

GAVELS DEFYING GUNS: THE JUDICIAL CONTROL OF STATE POWER
IN AUTHORITARIAN SYSTEMS

By

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To my children, Gayle and Jaden,

For touching my life with their smiles

and to Charie,

Whose love makes it all worthwhile

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To count a hundred million stars...at a rate of one per second, sounds like a job that no one can possibly complete in a lifetime. In reality, it would only take three years. *The key is focus---a willingness not to be distracted.*

---**Timothy Corelli Sullivan**
The Rule of Four

This quotation was an ever present companion when I was writing this project. It was a perpetual reminder of what I needed to do in order to complete my dissertation. There were times that I have lost my focus; got distracted by the stars. However, through the kindness of certain people I managed to get back on track.

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