INFORMALLY QUALIFIED: JUSTIFYING QUALIFICATIONS FOR

EMPLOYMENT IN CREATIVE INDUSTRIES

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INTRODUCTION

Research has demonstrated that creative industries are built on a "good ol' boys network" where knowing the right people is key in obtaining employment (Bielby and Bielby 1994; Faulkner and Anderson 1987). But how do new artists with limited social network connections break into a field? Jerry Weintraub, a concert promoter and John Denver's talent manager, suggests in his autobiography that the secret to promoting an emerging act is to "sell [them] in the past tense" (2010:123). He divulges in his memoires that John Denver was launched into stardom by being sold "as if he were already a star." Weintraub marketed Denver as an established artist using several tactics including producing a Greatest Hits album after Denver's first hit, "Take Me Home, Country Roads." According to Weintraub's philosophy, emerging artists achieve success if they are presented as *maintaining* their status rather than achieving it. In this article I utilize Weintraub's marketing philosophy as I seek to understand how emerging artists display themselves as having directive power authority to make and enforce demands made in their employment contracts.

I investigate contract riders as material representations of the interpersonal communication between concert promoters and artists wherein an artist signals qualifications of professionalism and alignment with values and belief structures characteristic of a touring musician's profession. Through a quantitative content analysis of 30 production riders I develop a typology of signaling strategies used by artists to signal adherence to norms, values, and beliefs in an effort to justify their power to make and enforce demands in their riders. Through this analysis I am able to begin to explain

the role of signaling professionalism in achieving status and power in employment negotiations.

The purpose of this article is to provide a theoretical model that integrates literatures from sociology, law, and organizational theory to illuminate the process of achieving legitimacy and its influence on careers in creative industries. I identify strategies used by artists to justify employment qualifications in contract negotiations and measure variation in the type and usage of signaling strategies by career stage and genre. The legitimation of an artist's status is crucial for sustaining employment in the arts as "art world success…[is] equated with the attainment of legitimacy" (Baumann 2007:51). An artist's legitimacy correlates with their ability to invoke directive power to enforce requests made in their rider.

I begin with a discussion of the signaled qualifications required for artists to enhance their project opportunities and matches. The next section of the article addresses the process by which artists are matched to contractors through signaled qualifications. In the next section of the article, I outline the process of legitimation and its application it to the case of artist contract riders. I follow this with a discussion with an application of the model to a sample of contract riders. Finally I offer conclusions and directions for future research.

QUALIFICATIONS FOR ARTISTIC EMPLOYMENT

In explaining why some artists succeed while a large majority fails, scholars consider two types of candidate qualifications: formal and informal. Formal qualifications are those present in an artist's resume such as work histories, skill sets, awards, critical acclaim, and past project revenues (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Bielby

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and Bielby 1999; Pinheiro and Dowd 2009). Defillippi and Arthur (1994) have labeled these types of qualifications as "knowing-how" career competencies which are evaluated in employment decisions in firms using project-based employment structures. These formal qualifications signal to a potential contractor that the candidate possesses the requisite competencies in job-related skills and has the potential to increase a project's profits (Jones 2002: 213-214). Several longitudinal studies of artistic labor have demonstrated that career success is a function of these formal qualifications. Studies have found the strongest predictor of future employment in the arts is a history of associations with successful projects (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Bielby and Bielby 1999).

In further analyzing such formal qualifications for employment in the arts scholars have examined the relationship between economic success and the accumulation of a diverse set of skills including technical know-how and the ability to work across multiple genres. These scholars have found that artists who demonstrate formal qualifications through a display of their "knowing-how" competencies across a broad range of artistic skills increase their desirability and therefore open up more opportunities for employment (Pinheiro and Dowd 2009; Bechky 2006; Zuckerman 2005; Faulkner 2003).

A surplus of formally qualified workers in the artistic labor market exists because a large number of artists have training in technical and aesthetic skills (Menger 1999). Creating a successful career in the arts is complicated by the concentration of rewards among a small percentage of practitioners, and almost immediate failure for the rest (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Menger 1999). The skewed distribution of rewards is

produced, in part, by the fact that contractors rely on an artist's informal qualifications—components of an artist's candidacy that cannot be found on a resume—as proxy measures of a candidate's fit with a project (Menger 1999; Bechky 2006; Bielby and Bielby 1994, 1999; Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Zafirau 2008; Zwaan, ter Bogt, and Raaijmakers 2010; Neff, Wissinger, and Zukin 2005).

One site scholars look to in measuring the role of informal qualifications in the hiring process is an artist's "knowing-whom" competencies—information about a candidate provided though social networks (Defillippi and Arthur 1994; Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Jones 1996, 2002; Jones, Hesterly, and Borgatti 1997; Zafirau 2008). An artist's knowing-whom competencies are referred to as *reputation*—third party information about an artist's "character, skills, reliability, and other attributes important to exchanges" (Jones et al. 1997:932). Artists leverage their contacts for recommendations and referrals in seeking employment. An artist obtains a so-called "stamp of approval" through affiliation with well-connected individuals who refer them to jobs. Formal characteristics of an artist's social network including its size and embeddedness also matter in explaining career outcomes for artists. Studies show a strong positive correlation between the size of an artist's professional network and both economic and critical success (Zwaan et al. 2010; Zuckerman 2005; Faulkner 2003). These studies demonstrate how social capital, in the form of one's reputation, is translated into economic capital in project-based industries (Becker 1982; Craig and Dubois 2010).

Furthermore, the informal qualification of "knowing-whom" has compounding effects with the formal qualification of "knowing-how." Experienced artists who have

broad reaching and well-connected networks are more frequently hired, while artists

without these networks face frequent spells of unemployment (Menger 1999; Bechky

2006). Faulkner and Anderson (1987) find evidence of the compounding effect of

knowing-whom and knowing-how in their study of film industry workers wherein they

discover that those artists with the most extensive work histories and skill sets are

structurally embedded in the same social networks. Together, these artists repeatedly

work on projects over the course of their careers. This yields a skewed distribution of

rewards where success is concentrated among a select group of highly skilled,

interconnected artists. As artists advance in their careers and become further connected

in highly successful networks they rely more heavily on their work histories with well-

established network individuals to obtain employment (Faulkner and Anderson 1987;

Bielby and Bielby 1999).

   While studies of formal qualifications and informal qualifications measured

through an artist's social networks account for a portion of employment decisions in

project-based labor markets, scholars have argued that "knowing-why" career

competencies also play a factor in hiring decisions (Defillippi and Arthur 1994; Jones

2002) . Knowing-why career competencies are information about a worker's individual

beliefs, values, identities, and practices (Defillippi and Arthur 1994). Scholars have

suggested that the interpersonal communication between contractors and artists is a site

for the presentation of the following knowing-why informal qualifications: artistic

interests and identity (Defillippi and Arthur 1994; Jones 2002), professional attitudes and

business skills (Zwaan, ter Bogt, and Raaijmakers 2009; Zwaan et al. 2010), and the

adoption and performance of institutionalized norms and conventions (Zafirau 2008).

Vertically integrated organizations attempt to align workers' knowing-why qualifications with the organization's values, beliefs, and practices through a process of professional socialization (Feldman 1989; Fiol 1991; Barney 1986). However, in project-based industries an employee's values, beliefs, and practices are decoupled from the firm's (Parker 2002; Defillippi and Arthur 1994). For workers in creative industries professional socialization occurs across projects as workers develop a collective understanding of the institutionalized norms, practices, values and beleifs of their profession (Bechky 2006). Workers display adherence to professional norms, values and beliefs through signals of knowing-why career competencies in exchanges with potential contractors (Defillippi and Arthur 1994).

Preliminary work has been done to measure the role of knowing-why competencies on career outcomes. In their study of emerging Dutch pop musicians, Zwaan et al. (2010) find the odds of success increase for musicians with stronger self-reported professional attitudes. Additionally, Zafirau (2008) has studied how professional norms—"the intentional activities that participants perform in order to create the perception that they are legitimate, according to institutionalized expectations" (101)—are practiced by agents in a Hollywood talent agency. Such studies reveal evidence of the processes by which a worker's knowing-why qualifications factor into employment in creative industries. These theories and findings are expanded upon in this paper as I develop a model for the analysis of signals of knowing-why career competencies in the interpersonal communication between artists and contractors negotiating employment conditions. I seek to explain how artists with varying amounts

of formal and informal qualifications signal adherence to professional norms, values, and belief structures—capacities of their knowing-why qualifications.

MATCHING ARTIST AND CONTRACTOR QUALIFICATIONS

Projects in culture industries involve a matching process where artists and contractors are matched with one another based on knowing-how, knowing-whom, and knowing-why qualifications (Jones 2002). Artists are constrained to various performance outlets based on genre, size and construction of the show, and characteristics of their fan base. These needs are aligned with an artist's knowing-how formal career competencies. Accordingly, artists must be matched with promoters who have the ability to fulfill these needs. Like artists, promoters are also situated in market niches, specializing in the number and size of shows they promote (e.g., local versus national tour promoters), physical constraints of the venues they subcontract with (e.g., size limitations and building codes), and genres they specialize in promoting. In addition to the matching of artists' and promoters' formal qualifications, artists and promoters are also matched based on informal qualifications (Jones 2002). Just as in other project-based industries, social and professional networks are important when assessing matches between concert promoters and artists. Promoters and musicians often work repeatedly with tour managers, record labels, and other team members who are structurally embedded in their own professional networks (Passman 2000).

Scholars have examined the process of matching artists to contractors according to alignment of formal qualifications (Pinheiro and Dowd 2009). Further, studies have addressed the role of knowing-whom employment qualifications in the matching process (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Bielby and Bielby 1999). However, scholars have yet to

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pair equally qualified artists to examine the role of knowing-why competency signals in the matching of contractors to artists. Such an investigation into the signals used by artists to display knowing-why employment qualifications will illuminate the role of adherence to professional norms, values and beliefs in explaining employment outcomes. Perhaps the relative lack of attention to variation in signals of knowing-why competencies is due to the fact that these informal qualifications are displayed in private and evaluated in a highly-concentrated network of industry insiders (Zafirau 2008; Uzzi 1999). The relative obscurity of knowing-why signals yields problematic response bias for researchers examining the role of informal qualifications in career outcomes. However, access to displays of knowing-why qualifications is not as difficult as it appears to be. Legal scholars have argued that contracts are documents in which individuals signal values, beliefs, identities, and adherence to norms of conduct for contractors to interpret when making hiring decisions (Suchman 2003; Smith and King 2009; Macaulay 1963).

Contract riders—addenda to production agreements in which artists stipulate technical and personal requests—are especially useful in this regard, as they are a site for artists to signal competencies which are evaluated in the matching of artists and promoters. As seen in Figure 1, the contract rider is an agreement between the artist and promoter. By signing this contract, the promoter agrees to fulfill the requests of the rider and produce the concert to the artist's specifications. Thus, it is necessary that an artist be matched to a promoter who is capable of providing the necessary goods and services, or subcontracting with other agencies capable of fulfilling the demands of the rider. A promoter's ability to fulfill the demands of the contract rider is limited by the promoter's

economic capacities (e.g., the cost of purchasing expensive hospitality items for the artist's dressing room) and limitations of the subcontracted agencies (e.g., the structural constraints of a venue) (Kushner 2003). The rider is a critical document for assessing the appropriateness of a match.

Figure 1: Relationships in the Production of a Concert Performance

Compliance with the demands of a signed rider may appear unquestioned due to the fact that stipulations in the rider are legally a part of the agreement between the promoter and artist. However, in practice, non-compliance is common (Passman 2000). Yet, legal action is unlikely unless non-compliance is related to failure to obtain appropriate insurance, licenses, permits, or in some way results in inadequate staging, sound, and other lighting requirements deemed critical to the safety of the performance (Waddell, Barnet, and Berry 2007:155). Failures to provide hospitality services or nuanced specifications of the technical rider that are not critical to the safety of the artist and audiences are generally not treated with legal action, despite that fact that these specifications of the rider are also legally binding.

Due to the fact that a rider is typically not enforced through legal means, an artist must find alternative methods to insure compliance with their demands (Waddell et al. 2007). One way compliance is achieved is by invoking directive power that is ascribed to the artist by virtue of a high status position. An artist's status position and the power associated with that position is validated through a process known as *legitimation* (Johnson, Dowd, and Ridgeway 2006). Legitimation of an artist's status and power authority requires consensus among contracting parties about the validity of the artist's position in the status hierarchy (Johnson et al. 2006; Zelditch 2001). Consensus is achieved through *justification*—an argument which asserts that an artist without previously established legitimacy conforms to an existing set of norms, values or rules (Baumann 2007:49).

Established artists come to negotiations with validated legitimacy as their elevated status positions has been justified by their formal qualifications and reputation passed through social networks (Baumann 2007). By virtue of their legitimated status position, these artists command directive and influential power (Johnson et al. 2006). Baumann (2007:55) argues resources for justification include both tangible and intangible resources such as money, knowledge, experience, network connections, physical assets, informal traditions, emotional energy, and leadership. Emerging artists lack a number of these resources and are thus placed low in the status order in employment negations. Their low status positions correspond to an absence of directive power (Johnson et al. 2006). However, directive power is a necessary pre-condition for making enforceable requests in a rider. Therefore, emerging artists must work to achieve a higher status position in order

to obtain requisite power and authority. Following Baumann's (2007) resources for establishing legitimacy, I suggest that emerging artists can achieve an elevated status position is through the tradition of displaying adherence to professional norms, values, and beliefs. I argue that this adherence is displayed through signals of artist's knowing-why qualifications in the contract rider.

In this article I analyze variation in the strategies used by artists to justify their status and power authority through signals of knowing-why qualifications. The purpose of this analysis is to illuminate the role of justification and legitimacy in project-based career employment.

HYPOTHESES

Through a content analysis of riders, I assess variation in strategies used to justify an artist's knowing-why qualifications over time to determine if the variation in strategies reflects career stages for artists in different genres. By virtue of their relative novelty, new organizations such as an emerging musical act are ranked lower in the status order and have minimal directive power in negotiations (Johnson et al. 2006). Furthermore, research suggests that as an artist advances in their career contractors rely more heavily on information from social networks and expanding work histories when making hiring decisions due to the structural embeddedness of more established artists and the compounding effects of "knowing-how" and "knowing-whom" (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Bielby and Bielby 1999; Jones 2002, 2001). Accordingly, I hypothesize artists must do more work to signal alignment with professional norms to justify their power which is only minimally supported by the information presented through their weaker social networks and limited work histories. Likewise, I hypothesize justifications of an

artist's knowing-why qualifications in contract riders are used more sparingly by artists in advanced stages of their careers. The null hypothesis is no patterned variation in the signaling strategies used by artists at different stages of their careers.

Scholars have argued that genre classifications are structured around a unique set of conventions for the production, distribution, and consumption of art (DiMaggio 1987; Lena and Peterson 2008; Baumann 2007). In this article I use Lena and Peterson's (2008:688) definition of music genres: "systems of orientations, expectations, and conventions that bind together an industry, performers, critics, and fans in making what they identify as a distinctive sort of music." Following their definition of genre, I hypothesize artists' strategies for signaling knowing-why qualifications and the promoter's expectations of such qualifications will be patterned by genre. The null hypothesis is that variation in strategies for signaling knowing-why qualifications is not patterned according to musical genre.

Research has often examined the role genre plays in the classification of culture for production and consumption (see for example DiMaggio 1987; Lena and Peterson 2008; Baumann 2007; Hsu and Podolny 2005; Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003). However, scholars have yet to address the role of genre in explaining artistic career outcomes. The findings produced in this research are intended to generate hypotheses about the impact of genre on signals of an artist's knowing-why employment qualifications in musician's careers.

DATA AND METHODS
Sample

The production riders used as data in this study were collected from national, regional, and local concert promoters and producers. I made initial contact through email

or phone calls to concert promoters in my personal and professional social networks. Each promoter was asked to send riders from a variety of musical acts. They were also asked to provide contact information for other promoters who might be willing to participate in the study. The response rate was 100% for promoters who claimed access to a supply of riders.

I obtained a total of 146 production riders from a range of musical acts, comedians, and politicians. A single source, a large national concert promoter, provided a total of 97 riders. The additional 49 riders were collected from six other firms, all of which were either local or regional promoters. After excluding from my sample non-musical artists, incomplete riders, and riders from artists working outside the four defined genres (to be discussed below), the effective sample size was 80 riders. In this sample there is one rider for each artist for a tour date between 2007 and 2010. The sample is constrained to touring commercial artists with available riders. Thus, the sample is not generalizable to independent artists or those artists without production riders.

Dependent variable: signaling strategies

Using an inductive qualitative content coding strategy I coded each rider in my sample to identify strategies used to highlight and specify requests, an action understood as signaling the artist's knowing-why qualifications. Due to the fact that unfilled demands in a rider are rarely legally prosecuted (Waddell et al. 2007), artists must find alternative methods to justify their directive power in an effort to insure compliance with the demands set forth in the rider. Examples of such strategies include bolding items, attaching the phrase "very important" to a specific request, noting that a brand of bottled water was either an acceptable or unacceptable alternative to a specific backstage drink

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request, and clauses specifying liability.   While these strategies have instructional

purposes of directing attention to a specific request, they also are imbued with symbolic

meanings as they signal an artist's knowing-why informal qualifications to be assessed

and validated by promoters in the negotiation exchange.

Through an inductive and iterative coding process, I identified seven thematic

strategies used by artists to signal knowing-why qualifications in their riders:

"minimums," "acceptable alternatives," "unacceptable alternatives," "linguistic

emphasis," "aesthetic emphasis," "legal discourse," and "deference." Each signaling

strategy is used as a dependent variable in a series of quantitative analyses of the

strategies used by artists at various stages in their career. Table 1 outlines the descriptive

statistics for the strategies used to signal knowing-why qualifications as the dependent

variables in my analyses.

1. *Minimum* refers to any specification or addition to a clause written in such as

   manner as to note the request is a minimal requirement for the performance. An

   example of this type of strategy comes from a stage two pop artist's rider, "*Stage*

   size needs to be at least 30' wide x 20' deep." This type of strategy can be

   understood as an effort to deflect negative attention away from a request as

   potentially appearing frivolous. This strategy is a signal of adherence to the

   professional norm of respecting the rider as a site to include only reasonable

   requests (Passman 2000). As seen in Table 1, this strategy is the only strategy

   used universally across all the riders in my sample. On average this strategy

   comprises 17.65% of the signaling strategies used in a rider across all artists in the

   sample.

2. *Acceptable Alternatives* is one type of strategy used by artists to specify an appropriate alternative way of fulfilling a request. An example of this strategy comes from a stage two R&B/blues artist: *"One (1) Case (24) Stella Artois beer or local equivalent."* Artists utilizing this strategy acknowledge that their requests are not always met to their exact standard, and suggest a substitute for a specific demand. The strategy signals that an artist understands the standards practices of producing concerts—non-compliance. Acknowledgement of this professional norm signals a common framework for understanding the informal rules of the exchange between artists and promoters. This strategy is the least commonly used strategy in riders, on average comprising only 5.55% of signaling strategies used by all artists in the sample.

3. *Unacceptable Alternatives* is another type of strategy used by an artist when identifying alternative methods for fulfilling a request. While this was rarely the most prevalent strategy used in a rider (mean usage= 8.7%), riders routinely had at least a few occurrences, such as this one found in a stage one rock artist's rider: *"Purchaser will provide and pay for a professional barricade (no dinner tables, bicycle racks, etc.)."* Using this strategy an artist notes items that are unacceptable alternatives to a request, in this case tables or bicycle racks as a substitute to a professional grade barricade. Similarly to the strategy of acceptable alternatives, this strategy signals an understanding of standard procedural operations. However, unlike noting acceptable alternatives, this strategy invokes an artist's power to direct the operations of the promoter.

4. *Linguistic Emphasis* is a strategy used to draw attention to a stipulation in the rider through the use of any number of words to emphasize the importance of the request. Such an example comes from a stage three rock artist: *"It is imperative that all cold drinks and perishable foods be kept in/on ice at all times."* In this example the artist emphasizes the importance of the temperature control on their beverages, noting that this request is "imperative." Other linguistic emphasis wording includes "necessary," "mandatory," and "important." These strategies signal an artist's values by highlighting the importance of a particular demand for that artist. While linguistic emphasis signaling strategies are universally one of the most common strategies—with a mean usage of 15.92% of the strategies in the sample—it is never the only strategy used. Artists regularly employ this tactic to draw attention and specify a variety of their demands in the rider, but do not rely solely on this type of strategy to insure the fulfillment of all requests in their rider.

5. *Aesthetic Emphasis* includes all strategies that involve emphasizing or highlighting the importance of a demand through changes in font, such as underling or italicizing an item. An example of this type of signal comes from a stage one rock artist: " **<u>ALL FOOD ORGANIC WHEN POSSIBLE**</u> ". The use of this strategy draws a reader's visual attention to a specific request through aesthetic changes to the text. The added visual attention to the request signals the value that an artist places on a specific request. Like the linguistic emphasis strategy, almost every artist in the sample invoked this strategy at least once in their rider. The mean usage of the aesthetic emphasis strategy is 31.77% of the strategies in the rider making it the most commonly used strategy across all

artists in the sample. Signaling through aesthetic changes however, was never used as the only strategy used by artists to specify or highlight their demands.

6. *Deference* refers to strategies that have a tone of respect or deference to the reader of the contract (i.e., the concert promoter). An example comes from a stage one pop artist: *"Also two medium sized face towels, black if possible, please."* In this example the use of the word "please" signals deference and respect to the concert promoter, potentially deflecting negative attention away from the specificity of the request. Honorific deference is a mode in which status orders are validated (Johnson et al. 2006). Accordingly, by displaying deference to the promoter an artist is validating their inferior status position. I suggest that deference may also be a strategy used by artists to deflect resistance to the more commanding requests set forth in the rider. Deference strategies comprise, on average, 12.95% of all the signaling strategies used in a rider.

7. The *Legal Discourse* strategy indicates the inclusion of clauses to define liability and finically responsible parties. Such an example of this use of legal discourse is found in the rider of a stage three, R&B/blues artist: *"If Purchaser fails or refuses to make such a payment immediately, Purchaser shall be deemed in anticipatory breach of contract"*. This strategy demonstrates adherence to norms of the legal negotiation of contracts, and thus alignment with the norms of the profession as a business exchange. Despite the fact that one might expect to find a prevalence of this type of strategy in contract riders, on average over 84% of the signaling strategies used to specify and highlight demands in a rider are *not* legal discourse.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Use of Signaling Strategies in Sample Riders

Signaling Strategy	Min. Usage	Max Usage	Mean Usage	Median Usage
Minimum	4.55%	80%	17.65%	14.20%
Acceptable Alternative	0%	16.22%	5.62%	4%
Unacceptable Alternative	0%	20%	8.08%	8.03%
Linguistic Emphasis	0%	44.44%	15.92%	14.78%
Aesthetic Emphasis	0%	85.33%	32.67%	33.53%
Deference	0%	50%	12.95%	11.31%
Legal Discourse	0%	53.06%	12.23%	8.98%

Independent variable: career stage

Scholars have used a variety of measures of artistic careers including album sales (Zwaan et al. 2009), *Billboard* chart rankings (Strobl and Tucker 2000), and awards (Pinheiro and Dowd 2009). However, for the purposes of this study, an artist's album sales, chart positions, and critical acclaim may not accurately represent the touring aspect of their career. This is due to the fact that an artist's album sales, chart rankings, and awards do not necessarily correspond to tour revenue because concert promoters' revenue comes from ticket sales, not album sales or *Billboard* chart success (Waddell et al. 2007). Furthermore, with the rise of illegal electronic downloads, album sales are dropping while tour revenues remain on the rise (Kusek and Leonhard 2009). This suggests that concerts rather than album sales are becoming increasingly more valid measures of career success.

I created a new measure of touring career success, *average ticket price*, by dividing an artist's average ticket sales by their tour's gross profits. Data for this measure was collected from an online database, *Pollstar*—a trade publication that covers the concert industry and provides box office figures, artist itineraries, tour histories and contact information to touring industry professionals including promoters, booking

agents, artist managers, and venue owners/managers (Pollstar 2011). *Pollstar*'s data is

collected directly from artist agents, managers and promoters, who report sales figures

and other logistics involving the production of the concert to the agency (Pollstar 2011).[1]

I dropped artists from my sample that did not have ticket sales data available in *Pollstar*'s

database. The measure of average ticket price for each artist comes from 2009 tours, as

at the time of data collection this was the only aggregated data available. A limitation of

using 2009 data for all artists is that the riders in my sample are for tours dates between

2007 and 2010. Therefore, 2009 data is most applicable for the 2010 riders (as these

riders will reflect changes directly applicable to their 2009 tours), and will be least

applicable to 2007-2009 riders.

Independent variable: musical genre

In addition to the theoretical justifications I have for expecting variance by genre,

preliminary analyses of the data showed variation in the average ticket price of a concert

by genre. In my sample jazz and pop concerts cost, on average, more than rock and

R&B/blues concerts. To accurately assess variation in signaling strategies by an artist's

career stage I include genre in my second set of analyses. To do so, I used data from the

All Music Guide's online database allmusic.com to categorize each artist into one of four

genres: pop, rock, R&B/blues, and jazz (Allmusic 2011). *All Music* is a bibliographic

reference entertainment guide that provides artist profiles, discographies and chart

rankings (Leach 2008). Scholars have used data from *All Music Guide* and its companion

website allmusic.com for measures of genre, networks, and career outcomes (Kusek and

Leonhard 2009). In this article, I produced the variable genre by collapsing several

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[1] The self-reported aspect of this data is acknowledged as a limitation of the study. However, *Pollstar* has a reputation of being a valid and reliable source of tour data within the industry despite the self-reported measures (Kusek and Leonhard 2009).

subgenres listed on allmusic.com into one genre. For example, the pop genre includes: alternative pop/rock, pop, contemporary pop/rock, teen pop, dance pop, power pop, bubblegum, AM pop, sunshine pop, early pop/rock, and vocal pop.

Measurement

After compiling the information from *Pollstar* to calculate 2009 average ticket prices for each artist, I grouped artists according to genre and produced descriptive statistics for the distribution of ticket prices, provided in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Career Stage Measure: Average Ticket Price by Genre

Genre	Min	Max	Mean	Standard Deviation	Range
Pop	$35.43	$85.35	$49.61	$17.24	$35.43-$85.35
Rock	$9.13	$78.43	$28.52	$14.68	$9.13-$78.43
R&B/Blues	$18.51	$99.49	$52.30	$22.50	$18.51-$99.49
Jazz	$27.27	$73.34	$52.20	$19.43	$27.27-$73.34

From these descriptive statistics I identified the natural breaks in the distributions and used these breaks as boundaries for 3 distinct career stages (stage one-three). I chose to use three distinct career stages to represent early, mid, and advanced career stage artists in order to insure at least one rider per cell. For genres with normal distributions, I used quartiles as markers for the natural breaks. The natural breaks in genres with skewed distributions were identified visually from graphical representations of average ticket prices within each genre and are reported in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Average Ticket Prices by Genre and Career Stage

Genre	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3
Pop	$1-$40	$40.01-$50	$50.01+
Rock	$1-$20	$20.01-$40	$40.01
R&B/Blues	$1-$40	$40.01-$60	$60.01+
Jazz	1-$30	40.01-$60	$60.01+

Data analysis

In an effort to account for sampling bias, I devised a stratified sample. I created a 3x4 table of riders by career stage and genre (see Table 4 below). Cell counts range from one artist (jazz, stage one and jazz, stage three) to 23 artists (rock, stage two) with the majority of cells containing between two and seven artists. I used a random number generator to randomly select two riders from each cell in this table. There were two exceptions: the first was within the genre of jazz as two artists were not available in each cell so I coded all four of the available contracts. The second exception to my sampling strategy was within the genre of rock. The rock genre comprised the largest portion of my sample. Furthermore, the rock genre contained a number of different and relatively unique subgenres including heavy metal, alternative, and folk rock. To account for the variation within the genre I oversampled rock riders using 30% of the riders in each cell. The stratified re-sampling of riders yielded a total of sample of 30 riders from four genres within three distinct career stages.

Table 4: Sampling Frame of Production Riders by Genre and Career Stage [a]

	Stage #1		Stage #2		Stage #3
Pop (2 each) Stage 1: 1-40 Stage 2: 40.01-50 Stage 3: 50.01+	(35.43)* (39.40)*		(41.98)* (45.57)* (46.98)		(65.44)* (85.35)*
Rock (3-30%) Stage 1: 1-20 Stage 2: 20.01-40 Stage 3: 40.01+	(9.13) (10.40) (10.43) (11.98)* (12.65) (13.16) (16.01) (16.11) (17.35)*	(17.35) (17.73)* (18.00) (18.13) (18.46)* (18.83) (18.77)* (19.17)	(22.41) (24.03) (24.34) (24.41)* (24.59) (25.94) (26.50)* (26.66) (26.93) (27.54) (27.86)* (28.72)*	(32.17) (32.79) (34.43) (35.80)* (37.01) (38.06) (38.27)* (39.58) (38.99)* (39.68) (39.77)	(48.42) (49.26) (52.01)* (52.13) (54.31) (55.53) (78.43)*
R&B/Blues (2 each) Stage 1: 1-40 Stage 2: 40.01-60 Stage 3: 60.01+	(18.51)* (24.50)*		(41.42) (50.74)* (50.82) (54.94)*	(55.87) (59.60)	(67.11)* (99.49)*
Jazz (2 each) Stage 1: 1-40 Stage 2: 40.01-60 Stage 3: 60.01+	(27.27)*		(48.75)* (59.43)*		(73.34)*

*An asterisk indicates the rider was randomly selected for inclusion in the final
sample. Riders are anonymous, denoted instead by the tour's average ticket price.

The unit of analysis for my study is the production rider. Each rider was coded
using quantitative content analysis coding in Atlas.ti, version 6. The rider was coded at
the level of the sentence to account for multiple signaling strategies used in each of its
sections. Furthermore, some sections of the rider are often written as a series of bullet
points as opposed to the more conventional prose of contract clauses. The standard
formatting practices of contract riders lends itself to sentence-level coding. Utilizing a
quantitative content analysis method, I coded each rider for the content of strategies used
to justify a demand. A total of 281 codes were applied to each of the riders. Through my
analyses I indentified 77 strategies which were subsequently collapsed into the seven

signaling strategies used as the dependent variables in my analyses. After identifying the

typology of signaling strategies, I conducted a series of ordinary least squares (OLS)

regressions to determine the relationship between career stage and the percent of each

specification strategy used in an individual rider. I conducted a *post-hoc* non-parametric

test using Tukey's honest significant difference (HSD) method to analyze pairwise

comparisons of each of the three career stages. For example, stage one musicians' riders

comprised of an average of 59 individual strategies, 24.46% of which were notations of

minimum requirements. I conducted Tukey's HSD to test if this percentage was

statistically different from stage three artists whose riders on average consisted of 99

specifications, 15.71% of which were notations of minimum requirements. A second

OLS regression analysis was then conducted to assess variations in signaling strategy by

both career stage and genre. These analyses test the difference in percentage of

specification strategies used per rider for artists by both career stage and musical genre.

The non-parametric Wilcoxon Rank-Sign test was run to test pairwise comparisons of the

median use of signaling strategies by genre. For example, jazz artists' riders are

comprised on average of 132 individual strategies, with an average median usage of the

notation of minimum requirements of 11.24% of the strategies used per rider. I

performed a series of Wilcolxon-Rank-Sign analyses to test if this median percentage was

statistically different from rock artists whose riders on average consisted of 83 signaling

strategies, a median usage of minimum requirements comprising 19.98% of signaling

strategies per rider.

RESULTS

Descriptive statistics

Descriptive statistics for each of the sampling strategies by career stage are reported in Table 5 below. The results demonstrate that each signaling strategy used in a rider is always coupled with another strategy—no one signaling strategy comprises more than 80% of the strategies used in each rider. Furthermore, the diversity of signaling strategies used in a rider is patterned by career stage. Later career stage artists have a broader repertoire of signaling strategies used in a rider compared to their early career stage counterparts. The maximum usage of one strategy by an advanced career stage artist is 53.06% of the strategies (the invocation of legal discourse by a stage three jazz artist). The maximum use of a specification strategy for an early career stage artist is 80% of the signaling strategies (notations of minimum requirements by a stage one rock artist). Perhaps this is because until an artist achieves a high status position through economic success their ability to invoke directive power to specify and highlight demands is limited. Accordingly, I suggest that early career stage artists must focus their specification efforts on fewer strategies.

Artists across all career stages commonly focus their power to specify demands on making aesthetic changes to the font of the text used in the contract. On average this type of specification strategy comprises almost one-third of the signaling strategies used in a rider. The least commonly used strategy used by artists across all career stages is noting appropriate alternatives to a request. On average less than 6% of the strategies used to specify and highlight a demand mention acceptable alternatives to a request.

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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Use of Signaling Strategy by Career Stage

Signaling Strategy	Min. Usage	Max Usage	Mean Usage	Median Usage
Minimum				
Stage 1	7.27%	80%	24.46%	13.01%
Stage 2	4.55%	23.64%	13.46%	11.76%
Stage 3	9.52%	22.97%	15.71%	15.49%
Total	4.55%	80%	17.65%	14.20%
Acceptable Alternatives				
Stage 1	0%	16.22%	6.90%	5.46%
Stage 2	0%	14.81%	5.17%	4%
Stage 3	1.36%	12.5%	4.35%	3.59%
Total	0%	16.22%	5.55%	3.82%
Unacceptable Alternatives				
Stage 1	0%	20%	8.60%	10.22%
Stage 2	0%	17.9%	9.11%	9.82%
Stage 3	0.68%	17.57%	8.07%	6.3%
Total	0%	20%	8.70%	8.90%
Linguistic Emphasis				
Stage 1	0%	44.44%	11.60%	6.89%
Stage 2	0%	35.27%	19.23%	15.96%
Stage 3	7.48%	24.55%	15.96%	15.75%
Total	0%	44.44%	15.92%	14.78%
Aesthetic Emphasis				
Stage 1	0%	50.91%	29%	37.97%
Stage 2	13.82%	58.33%	34.64%	33.73%
Stage 3	18.31%	42.86%	30.39%	29.94%
Total	0%	85.33%	31.77%	33.53%
Deference				
Stage 1	4.84%	50%	19.33%	14.91%
Stage 2	0%	18.52%	10.14%	9.09%
Stage 3	0.68%	14.97%	9.05%	9.52%
Total	0%	50%	12.95%	11.31%
Legal Discourse				
Stage 1	0%	40%	10.71%	3.1%
Stage 2	0%	25.76%	12.71%	11.11%
Stage 3	4.69%	53.06%	19.27%	8.98%
Total	0%	53.06%	13.57%	10.45%

Descriptive statistics are also reported for the usage of signaling strategies by genre in Table 6 below. The results point to the rock genre as an interesting case. Riders from rock artists are the least diverse of all genres. As demonstrated through the univariate analyses of career stage, the highest percentage use of an individual specification strategy is the notation of minimum requirements. This comes from a stage

one rock artist's rider. The genre of jazz is the most diverse of all genres in the sample. Within jazz artists' riders, no one strategy comprises more than 43% of the sampling strategies used per rider.

Consistent with the descriptive statistics for the use of signaling strategies by career stage, descriptives for the analysis of genre reveals that aesthetic changes are the most commonly used strategy among all artists in the sample. Again, noting appropriate alternatives is the least commonly used strategy by artists across genres.

Table 6: Descriptive Statistics for Use of Signaling Strategy by Genre

Signaling Strategy	Min. Usage	Max Usage	Mean Usage	Median Usage
Minimum				
Jazz	4.55%	16.67%	10.92%	11.24%
Pop	6.06%	15.49%	10.66%	10.88%
R&B/Blues	7.98%	18.00%	10.66%	8.82%
Rock	8.33%	80.00%	25.56%	19.98%
Total	4.55%	80.00%	17.65%	14.20%
Acceptable Alternatives				
Jazz	0.00%	3.54%	2.22%	2.66%
Pop	0.00%	5.33%	2.97%	3.00%
R&B/Blues	1.36%	16.22%	5.57%	2.80%
Rock	0.00%	15.00%	7.61%	7.31%
Total	0.00%	16.22%	5.55%	3.82%
Unacceptable Alternatives				
Jazz	7.14%	14.71%	10.50%	10.07%
Pop	0.00%	10.91%	6.49%	7.29%
R&B/Blues	0.68%	14.00%	5.62%	4.28%
Rock	0.00%	20.00%	10.45%	11.52%
Total	0.00%	20.00%	8.70%	8.90%
Linguistic Emphasis				
Jazz	8.33%	22.06%	14.80%	14.40%
Pop	5.45%	44.44%	20.06%	17.74%
R&B/Blues	7.48%	24.55%	17.55%	17.44%
Rock	0.00%	35.27%	13.78%	13.79%
Total	0.00%	44.44%	15.92%	14.78%
Aesthetic Emphasis				
Jazz	15.20%	42.86%	33.68%	38.33%
Pop	18.31%	50.91%	35.51%	36.31%
R&B/Blues	16.22%	45.51%	30.58%	28.58%
Rock	0.00%	58.33%	30.13%	32.29%
Total	0.00%	58.33%	31.77%	33.53%
Deference				
Jazz	6.06%	20.24%	11.16%	9.17%
Pop	2.82%	20.00%	9.71%	8.87%
R&B/Blues	0.68%	16.43%	11.34%	12.59%
Rock	0.00%	50.00%	15.53%	12.03%
Total	0.00%	50.00%	12.95%	11.31%
Legal Discourse				
Jazz	4.76%	25.76%	16.44%	17.61%
Pop	0.00%	36.62%	13.91%	11.89%
R&B/Blues	2.00%	53.06%	17.27%	9.58%
Rock	0.00%	40.00%	11.02%	7.80%
Total	0.00%	53.06%	13.57%	10.45%

Model 1: OLS regression effects of career stage on use of signaling strategies

       Table 7 reports the coefficients form the OLS regression analysis of the use of

signaling strategies by career stage. Previous research has indicated that as artists

progress in their careers they rely more heavily on extensive work histories and social

networks to obtain employment (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Bielby and Bielby 1999).

I have hypothesized that this increased reliance on formal qualifications and informal

qualifications presented through social networks reduces the need for justifying power

through displays of knowing-why qualifications in the contract agreement. Results for the

non-parametric *post hoc* test of Tukey's HSD are also listed in the table. In this first stage

of my analyses I ran the regression analysis without controlling for genre.

Table 7: Rankings of Use of Signaling Strategy by Career Stage [b]

Signaling Strategy	Estimate	Std. Error	T-Value	P-Value	Tukey Group [c]		
Minimum							
Intercept	24.460	4.596	5.322	1.28e-05***	A		
Stage 2	-11.004	6.113	-1.800	0.083 .	A		
Stage 3	-8.751	7.162	-1.222	0.232	A		
N= 30	Adjusted r^2= .046		F=1.7	df=(2,27)	p = 0.201		
Acceptable Alternative							
Intercept	6.894	1.575	4.378	0.0002***	A		
Stage 2	-1.723	2.095	-0.823	0.418	A		
Stage 3	-2.541	2.454	-1.035	0.310	A		
N= 30	Adjusted r^2= -0.03		F= .60	df=(2,27)	p = 0.554		
Unacceptable Alternative							
Intercept	8.593	1.869	4.597	9e-05 ***	A		
Stage 2	0.522	2.487	0.210	0.835	A		
Stage 3	-0.523	2.913	-0.180	0.859	A		
N= 30	Adjusted r^2= -.07		F= .07	df=(2,27)	p = 0.930		
Linguistic Emphasis							
Intercept	11.602	3.453	3.360	0.002 **	A		
Stage 2	7.627	4.593	1.661	0.108	A		
Stage 3	4.361	5.381	0.810	0.425	A		
N= 30	Adjusted r^2= .03		F= 1.38	df=(2,27)	p = 0.269		
Aesthetic Emphasis							
Intercept	28.999	4.633	6.259	1.07e-06***	A		
Stage 2	5.645	6.163	0.916	0.368	A		
Stage 3	1.387	7.220	0.192	0.849	A		
N= 30	Adjusted r^2= -0.04		F= .46	df=(2,27)	p = 0.636		
Deference							
Intercept	19.326	3.020	6.399	7.44e-07***		B (0.075)	C (0.092)
Stage 2	-9.186	4.017	-2.287	0.030 *	A	B (0.075)	
Stage 3	-10.280	4.706	-2.184	0.038 *	A		C (0.092)
N= 30	Adjusted r^2=0.14		F=3.4	df=(2,27)	p = 0.049 *		
Legal Discourse							
Intercept	10.705	4.280	2.501	0.019 *	A		
Stage 2	2.003	5.693	0.352	0.728	A		
Stage 3	8.566	6.670	1.284	0.210	A		
N= 30	Adjusted r^2= -0.01		F= .87	df=(2,27)	p = 0.430		

Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '

[b] One- way ANOVAs were conducted on the relationship between the use of signaling strategy and career stage. Resulting F scores and significance levels are given.

[c] Groups with the same letter are not significantly different at the .10 level. Those with different letters are significantly different at the .10 level. P-values for significant differences are in parentheses under the Tukey Group letter.

The results for the analysis of the deference strategy show that earlier career stage artists are *more* likely to use the specification strategy of deference than are later career stage artists (F=3.4, p<.05). There is more than a 9% increase in the use of deference strategies between stage one (μ=19.3%) and stage two (μ=10.14%) artists (p-value <.10). Further, the difference in the mean usage of deferential language is more than 10% higher for stage one artists when compared to stage three artists (μ=9.05%). For example, 20.24% the signaling strategies in the stage 1 jazz group, Straight No Chaser's rider is deferential discourse. Within the first three sentences of the document, the rider includes a request that the promoter: "*Please take the necessary time to fully ready (sic) this rider.*" Throughout their nine page rider deferential language is regularly used. Such additional examples include mentions of *preferred* equipment, requests for hospitality items only *if it is possible* without inconveniencing the promoter, and additional pleases and thank you's. Advanced career stage artists in the sample are statistically less likely to include such a high percentage deferential signaling strategies in their riders. When deference is used in these riders, it is typically only through the use of "please" and "thank you" language.

Studies have shown that individuals with low status who do not have legitimated power authority face resistance from others if they come across as "too directive" in their attempts to invoke power authority by making demands (Eagly and Karau 2002). Early career stage artists by virtue of their relative novelty in the industry are positioned low in the status order. The results of my study show that these artists are most likely to use deferential language in making their requests. Perhaps the high percentage use of deferential language in the riders of early career stage artists reflects an offensive position

taken by these individuals to reduce the likelihood of resistance for being "too directive" in their attempts to invoke authority when making demands in their riders. Mid-stage and advanced career stage artists' status positions and power authority is legitimated by their extensive work histories and well-connected social networks. Therefore, the strategies through which they display legitimacy in a contract rider are more commanding (non-deferential) without fear of being faced with resistance.

In the regression output for Model1 a marginally significant relationship appears for the strategy of noting minimum requirements between stage one and stage two artists. However, due to the asymmetric distribution of the mean use of the minimum specification strategies across riders in my sample, non-parametric *post-hoc* tests were conducted to analyze the difference in the use of specification strategies by career stage. Results of the Tukey's HSD analysis show no significant difference in the median usage of the minimum specification strategy between career stage one and career stage two artists. Additionally, no significant difference was discovered for the use of minimum notations between career stage one and career stage artists artists, nor between career stage two and stage three artists. I hypothesize that with an increased sample size, minimum requirements may prove to be significant in non-parametric post-hoc tests as the power of Tukey's HSD test increases with sample size (Verzani 2004).

There is no statistically significant difference in the mean use of the other five specification strategies: the notation of appropriate or inappropriate alternatives to a request, the invocation of legal discourse, or linguistic and aesthetic emphasis to the text. In the case of signaling the knowing-why qualification of adherence to profession norms through notations acceptable alternatives, the predicted mean use is between 4.4% and

6.9% for all artists in the sample. The lack of statistical significance for the use of this strategy could again be due to my small sample size. Noting acceptable alternatives is a strategy that is aligned with deference is that both strategies do not signal high levels of directive authority. I hypothesize with an increased sample size statistical significance for the acceptable alternative category may be discovered.

Noting unacceptable alternatives is one of the least commonly used strategy in riders. Additionally, high p-values in the range of .80 suggest that this strategy is likely not patterned by career stage. In contrast, linguistic and aesthetic emphasis strategies are extremely common in riders for artists across career stages. The p-values for these strategies are lower: 0.108 for stage two artists and 0.425 for stage three artists. The variable of linguistic emphasis was comprised of 14 different phrases that are used to stress the importance of a request. The phrase "must have" is a commonly used strategy for stage two and stage three artists. However, the use of this phrase appears qualitatively different among stage one career artists. Perhaps by separating this phrase out from the 13 other phrases used to emphasize importance will reveal statistically significant patterns in the use of linguistic emphasis strategies by career stage.

This lack of statistical significance in the differential use of the five strategies addressed above fails to support my hypothesis that as an artist advances in their career they are less likely to signal knowing-why qualifications using these tactics as they seek justification of their directive power. Yet, the differential use of the strategy of deference by career stage reveals an acknowledgement of status orders and authority to invoke directive power which support the theories that guide my research.

Model 2: OLS regression effects of career stage and genre on use of signaling strategies

Next, I conducted a second OLS regression model including both career stage and genre. Preliminary analyses of the data showed variation in average ticket prices by genre. There is not an existing literature that tests the impact of genre on career outcomes. The findings from the regression analysis are used to generate hypotheses about the effects of genre on career outcomes. The regression coefficients are reported in Table 8 below.

The results from Model 2 demonstrate no statistically significant difference in the main effects of career stage after genre is included in the model. The use of deferential language remains the only specification strategy with patterned use by career stage. Controlling for genre, earlier career stage artists are still more likely to use deferential language when making their requests as compared to stage two and three artists (p-value $> .05$). There is no patterned difference in the use of deferential language by genre.

Table 8: Rankings of Use of Signaling Strategy by Career Stage and Genre [d]

Signaling Strategy	Estimate	Std. Error	T-Value	P-Value	N
Minimum					
Intercept	18.01	9.51	1.89	0.070 .	6
Career Stage	-3.54	3.34	-1.06	0.300	30
Pop	-0.26	8.73	-0.03	0.976	6
R&B	-0.26	8.73	-0.03	0.976	6
Rock	13.88	7.70	1.80	0.083 .	12
Adjusted r^2= 0.17		F= 2.53	df=(4,25)	p = 0.066	
Acceptable Alternative					
Intercept	4.13	3.27	1.26	0.219	6
Career Stage	-0.96	1.15	-0.83	0.413	30
Pop	0.76	3.00	0.25	0.803	6
R&B	3.36	3.00	1.12	0.274	6
Rock	5.19	2.65	1.96	0.061 .	12
Adjusted r^2= 0 .10		F= 1.83	df=(4,25)	p = 0.154	
Unacceptable Alternative					
Intercept	10.26	3.99	2.57	0.017 *	6
Career Stage	0.12	1.40	0.08	0.934	30
Pop	-4.01	3.67	-1.09	0.284	6
R&B	-4.88	3.67	-1.33	0.195	6
Rock	-0.02	3.23	-0.01	0.995	12
Adjusted r^2= 0.01		F= 2.53	df=(4,25)	p = 0.014	
Linguistic Emphasis					
Intercept	10.26	8.05	1.28	0.214	6
Career Stage	2.27	2.83	0.80	0.431	30
Pop	5.26	7.39	0.71	0.483	6
R&B	2.75	7.39	0.37	0.713	6
Rock	-0.53	6.52	-0.81	0.936	12
Adjusted r^2= -0.07		F= 0.52	df=(4,25)	p = 0.723	
Aesthetic Emphasis					
Intercept	32.08	10.75	2.99	0.006 **	6
Career Stage	0.80	3.78	0.21	0.834	30
Pop	1.83	9.86	0.19	0.854	6
R&B	-3.10	9.86	-0.31	0.756	6
Rock	-3.38	8.70	-0.39	0.701	12
Adjusted r^2= -0.13		F= 0.17	df=(4,25)	p = 0.953	
Deference					
Intercept	21.35	6.99	3.06	0.005 **	6
Career Stage	-5.10	2.46	-2.07	0.049 *	30
Pop	-1.46	6.41	-0.23	0.822	6
R&B	0.18	6.41	0.03	0.977	6
Rock	3.28	5.66	0.58	0.567	12
Adjusted r^2= 0.07		F= 1.54	df=(4,25)	p = 0.220	
Legal Discourse					
Intercept	8.99	9.78	0.92	0.367	6
Career Stage	3.72	3.44	1.08	0.289	30
Pop	-2.52	8.97	-0.28	0.781	6
R&B	0.83	8.97	0.09	0.927	6
Rock	-4.61	7.92	-0.58	0.565	12
Adjusted r^2= -0.06		F= 0.56	df=(4,25)	p = 0.694	

However, after the inclusion of genre in the second model, genre effects appeared for two specification strategies: the strategy of noting minimum requirements and the strategy of specifying acceptable alternatives. To test pairwise comparisons of each of the four genres, I conducted a series of non-parametic T-tests using the Wilcoxon Rank-Sign test to analyze the difference in the median usage of each of the seven specification strategies. Results of these analyses are produced in Table 9 below.

Rock artists are statistically more likely to include a higher percentage of minimum requests than musicians from each of the three other genres when controlling for career stage (p-value > .05). The predicted percentage of the use of minimums in a rock artist's rider is 31.89% compared to 18% for jazz musicians, and 17.74% for both pop and R&B/blues musicians. To illustrate this difference I now provide examples from two of the riders in my sample. Lyle Lovett's (a stage three rock musician) production rider includes each of the seven signaling strategies. However, 33.33% of the signaling strategies used are notations of minimum requirements. This is compared to only 9.52% of the strategies used in Al Green's rider (a stage three R&B/Blues musician). Lovett's rider contains multiple instances of requests for "*adequate security*" and a dressing room to accommodate "*at least 35 people*." Green's rider, while also noting minimum production requirements focuses the majority of the attention of the rider's signaling strategies on invoking legal authority (mean usage= 53.06%) primarily to specify financial responsibility for supplying personnel and dressing room accommodations.

Table 9: Tests of Equal Medians of Usage of Signaling Strategy by Genre [e]

Signaling Strategy	Test Statistic	p-value
Minimum		
Jazz—Pop	13	0.914
Jazz—R&B/Blues	13	0.914
Jazz—Rock	7.5	0.033 *
Pop—R &B/Blues	19	0.937
Pop—Rock	9	0.005 **
R&B/Blues—Rock	8	0.003 **
Acceptable Alternatives		
Jazz—Pop	9.5	0.669
Jazz—R&B/Blues	9	0.610
Jazz—Rock	8	0.038 *
Pop—R&B/Blues	18	1
Pop—Rock	19	0.063 .
R&B/Blues—Rock	31	0.386
Unacceptable Alternatives		
Jazz—Pop	17.5	0.285
Jazz—R&B/Blues	20	0.114
Jazz—Rock	26	0.873
Pop—R &B/Blues	21	0.699
Pop—Rock	25	0.173
R&B/Blues—Rock	25	0.173
Linguistic Emphasis		
Jazz—Pop	10	0.762
Jazz—R&B/Blues	9	0.610
Jazz—Rock	30	0.872
Pop—R &B/Blues	17	0.937
Pop—Rock	55	0.299
R&B/Blues—Rock	54	0.339
Aesthetic Emphasis		
Jazz—Pop	12	1
Jazz—R&B/Blues	12	1
Jazz—Rock	34	0.559
Pop—R &B/Blues	23	0.485
Pop—Rock	50	0.536
R&B/Blues—Rock	39	0.837
Deference		
Jazz—Pop	15	0.610
Jazz—R&B/Blues	9	0.610
Jazz—Rock	24	0.721
Pop—R &B/Blues	14	0.589
Pop—Rock	31	0.397
R&B/Blues—Rock	41	0.968
Legal Discourse		
Jazz—Pop	15	0.593
Jazz—R&B/Blues	14	0.762
Jazz—Rock	40	0.221
Pop—R &B/Blues	15	0.6884
Pop—Rock	46	0.771
R&B/Blues—Rock	47	0.710

Significance codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' '
[e] Wilcoxon Rank-Sign tests were conducted to compare median usage of signaling strategies by genre. Resulting T-statistic and p-values are given

Additionally, rock musicians are also statistically more likely to have a higher percentage use of noting acceptable alternatives as compared to jazz musicians (p-value> .05). The predicted percentage of the use of noting acceptable alternatives is 9.32% for rock artists compared to 4.13% for jazz musicians. Furthermore, rock artists are marginally more likely to have a higher percentage use of noting acceptable alternatives as compared to pop musicians after controlling for career stage (p-value >.10). The predicted percentage use of noting acceptable alternatives is 4.89% for pop musicians compared to 9.32% for rock musicians.

The early career stage rock group Five Finger Death Punch's rider is comprised of 40 signals of knowing-why qualifications to justify status and power authority. 15% of these signals are notations of acceptable alternatives to their requests. The stage one jazz group Straight No Chaser's rider is comprised of 84 individual signaling strategies, none of which are notations of acceptable alternatives. Additionally, the stage one pop artist Adam Lambert's rider lists only 18 signals of knowing-why qualifications, 7.27% of these are mentions of acceptable alternatives. This difference in the use of signaling adherence to the professional norm of respecting the rider as a site to include only reasonable requests (Passman 2000) suggests that rock artists are potentially often perceived to break the norm as compared to jazz and pop artists. The findings suggest that perhaps rock artists must perform more symbolic work to buffer against a negative stereotype and display adherence to norms of the profession.

The specification strategies of noting minimal requirements and suggesting acceptable alternatives to a request have one commonality: foreshadowing and working to buffer against non-compliance by positing their demands as austere and flexible. The

specification of a minimum request demonstrates to promoters that the artist is being conservative in their demands. Noting acceptable alternatives also demonstrates flexibility and understanding on behalf of the artist. I suggest that rock artists are more likely to use strategies to present their demands as austere and flexible to buffer against a social stigma of rock artists as frivolous, eccentric performers.

There is no statistically significant difference in the mean use of the other five specification strategies by genre: the notation of inappropriate alternatives to a request, the invocation of legal discourse, deferential language, or linguistic and aesthetic emphasis to the text. I hypothesize significance was not discovered in these remaining five specification strategies because of the small sample size of riders in jazz, pop, and R&B/blues genres. I suggest that the small sample sizes drastically reduced the power of my tests to assess variation by genre. Additionally, the results of my analyses show potential interaction effects between genre and career stage with respect to cases of deferential language. Limitations of my sample size prevent me from testing these apparent interaction effects as well as reduce the power of my regression analyses. I suspect that analyses including a larger sample of a more diverse group of artistic genres will reveal significant results in the categories of minimum notations, acceptable alternatives, deference, and linguistic discourse in line with the patterns that appear in the analyses of both career stage and genre variation.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has explored how artists signal informal qualifications of knowing-why in an effort to justify power and status in the negotiation of employment contracts. The aim of this study was to explore the relationship between an artist's career stage,

musical genre, and use of strategies to signal adherence to norms, values, and beliefs of the concert production industry. In this article I have demonstrated how the display of knowing-why career qualifications are patterned by career stage with a focus on explaining how early career stage artists who have limited validations of their status and power authority signal their knowing-why qualifications to justify their power to make specific demands in their contract rider.

The concert touring industry has two main characteristics—also found in other project-based industries—that make the display of informal knowing-why qualifications an ever-present need for those seeking employment. First, as discussed above, creative industries are built around social networks. Studies have demonstrated how workers in industries that are built on closely linked social networks rely on reputation passed through these networks to obtain employment. This is true in many fields including service work, low skilled and low paid manufacturing positions, independent contractors, managerial positions, and freelance entrepreneurs (Smith 1997; Zafirau 2008; Osnowitz 2006; Kunda, Barley, and Evans 2002). Artists have an awareness of the importance of building and maintaining a good reputation with social networks, and they work to portray themselves as adhering to professional norms, values and belief structures in order to develop a good reputation with concert promoters who may employ them in the future, or pass information about them along to other promoters.

Second, creative industries are fraught with uncertainty wherein there are no formal characteristics for measuring an artist's potential for economic or critical success. Given the rapid pace of changing consumer demands, creative industries must deal with a high degree of uncertainty in the hiring process (Bielby and Bielby 1994, 1999). The

uncertainty of success leads contractors to rely on informal qualifications of an artist's character and attitudes as proxy measures of a candidate's fit with the project (Jones 2002; Zafirau 2008; Bielby and Bielby 1994, 1999). In this respect, the concert industry has commonalities with other project-based labor markets in the postindustrial economy wherein the absence of formal criteria for evaluating workers reflects the utility informal qualifications to fill the void (Scott 1987).

The case of artist contract riders suggests the process of justifying power authority varies in form and content based an artist's validated formal and informal qualifications. Early career stage artists who have little external validation in the form of work histories and social networks present their informal qualifications of knowing-why qualifications by demonstrating deference to potential contractors. Early career stage artists have several characteristics commonalities to other inexperienced workers seeking employment in project based industries. The need for artists to display deference to promoters can be generalized to the experience of a recent college graduate seeking first-time employment in project-based sectors. Similar to an early career stage artist, these recent graduates have a skill set, but little to no work experience, awards, to validate their skill set as desirable to employers. Furthermore, recent college graduates by virtue of their inexperience in the workforce have limited professional networks to leverage for recommendations and referrals in a project-based employment sector. Therefore, the findings presented in this article demonstrating the increased use of deferential language used by artists in their contract riders may be generalizable to the study of recent graduates' resumes. In illustrating their qualifications for employment in resumes and job applications graduates assert power through claims of their qualifications. However,

with little work experience and networks to legitimate their qualifications, these workers also must rely on their knowing-why qualifications to obtain employment (Defillippi and Arthur 1994). Future research ought to analyze the generalizability of my findings to an empirical investigation of recent-graduate's resumes. If these studies found similarities in the patterned usage of signaling strategies by career stage, these theories may begin to explain how knowing-why qualifications also contribute to labor market segmentation in project-based employment sectors.

The results of my analyses show interesting variation in the use of the strategies: noting minimum requirements and acceptable alternatives by musical genre. Rock artists are more likely than other artists in the sample to use these techniques to signal professionalism—a component of their knowing-why career qualifications. I suggest that this is the case because rock artists face the task of deflecting the negative perceptions of their professional behavior that accompany the negative stereotypes of musicians in this genre in the music industry (Passman 2000). I suggest that these findings may translate to an understanding of the ways in which women, minorities, and other workers whose perceived competency is tainted by negative stereotypes. In alignment with this model for explaining the process of justification of power authority, scholars have argued that stereotypical beliefs about characteristics including gender, sexuality and ethnicity have pervasive effects on the individual's ability to obtain influence, power, and respect among other actors (Ridgeway et al. 1998; Carli 1991; Feagin 1991; Webster and Foschi 1988). I suggest that these social actors utilize the same strategies as early career stage artists to deflect negative attention away from the stereotypical categorizations of their work and help them obtain status and power authorities. Future research ought to apply

these hypotheses to cases such as gender, sexuality, and racial discrimination in employment to verify my findings applicability to work outside the concert industry.

The sample used in this analysis has a number of notable limitations including the small sizes's impact on the power of statistical tests and the fact that my sample is not constructed systematically from a population index. I suggest that increased levels of significance in the differential use of signaling strategies by career stage and genre may be found when utilizing a larger sample of riders from a diverse set of musical genres due to the fact that statistical power increases with increased sample sizes (Agresti and Finlay 2008).

Due to the fact that I do not have access to a comprehensive database of musicians' riders my results cannot be generalized to all touring musicians. Instead, my sample and the generalizabiliy of my findings are limited to commercial artists with formal contract riders. If a population level database of riders existed I would be able to systematically stratify my sample to include appropriate proportions of riders from artists across career stages and genres. This sampling strategy would also allow me to test for interaction effects as well as increase the statistical power of my models. Despite the fact that a population level database of riders does not exist, my sample is comprised of riders obtained from each of the three types of promoters: local, regional, and national. Therefore, I am confident that the effect of the promoter's capacities has been adequately accounted for, leaving only variation in artists' capacities to be evaluated in the analysis of signaling strategies. Additionally, the findings of this research are consistent with theories of status and the legitimation process: those without legitimated power must seek to obtain that power through a variety of measures including addressing informal

traditions of the profession (Baumann 2007). Therefore, I am confident with my

sample's ability to accurately identify the main effects of career stage on the use of

signaling strategies in addition to my ability to generate testable hypotheses about the

effects of genre.

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