we probably should read it as literally as possible—meaning that it refers to the inability of the mind to produce fruit. The reference to "fruit" must remind the readers of Paul's insistence for εὔσημον λόγον (understandable word/speech) in v. 9. Paul is basically arguing that because foreign language speakers do not produce utterances that are understandable by the hearers, their minds are fruitless. In this sense, the NRSV translation renders it quite well as "my mind is unproductive." The unproductivity of mind is not the inactivity of mind. The mind is unproductive because it does not produce fruit, i.e., εὔσημον λόγον. In verse 16 Paul makes clearer the absence of "εὔσημον λόγον" when he imagines the coming of ἰδιώτης (a common person who does not know foreign language) who cannot say "amen." The reason for this, according to Paul, is because that person "does not know what you say" (τί λέγεις οὐκ οἶδεν).

4.2.6. Summary

On the basis of these arguments, a good case can be made that Paul's discussion on tongue(s) in 1 Cor 14 relates to his struggle with heteroglossia and immigrant experience with languages. The issue of tongue(s) is a linguistic one, not only a spiritual or missional one. Since this is a linguistic clash, it is a window by which modern readers can understand the way early Christians dealt with the multiplicity of languages. Language is a site of thoroughly political struggle. Consciously or unconsciously, Paul's demand for the Corinthian followers of Christ to speak only one language in public gatherings has politicized language. The public gathering is now not only a sacred space but also a political space. It is a space of contestation, a space of dispute, a space of rivalry. With this in mind, I will move from identifying this phenomenon as a linguistic one and take one step further to analyze Paul's politicization of language in the Corinthian church.

4.3. The Constructed Linguistic Stratification: Prophecy vs Tongue(s)

The discussion of tongue(s) in 1 Cor 14 is part of the larger context of discourse on τὰ πνευματικά (spiritual things) that begins in chapter 12. Paul opens the entire conversation with the statement: "περὶ δὲ τῶν πνευματικῶν" (concerning spiritual things). In contrast to James Dunn, who thinks that tongue(s) is an ecstatic experience and Paul understood it as a linguistic phenomenon,[111] I think it is the other way around: the phenomenon of tongue(s) is a multilingual one and Paul attempts to make sense of it theologically in 1 Cor 14. After all, Paul filters most social issues through a theological lens (i.e., gender roles, economic relations, foods, etc.). Just as he thinks that the law is πνευματικός (Rom 7:14), so too in his worldview language is spiritual. But then why does Paul put languages under the umbrella of "spiritual" things (τὰ πνευματικά)? Echoing Antoinette Clark Wire's assertion that "Paul is not answering questions addressed to an authority but questioning answers authoritatively delivered,"[112] I suggest that Paul theologically appropriates tongue(s) to constitute a divine authority over this community. Since Paul thinks that multilingual interactions in the Corinthian gathering are chaotic, he feels the need to bring "order" (τάξις, 14:40) into that community. To this end, he employs a rhetoric of spiritual gifts as a tool for control.

The text of 1 Cor 14:37–38 provides the best clue to Paul's desire for control and authority. Paul states: "If anyone thinks that he is a prophet or a spiritual person, let him know that the things that I write to you is the command of the Lord" (εἴ τις δοκεῖ προφήτης εἶναι ἢ πνευματικός, ἐπιγινωσκέτω ἃ γράφω ὑμῖν ὅτι κυρίου ἐστὶν ἐντολή·), and in the same breath he

---

[111] James D. G. Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit: A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of Jesus and the First Christians as Reflected in the New Testament* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 242ff.

[112] Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets*, 135–36.

continues: "If anyone ignores (this), let him be ignorant!" (εἰ δέ τις ἀγνοεῖ, ἀγνοείτω). In this context, I think the best way to understand πνευματικός is a person who exercises τὰ πνευματικά, and tongue(s) speakers are the primary target here. This statement is so strong that even ancient scribes found it troubling. Assuming that the reading of NA[28] is more original,[113] we can argue that many ancient scribes, particularly from a Western tradition (D*, F, G), considered the phrase "κυρίου ἐστὶν ἐντολή" to be too strong, so they omitted the word ἐντολή leaving "κυρίου ἐστὶν" (is of the Lord) only. They probably perceived the word ἐντολή as too authoritarian.

Further, some ancient MSS have a middle indicative ἀγνοεῖται reading instead of an imperative ἀγνοείτω. However, on the basis of the *lectio difficilior potior* principle, I suggest that ἀγνοείτω is an earlier reading. Also, the imperative ἀγνοείτω reading is supported by papyrus P[46], one of the earliest textual witnesses to Pauline letters from the Alexandrian tradition dated around the late second or early third century CE.[114] In terms of the temporal quality and geographical distribution of manuscript witnesses, therefore, it is still reasonable to conclude that the imperative ἀγνοείτω is an earlier reading than the indicative ἀγνοεῖται. This means that the scribes found the command troubling and decided to ease or smooth the reading.

That said, by establishing the idea that everything he writes is the command of the Lord, Paul apparently attempts to establish a divine authority over this community. His words are, he says, the words of Jesus himself, so all that he says has to be obeyed. He expects the Corinthians to submit to his divine authority. If anyone ignores his authority, Paul insists, "let that person be ignorant!"

---

[113] This reading is supported by P[46], D[1], K, L, Ψ, 81, 104, 365, 630, 1175, 1505, 2464, Majority Texts, and some early translations (Latin, Syriac, and Sahidic versions).

[114] The ἀγνοείτω reading also appears in ℵ[2], A[c], B, D[1], K, L, Ψ, 81, 104, 365, 630, 1175, 1241, 1505, 1881, 2464, Majority Text, and Syriac version.

Furthermore, as I have described in chapter 2, language is bodily social performance. It is a social performance because the event of language takes place in thoroughly social relations. This is precisely how the Javanese people perform their language. The correctness of a speech does not depend on whether it is grammatically correct or not, but whether it is socially appropriate or not. This social aspect of dialogical language is also what Bakhtinian philosophy of language is all about. Language is dialogic. That is to say, language is not the product of an isolated individual. That said, Paul's discourse in 1 Cor 14 can be seen as his way of mapping a sociolinguistic stratification: the higher value of bodily performance is given to the dominant language, while the lower value is given to the minority languages. He calls the higher (or more valuable) performance "prophecy," and the lower performance "tongue(s)."

Thus, at the core of Pauline distinction between tongue(s) and prophecy is a linguistic difference. This political move can be understood through the Bakhtinian idea of heteroglossia as stratified languages. Also, it echoes Ferguson's concept of diglossia—that in a multilingual interaction, a certain way of speech is considered a H(igh) form of language and others a L(ow) form of language. In this sense, tongue(s) is the L language whereas prophecy is H language. This analysis, of course, requires a close reading of Paul's argument. In the following discussion, I will argue that the distinction that Paul makes between prophecy and tongue(s) speaks directly to the problem of linguistic stratification.

The difference between tongue(s) and prophecy lies at the core of Paul's discussion of 1 Cor 14. What we have in this text is not just the construction of difference but also stratification, which eventually leads to complete silencing. Such stratification is apparent in 14:5: "μείζων δὲ ὁ προφητεύων ἢ ὁ λαλῶν γλώσσαις…" (the person who prophesies is greater than the person who speaks in many foreign languages). Paul not only differentiates between

tongue(s) and prophecy, he also argues that prophecy is more important or bigger or greater than tongue(s).

4.3.1. Previous Scholarship

Scholars generally have attempted to explain this difference as tongue(s) being ecstatic-unintelligible versus prophecy being sane-intelligible speech. Engelsen's unpublished dissertation is probably the best scholarly effort to explain the distinction between the two. His basic argument is that the occurrences of ecstatic speeches in both ancient Greek sources (e.g., Orgiastic worship, the Dionysian cult, Plutarch, Plato, Herodotus, etc.), ancient Hebrew sources (1 Sam 10; 1 Kings 22; Num 11; Num 22, Isa 28; Zach 13, etc.), and late pre-Christian and early Christian era documents (Josephus, Lucian, Celsus, Irenaeus, Testament of Job, etc.) show that "unintelligible speech was a peculiarity inherent in prophecy."[115] That is to say, except for Plato, these sources do not make a sharp distinction between unintelligible and intelligible prophetic speech.[116] Ecstatic-prophetic speech is both intelligible and unintelligible. "Ecstatic speech has

---

[115] Engelsen, "Glossolalia and Other Forms of Inspired Speech According to I Corinthians 12-14," 60.

[116] Engelsen particularly looks into Plato's statement in *Timaeus*: "And that God gave unto man's foolishness the gift of divination a sufficient token is this: no man achieves true and inspired divination (μαντικῆς ἐνθέου καὶ ἀληθοῦς) when in his rational mind, but only when the power of his intelligence is fettered in sleep or when it is distraught by disease or by reason of some divine inspiration. (διά τινα ἐνθουσιασμὸν) But it belongs to a man when in his right mind (ἔμφρονος) to recollect and ponder both the things spoken in dream or waking vision by the divining and inspired nature, and all the visionary forms that were seen, and by means of reasoning to discern about them all wherein they are significant and for whom they portend evil or good in the future, the past, or the present. But it is not the task of him who has been in a state of frenzy, and still continues therein, to judge the apparitions and voices seen or uttered by himself; (τοῦ δὲ μανέντος ἔτι τε ἐν τούτῳ μένοντος οὐκ ἔργον τὰ φανέντα καὶ φωνηθέντα ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ κρίνειν) for it was well said of old that to do and to know one's own and oneself belongs only to him who is sound of mind (σώφρονι). Wherefore also it is customary to set the tribe of prophets (τὸ τῶν προφητῶν γένος) to pass judgement upon these inspired divinations (ἐπὶ ταῖς ἐνθέοις μαντείαις); and they, indeed, themselves are named "diviners" by certain who are wholly ignorant of the truth that they are not diviners but interpreters of the mysterious voice and apparition (ὅτι τῆς δι᾽ αἰνιγμῶν οὗτοι φήμης καὶ φαντάσεως ὑποκριταί, καὶ οὔ τι μάντεις), for whom the most fitting name would be "prophets (προφῆται) of things divined." (Plato, *Timaeus*, 72a-b) See Engelsen, 18–19. According to Engelsen, this is an example of ancient efforts to point to "the overall unintelligibility of the mantic utterances and attempts to introduce a distinctiveness between μάντις and προφήτης in opposition to the popular undifferentiated use of the two terms." He notes further, however, "the popular use prevailed, due probably to the fact that the gift of divination practiced by single, wandering prophets made a

a tendency to relapse into inarticulate ejaculations and rapturous speech flows, or it may have this character only. Because of this, the mantis or the prophetess was considered to be possessed by a god or a spirit who used his organ or speech."[117]

Furthermore, Engelsen argues that a clear separation between those two kinds of speech (i.e., intelligible and unintelligible speech) takes place in Paul's writing:

> Paul systematically uses tongues and prophecy as opposite terms. He also defines, so to speak, both of them. The explanation must be that both were seen as parts of ecstatic speech and not separated into two different categories. The Corinthians seem to have practiced ecstatic speech without any reflection about [its] intelligibility of the lack of it, just as was usually the case outside of Paul. The only exception is Plato who expressed the opinion that the term prophet should not be used for a mantic, but only for the interpreter of the mantic utterance, naming them prophets of things divined.[118]

He then points out that based on 1 Cor 14 we should understand tongue(s) as "a special phenomenon. It is not looked [at] simply as a language." This is the heart of his argument. Because tongue(s) is not language, it is unintelligible and thus useless.[119] Thus, says Engelsen, Paul uses the term γλῶσσα as a "technical term" that "denotes neither 'tongue' (physiological sense) nor (foreign) 'language.'"[120] He uses this word as a technical term in order to express the phenomenon of "unintelligible, inspired speech." If this is the case, then prophecy is precisely the opposite of the non-language phenomenon. "He refers to prophecy as fully intelligible and to glossolalia as fully unintelligible," Engelsen writes.[121] Although unpublished, Engelsen's work

---

distinction more or less irrelevant. The prophet's ecstatic speech flow would easily relapse into inarticulate ejaculations." Engelsen, 57.

[117] Engelsen, "Glossolalia and Other Forms of Inspired Speech According to I Corinthians 12-14," 60.

[118] Engelsen, 143.

[119] Engelsen also explains, "The uselessness of tongues for the community does not seem to have been realized in Corinth, partly because tongues were not separated from prophecy and partly because the Corinthians' attention was attracted in a different direction from Paul's realistic consideration." Engelsen, 147.

[120] Engelsen, 188.

[121] Engelsen, ii. He also states: "Paul emphasizes the unintelligibility of this speech form and contrasts the gift of tongues with prophecy as its intelligible counterpart." (Engelsen, 177.) The evidence for the unintelligibility of tongue(s) as non-language is, unsurprisingly, Paul's statement that "ὁ νοῦς is left ἄκαρπος," which Engelsen interprets as the detachment of "rational faculty."

has been quite influential since 1970. Forbes describes this dissertation as "the most detailed

attempt to justify the hypothesis known to me, and its conclusion that Paul was [the] first to

distinguish between intelligible and intelligible forms of inspired speech, which had hitherto

been seen as one undifferentiated phenomenon, has made its way into the footnotes of others."[122]

In spite of his original thesis that it was Paul who distinguishes these two kinds of ecstatic

speech, the view that Engelsen proposes that tongue(s) is non-linguistic speech and prophecy is

linguistic speech can be found throughout twentieth-century biblical scholarship.[123]

The first thing that needs to be stated about Engelsen's dissertation is that it works well

within the romantic-nationalist mode of reading. One can see this quite clearly in his survey of

scholarship. His interpretation follows the German scholarship tradition, particularly his heavy

dependence on Meyer's commentary, which can be seen throughout his dissertation.[124] Thus, the

first chapter of the dissertation (page 4) is entitled "Evidences for Ecstatic Speech in Ancient

Greek Sources."[125] Since he treats as a *given* the idea that tongue(s) is an ecstatic experience, he

---

[122] Forbes, "Early Christian Inspired Speech and Hellenistic Popular Religion," 269.

[123] Carl Clemens explains that the entire discussion in 1 Cor 14 is about "a separation of intelligible and unintelligible speech," and the evidence for this separation is the distinction between tongue(s) and prophecy. Clemens, arguing that the distinction between tongue(s) and prophecy will help us understand the nature of tongue(s), writes that while tongue(s) is unintelligible, "in every case it is assumed, and in v.3 expressly stated, that prophecy, for which we should more properly use the name sermon, is universally intelligible." See Carl Clemens, "The Speaking with Tongues' of the Early Christians," *The Expository Times* 10, no. 8 (1899): 347. Similarly Conzelmann argues that tongue(s) is unintelligible speech that "can be translated into normal language." See Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 234. James Dunn, stating that tongue(s) is not a linguistic phenomenon, writes that Paul "contrasts prophecy and glossolalia not as to inspiration, but as to intelligibility: prophecy is as much inspired speech, as much a 'speaking with the Spirit', as much a charisma, as glossolalia; the difference is that glossolalia is unintelligible whereas prophecy is intelligible (with the Spirit *and* with the mind)." Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit*, 229. A similar interpretative move of making tongue(s) unintelligible (non-linguistic) speech and prophecy intelligible linguistic speech can be found in many other scholarly works. David E. Garland, *1 Corinthians*, Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 630; Witherington III, *Conflict and Community in Corinth*, 280–81; Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 512; Holladay, *The First Letter of Paul to the Corinthians*, 176–77.

[124] See Engelsen, "Glossolalia and Other Forms of Inspired Speech According to I Corinthians 12-14," 177–80. See also my discussion on Meyer in the first chapter.

[125] Engelsen, pt. I. Chapter 2 is entitled "Evidences of Ecstatic Speech in Ancient Hebrew Sources"; chapter 3 "Evidences of Prophecy and Ecstatic Speech in the Late Pre-Christian and Early Christian Era outside of the New Testament." The theme of ecstatic speech is consistent throughout the dissertation.

scrambles around Hellenistic and Jewish literature to find similar phenomena with the supposedly Pauline unintelligible non-linguistic ecstatic speech. Although we do not have explicit reference to, for example, ἔνθεος or ἐνθουσιασμός or τραχύτης etc., the occurrences of these expressions Engelsen sees as parallel to Paul's discussion on tongue(s) in 1 Cor 12-14. It is not surprising that he writes that "the ecstatic phenomena in Corinth are not as such distinctively Christian, but are pan-human."[126]

Second, although he insists that tongue(s) is a non-linguistic and unintelligible phenomenon, Engelsen still thinks that "Paul will not suggest that tongues are meaningless."[127] But how can a speech be unintelligible and still meaningful? This is a self-contradictory statement. There is no such thing as unintelligibility without meaninglessness. To put it more positively, something is intelligible only because it is meaningful.

I suggest that the distinction between these two phenomena is a linguistic one—that of foreign languages versus the dominant language. If this is the case, then tongue(s) can still be unintelligible (especially on the part of the hearers) and yet meaningful. However, Paul does make a sharp distinction between these two, but the distinction is not between non-linguistic tongue(s) and linguistic prophecy but about dominant language and foreign languages. Prophecy is to speak in the dominant language, while tongue(s) is to speak in the foreign languages (i.e., minoritized languages). Both kinds of speech are linguistic through and through. Foreign languages are unintelligible to the ear of the dominant linguistic-speakers, but they are not meaningless.

---

[126] Engelsen, 23.

[127] Engelsen points to Paul's statement "πνεύματι δὲ λαλεῖ μυστήρια" as evidence that it is not meaningless. See Engelsen, 144.

In this case, language is also a pan-human phenomenon. Paul himself acknowledges that nobody is without language (1 Cor 14:10). The intelligibility of prophecy is not to be compared to the gibberish of tongue(s). Instead, prophecy is intelligible because it is uttered in the dominant linguistic expression while tongue(s) is unintelligible because it is uttered in non-dominant linguistic expression. The difference is entirely linguistic.

4.3.2. Internal and External Arguments for Linguistic Stratification

Herodotus's story of a man from Europus by the name of Mys (ἄνδρα Εὐρωπέα γένος, τῷ οὔνομα ἦν Μῦς) is probably the best counterexample to the Pauline distinction between tongue(s) and prophecy.[128] The story appears in book eight of his *Histories*. He recounts that when Mys went to a temple that is "called Ptoum, and belongs to the Thebans," the town picked three men to follow him to write down the oracle. However, when he arrived, the diviner spoke a foreign tongue from the outset (πρόκατε τὸν πρόμαντιν βαρβάρῳ γλώσσῃ χρᾶν).[129] The three Thebans who were there following Mys marveled because, according to Herodotus, "they heard barbarian language instead of Greek" (ἀκούοντας βαρβάρου γλώσσης ἀντὶ Ἑλλάδος).[130] However, since Mys himself was a Carian-speaking person, he told them that "the words of the oracle were Carian" (φάναι δὲ Καρίῃ μιν γλώσσῃ χρᾶν). Plutarch also wrote about this story, noting that the prophetic oracles were usually performed using the Aeolic dialect (φωνῇ Αἰλίδι). However, when Mys came, "the prophetic priest (τοῦ μαντείυ προφήτης)… took the side of the barbarians and gave forth an oracle such that no one else of those present comprehended it, but only Mys himself."[131]

---

[128] Herodotus, *Histories,* 8.135.

[129] Herodotus, *Histories,* 8.135

[130] Herodotus, *Histories*, 8.135

[131] Plutarch, *Moralia: Obscolesence of Oracles*, 412. In *Life of Aristides*, Plutarch notes that "the prophet actually addressed in the Carian tongue" (ὁ προφήτης Καρικῇ γλώσσῃ προσεῖπεν). Plutarch, *Aristides*, 19.1.

Is this an instance of the miraculous ability to speak in a foreign language? Englesen and Charles Talbert think it is.[132] My reading of this text, however, is similar to that of Gerald Hovenden. According to Hovenden, the promantis probably knew of Mys's origin, so in order to make the communication easier he just used the Carian language. "Additionally, it should be noted that neither the prophet nor Mys are said to be surprised by the event. It was those who did not know what was happening who were surprised, a fact which leaves open the possibility of their ignorance of the promantis's ability to speak Carian. Their surprise was related to hearing a 'strange language instead of Greek.'"[133] This narrative is therefore mainly about the linguistic difference between the oracle delivered in the dominant language and in a foreign language.

The story of Mys might clarify for us the way in which Paul distinguishes between prophecy and tongue(s). Paul is just like the Thebans who think that the only way in which a prophetic oracle is to be uttered in a religious space is in the dominant language, i.e., Greek. Thus, when a speech is given in (a) foreign tongue(s), Paul finds such a practice profoundly problematic. He uses the generic term "tongue(s)" to describe speech delivered in barbarian languages and "prophecy" to describe speech in the dominant language.

---

[132] Engelsen writes: "This story, as related by Herodotus, describes a case of automatic speech. It is not inarticulate as the usual forms of 'glossolalia.' It is xenoglossic. The prophet spoke in a language known to Mys. Neither the Thebans nor the prophet himself understood it. The intention of the story is probably to demonstrate the divine source of the oracle." Engelsen, "Glossolalia and Other Forms of Inspired Speech According to I Corinthians 12-14," 18. Charles H. Talbert, "Paul's Understanding of the Holy Spirit," in *Perspectives on the New Testament: Essays in Honor of Frank Stagg*, ed. Charles H. Talbert (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985), 104.

[133] Gerald Hovenden, *Speaking in Tongues: The New Testament Evidence in Context*, Journal of Pentecostal Theology Supplement 22 (New York and London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002), 14. Forbes similarly notes that "only once does the pre-Christian Hellenistic world *ever*, so far as I am aware, describe the inspired speech of a prophet/mantis as resembling a foreign language." While noting that "Greek was the norm," Forbes still emphasizes the amazement of the Thebans. This amazement "reinforces the point: oracles normally spoke in plain Greek." See Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*, 1995, 116–17; Forbes, "Early Christian Inspired Speech and Hellenistic Popular Religion," 266. It is worth noting that Forbes presents his reading of this text as an alternative to the reading of E.R. Dodds, K. Wicker, M.A. Hart, and T.M. Crone who read this text as an example of glossolalia.

His entire argument for the primacy of prophecy is built upon the basic premise that only the dominant language that can be universally understood is beneficial. The logic of universality of the dominant language runs deep beneath his argument. He describes this stratification of language through the constructed difference between prophecy and tongue(s) in two places: 1) 14:1–5, and b) 14:22–25. One the one hand, the argument in 14:1–5 is centered primarily on the internal factor. On the other hand, the argument of 14:22–25 pertains mainly to the external factor. These two arguments, however, are rooted in the same basic idea that prophecy [i.e., the dominant language] is universally intelligible. Tongue(s) [i.e., the non-dominant/minoritized languages], on the other hand, is unintelligible.

The Internal Argument (14:1–5)

The internal factor pertains to the impact of the language use within the church. Paul begins this argument with a strong statement: that he wants everyone to prophesy. The clause μᾶλλον δὲ ἵνα προφητεύητε implies that Paul seems to desire a universal use of the dominant language in the church of Corinth. This desire for universality of prophesy is further stressed through the use of the term πάντας ὑμάς (you all) in verse 5. If we read this argument in light of his discussion in chapter 12, Paul seems to be quite inconsistent. He lays out in chapter 12 the idea that that there are varieties of activities (12:6) and *some* are given prophecy while *others* various kind of languages (12:9), implying that both prophecy and tongue(s) are not universally given to everyone. However, when he zooms in oto the actual practice of these two kinds of speeches, Paul argues that he wants everyone to be able to speak different languages (tongue[s]), but even more to prophesy (14:5). It is his conviction that only a language that is universally understandable can build up the church.

The word οἰκοδομή appears eighteen times in the entire New Testament, and sixteen of them are in Paul, whereas two other instances appear in Matthew 24:1 and Mark 13:1. Paul seems to put a lot of emphasis on the idea of building up the church.[134] In 1 Cor 3:9, for example, he describes the church as God's building (θεοῦ οἰκοδομή). He argues that he has the authority (τὴν ἐξουσίαν) that comes from Jesus himself for the building up of the church (2 Cor 13:10). By describing the church as a building, and likewise the church as body,[135] Paul is not only making a theological statement, but also a political one. The church is a political structure. Thus, as in any other social structure such as empire, nation-state, city-state, etc., the unification of speech or language is an absolute requirement for its survival and expansion. To this end of promoting a monolingual ecclesial order, Paul proposes two interconnected arguments: 1) no one understands (lit. hears) foreign languages; and 2) they speak mysteries.

First, concerning the idea that no one understands (4:2) (discussed in the previous part of this chapter), this reflects Paul's inability to understand rather than the unintelligibility of those speeches *per se*. One further thing that we need to notice here, however, is Paul's theological move in arguing that foreign languages are unintelligible. He says that the person who uses a native language (ὁ λαλῶν γλώσσῃ) speaks to God and not to human beings. This statement can be understood both negatively and positively. Positively, Paul is affirming his basic idea that language originates from God, as he laid out in chapter 12. That is to say, when one prays in a foreign language, God can still understand. Thus, it is no surprise that Paul says that the church should not forbid people to speak in foreign languages (14:39). Negatively, that is not to say that

---

[134] Rom 14:19; 15:2; 1 Cor 3:9; 14:3, 5, 12, and 26; 2 Cor 5:1; 10:8; 12:9: 13:10; Eph 2:21; 4:12, 16, and 29. Pauline authorship of Ephesians has been questioned by modern scholars broadly. If we accept the idea that Paul is not the author of Ephesians, we can still say that the metaphor of is prominent in the Pauline tradition.

[135] See Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).

Paul approves or allows the use of these languages in public gatherings. Because only God can understand, foreign language speech basically has no human social value. The social value of language depends thoroughly on hearers.

This one-sided approach to language causes a serious imbalance of power in that the listeners basically silence the speakers, for the speakers have to subject themselves to whether their speech is intelligible to the listeners. In a Bakhtinian theoretical framework, both speakers and hearers are subjects whose position in the dialogical relations have to be taken equally and seriously. Instead of forcing the speakers to submit themselves completely to the regime of the dominant group of hearers, is it possible to imagine the hearers learning the language of the speakers? Unfortunately, this other side of the social imagination is somehow absent in Pauline discourse.

This leads us to the second argument concerning speaking mysteries in/with the spirit (14:2). While the first argument is about the impact of the speech, this second one is primarily about the content of the speech. The word μυστήρια (mysteries) is also quite prominent in the Pauline letters, as is the word οἰκοδομή discussed above. Thiselton points out that the exact meaning of this word "remains controversial" among biblical scholars.[136] Some argue that it refers to the idea that the utterance is unintelligible to both the speakers and the hearers.[137] Others argue that the word should refer to some sort of divine secrecy that no person can understand. This interpretation primarily attributes the dative noun πνεύματι (in/with spirit) to

---

[136] Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1085.

[137] Fee, for example, states that "more likely it [i.e., the term "mysteries"] carries here the sense of that which lies outside the understanding, both for the speaker and for the hearer." Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 728. See also Fee's extended argument rejecting the idea that tongue(s) is a linguistic phenomenon in Fee, 662–64. Similarly Fitzmyer argues that the word "means what transcends normal human understanding." Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 511. Raymond Collins writes, "the one speaking in tongues utters mysterious realities." Collins, *First Corinthians*, 492.

the work of the Holy Spirit.[138] Others believe that this is the work of the human spirit that

produces unintelligible mysteries.[139] These interpretative decisions should not be surprising at

all especially if tongue(s) is seen as a non-linguistic phenomenon.

The heteroglossic-immigrant mode of reading takes seriously the issue of linguistic

difference in interpreting this statement. In this sense, Paul says that what a foreign language

speaker utters are only mysteries because the hearers do not understand the language that is

spoken. The messages conveyed, thus, become secrets or hidden. Again, Paul's overall mood in

placing the primacy on the hearers should logically lead him to this conclusion. Furthermore, the

concept of "spirit" when discussed in the context of language use can be understood in light of

Aristotle's idea that language is produced through human breath discussed above. The Greek

sentence "ὁ γὰρ λαλῶν γλώσσῃ . . . πνεύματι δὲ λαλεῖ μυστήρια" (14:2) can be translated as

follows: "the one who speaks in a native language . . . speaks mysteries with [his/her] breath."

It is worth noting that speech delivered through breath in the Jewish tradition is not a

completely new idea. In Genesis 1–3, for example, the divine breath (רוח), voice (קול), and the

act of speaking and calling (קרא, אמר) are all at work in the narratives of creation and Adam-Eve.

In a similar vein, 1 Enoch 14:2 reads: "I saw in my sleep what I now *speak* with my *tongue* of

flesh and the *breath* of my mouth (λέγω ἐν γλώσσῃ σαρκίνῃ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ στόματός μου)

which the Great One has given to man (so that) he (man) may speak with it—and (so that) he

---

[138] Arguing that tongue(s) is a genuine work of the Holy Spirit, Carl Holladay insists that 'mysteries' refers to the "utterances delivered under the impulse of the divine Spirit." Holladay, *The First Letter of Paul to the Corinthians*, 175. Barrett similarly thinks that the word πνεύματι refers to the idea that no one understand a tongue because "as in the Spirit he speaks." The Spirit here refers to the Holy Spirit. He writes, "Here the meaning is simply 'secrets'; the speaker and God are sharing hidden truths which others are not permitted to share." C.K. Barrett, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1968), 315–16.

[139] Richard Horsley insists that the dative noun πνεύματι refers to human spirit, and thus "'mysteries' in the plural has the vaguer general sense of secret undiscerned things beyond understanding." Cf. Marion L. Soards, *1 Corinthians*, New International Biblical Commentary (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 281.

may have understanding with his heart as he (the Great One) has created and given it to man."[140]

Tongue and breath (and sound) are all perceived as integral parts of speech. Adriana Cavarero has noted, "*Ruah* [breath] and *Qol* [sound]—which are sources of an inspiring and vocal communication between God and the world, and human beings—belong in the Hebrew tradition to a fundamental sphere of meaning that comes *before* speech."[141]

If this is the case, then Paul seems to understand the production of foreign languages as mere sound through the breath only, without having any meaning because the hearers do not understand. By doing so, Paul reaffirms their uselessness, which he describes as being like voice being thrown into the air (14:9). This reading is significantly different from Martin's social body reconstruction, which sees *pneuma* as having a higher social rank and *nous* as having a lower rank.[142] In the framework of heteroglossic-immigrant reading, the use of *pneuma* (breath) is used in a negative way in order to demonstrate the uselessness of foreign languages. The dichotomy of *pneuma-nous* in this context needs also to be understood in this way. As I have explained above, Paul argues that the *nous* of a foreign language speaker is fruitless, because it does not produce meaningful signs. Or in an Aristotelian sense, the mind does not produce imaginations (φαντασίας) that flow out in a form of understandable voice. It is the function of *nous* to produce fruits, i.e., εὔσημον or good signs (vv. 9 and 14).

Paul is not saying that tongue(s) speakers *only* operate in spirit/breath and that prophecy is speech produced with the mind. This is not the case at all. The opposition of "prophecy/mind" versus "tongue(s)/spirit" does not exist in Paul. Instead, while both

---

[140] Italics are mine. Translation by Ephraim Isaac.

[141] Italics are hers. Adriana Cavarero, *For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression*, trans. Paul A. Kottman (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 20. Cf. Johanna Stiebert, "The Body and Voice of God in the Hebrew Bible," *Journal for Religion, Film and Media* 2, no. 1 (2016): 22–33.

[142] Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 96–102.

prophesying and tongue(s) speaking use both spirit/breath and mind, the mind in the tongue(s) speaking is fruitless, that is, it does not produce good signs (14:14).[143] The implication is clear: prophesying uses both mind and spirit, and is fruitful to the mind. Again, this is not about the inactivity of mind as many scholars have proposed, but the unproductivity of mind. Every speech will involve the employment of breath to produce sound! Prophecy is not the absence of spirit/breath (cf. 14:32) and tongue(s) is not the absence of mind. The only difference between these two is tongue(s) produces unintelligible words (to the hearers) while prophecy produces intelligible words.

So how can we map Pauline philosophy of language? The order of linguistic production can be described as follow:

God −> Mind −> Breath −> Tongue / Sound −> Meaningful Sign (Hearers)

First and foremost, Paul is convinced that God is the source of all languages (1 Cor 12). When it comes to human production of language, it is the task of the human mind to produce words. Unlike Aristotle, Paul does not make a sharp distinction between imaginations (φαντασίας) and words (λόγοις). Paul seem to flatten these two concepts. Words then will travel through a person's breath and are actualized through tongue and sound. A fruitful mind, Paul insists, will produce words that are meaningful to the hearers. As a consequence, words that are unintelligible to the

---

[143] Here my reading differs from Tibbs's argument that the prepositional phrase "ἐν πνεύματι" that appears in 12:3; 14:2c, 16, is an indication that both tongue(s) and prophecy are ecstatic or frenzied experiences. Although acknowledging that the words such as μανία, ἔκστασις, ἐνθουσιασμός, and ἔνθος do not appear in 1 Cor 12-14, Tibbs still insists, "This preposition phrase is Paul's way of describing a spirit speaking through a Christian medium that probably include the psychic condition of ecstasy." See Tibbs, *Religious Experience of the Pneuma*, 217–19. This insistence shows quite well a certain 'mode of reading' (i.e., romantic-nationalist mode of reading) determines how interpreters fill the gap in the text.

hearers will be as though coming only from breath or tongue. It is not surprising, therefore, that Paul even equates such words with a foreign tongue (i.e., *barbaros*; 14:11).

This idea lies behind his statement: "ἀλλ᾿ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ θέλω πέντε λόγους τῷ νοΐ μου λαλῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ ἄλλους κατηχήσω, ἢ μυρίους λόγους ἐν γλώσσῃ" (But in a church I would want to speak five words with my mind so that I may instruct others than thousands of words in a tongue). Note that here both tongue and mind produce "words" (λόγους). They are not gibberish utterances; they are words. Paul affirms the linguistic nature of both phenomena. The only distinction between them is that the five words are more productive or fruitful because the hearers can understand them, while a thousand of words in a [foreign] tongue are unproductive or useless because unintelligible. In this sense, the demand for thorough translation (ἵνα διερμηνεύῃ) in 14:13 can be understood as the demand to make the mind of foreign language speakers be productive. Their mind should produce intelligible words. That is, they have to speak the dominant language that can be understood by the hearers.

He further explains: "τί οὖν ἐστιν; προσεύξομαι τῷ πνεύματι, προσεύξομαι δὲ καὶ τῷ νοΐ· ψαλῶ τῷ πνεύματι, ψαλῶ δὲ καὶ τῷ νοΐ" (What then is it? I will pray with breath, I will pray also in my mind. I will sing psalm in my breath, I will also sing psalm in my mind). What is Paul trying to say here? He seems to affirm his basic understanding of language—that a linguistic production of language will involve both fruitful mind and breath. On the one hand, from the perspective of the speaker, if mind produces meaningful words, what comes out through breath will also be meaningful words.   From the perspective of the hearers, on the other hand, when the expressed words are unintelligible, then they clearly come from breath or tongue only. Paul uses "tongue" and "breath" interchangeably in 14:13–19 to indicate the foreignness (i.e., unintelligibility) of a speech.

The statement in 14:16 is also framed from the perspective of a hearer, an *idotēs* (I will discuss this word further below). Paul begins the statement with a subjunctive expression "ἐπεὶ ἐὰν εὐλογῇς [ἐν] πνεύματι" (because if I say a blessing in/with breath), which indicates that the scenario does not happen in reality, only in Paul's imagination. Speaking with breath means speaking with an unfruitful mind. It is again just like sound moving in the air to the ears of the hearers. The result is clear: an *idotēs* will not be able to say "Amen" to what is being said. The speech is useless because it only contains secrets or mysteries.

While on the one hand Paul argues that foreign tongue(s) are unintelligible and socially useless, on the other hand he insists that a speech that is delivered in the dominant language (i.e., prophecy) is intelligible and socially useful. The social usefulness of prophecy is described in verse 3 and 4: "ὁ δὲ προφητεύων ἀνθρώποις λαλεῖ οἰκοδομὴν καὶ παράκλησιν καὶ παραμυθίαν. λαλῶν γλώσσῃ ἑαυτὸν οἰκοδομεῖ· ὁ δὲ προφητεύων ἐκκλησίαν οἰκοδομεῖ" (The one who prophesies [i.e., uses the dominant language] speaks edification and encouragement and comfort to human beings. The one who speaks in a tongue builds up himself/herself, while the one who prophesies builds up church).

Several observations about this statement: First, the insistence that the person who prophesies speaks to human beings reflects the overall mood of Paul's understanding of language, that is the primacy of the hearers in the language event. For this reason, prophecy is a speech to human beings not because it is language and tongue(s) is non-language, but rather because it is the language that the hearers understand while tongue(s) is the language(s) that the hearers do not understand. Second, the dative noun ἀνθρώποις here has a limited reference. It is Paul's hyperbolized way of expressing the idea that prophecy communicates with other human beings. Third, by virtue of its intelligibility on the part of the hearers, prophecy is edifying, encouraging,

and comforting. In verse 4, Paul reemphasizes and repeats the "building" (or edifying) benefit of prophecy in verse 4. Because of this benefit, Paul wants everyone to prophesy instead of speaking in foreign languages. This argument may sound good in the ears of the people of the dominant group—in this case, the Greek-speaking group—but a total nightmare to those who do not speak Greek. Paul persists in his conviction that the person who speaks in the dominant language is greater or more important than the person who speaks in foreign languages (14:5).

After arguing that the dominant language is more important for the church than foreign languages, Paul adds this little disclaimer: "except it is translated so that the church may receive edification" (εἰ μὴ διερμηνεύῃ, ἵνα ἡ ἐκκλησία οἰκοδομὴν λάβῃ). This, we know, is a demand for a thorough translation, a complete subjugation of the alterity of tongue(s) under the regime of sameness of the dominant language. To put it differently, unless the otherness is erased, Paul insists, tongue(s) will always be inferior and less important than prophecy. In a positive way, a thoroughly translated tongue(s) will have the same function as prophecy: of building up the church.

The External Argument (14:22–25)

While the internal factor is about the function of language to the church, the external factor pertains mainly to the outsiders or the unbelievers. First of all, 1 Cor 14:22-25 is a most confusing passage. Anthony Thiselton notes that it is "one of the most difficult verses in our epistle [1 Corinthians]."[144] Two major points of debate among scholars concern the meaning of the word "sign" and its apparent contradiction. The heart of the problem is actually quite simple: if the tongue(s) is for the purpose of being a sign (εἰς σημεῖόν) for the unbelievers (v. 22), why do they respond negatively to the phenomenon of tongue(s) by saying that they are crazy (v.

---

[144] Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1122. Thiselton also points to the fact that even early readers of Paul like Chrysostom stated that "the difficulty at this place is great, which seems to arise from what it said" (Chrysostom, *Homilies on 1 Corinthians,* 32. 2.)

23)?[145] Also, if prophecy is a sign for believers, why does it have an effect on unbelievers (v.

24-25) instead of believers? Who are these believers, unbelievers, and ἰδιῶται that Paul talks

about?

In order to make sense of this discussion from the perspective of a heteroglossic-

immigrant reading, the noun ἰδιῶται in 14:24 (translated as "outsider" in ESV and NRSV) needs

to be clarified. Understanding how this word is connected with γλῶσσα will help us unlock the

force of Paul's discourse on foreign languages. In his *Poetics*, Aristotle argues that every poetic

utterance or speech is made up of "diction and thought" (περὶ λέξεως καὶ διανοίας). "Thought"

pertains to "all effects which need to be created by speech: their elements are proof, refutation,

the conveying of emotion (pity, fear, anger, etc.), as well as enhancement and belittlement,"

whereas diction pertains to the "forms of utterance."[146] So in a way, thought is the content and

diction is the package of a speech.

The purpose of diction, for Aristotle, is to ensure clarity of thought and "avoidance of

banality."[147] How does a poet ensure this? Aristotle insists that one way to do it is to employ

common words or standard/authoritative terms (τῶν κυρίων ὀνομάτων), but he then thinks this is

bad and poor (ταπεινή).[148] That is to say, it will not be so impressive. A better way is to use

exotic language which, Aristotle argues, comes from loan words (γλῶτταν), metaphor,

lengthening, and everything that is beyond ordinary language. Now, if an utterance is composed

---

[145] Theophilos and Smith summarize the second problem as follows: "[P]roblems immediately arise since the explanation of the quote in verse 22 seems antithetical to the illustration provided in verses 23–25. The text seems to contradict itself: for in verse 22 Paul explains that tongues are a sign for unbelievers and prophecy for believers, whereas in verses 23–25 he demonstrates both the negative effects of tongues and the positive effect of prophecy on unbelievers!" Theophilos and Smith, "The Use of Isaiah 28:11-12 in 1 Corinthians 14:21," 54.

[146] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 19.34-35.

[147] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 22.18.

[148] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 22.19.

in this second way, it will result in two outcomes on the part of the listeners: a) riddles, and b) barbarianism. A riddle, according to Aristotle, is when the speech is filled with too many metaphors. A barbarianism is when the words are taken from other languages, i.e., loan words (ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ γλωττῶν, βαρβαρισμός). Aristotle therefore insists that a poet should strive for a balance in combining these elements of diction so that it will produce neither ἰδιωτικός nor banality (ταπεινός). The word ἰδιωτικός in this context refers to the inability to understand γλῶτταν (foreign word). That said, if we read Paul's statement in 14:23 from this point of view, then it will mean that Paul is expecting people who don't understand foreign languages to participate in the Corinthian gathering. And for Paul, these ἰδιῶται would think that the entire situation is madness.

Another way of understanding the word ἰδιῶται in connection to γλῶσσα is in light of how it is used by Philo. As I have described above, Philo puts ἰδιῶται and the magistrates (ἄρχουσιν) side by side to explain that the scale of the translation of the Septuagint is not for them.[149] He basically says that because the task of translation of the laws is big or important (μέγα) and for the common good (κοινωφελές), it should not be for common people nor magistrates (οὐκ ἰδιώταις οὐδ᾽ ἄρχουσιν). The "ἄρχουσιν" here likely refers to local aristocrats, and they are placed side by side with "ἰδιώταις." Since the word is related to the adjective ἴδιος (one's self or private), it is often translated as "private persons." However, in this context given its paring it with ἄρχουσιν, the word ἴδιος probably refers to those who don't hold public office, meaning most likely common people.

---

[149] The complete Greek sentence: τὸ δ᾽ ἔργον ἐπεὶ καὶ μέγα ἦν καὶ κοινωφελές, οὐκ ἰδιώταις οὐδ᾽ ἄρχουσιν, ὧν πολὺς ἀριθμός, ἀλλὰ βασιλεῦσι καὶ βασιλέων ἀνετέθη τῷ δοκιμωτάτῳ.

In the context of language, we might be able to understand Paul's use of this term through the way it was employed by both Aristotle and Philo. In the context of Corinth, Paul was probably thinking about Greek-speaking non-aristocrats, or common folk, who are unable to speak or understand foreign languages. The word ἐάν followed with a subjunctive verb in vv. 23–24 shows that the statement is an anticipation rather than a statement of reality. That is to say, Paul is imagining that someone who does not understand foreign languages, i.e., a common person who speaks Greek only, enters the Corinthian gathering. Paul's imagination is apparently shaped by a monolingual social possibility.

Concerning σημεῖον, the word has a range of meaning. However, the first definition in LSJ is "*mark* by which a thing is known."[150] If tongue(s) and prophecy are meant to be a "mark" (or sign, proof), the question then becomes what is the "content" of such a sign or mark? To what does it refer? Scholars have tried to fill the gap behind the signifier "σημεῖον" with many theological possibilities. It is either the sign of God's favor or God's judgment, or both.[151] Perhaps we do not have to look far for those signified by σημεῖον because it is right there in the next part of the sentence. Scholars and Bible translations have commonly understood the dative

---

[150] Liddell, Scott, and Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon, Ninth Edition with a Revised Supplement*, s.v. σημεῖον.

[151] Scholarly positions on this issue of 'sign' can be divided into three categories: a) a negative sign of judgment, b) a positive sign of divine blessed or redemptive activity, and c) both judgment and blessing. For further discussion on the negative sign, see Robert B. Hughes, *First Corinthians- Everyman's Bible Commentary* (Chicago, IL: Moody Publishers, 1985), 132–35; Witherington III, *Conflict and Community in Corinth*, 285; Keener, *1-2 Corinthians*, 115; C. K. Barrett, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, Black's New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 323; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 508.

For those who argue that tongue(s) is a sign of divine blessed or redemptive activity, see P. Roberts, "A Sign — Christian or Pagan?," *The Expository Times* 90, no. 7 (April 1, 1979): 199–203; O. Palmer Robertson, "Tongues: Sign of Covenantal Curse and Blessing," *Westminster Theological Journal* 38 (1975): 44–53; Stephen J. Chester, "Divine Madness? Speaking in Tongues in 1 Corinthians 14.23," *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 27, no. 4 (June 1, 2005): 417–46.

For those who hold the view that it is a sign of both judgment (to the unbelievers) and blessing (to the believers), see W. Grudem, "1 Corinthians 14.20-25: Prophecy and Tongues as Signs of God's Attitude," *Westminster Theological Journal* 41, no. 2 (Spring 1979): 381–96; Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit*, 231; Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 755–56; Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 650–51.

of "τοῖς πιστεύουσιν" and "ἀπίστοις" as simply indirect objects. That is to say, the sign is aimed

at believers and unbelievers. Thus, it is always translated as "a sign not 'for' believers but 'for'

unbelievers" (RSVP, NIV, ESV, etc.). Another possibility is to see them as datives of reference.

Daniel Wallace explains that such a dative is "a frame of reference dative, limiting dative,

qualifying dative, or contextualizing dative."[152] Thus, the statement "σημεῖον . . . οὐ τοῖς

πιστεύουσιν" can be translated as "a mark not concerning believers." In this case, the statement

"ὥστε αἱ γλῶσσαι εἰς σημεῖόν εἰσιν οὐ τοῖς πιστεύουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀπίστοις, ἡ δὲ προφητεία οὐ

τοῖς ἀπίστοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς πιστεύουσιν," can be translated: "For this reason, tongues are meant as a

mark not concerning those who believe, but concerning those who do not believe, while

prophecy is a mark not concerning those who do not believe but those who believe."[153]

Tongue(s) are a sign concerning the unbelievers because they are a proof that such a

method of communication is ineffective. Why? Because people who hear these languages will

not understand, and thus they will not believe. It is an affirmation and reaffirmation of Paul's

appropriation of Isaiah in v. 21. Foreign languages are ineffective means of communication even

if they come from the mouth of God. Their ineffectiveness is demonstrated through and results

in people's unbelief.[154] In this sense, σημεῖον here is not a theological mark, but a practical one.

It is about whether a practice works and produces result or not. Paul seems to say to them that, if

they continue to use foreign languages in public gatherings, such a practice will point to (i.e.,

will be the 'mark' of) the inability to produce results, i.e., the inability to make people believe.

---

[152] Daniel B. Wallace, *The Basics of New Testament Syntax* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000), 69.

[153] Following B.C. Johanson's suggestion, I translate the phrase "εἰς σημεῖον" as "meant as a sign." See Johanson, "Tongues, a Sign for Unbelievers?," 193.

[154] Robert Gladstone's translation echoes this idea: "Therefore tongues are a sign, not *resulting in* believers, but *resulting in* unbelievers; But prophecy [is a sign], not *resulting in* unbelievers, but *resulting in* believers" (italics are mine). See Robert J. Gladstone, "Sign Language in the Assembly: How Are Tongues a Sign to the Unbeliever in 1 Cor 14:20-25?," *Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies* 2, no. 2 (1999): 185. Joseph Fitzmayer interestingly agrees with this translation. See Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 521.

Such practice is useless. Prophecy, on the other hand, is a mark concerning believers. It proves that people will understand, and thus believe. Again, it is always important to keep in mind that Paul operates from an assumption that the Corinthians would only know Greek and the only legitimate way of speech in public spaces is in the dominant language. Languages other than Greek are unintelligible, and therefore ineffective.[155]

In verses 23–25, Paul then gives an imaginary situation (ἐὰν and subjunctive verb) in order to illustrate further his point on the ineffectiveness of foreign languages.[156] Here he introduces the word ἰδιῶται by putting it side by side with ἄπιστοι and he connects them with the conjunction ἤ (or). The ἤ (or) here is important because Paul seems to give a face to the general notion of "unbelievers" found in v. 22. These unbelievers are common people who do not understand foreign languages; they are ἰδιῶται, as I have discussed above. Unlike Conzelmann and other scholars who think that the ἰδιῶται here refers to those who know "nothing of the phenomenon of speaking with tongues,"[157] I suggest that they are people who, in Paul's assumption, speak only Greek and are unable to understand foreign languages.

The idea that they are people who do not know foreign language is clearer in 14:13 when Paul insists that an ἰδώτης does not know what the tongue(s) speakers say. They are not just "outsiders," as some Bible translators have made them out to be. Paul strategically creates these

---

[155] I disagree with Johanson's view that v. 22 is the slogan of some Corinthians, and not Paul's view. The need to make such an interpretative move is because Johanson wants to reconcile the apparent contradiction between this verse and the following verses (23–25). For further discussion, see Johanson, "Tongues, a Sign for Unbelievers?," 193–95. However, if we understand sign not as a theological mark, rather as a practical mark, then I do not think there is any contradiction there. Paul seems to be very consistent throughout his argument. Speaking in foreign languages does not work because it will not be understood by the common people in Corinth.

[156] Many scholars have seen v. 23-24 as contradicting to v. 22. For instance, Richard Hays writes, "This comment [i.e., v. 22] seems to stand in direct contradiction to the explanation that follows in verses 23-25, in which believers are turned away by tongues and converted by prophecy." Richard B. Hays, *First Corinthians: Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching*, Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011), 239.

[157] Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 243.

imaginary actors in order to push his strong belief that foreign languages are useless and ineffective. When these ἰδιῶται enter a church gathering and watch the others all speaking foreign languages, Paul insists that they might say that these people are out of their mind. Interestingly, many scholars have taken this statement at face value as though Paul is stating a fact.[158] They use it as a way to explain what tongue(s) is. However, the construction of ἐὰν and subjunctive verb indicates that it is not a statement of fact but rather what Paul imagines. Thus, rather than being a description of the craziness of tongue(s) speakers, calling these people 'mad' (or out of their minds) actually reflects Paul's own rampant fear of foreign languages.

While insisting that people who foreign language speakers are crazy, in 1 Cor 14:23 Paul then creates another possible scenario for everyone speaking the dominant language.[159] The result of the social space being filled with the intelligible dominant language, according to Paul, is that an ἰδώτης or an unbeliever who enters their gathering is convicted and judged by all. Speaking the dominant language works and produces results! The switch from the plural in v. 23 (ἰδιῶται ἢ ἄπιστοι) to the singular in v. 24 (τις ἄπιστος ἢ ἰδιώτης) could well be a word play on Paul's part. However, if we read this passage from the other perspective, from the eyes of the minority language speakers in Corinth, such a switch could leave an impression of exaggerating

---

[158] Stephen J. Chester's essay, it seems to me, is an attempt to save Paul from trashing tongue(s) speakers as being crazy. On the basis of the idea, he borrows from Theissen's reading of 1 Cor. 14:23 that the "ecstatic speech is talking without *nous*," Chester argues that the verb "you are mad" should be understood in light of Bacchaian frenzied religious madness. Madness is a sign of divine inspiration. Thus the reaction in v. 23, according to Chester, should not be seen as a positive one. See Chester, "Divine Madness?," 436–37. The problem with this explanation, as Forbes has strongly insisted, is that there is no "glossolalic" – as in ecstatic speech – in Bacchae at all. The constructed parallel between tongue(s) and Bacchae is profoundly problematic. To be fair, Chester does try to answer Forbes' challenge through Martin's insistence that "Forbes is looking for the same 'thing' as Christian glossolalia." Martin, "Tongues of Angels and Other Status Indicators," 548 n. 4. However, this objection is problematic because if two things are not parallel, how can one establish a comparison between them? It will end up being like comparing apples and oranges. The problem lies, I believe, in the scholarly assumption that tongue(s) is an ecstatic and enthusiastic experience instead of a linguistic one.

[159] In this project I assume that the difference between tongue(s) and prophecy in the context of Corinthian conflict is a linguistic one. Prophecy is speaking in the dominant language, i.e., Greek, while tongue(s) is speaking in foreign minoritized languages.

and amplifying the problem of ineffectiveness of foreign tongue(s). On the one hand, the

unintelligibility of tongue(s) is a bigger problem, because "many" ἰδιῶται and unbelievers would

be turned off by such situation. On the other hand, however, prophecy, i.e., a speech in the

dominant language, is effective even if only one unbeliever or ἰδιώτης (τις ἄπιστος ἢ ἰδιώτης)

enters the gathering.

Paul then describes the effectiveness of the dominant language in more detail in v. 25.

Paul seems to believe that the words of prophecy, which are spoken in the dominant language,

will be able to illuminate the heart of this particular imaginative unbeliever or ἰδιώτης. That

person will end up bowing before God and acknowledging the presence of God in the gathering.

Yet, because this is still part of a subjunctive conditional statement (v. 24), we should recall that

all of this discourse is merely in Paul's imagination. It would be reasonable to assume that a

Corinthian believer from Syria might rebut Paul and say, "Hey, if a certain Syrian ἄπιστος enters

the room, the same reaction or result might happen as well. An ἄπιστος does not have to be a

Greek-speaking person."

4.3.3. The Result of Stratification: Subject Formation

Language is always embedded in power relations. In her book, *Excitable Speech,* Judith

Butler focuses primarily on theorizing the depth of the socio-political impact of hate speech.

Building upon the speech acts theory of J. L. Austin, for whom the function of language is not

only to describe things (descriptive) but to do things as well (performative),[160] Butler argues that

hate speech goes even further than just performing hatred— it actually constitutes the subject. In

other words, it is through language that a subject establishes an identity. A subject can only exist

---

[160] See J. L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 2nd ed., William James Lectures ; 1955 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975).

in a linguistic life. "One comes to 'exist' by virtue of this fundamental dependency on the address of the Other. One 'exists' not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being *recognizable*."[161]

Concerning the concept of the constitution of the subject, Butler argues that there are two somehow different, yet connected, views of the relationship between subject and speech. One is the Althusserian concept of interpellation [or hailing],[162] and the other one is the Austinian concept of illocutionary speech. "For Austin, the subject who speaks precedes the speech in question. For Althusser, the speech act that brings the subject into linguistic existence precedes the subject in question."[163] Austin still thinks that the illocutionary speech act is influenced and formed by its convention, whereas Althusser argues that there is a ritualistic sort of ceremony, which is something that he develops from Pascal, that forms the subject of ideology. For Althusser, therefore, ideas are formed by ritual, and not the other way around. But for Austin, convention (or ritual in an Althusserian sense) produces a speaking subject. On the one side, Austin believes in the existing subject who speaks; Althusser, on the other side, believes that the subject is formed through being addressed. Butler attempts to find a sort of middle way between these two positions and tries

> to bridge an account of how the subject constituted through the address of the Other becomes then a subject capable of addressing the others. In such a case, the subject is neither a sovereign agent with a purely instrumental relation to language, nor a mere effect whose agency is pure complicity with prior operations of power. The vulnerability to the Other constituted by that prior address is never overcome in the assumption of agency (one reason that "agency" is not the same as "mastery").[164]

---

[161] Judith Butler, *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (New York: Routledge, 1997), 5. Emphasis is hers.

[162] See Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001), 172ff.

[163] Butler, *Excitable Speech*, 24.

[164] Butler, 25–26.

This middle way lies at the heart of Butler's theory of linguistic interpellation. By addressing or naming the other, a subject is interpellated, but, for Butler, the addresser will not be able to name without first being named.

Further, Butler insists that "one need not know about or register a way of being constituted for that constitution to work in an efficacious way."[165] In other words, "Interpellation must be dissociated from the figure of the voice in order to become the instrument and mechanism of discourses whose efficacy is irreducible to their moment of enunciation."[166] The effectiveness of a speech in producing or constituting a subject, both as free being and subjected being, does not depend on whether the listener knows it or not. Paul's discourse on tongue(s), I argue, is precisely his effort to constitute subject. The subject interpellation aims at placing minority language speakers under the primacy of the dominant language. Tongue(s) speakers in 1 Cor 14, thus, are subjected beings. With this in mind, the stratification of language that Paul constructs in this text is not only about the practicality or pragmatism of speech, i.e., the intelligibility of language and its social benefit. This discourse that marks tongue(s) as being inferior, less desirable, and useless is an ideological move to constitute tongue(s) speakers as subjected beings. The result of such subjugation is obvious in this text: a complete silencing.

4.4. The Silencing of Minority Languages

In 1 Cor. 14:26–28, right after employing his rhetoric of church building again, Paul then suggests the following: "εἴτε γλώσσῃ τις λαλεῖ, κατὰ δύο ἢ τὸ πλεῖστον τρεῖς καὶ ἀνὰ μέρος, καὶ εἷς διερμηνευέτω·" (If someone speaks in/with a tongue, [distributively][167] by two or at most

---

[165] Butler, 31.

[166] Butler, 32.

[167] According to the Liddell and Scott Greek Lexicon (LSJ), the preposition κατά with an accusative noun has a wide range of meanings including "of motion *downwards*," "*distributively*, of a whole divided into parts," "of

364

three in turn, then let one translate)." This statement is a typical Greek conditional construction, meaning a combination of an indicative verb expressing a condition (*protasis*) followed by an imperative verb as its consequence (*apodosis*). Many commentators, and English Bible(s), [168] render this sentence as though there are two *apodoses*, i.e., to speak in turn and to translate. For example, Raymond Collins translates it as follows: "If anyone speak in a tongue, two or at most three, one at a time. Let there be someone to interpret." Separating the first clause from the imperative διερμηνευέτω would leave a clear impression that the prepositional phrase "κατὰ δύο ἢ…" is the apodosis.[169] This translation unsurprisingly affects his interpretation in which he says that there are three ways Paul deals with tongues and interpretation of tongues: "First, that there be a limited number of such utterances, no more than two or three. Second, that those who speak in tongues speak in turn. Third, that the utterances be interpreted."[170] We find the same interpretative move in Fee's commentary, when he translates this sentence as follows: "If anyone speaks in a tongue, two—or at the most three—should speak, one at a time, and someone must interpret." Note that the word "should speak" is absent in Greek and is supplied here as though it were an apodosis.[171]

This translation is probably inaccurate syntactically. The first clause (εἴτε with the indicative verb λαλεῖ) is the *protasis*, and the imperative διερμηνευέτω is the *apodosis*. Therefore, the prepositional phrase "κατὰ δύο ἢ τὸ πλεῖστον τρεῖς καὶ ἀνὰ μέρος" is not an

---

direction *towards* an object or purpose," "of fitness or conformity, *in accordance with*," and "*by the favour of* a god, etc." Since Paul speaks of "ἀνὰ μέρος" [in part], I think it makes sense to translate κατά in a distributive sense. See Liddell, Scott, and Jones, *Greek-English Lexicon, Ninth Edition with a Revised Supplement*, s.v. "κατά."

[168] Almost all English translations render this statement as an apodosis by supplying a verb "Let it be…" or "Should speak…" KJV: "let it be by two, or at the most by three"; NIV: "two—or at the most three—*should* speak"; ESV: "let there be only two or at most three, and each in turn" NRSV: "let there be only two or at most three, and each in turn"; NASB: "it should be by two or at the most three, and each in turn," etc.

[169] See Collins, *First Corinthians*, 511–12.

[170] Collins, 511.

[171] Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 689.

apodosis but rather a further elaboration of the *protasis*. Young's Literal Translation (YLT) comes closest to what I am suggesting here: "if an unknown tongue any one do speak, by two, or at the most, by three, and in turn, let one interpret." If this translation more accurately reflects Paul's intentions, then Paul is not so much instructing them to take turns in speaking but stating his observation that the act of speaking in a [foreign] tongue has been done not only by one person, but also by two and three. Moreover, unlike the subjunctive conditional, the conditional statement characterized by the indicative mood expresses the "real case," which "borders on 'because.'"[172] Thus, the statement expresses Paul's sense of frustration of the "chaotic" (ἀκαταστασία, 14:33) situation that tongue(s) speaking has caused. The *apodosis* part expresses what Paul wants; he wants it to be translated. Unless it is interpreted,[173] non-dominant languages will remain useless.

Paul continues his instruction with another conditional statement, a stronger one. He says: "ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ᾖ διερμηνευτής, σιγάτω ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ, ἑαυτῷ δὲ λαλείτω καὶ τῷ θεῷ" (If there was no translation, let him/her be silent in the church, let him/her speak to himself/herself and to God). When there is no translation, Paul apparently pushes his othering project to the extreme by shutting off tongue(s) altogether. In other words, in such situations Paul doesn't allow the presence of unknown tongue(s) to take place in public gatherings at all. This complete silencing of all languages other than the dominant one Paul perceives to be the best solution. In this sense,

---

[172] N. Clayton Croy, *A Primer of Biblical Greek* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 140.

[173] It is important to note the proposal by Anthony Thiselton that the words ἑρμηνεία (12:10; 14:26) and διερμενευτής (14:28) should be understood as "to put into words." I don't find this argument convincing because neither Philo nor Josephus used those words in the context of unintelligible speech as Thiselton describes the phenomenon in 1 Cor. 14. See Thiselton, "The 'Interpretation' of Tongues," 15–36. I share the same objections that Christopher Forbes has offered in his work on inspired speech and prophecy in early Christianity. For Forbes, both sources that Thiselton uses, i.e., Philo and Josephus, are incomplete and inconclusive. See Christopher Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 75 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995), 65–72.

I disagree with Earl Ellis's assessment that "Chapter 14 is not deprecation of glossolalia, but a regulation of it for the edification of the community."[174] There is no regulation of tongue(s) here in chapter 14. What we have instead is silencing of tongue(s).

Conversely, a reader should not fail to notice that when it comes to the prophecy, i.e., a speech given in the dominant language, Paul does not employ a conditional construction (14:29). He uses the imperative: "προφῆται δὲ δύο ἢ τρεῖς λαλείτωσαν καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι διακρινέτωσαν·" (let two or three prophets speak and let others judge). Since they are allowed to speak, this is a regulation of speech rather than a complete silencing of speech as the way Paul deals with tongue(s). Thus, he asks them to speak one at a time (vv. 30–31). Instead of insisting that there be translation, Paul argues for the Corinthians to examine or judge the speech.

In the following section, I highlight three political strategies of silencing: the politics of race, the politics of gender, and the politics of imperialism. I suggest that Paul employs these strategies for the sole purpose of unifying the diversity of languages in the Corinthian congregation. The following statement from Pierre Bourdieu captures Paul's political behavior well here.

> In order for one mode of expression among others (a particular language in the case of bilingualism, a particular use of language in the case of a society divided into classes) to impose itself as the only legitimate one, the linguistic market has to be unified and the different dialects (of class, region or ethnic group) have to be measured practically against the legitimate language or usage. Integration into a single 'linguistic community', which is a product of the political domination that is endlessly reproduced by institutions capable of imposing universal recognition of the dominant language is the condition for the establishment of relations of linguistic domination.[175]

---

[174] E. Earle Ellis, "Diskussion (A Response to Lars Hartman)," in *Charisma Und Agape: (1 Ko 12-14)*, ed. Lorenzo De Lorenzi (Rom: Abtei von St Paul vor den Mauern, 1983), 170.

[175] Pierre Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*, trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), 45–46.

Any effort to create a single linguistic community is directly related to the establishment, perpetuation, and domination of a particular language. That is to say, the unification of language is the universalization of a particular language. In the case of 1 Cor 14, it is the reinforcement, and thus universalization, of Greek language. Such linguistic universalization is constructed through producing raced subjects, gendered subjects, and colonized subjects.

However, as Bakhtin has also pointed out, the centripetal force is not the only story about the life of language. Tongue(s) is the centrifugal force of language that breaks apart this linguistic unity, decentralizes it, and becomes the site of subversion. In the next part of this chapter, I will (re)imagine tongue(s) as a site of subversion and decentering of linguistic unity. Let me now turn to the politics of race.

4.4.1. Politics of Race

In 14:11, after discussing the analogy of musical instruments and acknowledging that there are many kind of sounds (γένη φωνῶν) in the world and that nothing exists without sound (ἄφωνον), Paul states: "ἐὰν οὖν μὴ εἰδῶ τὴν δύναμιν τῆς φωνῆς, ἔσομαι τῷ λαλοῦντι βάρβαρος καὶ ὁ λαλῶν ἐν ἐμοὶ βάρβαρος" (Therefore, if I don't know the force of sound, I will be a barbarian to the one who speaks, and the one who speaks [will be] a barbarian in me). Many English bibles translate the word βάρβαρος as "foreigner" (cf. NIV, NLT, ESV, etc.) Only the King James Version renders it with the transliteration word, "barbarian." If Paul had wanted to express the idea of "foreigner" or "stranger" from a different geographical location, the word ξένος, which Paul uses three times, would probably have fit better. The term βάρβαρος, however, is different from ξένος because it signifies ethnic "others" marked by a linguistic difference.

When in the next breath Paul talks about φωνή and then βάρβαρος, it would likely ring a bell in the ear of many Greek-speaking people, especially those who are familiar with the *Iliad*

from the eighth century BCE, in which Homer describes the Carians, a group of people in his

Trojan Catalogue, as βαρβαρόφωνων.[176] This is the earliest instance of the appearance in Greek

literature of βάρβαρος as a compound word with φονή.[177] Moreover, Edith Hall in her important

work, *Inventing the Barbarian*, which is influenced by Edward Said, argues that it was not until

the Greeks had to face the immense social and political challenge from the Persians during the

Greco-Persian war (499–449 BCE) that the "otherness" of βάρβαρος became critical in their

collective identity. As Simon Hornblower puts it: "Persia gave the Greeks their identity, or

means for recognizing it."[178] This is the reason Hall thinks that βαρβαρόφωνων in the *Iliad* is

probably a fifth- or fourth-century interpolation. [179] Thus, in the post Greco-Persian wars,

language became a crucial boundary marker that the Greeks constructed in order to separate

themselves from the others (i.e., βάρβαροι). One of the factors that contributes to this

ethnolinguistic construction of identity is their geographical location, which somehow makes

them different from the Chinese or Hebrews.[180] Hall suggests that "no other ancient people

---

[176] *Iliad*.2.865. "Νάστης αὖ Καρῶν ἡγήσατο βαρβαροφώνων" (Natstes led the Carians who are *barbarophōnōn*).

[177] Deborah Gera explains: "Even if Homer uses the term *allothroos*, speaker of a different language, in neutral fashion, with no intention of erecting either a cultural or conceptual barrier between such people and Greek speakers, the two epithets *barbarophonos* and *agriphonos* seem less innocuous. These words may point to an attitude found in later Greek writings, according to which the non-Greek languages spoken by foreigners are thought to characterize their (inferior) culture." See Deborah Gera, *Ancient Greek Ideas on Speech, Language and Civilization* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 9.

[178] Simon Hornblower, *The Greek World, 479-323 BC*, Classical Civilizations (London; New York: Methuen, 1983), 11.

[179] See Edith Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy* (Oxford England; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 9.

[180] Hall writes: "The priority of the linguistic criterion in the Greek's self-determination of their ethnicity is not surprising when one considers their geographical dispersal over numerous coasts and countless islands, and the enormous variety in way of life, political allegiance, cult, and tradition amongst the different communities, whether Ionian, Dorian, or Aeolian. Had the Greek-speakers walled themselves into cities on a mainland, like ancient Chinese, many of whose words for 'barbarian' were connected with lifestyle and habitat ('nomads,' 'shepherds,' 'jungle people'), the original criterion of Hellenic ethnicity might *not* have been their language. It has been suggested that the closest parallel in the ancient world to the Greeks' self-image was that of the Hebrews; both travelled widely and settled everywhere, but their language was in both cases remarkably resilient and inextricably bound up with their sense of 'peopleness.' But religion was central to the difference felt by the Hebrews between

---

privileged language to such an extent in defining its ethnicity" as the Greeks. Her entire project

is centered around the idea that the "others" are described with all kinds of representations in

"the rhetorical topos" of the tragedies. Far from being neutral, those representations are

thoroughly political. They are constructed not only as a way to describe the others, but also as a

strategy of "self-definition"[181] by portraying the barbarians "as the opposite of the ideal

Greek."[182]

Theoretically, the construction of the barbarian other can be explained through the

definition of race/ethnicity provided by Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown. They highlight the

constructed dialectical dimension between the Self and the Other, by which they attempt to find a

better solution to two contrasting stances on the issue of race and ethnicity, namely, conceptual

inflation[183] and deflation.[184] In order to avoid both extremes, they propose a consistent pattern

behind every instance of racism. Racism takes place in a context of dialectical relationship

---

themselves and Gentiles, as it was to the Hindus' distinction between themselves and the non-Hindus, *mlechhas*; Greek polytheism, on the other hand, was remarkably flexible and able to assimilate foreign gods and cults." Hall, 5.

[181] Hall, 2–3.

[182] Hall, 2.

[183] Conceptual inflation is when the category of racism is applied and conceptualized too widely, so much so that the concept of racism becomes meaningless. Miles and Brown show two examples of conceptual inflation. The first example is the so-called "new racism," which is basically a response to the large influx of immigrants coming to Britain from many different parts of the world in the 1970s. Scholars, such as Martin Barker, began to theorize this new form of racism in terms of inferiority and superiority. This idea of racism was then expanded by Marxists thinkers, especially those who are affiliated with the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS). The problem with CCCS, for Miles and Brown, is that their focus of attention is too much on ideology. If racism and ideology are seen as identical, then conceptual inflation results, in which there is nothing we can say about racism that is different from any other ideology. There should be clear criteria through which we can say that something is racism or not, and conceptual inflation does not provide it. It is the lack of conceptual criteria that creates the problem of inflation. See Robert Miles and Malcolm Brown, *Racism*, 2nd ed., Key Ideas (London: Routledge, 2003), 61ff.

[184] White racism in the US is the best example of this conceptual deflation. When racism is reduced to just a "white" phenomenon, so that only white people are capable of racism, then it becomes a deflated concept. Miles-Brown reject this deflated understanding of racism for three reasons. First, it is based primarily on "racial essentialism." All white people are categorized in a single box of racism. They are not capable of speaking about racism simply because they are ontologically racists. For Miles and Brown, "it is evidently a mistake because there is a long tradition of 'white' people being involved in anti-racist activities of many kinds." It is problematic because it will lead to a conclusion that all the things that white people do are racist. And lastly, it will limit the scope of analysis to only an American version of racism. See Miles and Brown, 74ff.

between Self and Other. This analytical framework means that when a group defines the Other through giving signification to the Other, it inevitably reflects its own identity. It is a dialectical movement that goes in both directions.

Thus, instead of speaking about race or ethnicity as objective and essentialist facts, Miles and Brown prefer to talk about them as processes—ethnicization and racialization. Ethnicization, on the one hand, is defined as "a dialectical process by which meaning is attributed to socio-cultural signifiers of human beings, as a result of which individuals may be assigned to a general category of persons which reproduces itself biologically, culturally and economically."[185] On the other hand, they define racialization as "a dialectical process by which meaning is attributed to particular biological features of human beings, as a result of which individuals may be assigned to a general category of persons that reproduces itself biologically."[186] These two concepts are similar in their emphasis on a dialectical process of Self and Other. However, the difference is also quite obvious: ethnicization is related mainly to the attributed socio-cultural signifiers, whereas racialization has more to do with attributed biological or phenotypical features.

Denise Buell notes that in any historical analysis, race, ethnicity, and religion are "all modern categories."[187] The task of a critical historian, therefore, is not to remove these modern analytical categories altogether, but to define them knowing that "we can place modern categories into conversation with ancient ones without effacing their differences, even while we must also acknowledge that we can only understand those differences through the lens of our

---

[185] Miles and Brown, 99.

[186] Miles and Brown, 102.

[187] Denise Kimber Buell, *Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 14.

present."[188] While language can be categorized as a socio-cultural marker, language is also a

bodily performance.[189] It is, thus, implicated in both racialization and ethinicization. In this

sense, the boundary between racialized and ethnicized identity is not as solid as it may seem.[190]

Moreover, Buell's proposal of "racial reasoning" provides a helpful way to navigate this

rigid distinction between race and ethnicity. For Buell, the border marker, e.g., skin color, that

separates the others from the self is often perceived as a fixed boundary. However, in reality such

apparently rigid borders are far more fluid and movable than one assumes. In other words, both

fixity and fluidity are at play in every racial-ethnic construction of identity.[191] Following Buell, I

will also use the terms race and ethnicity in an interchangeable way here.[192] I do so not just

because they are imprecise, as Buell has argued, but in the ethno-linguistic context in which

language becomes the marker of difference in the dialectical relationship of self and others the

concepts of race and ethnicity are almost inseparable.[193]

---

[188] Buell, 14. Buell's proposal of "ethnic reasoning" which is an attempt to navigate an inherent tension between fixity and fluidity is helpful to me in understanding the locus of language in the context of racial-ethnic identity construction.

[189] See Butler, *Excitable Speech.*

[190] Benjamin Bailey's research among the second-generation Dominican Republic immigrants in Providence, RI provides an interesting case of how language plays a significant role in breaking the rigid distinction between race and ethnicity. In this research, Bailey demonstrates that "the ethnolinguistic terms in which the Dominican second generation think themselves – 'Dominican,' 'Spanish,' or 'Hispanic' – are frequently at odds with the phenotype-based racial terms in which they are seen by others in the US, namely as Black." Through language, Bailey argues further, Dominican Americans resist "American racialization practices" that exclusively operates within the Black/White binary. See Benjamin Bailey, "Language and Negotiation of Ethnic/Racial Identity among Dominican Americans," *Language in Society* 29, no. 4 (2000): 556. A more extensive version of this research was published in 2002. See Benjamin H. Bailey, *Language, Race, and Negotiation of Identity: A Study of Dominican Americans*, New Americans (New York: Lfb Scholarly Pub Llc, 2002).

[191] The notion of fluidity is somehow parallel to Cavan W. Concannon's proposal of the Pauline malleable body. See Cavan W. Concannon, *"When You Were Gentiles": Specters of Ethnicity in Roman Corinth and Paul's Corinthian Correspondence*, Synkrisis: Comparative Approaches to Early Christianity in Greco-Roman Culture (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), chap. 1.

[192] See also Eric D. Barreto, "Reexamining Ethnicity: Latina/Os, Race, and the Bible," in *Latino/a Biblical Hermeneutics: Problematics, Objectives, Strategies*, ed. Francisco Lozada and Fernando F. Segovia (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015), 73–93.

[193] This definition is close to the working definition proposed by Joshua Fishman in his influential work on language and ethnicity. Although Fishman points out that he doesn't want to worry too much about definition, he

Barbarians are the Greeks' others. In the *Histories,* Herodotus describes how the Athenians originated from the Pelasgians. The Pelasgians, Herodotus explains, "spoke a language which was not Greek" (βάρβαρον γλῶσσαν)[194] and the Attic people had to change their language in order to become part of the Hellenes. Herodotus further explains that the people of Creston and Placia have their own common language (ὁμόγλωσσοι), which they bring with them wherever they go. Now, concerning the Greeks (τὸ δὲ Ἑλληνικὸν), Herodotus explains: "It seems clear to me, [they have] always had the same language (γλώσσῃ) since [their] beginning." Again, we see that language is a crucial defining marker of being "τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν." The word διαχρᾶται (or διαχράομαι) is a compound verb made up of the preposition δια and the verb χράομαι that denotes the idea that the Greek language [i.e., the same language] thoroughly binds and elides their differences. Thus, when recounting the story of the Athenians' response to Alexander concerning whether they should make a peace pact with the Persian king, Xerxes, Herodotus describes Greekness (τὸ Ἑλληνικόν) as having a common ancestor, shared language (ὁμόγλωσσον), common temples for gods and sacrifices, and the same way of life.[195]

One the one hand, the rhetoric of Greekness as a unified entity is surely an ideological, and thus political, move. Hyun Jin Kim in his comparative study of the ethnic constructions between the ancient Chinese and Greeks puts it this way: "The call for Hellenic unity and

---

explains that his work is framed in the following definition: "Ethnicity is a self-and-other aggregative definitional dimension of culture. It is a dimension that deals with 'us' vs. 'them' and with 'them' vs. 'them.' It is not necessarily a conscious, highlighted or salient dimension of daily life . . . but it is close to consciousness and contrastive experiences easily call into consciousness." See Joshua A. Fishman, *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective*, Multilingual Matters 45 (Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 1989), 5. Within the framework of ethnic analysis, Fishman's project penetrates a wide range of areas in sociolinguistic research such as language and nationalism, language maintenance, language shift, language minority in education, and the relationship between bingualism and diglossia. Cf. Joshua A. Fishman, "Language, Ethnicity and Racism," in *The Rise and Fall of the Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on Language and Ethnicity*, ed. Joshua A. Fishman et al., Contributions to the Sociology of Language ; 37 (Berlin ; New York: Mouton, 1985), 3–13.

[194] Herodotus, *Histories,* 1.57.1

[195] Herodotus, *Histories*, 8.144.2.

rhetoric of freedom of the Greeks were indeed the political tools employed by every successful

Greek power for the expressed aim of gaining hegemony over other city-states. The Greeks

could in reality utilize their ethnic identity in a flexible manner."[196] On the other hand, in Plato's

Statesman, we know that this perceived separation between the Greeks and the Barbarians is

widely accepted among the Greeks in a quite essentialist way. In his conversation with the

Younger Socrates (Νεώτερος Σωκράτης) on the issue of the social division in the context of

defining the idea of royalty or kingship, the Stranger (Ξένος) says: "they [the Greeks] separate

the Hellenic race from all the rest as one, and to all the other races, which are countless in

number and have no relation in blood or language to one another, they give the single name

"barbarian"; then, because of this single name, they think it is a single species."[197]

We know from Plutarch that the way Alexander unified the Hellenistic Empire was by

making sure that Greek language was used and taught throughout it.[198] As a consequence, Greek

became the primary language of the Mediterranean world. After the death of Alexander, "Greek

became… the language used in the various kingdoms resulting from the division in the

empire."[199] The Greeks were proud of and identified themselves with the Greek. Even until the

Roman period, the importance of the Greek language was still recognized.[200] To echo Edward

---

[196] Hyunjin Kim, *Ethnicity and Foreigners in Ancient Greece and China* (London: Bristol Classical Press, 2009), 8. Cf. Edith Hall, "When Is a Myth Not a Myth? Bernal's 'Ancient Model,'" in *Greeks and Barbarians*, ed. Thomas Harrison, Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World (Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2002), 144–47.?

[197] Plato, Statesman, 262d.

[198] See Plutarch, *Alexander*, 47.6

[199] Bruno Rochette, "Greek and Latin Bilingualism," in *A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language*, ed. Egbert J. Bakker (West Sussex, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 282.

[200] Cicero acknowledges, "For if anyone thinks that there is a smaller gain of glory derived from Greek verses than from Latin ones, he is greatly mistaken, because Greek poetry is read among all nations, Latin is confined to its own natural limits, which are narrow enough" (Cicero, *For Archias,* 23).

Anson's phrase, "a Greek knew a Greek when he heard one."[201] This language is what made them different from the others, the barbarians.

This said, although Arnaldo Momigliano argues that Ancient ethnic identity did not have an important space for language because comparative philology had not been invented and that therefore ethnicity was mainly marked by a common ancestor or institution, Benjamin Isaac asserts that one must not deny the importance of language in Herodotus.[202] If Herodotus is convinced that language is a crucial marker of the identity of Greekness, then within the context of the speech in *Histories* book 8, Herodotus "found it obvious that Athenians would have started speaking Greek when they joined the Hellenic community, or, rather, they could not have joined if they had not spoken Greek, for there are no Hellenes who do not speak Greek. The Hellenes had a common language but no common ancestors or institutions."[203] Therefore, Isaac states further that "Generally speaking, language is one of the essential components of social identity."[204] In a similar vein, when arguing that when Herodotus speaks about language he refers mainly to mutual comprehension among the Greeks instead of a linguistic structural unity, Anson also points out: "in antiquity Greek primarily defined their ethnicity by the Greek language."[205] Wilfried Nippel, discussing the way the Greeks differentiate themselves from non-Greeks, in his essay "*The Construction of the 'Other*,'" also argues: "Language remained the best criterion of differentiation[. O]riginally, the concept of the Barbarian referred to those who did

---

[201] Anson, "Greek Ethnicity and the Greek Language," 5.

[202] Arnaldo Momigliano, *Alien Wisdom* (1975), 69 quoted in Benjamin H. Isaac, *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 112.

[203] Isaac, 112.

[204] Isaac, 112.

[205] Anson, "Greek Ethnicity and the Greek Language," 5.

not speak Greek...."[206] Language is thus one of the most important markers of Greek's ethnic

identity, and a βάρβαρος is Greek's imaginative and discursive term for "others" who do not

share their language.[207]

---

[206] Wilfried Nippel, "The Construction of the 'Other,'" in *Greeks and Barbarians*, ed. Thomas Harrison, trans. Antonia Nevill, Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World (New York: Routledge, 2001), 281.

[207] In spite of the general consensus among Classicists about the interconnectedness between language and ethnicity, Jonathan Hall offers a serious objection. His argument is based on the numerous diversity of Greek dialects. "The language that we term Ancient Greek was in reality a collective of regionally specific (or epiphoric) dialects which can be traced by identifying isoglosses." Thus, the simple traditional division of Aeolic, Doric, and Ionic, and Attic cannot account to the richness of Greek's linguistic situation. The Greeks, Hall argues, were fully aware of this diversity. Because the lack of "standardized national Greek language before the fourth century,"[207] a point in history "when the Attic dialect was taken as the model for the *koine*," Hall questions the possibility of complete mutual intelligibility among Greek dialects. For example, he quotes Plato that describes Socrates asking for an excuse for "his unfamiliarity with legal language" saying "just as I were a *xenos* (i.e., a non-Athenian Greek), you would certainly forgive me if I spoke in the speech and manner in which I had been brought up." (Plato, *Apology,* 17d) This particular passage points to the reality that "dialects were not quite as linguistically similar at the level of comprehension as has sometimes been assumed." (Jonathan M. Hall, "The Role of Language in Greek Ethnicities," *The Cambridge Classical Journal* 41 (January 1996): 93–94.) In other words, even though there are some level of similarity, the differences between dialects also pose a serious challenge to mutual comprehension. Hence, Hall maintains:

> Rather than arguing either for or against mutual intelligibility, it is surely more reasonable to suppose that there were varying degrees of intelligibility between any one pair of dialects throughout Greece. The degree of intelligibility need not, however, be directly proportional to the *structural* similarity between two dialects – it may, instead, be a function of contact. That is to say, one is more likely to understand dialects with which one comes into contact more regularly, especially in cases where speakers of two dialects are strongly motivated to comprehend one another, perhaps for the purposes of economic exchange. Thus, neighboring speech communities are more likely to understand one another than geographically distant ones.

Because of this diversity, Hall argues, "language and dialect… cannot be regarded as criteria of ethnicity."[207] The idea is if there is no such thing as a unified language in the Ancient Greek society, how can it be the criterion for ethnicity? Therefore, Hall argues that instead of speaking of language as "ethnic criterion," it would be better to refer it as "ethnic indicium" because "Greeks themselves were incapable of identifying ethnic groups through linguistic cues alone." See Jonathan M. Hall, *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 174–77.

However, I find Hall's thesis both irrelevant to the present study and unconvincing for several reasons. First, Hall speaks mainly about the construction of Greek's ethnicity prior to the fourth century, before the invention of the standardized language. Hall does not clarify whether his thesis still stands for the post-fourth century BCE Hellenistic society. If his argument is limited only to the pre-fourth century BCE social location, then it is not relevant for the first century AD Pauline social context. Second, although βάρβαρος may not have had a linguistic origin, it does not mean that it can be loaded in the later period of time with the ethno-linguistic signification. As Saussure has pointed out, the diachronic dimension of language would bring about change to both the shape and meaning of the signifier, although it is not necessarily a structural change. The term itself underwent a serious diachronic development in which its function as the marker of the other became stronger through time. Third, the diversity of dialects or speech communities should not be the only analytical category in understanding the role of language in a society. As Mikhail Bakhtin has pointed out, there are always "two poles in the life of language." First are the forces to unify language into a central system. They are the "centripetal forces of language." This, Bakhtin argues, is not the natural condition of language. Language in its actuality is never unitary. Thus, a monologic system of language is an abstraction. The centripetal forces of language would flatten languages into a single system. Second are the forces to decentralize language or break language apart. Bakhtin calls them "centrifugal forces of language." Both forces work simultaneously in every enunciation of a speech. (See M. M.

I would argue that the term βάρβαρος–like other racialized terms (the N-word, anchor babies, etc.)–is political because consciously or unconsciously it produces subjected beings. Language not only facilitates a certain mode of power relation but also perpetuates such relation. I make this argument by pointing to the political discourse from the two sides of the relation—the Greek and the barbarian sides.

Aristotle in his *Politics* helps us see how the construction of βάρβαρος is directly related to power relations between the Greeks and the Barbarians. Aristotle argues that politics is based on "partnership" or "fellowship" (κοινωνία) and that such fellowship exists not just at the higher level of *polis* but goes all the way down to the most basic level of human relationship—that is, "the union of female and male" procreation (γενέσεως). This male-female union is "the union of the natural ruler and natural subject for the sake of security."[208] Just like the relation between mind and body, Aristotle argues, in which "mind is naturally ruler and naturally master" and body is "subject and naturally a slave," so is the relation between male and female. The mind gives all the commands, and the body follows. In other words, male is naturally master, and female is naturally subject. Although the master-slave relation and male-female relation function in the same way, Aristotle maintains that they belong to a different order of relations because they serve different purposes.

On the basis of this simple logic, Aristotle then insists that among the barbarians (ἐν δὲ τοῖς βαρβάροις) the female and the slave belong to the same order (τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ δοῦλον τὴν

Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004), 269–72.) These two forces have to be taken into consideration. One the one hand, it is true that scholars who argue that language is the primary marker of ethnicity have probably overlooked the great diversity of linguistic phenomena in ancient Greek society. However, on the other hand, Hall has also overlooked the strength of the centripetal forces of language. This tension between centrifugal and centripetal forces of language, I would argue, is apparent in the case of the Corinthian church.

[208] Aristotle, *Politics*, I.1252a

αὐτὴν ἔχει τάξιν) because they don't have a "class of natural rulers." Thus, he insists that the barbarians are slaves by nature, or born slaves. The same case is laid out in Book III in which he explains many different kinds of royal governments. One of them is kingship through "lifelong generalship" (στρατηγία διὰ βίου) that tends to be hereditary in nature, [209] although some kingship occurs through election. Aristotle argues that this kind of military rule tends to be tyrannical and can be found among the barbarians. Why do the barbarians have a tendency to be ruled by a tyrant? He explains: "because the barbarians are more servile (τὸ δουλικώτεροι) in their nature than the Greeks... they endure despotic rule without resentment."[210]

It is not a surprise that, in agreement with Euripides, Aristotle maintains: "It is reasonable/proper for the Greeks to rule over the barbarians" (βαρβάρων δ᾽ Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός),[211] which means that a barbarian and a slave are the same (ὡς ταὐτὸ φύσει βάρβαρον καὶ δοῦλον ὄν). Otfried Höffe comments: "In this passage he [Aristotle] derives political privileges from cultural superiority, and he also reinforces the meaning of the poet's words by placing the barbarians at the level of born slaves."[212] Since language interpellates subjects, as Butler has pointed out, it is clear that Aristotle's discourse on βάρβαρος not only promotes an ideology of

---

[209] Aristotle, *Politics*, III.1285a

[210] Aristotle, *Politics*, III.1285a

[211] Aristotle, *Politics*, I.1252a. Isocrates similarly argues that the barbarians must be ruled by the Greeks. He writes: "Far more has been passed over than has been said. Apart from the arts and philosophic studies and all the other benefits which one might attribute to her and to the Trojan War, we should be justified in considering that it is owing to Helen that we are not the slaves of the barbarians. For we shall find that it was because of her that the Greeks became united in harmonious accord and organized a common expedition against the barbarians, and that it was then for the first time that Europe set up a trophy of victory over Asia; and in consequence, we experienced a change so great that, although in former times any barbarians who were in misfortune presumed to be rulers over the Greek cities (for example, Danaus, an exile from Egypt, occupied Argos, Cadmus of Sidon became king of Thebes, the Carians colonized the islands,ᵃ and Pelops, son of Tantalus, became master of all the Peloponnese), yet after that war our race expanded so greatly that it took from the barbarians great cities and much territory. If, therefore, any orators wish to dilate upon these matters and dwell upon them, they will not be at a loss for material apart from what I have said, wherewith to praise Helen; on the contrary, they will discover many new arguments that relate to her" (Isocrates, *Hellen*, 67–69).

[212] Otfried Höffe, *Aristotle: The Rise of For-Profit Universities*, trans. Christine Salazar (New York: SUNY Press, 2003), 177.

Greek supremacy but also constitutes the others as subjected beings. One can see that a certain relation of power is both promoted and perpetuated through the discourse and knowledge production about the others.

On the other hand, there is a little hint available to us about the experience of othering from a barbarian perspective in the so-called "Zenon Archive," the collection of papyri mainly from the Ptolemaic period Egypt in the third century BCE. In that collection, there is a letter from a non-Greek-speaking camel driver complaining to Zenon, the administrator of the property belonging to Ptolemy II Philadelphus's finance minister, Apollonios, in Fayum, Middle Egypt, about his experience of discrimination.[213] Graham Shipley suspects that the camel driver probably hired a scribe or interpreter to write this letter.[214]

In the letter, he reports to Zenon of his work conditions in Syria with Krotos that he has worked hard and "blamelessly," but that Krotos doesn't pay him at all. Not only does this happen in Syria, the camel driver also reports about similar experiences in Philadelphia, saying:

> When you sent me again to Philadelphia to Jason, though I do everything that is ordered, for nine months, now he gives nothing of what you ordered me to have, neither oil nor grain, except two month periods when he also pays the clothing. And I am in difficulty both summer and winter.[215]

To make sense of this experience, the camel driver explains "They have treated me with scorn because I am a 'barbarian'" (ἀλλὰ κατεγνώκασίμ μου ὅτι εἰμὶ βάρβαρος). This sentence can also be translated this way: **"they have formed unfavorable/prejudiced perception/knowledge of me because I am a 'barbarian,'"** showing that he is tremendously concerned about his experience

---

[213] For further discussion on Zenon Archive, see Trevor Evans, "Complaints of the Natives in a Greek Dress: The Zenon Archive and the Problem of Egyptian Interference," in *Multilingualism in the Graeco-Roman Worlds*, ed. Alex Mullen and Patrick James (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 106–23.

[214] Graham Shipley, *The Greek World after Alexander, 323-30 BC*, Routledge History of the Ancient World (London: Routledge, 2000), 220.

[215] The translation is provided by the Advanced Papyrological Information System (APIS). The image of the papyrus is available online here: http://www.papyri.info/hgv/1781#to-app-choice06

of discrimination. He then continues, "I beg you, therefore, . . . to give them order that I may not perish of hunger because I do not know how to act the Hellene." Again, the statement "ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίσταμαι ἑλληνίζειν" can also be rendered as "I do not know [how to speak] Greek," indicating his inability to use the Greek language properly.

There are three things to note about this letter of complaint. First, this is certainly an anecdotal example. However, it is important to recall that almost all evidence we have now comes from Greek writers, so this side of the story can be a significant window for us to look into the socio-economic conditions of people who did not speak the dominant language. Second, the question of whether this is an actual or historical event or not is an important one but also somewhat irrelevant. The historicity of this incident is almost impossible to prove, but the fact that this discourse exists at all is helpful to us modern readers for understanding the barbarians' point of view. Third, the discourse on the others, as we have seen in Aristotle, is not mere philosophical discussion but has a real impact in people's lives. In other words, language has a material quality, as Valentin Vološinov has pointed out.[216] The materiality of language pertains to its use and function both in economic and social relations. Linguistic competence impacts one's material condition. This camel driver definitely knows this powerful force of the dominant language. Being unable to speak the dominant language means he is the other (βάρβαρος), and therefore he was treated in a discriminatory way.[217] With this in mind, I will now discuss Paul's employment of this term in 1 Cor 14.

---

[216] See V. N. Vološinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, Studies in Language (New York, Seminar Press, 1973).

[217] For a more detailed discussion on wages in the Ptolemaic period, see Sitta von Reden, *Money in Ptolemaic Egypt: From the Macedonian Conquest to the End of the Third Century BC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), chap. 6.

Concerning Paul's dealings with people who speak different languages in the church of Corinth, I would first register my disagreement with Fitzmyer's take on this passage. He seems to be aware of the negative connotation of the term βάρβαρος as he states that this word "often connoted people less cultured, among whom were included the noted enemies, Persians and Egyptians; and in the Roman period, the Gauls, Germans, and Spaniards."[218] However, instead of pursuing this line of logic as we might have expected, Fitzmyer immediately denies its importance. He continues,

> …but that is not the sense in which Paul is using the word. For him it means that he would be a speaker of a foreign language that would not be understood; but it also implies that he would be like an outsider to the community, in which he should be recognized as *adelphos*, and that is why speaking in tongues is detrimental to the unity of the community. Just as differences of language make people into foreigners, so unintelligible utterances create barriers to comprehension and foment disunity.[219]

Fitzmyer's interpretative move, for one thing, is unfortunate because he seems to overlook the basic fact that language is thoroughly embedded in social relations. Dismissing the negative connotation would blind him from seeing the struggle in this text.[220]

According to the Butlerian theory of the performative function of language that I have discussed above, the efficacy of a word employed in a speech does not necessarily depend on the intention of the speaker, but on the context, history, and power networks from which that word is taken. Speech in essence is citation because a speaker cites the word of the others that has been used, circulated, and filled with all kinds of significations. A speaker, in this sense, is not a producer of language, but a citator. Hate speech, therefore, is effective not because the speaker intends it to be hateful, but because it participates in the hateful power network within which that

---

[218] Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 514.
[219] Fitzmyer, 514–15.
[220] Fitzmyer is not the only scholar who dismisses the negative connotation of this word.

speech is located. As I have pointed out above, the constitutive force of speech in producing

subjects does not depend on whether both the addresser or the addressee is aware or not. This is

true also with the employment of the term βάρβαρος in 1 Corinthians. Whether Paul intends it to

be hateful or not, it clearly leads to the production of "subjects" in an Althusserian interpellative

sense—that is, subjected beings.[221]

It is important to analyze closely how the sentence is constructed in Greek: "ἔσομαι τῷ

λαλοῦντι βάρβαρος καὶ ὁ λαλῶν ἐν ἐμοὶ βάρβαρος." If we are consistent with the prepositional

phrase ἐν in the second clause, then the dative in the first clause could be read as a dative of

sphere or location.[222] So the translation would be, "I will be βάρβαρος in the one who speaks,

and the one who speaks will be βάρβαρος in me." However, because τῷ λαλοῦντι is a bare

dative, it is open to many possible interpretations, and I would propose one of them now. If we

treat this dative as a "dative of cause" then it can be translated as follows: "I will be a barbarian

because of the one who speaks, and the one who speaks [will be] a barbarian in me." What we

can see in this statement is a flat rejection of βάρβαρος. Paul apparently does not want to be a

barbarian and he does not want to have any barbarian in him. The presence of the "other" in the

self is seen as a threat, and thus is perceived by Paul as not being beneficial for the church.

This reading is consistent with the next statement that Paul makes. In v. 12, Paul

immediately encourages them once more to do things for the building of the assembly (πρὸς τὴν

οἰκοδομὴν τῆς ἐκκλησίας). The erasure of difference at the expense of the others is the Pauline

strategy to manage the dynamic of multilingualism in this community. By employing an

ethnicized rhetoric, Paul's discourse is very consistent with the larger Hellenistic attitude and

---

[221] Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, 172ff.

[222] See Daniel B. Wallace, *Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996), 167–68.

discrimination against the others (i.e., the barbarians) that we have discussed in the previous part of this article. Paul is adopting their ethnic hostility discourse against the others. After being othered, the next step is easily predicted. Paul's demands for translation (14:13, 27) can be understood as an act of silencing or disavowal of linguistic difference. Forbes is correct that 1 Cor. 14:5b and 13 indicate "strongly that the speaker himself ought to interpret,"[223] which means that Paul assumes that these people are able to speak both their native language and the language of the dominant group. If there is no translation, they should remain totally silent, he insists (14:28).

4.4.2. Politics of Gender

The topic of silencing women in 1 Cor 14:32–36 has triggered countless scholarly efforts to explain not only its connection with the previous discussion on tongue(s), but also with the position of women in the early church.[224] Some scholars see no connection whatsoever between tongue(s) and the silencing of women. Hays, for example, says that the discussion on the silencing of women appears to be "an abrupt interjection."[225] Fitzmyer similarly states that "per se it has nothing to do with *glōssais lalien*, because now *lalein* alone is the issue."[226] Wire argues that, after discussing people who speak in tongue(s) and people who prophesy, Paul here

---

[223] Forbes, *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*, 1995, 101. Forbes also points out that 1 Cor. 14:27 is an indication that there should be another translator in the church.

[224] Concerning the difficulty of this passage, D.A. Carson unsurprisingly writes: "The interpretation of 1 Corinthians 14:33b–36 is by no means easy." D. A. Carson, "'Silent in the Churches': On the Role of Women in 1 Corinthians 14:33b-36," in *Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood Publisher: Crossway Books*, ed. John Piper and Wayne A. Grudem (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1991), 133.

[225] Hays, *First Corinthians*, 245. Hays himself argues that this "passage is a gloss, inserted in the text at this point because of the catchword connection to Paul's instruction to prophets to "be silent" under certain circumstances (v. 30) and because of Paul's appeal to the general practice of "all the churches of the saints" in verse 32. The whole passage is much more coherent without these extraneous verses. Paul never told women to be silent in churches: this order is the work of a subsequent Christian generation." In other words, he believes that this is a later interpolation (Hays, 248.)

[226] Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 528.

is introducing "people not apparently under discussion and [yet he] immediately requires

silence."[227] In other words, 1 Cor 14 deals with three different groups of people, and thus "three

regulations."[228] Kenneth Archer similarly contends that, in light of other instances of how Paul

uses the phrase "in all churches" in 1 Corinthians (i.e., 4:17–18; 7:17–18; 11:16–17), the

discussion on women in 14:34–36 is basically "a new topic or fact of his argument."[229]

    This insistence on the disconnectedness between tongue(s) or prophecy and women has

resulted in three different positions. The first position is that this passage is a post-Pauline

---

[227] Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets*, 153.

[228] Wire, 153.

[229] Kenneth J. Archer, "Women in Ministry: A Pentecostal Reading of New Testament Texts," in *Women in Pentecostal and Charismatic Ministry: Informing a Dialogue on Gender, Church, and Ministry*, ed. Lois Olena and Margaret English de Alminana, Global Pentecostal and Charismatic Studies (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 47.

interpolation;[230] the second, that it is just a Corinthian slogan.[231] These two positions are

apparently an attempt to save Paul from being a misogynist. The third position is that this

---

[230] This proposal basically questions the authenticity of the text. The proponents of this view build the case for this position mainly on the basis of internal (esp. the vocabularies) and external evidence (esp. textual variants). See Hiu, *Regulations Concerning Tongues and Prophecy in 1 Corinthians 14.26-40*, 139–42. The locations of vv. 34–35 (αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις σιγάτωσαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτρέπεται αὐταῖς λαλεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑποτασσέσθωσαν, καθὼς καὶ ὁ νόμος λέγει. εἰ δέ τι μαθεῖν θέλουσιν, ἐν οἴκῳ τοὺς ἰδίους ἄνδρας ἐπερωτάτωσαν· αἰσχρὸν γάρ ἐστιν γυναικὶ λαλεῖν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ) in two different places: a) in this location between v. 33 and v. 35; and b) after v. 40. The position after verse 40 comes mainly from the Western textual tradition (D, F, G, Ψ*, 1241, ar, b, vg^ms, Abrosius) Fee, for example, insists that since the case of disposition is quite rare in the New Testament (the other one is in Matthew 5:4-5), "this reality in itself should cause any NT scholar to have serious doubts as to its authenticity, even more so when one adds to this the considerably non-Pauline way of saying things that occurs in this passage." See Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 780. Other scholars who argue for later interpolation are Barrett, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1968, 330–33; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 246; Philip B. Payne, *Man and Woman, One in Christ: An Exegetical and Theological Study of Paul's Letters* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009), chap. 14; Eldon Jay Epp, *Junia: The First Woman Apostle* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005), 15–20; Hays, *First Corinthians*, 245–48; Peter F. Lockwood, "Does 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 Exclude Women from the Pastoral Office?," *Lutheran Theological Journal* 30, no. 1 (1996): 30–38; Richard A. Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, Abingdon New Testament Commentaries (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2011), 188–89.
　　For further discussion on the textual critical debates on this text, particularly concerning the appearance of the umlaut in Codex Sinaiticus and double slash above the last letter of 14:33 in miniscule 88, see Philip B. Payne, "Fuldensis, Sigla for Variants in Vaticanus, and 1 Cor 14.34–5," *New Testament Studies* 41, no. 2 (April 1995): 240–62; Philip B. Payne, "MS. 88 as Evidence for a Text without 1 Cor 14.34–5," *New Testament Studies* 44, no. 01 (January 1998): 152–158; Philip B. Payne, "Vaticanus Distigme-Obelos Symbols Marking Added Text, Including 1 Corinthians 14.34–5," *New Testament Studies* 63, no. 4 (October 2017): 604–25. Scholars who have written their responses to Payne's proposal include J. Edward Miller, "Some Observations on the Text-Critical Function of the Umlauts in Vaticanus, with Special Attention to 1 Corinthians 14.34-35," *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 26, no. 2 (December 1, 2003): 217–36; Curt Niccum, "The Voice of the Manuscripts on the Silence of Women: The External Evidence for 1 Cor 14.34–5," *New Testament Studies* 43, no. 2 (April 1997): 242–255; Jennifer Shack, "A Text without 1 Corinthians 14:34-35? Not According to the Manuscript Evidence," *Journal of Greco-Roman Christianity and Judaism* 10 (2014): 90–112. See also Payne's rebuttal to Miller in Philip B. Payne, "The Text-Critical Function of the Umlauts in Vaticanus, with Special Attention to 1 Corinthians 14.34-35: A Response to J. Edward Miller," *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 27, no. 1 (September 1, 2004): 105–12.
　　[231] The key to this position is the connection between the particle ἤ (or) with both vv. 34–35 and 36. D.W. Odell-Scott argues that vv. 34–35 are just quoting the Corinthian slogan and v. 36 is his rebuttal against such view. The question in v. 36 is a rhetorical question that challenges their opinion. The translation of v. 36 that he offers is as follows: "What! Did the word of God originate with you, or you the only ones it has reached?" Odell-Scott explains further: "The particle *e* (translated "What!" above) which introduces the interrogative sentence of 14:36 indicates that the negative rhetorical questions to follow will serve to refute the sentences which preceded. Thus it is my conclusion that given the *e* which introduces v 36, vv 33b–35 are to be emphatically refuted by the two-fold negative rhetorical query which follows the particle. The complete passage (vv 33b–36) is not an internal unified, straightforward argument against or condemnation of women who participate in the worship of the church. The silencing of women in the name of conformity to tradition and law is neither the last word nor the purpose of the text. The silencing of women in church is questioned, refuted and overcome by Paul's two-fold negative rhetorical query of v 36." David W. Odell-Scott, "In Defense of an Egalitarian Interpretation of 1 Cor 14:34-36: A Reply to Murphy-O'Connor's Critique," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 17, no. 3 (August 1, 1987): 100.
　　For further discussion, see David W. Odell-Scott, "Let The Women Speak in Church: An Egalitarian Interpretation of 1 Cor 14:33b-36," *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 13, no. 3 (August 1, 1983): 90–93; Odell-Scott, "In Defense of an Egalitarian Interpretation of 1 Cor 14"; Marshall Janzen, "Orderly Participation or Silenced Women?: Clashing Views on Decent Worship in 1 Corinthians 14," *Direction* 42, no. 1 (2013): 55–70; Collins, *First Corinthians*, 516–17; Michel Gourgues, "Who Is Misogynist: Paul or Certain Corinthians? Note on 1 Corinthians

passage is a Pauline regulation of women's behaviors in the Corinthian church, just as he

regulates the use of tongue(s) and prophecy in the church. In this sense, there are three different

regulations—concerning tongue(s), prophecy, and women.[232] Some feminist critical scholars

also argue for the third position, while insisting that the structure of patriarchy is embedded in

and behind the text itself. Besides Wire, the most prominent of these is Elisabeth Schüssler

Fiorenza, who argues that this conjunction "applies only to wives."[233] She writes further: "The

community rule of 1 Cor 14:34–36 presupposes that, within the Christian worship assembly,

wives had dared to question other women's husbands or point out some mistakes of their own

during the congregational interpreting of the Scriptures and of prophecy."[234] For her, what Paul

is trying to do here is merely maintain the order and peace of the church. Insisting that we do not

know how wives in the Corinthian church would respond to such regulation imposed on them,

Schüssler Fiorenza suggests that "the love of patriachalism of the deutero-Pauline household

codes and the injunctions of the Pastorals are further developments of Paul's arguments,

developments that will lead in the future to the gradual partiarchalization of the whole

church."[235]

14:33b-36," in *Women Also Journeyed with Him: Feminist Perspectives on the Bible*, ed. Gérald Caron (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2000), 117–24; Robert W. Allison, "Let Women Be Silent in the Churches (1 Cor 14:33b-36): What Did Paul Really Say, and What Did It Mean?," *Journal for the Study of the New Testament*, no. 32 (February 1, 1988): 27–60.

[232] For instance, Elisabeth Schüssler-Fiorenza, arguing that these women are not pneumatics because it will directly contradict what Paul says in 1 Cor. 11:2–16, explains: "14:26–36 is best understood as a church order with rules for glossolalists (vv. 27ff), prophets (vv.29–33), and wives (vv. 34–36). These three rules are formulated in a structurally similar fashion. General sentence of the regulation (vv. 27, 29, 34) are complemented by sentences that concretize them (vv. 28, 30, 35). The second and third rules are expanded with reasons for regulation (vv. 31–32, 34a, 35b). However, the rule for wives is different insofar as it ends with double rhetorical question (v. 36), thus appearing to underline the importance of the last regulation." See Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins* (New York: Crossroad, 1994), 230–31.

[233] Schüssler Fiorenza, 231. Some other scholars also have argued for the problem of the Corinthian wives. For example, see Ben Witherington III, *Women and the Genesis of Christianity* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 172–78.

[234] Schüssler Fiorenza, *In Memory of Her*, 232.

[235] Schüssler Fiorenza, 233.

Other scholars argue that there should be some connection between these two discussions. There are at least three different positions that can be categorized as being a part of this camp. First, some scholars maintain that these women are the ecstatic speakers (i.e., glossolalists) in the church. In this reading, they argue that women's behaviors in the Corinthian church have become so chaotic that they are disrupting the order of the church.[236] Thus, Paul needs to give a special attention to them. Second, some other scholars insist that some women—or wives—are the prophetesses in the Corinthian church.[237] Third, the women meant here are those who weigh in on or evaluate prophecy.[238]

Almost all the scholars that I just described above assumed a stable female subject behind the speech marked primarily by their biological features. This understanding assumes an essentialist notion of femaleness. Thus, when Paul speaks about women throughout 1 Corinthians, he refers to the same subjects. My counterproposal is based on the idea that gender is a social construction and performance.[239] Femaleness, therefore, is far more unstable than many biblical scholars would assume. In her landmark work published in 1975 entitled *Language and Woman's Place*,[240] linguist Robin Lakoff argues quite strongly that the difference

---

[236] See Lee A. Johnson, "Women and Glossolalia in Pauline Communities," *Biblical Interpretation* 21, no. 2 (January 1, 2013): 196–214; Richard Boldrey and Joice Boldrey, *Chauvinist or Feminist?: Paul's View of Women* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1976), 60.

[237] For example, Wayne A. Grudem, *The Gift of Prophecy in 1 Corinthians* (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2000), 60; Witherington III, *Conflict and Community in Corinth*, 287; Witherington III, *Women and the Genesis of Christianity*, 173.

[238] Margaret E. Thrall, *First and Second Letters of Paul to the Corinthians*, Cambridge Bible Commentaries on the New Testament (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 102; Carson, "'Silent in the Churches': On the Role of Women in 1 Corinthians 14:33b-36," 142–44.

[239] See particularly Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

[240] Jennifer Coates notes that Lakoff's book "for many people marks the beginning of twentieth-century linguistic interest in gender differences." See Jennifer Coates, *Women, Men and Language: A Sociolinguistic Account of Gender Differences in Language*, 3 edition (Harlow, England ; New York: Routledge, 2004), 12. Mary Bucholtz similarly points out that this book "played a crucial role in establishing the study of language, gender, and sexuality as a linguistic subfield." See Mary Bucholtz, "The Feminist Foundations of Language, Gender, and

in the social use of language "can tell us about the nature and extent of any inequity."[241] She

points out that the discrimination that women experience in language takes two different forms:

"in the way they are taught to use language, and in the way general language use treats them."[242]

Thus, she dedicates many pages of her book to explaining how a certain mode of speech is

imposed on women, i.e., "talking like a lady," and how language forms female subjectivity, i.e.,

"talking about women." In this sense, women's language is basically an external imposition in

which they are forced by the social structure of the society to perform certain linguistic

behaviors. Not only that, language itself shapes the subjectivity of women. That is, there is no

such thing as an objective and descriptive "women's language."[243] Women's language is the

work of external relations of power.

This is particularly apparent when she discusses the idea that female speech is marked by

a high degree of politeness. Being linguistically polite itself is not grounded in some ontological

constitution of femaleness, but is the result of an external will imposed on subjects who possess

Sexuality Research," in *The Handbook of Language, Gender, and Sexuality*, ed. Susan Ehrlich, Miriam Meyerhoff, and Janet Holmes, 2 edition (Chichester, West Sussex England ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014), 26.

Coates argues that after the publication of Lakoff's book, linguists are divided on this very issue of women's language. "These can be labelled the **deficit** approach, the **dominance** approach, the **difference** approach, and the **dynamic** or **social constructionist** approach." (bold is hers) She categorizes Lakoff under the deficit approach because Lakoff argues for the subordination of female speech. Coates, *Women, Men and Language*, 5–6. I disagree with Coates's reading of Lakoff. A close reading of Lakoff's work, however, should lead one to notice that she never sees female linguistic practice as being biologically conditioned by some sort of essentialist female body and thus weak or unassertive. The weakness and unassertiveness of women's language, for Lakoff, are attributed to women through social structure and through language itself. I would categorize her as a social constructionist.

[241] Robin Tolmach Lakoff, *Language and Woman's Place: Text and Commentaries*, ed. Mary Bucholtz, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 39.

[242] Lakoff, 39.

[243] Mary Bucholtz correctly notes this: "In her later research, Lakoff continued the work she began in *LWP* [Language and Woman's Place] of identifying cultural ideologies of femininity and the practices of gender inequality that result from them. Yet many readers misunderstood Lakoff's discussion of 'women's language' to be a straightforward description of women's linguistic practice rather than a characterization of ideological expectations of women's speech—expectations to which many speakers conform." See Mary Bucholtz, "Changing Places: Language and Women's Place in Context," in *Language and Woman's Place: Text and Commentaries*, ed. Mary Bucholtz, Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 124.

certain biological features. Politeness is a political constraint enforced on women's tongues. The consequence of not following these social demands is real. "If she doesn't learn to speak women's language, in traditional society she's dead: she is ostracized as unfeminine by both men and women. So it is not a possible option, unless a young girl is exceedingly brave—in fact, reckless. But what if she opts to do as she ought—learn to talk like a lady? She has some rewards: she is accepted as a suitable female," Lakoff explains. [244] Lakoff's work reveals that some ways of speech in a particular society are considered as women's language while other ways are perceived as men's language. The politics of language, in other words, is profoundly related to social construction of gender.[245]

My focus here, thus, is on the interconnectedness between language and gender construction. As Alastair Pennycook has also pointed out:

> Women are stereotyped as talkative while at the same time they are frequently silenced or ignored; many languages have a range of derogatory terms for women; women are relegated to the private rather than public language domains; women's use of language frequently bears signs of lower social status; women's ways of talking are not accorded respect; language systems themselves encode basic gender inequalities.[246]

Pennycook has put his finger on the contested issue of gender construction not through biological difference but through speech difference. He concludes that "Clearly, language is an important site of the reproduction of gendered inequality."[247] Difference of speech is the direct result of unequal relations of power.

---

[244] See Bucholtz, 84.

[245] See also Robin Tolmach Lakoff, "Language, Gender, and Politics: Putting 'Women'' and 'Power' in the Same Sentence," in *The Handbook of Language and Gender*, ed. Janet Holmes and Miriam Meyerhoff, First Edition (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), 161–78.

[246] Alastair Pennycook, *Critical Applied Linguistics: A Critical Introduction* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 151.

[247] Pennycook, 151.

This is precisely the way ancient Greco-Roman writers perceived female language: it is

inferior, irrational, and therefore has to be silenced in public spaces. The difference between

female and male speeches was widely recognized. Plato, for example, points out that women

tend to maintain a more ancient pronunciation. In a conversation between Socrates and

Hermogenes, Socrates explains that in the ancient times the Greek ancestors "made good use of

the sounds of iota and delta." This ancient linguistic behavior, according to Socrates, is still

found in women's speech. Women "are most addicted to preserving old forms of speech," says

Socrates. An example that he gives is their use of the word ἱμέρα or ἐμέρα rather than ἡμέρα, or

the word δυογόν rather than ζυγόν.[248] However, this difference is hardly innocent: it leads to

particular relations of power, relations of inferiority-superiority, and relations of private-public.

Thorsten Fögen summarizes it well when he writes: "Women's language was almost always

understood in antiquity as a deviation from the male norm. If, on the other hand, women did not

behave as they were expected to and acted more like male speakers, this was perceived as a

transgression of boundaries and a threat to male domains and spheres of power."[249] For this

reason, female speech is often seen as the 'other' in Greek social imagination. As John Heath

puts it, "in the ancient world . . . women, slaves and foreigner were universally treated as

outsiders in some fashion."[250] It is not surprising, therefore, that "women… were politically

---

[248] Plato, *Cratylus,* 418b–e. Clackson, however, doubts whether this attribution ancient pronunciation is historically true. He states: "[T]he examples for female conservatism which are given in Plato's *Cratylus* are problematic. In this dialogue, Socrates is represented as giving a number of etymologies for Greek words; evidence of women's pronunciation is adduced in order to support some of these etymologies. . . . However, neither Plato nor Socrates had access to the historical development of Greek and these pronunciation differences are in fact not archaisms but innovations in respect of standard Attic." See Clackson, "Language Maintenance and Language Shift in the Mediterranean World during the Roman Empire," 53. I tend to agree with Thorsten Fögen's assessment that this passage, at least, "sheds an interesting light upon the way in which linguistic peculiarities of female speakers were perceived." See Thorsten Fögen, "Female Speech," in *A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language*, ed. Egbert J. Bakker (West Sussex, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 319.

[249] Fögen, "Female Speech," 324.

[250] John Heath, *The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 174.

silent because they were not allowed to speak publicly; there were publicly silent because they had no political role."[251]

Aristotle insists that this structure of social subordination is grounded in nature.[252] In this sense, men by nature are the rulers of women. This is not because they are different, and thus complement each other, but rather because men are superior especially in their courage and justice.[253] Difference, thus, has a thoroughly political implication in the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Because of this difference, while quoting Sophocles Aristotle argues that "silence gives grace to woman" (γυναικὶ κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει), and immediately adds "but this is not so for a man" (ἀλλ' ἀνδρὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο).[254] Aristotle was not unique in ancient society. In his *Trojan Women*, Euripides vividly depicts the lament of Andromache not only over the death of Hector, but also upon hearing the news that the Greeks are going to kill her son. Talthybius, the bearer of this bad news to Andromache, says: "Do not hold on to him but nobly bear the pain of your misfortune."[255] He further tells Andromache that because she has lost her people and her husband, the Greeks are all the more strong to fight against her. What she needs to do now is to

---

[251] Heath, 174.

[252] Soul, for Aristotle, by nature (φύσει) possesses "a part that rules and a part that is ruled, to which we assign different virtues, that is the virtue of the rational and that of the irrational." See Aristotle, *Politics,* 1.5.5. Just like soul, the social structures too are designed by nature. (Aristotle, *Politics,* 1.5.6) He explains: "Hence there are by nature various classes of rulers and ruled. For the free rules the slave, the male the female, and the man the child in a different way. And all possess the various parts of the soul, but possess them in different ways; for the slave has not the deliberative part (βουλευτικόν) at all, and the female has it, but without full authority, while the child has it, but in an undeveloped form." The idea of "deliberation" is quite important in Aristotelian conception of human being and ethics. In his *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle explains that deliberation has something to do with ability to choose. When faced with options, a human being has a capacity of deliberate first and then the ability to select from those options. See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 3.3–5.

[253] Aristotle, *Politics,* 1.5.8.

[254] Aristotle, *Politics*, 1.5.8–9.

[255] Euripides, *The Trojan Women*, 725.

keep silent and bear her misfortune well.[256] We see here a clear description of how a grieving

woman is not allowed to speak and express her sorrow. Reflecting on her own role as a wife,

Andromache says:

> Everything that women have discovered of modest behavior I practiced diligently in the house of Hector. First, whether or not there is anything blameworthy in a woman's conduct, the very fact that she goes out of the house draws criticism. I let go all longing for this and stayed in the house. I did not admit within my walls women with their clever talk but was content to have within myself a good teacher, my own mind. I kept my tongue quiet (γλώσσης . . . σιγὴν) and my gaze tranquil before my husband. I knew where I ought to be the winner over my husband and where I should yield the victory to him.[257]

It is important to note that these words are produced by Euripides and that he is the one who puts

them in Andromache's mouth. It reflects the way the Greeks perceive the role of a wife, or a

woman in general. Women are supposed to stay at home and be silent. Indeed, as John Heath

notes in speaking about women and slaves, "Control over speech is central to *all* Greek

hierarchical thought about status."[258]

This view of female speech and silence remained very much intact until the time when

Paul wrote this letter to the Corinthians in the first century.[259] An example of other first-century

---

[256] This is what Andromache says: "If you say anything to anger the army, this boy might not receive the mercy of a burial. But if you keep still (σιγῶσα) and bear your misfortunes well, you will not leave this boy's corpse behind unburied, and you yourself will win the favor of the Achaeans." Euripides, *The Trojan Women*, 735.

[257] Euripides, *The Trojan Women*, 649–50.

[258] Heath, *The Talking Greeks*, 171.

[259] For a helpful discussion on both Jewish and Greco-Roman view of women's speech in public spaces, see Craig S. Keener, "Women's Education and Public Speech in Antiquity," *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 50, no. 4 (December 2007): 756–58. Keener concludes his essay with this statement: "Scholars may differ in good conscience on the application of ancient sources to NT texts or the reapplication of those texts for different cultural situations today. I believe that most scholars will, however, agree on some central premises about what the ancient sources in question indicate: First, there can be no dispute that there were some educated women. Second, women were much less often educated to the same degree as men of the same social class, and this extends to Jewish learning in the Torah. Third, ancient society rarely allowed teaching roles to women. Though the application may be more controversial, this is information that some scholars will wish to continue to consider when discussing Paul's injunctions of women's silence in Corinth or Ephesus and whether he would apply them in the same manner in our culture today." While Keener's survey of ancient sources is helpful to frame the problem, I do not think the problem in 1 Cor 14 is about educated women.

In another place, Keener argues that the silencing of women has something to do with the distraction that they have caused in the Corinthian church. On the basis of similar construction between 11:34 and 14:35, he writes:

discourse on female speech is worth mentioning here. Plutarch wrote a treatise instructing brides

and grooms that, according to him, has received less "serious attention" than many other

philosophical topics. He argues that a bride's external appearance should be in harmony with the

delight of her "lips and speech" (στόματος καὶ φωνῆς).[260] This means that the internal quality of

femaleness is measured by the speech and voice. Using an example from Egypt that women

"were not allowed to wear shoes, so that they should stay at home all day," Plutarch argues that

"not only the arm of the virtuous woman, but her speech as well, ought to be not for public, and

she ought to be modest and guarded about saying anything in the hearing of outsiders, since it is

an exposure of herself; for in her talk can be seen her feelings, characters, and disposition."[261]

He further adds:

> Pheidias made the Aphrodite of the Eleans with one foot on a tortoise to typify for
> womankind (ταῖς γυναιξὶ) keeping at home (οἰκουρίας) and keeping silence (σιωπῆς).
> For a woman ought to do her talking (λαλεῖν) either to her husband or through her
> husband, and she should not feel aggrieved if, like the flute player (αὐλητὴς), she makes
> a more impressive sound (φθέγγεται) through a tongue (γλώττης) not her own.[262]

Regardless of whether Paul is aware of Plutarch or other Greco-Roman writers' views on

women's public speech, the similarity between 1 Cor 14 and Plutarch's statement is quite

striking. The words that Plutarch uses, such as φωνῆς, οἰκουρίας, σιωπῆς, γυναιξί, σιωπῆς,

---

"In 11:34, Paul does not there mean that no one should eat the Lord's Supper, or that it is wrong to be hungry when one gathers in the church; his point is that it is better to eat at home than to disrupt the Christian community by the *way* one eats at church. Since he uses the same construction here, we may guess that his argument is roughly the same: the way women are trying to learn, rather than the learning itself, is problematic." See Keener tries to fill the gap of context that does not exist in the text at all. There is no indication in the text of 1 Cor 14 that women are disruptive in the way they learn. The only clue from the text of 1 Cor 14 is Paul's discussion on being orderly. However, since Keener sees Paul's dealing with women as a separate issue, it is hard to establish such connection of disruption. Making women as disruptive cause in the Corinthian gather, I think, is way too speculative. See Craig S. Keener, *Paul, Women, and Wives: Marriage and Women's Ministry in the Letters of Paul* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1992), 70–88.

[260] Plutarch, *Moralia: Advice to Bride and Groom*, 1.

[261] Plutarch, *Moralia: Advice to Bride and Groom*, 31.

[262] "Τὴν Ἠλείων ὁ Φειδίας Ἀφροδίτην ἐποίησε χελώνην πατοῦσαν, οἰκουρίας σύμβολον ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ σιωπῆς. δεῖ γὰρ ἢ πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα λαλεῖν ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀνδρός, μὴ δυσχεραίνουσαν εἰ δι᾽ ἀλλοτρίας γλώττης ὥσπερ αὐλητὴς φθέγγεται σεμνότερον." Plutarch, *Moralia: Advice to Bride and Groom*, 32.

λαλεῖν, ἄνδρα, αὐλητὴς, φθέγγεται, and γλώττης, appear also in 1 Cor 14.[263] Paul seems to work within the same ideological atmosphere, one that both domesticates and subjugates women.

With this background in mind, I propose that Paul ideologically goes a step further than Plutarch by associating foreign languages with femaleness. Paul taps into this common understanding of female speech and attributes it to minority language speakers in Corinth. To put it differently, Paul is making tongue(s) speakers female. Thus, to speak a foreign language is to speak like a woman! In order to understand how Paul constructs the idea of femaleness, we need to place the discussion of 1 Cor 14:32b–36 within the larger discussion on the subordination of foreign language speakers. Just as Paul uses racial rhetoric (discussed above), in this passage Paul employs another strategy, namely a gendered rhetoric. If Tat-siong Benny Liew speaks about "(other) bodies feminized and sexualized," I would argue that what happens in 1 Cor 14 is other languages feminized and sexualized.[264] Paul imagines the relationship between foreign languages and the dominant language through the lens of female-male relationship. That is, he constructs gender not on the basis of biological difference, but linguistic difference. The reference to αἱ γυναῖκες in this passage, therefore, is not a biological one, but rather a linguistic one. Femaleness is constituted by the shamefulness, subordination, and silence of speech. On the one hand, foreign language speakers are female, and thus inferior subjects. On the other hand, the dominant language possesses masculine qualities such as superiority, logic, and appropriateness for public spaces. This passage, thus, is still thoroughly a discourse

---

[263] Here I disagree with Keener that Paul is more progressive than Plutarch. When it comes to female speech, Paul still seems to share the same attitude towards women. See Keener, *Paul, Women, and Wives*, 84–85.

[264] See Tat-Siong Benny Liew, "Redressing Bodies at Corinth: Racial/Ethnic Politics and Religious Difference in the Context of Empire," in *The Colonized Apostle: Paul in Postcolonial Eyes*, ed. Christopher Stanley (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2011), 139–43.

that deals with the language struggle in the Corinthian church. For this reason, I believe my reading will provide a better connection between this passage and the overall mood of 1 Cor 14.

The key word that connects the discussion on tongue(s) in the previous part and women in this passage is the particle ὡς (Eng.: as, just as, or just like). Scholars have debated the location of the clause "ὡς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν ἁγίων" (Just as in all churches of the saints) in the flow of Paul's argument. Some have argued that this clause should be attached to 33a. The main argument for placing it at the end of verse 32 is the redundancy of the phrase "ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις" that appears again in v. 34.[265] My reading, however, follows Nestlé-Aland 28 and scholars such as Witherington, Kistemaker, and Conzelmann, who situate this clause as the introduction to Paul's discussion on women.[266]

Again, the particle ὡς is critical here. This particle has a wide range of meanings, at least from what we can see in Greek lexicons. However, this word is commonly used as "a comparative particle." That is why it can also be translated as "just like" or "in such a way." One of the special uses of ὡς, according to Bauer, is to "introduce an example."[267] If this is the case, the ὡς can be understood as the beginning of another analogy or example in order to explain the relationship between tongue(s) and prophecy. The structure of the analogy is quite similar to what Paul does in 14:6–9:

---

[265] See Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 527; Richard B. Hays, *The Moral Vision of the New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics* (San Francisco, CA: HarperOne, 1996), 59, n.82; J. Murphy-O'Connor, "Interpolations in 1 Corinthians," *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (1986): 90; Barrett, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1968, 329.

[266] Witherington III, *Conflict and Community in Corinth*, 287; Garland, *1 Corinthians*, 669–70; Simon J. Kistemaker, *1 Corinthians*, New Testament Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1993), 511–12; Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians*, 246.

[267] Walter Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3rd Edition*, ed. Frederick William Danker, 3rd edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), s.v. "ὡς."

> Explanation of the point (14:6)
>> Analogy of musical instruments (14:7)
> Reaffirmation of the point (14:9)

While the analysis in 14:7 is marked by the conjunction ὅμως, Paul begins this female-male analogy with ὡς. The structure of his argument in 14:26–40 can be described as follows:

> Explanation of the point (14:26-32)
>> Analogy of female-male relationship (14:33b–35)
> Reaffirmation of the point (14:36–40)

The explanation of the point is mainly about the silencing of tongue(s) and the regulation of prophecy that I have discussed in the previous section of this chapter. In v. 33, Paul speaks theologically about avoiding disorder. The analogy of the silencing of female speech should be understood as a way of making the point clearer. The reaffirmation of the point begins with v. 36, and is marked by the switch from third person plural to second person plural (ὑμῶν and ὑμᾶς). It ends with a statement that reaffirms his desire for order: "all things should be done properly and in order" (πάντα δὲ εὐσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν γινέσθω).

This reading can provide a possible answer to Wire's claim that this passage is a bit off because Paul does not even "give sex-specific evidence" [268] to support his action. No: he doesn't give "sex-specific evidence" and moreover he doesn't need to, because his primary concern is not about the sexuality of the women. This passage does not deal with silencing biological women *per se* as many scholars have suggested. The silencing of women is all about the silencing of tongue(s). Women in this analogy are the tongue(s) speakers, while men are comparable to the role of prophecy, i.e., the dominant language.

---

[268] Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets*, 154.

Again, this has to do with the feminization of foreign language speakers and the masculinization of the dominant language. The following is the analogy and its transposition from female-male to tongue(s)-prophecy relation.

> *The Greek Text (NA²⁸)*: Ὡς ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν ἁγίων αἱ γυναῖκες ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις σιγάτωσαν· οὐ γὰρ ἐπιτρέπεται αὐταῖς λαλεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑποτασσέσθωσαν, καθὼς καὶ ὁ νόμος λέγει. εἰ δέ τι μαθεῖν θέλουσιν, ἐν οἴκῳ τοὺς ἰδίους ἄνδρας ἐπερωτάτωσαν· αἰσχρὸν γάρ ἐστιν γυναικὶ λαλεῖν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ.

> *My Translation:* Just as in all churches of the saints, let the women be silent in the churches because they are not allowed to speak, but they should submit, as the law also says. If there is anything they want to learn, let them ask their own husbands at home for it is disgraceful/shameful for a woman to speak in church.

> *The Transposition:* Just as in all churches of the saints, let the foreign language speakers be silent in the churches because they are not allowed to speak, but they should submit, as the law also says. If there is anything they want to learn, let them ask their own prophets at home for it is disgraceful/shameful for a tongue(s) speaker to speak in church.

With this in mind, several points need further clarification. First, the verbal parallel between 14:33b–35 and 14:26–33a is quite striking.[269] The following table displays those similarities side by side:

πάσαις (v. 33b)	πάντα (v. 26); πάντες (v. 31)
ἐν . . . ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις (vv. 33b, 34); ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ (v. 35)	ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ (v. 28)
λαλεῖν (vv. 34, 35)	λαλεῖ (v. 27); λαλείτω (v. 28);
σιγάτωσαν (v. 34)	σιγάτω (vv. 28, 30)
ὑποτασσέσθωσαν (v. 34)	ὑποτάσσεται (v. 32)
μαθεῖν (v. 35)	μανθάνωσιν (v. 31)

Besides those six words, the word ὁ νόμος in v. 34 also appears in v. 21 (τῷ νόμῳ). This striking similarity shows that there is a close connection between this passage on women and the discussion on tongue(s)-prophecy throughout chapter 14. Thus, against Payne's insistence that

---

[269] Several scholars have also pointed out these verbal similarities but they do not take a step of equating women with tongue(s) speakers and men with prophecy. For example, see Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, 189; Thiselton, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 1152–55.

"vv. 34–35 interrupt the flow of Paul's argument,"[270] I think this passage is not completely out of

the flow of thought at all. Paul inserts the gendered analogy in the middle of his discussion on

order regarding tongue(s) and prophecy to support his general argument: just like women's

speech, foreign language speakers should also be domesticated, because it is shameful for them

to speak in public spaces (here, churches). Conceptually, therefore, the linguistic relationship

between women and men is parallel to the relationship between tongue(s) and prophecy, i.e.,

minority languages and the dominant language.[271] This is where I differ from Horsley, who

insists that, although there are verbal similarities, "there are serious conceptual differences

---

[270] Payne, *Man and Woman, One in Christ*, 253. Similarly, Horsley also argues: "These sentences silencing women intrude into the argument of chapter 14, which compares prophecy and tongues throughout. They also interrupt the conclusion to the argument in chapter 12–14…" Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, 188. Fitzmyer notes: "The verses interrupt the discussion about speaking in tongues and prophesying, to which Paul returns in vv. 37–40" Fitzmyer, *First Corinthians*, 529. Seeing 1 Cor 14 as Paul's regulating of three different groups of people, Wire argues that Paul's silencing of tongue(s) only "secondarily to prevent unlimited or uninterpreted speech." When it comes to women, she argues that Paul "introduces people not apparently under discussion and immediately requires silence, returning to speaking and learning only by way of concession in the concrete example." Wire, *The Corinthian Women Prophets*, 153.

[271] Anders Eriksson's article has pointed to a right direction in his rhetorical analysis of this passage on the silencing of women. Following Dale Martin's proposal, Eriksson argues that Paul's primary opponent in 1 Cor 14:33b-36 is "a certain influential group of women pneumatics" (or "women glossolalists") who are known by both Paul and the Corinthians. They "should be literally 'shut up,'" Eriksson explains. He writes further: "Paul's association of women's public speaking with tongue speaking is underlined by the male/female imagery used in his disassociation between prophecy and tongues. The Greco-Roman world at Paul's time subordinated women to men. Contrary to our modern polarity between the male and the female sexes, the ancient operated with a one-sex hierarchical model, with the male on the top and the female on the bottom. This model expressed different degrees of metaphysical perfection." The aim of his argument is predictable: because some of these female tongue(s) speakers are influential, Paul need to silence them so that he can bring peace and order back to the community. "Public speaking was not for women, and Paul says 'not even tongue speaking." See Anders Eriksson, "'Women Tongue Speakers, Be Silent': A Reconstruction Through Paul's Rhetoric," *Biblical Interpretation* 6, no. 1 (January 1, 1998): 80–104. First of all, I am very sympathetic with his framing of the reading of this text within the ancient Greco-Roman gender construction. He is right that femaleness has something to do with tongue(s) speakers and maleness with prophecy. Second, I disagree with him that these are prominent or influential women. The only hint is the appearance of definite article in v. 34. This is quite weak because Eriksson does not even explain why the definite article is absent in v. 35. Third, although he suspects that "Paul intends to associate women with tongue speaking," Eriksson's limited application of that association (i.e., only a certain group of influential women) demonstrates that he still operates within the framework of an essentialist-biological notion of gender. Now, what I intend to do here is in line with Eriksson's suspicion, but my proposal differs significantly from his. I argue that Paul does not talk only a certain group of "biological women" who happen to be influential and speak in tongue(s) in Corinth. What Paul does is to associate tongue(s) speakers with femaleness. Paul describes the role and place of tongue(s) speakers in the church through a gendered lens.

between the statements in verses 34–35 and their context."[272] Horsley's misleading conclusion is the result of a biological-essentialist reading of Paul's instruction in 14:27–28. A heteroglossic-immigrant interpretation will see the reference of "women" in this context as a Pauline strategy of silencing minority language speakers.

Second, the silencing of women should be seen as an analogy of the silencing of foreign language speakers. It is worth noting again that Paul's silencing of prophecy (v. 32) is significantly different from his silencing of tongue(s) (v. 28). On the one hand, the silencing of prophecy has something to do with the regulation of speech. Paul does not want many prophets to speak simultaneously. They have to take turns. That is, while one is speaking the other has to be silent. This is quite different from the way he silences tongue(s). As I have explained above, the silencing of tongues is complete. Without translation, he does not allow tongue(s) to be expressed in public gatherings at all. Tongue(s) have to subject themselves thoroughly to the dominant language (prophecy). This means that the analogy of the silencing and subjugation of women is a direct reference to Paul's attitude towards tongue(s). In other words, the subordination of women is exactly parallel to the subordination of the foreign languages under prophecy.

Third, the phrase "ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις σιγάτωσαν" in 14:34 is an echo of "σιγάτω ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ" in 14:28. This parallel demonstrates that the silencing of tongue(s) is analogous to or comparable to the silencing of women. Paul is playing with the private-public binary in its connection to gender linguistic roles and projects it onto tongue(s) speakers. When Paul employs the imperative "σιγάτω" in v. 30 regarding prophecy, he does not add the propositional clause "in church" (ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ). This is simply because he thinks that prophecy needs to be

---

[272] Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, 189.

regulated rather than to be completely silenced in public gatherings. Again, Paul's attitude

toward women vis-à-vis tongue(s) is radically different. The words "ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις" and "ἐν

οἴκῳ" are added in order to show that the space for foreign languages is not in public spaces but

at home. In other words, they can use and speak those foreign languages at home, but not in the

churches. This leads us to the next point.

Fourth, the sentence "If there is anything they want to learn, let them ask their own

husbands at home," needs to be understood in the context of speech (λαλεῖν in vv. 34, 35).

Learning here, therefore, is not an internal process of thinking. It is an active learning that is

externally expressed in the form of speaking and asking. Thus, the command to ask their own

husbands (τοὺς ἰδίους ἄνδρας ἐπερωτάτωσαν) can be seen as being parallel to Paul's demand for

translation in v. 22. Asking their husband signifies channeling their speech through their

husband. It is quite similar to Plutarch's statement: "She makes a more impressive sound

through a tongue not her own." Since in this analogy the husband is the dominant language (i.e.,

prophecy), it should lead us to the conclusion that speech in foreign languages has to be

channeled through, and thus translated into, the dominant language.

Fifth, the appearance of the clause "καθὼς καὶ ὁ νόμος λέγει" (as the law also says) has

led many scholars to argue that, due to its uniqueness, it is an indication of a non-Pauline

element.[273] First of all, this exegetical move seems to overlook the fact that Paul also uses this

expression (ὁ νόμος ταῦτα οὐ λέγει) in 1 Cor 9:8.[274] Thus, it is not completely unique. This

---

[273] Fee, for example, thinks that this phrase is "the ultimate problem for Pauline authorship." See Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 791. Cf. Payne, *Man and Woman, One in Christ*, 256, 258–60.

[274] This point has also been expressed by Erkki Koskenniemi in Erkki Koskenniemi, "Religious Authorities in the Corpus Paulinum," in *Institutions of the Emerging Church*, ed. Erkki Koskenniemi and Sven-Olav Back, Library of New Testament Studies 305 (London: T&T Clark, 2016), 69. Fee says that when Paul uses this expression in 9:8 and 14:21, he usually quotes scripture "to support a point he himself is making." Fee, *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*, 791. I would argue that what we have in 14:33b–35 is Paul's using the term law in order to support his point without a direct quotation from the Hebrew scriptures.

argument is profoundly problematic because it assumes a very static view of the subjectivity of Paul. It assumes that as a static, consistent, and uncreative subject, he has to use the same way of speech all the time. Any linguistic behavior that is unusual, unique, and novel is suspected as the intervention of the others. Again, I disagree with this hermeneutical assumption because Paul is a far more dynamic subject or person than many scholars grant him to be. Also, given the remarkable verbal similarities with the rest of chapter 14 that I have shown above, I do not think that we can use this peculiar appearance of linguistic expression against those vast majority of similarities. Now, the question remains: why does Paul have to employ the word "law" here? In light of the overall mood of this text, I suggest that this is another way of establishing authority over the Corinthians, especially over those who speak foreign languages. Just as Paul argues that all his statements are the command of the Lord himself (v. 37) and that the law writes that foreign languages are useless (v. 21), Paul here insists that the silencing of women, vis-à-vis foreign languages, is the law. Paul leaves no room for negotiation. Being silenced or silent is the only option for foreign languages.

Sixth, a few words need to be said about the shamefulness of female speech. Paul also employs the word "αἰσχρός" in 11:6 to describe women who cut their hair. The use of this word apparently has something to do with the public performance of women. The prepositional phrase "ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ" (in [a] church or in a public gathering) seems to reaffirm and clarify the space in which women's speech is measured. Since the place of women's speech is at home (v. 35), Paul insists further that speaking in public spaces is a disgrace. Now, this is exactly what he says about tongue(s), or foreign languages, as well. In v. 28 he argues that they are to be silent in a church or in a public gathering (ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ). A foreign language speaker, according to Paul, has to speak to themselves and to God, indicating the private nature of their speech. In other

words, a foreign language is not for public use, but only for private use. If this is the case, then the analogy of women would add force to such insistence. Just like women's speech in public gathering is a disgrace, Paul seems to say that using foreign languages in public spaces also is a disgrace.

Lastly, I need to give a short note about v. 36, which scholars often take to be part of 33b–35. I think the end of the analogy lies in v. 35. What we have in v. 36 is the beginning of his reaffirmation of the point that Paul attempts to make through the analogy. The reason for this, as I have stated above, is because Paul employs the second person plural pronoun "you" (ὑμῶν and ὑμᾶς). In any case, the Greek sentence "ἢ ἀφ᾽ ὑμῶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐξῆλθεν, ἢ εἰς ὑμᾶς μόνους κατήντησεν" has been commonly translated and understood as (two different) rhetorical questions. The NRSV, for example, renders it as follows: "Or did the word of God originate with you? Or are you the only ones it has reached?" Again, since they are rhetorical questions, some scholars have taken them as a Pauline rebuttal against the Corinthian slogan against women.[275]

I disagree with this reading because, as I have elaborated above, as an analogy to tongue(s) and prophecy there is nothing for Paul to refute in vv. 33b–35. So, why does Paul need to make this statement? I would suggest that the pronoun "you" here is the key to understanding the statement. The antecedent of the pronoun "you" in this context is the foreign language speakers whom Paul has been dealing with throughout chapter 14. That is to say, Paul is now speaking directly to those he believes have caused disorder in the church, namely the foreign language speakers, the tongue(s) speakers. Since v. 37 also employs the second person

---

[275] See the discussion above.

plural pronoun, it can be argued that vv. 36 and 37–38 are one thought. Thus, this section might

be read this way:

> Or did the word of God originate with you? Or are you the only ones it has reached? If anyone thinks that he/she is a prophet or a spiritual person, let that person know that the things that I write to you are the command of the Lord. Anyone who ignores it, let him be ignored!

The rhetorical questions concerning "the word of God" in v. 36 are aimed at denying tongue(s)

speakers' the possibility of defending themselves. The word of God has neither originated from

them nor has reached them alone. In other words, they do not have sole access to the word of

God. And then, the statement about "the command of the Lord" in vv. 37–38 aims at solidifying

Paul's authority. It is not their defense that has divine weight; it is Paul's argument that comes

from the Lord himself.

I close this section with this disclaimer: seeing foreigners as women was hardly a novel

cultural move in the Greco-Roman world. The description through a gender lens of barbarians

who do not speak Greek was quite common in Hellenistic literature. In Euripides' Medea, for

example, the barbarian is depicted as a mad woman in the Hellenistic social imagination. As

Edith Hall points out, Medea's "overbearing nature cannot fully be understood without reference

to her barbarian provenance."[276] Furthermore, Aristotle thinks that the relationship between the

Greeks and the barbarians is analogous to the relationship between a man and a woman. The

man is the dominant and the woman is the subordinate, the inferior, the subjected. The Greeks,

who are powerful, are perceived as men; and the barbarians, who allegedly are by nature weaker,

are depicted as and connected to femaleness. Herodotus, a Greek historian who was probably

unable to "read or speak any language other than Greek,"[277] describes how people in Dodona

---

[276] Hall, *Inventing the Barbarian*, 203.

[277] Thomas Harrison, "Herodotus' Conception of Foreign Languages," *Histos* 2 (1998): 3.

perceived the Egyptian language spoken by women (i.e., prophetesses) as "like the cries of birds." He then adds this explanation: "As long as she spoke a foreign language, they thought her voice was like the voice of a bird. For how could a dove utter the speech of men? The tale that the dove was black signifies that the woman was Egyptian." [278] The interconnectedness between blackness, speech, and gender is quite obvious in Herodotus' recounting of the story.

Ann Laura Stoler's insistence is right that "sexual submission substantiates colonial racism, imposing fundamental limits on personal liberation."[279] In language, sexism and racism are often interconnected. This seems to be true also in Paul's discourse on language in 1 Cor. Having constructed the inferiority of foreign languages compared to the speech delivered in the dominant language through a racial or ethnic reasoning, Paul further equates minority language speakers with female inferior speech.

4.4.3. Politics of Imperialism

Since Paul considers multilingual interactions in the Corinthian gathering as chaotic, he feels the need to bring "order" (τάξις, 14:40) into that community. To that end, Paul demands translation (14:13, 27) and, if there is no translation, he silences these languages altogether (14:28). Paul further offers a theological argument to support his monolingual policy. After describing God in 14:25 almost like an emperor before whom people fall on their faces and

---

[278] Herodotus, *Histories,* 2.57. Harrison notes: "The central element in the characterization of foreign language is the emphasis of their incomprehensibility. . . . It is also because of the imagined incomprehensibility of foreign languages that the frequent analogy is drawn between foreign languages, prophecy and the sound of birds. Herodotus' rationalization of the myth of the foundation of the oracle of Dodona rests on the idea that Egyptian women could have been described as black birds from the sound of their speech (2.54–7)." See Harrison, 17. For further discussion on how the Greeks equated foreign languages with the sound of birds, see Benjamin Stevens, "The Origin of Language in Greek and Roman Thought: Volume One" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2005), 113–22.

[279] Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), 46.

worship, Paul continues this line of argument in 14:33 by saying that "God is not a God of disorder but of peace" (οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀκαταστασίας ὁ θεὸς ἀλλ᾽ εἰρήνης). From where does this idea of "peace" through silencing come?

Before I explain how and why Paul employs the rhetoric of peace, it is imperative to look first into how empire and language are interconnected. As I have already explained at great length in chapter 3 the role of empire (both Greek and Roman empires) in expanding imperial language, we know that the unification of language is absolutely necessary for the order and stability of the empire. That is to say, an empire will not stand without a unified language. Thus, English is not only the dominant language in the United States, it is also a global language today. The expansion of English is rooted politically and historically in the language of the British Empire, and now the American Empire. It expands by force and sword. As Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o puts it:

> [E]nglish and the African languages never met as equals, under the conditions of equality, independence, and democracy, and this is the root of all subsequent distortions. They met with English as the language of the conquering nation, and ours as the language of the vanquished. An oppressor language inevitably carries racist and negative images of the conquered nation, particularly in its literature, and English is no exception.[280]

For this very reason, Robert Phillipson coins the term "English Linguistic Imperialism" to describe the remarkable growth of English's influence from a simple provincial language in Europe to become "the international language *par excellence.*"[281]

Phillipson proposes the following working definition of *English linguistic imperialism*: "the dominance of English is *asserted* and *maintained* by the establishment and continues the

---

[280] Ngugi wa Thiong'o, *Moving the Centre: The Struggle For Cultural Freedoms* (London and Portsmouth, NH: James Currey, 1993), 35.

[281] Robert Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 6.

reconstruction of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages."[282]

Stressing the *structural aspect* of imperialism, he argues that this linguistic imperialism works at two levels: a) the macro level, and b) the micro level. At a macro level, English is now supported by a global socio-political structure that perpetuates the dominance of English. At the micro level, on the other hand, Phillipson focuses on English Language Teaching (ELT) endeavors as the extended hand of the imperial power throughout the globe.

Drawing upon the theory of structural imperialism from a Norwegian sociologist, Johan Galtung,[283] Phillipson argues that the interrelationship between the centered nations, i.e., the USA and Britain, and the peripheral nations is not the only story in English imperial expansion. Even within both the center and the periphery, there are also smaller scale center-periphery relations. Appropriating Galtung's theory in the context of linguistic struggle,[284] Phillipson writes: "Elites in the Centres of both the Centre and the Periphery are linked by shared interests within each type of imperialism and, it is claimed here, by language. The norms, whether economic, military, or linguistic, are dictated by the dominant Centre and have been internalized by those in power in the Periphery."[285] Persons who operate in the intersection of center-periphery relations are "*inter-state actors,*" a term that he borrows from Preiswerk. They are people who function at an international level. They have a connection with a larger scale of the Center, but at the same time they are also local elites on the periphery. In the case of English

---

[282] Phillipson, 47.

[283] Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no. 2 (1971): 83ff.

[284] Phillipson insists that linguistic imperialism influences all other form of imperialisms in terms of form and content.

[285] "In the early colonial phase of imperialism, the elites in the Periphery consisted of the colonizers themselves, whether settlers or administrators. In present-day neo-colonialism, the elites are to a large extent indigenous, but most of them have strong links with the Centre. Many of them have been educated in Centre countries and/or through the medium of the Centre language, the old colonial language." (Robert Phillipson, p. 52)

linguistic imperialism, Phillipson argues that "English language teachers working abroad and applied linguists in their writings both fall into this category."[286] English linguistic imperialism, Phillipson explains, is a form of linguicism. Just like other forms of –isms (i.e., sexism, racism, classism, etc.), linguicism constitutes, promotes, and perpetuates an unequal relation of power between the dominating and the dominated languages, and consequently the communities that speak those languages.[287] Linguicism ultimately leads to the complete exclusion and silencing of the dominated languages.[288]

With this in mind, let us now see the city and the community in Corinth to which Paul wrote his letter. As James Clackson notes, "There are clear ancient analogies with the modern processes of colonialism in the expansion of Greek and Latin around the shores of the Mediterranean from the Hellenistic period through the late antiquity. As in the colonial case, in many areas of the ancient world local languages coexisted alongside Greek and Latin, the dominant languages of the army, imperial officials and merchants."[289] The unification of language provides stability and order to the imperial rule throughout history. This logic of imperial order and peace through the unification of language, I would argue, also runs beneath Paul's discussion on tongue(s) in 1 Cor 14.

The Roman author Seneca the Younger can provide us with a hint about Paul's theological reasoning. Around the same time that Paul wrote 1 Corinthians in the mid 50s AD, Seneca the Younger also penned his famous treatise "On Mercy" to the young Roman emperor

---

[286] Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism*, 54.

[287] Phillipson defines linguicism as follow: "ideologies, structures, and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate, and reproduce *unequal* division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language." Phillipson, 47.

[288] Phillipson, 55.

[289] James Clackson, *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 131.

Nero affirming that: "[W]hatever has passed into your trust and guardianship is still kept safe, that through you the state suffers no loss, either from violence or from fraud.."[290] Seneca further tells Nero that as an emperor, everybody in Rome loves him more than anyone else and he is the primary figure that holds the entire empire together. The analogy that Seneca employs is the function of mind that controls all other parts of the body. Although mind is hidden and unseen, Seneca explains:

> The whole body is the servant of the mind, and though the former is so much larger and so much more showy, while the unsubstantial soul remains invisible not knowing where its secret habitation lies, yet the hands, the feet, and the eyes are in its employ; the outer skin is its defence; at its bidding we lie idle, or restlessly run to and fro; when it commands, if it is a grasping tyrant, we search the sea for gain; if covetous of fame, ere now we have thrust a right hand into the flame, or plunged willingly into a chasm.[291]

This is precisely how an empire works. Everyone is subject to the ruling power of the emperor. Describing the emperor as "the bond by which the commonwealth is united" and as "the breath of life," Seneca explains further that the entire commonwealth will be "the prey of others if the great mind of the empire should be withdrawn."[292] That is to say, if the emperor is overthrown, the empire will scatter and collapse. "Such a calamity would be the destruction of the Roman peace, such a calamity will force the fortune of a mighty people to its downfall," Seneca contends.

According to this imperial ideology, the submission and obedience to the emperor is the only path toward Roman peace. It is an imperial peace. Hannah Cornwell argues that for Seneca, "*Pax,* as the security and safety of the state, was firmly oriented around the imperial figure."[293]

---

[290] Seneca, *de Clementia*, 1.1.5.

[291] Seneca, *de Clementia*, 1.3.5

[292] Seneca, *de Clementia*, 1.3.5.

[293] Hannah Cornwell, *Pax and the Politics of Peace: Republic to Principate* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), 195.

Although Seneca speaks of the necessity of an imperial ruling through mercy (*clementia*), which makes a king different from a tyrant, in reality (and the Corinthians should be very familiar with this) when the Roman Empire penetrated other territories, it was harsh, brutal, and cruel. Again, the ruin of the old city of Corinth and the remaining populations in Corinth are the witnesses of this powerful silencing force of the empire.

Now, although there was an apocryphal correspondence between Paul and Seneca in the fourth century, we do not know for sure whether Paul and Seneca knew each other in the first century. However, the parallel between Paul's argument and Seneca's is quite striking. First, just like Seneca's notion of the state as a body, Paul also sees the church as a body (1 Cor. 12:12–26).[294] Second, while Seneca sees the emperor as the head of the body, Paul views God and Christ as the head of the body (1 Cor. 11:3[Christ and God]; Col. 1:18[Christ]; 2:19[God]). Third, in Seneca, the absence or the collapse of mind is the beginning of chaos. In Paul, a speech delivered in an unfruitful mind is chaotic (14:13–14). Fourth, just like Seneca's argument that Roman peace can only be attained, maintained, and retained through complete submission to the emperor, so too Paul argues that God is the only possible source of peace.

It is worth noting that the peace attained through silencing minority languages is parallel to Seneca's imperial peace, which the Romans gained through sacking, subjugating, and silencing other groups of people. As Neil Elliott notes, "The so-called Pax Romana, the cessation of 'hot' wars of expansion and competition among military rivals, was celebrated in rhetoric and

---

[294] The idea of the body as a social structure has been explained quite well by Dale Martin. See Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, chaps. 1–2.

ritual as a new golden age, the gift of the gods; but it was a 'peace' won through military conquest, as Roman iconography clearly shows."[295]

Richard Horsley, a scholar who has produced many works on Paul and Roman imperialism, ironically denies this reality of Paul's silencing tongue(s) as an act of adopting, or at least imitating, Roman imperial politics. He explains: "The term translated 'disorder' in v. 33 means political disorder or party strife, thus almost the opposite of the 'building up' that he is pressing upon his readers throughout chapters 12–14. 'Peace is an equally political term, with connotations for Paul of wholeness but here it counters, even as it recalls (for residents of cities such as Corinth), the Roman imperial peace."[296] It is not clear where Paul gets the idea, or on what basis he argues it, but Paul counters the Roman imperial peace here in 1 Cor 14. How is an act of silencing others seen as opposing an imperial power? Silencing others is absolutely the underlying work of an empire, and the Corinthians knew it very well. They could see the ruins of their old city. The brutality of the Roman Empire was very obvious in the city of Corinth. Horsley himself acknowledges, "Military action in previously conquered areas intensified in the late Republic, of course, as the Roman civil war involved virtually the whole empire. After Octavian's great victory at Actium, however, 'peace and security' were imposed on the empire

---

[295] Elliott explains further: "The 'altar of the peace of Augustus' was placed on the Hill of Mars, god of war. Coins struck under Augustus link the armed and armored First Citizen with Pax, goddess of peace, trampling on the weapons of subdued enemies, the Victoria, goddess of conquest, treading upon the globe itself." See Neil Elliott, "The Anti-Imperial Message of the Cross," in *Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation*, ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000), 169.

[296] Horsley, *1 Corinthians*, 188. In other works, Horsley has argued quite strongly that Paul opposes the Roman Empire. See Richard A. Horsley, "Paul's Counter-Imperial Gospel: Introduction," in *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997), 140–47; Richard A. Horsley, "Rhetoric and Empire - and 1 Corinthians," in *Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation*, ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000), 72–102.

by its savior. . . ”[297] In light of their socio-historical experience, the idea that Paul is opposing

the empire in 1 Cor 14 is probably unthinkable for these Corinthians.

Again, 1 Cor 14 is a chapter in which Paul claims a divine authority over this community.

To put it in the framework of Philipson's theory of linguistic imperialism that I discussed above,

Paul sees himself the "*an inter-state actor*" in the larger context of the empire. As a Roman

citizen, rather than using his privilege to resist the linguistic imperial power of Latin with which

he himself might struggle, Paul instead behaves like a miniature emperor in the locality of the

Corinthian community by silencing the minority voices and claiming that such behavior

conforms to the divine will and peace. The linguicism in Paul takes a theological shape.

However, from the point of view of minority language speakers, Paul's rhetoric of peace might

sound very much like the political propaganda of the Roman Empire.

4.4.4. Summary

To sum up, this discussion on Paul's political strategies in silencing tongue(s)–or foreign

languages–should be seen as a direct consequence of his constructed linguistic stratification that

appears throughout chapter 14. Difference is always a site of stratification and thus of the

struggle for power. Paul stratifies language in the Corinthian church by placing the dominant

language as the greater one, while arguing that the non-dominant, the foreign, and the other

languages are useless and unintelligible. Respectively, he names them prophecy and tongue(s).

Furthermore, the imposition of sameness onto the radical multiplicity of languages in Corinth is

an avoidable strategy because Paul seems to think that public and social order can only be

attained through a monolingual structure. People speaking all kinds of languages is a troubling

---

[297] Horsley, "Rhetoric and Empire - and 1 Corinthians," 76.

situation for Paul. Thus, he demands translation, and when no translation can be provided, he silences those other languages and voices.

4.5. Reimagining Tongue(s) as a Site of Resistance

Homi Bhabha insists that the domination and imposition of English—interestingly through the Bible—as a form of civilizing mission manifested in the exercise of colonial authority "requires the production of differentiations, individuations, identity effects through which discriminatory practices can map out subject populations that are tarred with visible and transparent mark of power."[298] In short, the authority of the colonialist cannot be exercised without difference. Difference (between the ruler and the ruled) has to be maintained and perpetuated in order for domination to work. Therefore, the colonialists will always produce difference even within their own discourse about their domination. Bahbha argues further, "the colonial presence is always ambivalent, split between its appearance as original and authoritative and its articulation as repetitive and difference."[299] This is why difference is not always outside the system but is often profoundly embedded within the system itself.[300] The dominant system of discourse cannot help but be ambivalent.

However, that crack, that split, that ambivalence, or that 'excess'[301] in the totality of the discourse is also the site of the instability and resistance. Because difference is embedded and always attached in the totality, the unavoidable result is quite frankly the condition of hybridity,

---

[298] Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 111.

[299] Bhabha, 107.

[300] Bhabha writes: "The place of difference and otherness, or the space of the adversarial, within such as system of 'disposal' as I've proposed, is never entirely on the outside or implacable oppositional. It is a pressure, and a presence, that acts " See Bhabha, 109. Julia Kristeva has also argued for almost the same point. See Julia Kristeva, *Strangers to Ourselves*, trans. Leon Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

[301] Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 112.

which is the simultaneous co-existence of sameness and otherness. Bhabha insists: "Hybridity intervenes in the exercise of authority not merely to indicate the impossibility of its identity but to represent the unpredictability of its presence. The book [i.e., the discourse of domination] retains its presence, but it is no longer a representation of an essence; it is now partial presence, a (strategic) device in a specific colonial engagement, an appurtenance of authority."[302] Such intervention of difference and hybridity against the force of colonial totality, as a result, becomes the locus of heterogeneous resistance. That heterogeneous difference and otherness will continue to challenge and interrupt "the voice of command," which, according to Bhabha, can turn the command into enigma.[303]

In spite of Paul's command to totalize and universalize language in the Corinthian church, I suggest that the difference and otherness of tongue(s) will always challenge his project. This is the reason that, toward the end of chapter 14, after repeating his original thesis on the eagerness of seeking prophecy in v. 39, Paul surprisingly makes this statement: "Do not hinder speaking in foreign languages" (τὸ λαλεῖν μὴ κωλύετε γλώσσαις). But, why? What does he really want? He has been forbidding, silencing, and repressing tongue(s) all along up to this point, but suddenly he says that we should not forbid them. He seems to contradict everything he has just said. This statement, at least, displays a remarkable ambivalence in Paul's relationship to tongue(s) speakers. His goal is, of course, to silence them for the sake of attaining

---

[302] Bhabha, 114–15. When Bhabha uses the term "the book," he mainly refers to the Bible as the "WORD of God" (emphasis is his), which the English colonizers brought with them to the colonies. However, the entire discussion is actually not Bhabha's critique of the Bible itself, but of what the Bible represents in the colonies. It represents English cultural dominance. He writes: "The miraculous authority of colonial Christianity, they [the English] would have held, lies precisely in its being both English and universal, empirical and uncanny, for 'ought we not rather to expect that such a Being on occasions of peculiar importance, may interrupt the order which he had appointed?' [a quotation from William Paley's *Evidences of Christianity*]. The Word, no less theocratic than logocentric, would have certainly borne absolute witness to the gospel of Hurdwar had it not been for the rather tasteless fact that most Hindus were vegetarians!" Bhabha, 117.

[303] Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*, 116.

an imagined unified-linguistic order, but their state of otherness keeps luring him, enticing him, and inducing him. Not only that but, as Bhabha has pointed out, the otherness of tongue(s) that Paul himself cannot disavow, either through the demand of translation or the command to be silent, reversely will challenge the totality of Paul's imagined monolingual order of sameness. Such order is unstable in the presence of tongue(s).

Furthermore, in regard to translation, Paul's demand for non-native speakers to speak another language will lead to imprecision because it is impossible to speak like natives. Thus, when Paul insists that the tongue(s) speakers have to pray so that their speech can be translated (1 Cor. 14:13), the reality is that this will likely result in slippery speech, inexact speech, speech with an 'accent.' In the words of Rey Chow,

> Because the native speaker is thought to occupy an uncorrupted origination point, learning a language as a nonnative speaker can only be an exercise in woeful approximation. The failure to sound completely like the native speaker is thus given a pejorative name: "(foreign) accent." Having an accent is, in other words, the symptom precisely of discontinuity–an incomplete assimilation, a botched attempt at eliminating another tongue's competing copresence. In geopolitical terms, having an accent is tantamount to leaving on display–rather than successfully covering up–the embarrassing evidence of one's alien origins and migratory status.[304]

Chow argues further that being native is actually just an empty claim because of the inherent plurality of language itself. She writes: "a native speaker becomes audible or discernible only when there are nonnative speakers present, when more than one language is already in play, explicitly or implicitly, as a murmur and an interference."[305] That is to say, a native cannot be native without the presence of the others. The identity of the native is tied to the others. The claim of originality "is viable only by erasure of the liminality of a language – the fact that its

---

[304] Rey Chow, *Not Like a Native Speaker: On Languaging as a Postcolonial Experience* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, 2014), 58.
[305] Chow, 58–59.

identity as one entity is always already the result of its proximity to other languages – and by erasure of discontinuity." Building upon Chinua Achebe's insistence that one should not learn to speak like a native, [306] Chow argues further that in the space where people speak with different accents – meaning other than the one 'claimed' to be native – "we can hear [the] creative domain of languaging emerging, a domain [of] the murmur, the passage, of diverse found speeches."[307] She calls this domain "xenophone" in order to convey the sense of intentionality or intendedness. "Imprints of the xenophone are already present everywhere, in particular in those discourses that, even when they are communicated in the colonial or imperial registers of standard or proper English, French, Spanish, or Chinese, carry memories that are not quite containable within the illusory unified histories of such registers," Chow argues.[308] For this reason, the impreciseness of the xenophone compared to the discourse of linguistic unity and origin is "the noise—and historical force—of a fundamental disruption."[309]

I propose that the disruption caused by the xenophone is the very promise of tongue(s). For in spite of Paul's demand for translation, when the translation is provided it will produce an expansive locus of inaccuracy. This linguistic inaccuracy or impreciseness becomes the space of linguistic resistance and disruption against the dominating language. "In postcolonial languaging, dispossession is the gate that opens unexpected doors. Behind those doors lie the vast, wondrous troves of xenophonic *énoncés,*"[310] Chow writes. Now, just like the tongue(s) speakers in the

---

[306] Chow presents the positions of Chinua Achebe and Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o as two opposing views on the colonial language (i.e., English). Achebe argues that one can still use the language but with a twist in order to resist its power, whereas Ngũgĩ refuses to use English at all. See Chow, 37–43.

[307] Chow, 59.

[308] Chow, 59.

[309] Chow, 59.

[310] Chow, 60. The concept *énoncé* is a Foucaultian archaeology of knowledge production that is rooted in and the further expansion of the structuralist tradition. A statement, for Foucault, "appears as an ultimate, undecomposable element that can be isolated and introduced into a set of relations with other similar elements. A

Corinthian church, Corinthian immigrants are the embodiment of xenophonic disruption in their impreciseness of speech (read: speaking with a foreign accent), which constitutes the multiplicity of competing discourses against the dominant one.

4.6. Some Closing Remarks

As readers might have noticed, I do not spend many pages in this chapter to explain the resistance of tongue(s) against the Pauline discourse of order and peace. It is simply because tongue(s) speakers are trapped in the eternal prison of Paul's representation. Thus, the entire discussion focuses on Paul and how he understands language, its use and its role in social organization. However, my reading of Paul does not necessarily aim to look into Paul's mind in order to find some sort of original-authorial intention. Far from it. My reading is a reconstruction on the basis of my experience as an immigrant in the United States. I call it a "heteroglossic-immigrant" mode of reading. It recognizes the presence of both centripetal and centrifugal forces of language. As such, language is thoroughly a site of struggle and 1 Cor 14 is a reflection of such struggle in the early Christian movement.

To sum up, I reemphasize several points now. First, concerning the nature of tongue(s), a strong case can be made that tongue(s) is a linguistic phenomenon instead of spiritual-ecstatic experience. Paul's quotation from Isaiah shows that he is aware of this linguistic problem. The issue in the Corinthian church is not glossolalia, but heteroglossia. This linguistic nature of tongue(s) can be detected also by Paul's use of singular and plural form of the noun γλῶσσα.

---

point without a surface, but a point that can be located in planes of division and in specific forms of groupings. A seed that appears on the surface of a tissue of which it is the constituent element. The atom of discourse." Any discourse, for Foucault, has to start with a statement, or a thing said (*énoncé*). In other words, *énoncé* is the building block of discourse. For further discussion see Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), pt. III; Chow, *Not like a Native Speaker*, chap. 2.

Similarly, the appearance of the word φωνή is also a strong indication that Paul is dealing with language differences here. If that is the case, then the best way to understand the word "translation" is not putting words to gibberish speech, but to transfer speech from one language to another.

Second, concerning the stratification of language, Paul makes a sharp distinction between tongue(s) and prophecy. I agree with many contemporary biblical scholars that the difference between those two lies in their intelligibility. Tongue(s) are not intelligible while prophecy is intelligible. However, I also differ from these scholars on what causes such difference. This issue of intelligibility is not caused by the fact that tongue(s) is non-language and prophecy is language. Instead, tongue(s) is foreign languages and prophecy is the dominant language. The unintelligibility of tongue(s), therefore, is caused by the inability of people in the dominant language speaking group to understand them. Paul does not stop by making such a distinction. He goes a step further by creating a stratification of language. Tongue(s), on the one hand, is lower, unintelligible, and useless. On the other hand, prophecy is higher, intelligible, and useful. Politically speaking, this discourse on stratification has a performative force that constitutes subjected and dominant subjects.

Third, this constructed stratification of language is not the end of the story. Paul takes a politically aggressive step to silence these useless languages in the name of "order." In this chapter, I highlight three strategies of silencing: the politics of race, the politics of gender, and the politics of imperialism. These are all interconnected, of course. Both racial and gender difference is constructed on the basis of linguistic difference, while the politics of imperialism highlights Paul's theological insistence on the God of peace. Again, the aim of such political

strategies is clear throughout 1 Cor 14, that is, to bring monolingual order to the community of believers in Corinth.

Lastly, this chapter reimagined tongue(s) speakers not as a bunch of troublemakers who deserve to be silenced, as has been commonly argued by biblical scholars today, but tongue(s) speakers as a space of resistance against the force of the dominant language. Such resistance is expressed mainly through the otherness that tongue(s) present in the ocean of sameness. For though they may be forced to transfer, to change, to translate their language into the dominant language, the difference will continue to follow them. Speaking with an 'accent' is not a scandal. The impreciseness of non-native speech is a subversive act of introducing and presenting difference to the structure of sameness, and thus destabilizes its totality.

Inconclusion

> To speak a language is to take on a world, a culture.
> Frantz Fanon.[1]

> It goes without saying, then, that language is also a political instrument, means, and proof of power. It is the most vivid and crucial key to identity: It reveals the private identity, and connects one with, or divorces one from, the larger, public, or communal identity.
> James Baldwin[2]

The primary concern of this dissertation project has been to bring the reality of linguistic struggle to the study of the early Christianity. Languages always exist in contested political spaces. To put it in James Baldwin's terms, language is an instrument of politics, a means of power. For this very reason, it is no surprise that Frantz Fanon places the issue of language right in the first chapter of his book, *Black Skin, White Masks* to "ascribe a basic importance to the phenomenon of language."[3] For Fanon, "To speak a language is to take on a world, a culture." This statement has to be understood in light of the context of his discussion. Language is not only about knowing "syntax" or grasping "the morphology of this or that language."[4] Why? Because, Fanon insists, in the colonies, in the subjected position, in the peripheries, language is constantly a site of struggle.[5] "Every colonized people—in other words, every people in whose

---

[1] Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann, Get Political (London: Pluto Press, 1991), 25.

[2] James Baldwin, "If Black English Isn't a Language, Then Tell Me, What Is?," *The New York Times*, July 29, 1979, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/07/29/archives/if-black-english-isnt-a-language-then-tell-me-what-is.html.

[3] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 8.

[4] Fanon, 8.

[5] Fanon makes it clear that his interest is primarily how "the black man[was] confronted by French language." (Fanon, 16.) Fanon writes this about people who speak the dominant language poorly: "I meet a Russian or a German who speaks French badly. With gestures I try to give him the information that he requests, but at the same time I can hardly forget that he has a language of his own, a country, and perhaps he is a lawyer or an engineer there. In any case, he is foreign to my group, his standard must be different." This condition is even worse among Blacks, according to Fanon, because they have "no culture, no civilization, no 'long historical past.'" And thus, the fight to reclaim their culture correlates directly to the linguistic struggle. (Fanon, 10.)

soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality—finds itself face to face with the language of the civilizing nation; that is, with the culture of the mother country,"[6] writes Fanon. This linguistic struggle is the experience of many non-English speaking immigrants who live in the United States today. The same is true also for non-Greek and non-Latin speaking communities in the first-century Greco-Roman world. This concern is precisely what I have attempted to bring to the surface in my reading of Paul's letter to the Corinthians.

Pauline Silencing Discourse at Work

Having investigated the text's history of reception (chapter 1), its contextual-theoretical framework (chapter 2), the historical context of Corinth in the Roman period (chapter 3), and Paul's discursive force of silencing other languages and imposing a unified language in public gatherings (chapter 4), in this last section of the dissertation I look back briefly at history to see how Paul's discursive force has been employed politically in the church. This is where the rubber meets the road, because 1 Cor 14 has played a significant role during the transition of the dominant ecclesial language from Greek to Latin in the Western Church, and then from Latin to vernacular European languages in the post-Reformation period.

The Corinthian commentary by a fourth-century pseudonymous author, Abrosiaster, reveals how this passage was used to combat the dominance of Greek. He wrote about Paul's statement in 1 Cor 14:14 that "Latin-speakers sing in Greek and enjoy the sound of the words but do not understand what they are singing."[7] Knowing that when Paul made this statement he was

---

[6] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 9.

[7] Abrosiaster, *Commentaries on Romans and 1–2 Corinthians*, trans. Gerald L. Bray, Ancient Christian Texts (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 186.

referring mainly to Greek-speaking people using other languages (including Latin!),

Ambrosiaster turns the tables and now uses this passage against the Greek language. Maura K.

Lafferty shows how Abrosiaster's interpretation of this text demonstrates how Latin speakers

resisted the dominance of the Greek language,[8] a resistance that eventually led to the

establishment of Latin language as the official tongue of the Western church. From as early as

the fourth century, the ecclesial mass of the Western church was henceforth spoken in Latin.[9]

Fast forward to the post-Reformation period when a fierce debate concerning the

liturgical language emerged again among church leaders in Europe.[10] What language should the

church use: Latin (i.e., the official liturgical language of the Roman Catholic Church) or, say,

English or German (the local languages)? This question was a critical one at this time. Heinrich

---

[8] Lafferty notes: "Here Ambrosiaster assumes that it is a common occurrence for Latin speakers to pray in Greek, even when they cannot understand it. At the same time, however, the passage suggests the possibility, indeed the desirability, of praying in one's native tongue. This passage fits well with a picture of a linguistically complex liturgical situation in Rome. Several scholars have argued that the Roman church went through a gradual period of transition from Greek to Latin, each community within the city using in its liturgy the language or balance of languages most suited to the demography, taste, or expectations of its members." See Maura K. Lafferty, "Translating Faith from Greek to Latin: Romanitas and Christianitas in Late Fourth-Century Rome and Milan," *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 11, no. 1 (March 27, 2003): 33.

[9] See Keith Pecklers, *The Genius of The Roman Rite: On the Reception and Implementation of The New Missal* (London: Burns & Oates, 2009), 7–12; Lafferty, "Translating Faith from Greek to Latin."

[10] Michel Foucault has characterized the sixteenth century as a period of immense political instability that triggered the production of many discourses on governmentality. He explains: "How to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept being governed, how to become the best possible governor – all these problems, in their multiplicity and intensity, seem to me to be the characteristic of the sixteenth century, which lies, to put it schematically, at the crossroads of two processes: the one which, shattering the structures of feudalism, leads to the establishment of the great territorial, administrative and colonial states; and that totally different movement, which the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, raises the issue of how one must be spiritually ruled and led on this earth in order to achieve eternal salvation." See Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 87–88. Cf. Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978*, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 88–89. The second point that Foucault raises has something to do with the internal governmental struggle within the church. Since politics and language are almost inseparable, the debate on language should be viewed within this larger context of the struggle on governmentality. The art of governing in the western world, according to Foucault, is marked by the so-called the "pastoral power," which is governing through controlling and managing population. This particular mechanism of power is the product of a Hebraic (and Christian) theological notion of God as a shepherd leading the flock (human beings). This idea of ruling through being a shepherd is quite absent, according to Foucault, in the Greco-Roman political discourses.

Bullinger, a Swish Reformer, responding to this question in the late sixteenth century, wrote "[that the Roman Catholic church affirms] that privately and publicly we must pray in Latin, seems in my judgment to be out of their wits, unless they speak of such as are skillful in the Latin tongue."[11] Bullinger then alluded to 1 Cor 14 as a justification for the rejection of the use of Latin in church gatherings.

> Whereby it is clearer than the daylight, that they, that have brought in strange tongues into the church of God, have troubled all things, have quenched the ferventness of men's minds, yea, and have banished out of the church both prayer itself and the use of prayer, and all the fruit and profit that should come of things done in the church. And truly, the Roman and Latin prince hath brought this Latin abomination into the church of God.[12]

The point of 1 Cor 14, according to Bullinger, is that everyone should pray in the language that they can understand. In other words, speaking Latin in sixteenth-century Zurich churches is very much like speaking in tongue(s) in the Corinthian church.

The Church of England had to deal with the same linguistic issue around the late sixteenth century. The famous controversy between Thomas Harding and John Jewel on language use in public worship is indicative of such struggle. On the one hand, Harding argued that Latin is the language that people have to use in the mass and the English reformers' insistence that they use their own vernacular language is a lie. Why? Simply because, for him, the Catholic church should use the universal language that everyone—or at least most (educated) people—can understand. Referring to 1 Cor 14:11, Harding contends that because all other languages are more barbarous (i.e., unintelligible) than Latin, the supreme linguistic position in

---

[11] Henry Bullinger, "The Fifth Sermon: Of the Form and Manner How to Pray to God; That Is, of the Calling on the Name of the Lord: Where Also the Lord's Prayer Is Expounded; and Also Singing, Thanksgiving, and the Force of Prayer, Is Entreated," in *The Decades of Henry Bullinger, Minister of the Church of Zurich*, ed. Thomas Harding, vol. I (Cambridge: The University Press, 1852), 188.

[12] Bullinger, 189.

the universal church can only be assumed by the Latin language, rather than by the English language.[13]

On the other hand, Harding's staunch opponent, John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury, rejected Harding's view, interestingly also by using Paul's discourse on tongue(s) in 1 Cor 14. While Harding argues that the universality of Latin guarantees its "non-barbarian" status, Jewel contends that when Paul wrote 1 Cor 14:11 he simply followed the general social division of Greek and barbarians at that time. Thus, "as for [the] Latin tongue, which M. Harding so favourably excepteth, it hath no such special privilege above others. St. Paul, making a full division of the whole world, nameth some Greeks, and some barbarous, and so leaveth out the Latins among the barbarous."[14] Latin, the language that Harding deems as the least barbarous of all, according to Jewel, is still a barbarous tongue. Furthermore, refuting Harding's view that when the apostles traveled around the world to preach the gospel they used Latin instead of the local languages for their public prayers,[15] Jewel wrote:

---

[13] He wrote: "[T]he fifth lye is to saye that we pronounce our service and our mysteries in a barbarous tongue. As though the latine tongue wer barbarous and not rather every vulgare tongue. That tōgue is most barbarous, which is most vsed of the vulgare sort, most private, most vnknowe in respect of all. But in the latine church wherein al our seruice is said, and whereof the catholikes of England be members (as wherein they were Christened) in this church the latine tongue is more knowen and more vniuersall, and therefore lesse barbarous then then the englishe tongue. It is otherwise when we preach. For then we teach the people, and speake to them only. But in our publike praiers we saie the cōmon seruice of all the West church, and not only the seruice of England. When England commeth to haue a seruice of their owne, a tongue of their owne in churches, and hath a church of their owne besyde the whole, thē haue they lost their part with the catholike church, whereunto God restore it againe." Thomas Harding, *A Confvtation of a Booke Intitvled an Apologie of the Chvrch of England* (Antwerpe: Ihon Laet, 1565), 243.

[14] John Jewel, *The Works of John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury. First Portion, Containing, a Sermon Preached at Paul's Cross. Correspondence with Dr. Cole. The Reply to Harding's Answer.*, ed. John Ayre, vol. I (Cambridge: The University Press, 1845), 267.

[15] This is the complete argument from Harding that Jewel refutes: "The gospel and the faith of Christ was preached and set forth in Syria and Arabia by Paul; in Egypt by Mark, in Aethiopia by Matthew; in Mesopotamia, Persia, Media, Batra, Hyrcania, Parthia, and Carmania, by Thomas; in Armenia the greater by Bartholomew; in Scythia by Andrew; and likewise in the other countries by apostolic men, who were sent by the apostles and their successors. . . Now, if M. Jewel, or any of our learned adversaries, or any man living, could shew good evidence and proof; that the public service of the church was then in the Syriacal or Arabic, in the Egyptian, Ethiopian, Persian, Armenian, Scythian, French, or Britain tongue; then might they justly claim prescription against us in this article, then might they charge us with example of antiquity, then might they require us to yield to the manner and authority

M. Harding maketh a long discourse of the apostles' and other apostolic men's travels throughout the world. If he had shewed to what end, we might the better have known his purpose. If he will say, "The apostles preach in sundry countries; *ergo*, the people had their common prayers in an unknown tongue," this argument will hardly hold. For to that end God gave unto them the gift of tongues, that they might deal with all nations in their own languages.[16]

Just as Paul silences languages that are not understandable, both Harding and Jewel think that the only way to conduct the church liturgy is in an understandable language. Harding rejects the use of local languages, while Jewel rejects Latin. This brief overview of the linguistic debate in the Western church reveals that the readers of 1 Cor have long identified themselves with Paul's act of silencing. Indeed, Paul's logic of negation, of exclusion, in 1 Cor 14 has become a discursive tool for establishing a monolingual social order in the church.

However, reading Paul's discourse from a heteroglossic-immigrant point of view, is it possible to turn the table around? Can one change one's allegiance from Paul to the plurality, openness, and inclusivity of tongue(s)? To put it differently, can tongue(s) be reimagined as a project of hospitality, a radical openness to the others? Can tongue(s) be viewed as a promise of the hospitable breaking of centripetal force of monoligualism? I would like to close this dissertation with a short remark on seeing tongue(s) as a space of radical hospitality.

Hospitality

As I have discussed in chapter 2, Bakhtin argues that heteroglossia is the most basic fact of language. Heteroglossia is "given" while monoglossia is a force that united only by silencing this radical diversity of speeches. Both polyphony (the multiplicity of voices) and dialogism (the active interactions among subjects) are thoroughly based on this basic fact of linguistic life, i.e.,

---

of the primitive church. But that doubtless cannot appear, which any could shew, it would make much for the service to be had in the vulgar tongue." (Quoted in Jewel, I:266–67.)

[16] Jewel, I:268.

heteroglossia. And this dialogic heteroglossia is unending and unfinalized. Therefore, language has never been owned by one person only. One person's language is also somebody else's. This insistence on the unfinalizability of dialogism lies at the heart of Bakhtin's philosophy of language. In this sense, heteroglossia is always a space of hospitality. It welcomes, affirms, and invites the others to engage in an active dialogic interaction. On the basis of that, the heteroglossic nature of tongue(s) in the Corinthian church could be seen precisely as linguistic hospitality. By changing the allegiance from Paul's discourse of monoglossic silencing to the heteroglossic-dialogical tongue(s), we can seriously affirm that "the essence of language is friendship and hospitality," as Emmanuel Levinas puts it.[17]

This brings me to the issue of "translation" that is quite central in Pauline logic of linguistic order. As I have discussed in Chapter 4, a demand for translation of tongue(s) is the way Paul handles the issue of many languages in Corinth. Is this demand for translation an act of hospitality? In other words, is the demand for translation a demand to be hospitable? In this case, Paul Ricoeur's argument that the primary task of a translator is to exhibit what he calls "linguistic hospitality"[18] comes from a different subject position. His discussion on translation is based primarily on the common practice among European scholars translating Greek or Latin literature.[19] The task of a European translator, in this case, is to demonstrate a respect for the guest or source language when it is "invited into" the European host languages. This is significantly different from the situation of the Corinthian church where minority language speakers are required to translate their languages thoroughly into the dominant tongue.

---

[17] Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979), 305.

[18] Paul Ricoeur, *On Translation*, trans. Eileen Brennan, Thinking in Action (London: Routledge, 2006), 10.

[19] See Ricoeur, 21.

I turn to Jacques Derrida to help me shed some light on this situation of the Corinthian church. In framing the linguistic struggle of foreigners in the story of Socrates defending himself in front of the Athenian judges in Plato's *Apology,* in which Socrates expresses his inability to speak in the language of the court, Derrida argues that such inability renders Socrates as the foreigner asking to be treated with hospitality. Socrates "is *like* a foreigner."[20] That is to say, his status as a foreigner is above all marked by a linguistic otherness or foreignness. "The foreigner is first of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospitality is formulated, the right to asylum, its limits, norms, policing, etc.," writes Derrida.[21] Thus, in order to navigate all the legal challenges, the foreigners are required to speak the language of the host state. The act of imposing the language and requiring translation is "the first act of violence." Derrida contends: "That is where the question of hospitality begins: must we ask the foreigner to understand us, to speak our language, in all the senses of this term, in all its possible extensions, before being able and so as to be able to welcome him into our country?"[22] Placing the Corinthian linguistic contestation in this Derridean sense, Paul's demand for a complete translation becomes not an expression of hospitality but rather an act of violence.

As a heteroglossic phenomenon, I should argue now that the openness to tongue(s) would lead to what Derrida calls "an absolute or unconditional hospitality." It is unconditional because it would let the others be the others without subjecting them to the structure of sameness. It is about "the right granted to the foreigner as such, to the foreigner remaining a foreigner."[23] To quote Derrida again:

---

[20] Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, *Of Hospitality*, trans. Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000), 15.
[21] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 15.
[22] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 15.
[23] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 21–22.

> [A]bsolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner (provided with a family name, with social status of being a foreigner, etc.), but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other, and that I *give place* to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names.[24]

This radical form of hospitality is precisely the social promise of tongue(s). Changing the allegiance from Paul to tongue(s) requires us to perceive social order from a different point of view. The social dynamic is no longer ordered by a totalizing-systemic structure of sameness but by an openness to linguistic diversity. Putting it in Bakhtinian terms again, in spite of the existence of the centripetal force, the centrifugal forces of heteroglossia would always insist on welcoming diversity and opening the space for otherness.

Unexplored Areas

This hospitality promised by heteroglossia, I argue, appears in the story of Pentecost in Acts 2. Critical readers of this dissertation will notice that I have avoided discussing the appearance of tongue(s) in the book of Acts (and also in Mark 16, or Revelation 7:9). The main reason for my avoidance of discussing those non-Pauline passages is clearly because of the limited space of this dissertation. I strongly felt the need to spend more energy and ink to bringing "language" back to the scholarly discussion on speaking in tongue(s). As I have described in the first chapter, that is primarily because the linguistic nature of "tongue(s)" has been stripped away by biblical scholars for more than two centuries.

Having said that, it is always important to remember that Paul is not the only person in the early Christian movement who struggled with the reality of the multiplicity of languages. There are other visions of multilingualism in the New Testament. Paul is only one of them and

---

[24] Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 25.

427

the early Christian movement is not a monolithic entity. It is better, therefore, to describe this movement as early Christianities. Differences appear not only in their theologies, races/ethnicities, classes, social statuses, genders, and languages, but also in the way they view how the church should deal with those differences. My next project is to write a more comprehensive exposition on other visions of multilinguality in other New Testament books (particularly Acts, Mark, and Revelation) and then compare them with Paul's attitude on tongue(s). Indeed, there are still many areas to be explored. Also, because heteroglossia should be seen as a space of hospitable openness to the others, the foreigners, I believe that it is most appropriate to close this dissertation with this gesture of inconclusion. Keterkaitan dialogis bahasa yang tak berakhir menuntut kita untuk terus membuka diri kepada sang liyan.

Bibliography

Adams, J. N. *Bilingualism and the Latin Language*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

———. "'Romanitas' and the Latin Language." *The Classical Quarterly* 53, no. 1 (2003): 184–205.

Adams, James Noel. *The Vulgar Latin of the Letters of Claudius Terentianus (P. Mich. VIII, 467-72)*. Menchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1977.

Agamben, Giorgio. *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Homo Sacer Series. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.

Agha, Asif. *Language and Social Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

"Agrarian Law; 111 B.C." The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy. Accessed December 13, 2017. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/agrarian_law.asp.

Alba, Richard, John Logan, Amy Lutz, and Brian Stults. "Only English by the Third Generation? Loss and Preservation of the Mother Tongue among the Grandchildren of Contemporary Immigrants." *Demography* 39, no. 3 (2002): 467–84.

Algeo, John. "External History." In *The Cambridge History of the English Language:*, edited by John Algeo, Volume 6: English in North America:1–58. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Allison, Robert W. "Let Women Be Silent in the Churches (1 Cor 14:33b-36): What Did Paul Really Say, and What Did It Mean?" *Journal for the Study of the New Testament*, no. 32 (February 1, 1988): 27–60.

Alter, Peter. *Nationalism*. London; New York: Hodder Education Publishers, 1994.

Althusser, Louis. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001.

Abrosiaster. *Commentaries on Romans and 1-2 Corinthians*. Translated by Gerald L. Bray. Ancient Christian Texts. Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009.

An Essay on the Gift of Tongues, Proving That It Was Not the Gift of Languages: In a Letter to a Friend. London; Bristol: R. Cruttwell, 1786.

Anderson, Benedict R. O'g. "Language, Fantasy, Revolution: Java 1900-1950." In *Making Indonesia*, edited by Daniel S. Lev, George McTurnan Kahin, and Ruth Thomas McVey, 25–39. Ithaca, NY: SEAP Publications, 1996.

———. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Rev. Ed. London: Verso, 2006.

———. *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*. Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006.

Anson, Edward M. "Greek Ethnicity and the Greek Language." *Glotta* 85 (2009): 5–30.

Anwar, Khaidir. *Indonesian: The Development and Use of a National Language*. Yogyakarta, Indonesia: Gadjah Mada University Press, 1980.

Apsler, Alfred. "Herder and the Jews." *Monatshefte Für Deutschen Unterricht* 35, no. 1 (1943): 1–15.

Archer, Kenneth J. "Women in Ministry: A Pentecostal Reading of New Testament Texts." In *Women in Pentecostal and Charismatic Ministry: Informing a Dialogue on Gender, Church, and Ministry*, edited by Lois Olena and Margaret English de Alminana, 35–56. Global Pentecostal and Charismatic Studies. Leiden: Brill, 2016.

Arendt, Hannah. "Imperialism, Nationalism, Chauvinism." *The Review of Politics* 7, no. 4 (1945): 441–63.

———. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New Edition with Added Prefaces. New York: A Harvest Book, 1973.

———. *The Portable Hannah Arendt*. Edited by Peter Baehr. New York: Penguin Classics, 2003.

Arens, Hans. *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Its Tradition*. Studies in the History of Language Sciences 29. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 1984.

Arnal, William. "What Branches Grow out of This Stony Rubbish? Christian Origins and the Study of Religion." *Studies in Religion/Sciences Religieuses* 39, no. 4 (December 1, 2010): 549–72.

Augustine. *Confessions*. Translated by Henry Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Austin, J. L. *How to Do Things with Words*. 2nd ed. William James Lectures ; 1955. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975.

Back, Sven-Olav, and Erkki Koskenniemi. *Institutions of the Emerging Church*. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016.

Baer, April. "Luis Alfaro's Medea Takes On The Mexican Immigrant Experience At Oregon Shakespeare Festival." Accessed October 19, 2017. http://www.opb.org/radio/programs/state-of-wonder/article/oregon-shakespeare-festival-luis-alfaro-medea-mojada-immigration/.

Bailey, Benjamin. "Language and Negotiation of Ethnic/Racial Identity among Dominican Americans." *Language in Society* 29, no. 4 (2000): 555–82.

———. *Language, Race, and Negotiation of Identity: A Study of Dominican Americans*. New Americans. New York: Lfb Scholarly Pub Llc, 2002.

Bailey, Beryl Loftman. "Toward a New Perspective in Negro English Dialectology." *American Speech* 40, no. 3 (1965): 171–77.

Baldwin, James. "If Black English Isn't a Language, Then Tell Me, What Is?" *The New York Times*, July 29, 1979. https://www.nytimes.com/1979/07/29/archives/if-black-english-isnt-a-language-then-tell-me-what-is.html.

Bakhtin, M. M. *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays*. Edited by Michael Holquist. Translated by Vadim Liapunov and Kenneth Brostrom. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1990.

———. *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*. Edited by Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson. Translated by Vern W. McGee. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1986.

———. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. Edited by Michael Holquist. Translated by Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004.

———. *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.

Baltes, Guido. "The Origin of the 'Exclusive Aramaic Model' in the Nineteenth Century: Methodological Fallacies and Subtel Motives." In *The Language Environment of First Century Judaea: Jerusalem Studies in the Synoptic Gospels*, edited by Randall Buth and R. Steven Notley, 2:9–34. Leiden: Brill, 2014.

Balzat, Jean-Sébastien, and Benjamin W. Millis. "M. Antonius Aristocrates: Provincial Involvement with Roman Power in the Late 1st Century B.C." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 82, no. 4 (2013): 651–72.

Bardili, Christoph Gottfried. *Significatus primitivus vocis προφητης ex Platone erutus, cum novo tentamine interpretandi I. Cor. Cap. XIV*. Göttingen: I.C. Dieterich, 1736.

Barnard, Frederick M. *Herder on Nationality, Humanity, and History*. London and Ithaca: McGill-Queen's Press, 2003.

Baron, Dennis E. *The English-Only Question: An Official Language for Americans?* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992.

Barrett, Caitlín E. *Egyptianizing Figurines from Delos*. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011.

Barrett, C.K. *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1968.

Barrett, Rusty. "African American English and the Promise of Code-Meshing." In *Other People's English: Code-Meshing, Code-Switching, and African American Literacy*, edited by Vershawn Ashanti Young, Rusty Barrett, Y'Shanda Young-Rivera, and Kim Brian Lovejoy, 15–51. New York: Teachers College Press, 2013.

Barreto, Eric D. "Reexamining Ethnicity: Latina/Os, Race, and the Bible." In *Latino/a Biblical Hermeneutics: Problematics, Objectives, Strategies*, edited by Francisco Lozada and Fernando F. Segovia, 73–93. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2015.

Bauer, Walter. *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3rd Edition*. Edited by Frederick William Danker. 3rd edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

Baugh, John. *Out of the Mouths of Slaves: African American Language and Educational Malpractice*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999.

Baur, Ferdinand Christian. "Kritische Uebersicht: Über Die Neuesten, Das Γλώσσαις Λαλεῖν in Der Ersten Christlichen Kirche Betreffenden Untersuchungen (Mit Besonderer Rücksicht Auf Die Schrift: Die Geistesgaben Der Ersten Christen, Insbesondere Die Sogenannte Gabe Der Sprachen. Eine Exegetisch Entwickelung von Dl. David Schulz. Breslau 1836)." In *Theologische Studien Und Kritiken*, 618–702. Hamburg: bei Friedrich Perthes, 1838.

———. "Ueber Den Wahren Begriff Des Γλωσσαις Λαλειν, Mit Rückficht Auf Die Neuesten Untersuchungen Hierüber." In *Tübinger Zeitschrift Für Theologie*, edited by Ferdinand Christian Baur and Friedrich Heinrich Kern, 75–133. Tübingen: bei Ludw. Friedrich Fue'i., 1930.

———. *Paul the Apostle of Jesus Christ: His Life and Works, His Epistles and Teachings*. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2003.

———. *The Church History of the First Three Centuries*. Translated by Allan Menzies. Vol. 1. London: Williams and Norgate, 1878.

Baycroft, Timothy, and David Hopkin, eds. *Folklore and Nationalism in Europe During the Long Nineteenth Century*. Leiden: Brill, 2012.

Beckmann, Susan. "Language as Cultural Identity." In *Language and Literature in Multicultural Contexts*, edited by Satendra P. Nandan, 66–77. ACLALS Fifth Triennial Conference Proceedings. Suva, Fiji: University of the South Pacific, 1983.

Beet, John Agar. *A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Corinthians*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1882.

Beiser, Frederick C. *The German Historicist Tradition*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Bell, Allan. "Style in Dialogue: Bakhtin and Sociolinguistic Theory." In *Sociolinguistic Variation: Theories, Methods, and Applications*, edited by Robert Bayley and Ceil Lucas, 90–109. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Bennett, David Malcolm. *Edward Irving Reconsidered: The Man, His Controversies, and the Pentecostal Movement*. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2014.

432

Berger, Stefan. "Introduction." In *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Europe, 1789 - 1914*, edited by Stefan Berger, xvii–xxvi. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008.

Berlin, Isaiah. "The Counter-Enlightenment." In *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas*, edited by Henry Hardy, Second., 1–32. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.

———. *Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hamann, Herder*. Edited by Henry Hardy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Beuken, W. *Isaiah Chapters 28-39*. Vol. 2, Part 2. The Historical Commentary on the Old Testament. Leuven: Peeters, 2000.

Beydoun, Khaled A. "Pledging Allegiance to Islamophobia in US Classrooms - Al Jazeera English," March 23, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/03/pledging-allegiance-islamophobia-classrooms-150322050951640.html.

Bhabha, Homi K. "Introduction: Narrating the Nation." In *Nation and Narration*, edited by Homi K. Bhabha, 1–7. London; New York: Routledge, 1990.

———. *The Location of Culture*. New York: Routledge, 1994.

Billings, Andrew C. "Beyond the Ebonics Debate: Attitudes about Black and Standard American English." *Journal of Black Studies* 36, no. 1 (2005): 68–81.

Billroth, Gustav. *A Commentary on the Epistles of Paul to the Corinthians*. Translated by William Lindsay Alexander. Vol. II. The Biblical Cabinet; or Hermeneutical, Exegetical, and Philological Library, XXIII. Edinburgh, UK: Thomas Clark, 1838.

Bitner, Bradley J. "Mixed-Language Inscribing at Roman Corinth." In *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, edited by James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn, 185–218. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016.

———. *Paul's Political Strategy in 1 Corinthians 1-4*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Biville, Frédérique. "The Graeco-Romans and Graeco-Latin: A Terminological Framework for Cases of Bilingualism." In *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, edited by J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain, 77–102. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Bleek, Frederich. "Über Die Gabe Des Γλώσσαις Λαλεῖν in Der Ersten Christlichen Kirche." In *Theologische Studien Und Kritiken*, 3–79. Hamburg: Bei Friedrich Perthes, 1829.

Blegen, Carl W. "Corinth in Prehistoric Times." *American Journal of Archaeology* 24, no. 1 (1920): 1–13.

Boldrey, Richard, and Joice Boldrey. *Chauvinist or Feminist?: Paul's View of Women*. Grand
　　　Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1976.

Bookidis, Nancy. "Religion in Corinth: 146 B.C.E. to 100 C.E." In *Urban Religion in Roman
　　　Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, edited by Daniel Schowalter and Steven J.
　　　Friesen, 141–64. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Bourdieu, Pierre. *The Logic of Practice*. Translated by Richard Nice. Stanford, CA: Stanford
　　　University Press, 1992.

———. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Translated by Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson.
　　　Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991.

Boyarin, Daniel. *A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity*. Berkeley, CA: University of
　　　California Press, 1994.

Boyle, Matthew. "Exclusive: Donald Trump Fires Back at Jeb Bush." Breitbart, September 2,
　　　2015. http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/09/02/exclusive-donald-trump-
　　　fires-back-at-jeb-bush-he-should-lead-by-speaking-english-while-in-the-united-states/.

Branham, Robert Bracht. *Bakhtin and the Classics*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press,
　　　2002.

Brixhe, Claude. "Interactions between Greek and Phrygian under the Roman Empire." In
　　　Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word, edited by J. N.
　　　Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain, 246–66. Oxford and New York: Oxford
　　　University Press, 2003.

———. "Linguistic Diversity in Asia Minor during the Empire: Koine and Non-Greek
　　　Languages." In *A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language*, edited by Egbert J.
　　　Bakker, 228–52. West Sussex, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Broneer, Oscar. "Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American
　　　School of Classical Studies at Athens* 10, no. 4 (1941): 388–90.

———. "Corinth: Center of St. Paul's Missionary Work in Greece." *The Biblical Archaeologist*
　　　14, no. 4 (1951): 78–96.

———. "The Isthmian Sanctuary of Poseidon." *Archaeology* 8, no. 1 (1955): 56–62.

———. *The South Stoa and Its Roman Successors*. Vol. I part IV. Princeton, NJ: The American
　　　School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1954.

Bronner, Stephen Eric. *Critical Theory: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford
　　　University Press, 2011.

Brown, Roger Langham. *Wilhelm von Humboldt's Conception of Linguistic Relativity*. Paris:
　　　Mouton, 1967.

Bruhn, Jørgen, and Jan Lundquist. "Introduction: A Novelness of Bakhtin?" In *The Novelness of Bakhtin: Perspectives and Possibilities*, edited by Jørgen Bruhn and Jan Lundquist, 11–52. Copenhagen, Denmark: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2001.

Bucholtz, Mary. "Changing Places: Language and Women's Place in Context." In *Language and Woman's Place: Text and Commentaries*, edited by Mary Bucholtz, Revised and Expanded Edition., 121–28. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

———. "The Feminist Foundations of Language, Gender, and Sexuality Research." In *The Handbook of Language, Gender, and Sexuality*, edited by Susan Ehrlich, Miriam Meyerhoff, and Janet Holmes, 2 edition., 23–47. Chichester, West Sussex England ; Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.

Buck, Carl D. *The Greek Dialects*. London; Newburyport: Bristol Classical Press, 1998.

Buell, Denise Kimber. "Early Christian Universalism and Modern Forms of Racism." In *The Origins of Racism in the West*, edited by Miriam Eliav-Feldon, Benjamin H. Isaac, and Joseph Ziegler, 109–31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

———. "Rethinking the Relevance of Race for Early Christian Self-Definition." *Harvard Theological Review* 94, no. 4 (2001).

———. *Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2005.

———., and Caroline Johnson Hodge. "The Politics of Interpretation: The Rhetoric of Race and Ethnicity in Paul." *Journal of Biblical Literature* 123, no. 2 (2004): 235–51.

Bullinger, Henry. "The Fifth Sermon: Of the Form and Manner How to Pray to God; That Is, of the Calling on the Name of the Lord: Where Also the Lord's Prayer Is Expounded; and Also Singing, Thanksgiving, and the Force of Prayer, Is Entreated." In *The Decades of Henry Bullinger, Minister of the Church of Zurich*, edited by Thomas Harding, I:163–225. Cambridge: The University Press, 1852.

Butler, Judith. *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*. New York: Routledge, 1997.

———. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge, 1999.

Bultmann, Rudolf. *Theology of the New Testament*. Translated by Kendrick Grobel. Vol. I. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955.

"California Mom Berated Publicly for Speaking Spanish in Restaurant." NBC News, August 4, 2015. http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latina-mom-berated-speaking-spanish-restaurant-n403901.

Calvin, John. *Commentary on Corinthians*. Translated by John Pringle. Vol. 1. Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library, 1848.

Capps, Edward. "Pergamene Influence at Corinth." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 7, no. 4 (1938): 539–56.

Carlisle, Rodney P., and J. Geoffrey Golson. *Colonial America from Settlement to the Revolution*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006.

"Carlo Stefan." Accessed July 19, 2016. https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=532661783550190&permPage=1.

Carson, D. A. *Showing the Spirit: A Theological Exposition of 1 Corinthians 12-14*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1987.

———. "'Silent in the Churches': On the Role of Women in 1 Corinthians 14:33b-36." In *Recovering Biblical Manhood and Womanhood Publisher: Crossway Books*, edited by John Piper and Wayne A. Grudem, 133–47. Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1991.

Cavarero, Adriana. *For More than One Voice: Toward a Philosophy of Vocal Expression*. Translated by Paul A. Kottman. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005.

Chermak, Steven, and Frankie Y. Bailey. *Crimes of the Centuries: Notorious Crimes, Criminals, and Criminal Trials in American History [3 Volumes]: Notorious Crimes, Criminals, and Criminal Trials in American History*. Santa Barbara, CA; Denver, CO: ABC-CLIO, 2016.

Cheshire, Jenny. *English around the World: Sociolinguistic Perspectives*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Chester, Stephen J. "Divine Madness? Speaking in Tongues in 1 Corinthians 14.23." *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 27, no. 4 (June 1, 2005): 417–46.

Choi, Jin Young. "Asian/Asian American Interpretation." In *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Bible and Gender Studies*, edited by Julia M. O'Brien, 1–9. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Chomsky, Noam. *Aspects of the Theory of Syntax*. 38. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965.

———. *Current Issues in Linguistic Theory*. Edited by Cornelis H. van Schooneveld. Janua Linguarum: Studia Memoriae Nicolai van Wijk Dedicata 38. Paris: Mouton, 1988.

Chow, John K. *Patronage and Power: A Study of Social Networks in Corinth*. The Library of New Testament Studies 75. London and New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 1992.

Chow, Rey. *Not Like a Native Speaker: On Languaging as a Postcolonial Experience*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014, 2014.

Chris, Len de Wet. "The Homily of John Chrysostom on 1 Corinthians 12: A Model of Antiochene Exegesis on the Charismata." MA Thesis, University of Pretoria, 2007.

Christie, Clive J. *A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism*. London; New York: I.B.Tauris, 1998.

Church, Jeffrey. "Culture Beyond Identity: J. G. Herder on the Purpose and Justification of Culture." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 41, no. 8 (October 1, 2015): 791–809.

Ciampa, Roy E., and Brian S. Rosner. *The First Letter to the Corinthians*. The Pillar New Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010.

Clackson, James. *Language and Society in the Greek and Roman Worlds*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

———. "Language Maintenance and Language Shift in the Mediterranean World during the Roman Empire." In *Multilingualism in the Graeco-Roman Worlds*, edited by Alex Mullen and Patrick James, 36–57. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

———. "Latinitas, Ἑλληνισμός and Standard Languages." *Studi e Saggi Linguistici* 53, no. 2 (2015): 309–30.

———., and Geoffrey Horrocks. *The Blackwell History of the Latin Language*. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Clark, Katerina, and Michael Holquist. *Mikhail Bakhtin*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1986.

Clarke, Andrew D. *Secular and Christian Leadership in Corinth: A Socio-Historical and Exegetical Study of 1 Corinthians 1-6*. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2006.

Clarysse, Willy, and Mario C. D. Paganini. "Theophoric Personal Names in Graeco-Roman Egypt. The Case of Sarapis." *Archiv Für Papyrusforschung Und Verwandte Gebiete* 55, no. 1 (2009): 68–89.

Clemens, Carl. "The Speaking with Tongues' of the Early Christians." *The Expository Times* 10, no. 8 (1899): 344–352.

Clyne, Michael. *Dynamics of Language Contact: English and Immigrant Languages*. Cambridge Approaches to Language Contact. Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Coates, Jennifer. *Women, Men and Language: A Sociolinguistic Account of Gender Differences in Language*. 3 edition. Harlow, England ; New York: Routledge, 2004.

Cohen, Gerard Daniel. *In War's Wake: Europe's Displaced Persons in the Postwar Order*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Cole, Alistair. *Franco-German Relations*. Political Dynamics of the European Union. London: Routledge, 2000.

Coleman, Robert. "The Dialect Geography of Ancient Greece." *Transactions of the Philological Society* 62, no. 1 (November 1, 1963): 58–126.

Collins, Raymond F. *First Corinthians*. Edited by Daniel J. Harrington. Sacra Pagina Series 7. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999.

Concannon, Cavan W. "Negotiating Multiple Modes of Religion and Identity in Roman Corinth." In *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, edited by James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn, 85–104. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016.

———. *"When You Were Gentiles": Specters of Ethnicity in Roman Corinth and Paul's Corinthian Correspondence*. Synkrisis: Comparative Approaches to Early Christianity in Greco-Roman Culture. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.

Condillac, Etienne Bonnot De. *Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge*. Translated by Hans Aarsleff. Cambridge Text in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Conzelmann, Hans. *1 Corinthians*. Hermeneia: A Critical and Historical Commentary on the Bible. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1975.

Cook, R. M. "Archaic Greek Trade: Three Conjectures." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 99 (1979): 152–55.

Cooley, Alison E. *The Cambridge Manual of Latin Epigraphy*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Cooper-Rompato, Christine F. *The Gift of Tongues: Women's Xenoglossia in the Later Middle Ages*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2010.

Cornwell, Hannah. *Pax and the Politics of Peace: Republic to Principate*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Coskun, Abdullah. "Causes of the 'I Can Understand English but I Can't Speak' Syndrome in Turkey." *Journal on English Language Teaching* 6, no. 3 (2016): 1–12.

———. "Causes of the 'I Can Understand English but I Can't Speak' Syndrome in Turkey." *Journal on English Language Teaching* 6, no. 3 (2016): 1–12.

Cramb, J. A. (John Adam). *The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain and Nineteenth Century Europe*. New York, E.P. Dutton & Company, 1915.

Croy, N. Clayton. *A Primer of Biblical Greek*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999.

Crawford, James. *At War with Diversity: US Language Policy in an Age of Anxiety*. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 2000.

———. "Endangered Native American Languages: What Is to Be Done, and Why?" *Bilingual Research Journal* 19, no. 1 (January 1, 1995): 17–38.

———. "Seven Hypothesis on Language Loss Causes and Cures." Symposium on Stabilizing Indigenous Languages, Northern Arizona University, May 4, 1995.

Crowley, T. *Standard English and the Politics of Language*. New York: Springer, 2003.

Crystal, David. *English as a Global Language*. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

———. *Language Death*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Culler, Jonathan D. *Ferdinand de Saussure*. Revised. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986.

Currie, Stuart D. "'Speaking in Tongues': Early Evidence Outside the New Testament Bearing on 'Glōssais Lalein.'" *Interpretation* 19, no. 3 (July 1, 1965): 274–94.

Cutten, George Barton. *Speaking with Tongues, Historically and Psychologically Considered*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1927.

Dallimore, Arnold. *Life of Edward Irving: Fore-Runner of the Charismatic Movement*. First Edition edition. Edinburgh ; Carlisle, Pa., USA: Banner of Truth, 1983.

Darling, Janina K. *Architecture of Greece*. Greenwood Publishing Group, 2004.

Davidson, Gladys R. *The Minor Objects*. Vol. XII. Corinth: Results of Excavations Conducted by The American School of Classical Studies at Athens. Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1952.

Davies, Anna Morpurgo. "The Greek Notion of Dialect." In *Greeks and Barbarians*, edited by Thomas Harrison, 153–71. Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002.

Deibert, Richard I. *Second Corinthians and Paul's Gospel of Human Mortality: How Paul's Experience of Death Authorizes His Apostolic Authority in Corinth*. Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017.

Delitzsch, Franz. *A System of Biblical Psychology*. Translated by Robert Ernest Wallis. Second edition, Thoroughly revised and enlarged. Clark's Foreign Theological Library, Fourth. Edinburgh, UK: T & T Clark, 1867.

Denison, Norman. "Language Death or Language Suicide?" *International Journal of the Sociology of Language* 1977, no. 12 (1977): 13–22.

Derose, Jason. "Set In Los Angeles, Greek Tragedy 'Medea' Gets A Modern Twist." NPR.org. Accessed October 19, 2017. http://www.npr.org/2015/09/19/441701784/set-in-los-angeles-greek-tragedy-medea-gets-a-modern-twist.

Derrida, Jacques. "Differance." In *Speech and Phenomena: And Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*, by Jacques Derrida, 129–60. translated by David B. Allison. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.

———. *Of Grammatology*. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997.

———. *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, The Work of Mourning & the New International*. Translated by Peggy Kaumf. New York: Routledge, 2006.

———. "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences." In *Writing and Difference*, translated by Alan Bass, 351–70. London: Routledge, 2005.

———. *Writing and Difference*. Translated by Alan Bass. London: Routledge, 2005.

———., and Anne Dufourmantelle. *Of Hospitality*. Translated by Rachel Bowlby. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.

Dillard, J. L. *All-American English*. New York: Random House, 1975.

———. *Black English: Its History and Usage in the United States*. New York: Random House, 1972.

Dixon, Michael D. "A New Latin and Greek Inscription from Corinth." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 69, no. 3 (2000): 335–42.

Dods, Marcus. *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*. The Expositor's Bible. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1891.

Dollar, George W. "Church History and the Tongues Movement." *Bibliotheca Sacra* 120, no. 480 (October 1963): 316–21.

Doss, Richard C., and Alan M. Gross. "The Effects of Black English and Code-Switching on Intraracial Perceptions." *Journal of Black Psychology* 20, no. 3 (August 1, 1994): 282–93.

Dover, Cedric. "The Racial Philosophy of Johann Herder." *The British Journal of Sociology* 3, no. 2 (1952): 124–33.

Drummond, Andrew Landale. *Edward Irving and His Circle: Including Some Consideration of the "Tongues" Movement in the Light of Modern Psychology*. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009.

Duff, A. M. *Freedmen in the Early Roman Empire*. Cambridge, UK: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd, 1958.

Dunbabin, T. J. "The Early History of Corinth." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 68 (1948): 59–69.

Dunn, James D. G. "Introduction." In *The Cambridge Companion to St. Paul*, edited by James D. G. Dunn, 1–15. Cambridge Companions to Religion. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

———. *Jesus and the Spirit: A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of Jesus and the First Christians as Reflected in the New Testament*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997.

Dunkel, George E. "Remarks on Code-Switching in Cicero's Letters to Atticus." *Museum Helveticum* 57, no. 2 (2000): 122–29.

Eck, Warner. "The Presence, Role and Significance of Latin in the Epigraphy and Culture of the Roman Near East." In *From Hellenism to Islam: Cultural and Linguistic Change in the Roman Near East*, edited by Hannah M. Cotton, Robert G. Hoyland, Jonathan J. Price, and David J. Wasserstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Edwards, John R. *Language, Society and Identity*. The Language Library. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.

Edwards, Jonathan. *Charity and Its Fruits; Or, Christian Love as Manifested in the Heart and Life*. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1854.

Edwards, Thomas Charles. *A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians*. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co., 1885.

Elbert, Paul. "Calvin and the Spiritual Gifts." *Journal of Evangelical Theological Society* 22, no. 3 (n.d.): 235–56.

Ellingsworth, Huber W. "The Shadow of Benjamin Lee Whorf: Continuing Issues in Linguistic Relativism." *Intercultural Communication Studies* II, no. 2 (1992): 43–59.

Elliott, Neil. "The Anti-Imperial Message of the Cross." In *Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation*, edited by Richard A. Horsley, 167–83. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000.

Ellis, E. Earle. "Diskussion (A Response to Lars Hartman)." In *Charisma Und Agape: (1 Ko 12-14)*, edited by Lorenzo De Lorenzi. Rom: Abtei von St Paul vor den Mauern, 1983.

Emerson, Caryl. "The Tolstoy Connection in Bakhtin." *PMLA* 100, no. 1 (1985): 68–80.

Engels, Donald. *Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990.

Engelsen, Nils Ivar Johan. "Glossolalia and Other Forms of Inspired Speech According to I Corinthians 12-14." Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1970.

Englander, Alex. "Herder's 'Expressivist' Metaphysics and the Origins of German Idealism." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 21, no. 5 (September 1, 2013): 902–24.

Englmann, Johann Baptist Anton. *Von Den Charismen in Allgemeinen Und von Dem Sprachen-Charisma Im Besonderen, Oder, Historisch-Exegetische Abhandlung Über 1 Kor. 12-14: Eine Gekrönte Preisschrift*. Regensburg: Joseph Manz, 1848.

Epp, Eldon Jay. *Junia: The First Woman Apostle*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005.

Erdinast-Vulcan, Daphna. "Between the Face and the Voice: Bakhtin Meets Levinas." *Continental Philosophy Review* 41, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 43–58.

Eriksson, Anders. "'Women Tongue Speakers, Be Silent': A Reconstruction Through Paul's Rhetoric." *Biblical Interpretation* 6, no. 1 (January 1, 1998): 80–104.

Esler, Philip F. *The First Christians in Their Social Worlds: Social-Scientific Approaches to New Testament Interpretation*. New York: Routledge, 2002.

Evans, Trevor. "Complaints of the Natives in a Greek Dress: The Zenon Archive and the Problem of Egyptian Interference." In *Multilingualism in the Graeco-Roman Worlds*, edited by Alex Mullen and Patrick James, 106–23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Faloia, Toyin. *The End of Colonial Rule: Nationalism and Decolonization*. Edited by Toyin Falola. Vol. 4. Africa. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2002.

Farrar, Frederic William. *The Life and Work of St. Paul*. Vol. I. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1879.

Fee, Gordon D. *Paul, the Spirit, and the People of God*. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996.

———. *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*. Revised Edition. New International Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014.

———. "Toward a Pauline Theology of Glossolalia." In *Listening to the Spirit in the Text*, 105–20. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000.

———. *God's Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009.

Feldherr, Erica, and Amy Mitchell. "U.S. English Language Print." *Pew Research Center's Journalism Project* (blog), May 28, 2009. http://www.journalism.org/2009/05/28/usenglish-language-print-new-york-times-washington-post-los-angeles-times/.

Ferguson, Charles A. "Diglossia." *WORD* 15, no. 2 (January 1, 1959): 325–40.

Fetterley, Judith. *The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American Fiction*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978.

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. *Addresses to the German Nation*. Edited by Gregory Moore. Translated by R.F. Jones and G.H. Turnbull. Cambridge Text in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Fisher, John Hurt, ed. "British and American, Continuity and Divergence." In *The Cambridge History of the English Language: English in North America*, 6:59–85. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Fishman, Joshua A. *Language and Ethnicity in Minority Sociolinguistic Perspective*. Multilingual Matters 45. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 1989.

———. "Language, Ethnicity and Racism." In *The Rise and Fall of the Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on Language and Ethnicity*, edited by Joshua A. Fishman, Michael H. Gertner, Esther G Lowy, and William G. Milán, 3–13. Contributions to the Sociology of Language ; 37. Berlin ; New York: Mouton, 1985.

———. *Language in Sociocultural Change*. Language Science and National Development. Stanford University Press: Stanford, CA, 1972.

———. "Language Maintenance and Language Shift as a Field of Inquiry: A Definition of the Field and Suggestions for Its Further Development." *Linguistics: An Interdisciplinary Journal of the Language Sciences* 51, no. Jubilee (2013): 9.

———. "Positive Bilingualism: Some Overlooked Rationales and Forefathers." In *The Rise and Fall of the Ethnic Revival: Perspectives on Language and Ethnicity*, edited by Joshua A. Fishman, Michael H. Gertner, Esther G. Lowy, and William G. Milán, 445–56. Contributions to the Sociology of Language 37. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985.

———. *Reversing Language Shift: Theoretical and Empirical Foundations of Assistance to Threatened Languages*. Clevedon ; Philadelphia: Multilingual Matters, 1991.

———. "Why Is It so Hard to Save a Threatened Language?" In *Can Threatened Languages Be Saved?*, edited by Joshua A. Fishman, 1–22. Multilingual Matters 116. Clevedon England ; Buffalo: Multilingual Matters, 2001.

Fitzmyer, Joseph A. *First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*. The Anchor Yale Bible 32. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008.

Fogarty, Brian E. *Fascism: Why Not Here?* Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2009.

Fögen, Thorsten. "Female Speech." In *A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language*, edited by Egbert J. Bakker, 311–26. West Sussex, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Forbes, Christopher. "Early Christian Inspired Speech and Hellenistic Popular Religion." *Novum Testamentum* 28, no. 3 (1986): 257–70.

———. *Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and Its Hellenistic Environment*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 75. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995.

Forster, Michael N. *After Herder: Philosophy of Language in the German Tradition*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

———. "Introduction." In *Herder: Philosophical Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Foucault, Michel. *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*. Translated by Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980.

———. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." In *The Foucault Reader*, edited by Paul Rabinow, 76–100. New York: Pantheon, 1984.

———. *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*. Edited by Colin Gordon. New York: Vintage, 1980.

———. *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. 2nd ed. New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

———. *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language*. Translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith. London and New York: Routledge, 1989.

———. *The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de France 1981--1982*. Edited by Frédéric Gros. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2005.

———. "Governmentality." In *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, 87–104. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
———. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978*. Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

"Founders Online: From Benjamin Franklin to James Parker, 20 March 1751." Accessed July 15, 2016. http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-04-02-0037.

Franklin, Benjamin. "Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind, Peopling of Countries, Etc." Accessed July 15, 2016. http://www.columbia.edu/~lmg21/ash3002y/earlyac99/documents/observations.html.

———. *The Writings of Benjamin Franklin*. Edited by Albert Henry Symth. Vol. III. New York: Ardent Media, 1970.

Fredrickson, George M. *Racism: A Short History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015.

Friedman, Maurice. "Martin Buber and Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogue of Voices and the Word That Is Spoken." *Religion & Literature* 33, no. 3 (2001): 25–36.

Friesen, Steven J. "Junia Theodora of Corinth: Gendered Inequalities in the Early Empire." In *Corinth in Contrast: Studies in Inequality*, edited by Steven J. Friesen, Sarah A. James, and Daniel N. Schowalter, 203–26. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013.

Galtung, Johan. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism." *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no. 2 (1971): 81–117.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. 2nd rev. ed. / translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. New York: Crossroad, 1989.

Gamauf, Richard. "Slavery: Social Position and Legal Capacity." In *The Oxford Handbook of Roman Law and Society*, edited by Paul J. du Plessis, Clifford Ando, and Kaius Tuori, 386–401. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016.

García, Alma M. *The Mexican Americans*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2002.

Gardiner, Michael. *The Dialogics of Critique: M. M. Bakhtin and the Theory of Ideology*. London and New York: Routledge, 1992.

———., and Michael Mayerfeld Bell. "Bakhtin and the Human Sciences: A Brief Introduction." In *Bakhtin and the Human Sciences: No Last Words*, edited by Michael E. Gardiner and Michael Mayerfeld Bell, 1–12. London: SAGE, 1998.

Garland, David E. *1 Corinthians*. Baker Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003.

Garnsey, Peter. *Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine*. The W. B. Stanford Memorial Lectures. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Gasparov, Boris. *Beyond Pure Reason: Ferdinand de Saussure's Philosophy of Language and Its Early Romantic Antecedents*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013.

Gebhard, Elizabeth R., and Matthew W. Dickie. "The View from the Isthmus, ca. 200 to 4 B.C." In *Corinth, the Centenary, 1896-1996*, edited by Charles K. Williams II and Nancy Bookidis, XX:261–78. Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2003.

Gera, Deborah. *Ancient Greek Ideas on Speech, Language and Civilization*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Gesche, Astrid. *Johann Gottfried Herder: Sprache und die Natur des Menschen*. Germany: Königshausen & Neumann, 1993.

Gjesdal, Kristin. "Aesthetic and Political Humanism: Gadamer on Herder, Schleiermacher, and the Origins of Modern Hermeneutics." *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (2007): 275–96.

Gladstone, Robert J. "Sign Language in the Assembly: How Are Tongues a Sign to the Unbeliever in 1 Cor 14:20-25?" *Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies* 2, no. 2 (1999): 177–93.

Glissant, Édouard. *Poetics of Relation*. Translated by Betsy Wing. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997.

Goodman, Felicitas D. "Altered Mental State vs. 'Style of Discourse:' Reply to Samarin." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 11, no. 3 (1972): 297–299.

———. "Phonetic Analysis of Glossolalia in Four Cultural Settings." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 8, no. 2 (1969): 227–39.

———. *Speaking in Tongues: A Cross-Cultural Study of Glossolalia*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1972.

Gordon, Bruce. *The Swiss Reformation*. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2002.

Gordon, Mary L. "The Nationality of Slaves under the Early Roman Empire." *The Journal of Roman Studies* 14 (1924): 93–111.

Gould, William. *Hindu Nationalism and the Language of Politics in Late Colonial India*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Gourgues, Michel. "Who Is Misogynist: Paul or Certain Corinthians? Note on 1 Corinthians 14:33b-36." In *Women Also Journeyed with Him: Feminist Perspectives on the Bible*, edited by Gérald Caron, 117–24. Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 2000.

Grandgent, Charles Hall. *An Introduction to Vulgar Latin*. Boston, New York and Chicago: D.C. Heath & Company, 1907.

Grant, Michael. *The Rise of the Greeks*. New York: Collier Books, 1987.

Grant, Robert M. "Like Children." *The Harvard Theological Review* 39, no. 1 (1946): 71–73.

———. *Paul in the Roman World: The Conflict at Corinth*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001.

Green, Lisa J. *African American English: A Linguistic Introduction*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Greenfeld, Liah. *Nationalism and the Mind: Essays on Modern Culture*. Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006.

———. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Gregory of Nyssa. "On The Christion Mode of Life." In *Ascetical Works (The Fathers of the Church, Volume 58)*, edited by Virginia Woods Callahan, 123–58. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1999.

Grigsby, Ellen. *Analyzing Politics: An Introduction to Political Science*. 4th edition. Cengage Advantage Books. Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning, 2008.

Group, Women and Geography Study. *Feminist Geographies: Explorations in Diversity and Difference*. Routledge, 2014.

Grudem, W. "1 Corinthians 14.20-25: Prophecy and Tongues as Signs of God's Attitude." *Westminster Theological Journal* 41, no. 2 (Spring 1979): 381–96.

Gruen, Erich S. "The Origins of the Achaean War." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 96 (1976): 46–69.

Gundry, Robert H. "'Ecstatic Utterance' (N.E.B)?" *Journal of Theological Studies* 17, no. 2 (1966): 299–307.

Gunkel, Hermann. *Israel and Babylon: The Babylonian Influence on Israelite Religion*. Translated by K. C. Hanson. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2009.

Günther, Lottes. "China in European Political Thought, 1750-1850." In *China and Europe: Images and Influences in Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, edited by Thomas H. C. Lee, 65–98. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1991.

Hainsworth, J. B. "Greek Views of Greek Dialectology." *Transactions of the Philological Society* 66, no. 1 (November 1, 1967): 62–76.

Hall, Edith. *Inventing the Barbarian: Greek Self-Definition through Tragedy*. Oxford England; New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

———. "When Is a Myth Not a Myth? Bernal's 'Ancient Model.'" In *Greeks and Barbarians*, edited by Thomas Harrison, 133–49. Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press, 2002.

Hall, Jonathan M. *Ethnic Identity in Greek Antiquity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

———. *Hellenicity: Between Ethnicity and Culture*. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 2005.

———. "The Role of Language in Greek Ethnicities." *The Cambridge Classical Journal* 41 (January 1996): 83–100.

Harding, Thomas. *A Confvtation of a Booke Intitvled an Apologie of the Chvrch of England*. Antwerpe: Ihon Laet, 1565.

Harrison, James R. "Introduction: Excavating the Urban Life of Roman Corinth." In *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, edited by James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn, 1–45. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016.

———. "Paul and the Agōnothetai at Corinth." In *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, edited by James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn, 271–326. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016.

Harrison, Thomas. "General Introduction." In *Greeks and Barbarians*, edited by Thomas Harrison, 1–14. Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002.

———. "Herodotus' Conception of Foreign Languages." *Histos* 2 (1998): 1–45.

Harvey, Graham. "Synagogues of the Hebrews: 'Good Jews' in the Diaspora." In *Jewish Local Patriotism and Self-Identification in the Graeco-Roman Period*, edited by Siân Jones, Sarah Pearce, and Lester L. Grabbe, 132–47. The Library of Second Temple Studies 3. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998.

Haugen, Einar. "Dialect, Language, Nation." *American Anthropologist* 68, no. 4 (1966): 922–35.

Hawthorne, Gerald F., Ralph P. Martin, and Daniel G. Reid, eds. *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters: A Compendium of Contemporary Biblical Scholarship*. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009.

Hayes, Carlton J. H. *Nationalism: A Religion*. Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2016.

Hays, Richard B. *First Corinthians: Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching*. Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2011.

———. *The Moral Vision of the New Testament: A Contemporary Introduction to New Testament Ethics*. San Francisco, CA: HarperOne, 1996.

Heath, John. *The Talking Greeks: Speech, Animals, and the Other in Homer, Aeschylus, and Plato*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Heil, John Paul. *The Rhetorical Role of Scripture in 1 Corinthians*. Atlanta, GA: SBL Press, 2005.

"Herder, Folklore and Romantic Nationalism - Wilson - 1973 - The Journal of Popular Culture - Wiley Online Library." Accessed August 1, 2017.

Herder, Johann Gottfried. "Fragments on Recent German Literature (1767-8) [Excerpts on Language]." In *Herder: Philosophical Writings*, translated by Michael N. Forster, 65–

164. Cambridge Text in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

———. *Kalligone: Vom Erhabnen und vom Ideal*. Leipzig: Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1800.

———. "Letters Concerning the Progress of Humanity (1792) [Excerpts on European Politics]." In *Herder: Philosophical Writings*, translated by Michael N. Forster, 361–69. Cambridge Text in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

———. "On Diligence in the Study of Several Learned Languages (1764)." In *Johann Gottfried Herder: Selected Early Works, 1764-1767: Addresses, Essays, and Drafts; Fragments on Recent German Literature*, translated by Ernest A. Menze and Karl Menges, 29–34. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992.

———. *On World History: An Anthology*. Edited by Hans Adler and Ernest A. Menze. Translated by Michael Palma and Johann Gottfried Herder. London and New York: Routledge, 2015.

———. *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man*. Translated by T. Churchill. Vol. I. London: Luke Handard, 1802.

———. "Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772)." In *Herder: Philosophical Writings*, translated by Michael N. Forster, 65–164. Cambridge Text in the History of Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

———. "Von Der Gabe Der Sprachen Am Ersten Christlichen Pfingstfest (1794)." In *Herders Sümmtliche Werke*, edited by Bernhard Suphan, Vol. 19. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1880.

Héring, Jean. *The First Epistle of Saint Paul to the Corinthians*. Translated by A. W. Heathcote and P. J. Allcock. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2009.

Herman, József. *Vulgar Latin*. University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 2000.

Heryanto, Ariel. *Language of Development and Development of Language: The Case of Indonesia*. Canberra, Australia: Department of Linguistics, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 1995.

———. "Then There Were Languages: Bahasa Indonesia Was One Among Many." In *Disinventing and Reconstituting Languages*, edited by Sinfree Makoni and Alastair Pennycook, 42–61. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 2007.

Hilgenfeld, Adolf Bernhard Christoph. *Die Glossolalie in Der Alten Kirche, in Dem Zusammenhang Der Geistesgaben Und Des Geisteslebens Des Alten Christenthums*. Leipzig: Drud und Verlag von Breitkopf und Hartel, 1850.

Hill, B. H. "Excavations at Corinth 1926." *American Journal of Archaeology* 31, no. 1 (1927): 70–79.

Hiu, Elim. *Regulations Concerning Tongues and Prophecy in 1 Corinthians 14.26-40: Relevance Beyond the Corinthian Church*. London and New York: T&T Clark, 2010.

Hoang, Haivan V. *Writing against Racial Injury: The Politics of Asian American Student Rhetoric*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015.

Hobsbawm, Eric. "Introduction: Inventing Traditions." In *The Invention of Tradition*, edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, 1–14. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Hobson, Barbara, Jane Lewis, and Birte Siim. "Introduction: Contested Concepts in Gender and Social Politics." In *Contested Concepts in Gender and Social Politics*, edited by Barbara Hobson, Jane Lewis, and Birte Siim, 1–22. Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Pub, 2002.

Hodge, Charles. *An Exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians*. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1860.

Höffe, Otfried. *Aristotle: The Rise of For-Profit Universities*. Translated by Christine Salazar. New York: SUNY Press, 2003.

Hogeterp, Albert L. A. *Paul and God's Temple: A Historical Interpretation of Cultic Imagery in the Corinthian Correspondence*. Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2006.

Holdcroft, David. *Saussure: Signs, System and Arbitrariness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Holladay, Carl R. *The First Letter of Paul to the Corinthians*. The Living Word Commentary. Austin, TX: Sweet Pub. Co, 1979.

Hollenweger, Walter J. *Pentecostalism: Origins and Developments Worldwide*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2005.

Holmes, Janet. *An Introduction to Sociolinguistics*. 4th edition. London: Routledge, 2013.

Holquist, Michael. *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World*. Second edition. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.

———. *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World*. 2nd ed. London; New York: Routledge, 2003.

———. "Introduction." In *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*, by M. M. Bakhtin, xv–xxxiii. edited by Michael Holquist, translated by Michael Holquist and Caryl Emerson. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004.

———. "Why Is God's Name a Pun? Bakhtin's Theory of Novel in Light of Theophilology." In *The Novelness of Bakhtin: Perspectives and Possibilities*, edited by Jørgen Bruhn and Jan Lundquist, 53–70. Museum Tusculanum Press, 2001.

Hopper, R. J. "Ancient Corinth." *Greece & Rome* 2, no. 1 (1955): 2–15.

Horkheimer, Max. *Eclipse of Reason*. London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2004.

Hornblower, Simon. *The Greek World, 479-323 BC*. Classical Civilizations. London; New York: Methuen, 1983.

Horrell, David. G., and Edward Adams. "The Scholarly Quest for Paul's Church at Corinth: A Critical Survey." In *Christianity at Corinth: The Quest for the Pauline Church*, edited by Edward Adams and David G. Horrell, 1–50. Louisville and London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004.

Horsley, Richard A. "Paul's Counter-Imperial Gospel: Introduction." In *Paul and Empire: Religion and Power in Roman Imperial Society*, edited by Richard A. Horsley, 140–47. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997.

———. "Rhetoric and Empire - and 1 Corinthians." In *Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation*, edited by Richard A. Horsley, 72–102. Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2000.

———. *1 Corinthians*. Abingdon New Testament Commentaries. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2011.

Horton, John, and José Calderón. "Language Struggles in a Changing California Community." In *Language Loyalties: A Source Book on the Official English Controversy*, edited by James Crawford. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Hovenden, Gerald. *Speaking in Tongues: The New Testament Evidence in Context*. Journal of Pentecostal Theology Supplement 22. New York and London: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002.

Hughes, Robert B. *First Corinthians- Everyman's Bible Commentary*. Chicago, IL: Moody Publishers, 1985.

Humboldt, Wilhelm von. *Linguistic Variability and Intellectual Development*. Translated by George C. Buck and Frithjof A. Raven. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972.

———. *On Language: On the Diversity of Human Language-Structure and Its Influence on the Mental Development of Mankind*. Edited by Michael Losonsky. Translated by Peter Heath. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Hunt, Peter. *Ancient Greek and Roman Slavery*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2017.

Hunter, Harold D. "Spirit-Baptism: Evaluated Biblically, Historically and Systematically." Ph.D. Dissertation, Fuller Theological Seminary, 1979.

———. "Tongues-Speech: A Patristic Analysis." *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 23, no. 2 (June 1980): 125–37.

Isaac, Benjamin H. *The Invention of Racism in Classical Antiquity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Ishay, Micheline R. "Introduction." In *The Nationalism Reader*, edited by Omar Dahbour and Micheline R. Ishay, 1–19. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1995.

Ivic, Milka. *Trends in Linguistics*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970.

Jakobson, Roman. *Fundamentals of Language*. Leiden, Netherlands: 'S-Gravenhage, Mouton, 1956.

James, Sarah A. "The Last of the Corinthians? Society and Settlement from 146 to 44 BCE." In *Corinth in Contrast: Studies in Inequality*, edited by Steven J. Friesen, Sarah A. James, and Daniel N. Schowalter, 17–37. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013.

Jameson, Fredric. *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981.

———. *The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975.

Janse, Mark. "Aspects of Bilingualism in the History of Greek Language." In *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, edited by J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain, 332–90. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Janzen, Marshall. "Orderly Participation or Silenced Women?: Clashing Views on Decent Worship in 1 Corinthians 14." *Direction* 42, no. 1 (2013): 55–70.

Jeffers, James S. *The Greco-Roman World of the New Testament Era: Exploring the Background of Early Christianity*. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999.

Jenkins, Jennifer. *World Englishes: A Resource Book for Students*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003.

Jewel, John. *The Works of John Jewel, Bishop of Salisbury. First Portion, Containing, a Sermon Preached at Paul's Cross. Correspondence with Dr. Cole. The Reply to Harding's Answer*. Edited by John Ayre. Vol. I. IV vols. Cambridge: The University Press, 1845.

Jipp, Joshua W. *Divine Visitations and Hospitality to Strangers in Luke-Acts: An Interpretation of the Malta Episode in Acts 28:1-10*. Leiden, Netherlands: BRILL, 2013.

Jo, Hye-Young. "'Heritage' Language Learning and Ethnic Identity: Korean Americans' Struggle with Language Authorities." *Language, Culture and Curriculum* 14, no. 1 (September 1, 2001): 26–41.

Johanson, B. C. "Tongues, a Sign for Unbelievers?: A Structural and Exegetical Study of I Corinthians XIV. 20–25." *New Testament Studies* 25, no. 02 (January 1979): 180–203.

Johnson, Lee A. "Women and Glossolalia in Pauline Communities." *Biblical Interpretation* 21, no. 2 (January 1, 2013): 196–214.

———. "Tongues, Gift Of." Edited by David Noel Freedman. *Anchor Bible Dictionary*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992.

Joseph, John E. *From Whitney to Chomsky: Essays in the History of American Linguistics*. Studies in the History of the Language Sciences 103. Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2002.

———. "Language and Politics." In *The Handbook of Applied Linguistics*, edited by Alan Davies and Catherine Elder, 347–66. Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006.

———. *Saussure*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

———. "The Linguistic Sign." In *The Cambridge Companion to Saussure*, edited by Carol Sanders, 59–75. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

———. *Language and Politics*. Edinburgh Textbooks in Applied Linguistics. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006.

Kajanto, Iiro. *A Study of the Greek Epitaphs of Rome*. Helsinki, 1963, n.d.

Kajava, Mika. "When Did the Isthmian Games Return to the Isthmus? (Rereading 'Corinth' 8.3.153)." *Classical Philology* 97, no. 2 (2002): 168–78.

Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

———. "Reviews of Herder's Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind." In *Immanuel Kant Political Writings*, 201–20. Cambridge Text in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Kaplan, Jacob. "A Samaritan Amulet from Corinth." *Israel Exploration Journal* 30, no. 3/4 (1980): 196–98.

Käsemann, Ernst. *Commentary on Romans*. Translated by Geoffrey W. Bromiley. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994.

Kearney, Richard. "Hospitality: Possible or Impossible?" *Hospitality & Society* 5, no. 2–3 (September 1, 2015): 173–84.

Kearney, Richard, and Kascha Semonovitch. *Phenomenologies of the Stranger: Between Hostility and Hospitality*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2011.

Kearsley, R.A. "Women in Public Life in the Roman East: Iunia Theodora, Claudia Metrodora and Phoebe, Benefactress of Paul." *Tyndale Bulletin* 50, no. 2 (1999): 189–211.

Keener, Craig S. *1-2 Corinthians*. The New Cambridge Bible Commentary. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

———. *Paul, Women, and Wives: Marriage and Women's Ministry in the Letters of Paul*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 1992.

———. "Women's Education and Public Speech in Antiquity." *Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society* 50, no. 4 (December 2007): 747–59.

Kent, John Harvey. *The Inscriptions 1926 to 1950*. Vol. VIII, Part III. Corinth: Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1966.

Kildahl, John P. "Psychological Observations." In *The Charismatic Movement*, edited by Michael Pollock Hamilton, 124–42. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975.

———. *The Psychology of Speaking in Tongues*. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

Kim, Hyunjin. *Ethnicity and Foreigners in Ancient Greece and China*. London: Bristol Classical Press, 2009.

Kistemaker, Simon J. *1 Corinthians*. New Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1993.

Klages, Mary. *Literary Theory: A Guide for the Perplexed*. New York and London: Continuum, 2006.

Klauck, Hans-Josef. *Religion und Gesellschaft im frühen Christentum: Neutestamentliche Studien*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003.

Klein, Herbert S. *The Atlantic Slave Trade*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Klemack, John Cádiz, and Jonathan Lloyd. "Caught on Camera: Customer Berated for Speaking Spanish." NBC Southern California. Accessed July 19, 2016. http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/IHOP-English-Spanish-Rant-320609602.html.

———. "Caught on Camera: Customer Berated for Speaking Spanish." NBC Southern California. Accessed July 19, 2016. http://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/IHOP-English-Spanish-Rant-320609602.html.

Koerner, E. F. K. *Practicing Linguistic Historiography*. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1989.

Königseder, Angelika, and Juliane Wetzel. *Waiting for Hope: Jewish Displaced Persons in Post-World War II Germany*. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001.

Koskenniemi, Erkki. "Religious Authorities in the Corpus Paulinum." In *Institutions of the Emerging Church*, edited by Erkki Koskenniemi and Sven-Olav Back, 39–70. Library of New Testament Studies 305. London: T&T Clark, 2016.

Kovecses, Zoltan. *American English: An Introduction*. New York: Broadview Press, 2000.

Kramer, Lloyd S. *Nationalism in Europe and America: Politics, Cultures, and Identities since 1775*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2011.

Krauss, Michael E. Statement of Mr. Michael Krauss, representing the Linguistic Society of America in U.S. Senate., § Hearing before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs (1991).

Kristeva, Julia. *Strangers to Ourselves*. Translated by Leon Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.

Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Third edition. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1997.

Labov, William. *Dialect Diversity in America: The Politics of Language Change*. Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2014.

———. "Unendangered Dialect, Endangered People: The Case of African American Vernacular English." *Transforming Anthropology* 18, no. 1 (April 1, 2010): 15–27.

———., and Wendell A. Harris. "De Facto Segregation of Black and White Vernaculars." In *Diversity and Diachrony*, edited by David Sankoff, 1–24. John Benjamins Publishing, 1986.

Lafferty, Maura K. "Translating Faith from Greek to Latin: Romanitas and Christianitas in Late Fourth-Century Rome and Milan." *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 11, no. 1 (March 27, 2003): 21–62.

Lakoff, Robin Tolmach. *Language and Woman's Place: Text and Commentaries*. Edited by Mary Bucholtz. Revised and Expanded Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.

———. "Language, Gender, and Politics: Putting 'Women'' and 'Power' in the Same Sentence." In *The Handbook of Language and Gender*, edited by Janet Holmes and Miriam Meyerhoff, First Edition., 161–78. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005.

Lakshmipathy, Vinod. "Kant and the Turn to Romanticism." *Kritike: An Online Journal of Philosophy* 3, no. 2 (December 2009): 90–102.

Langslow, D. R. "Approaching Bilingualism in Corpus Languages." In *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, edited by J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain, 23–51. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Lavezzi, John C. "Corinth before the Mycenaeans." In *Corinth, the Centenary, 1896-1996*, edited by Charles K. Williams II and Nancy Bookidis, XX:63–74. Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2003.

———. "Prehistoric Investigations at Corinth." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 47, no. 4 (1978): 402–51.

Lawson, Stephanie. *Culture and Context in World Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Layton-Henry, Z., and C. Wilpert. *Challenging Racism in Britain and Germany*. New York: Springer, 2003.

Leaf, Walter. "Corinth in Prehistoric Times." *American Journal of Archaeology* 27, no. 2 (1923): 151–56.

———. *Homer and History*. London: Macmillan and Company, limited, 1915.

Lee, Sang-Il. *Jesus and Gospel Traditions in Bilingual Context: A Study in the Interdirectionality of Language*. Göttingen, Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2012.

Lee, Tiffany S. "Beyond Sociolinguistics: Joshua Fishman's Influence on Students in Native American Studies. (In Memoriam)." *Journal of American Indian Education* 54, no. 2 (2015): 6.

Leiwo, Martti. "From Contact to Mixture: Bilingual Inscriptions from Italy." In *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, edited by J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain, 168–94. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Lepschy, Guilio. "European Linguistics in the Twentieth Century." In *Studies in the History of Western Linguistics*, edited by Theodora Bynon and F. R. Palmer, 189–201. London; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. *Structural Anthropology*. Translated by Claire Jacobson. New York: Basic Books, 1977.

Lévinas, Emmanuel. *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979.

Liddell, Henry George, Robert Scott, and Henry Stuart Jones. *Greek-English Lexicon, Ninth Edition with a Revised Supplement*. 9 edition. Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1996.

Liew, Tat-Siong Benny. "Redressing Bodies at Corinth: Racial/Ethnic Politics and Religious Difference in the Context of Empire." In *The Colonized Apostle: Paul in Postcolonial Eyes*, edited by Christopher Stanley, 127–45. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2011.

Lifschitz, Avi. *Language and Enlightenment: The Berlin Debates of the Eighteenth Century*. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Lim, Sung Uk. "Race and Ethnicity Discourse in Biblical Studies and Beyond." *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies* 15 (December 1, 2016): 120–42.

Lister, Ruth. *Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives*. New York: NYU Press, 2003.

Locke, John. *The Works of John Locke*. 12th ed. Vol. 7. 9 vols. London: C. Baldwin Printer, 1824.

Lockwood, Peter F. "Does 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 Exclude Women from the Pastoral Office?" *Lutheran Theological Journal* 30, no. 1 (1996): 30–38.

Lothian, William. *Expository Lectures on Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians*. Edinburgh, UK: Waugh & Innes, 1828.

"'Lousy Speaking Immigrant,': Oklahoma Woman Records Racist Rant at Goodwill." *WREG.Com* (blog), September 7, 2017. http://wreg.com/2017/09/07/lousy-speaking-immigrant-oklahoma-woman-records-racist-rant-at-goodwill/.

Löwy, Michael, and Robert Sayre. *Romanticism Against the Tide of Modernity*. Translated by Catherine Porter. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002.

Luther, Martin. "Concerning the Order of Public Worship." In *Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings*, edited by Timothy F. Lull, 3 edition., 445–48. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989.

———. "How Christians Should Regard Moses." In *Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings*, edited by Timothy F. Lull, 135–48. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989.

Lyons, John. *Language and Linguistics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

MacDonald, Brian R. "The Diolkos." *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 106 (1986): 191–95.

Mack, Michael. "The Other." In *The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, edited by Michael N. Forster and Kristin Gjesdal, 736–50. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

MacMullen, Ramsay. "Provincial Languages in the Roman Empire." *The American Journal of Philology* 87, no. 1 (January 1, 1966): 1–17.

Magness, Josh. "He Yelled Racial Slurs at a Woman for 'Speaking Immigrant,' Video Shows." miamiherald. Accessed September 7, 2017. http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/national/article171518347.html.

Mäkikalli, Aino. "Concepts of Novelistic Polyphony: Person-Related and Compositional-Thematic." In *Bakhtin and His Others: (Inter)Subjectivity, Chronotope, Dialogism*,

edited by Liisa Steinby and Tintti Klapuri, 37–54. London, New York, and Delhi: Anthem Press, 2013.

Makoni, Sinfree, Geneva Smitherman, Arnetha F. Ball, and Arthur K. Spears. *Black Linguistics: Language, Society and Politics in Africa and the Americas*. London and New York: Routledge, 2003.

Manias, Chris. *Race, Science, and the Nation: Reconstructing the Ancient Past in Britain, France and Germany*. New York and London: Routledge, 2013.

Manning, Patrick. *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey, 1640-1960*. African Studies Series 30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Marshall, I. Howard. "Who Were the Evangelists?" In *The Mission of the Early Church to Jews and Gentiles*, edited by Jostein Ådna and Hans Kvalbein, 251–64. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 127. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000.

Marshall, Jill E. *Women Praying and Prophesying in Corinth: Gender and Inspired Speech in First Corinthians*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament, 2 Reihe 448. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2017.

Marshall, Jonathan. *Jesus, Patrons, and Benefactors: Roman Palestine and the Gospel of Luke*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 259. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2009.

Martin, Dale B. *Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990.

———. *The Corinthian Body*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.

———. "Tongues of Angels and Other Status Indicators." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 59, no. 3 (October 1, 1991): 547–89.

Martin, I. J. "Glossolalia in the Apostolic Church." *Journal of Biblical Literature* 63 (1944): 123–30.

Mathew, Susan. *Women in the Greetings of Romans 16.1-16: A Study of Mutuality and Women's Ministry in the Letter to the Romans*. Library of New Testament Studies. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013.

May, Stephen. *Language and Minority Rights: Ethnicity, Nationalism and the Politics of Language*. New York and London: Routledge, 2013.

———. "Rearticulating the Case for Minority Language Rights." *Current Issues in Language Planning* 4, no. 2 (April 1, 2003): 95–125.

Mccartney, Eugene S. "Canting Puns on Ancient Monuments." *American Journal of Archaeology* 23, no. 1 (1919): 59–64.

McClintock, John, and James Strong. *Cyclopædia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature*. Vol. X. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1891.

McDavid, Raven I., and Virginia Glenn McDavid. "The Relationship of the Speech of American Negroes to the Speech of Whites." *American Speech* 26, no. 1 (1951): 3–17.

McGee, Gary B. "Shortcut to Language Preparation? Radical Evangelicals, Missions, and the Gift of Tongues." *International Bulletin of Missionary Research* 25, no. 3 (July 1, 2001): 118–23.

McGovern, William M. *From Luther to Hitler: The History of Fascist-Nazi Political Philosophy*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co, 1995.

McLean, Bradley Hudson. *An Introduction to Greek Epigraphy of the Hellenistic and Roman Periods from Alexander the Great Down to the Reign of Constantine (323 B.C.-A.D. 337)*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002.

McMahon, April M. S. *Understanding Language Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

McPherson, Stephanie Sammartino. *Lau V. Nichols: Bilingual Education in Public Schools*. Berkeley Heights, NJ: Enslow Publishers, 2000.

Meeks, Wayne A. *The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul*. Second Edition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003.

Meinecke, Friedrich. *Cosmopolitanism and the National State*. Translated by Robert B. Kimber. Princeton Legacy Library. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.

Mendelssohn, Moses. *Über die Empfindungen*. Berlin: bey Christian Friedrich Voß, 1755.

Medvedev, Pavel Nikolaevich. *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics*. Translated by Albert J. Wehrle. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.

Meritt, Benjamin Dean. *Corinth: Results of Excavations Conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, Greek Inscriptions 1896-1927*. Vol. VIII, Part I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, published for the American School of Classical Studies, 1931.

Merkelbach, R., and M.L. West. *Fragmenta Hesiodea*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Merricks, William S. *Edward Irving: The Forgotten Giant*. East Peoria, IL: Scribe's Chamber Publications, 1983.

Mey, Jacob. *Whose Language?: A Study in Linguistic Pragmatics*. Amsterdam; Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1985.

Meyer, Heinrich August Wilhelm. *Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistles to the Corinthians*. Translated by William P. Dickson. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1877.

Miles, Robert, and Malcolm Brown. *Racism*. 2nd ed. Key Ideas. London: Routledge, 2003.

Milleker, Elizabeth J. "Three Heads of Sarapis from Corinth." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 54, no. 2 (1985): 121–35.

Miller, D. Gary. *Ancient Greek Dialects and Early Authors*. Berlin ; Boston: De Gruyter, 2013.

Miller, J. Edward. "Some Observations on the Text-Critical Function of the Umlauts in Vaticanus, with Special Attention to 1 Corinthians 14.34-35." *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 26, no. 2 (December 1, 2003): 217–36.

Millis, Benjamin W. "The Local Magistrates and Elite of Roman Corinth." In *Corinth in Contrast: Studies in Inequality*, edited by Steven J. Friesen, Sarah A. James, and Daniel N. Schowalter, 38–53. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013.

———. "The Social and Ethnic Origins of the Colonists in Early Roman Corinth." In *Corinth in Context: Comparative Studies on Religion and Society*, edited by Steven J. Friesen, Daniel N. Schowalter, and James C. Walters, 13–35. Leiden: Brill, 2010.

Mills, Watson E. "Glossolaia as a Sociopsychological Experience." In *Speaking in Tongues: A Guide to Research on Glossolalia*, edited by Watson E. Mills, 425–37. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1986.

Minets, Yuliya. "The Slow Fall of Babel: Conceptualization of Languages, Linguistic Diversity and History in Late Ancient Christianity." Ph.D. Dissertation, Catholic University of America, 2017.

Mitchell, Margaret Mary. *The Heavenly Trumpet: John Chrysostom and the Art of Pauline Interpretation*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2002.

———. *Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation of the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1991.

Mithun, Marianne. *The Languages of Native North America*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

M'Neile, Hugh. *Miracles and Spiritual Gifts*. London: James Nisbet, Berners Street, 1832.

Modrak, Deborah K. W. *Aristotle's Theory of Language and Meaning*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Moore, Gregory. "Introduction." In *Fichte: Addresses to the German Nation*, edited by Gregory Moore, translated by R.F. Jones and G.H. Turnbull, xi–xxxvi. Cambridge Text in the History of Political Thought. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Morgan, Charles H. "Excavations at Corinth, 1935-1936." *American Journal of Archaeology* 40, no. 4 (1936): 466–84.

Morson, Gary Saul, and Caryl Emerson. "Introduction: Rethinking Bakhtin." In *Rethinking Bakhtin: Extensions and Challenges*, edited by Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, 1–60. Series in Russian Literature and Theory. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1989.

Morton, Michael. *Herder and the Poetics of Thought: Unity and Diversity in On Diligence in Several Learned Languages*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989.

Murphy-O'Connor, J. "Interpolations in 1 Corinthians." *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 48, no. 1 (1986): 81–94.

———. *St. Paul's Corinth: Texts and Archaeology*. Third Revised and Expanded Edition. Collegeville, MN: Michael Glazier Book, 2002.

———. "The Corinth That Saint Paul Saw." *The Biblical Archaeologist* 47, no. 3 (1984): 147–59.

Murray, Jeffrey W. "Bakhtinian Answerability and Levinasian Responsibility: Forging a Fuller Dialogical Communicative Ethics." *Southern Communication Journal* 65, no. 2–3 (March 1, 2000): 133–50.

Naerebout, Frederick G., and Henk W. Singor. *Antiquity: Greeks and Romans in Context*. West Sussex, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.

Nasrallah, Laura. *An Ecstasy of Folly: Prophecy and Authority in Early Christianity*. Harvard Theological Studies 52. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Divinity School, 2004.

Ndebele, Njabulo Simakahle. *South African Literature and Culture: Rediscovery of the Ordinary*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1994.

Nealon, Jeffrey T. "The Ethics of Dialogue: Bakhtin and Levinas." *College English* 59, no. 2 (1997): 129–48.

Neander, Augustus. *History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church by the Apostles*. Translated by J.E. Ryland. New York: Leavitt, Trow & Co., 1847.

"New York School Apologises for Reciting Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic." *The Guardian*, March 19, 2015, sec. US news. http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/19/ny-school-apologises-reciting-pledge-of-allegiance-arabic.

Nguyen, Tina. "Fox Guest: Reciting Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic Is Like Speaking German During WWII." Collection. Media ITE, March 20, 2015. http://www.mediaite.com/tv/fox-guest-reciting-pledge-of-allegiance-in-arabic-is-like-speaking-german-during-wwii/.

Nguyen, V. Henry T. *Christian Identity in Corinth: A Comparative Study of 2 Corinthians, Epictetus and Valerius Maximums*. Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2008.

Niccum, Curt. "The Voice of the Manuscripts on the Silence of Women: The External Evidence for 1 Cor 14.34–5." *New Testament Studies* 43, no. 2 (April 1997): 242–255.

Nippel, Wilfried. "The Construction of the 'Other.'" In *Greeks and Barbarians*, edited by Thomas Harrison, translated by Antonia Nevill, 278–310. Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World. New York: Routledge, 2001.

Noyes, John K. *Herder: Aesthetics against Imperialism*. University of Toronto Press, 2015.

Odell-Scott, David W. "In Defense of an Egalitarian Interpretation of 1 Cor 14:34-36: A Reply to Murphy-O'Connor's Critique." *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 17, no. 3 (August 1, 1987): 100–103.

———. "Let The Women Speak in Church: An Egalitarian Interpretation of 1 Cor 14:33b-36." *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 13, no. 3 (August 1, 1983): 90–93.

Okoth, Assa. *A History of Africa: African Nationalism and the de-Colonisation Process*. Vol. 2. Nairobi: East African Publishers, 2006.

Oliver, James H. "Panachaeans and Panhellenes." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 47, no. 2 (1978): 185–91.

Olshausen, Hermann. *Biblical Commentary on St. Paul's First and Second Epistles to the Corinthians*. Translated by John Edmund Cox. Vol. 20. Clark's Foreign Theological Library. Edinburgh, UK: T & T Clark, 1855.

———. *Biblical Commentary on the Gospels, and on the Acts of the Apostles, Adapted Expressly for Preachers and Students*. Translated by Richard Garvey. Fifth. Vol. 19. Clark's Foreign Theological Library 1. Edinburgh, UK: T & T Clark, 1855.

———. "Rachträgliche Bemerkungen Über Das Charisma Des Γλῶσσαις Λαλεῖν, in Beziehung Auf Die Abhandlung Darüber Vom Herrn Prof. Bleek." In *Theologische Studien Und Kritiken*, 538–49. Hamburg: Bei Friedrich Perthes, 1829.

O'Pry, Kay. "Social and Political Roles of Women in Athens and Sparta." *Saber and Scroll* 1, no. 2 (April 15, 2015): 7–14.

Osser, H. A., P. F. Ostwald, B. MacWhinney, and R. L. Casey. "Glossolalic Speech from a Psycholinguistic Perspective." *Journal of Psycholinguistic Research* 2, no. 1 (March 1, 1973): 9–19.

Özkirimli, Umut. *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement*. New York: Palgrave, 2005.

Pallas, D.I., S. Charitonidis, and J. Venencic. "Inscriptions Lyciennes Trouvées a Solomos Près de Corinthe." *Bulletin de Correspondonce Hellenique* 83 (1959): 496–508.

Parris, David Paul. *Reception Theory and Biblical Hermeneutics*. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2015.

Patten, Alan. "'The Most Natural State': Herder and Nationalism." *History of Political Thought* 31, no. 4 (January 1, 2010): 657–89.

Patterson, Orlando. *Slavery and Social Death*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.

Pawlak, Marcin N. "Corinth After 44 BC: Ethnical and Cultural Changes." *Electrum* 20 (2013): 143–62.

Payne, Philip B. "Fuldensis, Sigla for Variants in Vaticanus, and 1 Cor 14.34–5." *New Testament Studies* 41, no. 2 (April 1995): 240–62.

———. *Man and Woman, One in Christ: An Exegetical and Theological Study of Paul's Letters*. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2009.

———. "MS. 88 as Evidence for a Text without 1 Cor 14.34–5." *New Testament Studies* 44, no. 01 (January 1998): 152–158.

———. "Vaticanus Distigme-Obelos Symbols Marking Added Text, Including 1 Corinthians 14.34–5." *New Testament Studies* 63, no. 4 (October 2017): 604–25.

Pearson, Erica. "Asian Immigrant NYCHA Tenants Struggle to Get Translation Aid." NY Daily News. Accessed January 2, 2017. http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/asian-immigrant-nycha-tenants-struggle-tranlation-aid-article-1.2360649.

Pennycook, Alastair. *The Cultural Politics of English as an International Language*. London; New York: Routledge, 1994.

———. *Critical Applied Linguistics: A Critical Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2001.

———. *English and the Discourses of Colonialism*. London and New York: Routledge, 2002.

Penrose, Jan, and Joe May. "Herder's Concept of Nation and Its Relevance to Contemporary Ethnic Nationalism." *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 18, no. 1/2 (1991): 165–178.

Perlina, Nina. "Bakhtin and Buber: Problems of Dialogic Imagination." *Studies in Twentieth and Twenty-First Century Literature* 9, no. 1 (September 1, 1984). http://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol9/iss1/3.

Pettegrew, David K. "The Changing Rural Horizons of Corinth's First Urban Christians." In *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, edited by James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn, 153–83. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016.

———. "The Diolkos and the Emporion: How a Land Bridge Framed the Commercial Economy of Roman Corinth." In *Corinth in Contrast: Studies in Inequality*, edited by Steven J. Friesen, Sarah A. James, and Daniel N. Schowalter, 126–42. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013.

———. "The Diolkos of Corinth." *American Journal of Archaeology* 115, no. 4 (2011): 549–74.

Phillipson, Robert. "Linguicism: Structures and Ideologies in Linguistic Imperialism." In *Minority Education: From Shame to Struggle*, edited by Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Jim Cummins, 339–58. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 1988.

———. *Linguistic Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

"Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic Draws Backlash Against NY High School." FOX News Insider, March 20, 2015. http://insider.foxnews.com/2015/03/20/pledge-allegiance-arabic-draws-backlash-against-ny-high-school.

Poirier, John C. *The Tongues of Angels: The Concept of Angelic Languages in Classical Jewish and Christian Texts*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 287. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.

Poole, Matthew. *Matthew Poole, Annotations Upon the Holy Bible. Wherein the Sacred Text Is Inserted, and Various Readings Annex'd, Together with the Parallel Scriptures. The More Difficult Terms in Each Verse Explained. Seeming Contradictions Reconciled. Questions and Doubts Resolved. And the Whole Text Opened*. London: Parkhurst, 1700.

Porter, Stanley E. "Did Paul Speak Latin?" In *Paul: Jew, Greek, and Roman*, 289–308. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009.

Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. 3rd edition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006.

Post, Washington. "Student Removed from Southwest Flight after Speaking Arabic on Plane." chicagotribune.com. Accessed May 4, 2016. http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-student-removed-southwest-airlines-flight-arabic-20160418-story.html.

Powell, Benjamin. "Greek Inscriptions from Corinth." *American Journal of Archaeology* 7, no. 1 (1903): 26–71.

Reden, Sitta von. *Money in Ptolemaic Egypt: From the Macedonian Conquest to the End of the Third Century BC*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

"Remarks by President Trump, Senator Tom Cotton, and Senator David Perdue on the RAISE Act and Green Card Reform." whitehouse.gov, August 2, 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/08/02/remarks-president-trump-senator-tom-cotton-and-senator-david-perdue.

Requejo, Ferran, and Klaus-Jürgen Nagel. "Nationalism and Religon: Friends or Foes?" In *Politics of Religion and Nationalism: Federalism, Consociationalism and Seccession*, edited by Ferran Raquejo and Klaus-Jürgen Nagel. New York: Routledge, 2014.

Ricento, Thomas K. "Partitioning by Language: Whose Right Are Threatened?" In *Language and Politics in the United States and Canada: Myths and Realities*, 317–30. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1998.

Rickford, John R. "The Creole Origins of African American Vernacular English: Evidence from Copula Absence." In *African-American English: Structure, History and Use*, edited by Guy Bailey, John Baugh, Salikoko S. Mufwene, and John R. Rickford, 154–200. Routledge, 2013.

Ricoeur, Paul. "Schleiermacher's Hermeneutics." *The Monist* 60, no. 2 (1977): 181–97.

Richardson, James T. "Psychological Interpretations of Glossolalia: A Reexamination of Research." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 12, no. 2 (1973): 199–207.

Ricoeur, Paul. *On Translation*. Translated by Eileen Brennan. Thinking in Action. London: Routledge, 2006.

Ridgway, Brunilde Sismondo. "Sculpture from Corinth." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 50, no. 4 (1981): 422–48.

Rife, Joseph L. "Religion and Society at Roman Kenchreai." In *Corinth in Context: Comparative Studies on Religion and Society*, edited by Steven J. Friesen, Daniel N. Schowalter, and James C. Walters, 391–432. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010.

Ritter, Bradley. *Judeans in the Greek Cities of the Roman Empire: Rights, Citizenship and Civil Discord*. Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 170. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015.

Rizakis, A. D. "Roman Colonies in the Province of Achaia: Territories, Land and Population." In *The Early Roman Empire in the East*, edited by Susan Alcock, 15–36. Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2010.

Robeck Jr., Cecil. M. "Irenaeus and 'Prophetic Gifts.'" In *Essays on Apostolic Themes: Studies in Honor of Howard M. Ervin, Presented to Him by Colleagues and Friends on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday*, edited by Paul Elbert, 104–14. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2007.

Roberts, P. "A Sign — Christian or Pagan?" *The Expository Times* 90, no. 7 (April 1, 1979): 199–203.

Robertson, Frederick William. *Expository Lectures on St. Paul's Epistles to the Corinthians: Delivered at Trinity Chapel, Brighton*. Clark. London: Smith, Elder and Co, 65, Cornhill, 1859.

Robertson, O. Palmer. "Tongues: Sign of Covenantal Curse and Blessing." *Westminster Theological Journal* 38 (1975): 44–53.

Robinson, Betsey A. "Fountains and the Formation of Cultural Identity at Roman Corinth." In *Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, edited by Daniel Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen, 101–40. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Divinity School, 2005.

Rochette, Bruno. "Greek and Latin Bilingualism." In *A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language*, edited by Egbert J. Bakker, 281–93. West Sussex, UK and Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.

Roebuck, Carl. "Some Aspects of Urbanization in Corinth." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 41, no. 1 (1972): 96–127.

Roebuck, Mary C. "Archaic Architectural Terracottas from Corinth." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 59, no. 1 (1990): 47–63.

Rogers, Cleon L. "The Gift of Tongues in the Post-Apostolic Church." *Bibliotheca Sacra* 122 (June 1965): 134–43.

Romano, David Gilman. "A Roman Circus in Corinth." *Hesperia* 74, no. 4 (2005): 585–611.

———. "A Tale of Two Cities: Roman Colonies at Corinth." In *Romanization and the City: Creations, Transformations, and Failures : Proceedings of a Conference Held at the American Academy in Rome to Celebrate the 50th Anniversary of the Excavations at Cosa, 14-16 May, 1998*, edited by Susan E. Alcock, 83–104. Journal of Roman Archaelogy Supplementary 38. Portsmouth, RI: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2000.

———. "City Planning, Centuriation, and Land Division in Roman Corinth: Colonia Laus Iulia Corinthiensis & Colonia Iulia Flavia Augusta Corinthiensis." In *Corinth, the Centenary, 1896-1996*, edited by Charles K. Williams II and Nancy Bookidis, XX:280–301. Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2003.

———. "Post-146 B.C. Land Use in Corinth, and Planning of the Roman Colony of 44 B.C." In *The Corinthia in the Roman Period: Including the Papers Given at a Symposium Held at the Ohio State University on 7-9 March, 1991*, edited by Timothy E. Gregory, 9–30. Journal of Roman Archaeology Supplementary Series 8. Ann Arbor, MI: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 1994.

———. "Roman Surveyors in Corinth." *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 150, no. 1 (2006): 62–85.

———. "Urban and Rural Planning in Roman Corinth." In *Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, edited by Daniel Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen, 25–59. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Romano, Irene Bald. "A Hellenistic Deposit from Corinth: Evidence for Interim Period Activity (146-44 B. C.)." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 63, no. 1 (1994): 57–104.

Rose, H. J. *A Handbook of Greek Mythology*. New York: Routledge, 2004.

Rothermund, Dietmar. *The Routledge Companion to Decolonization*. New York: Routledge, 2006.

Rousseau, Jean Jacques. "Essay on the Origin of Languages." In *Essay on the Origin of Languages and Writings Related to Music*, edited and translated by John T. Scott, 7:289–332. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2013.

Rückert, L.J. "On the Gifts of Prophecy and of Speaking in Tongues." In *Selections from German Literature*, edited by B.B. Edwards and E.A. Park. Andover: Gould, Newman and Saxton, 1839.

Rush, Fred. "Conceptual Foundations of Early Critical Theory." In *The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory*, edited by Fred Rush, 6–39. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Ryan, David. "Industrial Revolution." In *Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia*, edited by Melvin E. Page, 276–77. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003.

Sacks, David. *Encyclopedia of the Ancient Greek World*. Revised edition. New York: Facts on File, 2005.

Said, Edward W. *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.

———. *Orientalism*. New York: Penguin Books, 2003.

Saïd, Suzanne. "Greeks and Barbarians in Euripides." In *Greeks and Barbarians*, edited by Thomas Harrison, 62–100. Edinburgh Readings on the Ancient World. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002.

Salway, Benet. "What's in a Name? A Survey of Roman Onomastic Practice from c. 700 B.C. to A.D. 700." *The Journal of Roman Studies* 84 (1994): 124–45.

Samarin, William J. "Glossolalia as Learned Behavior." *Canadian Journal of Theology* 15 (1969): 60–64.

———. Review of *Speaking in Tongues: A Cross-Cultural Study of Glossolalia*, by Felicitas D. Goodman. *Language* 50, no. 1 (1974): 207–12.

———. "Sociolinguistic vs. Neurophysiological Explanations for Glossolalia: Comment on Goodman's Paper." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 11, no. 3 (1972): 293–96.

Sanders, E. P. "Paul between Judaism and Hellenism." In *St. Paul among the Philosophers*, edited by John D. Caputo and Linda Alcoff, 74–90. Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009.

Sanders, G.D.R. "Landlords and Tenants: Sharecroppers and Subsistence Framing in Corinthian Historical Context." In *Corinth in Contrast: Studies in Inequality*, edited by Steven J. Friesen, Sarah A. James, and Daniel N. Schowalter, 103–25. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013.

———. "Urban Corinth: An Introduction." In *Urban Religion in Roman Corinth: Interdisciplinary Approaches*, edited by Daniel Schowalter and Steven J. Friesen, 11–24. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. *Course in General Linguistics*. Translated by Wade Baskin. New York: Philosophical Library, 1959.

Sayegh, Briggette. "Controversy Over Pine Bush CSD Pledge of Allegiance Language." TWC News. Accessed April 27, 2016. http://www.twcnews.com/nys/hudson-valley/news/2015/03/18/controversy-over-pine-bush-csd-pledge-of-allegiance-language.html.

Schmid, Carol L. *The Politics of Language: Conflict, Identity, and Cultural Pluralism in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford University Press, 2001.

Schmidt, Royal J. "Cultural Nationalism in Herder." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 17, no. 3 (1956): 407–17.

Schulz, David. *Die Geistesgaben Der Ersten Christen Insbesondre Die Sogenannte Gabe Der Sprachen*. Breslau: A. Gosohorsky, 1836.

Schüssler Fiorenza, Elisabeth. *In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins*. New York: Crossroad, 1994.

———. "Paul and the Politics of Interpretation." In *Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation*, edited by Richard A. Horsley, 40–57. Harrisburg, PA: T & T Clark, 2000.

———. *Rhetoric and Ethic: The Politics of Biblical Studies*. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999.

Schuster, Charles I. "Mikhail Bakhtin: Philosopher of Language." In *The Philosophy of Discourse: The Rhetorical Turn in Twentieth-Century Thought, Vol. 1*, edited by Chip Sills and George H. Jensen, 164–98. Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1992.

Scott, Eugene. "Palin Praises Bush for Being Bilingual." CNN. Accessed July 19, 2016. http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/06/politics/sarah-palin-diversity-spanish/index.html.

Scranton, Robert L. *Corinth: Monuments in the Lower Agora and North of the Archaic Temple*. Vol. I, part III. Princeton, NJ: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1951.

Scroggs, Robin. "Paul and the Eschatological Woman: Revisited." *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 42, no. 3 (September 1974): 532–37.

Segovia, Fernando F. "Biblical Criticism and Postcolonial Studies: Toward a Postcolonial Optic." In *Postcolonial Bible*, edited by R. S. Sugirtharajah, 49–65. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998.

———. "Biblical Criticism and Postcolonial Studies: Toward a Postcolonial Optic." In *The Postcolonial Biblical Reader*, edited by R. S. Sugirtharajah, 33–44. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2008.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *Nations and States: An Enquiry Into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*. London: Methuen, 1977.

Shack, Jennifer. "A Text without 1 Corinthians 14:34-35? Not According to the Manuscript Evidence." *Journal of Greco-Roman Christianity and Judaism* 10 (2014): 90–112.

Shantz, Colleen. *Paul in Ecstasy: The Neurobiology of the Apostle's Life and Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Sherwin-White, A. N. "Rome, Pamphylia and Cilicia, 133-70 B.C." *The Journal of Roman Studies* 66 (1976): 1–14.

Shipley, Graham. *The Greek World after Alexander, 323-30 BC*. Routledge History of the Ancient World. London: Routledge, 2000.

Shukman, Ann. "Bakhtin and Tolstoy." *Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature* 9, no. 1 (September 1, 1984).

Shumway, Charles William. "A Critical History of Glossolalia." Ph.D. Dissertation, Boston University, 1919.

Sikka, Sonia. *Herder on Humanity and Cultural Difference: Enlightened Relativism*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Silverstein, Jason, and Melissa Chan. "School Divided Over Reading Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic." NY Daily News. Accessed April 27, 2016.

http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/school-divided-reading-pledge-allegiance-arabic-article-1.2154933.

Sinha, M. P. *Modern Linguistics*. Delhi, India: Atlantic, 2005.

Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove, and Robert Phillipson. "Linguicism: A Tool for Analyzing Linguistic Inequality and Promoting Linguistic Human Rights." *International Journal of Group Tensions* 20, no. 2 (1990): 109–22.

Slane, Kathleen Warner. "Corinthian Ceramic Imports: The Changing Pattern of Provincial Trade in the First and Second Century AD." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies* 55 (1989): 219–25.

Smit, Joop F. M. "Tongues and Prophecy: Deciphering 1 Cor 14,22." *Biblica* 75, no. 2 (January 1, 1994): 175–90.

Smith, C. J. "Onasander on How to Be a General." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement*, no. 71 (1998): 151–66.

Smith, Claire S. *Pauline Communities as "Scholastic Communities": A Study of the Vocabulary of "teaching" in 1 Corinthians, 1 and 2 Timothy and Titus*. Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012.

Smith, D. Moody. "Glossolalia and Other Spiritual Gifts in a New Testament Perspective." *Union Seminary Review / Interpretation: A Journal of Bible and Theology* 28, no. 3 (July 1, 1974): 307–20.

Smith, Dennis Edwin. "The Egyptian Cults at Corinth." *The Harvard Theological Review* 70, no. 3/4 (1977): 201–31.

Smith, Jonathan Z. "Re: Corinthians." In *Redescribing Paul and the Corinthians*, edited by Ron Cameron and Merrill P. Miller, 17–34. Early Christianity and Its Literature 5. Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2011.

Smith, Woodruff D. *Politics and the Sciences of Culture in Germany, 1840-1920*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Snyder, Louis L. *Roots of German Nationalism*. New York: Barnes Noble Books, 1996.

Soards, Marion L. *1 Corinthians*. New International Biblical Commentary. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999.

Spanos, Nicholas P., and Erin C. Hewitt. "Glossolalia: A Test of the 'Trance' and Psychopathology Hypotheses." *Journal of Abnormal Psychology* 88, no. 4 (1979): 427–434.

Spawforth, A. J. S. "Roman Corinth and the Ancient Urban Economy." *The Classical Review* 42, no. 1 (1992): 119–120.

———. "Roman Corinth: The Formation of a Colonial Elite." In *Roman Onomastics in the Greek East: Social and Political Aspects*, edited by A. D. Rizakis, 167–82. ΜΕΛΕΤΗΜΑΤΑ 21. Athens and Paris: Diffusion de Boccard, 1996.

Spencer, Vicki A. *Herder's Political Thought: A Study of Language, Culture, and Community*. Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2012.

Stack, Liam. "College Student Is Removed From Flight After Speaking Arabic on Plane." *The New York Times*, April 17, 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/17/us/student-speaking-arabic-removed-southwest-airlines-plane.html.

Stanley, Arthur Penrhyn. *The Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians: With Critical Notes and Dissertations*. Third. London: John Murray, Albermarle Street, 1865.

Stanley, Christopher D. *Paul and the Language of Scripture: Citation Technique in the Pauline Epistles and Contemporary Literature*. Society for New Testament Studies Monograph Series 69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Stansbury, Harry. "Corinthian Honor, Corinthian Conflict: A Social History of Early Roman Corinth and Its Pauline Community." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Irvine, 1990.

Starnes, Todd. "One Nation Under Allah: Fury After School Recites Pledge In Arabic." Fox News, March 20, 2015. http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2015/03/20/one-nation-under-allah-fury-after-school-recites-pledge-in-arabic.html.

Stein, Kevin. *Poetry's Afterlife: Verse in the Digital Age*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010.

Stendahl, Krister. *Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and Other Essays*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976.

Stern, Wilma Olch, and Danae Hadjilazaro Thimme. *Kenchreai, Eastern Port of Corinth: Results of Investigations by the University of Chicago and Indiana University for the American School of Classical Studies at Athens*. Vol. VI. Ivory, Bone, and Related Wood Finds. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007.

Stevens, Benjamin. "The Origin of Language in Greek and Roman Thought: Volume One." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2005.

Stiebert, Johanna. "The Body and Voice of God in the Hebrew Bible." *Journal for Religion, Film and Media* 2, no. 1 (2016): 22–33.

Still, Judith. "Language as Hospitality: Revisiting Intertextuality via Monolingualism of the Other." *Paragraph* 27, no. 1 (2004): 113–27.

Stillwell, Richard. "The Theatre at Corinth." *American Journal of Archaeology* 33, no. 1 (1929): 77–97.

Stoler, Ann Laura. *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010.

Strachan, Gordon. *The Pentecostal Theology of Edward Irving*. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1988.

Sturgeon, Mary C. "Sculpture at Corinth, 1896-1996." In *Corinth, the Centenary, 1896-1996*, edited by Charles K. Williams II and Nancy Bookidis, XX:351–66. Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 2003.

Swain, Simon. "Bilingualism in Cicero? The Evidence of Code-Switching." In *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, edited by J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain, 128–67. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Sweet, J.P.M. "A Sign for Unbelievers: Paul's Attitude to Glossolalia." In *Speaking in Tongues: A Guide to Research on Glossolalia*, edited by Watson E. Mills, 141–203. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1986.

Talbert, Charles H. "Paul's Understanding of the Holy Spirit." In *Perspectives on the New Testament: Essays in Honor of Frank Stagg*, edited by Charles H. Talbert. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1985.

Taubes, Jacob. *The Political Theology of Paul*. Translated by Dana Hollander. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.

Taylor, Alan John Percivale. *The Course of German History: A Survey of the Development of German History Since 1815*. London and New York: Routledge, 2001.

Taylor, Charles. *Philosophical Arguments*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.

———. *Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Human Agency and Language*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Taylor, David G. K. "Bilingualism and Diglossia in Late Antique Syria and Mesopotamia." In *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, edited by J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain, 298–331. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Taylor, Lily Ross, and Allen B. West. "Latin Elegiacs from Corinth." *American Journal of Archaeology* 32, no. 1 (1928): 9–22.

Taylor, Mark C. *Altarity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

Terezakis, Katie. *The Immanent Word: The Turn to Language in German Philosophy, 1759-1801*. London; New York: Routledge, 2007.

The Associated Press. "A Spokesman for Los Angeles International Airport Police Says Officers Have Concluded a University of California, Berkeley Student Broke Now Laws When

He Spoke in Arabic on His Cellphone While Seated on a Southwest Airlines Plane." US News & World Report, April 18, 2016. http://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2016-04-18/the-latest-lax-police-say-arabic-speaking-man-broke-no-law.

Theissen, Gerd. *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology*. Translated by John P. Galvin. Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1987.

———. *The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth*. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock Pub, 2004.

Theodoret of Cyrus. *Theodoret of Cyrus: Commentary on The Letters of St Paul*. Edited and translated by Robert C. Hill. Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2001.

Theophilos, Michael P., and A M. Smith. "The Use of Isaiah 28:11-12 in 1 Corinthians 14:21." In *Religious Conflict from Early Christianity to the Rise of Islam*, edited by Wendy Mayer and Bronwen Neil, 51–69. Arbeiten Zur Kirchengeschichte, Band 121. Berlin Boston: De Gruyter, 2016.

Thibault, Paul J. *Re-Reading Saussure: The Dynamics of Signs in Social Life*. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.

Thilly, Frank. "Romanticism and Rationalism." *The Philosophical Review* 22, no. 2 (1913): 107–32.

Thiong'o, Ngugi wa. *Moving the Centre: The Struggle For Cultural Freedoms*. London and Portsmouth, NH: James Currey, 1993.

Thiselton, Anthony C. "Realized Eschatology at Corinth." *New Testament Studies* 24, no. 4 (1978): 510–526.

———. "The 'Interpretation' of Tongues: A New Suggestion in Light of Greek Usage in Philo and Josephus." *The Journal of Theological Studies* 30, no. 1 (April 1, 1979): 15–36.

———. *The First Epistle to the Corinthians*. The New International Greek Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013.

Thomas, J. David. "Latin Texts and Roman Citizens." In *Oxyrhynchus: A City and Its Texts*, edited by K. Bowman, R. A. Coles, N. Gonis, and D. Obbink, 231–43. London: Egypt Exploration Society, 2007.

Thomas, Margaret. *Fifty Key Thinkers on Language and Linguistics*. New York: Routledge, 2012.

Thompson, Martha E., and Michael Armato. *Investigating Gender*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.

Thrall, Margaret. *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, Vol. 2*. Edited by Christopher M. Tuckett and Graham I. Davies. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2001.

Thrall, Margaret E. *First and Second Letters of Paul to the Corinthians*. Cambridge Bible Commentaries on the New Testament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965.

Tibbs, Clint. *Religious Experience of the Pneuma: Communication with the Spirit World in 1 Corinthians 12 and 14*. Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 230. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007.

Titunik, I. R. "Preface." In *Freudianism: A Marxist Critique*, by V. N. Voloshinov, vii–xiv. Academic Press, 1976.

———. "The Baxtin Problem: Concerning Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist's Mikhail Bakhtin." *The Slavic and East European Journal* 30, no. 1 (1986): 91–95.

Titunik, I.R. "Bakhtin &/Or Vološinov &/Or Medvedev: Dialogue &/Or Doubletalk?" In *Language and Literary Theory: In Honor of Ladislav Matejka*, edited by Benjamin A. Stolz, I. R. Titunik, and Lubomir Dolezel, 535–64. Papers in Slavic Philology 5. Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1984.

Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America: Historical-Critical Edition of De La Démocratie En Amérique*. Edited by Eduardo Nolla. Translated by James T. Schleifer. Vol. I. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2010.

———. *Democracy in America: Historical-Critical Edition of De La Démocratie En Amérique*. Edited by Eduardo Nolla. Translated by James T. Schleifer. Vol. II. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2010.

Todorov, Tzvetan. *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogical Principle*. Translated by Wlad Godzich. Theory and History of Literature 13. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985.

Toit, Andreas B. Du. *Focusing on Paul: Persuasion and Theological Design in Romans and Galatians*. Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2007.

Tomlinson, Richard A. *From Mycenae to Constantinople: The Evolution of the Ancient City*. London and New York: Routledge, 1992.

Treggiari, Susan. *Roman Freedmen During the Late Republic*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Trudgill, Peter., and Jean Hannah. *International English: A Guide to Varieties of English Around the World*. New York: Routledge, 2017.

Tupamahu, Ekaputra. "Tongues as a Site of Subversion." *Pneuma* 38, no. 3 (January 1, 2016): 293–311.

Turner, Max. "Tongues: An Experience for All in the Pauline Churches?" *Asian Journal of Pentecostal Studies* 1, no. 2 (1998): 231–53.

United States Census Bureau. "Census Bureau Reports at Least 350 Languages Spoken in U.S. Homes." The United States Census Bureau. Accessed August 1, 2018. https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-185.html.

"US Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic Leads School to Apologise." BBC News. Accessed April 27, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/31989874.

Valle, Sandra Del. *Language Rights and the Law in the United States: Finding Our Voices*. Bilingual Education and Bilingualism. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters, 2003.

Van Unnik, Willem C. "The Meaning of 1 Corinthians 12:31." *Novum Testamentum* 35, no. 2 (1993): 142–159.

Vasconcellos, Colleen A. "Slavery and the Slave Trade." In *Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia*, edited by Melvin E. Page, 1:534–37. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2003.

Verdelis, M. N. "How the Ancient Greeks Transported Ships over the Isthmus of Corinth; Uncovering the 2550-Year-Old Diolcos of Periander,." *Illustrated London News*, October 19, 1957, 649–51.

Versteegh, Kees. "Dead or Alive?: The Status of the Standard Language." In *Bilingualism in Ancient Society: Language Contact and the Written Word*, edited by J. N. Adams, Mark Janse, and Simon Swain, 52–74. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

———. "Latinitas, Hellenismos, ˒Arabiyya." In *The History of Linguistics in the Classical Period*, edited by Daniel J. Taylor. Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1987.

Vice, Sue. *Introducing Bakhtin*. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1997.

Vick, Brian. "The Origins of the German Volk: Cultural Purity and National Identity in Nineteenth-Century Germany." *German Studies Review* 26, no. 2 (2003): 241–256.

Viereck, Peter. *Metapolitics: From Wagner and the German Romantics to Hitler*. London and New York: Routledge, 2017.

Viertel, John. "Concepts of Language Underlying the 18th Century Controversy about the Origin of Language." In *Report of the Seventeenth Annual Round Table Meeting on Linguistics and Language Studies.*, edited by Francis P. Dinneen, 109–32. Monograph Series on Languages and Linguistics 19. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1966.

Vincent, Nigel. "Continuity and Change from Latin to Romance." In *Early and Late Latin: Continuity or Change?*, edited by J. N. Adams and Nigel Vincent, 1–13. Cambridge University Press, 2016.

Vološinov, V. N. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. Studies in Language. New York, Seminar Press, 1973.

———. *Freudianism: A Critical Sketch*. Translated by I. R. Titunik. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.

Waele, Ferdinand Joseph de. "The Roman Market North of the Temple at Corinth." *American Journal of Archaeology* 34, no. 4 (1930): 432–54.

Walbank, Mary E. Hoskins. "The Foundation and Planning of Early Roman Corinth." *Journal of Roman Archaeology* 10 (January 1997): 95–130.

———. "What's in a Name? Corinth under the Flavians." *Zeitschrift Für Papyrologie Und Epigraphik* 139 (2002): 251–64.

Walchenbach, John R. *John Calvin as Biblical Commentator: An Investigation into Calvin's Use of John Chrysostom as an Exegetical Tutor*. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2010.

Waldow, Anik. "Between History and Nature: Herder's Human Being and the Naturalization of Reason." In *Herder: Philosophy and Anthropology*, edited by Anik Waldow and Nigel DeSouza, 147–65. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Wallace, Daniel B. *Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament*. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996.

———. *The Basics of New Testament Syntax*. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2000.

Walters, James. "'Phoebe' and "Junia(s) - Rom. 16:1-2,7." In *Essays on Women in Earliest Christianity*, edited by Carroll D. Osburn, 1:167–90. Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2007.

Wan, Sze-kar. "Asian American Perspectives: Ambivalence of the Model Minority and Perpetual Foreigner." In *Studying Paul's Letters: Contemporary Perspectives and Methods*, edited by Joseph A. Marchal, 175–90. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2012.

———. "'To the Jew First and Also to the Greek': Reading Romans as Ethnic Construction." In *Prejudice and Christian Beginnings: Investigating Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in Early Christian Studies*, edited by Laura Salah Nasrallah and Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, 129–55. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009.

Wang, Ling-chi. "Lau v. Nichols: The Right of Limited-English-Speaking Students." *Amerasia Journal* 2, no. 2 (October 1, 1974): 16–45.

Wariboko, Nimi. *The Split God: Pentecostalism and Critical Theory*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2018.

Warner, Todd Huston. "NY High School Makes Kids Recite Pledge of Allegiance in Arabic Featuring 'One Nation Under Allah.'" Right Wing News, March 19, 2015.

http://rightwingnews.com/democrats/ny-high-school-makes-kids-recite-pledge-of-allegiance-in-arabic-featuring-one-nation-under-allah/.

Wei, Jennifer M. *Language Choice and Identity Politics in Taiwan*. Lexington Books, 2008.

Weinberg, Saul S. "Remains from Prehistoric Corinth." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 6, no. 4 (1937): 487–524.

Welborn, L. L. "Inequality in Roman Corinth: Evidence from Diverse Source Evaluated by a Neo-Ridarcian Model." In *The First Urban Churches 2: Roman Corinth*, edited by James R. Harrison and L. L. Welborn, 47–84. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2016.

Wells, George Albert. *The Origin of Language: Aspects of the Discussion from Condillac to Wundt*. La Salle, Ill: Open Court Publishing Company, 1987.

West, Allen Brown. *Latin Inscriptions, 1896-1926*. Volume VIII, Part 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, published for the American School of Classical Studies, 1931.

White, George W. *Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe*. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000.

Wiater, Nicolas. *The Ideology of Classicism, Language, History, and Identity in Dionysius of Halicarnassus*. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2011.

Wieseler, Karl Georg. "Ueber Das Γλώσσαις Λαλειν Im Neuen Testament. Neuer Kritisch-Exegetischer Versuch Über 1 Kor. 14. in Verbindung Mit Ap. Gesch. 2." In *Theologische Studien Und Kritiken*. Hamburg: bei Friedrich Perthes, 1838.

Williams, Charles K. "A Re-Evaluation of Temple E and the West End of the Forum of Corinth." *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies*, no. 55 (1989): 156–62.

———., and Joan E. Fisher. "Corinth, 1971: Forum Area." *Hesperia: The Journal of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens* 41, no. 2 (1972): 143–84.

Williams, Mary Elizabeth. "It's Not Unpatriotic to Say the Pledge in Arabic." Salon. Accessed April 27, 2016. http://www.salon.com/2015/03/20/its_not_unpatriotic_to_say_the_pledge_in_arabic/.

Wilson, William A. "Herder, Folklore and Romantic Nationalism." *The Journal of Popular Culture* 6, no. 4 (March 1, 1973): 819–35.

Winter, Bruce W. *Roman Wives, Roman Widows: The Appearance of New Women and the Pauline Communities*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003.

Wire, Antoinette Clark. *The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul's Rhetoric*. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1990.

Wiryomartono, Bagoes. *Javanese Culture and the Meanings of Locality: Studies on the Arts, Urbanism, Polity, and Society*. New York and London: Lexington Books, 2016.

Witherington III, Ben. *Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians*. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995.

———. *Women and the Genesis of Christianity*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 1991.

Wittkower, E. D. "The Psychology of Speaking in Tongues." *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease* 158, no. 3 (1974): 234–235.

Wright, Arthur. *Some New Testament Problems*. London: Methuen & Co., 1989.

Wyles, Rosie. "Staging Medea." In *Looking at Medea: Essays and a Translation of Euripides' Tragedy*, edited by David Stuttard, 47–63. London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2014.

Young, Robert J.C. *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 2001.

Zake, Ieva. *Nineteenth-Century Nationalism and Twentieth-Century Anti-Democratic Ideals: The Case of Latvia, 1840s to 1980s*. Edwin Mellen Press, 2008.

Zanden, J. L. Van. *The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution: The European Economy in a Global Perspective, 1000-1800*. Leiden: Brill, 2009.

Zeitlin, Solomon. "The Names Hebrew, Jew and Israel: A Historical Study." *The Jewish Quarterly Review* 43, no. 4 (1953): 365–79.