THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF COMPULSORY VOTING IN LATIN AMERICA

By

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Para Gioco, mi elección voluntaria

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CHAPTER I

I. INTRODUCTION: COMPULSORY VOTING IN LATIN AMERICA

Political participation is the lifeblood of representative democracy (Norris 2002: 5). Citizens can participate in a democratic society in a variety of means, such as voting, campaigning, or protesting. One definition of political participation describes it as "those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take." (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978: 46) From this definition and range of activities, this dissertation focuses on the voting process, in which the selection of government personnel or the actions they take are determined through the mechanism of polls.

The individual decisions of private citizens to participate or abstain in elections are considered a standard measure of political participation and, in general, as an indicator of a country's democratic health. Hence, voting turnout is a useful measurement to compare participation across subnational units, countries, and population groups. It also allows a comparison of rates of participation across time. From cross-time comparisons, scholars have found long-term declines in levels of turnout in established democracies (Franklin 2004; Gray and Caul 2000). Because voting is a mechanism for expressing citizens' political opinions and preferences, a declining turnout could mean that the political system is not taking into account an increasing proportion of citizens' inclinations. Moreover, research has found that the group of citizens that opts for abstention is not a random sample of the total population but a biased group that shares certain characteristics. Of particular importance is the fact that those who abstain are

less wealthy, less educated and less engaged in the political system (Dalton 1996; Lijphart 1997; Powell 1986). The argument goes further: because this group turns out in lower rates, their level of influence in the political system is poor. Lever (2009) summarizes this argument in two steps: low turnout means unequal turnout, then, unequal turnout reflects and reinforces social disadvantages.

There have been some administrative solutions for increasing levels of turnout. Electoral management bodies in some countries have tried to ease the process of voting for citizens in the form of automatic registration, weekend voting, machine voting, and absentee voting. These measures highlight efforts made by electoral authorities to diminish the costs of transaction. Other proposals focus on civic education. Electoral authorities often try, for example, to implement discussions of civic duties in schools or informational fairs in public spaces as attempts to motivate citizens to participate and engage in elections and politics. However, it is not clear whether a long-term predisposition, such as the citizens' sense of duty to vote, changes with these short-term interventions.

The easiest, fastest and most effective response to low levels of turnout in a country is the implementation of compulsory voting. The objective of this dissertation is to assess the operation of compulsory voting in Latin America. This topic is highly related to electoral participation due to the fact that compulsory voting increases participation, which is one of the most robust findings in political science literature, particularly when it is enforced. Scholars have found this rule increases turnout around 10 to 15 percentage points in industrialized countries (Jackman and Miller 1995) and in similar proportions in Latin America (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004). In doing so, compulsory voting maximizes turnout and so it brings us closer to the ideal of universal turnout or full participation. Scholars who favor compulsory voting argue that it is not

enough to have universal suffrage –the opportunity to vote- because a lot of people opt out of exercising their rights. Instead, a democratic society should aspire to universal participation – encouraging the use of the opportunity to vote, even pushing citizens to the polls via negative incentives, such as monetary fines (Lijphart 1997; Rovensky 2008).

Even though this rule is not widespread, it is still employed in a small number of countries in the world. According to Birch (2009), 29 states in the world employ compulsory voting. From this group, Latin America stands out as the region where most countries use this rule: 16 countries in total. Compulsory voting is implemented through various procedures in Latin America. For example, Bolivia has compulsory voting with enforced sanctions. This country has monetary fees and civic sanctions if a citizen abstains. Other countries, like Mexico, have symbolic compulsory voting. In Mexico's case, this means that the Mexican Constitution stipulates that voting is compulsory but the Electoral Code (or any other legislation) does not establish penalties for not voting. So, there is a noteworthy variation that can be used when considering compulsory voting as an independent variable in models of turnout, or as a dependent variable for explaining the origins of this rule in Latin America. This dissertation aims to tackle both approaches: compulsory voting as a dependent and as an independent variable. In doing so, this dissertation takes seriously the notion that scholarship needs to explain the origins of this electoral rule in Latin America and to analyze its consequences for Latin American citizens' behaviors and attitudes.

The implementation of compulsory voting is heavily debated among politicians, policy-makers and political scientists. This debate revolves around normative issues and consequentialist arguments about pros and cons of its implementation. Not being the central point in this dissertation, I, however, briefly present the normative debate in the next section.

The Debate about the Implementation of Compulsory Voting

The idea of compulsory voting involves a normative discussion about the nature of voting. Some academics see voting from a civic duty perspective, in which the focus relies on principles such as representativeness, majority will, inclusive participation, and legitimacy. On the contrary, other academics see voting from a liberal perspective, in which the focus is on liberty and free will.

The first perspective emphasizes that voting should be seen as a civic duty (Hill 2002; Lijphart 1997). In this view, citizens should be obligated to fulfill their civic duties. For example, citizens have a duty to pay taxes. In some countries, citizens are obligated to collaborate with the justice system as juries. In others, citizens have a duty to service in the military. The obligation to perform citizens' duties is in part an intrinsic characteristic, but in some occasions it is also enforced by the state. This is the case of compulsory voting, where the state enforces turnout via symbolic calls to fulfill citizens' duties or via monetary fees and civic sanctions.

From a liberal perspective, voting should be understood as a right that citizens are free to exercise (Abraham 1955; Jones 1954, mentioned in Rovensky 2008). In this view, citizens are free to decide whether to vote or to abstain. Any interference in the individual's decision is seen as an intolerable coercion. Liberal supporters claim that if individuals have a right to vote, they should also have a right to abstain. However, opponents of this view argue that if citizens are completely free to participate, they also have the liberty to sell their votes (John Stuart Mill cited in Birch 2009: 41).

Compulsory voting, as a coercive mechanism to promote participation, is often opposed from the liberal camp. Between ideals of social interest and individual freedom, opponents of compulsory voting opt for the latter. Yet, scholars debate whether the principle of liberty is a reasonable objection given the considerable potential benefits of compulsory voting. For instance, Engelen (2007) argues that a state could not work if its citizens would be completely free from their obligations and duties. Moreover, Lijphart (1997) mentions that "compulsory voting entails a very small decrease in freedom compared with many other problems of collective actions that democracies solve by imposing obligations" (11). Furthermore, opponents of the liberal view say that the libertarian ideal is illusory and so the state can legitimately enforce participation via compulsory voting.

This electoral rule provokes another debate that revolves around its consequences. Because of its direct effect on increasing turnout, compulsory voting is frequently seen in a favorable light with respect to its consequences. When more people go to the polls, the preferences of the majority are better registered, then the outcome is supposed to be more representative of the electorate and it would bestow more legitimacy to the elected authorities and the democratic regime (Hill 2000).

Representation is one of the desirable outcomes of an election. Ideally, ballots should pick up citizens' voices and translate them to the political system in the form of elected authorities and preferred policies. When voting is voluntary, some groups are more likely to vote and this may create unequal participation and influence. In such circumstances, elections would fail to represent the average citizen. Lijphart (1997) mentions Tingsten's law of dispersion, which states that "the probability of differences in voting turnout is smaller the higher the general participation is." (2) Thus, because compulsory voting increases turnout, it should also

decrease differences in voting turnout across groups and, consequently, elections under mandatory voting should be more representative of the majority. Moreover, rulers selected in elections with low levels of turnout often do not receive a full mandate and their decisions might often be in doubt. Thus, because the will of the majority is better represented under elections in countries with compulsory voting, the legitimacy of elected authorities may be less questioned.

Compulsory voting is also promoted as an effective measure to deal with a collective action problem in elections. Given that each vote has a negligible contribution in the final outcome, citizens may consider their vote useless and they may finally decide to abstain. If so, they are not collaborating to a public good –the selection of the government-, but they are nonetheless receiving its indirect benefits. A citizen becomes a free-rider. In an extreme situation, all citizens may make the same reasoning and turnout would be zero, which is a potential risk for a democratic system. Some scholars propose that citizens would accept being coerced as long as the state guarantees others would also be coerced (Rovensky 2008). Other scholars assume that compulsory voting, in this situation, would be understood as a coordinating device to prevent "free riding" (see Birch 2009).

There are other positive effects of the implementation of compulsory voting. For example, Kato (2008) and Lijphart (1997) propose that compulsory voting diminishes the role of money in politics. The argument is that parties in a voluntary voting system have to get out the vote of their supporters. This system then depends a lot on parties' funds. In this view, elections are more an expression of mobilization rather than an expression of preferences. So, the introduction of compulsory voting should release parties from the need to raise considerable funds for mobilization and from the need of major donors. However, they still need votes and this would be a motivation for parties to represent the general interest.

Political information is another dimension on which compulsory voting may have a positive effect. The argument is that compulsory voting not only forces people to go to the polls, but it also forces people to think about politics and to be informed to cast a valid ballot. However, this hypothesis is not undisputed. Empirical evidence arrives at ambiguous conclusions about the effect of compulsory voting on citizens' information and engagement. Moreover, opponents of this idea propose that compulsory voting forces unwilling and disengaged people to turn out, those who otherwise would abstain. As a consequence, in a compulsory voting system, this electoral rule would introduce noise and the quality of elections would be deteriorated. Jakee and Sun (2006), for example, find that more random votes in compulsory voting would lead to nearly random electoral results. Further, compulsory voting not only pushes to the polls uninformed voters who would more likely cast spoiled ballots, but it also may generate voters' rejection and increase protest votes (Engelen 2007).

Finally, the implementation of compulsory voting presents some practical challenges. Lijphart (1997) mentions that the probabilities of the implementation of this electoral rule in most countries are low. The case of the United States is of particular interest for him. From his point of view, compulsory voting is difficult to implement, given constitutional objections, yet not impossible.[1] Further, the implementation and organization of compulsory voting is costly. Research has found that enforcement matters, but enforcement implies a bureaucracy to find, investigate and punish abstainers. Thus, the state has to invest public resources to maintain this bureaucracy. Opponents of compulsory voting argue that the investment is not worth it, given that it is not clear whether compulsory voting has positive effects on citizens' well-being.

[1] See for example an endorsement of compulsory voting expressed by President of the United States Barack Obama in 2015 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/03/19/president-obama-endorses-mandatory-voting/).

In conclusion, the debate about compulsory voting includes a normative discussion about the nature of voting: whether it is a right or a duty. In this discussion, political theorists are actually evaluating two ideals: liberty and free will on the one side and representation and legitimacy on the other side. There is not a solution to this debate because this is not an empirical argument, but rather a normative debate, in which scholars emphasize values and recommend the implementation or not of compulsory voting from their perspectives. At the end, each society (and their legislators, politicians and policy makers) has to decide which value they want to favor, evaluate the pros and cons of compulsory voting in their countries, and decide for or against its implementation or continuity.

Compulsory voting also includes a debate about the consequences of this rule. There are arguments in favor and against compulsory voting. Political scientists have tried to empirically test these arguments, but they have arrived at mixed conclusions. There is only one robust conclusion: compulsory voting increases turnout. Whether increasing levels of turnout mean less inequality of participation in a democratic society is an open hypothesis. Whether compulsory voting increases levels of political knowledge and interest is debatable. Results with respect to the effect of compulsory voting on the proportion of random and protest votes are inconclusive. And finally, whether compulsory voting helps to build more fair social and political outcomes requires further evaluation. There have been significant steps towards solving these questions, but still more research is needed. This dissertation takes part in this collective academic enterprise.

Before turning to the empirical chapters of this dissertation, I will present a panorama of electoral participation in Latin America, to show a remarkable variation in levels of turnout across countries, in part explained by the presence or not of compulsory voting. Next, I will

present a description of compulsory voting and the different procedures with which it is applied in Latin America. This information is the background context of this dissertation.

Turnout in Latin America

As a region, the Americas display huge variation in levels of turnout. I use data from the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA International) with respect to voter turnout from 120 presidential and parliamentary elections in 27 countries in the Americas in the last ten years (2005-2015).[2] According to these data, the 2011 presidential elections in Haiti registered the lowest turnout in the region in the last ten years[3] (22.4%) and the 2009 presidential and parliamentary elections in Bolivia recorded the highest turnout (94.6%). The average turnout for this period is 66.9%. Figure I.1 shows the proportion of presidential and parliamentary elections by levels of turnout in intervals.[4]

[2] Data include information from countries in North, Central and South America. Argentina and the United States are the two countries with the highest number of elections in this period (7 elections, 5 parliamentary and 2 presidential elections). Bahamas, Belize, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago are the countries with the lowest number of elections in this period (2 parliamentary elections).

[3] Haiti is clearly an outlier. Its parliamentary elections in 2006 show a very low turnout (28.3%). Parliamentary election in Venezuela in 2005 is other case with a very low level of turnout (25.3%). This last situation was due to irregularities in electoral procedures that did not guarantee free elections. Opposition parties did not trust in the *Consejo Nacional Electoral* (National Electoral Council) to organize free and fair elections and finally they withdrew from the electoral run. Figure I.1excludes these observations.

[4] See Appendix 1 for a table that shows turnout by country.



Figure I.1: Turnout in Latin America by Intervals
(Source: IDEA International www.idea.int/vt)

This figure shows variation in levels of turnout, but it ranges mostly in the interval from 60% to 80%. It is also remarkable that the difference between the lowest and the highest turnout in the Americas in the last 10 years is around 50 percentage points. Several institutional features have been hypothesized as having an impact on levels of turnout, such as proportional representation and unicameral versus bicameral legislatives. Among these institutional characteristics, the implementation of compulsory voting is often included as a significant determinant of turnout. IDEA International data allow a classification of countries according to whether or not a country implements compulsory voting.

Table I.1. Turnout by Type of Country

Type of Country	Num. Elections	Average Turnout	Min.	Max.
Countries with voluntary voting	53	58.9%	22.4%	92.1%
Countries with compulsory voting	67	73.2%	44.6%	94.6%

(Source: IDEA International www.idea.int/vt)

According to this classification, countries with compulsory voting show on average higher levels of turnout, as the literature has demonstrated. The difference between the two types of countries is 14.3 percentage points, which is consistent with previous analyses (Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004). However, it does not mean that all countries with voluntary voting have low levels of turnout and that all countries with compulsory voting have high levels of turnout. There is variation within each type of country. For example, the 2006 parliamentary elections in Colombia (40.5%) and the 2013 presidential elections in Chile (42%) can be considered typical examples of countries with voluntary voting and low levels of turnout, as expected. The 2007 and 2012 parliamentary elections in Bahamas (92.1% and 90.8% respectively), the 2012 and 2013 presidential elections in Venezuela (80.3% and 79.6% respectively), and the 2011 general elections in Nicaragua (79.1%) are rare cases of countries with voluntary voting and high levels of turnout. Elevated participation in these elections may be due to their controversial nature, in which a series of political scandals, violence, controversies, and accusations of fraud were pervasive.

In the group of countries with compulsory voting, the 2009 and 2015 parliamentary elections in Mexico (44.6% and 47.7% respectively) and the 2005 parliamentary elections (46%) and the 2009 presidential elections (49.9%) in Honduras are the countries with the lowest levels

of turnout. A plausible explanation is that these countries apply symbolic compulsory voting. This means that this electoral rule is mentioned in legislation, but sanctions are not defined and enforcement is not applied. On the other side, Bolivia and Uruguay, countries with enforced compulsory voting, display the highest levels of electoral participation in the region.

Data from IDEA international also allow a refined classification. This institution codifies this electoral rule in a four-fold classification: voluntary voting, countries with symbolic compulsory voting (no established sanctions), countries with compulsory voting and sanctions, and countries with compulsory voting and enforced sanctions. Map I.1 shows countries in the Americas according to this classification.



Map I.1. Countries by Compulsory Voting in the Americas
(Source: IDEA International www.idea.int/vt)

In this dissertation, I propose an improved measurement of compulsory voting, which I explain in detail in Chapter II. This new classification is based on a careful review of Latin American Constitutions and Electoral Codes. In the next section, I describe how compulsory voting is defined in each country and the monetary fines and civic penalties for abstainers, if applied, according to their legislation.

Variation in the Implementation of Compulsory Voting in Latin America[5]

Compulsory voting is applied in different ways in Latin America. In this section I describe compulsory voting based on Latin American legislations. The first source is each country's Constitution, which defines citizens' political rights and duties and in doing so it defines whether voting is a duty or an obligation in a country. This characteristic is deeply defined and specified in the Electoral Codes and related legislation.

In some countries, the Constitution states that voting is a right and/or a duty, but does not specify voting as an obligation. I consider these countries as having voluntary voting. In other countries, the Constitution does not exactly say voting is obligatory, but the Electoral Code contains an obligation to vote. I consider these countries as having compulsory voting. When their Constitutions or Electoral Codes literally define voting as an obligation, but their electoral legislation does not establish penalties for abstainers, I consider these countries as having symbolic compulsory voting. This means that there is an intention to make voting compulsory, but there is no realization of that intention. In countries where Constitutions or Electoral Codes say voting is an obligation and electoral legislation establishes penalties, for example monetary

[5] From this point I exclude the United States, Canada and Caribbean countries from the analyses.

fees and/or civic restrictions for abstainers, these are considered as having compulsory voting with sanctions.

Table I.2 presents countries with compulsory voting in Latin America, the legal base of compulsory voting in their Constitutions, and monetary fees and civic penalties defined in their electoral legislation. Latin American countries not shown in this table do not mention the obligation to vote in their Constitutions or in their Electoral Codes. Their constitutions usually mention that voting is a duty or that citizens are free to exercise their right and so I have considered these as countries with voluntary voting.

Table I.2. Characteristics of Compulsory Voting by Country in Latin America

Country	**Nature of voting**	**Penalties**
Argentina	The Electoral Code says voting is a duty (Art. 12).	The electoral code establishes monetary fees (Art. 125) and civic restrictions (Art. 126) for nonvoters who have not justified their abstention.
Bolivia	The Constitution says voting is obligatory (Art. 6).	The Electoral Code mandates that the National Electoral Court is in charge of setting a monetary penalty for abstainers (Art. 29). It also mentions civic restrictions if citizens do not have the suffrage certificate. Citizens designated to be Electoral Juries who have failed to do their duties are punished with monetary fees and 3 days of arrest.
Brazil	The Constitution says voting	The Electoral Code

	is obligatory for all Brazilian citizens older than 18. It is voluntary for those older than 70 years and those between 16 and 18 years old (Art. 14).	establishes a monetary fine for abstainers. It also mentions civic restrictions (Art. 7).
Chile	Until 2012 the Constitution says voting is obligatory for Chilean citizens (Art. 15). A modification of the Constitution eliminated the obligation to vote and established automatic registration for all citizens (Law 20,568).	Before 2012, Law 18,700 indicates that electors are those with valid registration in the Electoral Registry. Electors are under the obligation to vote (Art. 60). This law also establishes monetary fines for abstainers (Art. 139) and reasons for justification.
Costa Rica	The Constitution says voting is obligatory for all citizens enrolled in the Civic Registry (Art. 93).	The Electoral Code mentions that voting is a duty, but it does not reiterate voting as an obligation and does not establish penalties for not voting.
Ecuador	The Electoral Code says voting is obligatory for all Ecuadorian citizens older than 18. It is voluntary for those between 16 and 18 years old and for those older than 65 (Art. 11).	The Electoral Code establishes a monetary fine of 10% of the minimum wage for abstainers. It increases to 15% for abstainers selected as electoral authorities (Art. 292).
Honduras	The Constitution says voting is obligatory (Art. 44).	The Electoral Code has a chapter about electoral crimes and offenses (Title XII), but it does not mention penalties for not voting.

Mexico	The Constitution mentions that voting is a citizens' obligation (Art. 36).	The Electoral Code does not establish penalties for not voting.
Paraguay	The Constitution says voting is universal, free, direct, equal and secret. It does not mention the obligation to vote (Art. 118).	However, the Electoral Code establishes "exceptions from the obligation to vote" (Art. 94).
Peru	The Constitution says voting is obligatory until a citizen is 70 years old (Art. 31).	The Electoral Code establishes that the Electoral National Jury is the institution in charge the enforcement of penalties for not voting (Art. 251). Other legislation defines monetary fees according to poverty level of the province where abstainer lives. It also abolishes civic restriction for abstainers (Law 28859, Art. 5).
Uruguay	The Constitution says voting is obligatory (Art. 77).	The Law 13,882 regulates the obligation to vote. It establishes monetary fees (Art. 10) and civic restrictions for not voting (Art. 12 and 13).

This list shows that compulsory voting is concentrated in South America.[6] In this sub region, Colombia and Venezuela are the two only countries with voluntary voting. Actually, Venezuela employed mandatory voting until 1993 when this country abolished the obligation to vote. Colombia is the only case in South America where compulsory voting was never applied.

[6] I exclude Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana from this list.

Moreover, most countries in South America apply compulsory voting with established sanctions. Paraguay is the only case where Constitution mandates the obligation to vote, but electoral legislation does not regulate penalties for nonvoters.

A different scenario is observed in Central and North America. Countries in these regions often apply voluntary voting or symbolic compulsory voting. From all 16 countries in these regions, just three countries (Mexico, Honduras, and Costa Rica) apply a non-enforced obligation to vote. It is worth noting the situation in the Caribbean, where no country applies compulsory voting.

This classification of compulsory voting slightly differs from previous ones. For example Panagopoulos (2008) and Singh (2011) distinguish among countries with no formal sanctions, countries with moderate sanctions (fine only) and countries with high sanctions (fines and civic restrictions). These authors also rely in IDEA's coding for enforcement, which goes from low or weak to high and strict. This last variable gauges to what extent compulsory voting laws are enforced in practice. For example, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama are coded as having compulsory voting with no sanctions, but from a review of their legislation I code these countries as having voluntary voting, because their legislations do not mention any sanctions and do not specify the obligation to vote.

In this dissertation, I will focus only on legislation. I have not considered enforcement in practice, but I assume that countries that establish penalties in their electoral legislation implement mechanisms to enforce electoral laws in a greater or lesser degree. However, I understand that penalties can be defined in legislation but they may go unenforced in practice

due to resource constraints or lack of bureaucracy control.[7] A measurement of the real enforcement of compulsory voting would need a process-tracing of compulsory voting in each country. As an example, abstainers in Peru receive a letter from the Unit of Collection of the National Electoral Jury (JNE). Abstainers can appeal and present a justification. If they do not do it, they have to pay a fee within 15 days. If abstainers do not pay the fee or justify their abstention, the case is channeled to the Coercive Liability Office. This office is allowed to seize funds in abstainers' bank accounts.

In the first round of the 2011 presidential elections in Peru, 16.3% of electors failed to go to the poll stations. They represent more than 3 million people. The monetary fee in Peru for abstainers varies from 18 to 72 soles (U.S.$7 to $30), and 180 soles (U.S.$ 70) for citizens selected as electoral authorities. Thus, potential collection is at least U.S. $ 21 million if all abstainers would pay their penalties. However, the JNE cannot reach all abstainers because of administrative and procedural issues. This institution relies on addresses on the register of identification, but when people move and do not renew their information, the JNE is unable to locate them. As a consequence, actual collection is lower, but it is still noteworthy. From information of the JNE, in 2013 this institution collected around 2'404,655 soles (U.S. $925,000) in monetary fines (Jurado Nacional de Elecciones 2014).

After presenting information about levels of turnout in Latin America and the mechanisms by which compulsory voting is applied in this region, I present a summary of the dissertation and next I move to the empirical chapters.

[7] Laws in other domains (for example in squatting and street vending) are intentionally unenforced because politicians want to maximize votes as well as rents (See Holland 2015).

The Dissertation in Brief

To summarize, this dissertation proposes a comprehensive evaluation of compulsory voting in Latin America. In doing so, it evaluates this electoral rule as a dependent and as an independent variable. As a dependent variable, this dissertation analyzes the origins of compulsory voting in Latin America. As an independent variable, it examines whether compulsory voting diminishes the differences in electoral participation across socioeconomic and political groups, as the literature suggests. It also assesses the effect of compulsory voting on the citizens' sense of duty. Here, I offer a short summary of each chapter of this dissertation.

In chapter II, I propose that a broad understanding of the origins of compulsory voting should include an analysis of the factors influencing the timing of the implementation of universal suffrage. After a broad analysis of four countries (Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Peru), I demonstrate that in the wake of pressures for social transformation in Latin American countries around the beginning of the twentieth century, variations in the balance of power among factions of the elites and between elites and disenfranchised groups are fundamental for understanding whether universal suffrage and compulsory voting were implemented as a package or if they were implemented at different points in time. I propose that where elites faced a serious threat from disenfranchised groups pushing for inclusion and threatening with demands for revolutionary or redistributive change, compulsory voting was implemented in close proximity to the expansion of the electorate. On the other hand, where elites did not face as strong a set of forces for broader political inclusion, but faced electoral violence and fraud spurred on by competition among elite factions, compulsory voting, as part of a package of reforms, offered a means to reduce such maladies by modernizing the electoral competition.

In chapter III, I explore how the rational calculus of voting varies between countries with compulsory voting and countries with voluntary voting in Latin America. In countries in which voluntary voting is the norm, vote-eligible adults have the liberty, at least from a legal point of view, to decide whether to vote or to abstain. In countries with compulsory voting rules, however, the decision to vote is influenced by the potential of facing sanctions if a citizen abstains. This is important, as the act of compelling individuals to vote is thought to homogenize the pool of voters, so that political representation and influence is more equally distributed across different segments of the electorate. Based on this notion, some have argued that compulsory voting offers an attractive institutional remedy to fix the problem of inequality in electoral participation and influence. Yet, it is not clear precisely how or to what extent this electoral rule alters the decision to go to the polls or abstain, and therefore it is unclear how or even whether it affects biases in the composition of the electorate. To address whether compulsory voting reduces or eliminates biases in electoral participation, I examine how the decision to vote or abstain varies for citizens who live in countries with voluntary voting versus those who live in countries with compulsory voting. Building on the rational calculus of voting paradigm, I assess variables related to the three key dimensions of the rational choice calculus of voting paradigm: costs, benefits, and duty. I use three rounds of the AmericasBarometer survey from 2010 to 2014 to test these ideas in 18 countries in Latin America. This chapter contributes to the study of compulsory voting by providing strong evidence that compulsory voting is more effective at diminishing political differences than socioeconomic or civic-minded gaps in electoral participation.

In Chapter IV, I evaluate a second-order effect of compulsory voting laws. Ample research in psychology, education, and management posits a detrimental effect of systems of

reward and punishment: performance increases, but motivation suffers a decline. I apply this framework to theorize on the negative "side effects" of compulsory voting laws. Following this line of thinking, I hypothesize that when the state threatens citizens with a fine if they do not vote, voter performance (turnout) increases, but intrinsic motivation falls. I also assess whether these effects vary across individuals who may have greater sensitivities to threat. In the final section of this chapter, I distinguish results for low authoritarians and high authoritarians. I test these expectations using a survey experiment in Peru, a country with compulsory voting and varying levels of enforcement. The results support expectations in some situations: when people are reminded about both types of punishments, they express lower levels of civic duty in one indicator of duty. Moreover, the effect is monotonic for two indicators of duty: the harsher the punishment, the lower the intrinsic motivation to vote.

In sum, this dissertation aims at assessing the origins and consequences of compulsory voting. In doing so, it builds on the rational choice paradigm, develops original hypotheses and implements a multi-method approach to evaluate them.

CHAPTER II

II. THE STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPULSORY VOTING AND FRANCHISE EXPANSIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

Introduction

In the congressional discussions over proposals to reform the Peruvian electoral system at the beginning of the twentieth century, one perceptive legislator commented, "*the debate seems to be on principles...when it actually is based on a calculus of who would benefit*." Not only in Peru, but across Latin America around the turn of the twentieth century, governments deliberated and implemented electoral reforms in the face of pressures stemming from demands made by previously excluded groups seeking input and influence within fledgling oligarchic modern nation states. During this period, some countries pursued reforms that extended the franchise[8] and made voting compulsory, while others opted only for the latter and held off expanding the electorate until decades later. What accounts for the different sequence of institutional outcomes? As referenced in the quote presented here, much discussion around electoral reforms in the period centered on the rights and obligations of citizens. Yet, while the diffusion of ideas and norms may have defined the menu of electoral reforms under discussion, I argue that elites were motivated to support some reforms over others by strategic considerations that reflected the balance of power and this, in turn, explains variation across countries in the nature of the

[8] In this chapter, I focus on the expansion of the franchise to illiterates. The chapter does not deal with the enfranchisement of other groups, such as women.

sequence each followed in implementing compulsory voting and universal suffrage during the twentieth century.

Through an analysis of four countries, in this chapter I demonstrate that, in the wake of pressures for social transformations in Latin American countries around the beginning of the twentieth century, variation in the balance of power among factions of the elites and between elites and disenfranchised groups is fundamental to understand if universal suffrage and compulsory voting were implemented as a package or if they were implemented at different points in time. Where elites faced a serious threat from disenfranchised groups pushing for inclusion and threatening with demands for revolutionary or redistributive change, compulsory voting was implemented in close proximity to the expansion of the electorate. Unable or unwilling to resist expanding the franchise to include groups with strong mobilizing capacities, elites in these cases turned to compulsory voting as a means to minimize electoral losses. On the other hand, where elites did not face as strong a set of forces for broader political inclusion, but faced electoral violence and fraud spurred on by competition among elite factions, compulsory voting, as part of a package of reforms, offered a means to reduce such maladies by modernizing the electoral competition. Thus, balance of power and strategic considerations played key roles in determining whether universal suffrage and compulsory voting reforms were implemented jointly or, instead, whether systems adopted compulsory voting while holding off on significant expansions to the electorate.

The period that I focus on is between the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century, when Latin American elites in power faced pressures for social transformations that included demands to extend political rights and to open electoral participation. These demands took different forms, from serious revolutionary threats in

Argentina to moderate assertions from weak parties in Bolivia. These demands appeared shortly after the independence period in Latin America, emerging as a dispute between elites and would-be elites, named *criollos*.[9] The idea of franchise expansions arose from many sources, included the diffusion of the modern ideal of representative democracy from Europe and the United States, spilling over into Latin America. The demand for voting rights was sparked in the context of modernization and urbanization of Latin America's main cities, which facilitated the development of a civil society and political organizations (Sabato 2001). These demands for political inclusion largely came from the urban middle and working classes via emerging new parties.

During this period, elites took different strategies, conditional on their power. I propose that the institutional outcome depended on the balance of power between those who demanded liberalizing reforms and the elites in power at the time. I present a model with four potential outcomes: if the balance of power is in favor of those who demanded reforms, universal suffrage is highly likely to result and no compulsory voting. If both sides are strong, the conflict between them will lead to the extension of the franchise and to compulsory voting in the same package of reforms. If the balance of power is not in favor of disenfranchised groups, the continuation of the status quo is more likely when elites are powerful, but if elites are divided due to factional fights, the most likely outcome is the implementation of compulsory voting alone, with no expansion of suffrage. Each scenario and its expectations are grounded in considerations of the strategic calculus of elites and disenfranchised groups. Table II.1 summarizes these scenarios:

[9] *Criollo* is a term to identify mixed people with some Spanish ancestry, born in the Colonial America. After independence, this term was used to name descendants of mixed people.

Table II.1. Four Scenarios from the Interaction of Elites and Disenfranchised Groups

Disenfranchised group	Elite	
	Powerful and Organized	**Divided due to conflicts among factions**
Powerful, pose a valid threat	Change to franchise expansion and compulsory voting at the same time	Change to franchise expansion and then, years later, compulsory voting
Weak, cannot pose a valid threat	Continuation of the status quo (neither franchise expansion nor compulsory voting)	Change to compulsory voting and then, years later, franchise expansion

In what follows, I first present a theoretical framework to understand the institutional outcome most likely to emerge from different configurations of power between those who demanded reforms and the elites in power. I ground my argument in the literature about changes in electoral rules that emphasizes strategic considerations of political actors to support or oppose those changes.

Second, I describe the context of pressures for social transformation around the beginning of the twentieth century in four Latin American countries as a critical juncture, in which elites were confronted with the decision to choose an institutional arrangement that was unlikely to change once in place. Then, I examine the institutional outcome in each country and how they are related to the theoretical framework. In this chapter, I analyze a set of countries that fostered universal suffrage before compulsory voting, Argentina and Uruguay, and a set of countries that implemented compulsory voting and later universal suffrage, Bolivia and Peru. In the case of Peru, I am able to present a more detailed case study by probing into archival documents recording representatives' debates in the Congress. As an extension, I provide some evidence and discuss how to place other countries in Latin America in this theoretical framework. I

conclude by proposing that the argument developed in this article can be expanded to five countries not scrutinized here.

The Implementation of Electoral Rules as a Struggle of Power

This chapter proposes that a comprehensive understanding of the origins of compulsory voting should include the analysis of the factors influencing the timing of the implementation of universal suffrage. The analyses of the balance of power between ruling parties and opposition groups and the strategic considerations of political actors offer insights about the sequence in the implementation of universal suffrage and compulsory voting. I build on extant explanations for the strategic implementation of universal suffrage and compulsory voting and synthesize both into a single account of the implementation of these two electoral rules.

Compulsory voting and Enfranchisement as Strategic Decisions

I suggest that, in order to understand the reasons behind the implementation of compulsory voting, we also need to understand the rationale for the expansion of the franchise. Regarding enfranchisement, the literature emphasizes the role of revolutionary threats from below as an explanation for elites' willingness to expand the franchise (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000, 2001; Aidt and Jensen 2011) and finds empirical support for this hypothesis versus alternative explanations (Przeworski 2009). In this branch of the literature, disenfranchised groups conquered suffrage and elites simply reacted to these threats. Later models introduce

elites' agency and propose a game of two actors: the elite and the disenfranchised group (Xi 2013).[10]

In general, I assume that there is a logical, inherent order of elite preferences. First, elites prefer the continuation of the status quo, which means they prefer to avoid changing the electoral rules. Elites, therefore, seek to evade expanding the suffrage, to prevent a change from majoritarian to proportional representation, and a change in ballot structures, among other reforms. Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), I propose that the status quo is defined as a nondemocracy, in which a large proportion of the population is excluded from the political process and a small proportion forms the wealthy elite. Those excluded may organize an insurgency at any point. The success of the insurgency depends on the proportion of excluded individuals who take part in it ($\lambda=0$ means that no one joins the insurgency and $\lambda=1$ means that all excluded citizens join the insurgency). So, in order to be successful, the insurgency's organizers have to solve a collective action problem.

During the insurgency, a fraction of the income of the economy is destroyed and this fraction is proportional to λ. If λ is relatively small, then the insurgency fails. Excluded groups are not able to get over the collective action problem and the cost of organizing a credible threat and only a small fraction of the income is destroyed, but elites are still more powerful than disenfranchised groups, and, as a consequence the status quo persisted. However, if elites are in trouble owing to factional struggles, then they begin an intramural negotiation that does not take into account disenfranchised groups' interests.

[10] Xi (2013) also introduces the role of the middle class and proposes that elites first grant a gradual expansion of the franchise to the middle class in order to gain its support for maintaining the status quo, over which elite governs.

Second, if λ is relatively large, this situation becomes a threat for elite dominance. When the disenfranchised group is able to get over the collective action problem and the costs of organizing a threat and calculates that benefits exceed costs; they can pose a valid threat to elites in form of protests, strikes, and civil unrest. Because an increasing λ means also an increasing destruction of income of the economy, strong elites prefer a negotiation rather than the continuation and exacerbation of the threat. It implies that elites are more likely to cede and implement a franchise expansion as a way to calm down protests and as a credible commitment of future redistribution. On the other side, disenfranchised groups prefer also to negotiate rather than to continue a costly threat of insurgency with an uncertain outcome given that elites are still quite powerful. At the end, after the negotiation, the result is the inclusion of an important mass of new voters, which means a change in the median voter in future electoral results and the end of the former political equilibrium.

On the other hand, if elites are relatively weak, they have little power to negotiate with disenfranchised groups and as a consequence they lose everything. In this case, an insurgency is highly likely to succeed. This is the reason why they will always prefer to prevent an uprising. At the end, disenfranchised groups take the power and implement transformative changes in electoral rules, such as universal suffrage. This is the worst scenario for elites' interests. In sum, elites' order of preferences is: Status quo > Negotiation > Loss of power. Each situation depends on the power of disenfranchised groups (λ) and on the strength of the elite, i.e. whether its groups are coordinated or not.

What role does compulsory voting play in this model? Compulsory voting can have consequences for the electoral fortunes of parties running for office. It is a well-known fact that this electoral rule increases turnout, pushing to the polls those who otherwise would not go to

vote. If those who do not vote were a random sample of the population, there would be no changes in the distribution of votes, but scholarship finds that this group tends to have particular characteristics and, as a consequence, they may change the characteristics of the median voter when they are compelled to vote. As such, governing parties may introduce this rule to create an electoral advantage when they think they have a large base of untapped voters among those who do not vote. For parallel reasons, opposition groups may demand the implementation of mandatory voting if they think non-voters include a lot of their supporters. In both cases, groups in government and in the opposition are acting strategically. They want the implementation of this law to move electoral results in their favor.

Along this line, Helmke and Meguid (2007) propose that strategic rightist governments evaluate if they have a large base of untapped supporters among non-voters, then they use compulsory voting as a measure to get out the vote of this group, composed mainly of wealthy voters, and as a result, they are able to level the electoral playing field, disturbed after a franchise expansion. Their argument seems to challenge the conventional wisdom in the discipline. Since Lijphart, the usual assumption is that leftist parties, who are supported by the poor and the less educated and who are less likely to vote, would benefit from compulsory voting. Helmke and Meguid propose the opposite: right-wing established parties would benefit from this electoral rule in the context of franchise expansions. These authors mention scholars that find that compulsory voting pushed to the polls wealthy members of the upper bourgeoisie in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover, disenfranchised groups, composed mostly of poor and less educated citizens, turned out in droves when an expansion of the franchise was granted, because Leftist parties had an unmatched organizational ability to mobilize newly-enfranchised voters. Helmke and Meguid's selection of cases –Argentina Luxembourg, and Singapore-

provides support for this expectation and they conclude that "An incumbent conservative government facing an emerging political opposition with superior mobilization capacity strategically adopted compulsory voting to minimize electoral losses." (29)

In this setting, the elites in government have a twofold problem: on the one side, their supporters are abstaining under voluntary voting, and, on the other side, their opponents are more effective at encouraging their supporters to go to the polls under universal suffrage, and, as a consequence, they are acquiring more electoral power, which threatens the status quo of elite dominance. In response to this threat, incumbent elites have two options: restrict again suffrage or implement compulsory voting. They do not opt for a restriction of suffrage because when the expansion of the franchise is granted, it is extremely difficult to come back to the initial point (disenfranchisement). It would imply a continuation and probably an intensification of protests and civil unrest, and, as a result, it would exacerbate the threat with an increasing destruction of income. Thus, elites would choose not to penalize their opponents, but to push their supporters to the polls via compulsory voting. The end result would be a diminished or a finished threat.

I propose that Helmke and Meguid's argument is tied to a particular case of the timing in the implementation of franchise expansions and compulsory voting: when universal suffrage is implemented at the same time as compulsory voting. This outcome is tied to a previous scenario: when both sides negotiate. In this case, elites are still quite powerful and disenfranchised groups are able to pose a valid threat. I propose that still-powerful elites may think to implement compulsory voting as a way to level the electoral playing field, unbalanced after the implementation of universal suffrage that granted the right to vote mostly to opposition parties' supporters. Birch (2009) mentions that "making electoral participation mandatory was viewed as a means of mitigating the impact of other electoral reforms, especially franchise expansion" (28-

29). In this scenario, opposition groups' and elites' interests contradict and finally the institutional outcome is the implementation of both electoral rules. Elites see a loss of power, but they are able to retain some. Disenfranchised groups gain the right to participate, but they have to share power with the elite.

In this previous scenario, there is a balance of power between elites and disenfranchised groups that leads to a negotiation. However, a second scenario may present an unbalance in favor of disenfranchised groups – when λ is relatively large and so they are able to organize an insurgency and elites are weakened due to internal fractures. In this case, elites could not negotiate and so they had to accept only universal suffrage. Thus, the most likely outcome after the implementation of universal suffrage is an elite's loss of power. In this scenario, compulsory voting may arrive years later, as a corrective to universal suffrage (Stengers 1990 mentioned in Birch 2009; Conley and Temini n.d.).

In both cases universal suffrage was implemented before or at the same time as compulsory voting. Yet, empirically we know that actually some countries implemented compulsory voting before universal suffrage. For example, Bolivia implemented compulsory voting in 1924 and then universal suffrage in 1952, 28 years later; and Peru legislated compulsory voting in 1931 and universal suffrage in 1979, 48 years later. The remaining scenario explains this sequence.

What happens when disenfranchised groups are not powerful enough to pose a severe threat for the elite's dominance? This is the case when the disenfranchised group cannot overcome the collective action problem and the costs of organization or they see that the costs are too high for not-so-high benefits, and as a consequence they do not pose a valid threat (i.e.

when λ is relatively small); and in turn elites in power are coordinated and are still powerful. The most likely result from this correlation of forces is the continuation of the status quo of partial enfranchisement and voluntary voting. This is the best scenario for elite's interests, but it was highly unlikely given the broad diffusion of pressures for social change in Latin America.

In an alternative scenario, elites can be weakened due to internal fractures. The elites are not homogenous actors, but they actually consist of subgroups, each group having a particular set of interests. For example, they comprise landowners, the bourgeoisie, and an industrial class in some cases. In order to be considered as a homogenous and strong actor, these subgroups need to be coordinated in a system in which each subgroup has its interests satisfied. When they are not coordinated, each group may push for policies closer to its interests and these policies may disturb other subgroup's interests. This situation disrupts the equilibrium and originates rising disputes among factions, which put the whole elite at risk.

In a fourth scenario, elites are in trouble because of internal factional disputes. These disputes may emerge confrontationally in electoral times and, as a result, elections may become a struggle for deciding who the primus inter pares is. I propose that under this balance of power, the most likely result is the implementation of compulsory voting, but not an expansion of the franchise. In this scenario, the elite calculate that the threat from the disenfranchised group is not powerful enough and so they decide not to extend rights of participation, but they at the same time calculate that electoral violence and internal disputes may put their dominance at risk, and consequently they implement electoral reforms, that include compulsory voting, as a way to modernize voting procedures, with the expectation to stop disputes among factions of the elite. The idea is that this modernization of electoral rules would bestow representativeness to elected authorities, at least for the minor group of those with rights of participation. Previous scholarship

has emphasized that internal disputes among factions of the elite are one of the reasons for franchise expansions (Jack and Lagunoff 2006; Lizzeri and Persico 2004). Here I propose that, under certain circumstances, they can also be a reason for the implementation of electoral reforms, that include compulsory voting, but not universal suffrage.

In summary, I propose that the interaction between the disenfranchised group and the elite can be summarized in four scenarios. In this chapter, I analyze four countries profoundly: Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Peru. At the end, I expand the model to other four countries: Brazil, Ecuador, Colombia, and Chile, and I present partial evidence to support their inclusion in this model. This main group of countries is a convenience sample of cases, which allows for an initial assessment of this theoretical framework. Argentina is an example of scenario A in Table II.2, where a powerful elite confronted powerful parties and groups representing disenfranchised people. As a result, this country enacted universal suffrage and compulsory voting in 1912. Uruguay is in the middle between scenario A and B. The conditions were similar to the Argentinean case, but the process by which Uruguayan elites processed the conflict changed. In this country, parties avoided the conflict between elites and disenfranchised groups. They agreed to prevent an insurgency and consequently they implemented universal suffrage in 1915 and then soon compulsory voting in 1917 in the same package of reforms.

Bolivia and Peru are cases in which divided elites faced weak disenfranchised groups. They are examples of the scenario C. Bolivia implemented compulsory voting in 1929 and Peru in 1931. Elites in both countries were able to delay more profound reforms. Universal suffrage arrived many years later, in Bolivia in 1952 and in Peru in 1979. I have not presented a case of scenario D, where the status quo prevailed, but I assume this was the situation in each country before the beginning of the period of social and political transformations –what Acemoglu and

Robinson (2001) characterize as a nondemecracy. At the end of this chapter, I will extend this analysis and will argue that other countries not scrutinized here can be placed in this model.

Table II.2. Four Scenarios from the Interaction of Elites and Disenfranchised Groups

Disenfranchised group	**Elite**	
	Powerful and Organized	**Divided due to conflicts among factions**
Powerful, pose a valid threat	Change to franchise expansion and compulsory voting at the same time Scenario A: Argentina Uruguay	Change to franchise expansion and then, years later, compulsory voting Scenario B
Weak, cannot pose a valid threat	Continuation of the status quo Scenario D	Change to compulsory voting and then, years later, franchise expansion Scenario C: Bolivia and Peru

There are alternative explanations for the enactment of compulsory voting. Birch (2009) mentions that compulsory voting may be implemented as a continuation of a legal colonial tradition. In Latin America, this tradition should come from the Spanish Empire. However, Sabato (2001) argues that after independence Latin American constitutions were characterized by a break with the colonial order and its institutions. Moreover, the Spanish Empire was not characterized for the implementation of this rule. Actually, the 1812 Spanish Constitution (*Constitución de Cádiz*) was the one that arrived to Peru. Under this liberal Constitution, Peru celebrated its first elections for a Junta of Government, in which indigenous people were granted the right to vote, but this Constitution did not establish the obligation to vote.

Birch also mentions that compulsory voting may be implemented to improve the quality of democracy and to prevent electoral abuse, for example bribes for not voting in voluntary voting systems. This interpretation is similar to the scenario in which elites seek to improve electoral rules in order to prevent intramural conflicts. In this interpretation compulsory voting was implemented, as part of a package of reforms, to modernize the electoral system. In this way, elites, for example, want to prevent vote buying and post electoral violence in some Latin American countries. Thus, this chapter encapsulates this interpretation in a broader frame.

Pressures for Social and Political Transformation in Latin America

In this section I describe the period where several social and political transformations in Latin America emerged, from the end of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century. Huntington (1993) identifies the first wave of democratization from around 1826 to 1926, in which Argentina, Uruguay and Chile are included in Latin America. In this wave, many countries in the world and in Latin America experienced pressures for democratization and for changes in electoral rules.

I suggest that this period was a critical juncture in each country. According to Mahoney (2001), critical junctures are defined by two components: they are choice points and, once an option was selected and time passes, it is more difficult to revert to the initial point. Economic and political crises and the legacies of the War of the Pacific fueled social convulsion in many Latin American countries. I focus the analysis on the interaction between conservative elites in power and disenfranchised groups that pushed for social, economic, and political inclusion. In some countries, the social convulsion led to threats to elite dominance, as in Argentina, where

this threat manifested in intense strikes, riots, and protests. The case of Uruguay is distinctive because political elites prevented a revolution through agreed-upon reforms. Economic and political crises did not translate in to severe social revolts in Bolivia and Peru because the groups that demanded changes in the political system were relatively weak and because the oligarchy counted on the military among its allies. In these countries, an important source of instability came from internal disputes within a still powerful elite, especially in electoral times. In each country, elites in power faced a dilemma: maintain the status quo or change electoral institutions. When they chose an option, this institutional arrangement almost irreversibly persisted.

Argentina and Uruguay: Still Powerful Elite and Rising Disenfranchised Groups

Argentinean conservative elite faced this dilemma, which culminated in the 1912 reform, known as the Saenz-Peña Law. Before this electoral change, electoral participation in Argentina was, in abstract, free, but in practice an elite of *notables*, representing only the upper class of Buenos Aires (*porteños*), dominated the electoral process (*Historia Electoral Argentina (1912-2007)*, 2008). In this period, Argentina and Uruguay experienced social unrest, with increasingly strong groups clamoring for economic and political reforms. According to this framework, this means that λ was relatively large and therefore a considerable fraction of the income would be destroyed. In Argentina, Munck (1987) mentions that "the statistics on strikes mask the fact that, in 1907, two-thirds of all strikes were lost by the workers, whereas by 1910 this proportion was reversed as the working class strove successfully to defend its organizations and living standards" (28). McGuire (1995) indicates that "unable to advance their interests through the vote, workers took to the streets in massive and often violent demonstrations that deeply

unsettled the elite" (206). The Unión Cívica Radical (UCR or 'Radicals'), formed in 1891 as a party that represented workers and demanded electoral reforms, threatened the government with civic disturbances. They organized three intense revolts and Saenz-Peña, the leader of the reformist program within the conservative elite, had to make an agreement in 1910 with Hipólito Yrigoyen, leader of the UCR, to prevent new armed uprisings. This agreement included a commitment to legislate electoral changes. Devoto (1996) argues that the Saenz-Peña law was a strategic measure to calm down the social agitation, by incorporating the UCR into the electoral arena. I propose that the intensity of the protests placed Argentinean elite in a contentious context in which they faced a severe threat from excluded but well-organized sectors of the society.

Uruguay also observed profound economic and political crises at the end of the nineteenth century due to two civil wars in 1894 and 1904. The labor movement in this country, fueled by socialist and anarchist groups, adopted a strategy of boycotts, sabotages, and strikes, demanding better work conditions. The activation of the working class led to the first general strike in 1911, in which Montevideo, the capital city, was completely shut down. For the government, this strike took the form of an urban insurrection (Rosenthal 1995).

However, political elites faced promptly this challenge –a rising threat- through a political agreement, and not by a confrontation between both sides. A faction of the Colorado party headed by José Batlle –the liberal side in the bipolar system- and the Blanco (National) party –close to the conservative side- agreed with the need to prevent rising social conflicts in Uruguay and they reached a pact to implement a series of social reforms, including the enactment of universal male suffrage in 1915 for the elections for a Constituent Assembly next

year. Zeballos (2013) called this path as an "agreed electoral inclusion".[11] This case shows that negotiated reforms are measures to prevent social conflicts from escalating. Thus, pressures for social transformation were resolved quite peacefully in this country.

Bolivia and Peru: Divided Elites and Weak Disenfranchised Groups

The cases of Bolivia and Peru show a different scenario. In both countries, quite powerful elites faced relatively weak demands from leftist organization representing disenfranchised groups, in the middle of economic and political crises after the calamitous War of Pacific at the end of the nineteenth century. Most instability in these countries was due to poor economic conditions and internal fractures within the elites.

Bolivia, for example, went into the twentieth century governed by an oligarchic elite, divided in two main factions: the Liberals and the Conservatives. Gamarra and Malloy (1995) describe this period as a superficially stable two-party system, because volatility was observed within the elite, immersed in factional disputes, in which "the real game was one of 'ins' and 'outs,' with the latter, regardless of party affiliation, forming coalitions to harass and unseat the incumbent" (401). After a Liberal period, the Republicans, a new elite party, took the power after a coup in 1920. Several rival factions composed the Republicans, Liberals, and Conservatives parties. Whitehead (1981) mentions that "they [the Republicans] in turn broke up into rival factions that were unable to coexist within the framework of electoral competition, but instead resolved their differences by force" (314). Paz Salas (1997, cited by Van Cott 2000) also portrays this period as one of "constant conflict among multiple forces characterized by strong leadership and factionalism." Moreover, conflicts increased in electoral periods because "neither

[11] In Spanish, Zeballos called this path as "ampliación pactada".

party would concede electoral defeat to the opposition, resulting in bloody post-electoral battles" (163). Van Cott (2000) names the Bolivian party system at this period as "an arena for intra-class personalistic disputes among the oligarchy and the tiny middle class dependent upon public sector employment" (164).

In Bolivia, indigenous masses were not allowed to participate in political decisions because of literacy and property requirements. Gamarra and Malloy (1995) calculate that less than 10 percent of adult males voted in this period in Bolivia. Van Cott (2000) identifies Bolivia at the beginning of the twentieth century as an exclusionary party system, in which indigenous people did not have representation and *artesanos* –a sort of new urban middle class that was comprised of merchants and craftsmen, and some indigenous peasants- fought to be part of the selective group.

Bolivia saw the rise of a weak leftist movement in the twenties, particularly the populist Partido Obrero Socialista, which tried to be the voice of the large indigenous population, but its organization was feeble and consequently this party did not pose a threat to the oligarchic regime in form of frequent and severe protests, strikes, or demonstrations. Further, Van Cott (2000) indicates that "They [indigenous people] strive to participate in politics but on their own terms, independent of groups such as parties that may seek to coopt or dominate them" (158).

In the case of Peru, from the beginning of the twentieth century, a period called the 'Aristocratic Republic' matured in this country. This period revealed a change in the relative political power between factions of the elite, from landowners to a bourgeois class, associated with export activities. The oligarchy preserved their power, but it was divided in several parties: the Partido Civilista, the Partido Demócrata, and others, each representing a faction of the

aristocratic sector and led each by a *caudillo*. Elections in this period were wars of clans among regional oligarchies. Del Aguila (1997) notes that elections in this time were more an expression of the capacity of mobilization of each candidate, and not an expression of the popular will. Each elected government inaugurated a period of instability. Conflicts within the ruling elite had several sources: the clash of interests between coastal exporters and Andean landowners, the relationship of the elite with urban proletariats and their unions and parties, and the relationship of the elite with the indigenous mass.

When instability increased to levels that put at risk the continuation of the status quo, the military, assuming the role of "watching dog of the oligarchy", overthrew the government and installed a military junta that after a period called again for elections in which the winner should be a member of one of the factions of the oligarchic group. Risks to the continuation of the status quo included, for example, a reformist government that put too much emphasis on welfare, such as Billinghurst's government from 1912 to 1914,[12] or an eventual electoral victory of populist parties, such as the Aprista party in 1931.

The change of the economic model at the beginning of the twentieth century, from an emphasis on the agriculture sector to a growing import/export industry, produced the rise of an urban working class and an exacerbation of the feudal system in rural areas. New political parties, such as the Aprista party and the Comunista party tried to organize the urban working class in unions and fought for their demands. The Aprista party focused on the coastal region of the country, particularly the north of Peru, where they achieved a high degree of influence among sugar mill workers. The Communist party also worked to organize urban workers into

[12] Basadre (1980) notes that "In that way, after twenty years of civil governments from 1895, [a deadlock between Billinghurst and the Parliament] generated the intervention of the Armed Forces in politics, a force characterized as a decisive referee in this irreconcilable fight among parties in a not-working democracy" (74: author's translation).

unions. One example of their rising force was the organization of the first national strike in 1911 in which they fought for better economic conditions at work; however, they did not include political demands, in part because the working class in urban areas was slowly getting access to education and consequently they were gradually incorporating in the electoral body. The level of political exclusion was particularly high for peasants because they were mostly illiterates and did not have an easy access to education. Still, they did not have a party that advocated for their interests.

The emergence of the Aprista and the Comunista parties posed the first serious challenge to oligarchic rule in Peru, but despite their efforts in the organization of the working class, these new parties did not imply a severe threat to the dominant elite. Cotler (2005) mentions that after 1930 the Comunista party organized revolts in mining enclaves, but these uprisings were rapidly dissolved by the Armed Forces, allies of the oligarchic regime. Moreover, the oligarchy was able to ban the Aprista party from the electoral arena and prosecuted, jailed and exiled Aprista's leaders.

The context in each country resulted in different institutional outcomes: the implementation of universal suffrage or compulsory voting, or both. I argue that these outcomes depend on the balance of power between those who demanded transformations and elites in power. In the next section, I explain how the balance of power in each country produced an institutional outcome that fits the theoretical frame.

Institutional Outcome

Scenario A: Franchise Expansion and Compulsory Voting

In Argentina, universal male suffrage was in place since the beginning of the republic, but the literature indicates that it did not prevent electoral fraud and a low turnout. Actually Alonso (2000) states that from 1880 to 1916, "elections were simply an exercise in repression and manipulation by the landed elite" (144). The UCR, an opposition party, demanded an electoral system that would guarantee free elections and put pressure on the conservative elite via contentious tactics. The Conservatives, the dominant elite, faced a dilemma: they could make universal suffrage work, but it would risk reducing their electoral share and consequently they could lose elections; or they could maintain the status quo, but it would mean a continuation of the social unrest. Thus, this period was a crucial moment of decision for the elite: a critical juncture.

On the other side, disenfranchised people wanted to be really included and to change the political equilibrium towards policies closer to their interests. In order to seek their inclusion, they need to organize a costly threat of insurgency. Their strategic calculus involves weighing the cost of insurgency's organization and government's repression versus the expected benefits of being incorporated if the revolution succeeded. In Argentina, Radicals and Communists, which represented the working-class sector, were able to overcome collective action problem and the cost of organization, and, as a result, this country presented an increasing social agitation that posed a serious threat to the Conservatives' dominance. This threat included an escalation in number and intensity of strikes and violent demonstrations. Birch (2009) notes that "the situation had by the first years of the twentieth century grown so tense that legally incorporating the mass population into electoral politics was seen as preferable to retaining the status quo of violent

protest and non participation, even if it meant that those who introduced the measure lost politically as a result" (32).

As a result of the power of Radicals and Communists, the Saenz-Peña Law set universal suffrage to work. The literature has pointed out that the Saenz-Peña Law was a calculated risk taken by the Conservative party to calm down the social agitation (Devoto 1996; *Historia Electoral Argentina (1912-2007)* 2008).[13] However, the Conservative party was still powerful enough to not to cede all the power to the Radicals and to devise rules – such as compulsory voting, among others – for preserving their electoral influence.

There is a debate about the causes of the implementation of compulsory voting in Argentina in 1912. On the one side, some scholars argue only normative reasons for its implementation. For instance, Castro (2007), García-Garro (2013) and Devoto (1996) mention that compulsory voting (and public education and obligatory conscription) was implemented as a "school of citizenship." In this view, the electoral reform intended to democratize political decisions.

On the other side, other scholars affirm that the electoral reform was a conservative elite´s tactic to deal with the Radical´s threat. García-Garro (2013) cites a legislator who said "it is more comfortable to make a new Electoral law than to repress a general strike every six months" (5: author's translation). This tactic included the implementation of compulsory voting. This rule was not thought to extend electoral participation to the masses; on the contrary, it was implemented with the goal to push the conservative supporters to the polls. Nelson (2001) states

[13] Devoto also presents an optimistic view about the extension of suffrage. This view highlights the ideological convictions of the proponents of this reform and their legitimate belief in the benefits of this change for Argentina. In the middle, Devoto cites Botana's *El Orden Conservador* that proposes that reformists were convinced this law was good and also they were optimist about their electoral chances under the new law.

that upper classes in Argentina were lethargic and that wealthy citizens displayed high levels of abstention in elections. De Privitellio (2012) notes that the electoral reforms sought to incorporate the conservative citizens to the electorate via the obligation to vote rather than popular groups. Actually, illiterates were strategically excluded from penalties and so from the obligation to vote, according to the enacted legislation.[14]

Thus, I argue that the Conservatives in Argentina proposed compulsory voting as a way to counteract the potential negative effects of universal male suffrage by obligating the wealthy to turn out. This perspective is consistent with that of Helmke and Meguid (2007), who state that "Granting universal male suffrage without adopting compulsory voting thus ran the risk that elite voters would simply continue to stay at home (or engage themselves in more leisurely pursuits) while the newly enfranchised groups would turn out in droves." (30) The institutional result is what De Privitellio (2012) called a "qualified universal suffrage"[15], because the opportunity to vote was extended to all citizens, but only wealthy citizens were obligated to turn out.

In sum, Argentina around 1912 is an example where there was a dispute between emerging parties and a conservative elite. Radicals and Communists pushed for electoral changes that benefitted them: a real implementation of universal suffrage; and the Conservative party proposed a measure for preserving part of their dominance: compulsory voting. The result was the implementation of both as a package of reforms, and it meant a change in the balance of power from a declining but still powerful oligarchic party to new emerging parties, that was a symptom of the emergence of new sectors in the Argentinean society.

[14] The Article 84 of the Law 8.871 (Saenz Peña's law) says "There is no penalties for illiterates voters and for those who live at more than 20 kilometers from their electoral place" (author's translation).
[15] *Sufragio universal calificado* in Spanish.

Uruguay as a Middle Path Between Scenario A and B

In Uruguay, universal male suffrage was first proposed in 1915. Caetano (2011) mentions that the government of Batlle, from the Colorado party, the reformist sector in the political system, proposed several reforms, emphasizing the economic transformation of the country: nationalization of industries, promotion of unionism, an agrarian reform, and an increase in taxes for the wealthy. Batlle's faction thought that these transformations would reduce social discontent and counteract increasing polarization in the country. These reforms were not revolutionary, but a disruptive threat for the hegemony of the conservative coalition in urban and rural areas represented by the National Party, which included agrarian landowners, the Catholic Church clergy, and the Armed Forces in Uruguay. Zeballos (2013) points out that "the 'batllismo' (Batlle's faction) kept a distance from socialism, and calmed down the conservative class, becoming a shock-absorbing reformism of the social conflict" (24, author's translation).

In this context, both parties agreed to implement universal male suffrage in the 1916 elections for a Constituent Assembly. Batlle thought that the "vote would be more effective than a revolution…the votes of unionists plus the votes of good-will men of all social classes would peacefully achieve needed reforms." On the other side, "conservative groups preferred to extend the franchise than a revolt of rural sectors that implied the destruction of property" (Zeballos 2013: 27-29, author's translation). This was the first step in a series of political transformations in the country.

Caetano (2011) mentions that the first elections under universal male suffrage for a Constituent Assembly were a sort of plebiscite of Batlle's reformist project. Contrary to his expectations, results of these elections meant a stop in his endeavor. Uruguayan citizens voted

for moderation and sought conciliation between two parties. The Constitution was supposed to be a mechanism to reach agreements between parties, but the mandate was not clear. The 1917 legislative elections complicated the situation even more because the results favored Batlle's camp and so both sides could claim legitimacy in their options about the reformist agenda. In order to prevent a deadlock, main party leaders reached an agreement on a formula to satisfy main demands of each side. This was called *El Pacto de los Ocho*. This project was voted and ratified in 1917 (Chasquetti 2003).

This project introduced changes in the executive power, like a shared executive in hand of a president and an administrative national council, proposed by the Batlle's faction and the Colorado party. The National Party proposed changes in the electoral system, such as the introduction of mandatory registration, secret vote, and proportional representation. For the conservative class, the expansion of suffrage was viewed as a tolerable measure to prevent conflicts. This package of changes also included compulsory voting: the obligation to vote for male citizens. Under the framework I have asserted here, the assumption is that the National Party estimated a large base of untapped supporters among not registered citizens and abstainers and wanted to push them to the polls via mandatory registration and compulsory voting.[16]

Thus, the case of Uruguay shows that under a moderate threat a hyper integrated society and a rooted political party system led to an agreed upon solution that included a suffrage expansion and compulsory voting. Parties were key to this outcome because their characteristics (popular, multi classist and of national scope) prevented class conflicts (Zeballos 2013). According to Table II.2, Uruguay is a case in the middle between scenarios A and B because this

[16] In discourses in the Constituent Assembly, National party legislators claimed Uruguay needed mandatory registration to fight against abstention and they also affirmed that citizens should be educated in their duties, so Uruguay needed a law that obliged all citizens to vote (Zeballos 2013).

country experienced powerful demands from excluded sectors of the population, but these demands did not translate in extreme violence. A quite powerful elite prevented this situation via an agreement.

The sequence in the implementation of universal suffrage and compulsory voting also includes a path by which compulsory voting was implemented prior to the introduction of universal suffrage. The cases of Bolivia and Peru are of this type. In these countries elites were still powerful but they experienced serious problems because of internal conflicts (i.e. rivalries among factions for power and for economic issues) and new parties representing the disenfranchised groups were relatively weak. According to Table II.2, Bolivia and Peru are examples of scenario C.

Scenario C: Compulsory Voting and Later Franchise Expansion

In Bolivia, for example, compulsory voting was ruled in 1924 and pushed to the polls only those entitled to cast a ballot: a minority of Bolivian society. Before its implementation, it is fair to assume that each faction of the elite tried to carry to the polls more supporters than rival factions did, as scholars have pictured Bolivia in those years. This situation led to concerns about electoral procedures and rules, accusations of fraud, and finally to losers' rejection of final results. Liberals and Conservatives, the two factions of the Bolivian elite, used vote buying and forced disenfranchised people to register and turn out in order to win elections. At the same time, both parties accused the other of fraudulent maneuvers. The winning strategy consisted of convincing voters that the other party was dishonest while their own faction was a fair competitor. The loser in this game of crossfire accusations had a last tactic: threaten the

government with abstention to delegitimize the elected government. In the end, each elected government inaugurated a new precarious period in the middle of a volatile context. Thus, elections were a struggle afflicted with violence and corruption among powerful intra-elite factions to decide who was stronger and who was going to govern and they were more a reflection of mobilization capacity than a reflection of 'popular' will.

Voting rights were restricted in theory, but in practice parties used disenfranchised people as means to win elections. Irurozqui (1996) names this scenario a "democratic fiction" in which popular will was manipulated depending on the economic and material resources of both parties. The Liberal and the Conservative parties were oligarchic groups formed by the traditional landed elite and the newly emergent tin elite, whom excluded lower sectors and established a clientelistic relationship with middle class of the Bolivian society. These parties were not rooted in the society and were not representative of any other group beyond the elite. They also lacked any programmatic platform, despite the fact that they used the terms "liberal" and "conservative" as party labels (Irurozqui 1996). In words of Gamarra and Malloy (1995), the parties were "vehicles to capture and circulate state patronage among the dependent middle class" (399).

According to Irurozqui (1996), political elites and intellectual groups did not appear to consider an extension of suffrage to resolve electoral problems. On the contrary, they looked down on popular vote and accused middle and lower class voters of being the cause of electoral corruption. Elites argued that these 'bad citizens' who sell their votes and oblige parties to buy participation perverted the political system and they claimed that popular segments of the population did not have education and civic skills to obtain the right to vote. In turn, neither indigenous peasants nor *artesanos* did consider an expansion of the franchise as a critical demand. Irurozqui argues that the group of *artesanos* did not want an expansion of the franchise,

but they wanted to be part of the discriminatory group of citizens with rights. They did not seek a change in electoral rules to expand the franchise, but they tried to fulfill requirements, such as education or property, to be part of those with economic rights. Among many other factors, these reasons might explain why *artesanos* and peasants did not organize a movement to fight for their inclusion. They mostly pursued an individual strategy of social mobility.

In this context, I propose that the implementation of electoral reforms, which included compulsory voting, should be understood as a measure to prevent electoral irregularities. After the 1920 elections and the subsequent Republican Party's coup d'état, the elite became aware of the need for less vicious voting procedures. After the modification of electoral regulations, President Saavedra stated that "There have also been important modifications to the voting process, in order to shield it from fraud, violence and foul play" (Whitehead 1981: 316). In the case of compulsory voting, if supporters of all factions were entitled to vote and were obliged to go to the polls, then the winner may claim representativeness, at least for the Bolivian elite. I conclude that compulsory voting was part of an agreement among factions to prevent intra-elite factional disputes and to stabilize rotation in power, and not as a measure to promote ample participation.

Peru went down a different path than Argentina and Uruguay and more like that experienced by Bolivia and consequently this country is also an example of scenario C. In Peru, when compulsory voting was initially implemented, legislators did not have broad inclusion in their mind, but they wanted to prevent electoral violence, to modernize elections and so to assure a reasonable competition among elite factions. For example, Villarán (1931), a representative of the conservative elite, wrote in the draft bill of the 1933 Constitution that "the absence of regulatory majorities has been the immediate origin of our agitations, revolutions, dictatorships

and political crimes. If we want to eradicate these misfortunes, we should try to make real the popular vote" (27; author's translation). Actually, when he mentioned 'popular vote', he meant educated male suffrage.

From the end of the nineteenth century to 1931, when a new constitution was legislated, Peru experienced a period of severe instability and elections in this period were wars of clans. For example, the situation before the presidential election in 1876 was so exceptionally violent that candidates from the two parties –both parties of the elite: the Partido Civilista and the Partido Nacional- agreed for a disarmament to prevent an escalation of more violence (Loayza 2005: 437). Peralta (2005) highlights that Peru ran the most violent elections in its history in the period from 1895 to 1919.

Quite surprisingly, restrictions to citizenship and franchise did not have much opposition from excluded segments of the population.[17] Members of the Andean elite, local *caciques* who might fight for an extension of the franchise for indigenous people, agreed with the political exclusion because it disqualified poor members of peasant communities, with whom they competed for land in rural areas (Cotler 2005).

The first two decades of the twentieth century exhibited the emergence of new sectors in the society: urban blue-collar workers and a substantial white-collar middle class. The Aprista and the Comunista parties organized these new groups, but they could not get enough power to be a severe threat for elite dominance. In sum, the political landscape around the thirties in Peru displayed still powerful factions of the oligarchy in dispute, Armed Forces as allies and

[17] From the independence in 1821 to the end of the eighteenth century, Peru experienced a liberal wave and several Constitutions did not require literacy as a requirement for citizenship and franchise, and so indigenous people were allowed to vote. From the end of the eighteenth century, after the War of Pacific, literacy was introduced as a requirement and it excluded a huge mass of indigenous population of the political decisions.

mediators of elites factions, rising parties representing new urban sectors, and a huge mass of indigenous, mostly illiterates, with neither power nor representation.

This status quo faced an economic crisis because of the depression of the thirties. Incapable of solving this problem, the military overthrew President Leguía, installed a military junta, and called for elections for a Constituent Assembly and a new president in 1931. These elections were a breakpoint in Peru's electoral history because they allowed the participation of leftist parties -the Aprista and the Comunista parties. The results gave the Aprista party and the Socialista party a minority while oligarchic parties still held the majority of seats in the Assembly. Sánchez Cerro and his party, the Unión Revolutionaria, obtained a majority in the Constituent Assembly despite they gained just 38% of the popular vote. This electoral share was enough to control the Assembly with 67 seats, while the Aprista party, the main opposition party, gained 27 seats.

This election was organized under a new Electoral Code that included the creation of an electoral management body and an electoral registry. It also included compulsory voting. I conclude that this electoral reform was a way to modernize electoral procedures with the expectation to prevent intra-elite violence and fraud. Basadre (1946) recognizes that "the draft bill implied a revolutionary innovation in Peru, compared to the sinful practices of the past." (112; author's translation). Moreover, Villarán (1931), member of the committee in charge of writing the draft bill of the 1933 Constitution, stated that "Instituting the mandatory registration, the draft bill sets the basis for the obligation to vote, including in this way a principle of Political Law already established in *modern* legislations" (9: author's translation, emphasis added). However, this reform did not include an expansion of the franchise to illiterates, despite some legislators of the new Constitution thought illiterates should be included.

Once in debate, the Assembly engaged in intense discussion over rights to vote for those between 18 and 21 years old and for women in the new Constitution. Leftist parties took a position in favor of incorporating young citizens and women into the electorate, arguing that these citizens were part of the economy and had social responsibilities and in turn the state should give them the right to vote.[18] However, this incorporation had opponents, who argued lack of maturity of younger people and lack of experience of women.[19] Finally, people between 18 and 21 years old and women were not granted the right to vote in presidential elections. Parties associated with the oligarchic elite ruled citizenship for men from 21 years old. Opposition parties claimed this restriction gave advantage to oligarchic parties in power.[20]

It is significant that the vote for illiterates was hardly debated in this Constituent Assembly. Villarán was against the proposal of giving the vote to illiterates, but he proposed that indigenous people should have representation and proposed not an individual right, but a collective vote, based on peasant communities (Basadre 1946: 232). It seems that the Aprista party and Comunista party thought they could fight in the case of women and the young cohort, but in the case of illiterates, these parties might see it as a lost cause given the balance of power in the Assembly, in favor of the Sánchez Cerro's Unión Revolucionaria, which had the majority of seats. In any case, The Aprista and the Comunista parties wrote a report in which they

[18] Castro Pozo, from the Socialist party, defended this position and said: "They [younger citizens] are elements of production; they contribute to increase capitalists' fortunes and state's income, so they have the right that the state gives them a political decision" (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author's translation).
[19] Legislators associated with the ruling government wrote a report in which they expressed their reasons for opposing women's enfranchisement. They said: "Given that the number of women is higher than the number of men, according to statistics, it is not prudent to expose the country to uncertain transformations that may create this incorporation with no restrictions of a numerous electorate to the political life, with no habit in the fundamental function of suffrage." (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author's translation).
[20] An opposition representative said: "The prohibition of the illiterates' vote means an unjust exclusion of a huge mass of national people from all political rights. Thus, oligarchy is favored and it contributes to a exclusionary system, in conflict with substantive principles of democracy." (Author's translation)

expressed their reasons for supporting the enfranchisement of illiterates. They argued that illiterates had civic responsibilities and therefore they should also have rights.[21]

At the end, women were allowed a restricted right to vote in municipal elections, but not in presidential ones; literate males older than 21 years old were fully enfranchised; and illiterates were fully restricted. For illiterates, enfranchisement had to wait half a century to be enacted.

In sum, I propose that there was alternation among factions of the elite in Peru, but changes in power were not the results of peaceful elections or agreed transitions, but the results of contentious processes. I suggest that elites wanted to prevent more violence and thus compulsory voting was implemented in the 1933 Constitution as part of a set of reforms intended to stop violence and irregularities and to modernize the electoral system, with the last goal of assuring a reasonable competition among factions of the elite and as a measure to preserve elite's power.

Further Consequences After Critical Junctures

The change of the electoral rules had further consequences in each country. In Argentina, for example, after the implementation of universal suffrage and compulsory voting, the Unión Cívica Radical took the power in the 1916 elections. The Saenz-Peña Law incorporated emerging parties into the political arena, but the Radical party was most successful at taking advantage of the new rules. So, it seems that the Conservatives miscalculated how the coalition of forces was going to be after the reform and were unable to anticipate and prevent Radicals'

[21] An opposition representative said: "There are no distinctions between literates and illiterates. If there are no differences for paying taxes and for military service, etc., there should not be a difference for the right to vote" (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author's translation).

victory in the 1916 presidential elections. After this election, the old order stepped back and the UCR hegemony began in Argentina. However, after 14 years, the Armed Forces, supported by the Conservatives, organized a coup, dissolved the constitutional government, and inaugurated a new dictatorship.

In the Argentinean case the conflict between parties represented the old oligarchy and parties representing excluded groups was probably inevitable given the classist nature of these parties. In Uruguay, disenfranchised groups meant an increasing threat for the conservative side if they were not included, but once incorporated in the electoral arena there was not a sole party that represented this group given the multi-classist nature of parties in Uruguay. Both characteristics are related to the quite nonviolent outcome in Uruguay. In this country, the conquest of universal male suffrage and compulsory voting was an outlet for tensions in the society.

The opposite happened in countries that delayed the implementation of a franchise expansion to illiterates, such as Bolivia and Peru. In Bolivia, for example, the old order came to a crisis after the Chaco War with Paraguay in the thirties. After this war, leftist opposition groups gained support and political power, particularly the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario (MNR). Old Liberal and Conservative parties were perceived as responsible for the defeat in the war against Paraguay and newly activated working-class groups emerged as viable alternatives to govern (Gamarra and Malloy, 1995). From all emerging groups, the MNR was most successful to capitalize this discontent and finally under a platform that proposed the extension of suffrage (among other revolutionary measures), this party won the 1951 elections in a landslide victory (42.9% of the votes); however the military prevented that the MNR took office and installed a

military junta. Finally, in 1952, the MNR, with the support of indigenous people and workers, organized an insurgency and overthrew the military regime.

Under the MNR rule, the illiterates were finally enfranchised, but their interests were not completely represented in the political arena. The MNR's goal was to mobilize and control peasants and labor groups activated during the insurgent acts. They co-opted the indigenous movement and did not promote policies in their favor, but strategies to preserve MNR's power. At the end, MNR replicated patronage strategies as a measure to deal with factionalism.

In Peru, in turn, Sánchez Cerro, a candidate close to the oligarchy but with popular support, won the 1931 presidential elections, but the Aprista party claimed fraud. The elected president banned the Aprista party, jailed its leader Haya de la Torre and deported its representatives in the national Congress. The Aprista party was prohibited to participate in a presidential campaign until 1962 (Cotler 2005). From 1931 to 1968, oligarchic parties successfully maintained their power. They could block the implementation of electoral rules against their interests or they could co-opt emerging parties, giving them some power, but not enough to threaten their rule. When opposite parties were allowed to share power, they abandoned their demands for universal suffrage as a way to keep their influence. The Aprista party, for instance, gained more political power and they co-governed with the elite from 1944 to 1947. In this period, they abandoned their demand to enfranchise illiterates in order to preserve their pact with the oligarchic ruling party.[22] As a result, citizenship remained a privilege of male literate adults, roughly 20% of the total adult population.

[22] The Aprista party still pushed for a reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18 years old.

After this period a progressive military group took power and started a path of irreversible changes in Peruvian society that included an agrarian reform and more participation of excluded sectors. The extension of the franchise to illiterates was finally a reality in Peru in 1979. A Constituent Assembly gave the 1979 Constitution in which one of the most important measures was to finally give the right to vote to the illiterates, who were around 25% of the total population, most of them indigenous people. All political parties agreed with this measure, but there were nuances. Leftist parties claimed for immediate inclusion,[23] the Aprista party wanted a gradual incorporation,[24] and rightist parties expressed reservations about illiterates' electoral knowledge and their inclusion in the next presidential run.[25] Going beyond normative discourses, the rational calculus of what party is going to get advantage from illiterates' vote was mentioned in this debate.[26] Finally the position of leftist parties prevailed and consequently illiterates were allowed the right to vote for the first time in Peruvian history in the 1980 elections.

[23] Del Prado, from the Socialista Party of Peru said: "Our proposal, however, corresponds with the fundamental purpose for what we are here in this assembly: to contribute to give a new Constitution with a new concept of democracy, supposing that all groups here decide at least to eliminate two embarrassing burdens of the past: the article 53 of the current Constitution [it banned political parties associated with international organizations, such as the Communist, the Socialist and the Aprista parties] and the electoral discrimination of illiterates." (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author's translation).

[24] Sánchez, from the Aprista party, argued: "we realize that we have to decide if the right to vote for illiterates is facultative or obligatory, if illiterates have the same possibilities to know the responsibility of suffrage than literates do, and therefore if they should suffer the same penalties that the literates face. We should think, because there are proposals, if the right to vote can be gradual or not. If it can begin, like that of women, in municipal elections, o if it can be postponed, as it once was in other period." (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author's translation).

[25] Salazar, from the rightist conservative Partido Popular Cristiano, said: ""They have the right, according to a scientific and a democratic point of view, to exercise their rights…[but] They are not prepared to choose a position with responsibility in an electoral process; therefore, because they are more than a million three hundred thousand citizens in 1980, according to statistics from the National Planning Institute, they could be a deciding group and they may lead the country, not to what all Peruvians aspire, a progressive and responsible country that soon can leave the crisis we face, but they may be a double-edge sword and contribute to the climax of chaos." (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author's translation).

[26] Napurí, from a leftist party, argued: "the debate seems to be on principles...when it actually is based on a calculus of who would benefit with the vote of illiterates…the APRA [Aprista party] would benefit with the vote of illiterates because they have historical connections…with the mass in general and with certain groups of the peasantry in particular. The PPC [a rightist conservative party], obviously, does not have possibilities to get a part of this electoral share because they are a new organization, with no connections of this kind and then the votes of illiterates do not go to this political party…Acción Popular [a centrist party] does think that they can gain in this domain,

Compulsory voting was barely debated in this Constituent Assembly. Legislators assumed this electoral rule by default and they thought it benefited the country because high turnout means representativeness of elected authorities.[27] As a result, Peru inaugurated a new democratic period with a new Constitution that ruled universal suffrage and compulsory voting.[28]

The history of Bolivia and Peru exhibited tortuous paths for full enfranchisement. Oligarchic elites were able to delay this reform, but it meant an accumulation of social tensions, that finally exploded in a form of a revolution or a military coup that overthrew conservative elites from power. In both countries, the indigenous population was the group most affected with the participatory restriction, particularly in Peru where an indigenous movement did not emerge.

The four countries examined up to this moment are a convenience sample that tests two of the four cells in this model. I argue that that these two cells are the main portion of this argument because they are related to the different paths countries followed: one in which countries expanded the franchise and later implemented compulsory voting, and the other in which countries first enacted compulsory voting and years later they passed a franchise expansion. Thus, both cells include countries that currently have both electoral rules. However, Latin America currently observes countries that do not implement both, but just universal suffrage and not compulsory voting (f.i. Colombia). In an effort to further test this theoretical

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because the architect Belaúnde Terry [a former president of this party] walked from side to side of the country and because they have built ties; they think they can have a chance of getting the vote of illiterates." (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author's translation).

[27] Representative Pareja Paz-Soldán said: "Compulsory voting is a right, it is a duty, it benefits the country because a representative elected by 80% or 90% of participation of the electorate has higher autonomy and he is actually a representative of the popular will." (From Diary of Debates in Peruvian Congress, author's translation).

[28] Peru still had some excluded groups. This Constitution did not bring the vote to the military and the members of the police. Later amendments modified this Constitution and the military and members of the police are currently allowed the right to vote.

framework, I expand the model to four new countries in the next section, in which I provide initial evidence to place them in one of the four cells in the model.

Expanding the Model to Other Countries

Reviewing a number of illustrative cases, I find that Argentina is a clear example when emerging disenfranchised groups faced still powerful elites and so this country exemplifies scenario A. Uruguay is a case where a contentious scenario was activated, but factions of the elite agreed electoral reforms in order to prevent an escalation of social tensions. This country is an example in the middle between scenario A and B. In Uruguay, elites were not extremely divided and they did not want to cede all the power. Disenfranchised groups, in turn, were powerful but they accepted a negotiation in Uruguay. Hence, conditions were the same and the outcome was similar, while changed was the process by which Uruguay arrived to this outcome. Uruguay prevented a conflict and dealt with differences by institutionalized means.

Bolivia and Peru fit the scenario C, in which disenfranchised groups could not pose a revolutionary threat, consequently franchise expansions were not implemented and compulsory voting was a measure to stop intra elite disputes. So, this electoral rule did not mean full participation in this context, but it meant a way to organize electoral competition and rotation in power and finally to modernize elections only for the oligarchic group. It was a modernization for only the conservative elite. From its implementation, this electoral rule was a default option in several constitutions enacted later. This equilibrium could not be maintained for a long time and finally social pressures exploded in a form of a revolution, as Bolivia's 1952 insurrection, or a military coup, as Peru's 1968 coup. Finally, after several decades, franchise expansions to

illiterates were implemented in these two countries. When a franchise expansion accompanies compulsory voting in these countries, they finally mean (almost) full participation. The expansion of the franchise changed the electoral map in these countries and has further consequences. For instance, Del Aguila (2009) associates this massive growth of the electorate with the crisis of the national party system in Peru and the emergence of regional parties and outsiders.

A question is whether this argument can be extended to other countries in the region. Here, I provide some evidence that gives some indications on how other countries in the region may fit this theoretical framework. Brazil's history, for instance, resembles Peru's. Until 1930, a period called the First Republic matured in this country, one in which a traditional elite from rural states, controlled by local *coroneles* –rural bosses, dominated the political landscape. Electoral fraud was common in this period. For example, factions of the elite illegally introduced votes of illiterates, non-existent, and deceased persons in their favor (Love 1970). This was a period of instability and violence. As Love (1970) states "Such instability arose from divisions among the political elite (based primarily on regional cleavages) and occasionally from dissatisfaction among military officers, many of whom were recruited from non-elite strata" (13).

After the 1930 Revolution of Getulio Vargas, fueled by urbanization and industrialization in Brazil, the balance of power changes in favor of new unrepresented urban groups in addition to a still powerful traditional elite in rural states. In this context, compulsory voting was legislated in 1932. I hypothesize that this electoral rule was enacted with the goal to assure reasonable non-violent elections. In Brazil, compulsory may work as an instrument to provide representativeness to both rural *coroneles* and urban authorities. In addition, I propose that enfranchisement for illiterates was not legislated because this group did not have a strong party

to represent their interest. The continuation of the power of *coroneles* provides some evidence of the weakness of illiterates, mostly people from rural areas. In 1962, the presidential elections marked the consolidation of the urban sectors and parties. From the sixties, some voices in the Parliament began to discuss the vote for illiterates; however, the Congress was still dominated by rural interests and so, enfranchisement for illiterates had to wait 25 years more and finally it was legislated in 1988. In sum, Brazil presented a scenario with factions of the elite in dispute and a weak group of illiterates with no power and representation.

Ecuador, in turn, since independence, experienced a conflict among factions of the elite: trade-oriented liberal forces of the coastal area, the conservative landowners of the mountain region, and military *caudillos* (Nohlen and Pachano 2005). This equilibrium came to an end after the *Revolución Juliana* in 1925, in which a group of reformist young officers installed a civilian government and enacted broad social legislation, including the first extension of suffrage to women and also compulsory voting in 1929 (Quibell 2002). However, extensions of the franchise did not include illiterates. The Partido Socialista, formed in 1926, and the Partido Comunista, formed in 1931, represented rising urban blue-collar workers, not people from rural areas, mostly peasants.

Political instability characterized the period from 1925 to 1948 in Ecuador. A series of *coup d'états* took place and the situation got worse after the defeat in the war with Peru. In 1945, an additional effort to modernize the elections was made and "the Supreme Electoral Court (*Tribunal Supremo* Electoral) was created as an institutional base to ensure an effective electoral process" (Nohlen and Pachano 2005: 366). Finally, a military dictatorship began in 1972 and lasted until 1979, when Ecuador transited to democracy and enacted the right to vote for illiterates. Similar to the case of Peru, illiterates had to wait several years to have the right to vote

because they did not have a strong party to represent their interests. Moreover, compulsory voting was legislated in the thirties in both countries as a part of several measures to modernize elections. However, military interventions and several economic and political crises prevented a stable competition among factions of the elite in Ecuador.

Thus, Brazil and Ecuador followed a sequence in which compulsory voting was legislated before universal suffrage. In Brazil, compulsory voting arrived in the Constitution of 1932 and the right to vote for illiterates in 1988. Ecuador went to a similar path. This country legislated compulsory voting for literate persons aged 18 to 65 in 1929 and years later they introduced the right to vote for illiterates, mostly *quichua* people, in 1978. According to the theoretical frame in this chapter, compulsory voting should have been introduced as a measure to modernize elections, to impede electoral violence and fraud, and to provide a reasonable competition among contentious factions of the elite, and universal suffrage should not have been introduced because opposition groups could not pose a severe threat.

Colombia, on the other side, seems to be a country closer to Uruguay's path. This country established universal male suffrage in 1936 for all citizens older than 21, and legislators in Colombia did not discuss the introduction of compulsory voting until recently. According to this chapter, we should expect a consensual agreement among factions of the elite in a moderate contentious scenario, as Uruguay's path. In Colombia, after a period of Conservative hegemony, in which Liberals suffered electoral arbitrariness, and after the *Guerra de los Mil Días* (War of the Thousand Days), the two parties reached a settlement to prevent conflicts and seek mutual tolerance in 1890 (Posada-Carbó 1997). From this period, several measures were introduced to modernize elections: representation of minorities, direct presidential elections, but not an extension of the suffrage for illiterates in national elections. Jaramillo and Franco-Cuervo (2005)

mention that "This and other measures enabled new social sectors to integrate into the political system." (296) An open franchise was allowed only in second-order elections. However, as time passed, these restrictions were often ignored. Posada-Carbó (1997) notes that "social pressures to widen the franchise…was generally absent from not only Colombia but most other Latin American countries, for one simple reason: large segments of the popular sectors, particularly in the urban areas, were already in possession of the vote." (259) Moreover, Colombia in this period did not observe class struggles. As Uruguay, the absence of class conflict was due to the multiclass nature of the Liberal and the Conservative parties. Their social bases were similar, yet Liberals had more influence in urban cities and Conservatives in rural areas. Thus, both characteristics, the agreement between parties and their multiclass nature, favored the gradual inclusion of the universal suffrage, finally legislated in 1936, and the absence of compulsory voting in Colombia, despite the diffusion of this electoral rule in the region.

In Chile, voting and registration were voluntary for literate men. Compulsory voting was legislated in 1964, but only for those allowed to register: literate men and women. Illiterates were an ample majority; more than two-thirds of adult men (Colomer 2004) but they did not have representation. The parties that were supposed to represent them did not do so. Valenzuela (2004) says "the Chilean left, including the very first set of labor movement leaders, never pressed for an abolition of the literacy requirement. Hence, they did not see this limitation as one that affected their voting potential" (64). Further, Nohlen (2005) notes that Chile from 1932 to 1973 was a stable political system despite this country experienced severe political disputes. Power circulated and presidents in this period represented all political parties: liberals, radicals, Christian democrats, and independents from left to right. At the end, the right to vote for illiterates arrived in the early seventies, but due to the Pinochet's military coup, illiterate people

could not exercise the right to vote until the 1989 elections. In sum, Chile may be an example of a cartel of elites that circulated power among them and prevented the rise of parties representing disenfranchised groups. Thus, Chile may be an example of the scenario where the status quo remains. In some sense, this scenario is also the starting point from which Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, and Uruguay transited to a new situation, i.e. the status quo before the critical juncture.

Table II.3 presents an initial assessment of the place of some Latin American countries according to this framework. It shows the conditions, the expected institutional outcome and the countries that fit these expectations. In addition to Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, and Bolivia that I explain deeply in this chapter I offer a place for Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, and Chile.

Table II.3. Four Scenarios from the Interaction of Elites and Disenfranchised Groups for Latin American Countries

Disenfranchised group	Elite	
	Powerful and Organized	**Divided due to conflicts among factions**
Powerful, pose a valid threat	Scenario A: Change to franchise expansion and compulsory voting at the same time Argentina Uruguay	Scenario B: Change to franchise expansion and then, years later, compulsory voting, if any Colombia Venezuela
Weak, cannot pose a valid threat	Scenario D: Continuation of the status quo (neither franchise expansion nor compulsory voting) Chile and status quo before reforms in other countries	Scenario C: Change to compulsory voting and then, years later, franchise expansion Bolivia Peru Ecuador Brazil

Conclusion

The argument in this chapter focuses on a period in Latin American countries at the beginning of the twentieth century when pressures for social changes emerged, including electoral reforms, such as franchise expansions and compulsory voting. I propose that this context was a critical juncture in each country, in which oligarchic elites had to decide whether to reform or to maintain the status quo. According to the literature, elites may or may not opt for franchise expansions, depending on the strength of new parties representing disenfranchised

groups to pose or not to pose a severe threat and also on the coordinating capacity of the ruling parties.

If elites are in trouble and disenfranchised groups are powerful, the most likely outcome is the implementation of only a franchise expansion. If elites are still powerful to negotiate to keep some power, they implemented compulsory voting as a rule to balance the electoral playing field, agitated after the implementation of a franchise expansion.

When disenfranchised groups could not pose a revolutionary threat, a franchise expansion was less likely because elites did not need to include emerging groups of the population. If elites are powerful, the status quo prevailed, but if they are divided due to factional disputes, compulsory voting was implemented as part of a series of reforms intended to stop violence and fraud in elections and so as a rule to secure a reasonable competition among contentious elite's factions. Once an institutional arrangement was selected, it persisted as a default option.

Birch (2009) mentions that compulsory voting was introduced as a measure to improve the democratic quality of the electoral process. In this chapter, I relate this institutional outcome to a particular scenario: when divided elites face weak disenfranchised groups. Further, she also mentions that the introduction of compulsory voting was also likely in a context where established right-wing parties face newly-enfranchised workers. Here, I propose two outcomes depending on the strength of elites. If they are strong, they could negotiate and the final outcome is the implementation of a franchise expansion and compulsory voting. However, if they were weak and could not negotiate, compulsory voting was not legislated. Thus, this chapter encapsulates previous explanations and enriches our understanding about the origins of compulsory voting in Latin America.

This region has recently observed some cases in which lawmakers propose to change or have already changed electoral rules in their countries. For example, Chile changed from voluntary registration and compulsory voting to automatic registration and voluntary voting. Public opinion and political elites in this country are currently discussing to come back to compulsory voting. As mentioned before, representatives in Colombia are considering changes to compulsory voting. In Peru the debate about the change from compulsory to voluntary voting emerges frequently in electoral times. This chapter highlights the strategic considerations of political actors to agree with or to oppose a change in the institutional status quo. Thus, while this chapter focuses on explaining the nature and sequence by which electoral reforms concerning franchise expansion and compulsory voting were implemented initially in the Latin American region, it also makes a contribution by highlighting the relevance of strategic considerations, which likely explain the historical institutional paths toward these types of rules in other countries and, as well, are relevant to understanding the voices arguing for and against contemporary changes in the electoral regulation.

This chapter focuses on the origins of this electoral rule in Latin America. The next chapters move on to the consequences of compulsory voting. Specifically, chapter III explores an intended consequence of compulsory voting: an equalization of electoral participation across socioeconomic and political groups.

CHAPTER III

III. SHIFTING RATIONALES: DETERMINANTS OF VOTER TURNOUT IN COMPULSORY VERSUS VOLUNTARY VOTING COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA

Introduction

In most countries around the world, citizens are asked to vote in regular democratic elections to select presidents, legislators and any number of subnational officials. In countries in which voluntary voting is the norm, vote-eligible adults have the liberty, at least from a legal point of view, to decide whether to vote or to abstain. In countries with compulsory voting rules, however, the decision to vote is influenced by the potential of facing sanctions if a citizen abstains. Because most vote-eligible citizens want to evade penalties, they will go to the polls at a higher rate than in countries that do not threaten citizens with punishments for not voting. If more people are going to the polls, then an expectation in countries with compulsory voting is that this rule may significantly reduce differences in electoral participation. For example, the difference in electoral participation between wealthy and poor people may vanish. Tingsten (1937, mentioned in Lijphart 1997) affirms that "the probability of differences in voting turnout is smaller the higher the general participation is" (2). Based on this notion, politicians, policy-makers, and political scientists assume that mandatory voting can eliminate participatory gaps, and in consequence this electoral rule moves countries closer to the ideal of full participation. This is important, as the act of compelling individuals to vote is thought to homogenize the pool

of voters, so that political representation and influence is more equally distributed across different segments of the electorate.

Yet, it is not clear precisely *how* or *to what extent* this electoral rule alters the decision to go to the polls or abstain, and therefore it is unclear how or even whether it affects differences in the composition of the electorate. To address whether compulsory voting reduces or eliminates differences in electoral participation and of which type, I attempt to answer this question: how does the decision to vote or abstain vary for citizens who live in countries with voluntary voting versus those who live in countries with compulsory voting? Building on the rational calculus of voting paradigm, I assess variables related to the four key dimensions of the rational choice calculus of voting paradigm: costs, benefits, the probability of casting a decisive vote, and duty.

This chapter contributes to the study of compulsory voting by providing strong evidence that compulsory voting diminishes in a greater extent political differences than socioeconomic or civic-minded differences in electoral participation. This rule exerts an equalizing effect for variables related to the benefits of voting. For example, this rule eliminates the difference in electoral participation between partisans and non-partisans and between those who campaigned for a candidate and those who did not. It also affects variables related to the costs of voting and to the sense of duty. For example, it diminishes the gap between older citizens and younger citizens and it lowers the difference between those with high levels and those with low levels of internal efficacy.

These findings are relevant because they indicate that compulsory voting is effective at selectively reducing differences in electoral participation but it is far from perfect. Finally, these results indicate that there are groups in the society that are reluctant to push to the polls and so they require alternative strategies. Of particular note is the case of young people for whom the

penalties established in compulsory voting systems do not establish enough incentives to equalize their participation. This situation raises the question of whether negative incentives – penalties - are the ideal motivators of turnout, or whether legislators should also think in positive incentives –rewards - to increase participation of these disadvantaged groups. Also of interest is the case of older citizens (those older than 66 years old) who are more likely to vote than those younger than 66 in voluntary voting systems. This finding might indicate high levels of duty among these citizens. Probably, levels of duty are high enough to exceed the costs involved in the act of voting and the relatively low benefits expected in this activity, and so they decide to turn out.

In brief, this chapter proposes, first, to test the impact of compulsory voting on the composition of the electorate, with a particular focus on Latin America, a region with considerable variation in the application of compulsory voting rules. Second, it examines whether and to what extent compulsory voting changes the rational calculus of voting. In particular, I analyze whether compulsory voting is more effective in reducing socioeconomic, political, or civic-minded differences in electoral participation. To test these hypotheses, I develop hierarchical models, in which I use individual-level variables, country-level variables, and cross-level interactions to provide the most empirically rigorous test possible for my expectations. I obtain robust results across three rounds of the AmericasBarometer surveys.

This chapter proceeds as follows. The first part briefly presents the rational calculus of voting paradigm and discusses how components of the calculus of voting vary across electoral systems. Then I derive hypotheses about differences in the calculus of voting between voluntary voting and compulsory voting systems. The second part introduces data and methods that I use to test these hypotheses. I test these expectations using the 2010, 2012 and the 2014 rounds of the

AmericasBarometer survey by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP).[29] In the following section, I present the results of a series of logistic and hierarchical logistic models. Finally, I summarize the results and discuss the implication of the findings.

Theoretical Framework

The rational calculus of voting model assumes that each individual voter is able to decide whether to vote or to abstain. If individuals vote it is because they calculate low costs and (at least relatively) high benefits, because they have an elevated sense of duty, and/or because they estimates that their vote would have a reasonable probability of being decisive for the election outcome. If they abstain they do not receive any punishment for not voting. Thus, the decision to vote depends on costs, expected benefits, the probability of casting a decisive vote and the citizens' sense of duty; each of these is a component within the standard utilitarian model of turnout.[30]

Yet, this branch of the literature has concluded that voting is not rational, given that costs (the *C*-term) exceed benefits (the *B-term*) that are weighted down by the infinitesimal probability of casting a decisive vote in mass elections. Since its original formulation (Downs 1957; Tullock 1967), research has focused on each component of the calculus of voting in a series of efforts to salvage voters' rationality.

Trying to solve this paradox, Downs raises the notion that not voting is costly for democracy and that voting introduces long-term benefits from participation. Later, Riker and

[29] Data and questionnaires can be found at: www.lapopsurveys.org.
[30] The standard rational calculus of voting formula is: U = p*B –C, where U is the utility from the act of voting, p is the probability of being decisive, B denotes the expected benefits if my preferred candidate wins, and C are the cost involved in the act of voting.

Ordeshook (1968) modify Downs' equation and introduce the sense of duty (the *D-term*) into the calculus as an additive term.[31] They conceptualize the sense of duty as related to the citizen's internal satisfaction of carrying out their civic duties[32] —a reward for the act of voting and being part of a political community, regardless any utilitarian benefit.

In this standard model of turnout, the state (or any other institution) does not interfere in the individual decision to vote. Citizens are not punished if they do not fulfill their civic duties. However, there are many countries in the world where the state promotes voting via conditional negative incentives: monetary fees or civic restrictions in case a citizen fails to vote. An evident question arises: how does the rational calculus of voting change in countries with compulsory voting? And, if it changes, what component of the rational calculus of voting does compulsory voting alter?

The Calculus of Voting Under Voluntary and Compulsory Voting Systems

The literature has not taken many steps to examine the microfoundations of compulsory voting (see a balance, e.g., Blais 2006). Previous research on turnout in Latin America uses compulsory voting as an independent variable in models of electoral participation at the aggregate level. From a neo-institutional perspective, this branch of the literature has defined three dimensions that influence voter turnout: socioeconomic factors, the institutional arrangement, and the political environment (Altman 2007; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004; Pérez-Liñán 2001). These models indirectly refer to the rational calculus of voting. For example,

[31] The equation is: U = p*B –C + D.
[32] They mention, for example, "the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting", "the satisfaction from affirming allegiance to the political system", "the satisfaction from affirming a partisan preference", "the satisfaction of deciding going to the poll" and "the satisfaction of affirming one's efficacy in the political system" (28)

much of the focus to date on electoral turnout has been on factors related to socio-economic status, which it is a characteristic assumed to be related to the costs of voting. Given that these individuals otherwise turn out to vote at lower levels in voluntary voting settings (Dalton 1996; Lipset 1963; Powell 1986), some have argued compulsory voting offers an attractive institutional remedy to fix the problem of inequality in electoral participation and influence (Lijphart 1997).

Wealth is not the only socioeconomic characteristic that influence turnout and that might introduce inequalities in participation in voluntary voting systems. Research has also focused on education as a determinant of turnout, because less educated people face a higher cognitive barrier to participate; and so, compulsory voting should also be an equalizing force in this case. Similarly, other socioeconomic characteristics less inspected in the literature may demarcate other inequalities in participation. For example, young people, older people, women, and those who live in rural setting turn out to the polls at lower levels in countries with voluntary voting, and consequently compulsory voting should also equalize participation among these groups.

Education and age have not only been associated with the costs of voting, but also with the citizens' sense of duty. Scholars have found that more educated citizens exhibit higher levels of sense of duty than their less educated counterparts (Achen 2012; Bowler and Donovan 2013). Further, duty is a factor of age: measures of duty increases in older cohorts (Rallings and Thrasher 2007). Thus, these variables are indicators of both of the dimensions of the rational calculus of voting.

Why would compulsory voting eliminate these differences in electoral participation? Panagopoulos (2008) argues that mandatory voting introduces a new term in the calculus of voting: the cost of abstention, which is a penalty for not voting with certain probability

determined by the enforcement.[33] If poor people, illiterates, young, and older citizens face higher material and cognitive costs to cast a ballot in voluntary voting countries, they should increase their rate of participation in compulsory voting countries because they prefer to avoid the cost of abstention. In reality, though, it may not be the case that penalties established in compulsory voting systems completely shift the calculus of those at lower levels of socio-economic status, and so perhaps compulsory voting would not equalize participation at the end. Actually, Panagopoulos (2008) finds that turnout depends on levels of penalties. Thus, in some countries, penalties may not be high enough to change the calculus of voting for some groups of voters towards a decision to vote. Further, Singh (2011) provides evidence that variables associated with the costs of voting and with duty (age, income, education) do not lose statistical significance in countries with compulsory voting systems in a sample of 36 countries in the world. Similarly, research in Latin America finds that differences among socioeconomic groups in compulsory voting countries persist and are statistically significant (Maldonado 2011). Therefore, if costs in voluntary voting introduce differences in electoral participation, it is not clear whether the cost of abstention has a full equalizing effect in compulsory voting systems across socioeconomic groups. This chapter will test this hypothesis. Empirically, I examine whether those expected to turnout in lower levels to the polls in voluntary systems – that is, those with less wealth, those with less education, younger and older citizens, and those who live in rural settings – are more apt to turn out in compulsory voting systems.

In this rational calculus of voting framework, costs are not the sole determinant of voter turnout; benefits, the probability of casting a decisive vote, and duty also matter. The literature has barely worked with these dimensions to explain voter turnout in Latin America. Fornos,

[33] Kato (2008) also introduces the notion that compulsory voting introduces a new term into the rational calculus of voting. He adds the possibility that there could be sanctions for not voting and inducements for voting.

Power, and Garand (2004), for example, include the salience of elections in models of turnout. This variable is related to the probability of casting a decisive vote in the rational calculus of voting. Similarly, Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita (2013) define three dimensions that affect the propensity of voting: resources, networks, and motivation. The latter includes variables that may be associated with the benefits of voting, such as party identification, and with the citizens' sense of duty, such as satisfaction with democracy.

Hence, how do benefits and duty change when voting is mandatory? This chapter also proposes to evaluate whether compulsory voting diminishes or eliminates differences related to these dimensions. According to the standard model, those who expect fewer benefits and those who exhibit low levels of duty are less likely to vote, and these differences should create unequal turnout when voting is an option and not an obligation. Consequently, following Lijphart's reasoning, these differences in turnout may also create gaps in electoral participation. Surprisingly, the literature has scarcely dealt with changes in these terms of the rational calculus of voting across types of systems. Carlin and Love (2015) is a recent attempt to evaluate the behavior of some variables across electoral systems. They propose that voting is less psychologically demanding when voting laws ease electoral participation, and then, empirically, party identification, for example, should lose explanatory power in models of electoral turnout in compulsory voting systems. Their expectation is similar to the one proposed here: compulsory voting should reduce the effect of variables that explain voter turnout in voluntary voting systems. However, there are differences. I place these expectations within the rational calculus of voting paradigm and I propose these variables may lose explanatory power just because more people are going to the polls. Another prior attempt to examine how socioeconomic, political, and attitudinal variables change between types of countries is found in Seligson et al. (1995) who

find that individual-level political variables are stronger predictors of voter turnout when participation is low, but these variables have much less effect when turnout increases.

Thus, this chapter also proposes to assess the relevance of aspects that increase the stakes that individuals perceive in a given election, factors linked with the benefits of voting: those who identify with a party, those who have tried to convince others to vote for a different candidate or party, and those who have campaigned for a candidate or party. I also evaluate whether compulsory voting is effective at reducing differences in participation by variables related to citizens' civic characteristics, variables associated with the sense of civic duty in the calculus of voting paradigm, for example support for democracy, system support, and internal efficacy.[34]

These are meaningful turnout gaps. For example, partisans are more likely to support less moderated positions on certain issues than are non-partisans (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). If partisans are more likely to cast a ballot, elections could produce more polarized results. Further, if less motivated citizens are less likely to cast a ballot, this could generate a vicious circle in which they do not participate and consequently politicians fail to pick up their voices, and then they may feel unrepresented, and finally they may prefer to 'exit' to the political system, in Hirschman's (1970) terminology. Given that compulsory voting rules increase turnout, it should also help to eliminate these gaps.

Yet, if compulsory voting is not likely to wipe out differences in electoral participation by socioeconomic groups, would it eliminate differences by political groups or by civic characteristics? Do variables related to the benefits of voting and to citizens' sense of duty lose significance in compulsory voting systems? In the next section I empirically test whether and to

[34] Internal efficacy has been found to be a strong predictor of citizens' sense of duty. Below I explain how they are related.

what extent compulsory voting laws reduce the effects of correlates of voter turnout (related to the costs, benefits, and duty) in Latin America.

Methods and Data

To answer the question of whether compulsory voting diminishes or eliminates differences in electoral participation, I use data from the 2010, 2012 and 2014 waves of the AmericasBarometer surveys for 18 countries in the region. Each survey uses a nationally representative sample of voting-age citizens and includes a core section of comparable questions that are identical from country to country.[35] I use the following question as the dependent variable:

VB2. Did you vote in the last **presidential elections** of [year]? (1) Voted **[Continue]** (2) Did not vote **[Go to VB4NEW]** (88) DK **[Go to VB10]** (98) DA **[Go to VB10]**	|__|__|

In countries with a *ballotage*[36], that is, a second round of voting if the first round returns for the leading candidate do not cross a certain threshold, this question asks for the respondent to report their voting behavior for the first round. In the 2014 AmericasBarometer survey, 76.5%

[35] Countries included are: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Paraguay, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and Dominican Republic. I am excluding the USA and Canada. Also excluded are Caribbean countries: Haiti, Jamaica, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, and Suriname.

[36] Most countries in Latin America conduct a second round of elections when no candidate obtains a certain threshold of votes, commonly 50%. Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay require more than 50% of votes to win in the first round. Argentina requires more than 45% or more than 40% with a difference of 10% with respect to the second place. Ecuador and Costa Rica require more than 40%. Nicaragua requires more than 40% or more than 35% with a difference of 5% with respect to the second place. Mexico, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela do not have second round.

reported having voted in the last presidential election, but results show significance variation across countries, ranging from Venezuela where 91.5% reported having voted, to Colombia where 60.8% reported having turned out. In the 2012 sample, 78.8% of respondents reported having voted in the last presidential election and this percentage varies from Peru where 90.6% reported having voted, to Honduras where 50.7% reported having turned out. For the 2010 round, 76.4% reported having voted and it goes from Uruguay (93.5%) to Costa Rica (58%).[37]

Table III.1 shows a comparison of actual turnout and reported turnout in each country in the 2014 AmericasBarometer surveys according to the type of system. There are differences between actual turnout (the one registered in each country´s electoral institution) and reported turnout. Empirically, research finds over reported turnout in postelections surveys (see Selb and Munzert 2013). In some cases, I find sub reported turnout, but most of them show a small difference. A particular case is Bolivia where reported turnout is 18.4 percentage points smaller than official turnout. A reasonable explanation is the time passed between the election and the survey. In Bolivia, the 2014 AmericasBarometer asked for the 2009 presidential election, so it passed more than four years and citizens might have forgotten their electoral behavior.

As a key point in my argument, I have hypothesized that the components of the rational calculus of voting vary depending on whether it is a country with a voluntary voting system or a country with compulsory voting laws. To create an indicator of compulsory voting in Latin America, I rely on previous measures (Singh 2014) but change some classifications based on a few rules. I have distinguished three categories: countries with voluntary voting, countries with compulsory voting with no sanctions, and countries with compulsory voting that enforce sanctions in their legislations.

[37] See Appendix 2 for figures that compare reported turnout by country in 2014, 2012 and 2010.

In order to classify Latin American countries, I reviewed their Constitutions and Electoral Codes. The basic distinction is between voluntary and compulsory systems. To be classified as mandatory, it is necessary that the electoral code says voting is an obligation – in other words, it is not enough if it says that voting is a duty ("deber" in Spanish). For example, I have coded the Dominican Republic as a country with voluntary voting because its constitution establishes the vote is "a citizen's right and duty" and that voting is "personal, free, direct, and secret" (*Constitución Política de la República Dominicana*, Article 208). Its electoral code does not mention that voting is obligatory.[38] I have classified Honduras as a country with compulsory voting with no sanctions because its constitution says voting is "universal, *obligatory*, equal, free, direct, and secret" (*Constitución Nacional de Honduras*, Article 44, emphasis added), but its electoral code does not establish penalties for non-voters. Countries in which their Constitutions mention that voting is obligatory and in which their Electoral Codes stipulate sanctions for abstention are coded as having compulsory voting with enforced sanctions. A broad explanation of this classification is found in the chapter I.

The data (either official turnout or reported participation) show higher rates of participation in countries with compulsory voting with enforced sanctions than in countries with compulsory voting with no sanctions or countries with voluntary voting. However, these differences cannot be attributed only to the type of electoral system because there are other factors at work, such as the relative wealth of the country. Models in this chapter seek to isolate the effect of compulsory voting controlling for the effect of standard covariates.

[38] This classification differs from IDEA's, which is the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance and that provide knowledge to democracy builders, including classifications of electoral systems. This institution classifies Dominican Republic as a country with compulsory voting with no sanctions.

Table III.1. Official Turnout, Reported Turnout and Difference by Country and Type of Electoral System in 2014

Country	Official Turnout	Reported Turnout AB	Difference	Type of System	Mean turnout	Mean Reported Turnout
Guatemala	69.4%	72.3%	2.9%	Voluntary	65.1%	73.20%
El Salvador	55.3%	74.6%	19.3%	Voluntary		
Nicaragua	73.9%	69.5%	-4.4%	Voluntary		
Panama	74.0%	70.1%	-3.9%	Voluntary		
Colombia	49.3%	60.8%	11.5%	Voluntary		
Chile	49.4%	67.8%	18.4%	Voluntary		
Venezuela	79.7%	91.5%	11.8%	Voluntary		
Dominican Republic	69.8%	78.7%	8.9%	Voluntary		
Mexico	63.1%	74.9%	11.8%	Compulsory with no sanctions	65.3%	74%
Honduras	61.2%	74.6%	13.4%	Compulsory with no sanctions		
Costa Rica	68.2%	72.3%	4.1%	Compulsory with no sanctions		
Paraguay	68.5%	74.2%	5.7%	Compulsory with no sanctions		
Ecuador	81.1%	92.2%	11.1%	Compulsory with enforced sanctions	85.1%	82%
Bolivia	94.6%	76.2%	-18.4%	Compulsory with enforced sanctions		
Peru	83.7%	84.8%	1.1%	Compulsory with enforced sanctions		
Uruguay	89.9%	84.7%	-5.2%	Compulsory with enforced sanctions		
Brazil	81.9%	76.9%	-5.0%	Compulsory with enforced sanctions		
Argentina	79.4%	77.2%	-2.2%	Compulsory with enforced sanctions		

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP and IDEA International

In a strict sense, countries with compulsory voting are those with enforced sanctions. Countries with compulsory voting with no sanctions can be named as countries with symbolic compulsory voting. These countries are closer to countries with voluntary voting, but they still

differ because they enshrine the ideal of an obligation to vote in their Constitutions and Electoral Codes. Further, people in countries with symbolic compulsory often know their Constitutions say voting is mandatory, but they are unsure if there are sanctions. From informal conversations with people in Honduras, for example, citizens say they prefer to act as if the Electoral Code establishes penalties for not voting.

In this chapter, I propose to group independent variables together according to the dimensions of the rational calculus of voting. I have found indicators of each of these dimensions. For the cost component, given that elections are, almost certainly, a low-cost low-benefits act, I identify those potential voters who face higher barriers to participation as they are comparatively more affected even by low economic and cognitive costs.[39] However, age and education are not only related to the costs of voting, but also to the sense of civic duty.

To tap these barriers, I use indicators for illiterates[40] (3.5% in 2014, 4.1% in 2012, and 3.4% in 2010) and for those in the lower socioeconomic classes[41] (41.5% in 2014, 42% 2012, and 41.6% in 2010). I include two indicators related to age; one for young people (between 16 and 25 years old[42], 21.1% in 2014, 23% in 2012, and 25.5% in 2010)[43], and other for older people (older than 66 years, 8.7% in 2014, 8.3% in 2012, and 7% in 2010). I also include

[39] Blais (2000) uses a tailored question that is worded as follows: "Do you find it very easy, somewhat easy, somewhat difficult, or very difficult to get information to decide how to vote?" Here I use socioeconomic variables that are standard in the literature (see Carlin and Love 2015; Carreras and Castañeda-Angarita 2013; Sanders 1980).
[40] The survey asks for respondents to report their years of schooling. I define illiterates as those who report none.
[41] They include those who are in the first and second quintiles of wealth.
[42] Four countries allow people younger than 18 to vote: Nicaragua, Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentina. In Ecuador, Brazil, and Argentine, voting is voluntary for people between 16-17 years old.
[43] The AmericasBarometer includes people who did not have the legal age to cast a ballot when the last presidential election took place. For example, the last presidential election in Mexico when the AmericasBarometer was fielded in 2012 was in 2006. Thus, because legal age to cast a ballot is 18 years old in Mexico, those who were between 18 and 24 at the time of the survey could not vote in the 2006 election. They may respond 'I did not vote' in the survey when they really were not allowed to vote, and therefore they may artificially augment the proportion of true abstainers. In this chapter, I have excluded in the following models those who were not allowed to vote when the election took place.

indicators for women (51.5% in 2014, 50.8% in 2012, and 51.5% in 2010), and for those who live in rural settings (26% in 2014, 29% in 2012, and 26.6% in 2010). Sanders (1980) identifies a similar set of variables when he builds an index of the *C*-term based on rural residency, educational level, income, and length of residence in the community.[44]

Riker and Ordeshook (1968) measure the benefits of voting through a dichotomous variable that taps whether the voter cares about the election's results. Similarly, Blais (2000) gauges this term of the calculus of voting with a question that asks how important it is to the respondent which party wins the election. Sanders (1980) uses party affiliation and interest in the campaign to build an index that measures the *B*-term. In this chapter, I use indicators that identify individuals for whom electoral results may be more relevant. I include a measure of party identification (36.3% in 2014, 31.9% in 2012, and 32.9% in 2010)[45], a measure that taps whether respondents have worked for a campaign (8% in 2012 and 10.8% in 2010)[46], and a measure that gauges whether respondents have tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate (14.9% in 2012 and 29.2% in 2010).[47]

Riker and Ordeshook (1968) argue that the *D*-term includes five kinds of satisfaction: satisfaction derived from compliance with the ethic of voting; satisfaction derived from affirming allegiance to the political system; satisfaction derived from affirming a partisan preference;

[44] In this chapter, I use separate variables for the variables related to costs, benefits and duty given the low values of the Cronbach's alpha for the combination of these variables into an index for each dimension of the calculus of voting. For example, the Cronbach's alpha for variables related to the cost dimension is 0.18 in 2014 and 0.17 in 2012, for variables related to the benefits is 0.44 in 2012, and for variables related to the sense of duty is 0.39 in 2014 and 0.42 in 2012.

[45] The question is worded as follows: "VB10. Do you currently identify with a political party?"

[46] The question is worded as follows: "PP2. There are people who work for parties or candidates during electoral campaigns. Did you work for any candidate or party in the last presidential [prime minister] election of [year]?" This question was not included in the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer.

[47] The question is worded as follows: "PP1. During elections times, some people try to convince others to vote for a party or candidate. How often have you tried to persuade others to vote for a party or candidate?" This question was not included in the 2014 round of the AmericasBarometer.

satisfaction derived from deciding to go to the polls, and satisfaction derived from affirming one's efficacy in the political system. Further, they mention that the duty battery was dropped from the ANES because it was strongly correlated with a sense of political efficacy. Some scholars have tapped this concept using tailored questions related to voting as a duty, whether duty is important to preserve democracy, and whether a respondent would feel guilty if they had not voted (Blais 2000; Blais and Achen 2010; Blais and Young 1999).[48] In this analysis, I rely on three indirect indicators of duty. Two are related to the satisfaction derived from affirming allegiance to the political system: support for democracy (average score=0.70 on a 0-1 scale in 2014 and 2012, and 0.71 in 2010)[49] and system support (average score=0.52 in a 0-1 scale in 2014, 0.52 in 2012, and 0.54 in 2010).[50] One is related to the satisfaction of affirming one's efficacy in the political system: internal efficacy (average score=0.49 on a 0-1 scale in 2014, 0.47 in 2012, and 0.49 in 2010), which is highly correlated in the ANES with measures of civic duty, according to Riker and Ordeshook.[51]

Electoral competitiveness has been used as a measure to tap the probability of casting a decisive vote in the rational calculus of voting paradigm (Blais 2006; Panagopoulos 2008; Singh 2011), because when elections are defined by a narrow margin, each vote has a higher probability of affecting the outcome of an election and consequently individuals have a higher propensity to go to the polls. I measure the closeness of elections as the difference between the

[48] In the next chapter, for instance, I will use tailored questions to tap the citizens' sense of civic duty.
[49] The questionnaire includes the following question: "ING4. Changing the subject again, democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement." This question was asked on a 1-7 scale and was recoded into a 0-1 scale.
[50] System support is an index based on five questions related to evaluation of whether courts guarantee a fair trial, whether respondent respect political institutions, whether the respondent think basic rights are protected in his country, whether the respondent feels proud of living in his country, and whether the respondent supports the political system in his country. All these questions were asked on a 1-7 scale and were recoded into a 0-1 scale. Next, an index was created. I recoded this index into a 0-1 scale.
[51] This question was worded as follows: "EFF2. You feel that you understand the most important political issues of this country. How much do you agree or disagree with this statement?" It was collected on a 1-7 scale and recoded into a 0-1 scale. I have also recoded it into a 0-1 scale in this analysis.

leading two candidates in the first round of the last presidential election in each country included in the 2010 (from 0.56% to 40.3%), the 2012 (from 0.56% to 37.8%) and the 2014 (from 1.36% to 37.8%) rounds of the AmericasBarometer surveys. This measure was then logged to avoid bias from outliers.

A potential concern is that reported turnout is measured after the voting behavior took place. In some cases, elections occurred several years before the AmericasBarometer asks respondents to report on their turnout. This may introduce unintentional misremembering. The result may be that individuals erroneously report having voted in prior elections when they have not done so. To mitigate the time concern, I have replicated these models using only respondents from countries in which elections were held in the last three years and the results are similar to those presented here.[52]

Results

Effects of Costs, Benefits, and Duty on Turnout by Type of Country

I begin with basic models that have turnout as the dependent variable and individual-level variables that tap the costs, benefits, duty components and country fixed effects (not shown, but available upon request) as predictors, using logistic regression techniques. Results for these models are shown in the Appendix 4 and they are in the expected direction. Those who face stronger barriers to participation are less likely to vote, as expected, except for women and older citizens, whom I hypothesized to be less likely to vote. From these variables, it is worth noting

[52] See Appendix 6 for results using the 2014, 2012, and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer in this restricted sample.

the highly negative substantive effect of being young in the likelihood of turning out. The difference in predicted probabilities between young people (between 16 and 25 years old) and others (more than 25 years old) is -17.7% in 2014, -31.8% in 2012, and -29.9% in 2010. On the contrary, I find that older citizens are more likely to vote than those younger than 66 years old. The difference goes from 7.4% in 2014 to 7.7% in 2010. This last result is consistent with previous research in Latin America (Altman 2007; Seligson et al. 1995) and also consistent with the idea that older citizens exhibit higher levels of duty, a fundamental predictor of turnout.

Coefficients for variables related to the benefits of voting (party identification, persuasion and campaigning) are all positive and statistically significant in these rounds of the AmericasBarometer. From these three variables, party identification and campaigning have the strongest effects. Further, variables related to duty seem to have smaller effects than variables related to the benefits of voting. The coefficients for support for democracy and internal efficacy are positive and statistically significant, yet their effects are relatively small. These results also indicate that those who feel they understand the most important political issues are more likely to turn out than those who do not.

An initial comparison of the differences in conditional effects between types of systems involves to split the sample of countries in two by dichotomizing the compulsory voting variable[53], where countries with no sanctions are coded as countries with voluntary voting[54], and then to compare the coefficients and expected discrete changes between types of countries. I expect to observe smaller or null effects on countries with compulsory voting.

[53] Countries with compulsory voting with enforced sanctions in Latin America: Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and Uruguay. Chile changes from voluntary registration and compulsory voting to automatic registration and voluntary voting in 2012.
[54] Countries with voluntary voting in Latin America: Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, Costa Rica, Colombia, Paraguay, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic.

Detailed results from these models are in the Appendix 5 for the three rounds of the AmericasBarometer surveys. As a summary, here I present a balance of results in Table III.2.

Table III.2. Summary of result from Models Splitting the Sample of Countries

Variable	Result
Illiterates	Unexpected results
Lower class	CV diminishes bias
Rural	CV vanishes bias
Woman	No bias
Young citizens	CV diminishes bias
Older citizens	CV vanishes bias
Party identification	CV diminishes bias
Persuasion	CV diminishes or vanishes bias
Campaigning	CV diminishes bias
Support for democracy	Not clear results
System support	No bias
Internal efficacy	CV vanishes bias

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

The results indicate that compulsory voting rules are effective at reducing gaps in electoral participation, but this rule does not eliminate all differences in electoral participation. Mandatory voting seems to be more effective at reducing gaps with respect to variables related to the benefits of voting. It is also effective at reducing differences with respect to the costs of voting, but some results are contrary to expectation; and this electoral rule seems to be not so effective at vanishing gaps with respect to the sense of duty, except for internal efficacy.

The reduction in the gaps in electoral participation is marginal in the case of the lower class. For example, the difference between people at the lower class and others decreases from -

2.6 percentage points in countries with voluntary voting to -1.7 percentage points in countries with compulsory voting. Decreases are noteworthy with respect to party identification and campaigning, where two-digit differences plummet to one-digit gaps. Finally, with respect to respondents' sense of civic duty, internal efficacy seems to fulfill expectation of advocates of compulsory voting. Differences between those high and those low in internal efficacy vanish in compulsory voting systems in all rounds.

These models are informative, because they test differences between groups (young people versus older people, illiterates versus educated individuals, and so on) in each type of system. This approach allows me to compare the coefficients and predicted probabilities; however, these models are not appropriate to clarify whether the difference in differences between these two types of systems is statistically significant for each variable. For example, these models indicate that the difference between young people and older people decreases from 39% in voluntary voting systems to 21.2% in compulsory voting systems in 2012. Yet, we do not know whether this decrease is statistically significant. In the same manner, Table III.2 shows that the difference between the lower class and others decreases from 3.3% to 1.7% in 2012, but it is likely this decrease would not be statistically.

A formal statistical test of whether there are significant differences between countries with voluntary voting and countries with compulsory voting requires the use of hierarchical logistic models in which individual-level variables (the same used in previous models), two country-level variables (compulsory voting and closeness of elections), and cross-level interaction terms between each individual-level variable and compulsory voting are included. If the interaction term between the indicator for young respondents and the country-level indicator

for compulsory voting is statistically significant, for example, it would indicate that the decrease (from 39% to 20.7%, according to results from split subsamples) is statistically significant.[55]

Table III.3 presents the results for hierarchical random-intercept logistic models for the 2014, 2012, and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer survey with all individual-level variables from previous models, two country-level variables (closeness of elections and compulsory voting), and interactions terms for each individual-level variable and the indicator for compulsory voting.

[55] Table III.2 uses a dichotomized compulsory voting variable, but Table III.3 uses a three-fold classification of compulsory voting.

Table III.3. Individual-level and Country-level Determinants of Voter Turnout in Latin America, 2010 and 2012

	2014	2012	2010
Individual-level			
Illiterates	-0.087	-0.374**	-0.032
	0.116	0.118	0.134
Lower class	-0.154**	-0.168**	-0.146**
	0.049	0.057	0.055
Rural	0.214**	-0.083	0.006
	0.056	0.063	0.068
Woman	0.073	0.059	-0.013
	0.048	0.057	0.055
Young citizens	-0.989**	-0.727**	-0.490**
	0.058	0.075	0.071
Older citizens	0.323**	0.281*	0.397**
	0.092	0.111	0.130
Party identification	0.910**	1.102**	1.015**
	0.057	0.074	0.067
Persuasion		0.429**	0.089
		0.096	0.067
Campaigning		1.330**	0.853**
		0.165	0.112
Support for democracy	0.080	0.142	0.433**
	0.088	0.100	0.096
System support	0.074	0.417*	0.103
	0.115	0.132	0.128
Internal efficacy	0.510**	0.412**	0.185**

	0.085	0.097	0.097
Country-level			
Closeness of elections	-0.033	0.124	0.152
	0.129	0.178	0.165
Compulsory voting	0.622**	0.704**	0.503**
	0.148	0.183	0.191
Cross-level interactions			
Illiterate x CV	-0.146	-0.111	-0.305*
	0.131	0.147	0.194
Lower class x CV	-0.058	-0.063	-0.044
	0.044	0.050	0.044
Rural x CV	-0.189**	0.001	0.054
	0.052	0.058	0.058
Woman x CV	0.045	0.033	-0.004
	0.043	0.049	0.043
Young x CV	-0.222**	-0.023	-0.176**
	0.050	0.060	0.054
Older x CV	-0.327**	-0.246**	-0.162
	0.078	0.092	0.089
PID x CV	-0.066	-0.208**	-0.164**
	0.054	0.068	0.058
Persuasion x CV		-0.101	-0.027
		0.082	0.050
Campaigning x CV		-0.433**	-0.284**
		0.134	0.091
Support for democracy x CV	0.133	0.173*	-0.022

	0.081	0.089	0.078
System support x CV	-0.080	-0.061	0.144
	0.107	0.117	0.102
Internal efficacy x CV	-0.191*	-0.228*	-0.116
	0.079	0.088	0.078
Constant	0.800**	0.110	0.126
	0.353	0.531	0.462
Random effects parameters			
Std Dev. (constant)	0.196	0.344	0.393
	0.068	0.118	0.133
Number of observations	24,507	22,165	24,246
Number of countries	18	18	18
Prob > chi2	<.001	<.001	<.001

** p<0.01 * p<0.05
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Results for the individual-level variables are similar to those obtained in previous analysis for voluntary voting countries. In the 2014 round, I find consistent results for those in the lower class, for young citizens, older citizens, for party identification, and for internal efficacy. In this wave, the coefficient for rural is positive and statistically significant and it indicates that all else equal rural inhabitant are more likely to turn out to vote than urban residents, when compulsory voting is zero, i.e. in voluntary voting settings. However, this result is not robust. In other rounds, this variable turns negative but not significant.

The coefficients for young citizens are negative and statistically significant in all three rounds. They indicate that the young people are significantly less likely to vote in voluntary

voting systems. On the contrary, the coefficients for older citizens are all positive and significant. They indicate that older citizens are more likely to turn out in voluntary voting countries.

The coefficients for party identification, persuasion, and campaigning display the same pattern: positive and significant. They indicate significant differences in electoral participation in voluntary voting systems. The same occurs with internal efficacy. These results are consistent with results from split samples.

Regarding country-level variables, closeness of elections is not statistically significant in any model. This result indicates that turnout is independent of differences between the two leading candidates in the first round of the last presidential elections. In contrast, as expected, compulsory voting is positive and statistically significant in the three models. To test whether compulsory voting increases turnout, I calculate predicted turnout by levels of compulsory voting for the 2014, 2012, and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer surveys.[56]

The following figures display a monotonic increase in turnout, as compulsory voting is stricter. According to the results, the difference in predicted turnout between countries with voluntary voting and countries with enforced compulsory voting is around 15-20 percentage points, all else equal, and this difference is statistically significant in two rounds of the AmericasBarometer survey. These results are consistent with previous research about the impact of compulsory voting on electoral participation (see, e.g. Jackman 2001).

[56] I have also performed these models using the dichotomous compulsory voting variable and results are similar. I prefer to use the three-fold variable to show how turnout decreases monotonically. Predicted probabilities include only the fixed part of the equation.



Figure III.1. Predicted Turnout by Levels of Compulsory Voting, 2014 -2010

The cross-level interactions are mostly not statistically significant, except for rural residents, young and older citizens in the 2014 wave, for older citizens in the 2012 wave, and for illiterates in 2010. These coefficients are negative and statistically significant.

The negative sign of the cross-level interaction for rural and compulsory voting indicates that compulsory voting significantly decreases the gap between rural and urban inhabitants. Along the same line, the coefficients for older citizens are as expected; the negative sign of the

cross-level interaction term means that compulsory voting reduces the gap between citizens older than 66 years old and those younger than 66 years old. In voluntary voting countries, older citizens are significantly more likely to vote, but this difference diminishes in countries with compulsory voting rules. In contrast, the negative sign of the cross-level interaction for young people and compulsory voting indicates that compulsory voting augments the differences between young and older citizens, as previous results also indicate. This last conclusion is contrary to expectations. Thus, differences within electoral systems exist, but differences between electoral systems are not undistinguishable from zero in many cases, i.e. compulsory voting does not reduce significantly socioeconomic differences in electoral participation. Given that age and education are also related to the citizens' sense of duty, I conclude that compulsory voting does not reduce differences with respect to this dimension of the rational calculus of voting either.

From the cross-level interactions between components of the benefits of voting and compulsory voting, having tried to convince others to vote for a party or candidate is not statistically significant. Party identification is statistically significant in the 2014 and 2012 rounds and the coefficients are in the expected direction. The sign of the coefficient for party identification is positive and it indicates a significant difference between partisans and non-partisans in voluntary voting systems. When compulsory voting increases (to countries with compulsory voting with no sanctions and to compulsory voting with enforced sanctions), the coefficient reduces its impact, as the negative sign of the coefficient of the interaction term indicates. It means that the difference between partisans and non-partisans becomes smaller and it could even vanish in countries with enforced sanctions.

The interaction between having campaigned for a candidate or a party and compulsory voting is also statistically significant and the coefficient is negative, as expected. This means that the difference between those who campaigned and those who do not is smaller in compulsory voting countries and it could vanish in countries with enforced sanctions. I obtain similar results using the 2010 round of the AmericasBarometer survey.

With respect to variables related to the sense of duty, results show that, contrary to expectations, the coefficient for the cross-level interaction between support for democracy and compulsory voting and between system support and compulsory voting are positive and statistically significant in the 2012 round. They indicate higher differences between those who support democracy and those who do not and between those who support the system and those with do not in compulsory voting systems in comparison with voluntary voting systems. However, these results are not robust. The coefficients of these interactions are not statistically significant in the 2014 and 2010 rounds.

The cross-level interactions between internal efficacy and compulsory voting are negative and significant in the 2014 and 2012 rounds. They indicate that the difference in turnout by levels of internal efficacy changes between electoral systems in the expected direction. The negative signs indicate that the differences diminish when the variable that gauges compulsory voting changes from voluntary to enforced mandatory voting.

The following figures present the calculated predicted probabilities for the most robust findings; those related to party identification and campaigning, variables related to the benefits of voting in the rational calculus of voting.[57]

[57] In the Appendix 7 I present predicted probabilities for all cross-level interactions for the 2014 and 2012 rounds of the AmericasBarometer. They show graphically how the gap in electoral participation is similar among types of countries for the cross-level interactions that are not statistically significant.



Figure III.2. Figures for Predicted Probabilities of Party Identification and Campaigning for the 2014-2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer Surveys

As mentioned before, the gap between partisans and no partisans diminishes from countries with voluntary voting to countries with compulsory voting and no sanctions, and to countries with compulsory voting and enforced sanctions. Because the confidence intervals overlap in countries with enforced sanctions, it means that this gap vanishes in this type of countries. I arrive at a similar conclusion with respect to campaigning. The difference between those who campaigned and those who did not diminishes and it vanishes in countries with enforced sanctions.

In sum, results from these hierarchical models indicate that gaps with respect to socioeconomic and political variables exist within voluntary electoral systems and that compulsory voting slightly diminishes these gaps in some cases (in particular with respect to the gap between older citizens and those younger than 66 years old), but that it does not eliminate them. In particular, compulsory voting seems to fulfill expectations with respect to variables related to the benefits of voting. The difference in electoral participation between those who identify with a party and those who do not is significant in voluntary voting systems. Compulsory voting seems to eliminate this gap, equalizing levels of turnout between both groups. I arrive at a similar conclusion with respect to campaigning: compulsory voting equalizes participation between those interested in the campaign and those who are not interested. However, this electoral rule does not equalize participation on the basis of variables related to civic duty. Actually, the coefficients for the interaction terms between support for democracy and compulsory voting and between system support and compulsory voting are positive and statistically significant in 2012, which is contrary to expectations. The coefficient for the interaction between internal efficacy and compulsory voting is negative and significant and it

indicates that compulsory voting withers the difference between those with high internal efficacy and those with low levels of efficacy in 2014 and 2012, but not in 2010.

Conclusions

I propose that individuals' decisions regarding whether to vote or not to vote are not only conditioned by individual characteristics, but also by institutional characteristics. In particular, I shed light on the effects of an electoral institution –compulsory voting- on individuals' voting behavior.

Conceptually, this electoral rule should not only increase participation, but it also should eliminate differences in electoral participation. The argument is straightforward: the more people participate, the more the electorate is representative of the voting age population. As Lijphart (1997) affirms "The democratic goal should be not just universal *suffrage* but universal or near-universal *turnout*" (2). Empirically, this argument implies that the determinants of turnout should lose power to explain participation under compulsory voting rules.

I have classified determinants of turnout in three groups, based on the elements of the rational calculus of voting. Socioeconomic characteristics belong to the costs of voting. I find that there are differences in participation among socioeconomic groups. However, these groups are also related to other dimension of the calculus of voting because age is correlated with levels of duty. The most dramatic difference is between young citizens and older citizens. Young citizens are significantly less likely to go to the polls, but I also find that this gap remains in both types of systems. This finding may be explained because young citizens do not have experience to navigate the complexities of the political world. Also, they have not had time to develop a

higher sense of civic duty. Because compulsory voting does not eliminate the difference between young and older citizens, this raises the question on how to incentivize young citizens to the polls. According to these results, penalties for not voting are not enough to change their decision towards voting. An alternative might be to incentivize this group via positive incentives, such as rewards for voting.

Further, older citizens are more likely to go to the polls in voluntary voting countries. Probably it is due to an elevated sense of duty and to the increasing cognitive resources to navigate the political landscape. These characteristics may exceed the costs involved in voting and the fact that voting is a low-benefit act and as a result they decide to go to the polls. This difference decreases in compulsory voting countries.

There are also political differences in participation. According to the rational calculus of voting, those who expect more benefits if their preferred candidate wins are more likely to go to the polls. These differences again should vanish in compulsory voting systems. Empirical results support this expectation. In voluntary voting countries, results indicate that partisans and those who campaigned for a candidate are more likely to vote, but these differences decrease in compulsory voting systems and vanish in countries with enforced sanctions. Changes between types of systems are high enough to be statistically significant. Thus, these results indicate that compulsory voting is effective at pushing those who do not expect much in the way of benefits from elections to the polls, elevating their turnout to levels similar to those observed for citizens more involved in the campaign.

Utilitarian calculations are not the only inducement to turn out. A group of people votes in search of intrinsic benefits, related to the internal satisfaction of fulfilling their civic duties.

Duty has been found to be a major predictor of turnout in voluntary voting systems and compulsory voting is expected to shrink the difference in participation between those who exhibit higher levels of duty and those who have lower levels of duty. Here I measure sense of duty using three indirect measures. Among these variables, support for democracy and internal efficacy are significant predictors of turnout in individual-level models. Compulsory voting does not reduce the differences in turnout by levels of support for democracy, but it increases the gap in 2012. It may indicate that compulsory voting is more effective at pushing to the polls those with high levels of support for democracy than those with low levels of support for democracy. Results for internal efficacy are in the expected direction in a hierarchical model in 2014 and 2012. In this case, compulsory voting reduces the gap between those with high levels of efficacy and those with low levels and it vanishes when it is enforced.

In conclusion, I have replicated a well-known finding in the literature: compulsory voting increases participation and it is more effective at doing so when sanctions are enforced. Further, compulsory voting partially fulfills its promises. It significantly reduces important political gaps in electoral participation; but it does not eliminate biases with respect to socioeconomic characteristics and civic-minded attitudes.

A potential avenue for future research is whether penalties for abstention interact with the determinants of the calculus of voting. The literature has suggested interactions between elements of the calculus of voting. For example, Blais (2000) discusses this idea when he runs models of voting for those with low levels of duty and those with high levels of duty. He concludes that, "*B*, *P*, and *C* do a much better job of explaining the vote among those with a weak sense of duty than among those who feel a strong moral obligation to vote" (102). Thus, because penalties for not voting introduce a new element in the calculus of voting (i.e., the cost

of abstention), it remains to be tested whether this cost affects more those with low levels of duty than those with a strong sense of civic duty, and how this relationship changes between types of electoral systems.

Countries with compulsory voting rules establish monetary fines and civic penalties. Potentially, monetary fees are more effective at diminishing socioeconomic gaps in electoral participation and civic penalties at diminishing gaps with respect to benefits or duty. Because countries introduce both types of penalties, this design cannot disentangle the single effect of each. Further, the literature has found that levels of monetary fines matter. Thus, an open question is whether differences in electoral participation remain because monetary fines are not high enough and if so, what would be the level of penalties to erase participatory gaps? This question opens a discussion whether penalties are the most efficient way to push citizens to the polls. The other side of the same coin is to think in rewards. The literature has discussed the role of prizes by draw among those who participate in an election (see a discussion in Kato 2008). Actually, some countries institute rewards for certain voters. Colombia, for example, offers discounts in tuition at public universities if students vote.

It also remains to be tested whether these conclusions are robust to the use of tailored variables to tap each of the components of the rational calculus of voting. In this chapter, I have used indirect measures (but standard in the literature) to gauge the costs, benefits, and the sense of duty. Moreover, some of this measures gauge more than one dimension of the calculus of voting (age and education, for instance). The use of tailored measures would give a better understanding of the behavior of the components of the calculus of voting under different electoral systems.

Finally, compulsory voting is far from being an atypical electoral institution. It is used in a significant number of countries in the world and it is particularly clustered in Latin America with varying flavors. In this chapter, I demonstrate that this electoral rule actually increases turnout, but it does not completely fulfill its promise of erasing gaps in electoral participation. Political scientists, politicians, and policy makers should think of additional or different measures to eliminate these gaps and to move countries closer to the ideal of full participation.

This chapter focuses on a potential positive impact of the implementation of compulsory voting: an equalization of electoral participation across socioeconomic and political groups in Latin America. However, the literature has also evaluated negative effects of the implementation of this rule. The next chapter introduces a new potential negative effect of compulsory voting: a decreased citizens' sense of duty.

CHAPTER IV

IV. SIDE EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY VOTING: THE CONSEQUENCES OF COERCION FOR CIVIC DUTY

Introduction

In his presidential address to the American Political Science Association, Lijphart (1997: 1) proposed compulsory voting as a solution to the problem of "unequal turnout that is systematically biased against less well-to-do citizens." The notion is that, by implementing compulsory voting, countries will increase turnout in elections and this in turn will mitigate one of the longstanding failures of democracy, namely, unequal electoral participation. At first glance, Lijphart's prescription for remedying this problem is supported by the empirical evidence; countries with compulsory voting exhibit higher levels of turnout than countries with voluntary voting. For example, Birch (2009) finds an average increase in turnout of 13.7 percentage points after the introduction of compulsory voting and Fornos, Power, and Garand (2004) show that in Latin American countries with compulsory voting, turnout is approximately 20 percentage points higher than in voluntary voting countries. However, the previous chapter shows that compulsory voting partially fulfills Lijphart´s expectations. That compulsory voting raises turnout is a well-established fact. But, looking beyond turnout, does it have second-order effects that may not be as positive?

Scholars have suggested and debated several second-order effects of compulsory voting at the individual and country levels. Some focus on the consequences for electoral outcomes: for

example, it is argued that compulsory voting pushes people to vote, those who otherwise would be less likely to engage and, because these individuals are systematically different from those who voluntarily vote, they are more likely to vote for certain candidates or parties, such as the left (Mackerras and McAllister 1999). Others focus on positive effects for the citizenry. On the one hand, it has been argued that individuals could feel pressure from a compulsory electoral rule to become more informed and to cast a valid ballot. However, the evidence is inconclusive (Loewen, Milner, and Hicks 2008) and some even suggesting a negative effect, perhaps because individuals may simply cast more blank and invalid ballots (Power and Roberts 1995). Another potential positive effect is the degree to which individuals have higher levels of satisfaction with democracy as a consequence of having been brought into the fold of the political community and electoral processes (Birch 2009).

In this chapter I draw attention to a distinct potential *negative* effect of compulsory voting: decreased sense of civic duty. Civic duty, for the purposes of this study, is an intrinsic, or subjective, motivation to turnout in elections. The argument I develop builds on and extends scholarship on the effects of external inducements (rewards and punishments) on individual performance and intrinsic motivation. Specifically, I argue that compulsory voting is likely to have a negative effect on civic duty. Moreover, I provide reasons to expect that this relationship is monotonic, such that the negative effect increases with the magnitude of enforcement.

Second, I assess whether some individuals are more sensitive to compulsory voting laws than others. To answer this question, I draw on research on authoritarianism to argue that those high in authoritarian predispositions are more sensitive to threats coming from the environment and in consequence experience the obligation to vote as a more severe coercion than people who score low in an authoritarian scale. As a result, I expect that those high in authoritarian

predispositions will show a steeper decline in levels of citizens' sense of duty than their non-authoritarians counterparts, when confronted with compulsory voting rules.

To test the general theoretical framework as well as these secondary expectations, I make use of data from an original experiment conducted in Peru in the summer of 2012 with a representative sample of adults from the metropolitan capital area (Lima). The experiment was embedded in a face-to-face survey of individuals' democratic attitudes, and the treatments took the form of primes regarding the levels of punishment for non-voting in Peru.

The empirical results provide support for expectations in some indicators: when people are reminded about both punishments, they show lower levels of civic duty in one indicator. Moreover, the effect is monotonic: the harsher the punishment, the lower the intrinsic motivation to vote in two indicators of duty. Authoritarians also exhibit higher levels of duty in two measures. And, finally, by one measure, those high in authoritarian predispositions exposed to the harsher treatment exhibit a decline in their intrinsic motivation to vote while those who are in the control condition show an increase in their levels of duty, but these results are not robust to alternative indicators of duty.

If compulsory voting decreases civic duty, this is important because it could lead us to erroneous conclusions about the condition of a political system. Turnout is a key indicator of democratic health, and because, in theory, democracy requires a willing public, declining civic duty may ultimately chip away at the public's interest in and support for more general democratic mechanisms. So, if citizens turn out to vote only because they are compelled by extrinsic motivation, and not because they are intrinsically motivated to participate, high levels of turnout in a country would not necessarily be a sign of a healthy polity, but could instead mask the opposite: a hollow democracy.

A Theoretical Framework Connecting Compulsory Voting to Civic Duty

Civic duty relates to an individual's belief that turning out to elections is a responsibility that should be met by democratic citizens, regardless of the nature of the ballot or race. The concept was introduced into political science to resolve a paradox: if citizens only consider their own self-interest with respect to the costs of voting, its benefits, and the likelihood of determining the electoral outcome, then rationally they should stay home. Yet, citizens do vote, and one reason may be that they are motivated to do so because of a sense of civic duty. As a subjective motivation to participate, civic duty bears some similarities to other intrinsic motivations that can be shaped by punishment and reward systems. In this section, I first expand on the conceptualization of civic duty, then apply insights from other disciplines to argue that compulsory voting laws should decrease the subjective motivation to turnout, and finally I posit that this effect will vary across types of individuals.

Conceptualizing Civic Duty

Civic duty provides an explanation for why individuals turn out to vote despite the low odds that their single vote will make a difference in an election. But, what is civic duty? Classic conceptions are found in work by Downs (1957) and Riker and Ordeshook (1968). In addressing the so-called paradox of voting, Riker and Ordeshook (1968) state that duty is related to the internal satisfaction of fulfilling one's civic responsibilities. They define duty as an intrinsic reward for the act of voting and being part of the political community, regardless of any

utilitarian benefit obtained. This definition is close to Downs' idea that people vote even when short-term considerations are negligible because they consider maintaining democracy a long-term interest. The notion is that, if citizens consider the act of voting to be an important feature to preserve democracy, they are higher in civic duty and will consequently be more likely to turn out to vote. In other words, citizens' opinion about the importance of voting to preserve democracy may be considered as one indicator of the broader concept of civic duty.

The introduction of the *D-term* into the rational calculus of voting has been criticized because "ethical concerns fit only obliquely into the rational choice tradition, where self-interest looms large" (Blais and Achen 2010: 4). In a strict sense, the expected benefits, the costs of turning out and the probability of casting a decisive vote are the rational/utilitarian parts of the equation. Conditional on the value of these components, a voter obtains consumption benefits from the act of voting. The addition of the sense of duty includes a non-utilitarian motivation into the equation, from which a voter gets psychological benefits.

In this chapter, I distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic parts of each component of the calculus of voting, depending if the locus of action is internal or external to the individual. For example, the cost term, a component of the utilitarian part of the equation, can be intrinsic, when it is related to the internal characteristics of an individual, for instance her socioeconomic status or her educational background. It is extrinsic when costs are not related to a citizen's characteristics. Seasonal factors, such as rain, have been found to affect turnout (Gomez, Hansford, and Krause 2007; Knack 1994; Rallings, Thrasher, and Borisyuk 2003). These are extrinsic costs to the individual. In the same line, Panagopoulos (2008) introduces the cost of not voting in compulsory voting systems. This cost is not related to an individual's characteristic but it is instituted by the state.

Expected benefits from voting can also be intrinsic. Downs (1957) conceptualizes the intrinsic voting benefit as the one a voter would gain if her preferred candidate wins rather than loses. Extrinsic benefits, for their part, are related to benefits that an external actor sets, such as when the state institutes a reward for the act of voting. There have been proposals to implement policies along these lines in the U.S. (Panagopoulos 2013b) and, in fact, Colombia institutes some rewards for certain voters if they go to the polls, for instance, a discount in tuition for university students. Vote buying efforts also yield a type of extrinsic benefits because an external actor (a party or candidate) determines and administers such bribes.

The non-utilitarian part of the calculus of voting can also be decomposed into an intrinsic and an extrinsic part. The extrinsic part is associated with the social consequences of voting, for example positive feelings of pride for voting and negative feelings of shame for not doing it. In this case, people vote because they want social approval and seek to be part of the political community and because they also want to avoid social disapproval. Hence, extrinsic motivations emerge from others' scrutiny, which generates individuals' positive or negative feelings. Under this conceptualization, it is a sense of civic duty at large that increases turnout, with the locus of action external to the individual (in the eyes of one's fellow citizens).

In turn, the intrinsic aspect of the non-utilitarian side of the equation relates to an internal satisfaction of fulfilling one's civic responsibilities. In this case, citizens cast a ballot because turning out comports with their internalized norms about how democratic citizens should behave, and they seek coherence between their actions and their values. In this case, they would not need others' evaluations to turn out at the polls, and so the locus of action is internal to the individual. In both cases, nonetheless, the act of voting is done regardless of any immediate utilitarian benefit. While conceptions of civic duty can vary, at their core they refer to the notion that

voting is driven by the individual satisfaction one receives from exercising the democratic right to participate in the electoral process.

In sum, I distinguish between a utilitarian and a non-utilitarian part of the calculus of voting. The costs, the expected benefits and the probability of casting a decisive vote are elements of the utilitarian side because they are related to the voters' narrowly defined self-interest. All these terms can be decomposed into an extrinsic and an intrinsic part, depending if the locus of action is on an external actor or on the voter. The non-utilitarian side of the equation includes the social pressures to vote –the extrinsic part- and the sense of duty –the intrinsic component.

Compulsion and Civic Duty

To the degree that civic duty, the intrinsic non-utilitarian part of the calculus of voting, reflects individuals' internalized compulsion to behave in a certain way (to turn out to vote), it accords with the more general concept of "intrinsic motivation". Scholars across multiple subfields have studied how external systems of punishment and reward affect both performance and intrinsic motivation toward that behavior. Given that compulsory voting establishes a set of punishments, it is important to consider how this type of rule affects civic duty. In other words, what is the link between rules governing rewards and punishments and motivation to participate in the electoral arena?

One conventional economic view says that incentives, either positive or negative, are desirable because they increase performance (expressed in an employee who completes more tasks in the workplace or in a student that does more homework in his school). Yet, this view has

been debated by research centered mostly in other disciplines, such as psychology, education, and management. Those lines of scholarship suggest that monetary incentives can have some negative side effects; specifically, they may decrease intrinsic motivation to perform an activity. Given that compulsory voting establishes a system of extrinsic incentives around punishment for non-voting, this raises the question: are there side effects for citizens' intrinsic motivation that stem from systems of penalization for not voting in compulsory voting countries?

In considering how these apply to civic duty, I propose that rewards and punishments are incentives cast by an external actor: a parent who wants to bribe his child, a teacher who wants to motivate students, a boss who wants to incentivize employees, or, as this chapter suggests, a state that wants to push voters to the polls through sanctions.[58] Each of these types of reward or punishment systems – that is, factors providing extrinsic motivations – carries the potential to affect the intrinsic motivation to perform an activity. In considering rewards, the balance of evidence supports the notion that tangible rewards issued contingent on performance *decrease* intrinsic motivation.[59]

When and why would this be the case? According to Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999), some rewards work as controllers of behavior while others provide indicators of competence: monetary incentives are in the first group and verbal incentives in the second one. When people experience rewards as controllers, they feel a change in the locus of control from themselves to

[58] Panagopoulos (2008) proposes that sanctions in compulsory voting systems affect costs, introducing a cost of abstention. Rewards for voting, in turn, can be considered part of the benefits. Both, however, are extrinsic motivations. As the literature discusses, extrinsic motivations may interact with intrinsic motivations: an effect that is called *crowding out*.

[59] Considering rewards, Deci (1971)'s seminal work on the subject finds that tangible motivations – monetary rewards – negatively affect intrinsic motivation and that non-tangible rewards –reinforcement, verbal praise and social approval- increase intrinsic motivation. Since then, scholars have distinguished many other types of rewards, for example expected/unexpected or contingent/non-contingent, and have evaluated the effect of them on intrinsic motivation (Lepper, Greene, and Nisbett 1973; Podsakoff et al. 1984; Podsakoff, Todor, and Skov 1982). While much of that research finds inconclusive results with respect to the effects of these reward types on intrinsic motivation, Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999) examine findings in the literature in a meta-analysis of hundreds of studies and find support for Deci's original core expectation.

another and consequently rewards affect their perceived self-determination and competence. On the contrary, when people take rewards as positive feedback about their performance, they tend to increase feelings of self-determination and competence. Bénabou and Tirole (2003) offer an alternative explanation. They argue that decision makers in an uncertain context take rewards as signals; they infer that they will not enjoy the task because they are paid for doing it and hence they will be less motivated to do the task.

It is an open and debated question whether rewards and punishments are two sides of the same coin, whether both increase performance, and whether both decrease motivation. Compulsory voting is an electoral rule that establishes, not a reward, but a punishment. This punishment is issued contingent on whether the individual votes and it is tangible; as such, it contains the same types of contingency and tangibility factors identified as relevant to other studies of the effects of reward and punishment systems on intrinsic motivations. If a voting-age citizen does not vote –which, in this context, can be considered failing to perform well, the state institutes a contingent penalty: a monetary fee or civic penalties (e.g., loss of a right to get a passport or to cash check in banks). Deci and Cascio (1972) in fact find that threats of punishments work as controllers of behavior –they weaken feelings of competence and self-determination- and therefore affect intrinsic motivation. However, these results have been disputed. For example, Podsakoff, Todor, and Skov (1982) find that punishments do not affect performance and satisfaction in the work place and Atwater and Lau (1997) say that research on the impact of contingent punishments on recipients' behavior is not conclusive. Other interpretation suggests that fees may undermine prosocial behavior because they reduce the extent to which engaging in this kind of behavior signals being a good and altruistic citizen and thus monetary fees can reduce the citizens' willingness and motivation to do good (Kamenica

2012). Fines can also have unintended consequences because they change a behavior from the realm of social norms to the realm of market exchanges. For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) find that when a fine is instituted, parents are more likely to arrive late for picking up their kids at school. The argument is that monetizing the penalty legitimizes the behavior and makes it easier to swallow than some hazier social norm. Applying this argument to the subject at hand, I consider that the institution of a fine for not voting could be perceived to cheapen democracy because it changes a prosocial behavior to a market exchange, reducing a glorious belief in the preservation of democracy to paying a fine.

In this chapter, I evaluate whether the threat of punishment established by compulsory voting affects citizens' intrinsic motivation to vote. Prior attempts by political scientists to examine external incentives and the vote are mostly non-existent, though an exception is novel work by Panagopoulos (2013a), who assesses the effects of tangible rewards (monetary) on electoral behavior.[60]

Panagopoulos endorses the idea that extrinsic incentives can depress intrinsic motivation. To test this expectation, he conducted an experiment that randomly assigned potential voters to receive either a postcard with a simple reminder to vote or an offer to receive a financial reward in exchange of participation in elections. He finds no significant effects on turnout and concludes that "a striking implication of the results I report is that, even when successful, monetary rewards do not appear to be notably effective in stimulating voting than many other types of interventions" (278). The study is innovative, but it does not observe intrinsic motivation, only its net effect on performance. This tendency to use the same construct to capture both motivation

[60] Other recent work that has commonalities with the ideas in this chapter includes that by Singh (2014), who tests whether punishments in compulsory voting countries lead to a higher gap between 'democrats' and 'anti-democrats' in their levels of satisfaction with democracy. He mentions the effect of punishments on intrinsic motivation and argues that it leads also to a diminished trust in the legitimacy of the coercer, especially for those negatively predisposed towards democracy.

and performance is common in research in psychology and economics. For example, Deci tests his hypothesis using an activity that is intended to be interesting for subjects –solving puzzles- so they may feel intrinsically motivated to do it. He measures intrinsic motivation by performance – the number of puzzles solved- because both are highly correlated. However, research on activities that are not often intrinsically motivating requires distinguishing between performance and intrinsic motivation. In a review of the literature and findings, Kamenica (2012) differentiates, for example, between paying for an inherently interesting task and paying for prosocial behavior. Further, Podsakoff et al. (1984) explore the workplace and discern between subordinates' performance and satisfaction. They mention that when a manager incentivizes a group of workers, they may respond by increasing their performance (the amount of job done), but decreasing their satisfaction with the job (an attitude more closely related to intrinsic motivation), especially when punishments are set.

Voting can be understood as an intrinsically motivated behavior. If so, performance and motivation would both be highly correlated and changes in performance indicate also changes in motivation. However, voting can also be seen as an activity that citizens do not necessarily enjoy because they would prefer to spend their time in other activities. As such, the difference between participation and motivation is theoretically discernible.

Thus, in the realm of voting, performance and intrinsic motivation are better understood and measured as two distinct constructs. In fact, this distinction comprises the core of my argument: under compulsory voting, voters may increase in "performance" by turning out at higher levels at the polls, but at the same time they may be less intrinsically motivated to do so. This implies that intrinsic motivation cannot be only measured as turnout since demotivated

people may go to vote for other reasons (especially in compulsory voting countries, but also in non-compulsory systems where social pressures or other forces may induce turnout).

In sum, I argue that the concept of motivation in the literature of rewards and punishments is similar to the concept of sense of duty in the literature of the calculus of voting. A review of the literature of rewards and punishment indicates that tangible punishments issued contingent on performance decrease intrinsic motivation. Given that the state institutes this type of punishment over non-voters in compulsory voting systems, I hypothesize that punishments for not voting increase performance expressed by more people going to the polls, but they can decrease citizens' intrinsic sense of duty to vote. Given that civic duty can be assessed along several different dimensions, I further consider that the threat of punishment for not voting is consequential for a variety of indicators of duty. Generally speaking, the expectation is as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Citizens exposed to reminders of penalties for not voting will present on average lower levels of intrinsic motivation to vote than citizens not exposed to such reminders.

Monotonicity of the Effect of Compulsory Voting

When punishments are more severe, I expect to observe a greater decline in the intrinsic motivation. Thus, I propose that contingent punishments and motivation show a monotonic negative relationship. Panagopoulos (2013a) tests the effects of different levels of monetary incentives on voters' performance and finds a linear but non-substantive effect. Singh (2014) also tests for different levels of compulsion and finds a linear, but not perfect, relationship between

penalties and the probability of being not satisfied with democracy. Here, I test whether levels of punishments display a linear relationship not with performance, but with motivation.

Hypothesis 2: Citizens exposed to reminders of higher penalties will report lower levels of intrinsic motivation to vote than citizens exposed to reminders of lower penalties.

High Authoritarians are More Sensitive to the Negative Effects of Compulsory Voting

Classic works define authoritarianism as a predisposition according to which individuals need little situational pressure to submit to authority (Altemeyer 1996). This predisposition maps onto a dimension from extreme authoritarianism to extreme libertarianism (Stenner 2005). Individuals on the authoritarian side are more likely to "escape from freedom", in Fromm's words, and to obey and conform to authorities to restore order and security disrupted by normative threats. Further, certain values characterize authoritarian individuals. For example, "authoritarians stress values of self-denial, strong group loyalties, serving others, and putting group interests ahead of one's own, finding fulfillment in work and doing what is right, and adherence to strict moral codes" (Flanagan and Lee 2003: 238). Actually, research has found that right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is positively correlated with a measure of duty because a RWA person is "someone who is keen to follow the instructions of those in positions of power and influence" (Heaven and Bucci 2001: 55). Because voting is understood as doing what is right and it involves privileging group interests more than self-interest, then people who score high in an authoritarian scale should be also more likely to consider voting as a duty.

Hypothesis 3: Citizens who score high in an authoritarian scale will present on average higher levels of intrinsic motivation to vote.

Finally, I inspect whether the effect of compulsory voting varies by types of subject. The literature on rewards and punishments has not distinguished if this effect varies by type of recipient. Research in this field basically divides the world in two groups: those who establish rewards and punishments (parents, teachers, employers) and those who receive incentives (children, students, employees). But, another line of research in political psychology suggests an important division within the second group, by which individuals differ in their sensitivity to threats. Sidman (1989, cited in Singh 2014) argues that the effects of coercive mechanisms on attitudes and behaviors depend on subjects' orientations toward the system and that these effects are most pronounced for those who are negatively oriented toward the coercer. If so, distinct types of citizens may experience rewards and punishments differently. In this chapter, I propose that the effect of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic motivation varies by authoritarianism, such that more authoritarian citizens, by virtue of being more sensitive to these threats, experience an exacerbated decline in their levels of motivation when threatened with punishment.

The relationship between threats and authoritarianism has been amply documented (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Lavine, Lodge, and Freitas 2005). This line of research, mostly in political psychology, has found that those who score high on certain authoritarian measures are particularly sensitive to threats coming from the environment. Feldman and Stenner (1997) demonstrate that threats activate authoritarian predispositions and these predispositions then result in higher expressed authoritarian attitudes, such as negative attitudes toward minority groups (see also Merolla and Zechmeister 2009; Stenner 2005). This line of research suggests that threats generate a gap between authoritarians and non-authoritarians in their opinions about sensitive issues. However, this line of argument is not undisputed. In fact, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) find support for the opposite relationship. They find that changes over time in

expressed authoritarianism are due to changing preferences of those who score lower in authoritarian predispositions.

In the electoral field, Lavine et al. (1999) determine that authoritarian personalities are more likely to see a threat message (negative consequences of failing to vote) as having more quality –measured by how convincing and persuasive a massage was- than a reward message (positive benefits of voting). Therefore, if compulsory voting works as a threat message, it is possible that citizens who score high in authoritarianism will perceive this negative message stronger in quality (more convincing and persuasive) and so the detrimental effect on their intrinsic motivation may be amplified.

Another expectation, however, is plausible. Citizens who score high in authoritarianism may see the state as a proper legal authority and therefore they may be more likely to conform to messages from this agent, even threat messages. Extant scholarship tends to focus on threats external to the individual's own government. In this case the threat is coming from the same authority and so the imposition of an obligation to vote might not be perceived as a threat message, rather it might be understood as a message from an authority that authoritarians should follow. As a result, a threat messages from the state may reinforce the compliance with social norms among authoritarians and so they may exhibit higher levels of duty.

While recognizing that empirical research on authoritarians' reactions to threat has produced mixed findings and there are competing interpretations, I hypothesize a higher decline in intrinsic motivation among authoritarians than among non-authoritarians when considering for whom compulsory voting is made salient.

Hypothesis 4: Authoritarians exposed to reminders of penalties for not voting will display a higher decline in their levels of intrinsic motivation than non-authoritarian citizens.

Data and Measurement

The data used in this chapter to test these hypotheses come from a survey carried out in Lima, Peru –a country with compulsory voting with varying types of enforcement, in which 760 voting-age citizens were selected using a complex sample design representative of the capital city and were interviewed face to face. Peru is a country that established compulsory voting in 1931 when congressmen proposed the obligation to vote and dictated sanctions for those who do not vote. Presently several Latin American countries mention compulsory voting in their constitutions or electoral codes; however not all implement mechanisms to enforce this rule. Peru not only is part of the group of those countries that implement sanctions, but also is one of the countries with the harsher sanctions in the region. In Peru, this rule applies for national and subnational elections, for electing the president, members of the congress and subnational executives. Also, the electoral law specifies civic penalties: if a citizen does not pay the fine, she is not allowed to do several official acts like renew a passport or get access to some social services. The author of this dissertation has in fact personally experienced this penalty: while living out of the country I failed to vote twice in Peru and, for each time, I had to pay a fine of around U.S. $25 before being allowed to renew my passport.

In this survey in Peru, I introduced an experiment in which I randomly assigned subjects to one of three different messages, intending to prime the consequences of not voting: a reminder of receiving a monetary fee (N=189)[61], a reminder of receiving civic penalties (N=190)[62], or a

[61] This treatment was worded as follow: "The following questions are about voting. Please remember that voting in Peru is compulsory and if you do not vote in an election, you would be subject to a fine of S/ 72 ($ 25)."

reminder of both types of penalties (N=193).[63] The control group (N=188)[64] did not receive a reminder of the enforcement. After treatment, respondents were asked questions about whether voting is a choice or a duty and a battery of standard questions to measure duty.

A potential concern of this design is that citizens may be aware of the penalties for not voting before treatment. León (2011) finds that citizens in Lima overestimate a perceived fine (126.5 soles) close to the fine before the Peru's electoral reform in 2006 (144 soles), but far from current level (72 soles). Hence, when treatments remind citizens that present fine is 72 soles, they may be reducing citizens' perceived fine. However, this design is not only intended to test different levels of fines, but to place fines at the top of citizens' minds, because penalizations for not voting are barely salient in non-electoral times. Thus, after treatments, citizens may have reduced their expected level of fines, but penalties are salient in their minds. Because levels of fines are the same for all citizens living in Lima, I could not prime different amounts, but I varied intensity by priming monetary fines, civic restrictions for not voting, or both types of penalties. Finally, experimenting with the salience of electoral rules is an option to get causal estimates, due to the difficulty of randomizing electoral rules in practice.

The key dependent variable in this project is an index similar to one developed by Blais and Achen (2010) based on two related question about duty. The first question asked respondents whether voting is first and foremost a duty or a choice. If they respond duty, then the second question asks respondents to evaluate how strongly they feel that voting is a duty, from not very

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[62] This treatment was worded as follow: "The following questions are about voting. Please remember that voting in Peru is compulsory and if you do not vote in an election, you would not be allowed to use some state services such as getting or renewing a passport or cash checks in banks."
[63] This treatment was worded as follow: "The following questions are about voting. Please remember that voting in Peru is compulsory and if you do not vote, you would be subject to a fine of S/. 72 and you would not be allowed to use some state services such as getting or renewing a passport or cash checks in banks."
[64] The control was worded as follow: "The following questions are about voting."

strongly to somewhat strongly and very strongly.[65] I combined these two questions to create an index called 'Levels of duty' that goes from 0, which means voting is a choice, to 3, which means that voting is a strong duty. The average duty is 2 and the standard deviation is 1. This measure tries to offer an alternative positive view of voting as a duty. The "non-duty" option (voting as a choice) is linked with the freedom to exercise the right to vote or the right not to vote. So, if one option is related to choice, the duty option is related to a moral obligation to vote. However, I recognize that this measure was developed for a voluntary voting setting. In countries with compulsory voting, individuals may think about "duty" (*deber* in Spanish) as the legal coercion to vote. To deal with this possibility, I use alternative measures of duty.

The questionnaire includes a battery to tap duty from several angles using standard questions in the literature. It includes a question to gauge the importance of voting to preserve democracy. This variable taps into Downs' idea that citizens may vote in order to maintain democracy, as a long-term benefit. Further, this battery also includes a question to measure if a respondent feels guilty if she does not vote, if a respondent thinks her vote is not important because many people vote, if a respondent thinks a person who does not care an election should not vote, and if a respondent thinks it is not important to vote when her candidate does not have a chance to win.[66] All these questions were asked with response options on a 1-7 agree/disagree

[65] The dependent variable was built from two questions. The first was: "DUTY1. Different people feel differently about voting. For some, voting is a DUTY. They feel that they should vote in every election however they feel about the candidates and parties. For other, voting is a CHOICE. They feel free to vote in an election depending on how they feel about the candidates and parties. For you personally, voting is FIRST and FOREMOST a: 1) Duty, 2) Choice, 3) Not sure, 88) DK, 99) DA." The second question was worded as follow: "DUTY1b. [If respondent chose "duty"] How strongly do you feel personally that voting is a duty? 1) Very strongly, 2) Somewhat strongly, 3) Not very strongly, 88) DK, 99) DA."

[66] The questions are worded as follow: "Using the following scale, where 1 means "strongly disagree" and 7 means "strongly agree", to what extend do you agree or disagree the following statements. DUTY2. In order to preserve democracy, it is important you vote." DUTY3. "If I didn't vote, I'd feel guilty." DUTY4. "So many people vote that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not." DUTY5. "If a person doesn't care how an election comes out he shouldn't vote in it." And DUTY6. "It isn't important to vote when your candidate or party doesn't have a chance to win."

scale and they were rescaled so higher values indicate higher levels of duty. A factor analysis of these five variables yields two factors.[67] The first factor includes two questions: importance of voting to preserve democracy and if a respondent does not vote, she feels guilty. Looking at the wordings of the questions, the first factor includes questions related to citizens' values or feelings. The question about the importance of voting to preserve democracy is related to citizens' democratic values. If a citizen is high in democratic values, she probably expresses higher allegiance to the political system and so she would consider greater values in this question. The question about feeling guilty for not voting is related to citizens' feelings of shame and pride for the act of voting. I combined these two questions to create an index called 'Duty as values and feelings.'

The second factor includes the remaining three variables. It comprises questions related to negative incentives for voting: too many people voting that my vote is irrelevant, citizens' lack of interest, or low options of being in the winner side. If a person responds that she strongly disagrees with these statements, it indicates that she values the act of voting despite these barriers and negative incentives, and so it may indicate that she is high in duty. I create an index as the mean value of these three variables and it is called 'Duty as overcoming of barriers.' While both dimensions map onto the definition of sense of duty, it seems that the first factor is capturing elements closer related to the intrinsic motivation to vote, the one closer to internal values and feelings.

Following Feldman and Stenner (1997), I measure authoritarian predispositions with three questions that ask about child-rearing values (whether a child must obey his parents, whether a child must respect the elderly, and whether a child must have good manners). I

[67] See Appendix 8 for results of factor analysis.

combine these three questions to build an index that goes from 0 to 3 where higher values indicate more authoritarian predispositions.[68] This index has a mean of 2.5 and standard deviation of 0.77.

In the dataset, there were no differences across experimental conditions in age, proportion of women, educational level, self-placement in the left-right scale, proportion of Catholics, party identification, evaluation of the performance of the president, and proportion who think democracy is preferable, all of which was verified by separate t-tests.[69] In other words, post-study diagnostics reveal that the four conditions (three treatment and one control groups) are balanced on average on these variables. However, the control condition contains more affluent people (6.73) than the combined treatments conditions (6.36) and this difference, though small, (0.37 on a 0-10 scale of income) is statistically significant. However, a significant number of respondents (140) do not answer the income question and consequently when I include income as a control, models lose observations. To prevent this issue, I set those who refused to answer at the mean of income and I include a dummy to control for those who refused to report their income. Also, the control condition has people with lower authoritarian predispositions (2.42) than the treatment conditions (2.59) and the difference (0.17 on a 0-3 scale) is statistically significant as well. In what follows, I present analyses with controls for these imbalances.

Analyses and Results

[68] To assess the internal consistency of this index, I determined the Cronbach's Alpha=0.61. This indicates a moderate degree of consistency.
[69] See Appendix 9 for full results of balance check.

The following analyses examine whether reminders of penalties for not voting decrease citizens' sense of duty and whether this decrease is monotonic with the intensity of the threat. Table IV.1 presents the results for OLS models using the respondents' three indicators of duty as dependent variables and dummies for each treatment group: monetary fees, civic penalties, and fees and civic penalties. The control condition is the baseline category. Additionally I include controls for income and authoritarian predispositions.[70] The incorporation of authoritarian predispositions also helps to test hypothesis 3. I use one-tailed tests in the following analyses because all hypotheses are uni-directional and such an approach is conventional in experimental research (see Kam and Utych 2011).

First, I examine the results for levels of duty in models 1, 2 and 3 for testing hypotheses 1 and 2. In the control condition, the average level of duty is 2.07. Those exposed to threats of punishments exhibit lower levels of duty, as the negative signs indicate; and the value on duty decreases monotonically with the severity of the penalty, from the reminder of monetary fees to civic penalties and both. Those exposed to the reminder of the harshest penalty -fees plus civic penalties- score 0.15 points lower on average on the duty index than those in the control condition. This difference represents a modest but statistically significant decrease of 7% at one-tailed $p<0.09$.

In examining the effect of treatments on the duty as values and feelings and duty as overcoming of barriers in models 2 and 3, those in the treatment groups show lower levels of duty on average compared to those in the control group. In model 2, using the duty as values and feelings, coefficients decrease monotonically with the severity of the punishment, so those exposed to the more severe threat score 0.15 points lower on average than those in the control

[70] The first dependent variable is not strictly continuous variables. I have used OLS models for ease of interpretation, but I have also run these models using ordered logit models that deal with ordinal dependent variables, such as levels of duty (0-3). Results are substantively similar. See Appendix 10 for results.

condition, though this difference is significant only at a generous level (one-tailed p=0.11). In model 3, using duty as overcoming of barriers, the coefficient of a reminder of monetary fees and civic penalties are both positive, which is contrary to expectations, but they are not significant. The sign of the coefficient of a reminder of both types of penalties is negative, but this coefficient does not reach standard levels of significance.

Thus, in considering H1 and H2, these results provide some support for expectations. They indicate that when citizens are reminded about penalties for not voting, they experience a decline in different indicators of duty. Also, they suggest that when penalties are more severe, citizens experience an even higher decline, as the sign and magnitude of the coefficients indicate; however, they are not statistically significant at conventional levels, except for the more severe treatment in model 1.

Authoritarian predispositions are positive and statistically significant in model 1 and 2. These results indicate that individuals who score high in authoritarianism are also higher in duty. This conclusion provides support for H3 and accords with the literature on authoritarianism that concludes that authoritarian people are more likely to follow social norms, for example voting in this case. Income is also positive and statistically significant. It means that more affluent people display higher levels of duty, as measured by these indicators. Finally, those who refused to report their income display lower levels of duty.

Table IV.1. Analyses of Reminders of Punishments on Indicators of Duty

Variables	Level of duty	Duty as values and feelings	Duty as overcoming of barriers
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Reminder of monetary fee	-0.06	-0.03	0.07
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Reminder of civic penalties	-0.09	-0.07	0.001
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Reminder of monetary fee and civic penalties	-0.15*	-0.15	-0.002
	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.15)
Income	0.04*	0.10*	0.18*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Authoritarian predispositions	0.15*	0.23*	0.08
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Refused income	-0.25*	-0.11	-0.64*
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Constant	1.53*	4.46*	3.81*
	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.32)
Prob>F	0.003	0.00	0.00
N	691	701	691

Table entry is the OLS coefficient with standard error below.
*p<0.1, one-tailed

The following figures show the fitted values of duty with 90% confidence interval of the prediction by treatment for each model. According to these figures, results for model 1 show a monotonic decline. As penalties are more severe, we observe a higher decline in levels of duty. Model 2 does not show this decline, but those exposed to reminders of both penalties experience a significant decline in their levels of duty. Results for model 3 do not show a clear pattern.



Figure IV.1. Predicted Values for Levels of Duty and Importance of Voting by Treatments and Authoritarianism

I next examine Hypothesis 4, which states that the effect of reminders of punishments will be higher for authoritarians. To test this hypothesis, I interact each dummy for treatment groups with the variable that taps respondents' authoritarian predispositions. Recall that the authoritarian variable goes from 0 to 3, where higher values indicate more authoritarianism and that authoritarianism is positively correlated with duty. The models also include income and those who refuse to report income as controls.

Results for levels of duty in Model 4 show that coefficients for treatments and interactions are not statistically significant. The authoritarian predispositions index is positive

and significant. It indicates that authoritarians have on average higher levels of duty, as previous models also show.

Model 5 shows positive coefficients for reminders of penalties and negative coefficients for the interaction terms. The reminder of monetary and civic penalties is statistically significant and it indicates that people who is reminded both penalties display higher levels of duty (duty as values and feelings) when authoritarianism is zero. The interactions for civic penalties and both penalties are negative and statistically significant. Because coefficients for treatments are positive, a negative interaction indicates that treatments decrease the gap between those in the treatment condition and those in the control group when authoritarianism increases.

Model 6 mirrors, in the opposite direction, Model 5. In this case, the coefficient of reminders of both penalties is negative and statistically significant. This means that this treatment reduces levels of duty (duty as overcoming of barriers) when authoritarianism is at its minimum. The interaction for this treatment is positive and statistically significant. The combined effect of both coefficients indicates that the gap between individuals in the control group and those in the treatment group reduces when authoritarianism increases.

Table IV.2. Analyses of Reminders of Punishments and Authoritarianism on Indicators of Duty

Variables	Level of duty (4)	Duty as values and feelings (5)	Duty as overcoming of barriers (6)
Reminder of monetary fee	-0.32	0.16	-0.29
	(0.36)	(0.43)	(0.51)
Reminder of civic penalties	-0.28	0.47	-0.52
	(0.35)	(0.42)	(0.50)
Reminder of monetary fee and civic penalties	0.01	0.86*	-0.67*
	(0.37)	(0.43)	(0.51)
Authoritarian predispositions	0.12*	0.40*	-0.06*
	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Reminder of monetary fee x Authoritarian predispositions	0.10	-0.08	0.15
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.19)
Reminder of civic penalties x Authoritarian predispositions	0.07	-0.22*	0.21
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.19)
Reminder of both penalties x Authoritarian predispositions	-0.06	-0.40*	0.27*
	(0.14)	(0.16)	(0.19)
Income	0.04*	0.11*	0.18*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Refused income	-0.25*	-0.13	-0.62*
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.15)
Constant	1.58*	4.02*	4.18*
	(0.29)	(0.35)	(0.42)
Prob>F	0.01	0.00	0.00
N	691	701	691

Table entry is the OLS coefficient with standard error below.
*p<0.1, one-tailed

In order to analyze differences between those who score high and those who score low in authoritarians for each treatment, Figure IV.2 shows predicted values of indicators of duty by treatments and authoritarianism for the cases where I find statistically significant coefficients in Table IV.2. The first figure plots the interaction between reminders of both penalties in Model 5, the one using duty as values and feelings as dependent variable. The second figure shows the same for Model 6, the one using duty as overcoming of barriers as dependent variable.



Figure IV.2. Predicted Values for Levels of Duty and Importance of Voting by Treatments and Authoritarianism

These results are inconclusive. The first figure shows a declining gap when authoritarianism increases for low values of authoritarianism. Actually, when authoritarianism is higher than 2, results are as expected. In this area, individuals in the treatment condition exhibit lower levels of duty than individual in the control condition. Further, authoritarianism is positively correlated with duty for citizens in the control condition, but it is negatively correlated for people in the treatment condition. This finding would provide some support for H4.

However, the second figure shows the opposite conclusion. In this figure, those in the control condition score higher in levels of duty than people in the treatment condition when

authoritarianism is low and this line is almost flat indicating that those in the control condition do not change much with authoritarianism. Those in the treatment conditions exhibit changes. When authoritarianism increases, they show higher levels of duty and when it is higher than 2.5, they show higher levels of duty than those in the control condition.

In sum, results indicate that, on average, levels of duty decrease with the harsher penalty and they also fall monotonically with reminders of penalties for two indicators of duty. I have manipulated levels of penalties distinguishing between monetary fees and civic penalties. Probably, monetary fees and civic penalties do not work on their own because actually both are jointly applied in Peru. So, people may not respond when only one is mentioned, but when both are primed. However, the distinction between monetary fees and civic penalties seems to work for monotonicity looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, though they are not statistically significant.

These results, however, mask differences between high authoritarians and low authoritarians. Because high authoritarians are a majority of the sample (68.7%), the analysis should focus on the region above the mean (2.5) in Table IV.2. In this area, results are in the expected direction for the first index of duty as values and feelings, the one that also exhibit a monotonic decline with levels of penalties: duty increases with authoritarianism for those in the control condition, but it decreases for those in the treatment condition. I would conclude that high authoritarians are more sensitive to the threat and so they respond to the treatment and their levels of duty decrease. However, results for the second index of duty as overcoming of barriers show the opposite conclusion for high authoritarians. In this case, individuals in the treatment condition increase their levels of duty, while those in the control condition do not change. In balance, results are not conclusive.

I also find that those higher in authoritarianism exhibit higher values of duty. These results may indicate that authoritarian citizens see voting as a higher duty because they consider that state as a proper authority and so they should conform from its mandates. If it were the case, then these citizens face two conflicting messages; one in which the message –the fine for not voting- is a threat, and the other in which the message comes from a proper authority. This ambiguity may explain disagreeing results on the interaction between treatments and authoritarianism in Table IV.2.

Summary and Conclusions

Participation is a key component of a modern democracy. Freedom House, for example, includes the right to vote for distinct alternatives in competitive elections as one criterion for building its index. Because electoral participation is normatively desirable for a democracy, compulsory voting has been proposed as a rule to increase citizens' levels of engagement with electoral politics. The direct effectiveness of such a rule is supported by ample evidence of higher levels of turnout in compulsory systems, but supporters of this electoral rule and lawmakers have not considered that mandatory voting might also have some side effects that can be counterproductive to the initial expectations of its advocates. This chapter goes beyond the direct effect of compulsory voting: the increasing levels of turnout –a positive quantitative effect, and evaluates a potential side effect of compulsory voting: a decrease in citizens' intrinsic motivation to turn out –a negative qualitative effect.

Electoral rules set positive and negative incentives for citizens' participation. In this case, compulsory voting establishes extrinsic tangible negative incentives: a threat of punishment. In

line with the psychological view that proposes that extrinsic motivations, such as punishments, deteriorate intrinsic motivation, this analysis finds that when citizens are primed with reminders of both types of punishments, they experience a decline in in one indicator of the intrinsic sense of duty. In his seminal piece, Deci (1971) finds that monetary rewards affect the intrinsic motivation to perform an activity. Further, Deci and Cascio (1972) use threats of punishments and find parallel results. In this chapter, I apply this idea to the electoral context in countries with compulsory voting in which voters experience a threat of punishment if they do not vote and I find evidence in support of expectations at the margins. Thus, these results provide somewhat support for Deci's findings about the detrimental effect of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic motivation in a different setting. However, one question remains open: are rewards and punishments two sides of the same coin in the electoral context? Colombia, for example, provides an example of a country that incentivizes some groups of citizens with rewards for voting. So, an avenue for future research would be to test whether extrinsic tangible positive incentives also affect citizens' intrinsic motivation to vote. According to Podsakoff et al. (1984), I would expect to find even stronger results for the effect of contingent rewards on performance and satisfaction; I mean a significant increase in performance: those who are entitled of the benefits would exhibit higher levels of turnout, but a relevant decrease in levels of duty due to rewards: those who vote mobilized by incentives would show lower levels of intrinsic motivation. These hypotheses remain to be tested.

I also find that a drop in motivation brought about by the threats associated with compulsory voting is confined among those who express higher authoritarian predispositions, measured through child-rearing values, in one indicator of duty. Unfortunately, results for the

other indicator of duty do not corroborate this finding and so these results are similar to mixed empirical evidence on the relationships between authoritarian predispositions and threats.

Compulsory voting is far from being a societal threat, but one view may see it as an intimidation that might trigger some levels of anxiety on voters, particularly among those more sensitive to this type of threats –authoritarian citizens. If it is the case, a reminder of penalties in compulsory voting systems may generate more anxiety and so it may decrease authoritarians' motivation to vote. Other view may see compulsory voting as a rule established by a proper authority that an authoritarian person must follow. If it is the case, a reminder of this rule may generate more submission with the authority and trigger elevated adherence to this social norm, increasing authoritarians' sense of duty. Mixed results in this chapter may be due to the ambiguous message from the state, which sends a threat message –a fine if a citizen does not vote, but at the same time the state may be considered a proper authority that authoritarians should conform and so its message may increase adherence to the social norm of voting. Results in this chapter cannot distinguish between these two options.

In sum, previous research has found that a sense of duty has a great influence on turnout and that elevated levels of sense of duty is a desirable trait of democratic citizens. Thus, a declining motivation in compulsory voting systems is unwanted because it may mask a flawed democracy as a healthy one. High levels of electoral participation would not indicate engaged citizens, but coerced citizens, who, according to these findings, are more likely to be disengaged about the electoral process and the democratic system. Hence, compulsory voting increases the number of people going to the polls, but at the same time, it might trigger harmful side effects on citizens' motivation, and as a result, this electoral rule leads to higher turnout, but the electorate might contain mostly unmotivated citizens.

CHAPTER V

V. CONCLUSION: AN ASSESSMENT OF COMPULSORY VOTING

This project has emphasized the fact that compulsory voting has not been studied as much as it deserves and so its possibilities and consequences have been rather unclear. Millions of citizens are under the compulsion to vote in the world. According to IDEA International, 13% of countries in the world have this electoral rule; the largest proportion is found in Latin America. In fact, the biggest country having a compulsory voting rule is Brazil, where more than 150 million voting-age people are compelled to the polls election after election by the threat of punishment.[71] In spite of the prevalence of compulsory voting, there has been comparatively little scholarship on the topic and it has yielded ambiguous empirical evidence with respect to the supposed positive and negative consequences of this electoral rule, making it difficult to make a reasonable evaluation of compulsory voting.

The main goal of this dissertation has been to offer scientific responses to three research questions that I consider relevant to understand this electoral rule in Latin American democracies. The first question I addressed was: (1) What are the factors that explain the origins of this electoral rule in this region? Subsequently, I answered the following question: (2) Is compulsory voting vanishing the gaps in electoral participation? Finally, I responded to a third question: (3) Does compulsory voting have second-order effects on levels of citizens' sense of duty? In this chapter, I offer a summary and a discussion of the dissertation's most relevant theoretical postulates and empirical findings regarding these questions.

[71] See: http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=30#pres.

The Nature of Voting

To vote or not to vote is an individual decision of private citizens, but the result of citizens' individual decisions is a collective good: the selection of a government and its authorities. This characteristic motivates two debates: one is related to whether voting is a right or a duty and the other is related to the aggregation of individual decisions and the problem of free riding. The first debate involves a discussion about two values to be stressed in a democratic polity. On the one side, those who view voting as a right emphasize liberty and free will. On the other, those who view voting as a duty stress representation, legitimacy and participation. I discussed these issues in the Chapter I of this dissertation and here I present a summary and an evaluation.

A democratic society usually compels citizens to follow social norms. In small societies, some social norms may be enforced via societal pressures, for example shame and pride mechanisms. In a mass society, however, these mechanisms do not work in the same way. They are not enough to guarantee the fulfillment of important social norms, such as the participation in the political life. Thus, mass societies need to enforce collective norms in the form of legal regulations. For example, state agencies require every newborn to be registered. As Birch (2009) says, compulsory voting is one among many of such regulations to enforce social norms. Lijphart (1997) adds that compulsory voting means a small decrease in freedom in exchange of solving a problem of collective action.

Democracy is not a non-excludable good because it is provided to all members of a society independent if they collaborated or not in their procurement. Accordingly, citizens have incentives to "free ride" and to not cooperate by means of their electoral participation –a

citizen's individual contribution to democracy. This is a serious problem because if many citizens calculate and decide to free ride, then participate would decline and, as a consequence, high abstention could harm democracy. In some countries, if participation is below a certain threshold, the election is rendered void.

On balance, normative arguments in favor of compulsory voting seem to be stronger than arguments against it. This electoral rule increases participation, prevents citizens' free riding and entails a small decrease of freedom, similar to reductions on other social norms that citizens should fulfill. However, high turnout is not a straightforward indicator of democratic health. The effect of compulsory voting on turnout does not mean that countries with this electoral rule exhibit higher levels of democratic consolidation. On the contrary, countries that implement compulsory voting are often not established democracies. Thus, scholars should not assume that "artificially" high levels of turnout equal healthy democracies; rather citizens' engagement via compulsory voting might mask a reality of a hollow democracy, in which citizens are going to the polls but they are not involved in the political process.

The Nature of Compulsory Voting

Lijphart (1997) recommends two mechanisms to combat low levels of voter turnout: the removal of barriers for participation and the implementation of compulsory voting. Moreover, he proposes that low turnout means unequal turnout that is biased against poor citizens. Because compulsory voting increases participation, it should also help to reduce these gaps in electoral participation. However, opponents of compulsory voting argue that compulsory voting attacks the problem, but not the symptoms of low levels of voter turnout. From that perspective, the

symptoms are voter apathy and citizens' disengagement and disillusion with politics. Compulsory voting enforces participation, but it does not necessarily contribute to reducing declining citizens' interest in politics. A real remedy to the maladies of low voter turnout would integrate measures to improve citizens' civic and political education. The consequence of such measures would be the participation of citizens because they trust in politics and want to contribute to the public good, and not because they are afraid of a threat of punishment.

This dissertation sought to test Lijphart's hypothesis about the reduction of biases in electoral participation. A first well-established fact is that countries with compulsory voting exhibit higher levels of turnout than countries with voluntary voting, but mandatory voting does not guarantee full participation. It moves a country closer to this ideal, yet there remains a proportion of voters that does not go to the polls, even when facing harsh penalties.

Average turnout in countries with compulsory voting is around 80% to 90%, which is 10 to 15 percentage points higher than turnout in countries with voluntary voting. According to Tingsten's "law of dispersion", "the probability of differences in voting turnout is smaller the higher the general participation is" (mentioned in Lijphart 1997: 2). Differences in voting turnout would be null if the group of abstainers encompasses random voters with no defined characteristics. On the contrary, if this group still shares certain qualities, the difference may be smaller, but it would persist. Chapter III examines these alternatives and finds that compulsory voting diminishes select differences in voting turnout across socioeconomic and political groups. This rule is more effective at removing differences with respect to variables related to the benefits of voting, for instance party identification, rather than with respect to variables related to sociodemographic or civic-minded characteristics. This finding also means that there is a core group of abstainers that is more reluctant to be forced to the polls.

These findings raise some questions. Lijphart mentions Hirczy's (1994) finding that the increase of turnout in a country depends on the baseline of participation without compulsory voting. Probably, something similar happens with respect to groups in a society. For example, it would be easier to diminish the gap in voting turnout between young and older citizens because the gap in voluntary voting countries is higher. An opposite situation would occur with respect to differences between men and women because they are marginal in voluntary voting countries. As a result, compulsory voting may have a diminishing marginal return depending on the baseline with respect to differences in voting turnout in voluntary voting countries.

An additional question is related to the presence of a core group of abstainer: how can a state promote electoral participation for this group? There are some options discussed in the literature.

Compulsory voting applies an extrinsic tangible negative incentive. It is extrinsic because it comes from an external agency: the state. An alternative would emphasize intrinsic incentives to vote, in which the motivation to go to the polls emerges from the same individual. However, this is a long-term solution in which education and the formation of citizens with consciousness of their civic duties is needed.

Compulsory electoral rules are tangible because they entail monetary and civic penalties if citizens abstain. These two types of penalties are combined in reality. If citizens do not vote, they suffer a restriction of some civic rights. For example, they cannot cash checks in banks or cannot get public employment. These restrictions are effective until voters pay a monetary fee. When they pay it, they get back all their civic rights. Thus, it means that we observe the effect of both types of punishment in reality. Table I.2 displayed the fact that most countries enforce compulsory voting with both types of penalties at the same time in Latin America. For this

reason, the results in Chapter III cannot disentangle the effect of each type of penalty. This is relevant because different types of penalties hypothetically may have varying effects on different groups. For example, monetary fees may strongly push poor people for whom penalties are a higher proportion of their total income. Consequently, the difference in levels of turnout between rich and poor people should decrease in comparison to countries with voluntary voting where the difference between rich and poor people should be higher, as wealthy people are more likely to afford the cost of voting. Thus, monetary fees may have an equalizing effect on electoral participation.

On the other side, non-monetary enforcement mechanisms may exacerbate the differences in voting behavior between rich and poor people. Power (2009), for example, mentions that public employees in Brazil are extremely obligated to vote, as they may lose their jobs if they do not. In this case public employees would seem more motivated by the possibility of losing their jobs rather than for the monetary fees imposed if they do not vote. Thus, civic penalties may exert a higher effect on turnout over some citizens: those that need to interact more with the state because they need to preserve their job, as in Power's piece, or need to get a passport or cash a check in the bank, for example. From this perspective, those who need to interact more with the state would be pushed most heavily by compulsory voting laws with enforcement that establish this type of penalty for not voting. Conversely, the poor and those isolated of the formal economy have relatively less contact with the state, and so they may be less affected by civic penalties. Therefore, compulsory voting enforced in this way may exacerbate the gap in electoral participation between those in need of state services and those who do not need to interact with the state, because the former have more incentive to go to the

polls than the latter. Because enforcement matters, this discussion implies the need for more research on the particular effects of different types of penalties.

In Chapter IV, I evaluated the effect of reminders of types of penalties (each and combined) on citizens' levels of civic duty. I found that single reminders of penalties do not have an effect on levels of duty, but that joint penalties have a significant effect. I discuss that the lack of effect of single reminders of penalties may be due to the artificiality of presenting each type of penalty when they are combined in reality. However, it is relevant to ask about the single effect of each. Which one is more effective and for whom? Policy makers may apply this knowledge when they think about mechanisms to enforce compulsory voting and when they think on how to push particular groups of citizens to the polls.

Compulsory voting is also based in punishments and not in rewards. The literature has discussed whether they are both sides of the same coin. The balance of evidence indicates they are not. First, a negative incentive like compulsory voting elevates voting turnout, but a positive incentive like rewards does not have the same effect. Colombia is a country that establishes benefits for some groups of voters. For example, the electoral legislation stipulates discounts in university fees for voters. However, levels of turnout in this country are really low (below 50% in some elections). Thus, it seems that these selective positive incentives do not have a similar effect than a general negative incentive. Second, in Chapter IV, I build on theories that hypothesize a detrimental effect of incentives on citizens' intrinsic motivation to perform an activity and I propose that compulsory voting has a negative side effect on citizens' sense of duty. Podsakoff et al. (1984) find that positive incentives have a stronger effect on intrinsic motivation than negative incentives. Thus, this dissertation hypothesizes a stronger negative

effect of systems of electoral rewards on citizens' sense of duty. This hypothesis remains to be tested and, thus, this question remains for research beyond the scope of this project.

A damaging effect on levels of citizens' duty is important because this variable is a significant predictor in models of turnout. The sense of duty was introduced as a way to evade the paradox of voting, introducing long-term considerations -the voter's decision to invest in the permanence of democracy. Yet, some scholars argue its incorporation is tautological (Barry 1978, mentioned in Blais and Achen 2010). Empirically, models of turnout show that duty – measured in several different ways- has a substantive impact on levels of turnout. Thus, on the one side, compulsory voting increases turnout because of the cost of not voting, and on the other side, it depresses duty, a central predictor of turnout. The net effect, however, seems to be positive, but compulsory voting still needs a negative enforcement to operate.

In Chapter III the results presented in this dissertation indicated that penalties established in electoral legislation matter for diminishing the gaps in electoral participation. In Chapter IV, I find that the combination of monetary fines and civic restrictions has an effect on levels of civic duty. However, the inclusion of penalties in the legislation does not indicate they are enforced in reality because they may be dead letters.[72] To be enforced, the state has to invest money in bureaucracy to penalize abstainers. If the state has a special agency for this activity, it increases the probability that an abstainer is punished. Birch (2009) mentions an economic option: random examinations. The argument is that the state does not need to castigate all abstainers, but to make credible the punishment. So, it would be enough to punish a proportion of abstainers to instill the threat of punishment to all voters.

In the 2012 round of the AmericasBarometer surveys, I introduced a question about how probable people think they will be punished by the state if they do not vote. Results vary

[72] Laws that are still in effect but are neither complied with nor enforced.

significantly. For example, in Ecuador and Peru, two countries with penalties in their legislations, 48.1% and 42.9% indicate it is very probable respectively. In Argentina, only 11.3% says it is very probable regardless Argentinean legislation mentions monetary fees and civic restrictions. In Paraguay, one of the countries with the more relaxed version of compulsory voting, only 3% of the population says effective punishments are very probable. Thus, indications of punishments in electoral legislation are correlated to actual penalties, but this creates a set of insufficient indicators to measure enforcement. Research needs to measure enforcement by the method of process tracing, meaning an evaluation of each step in the process of making penalties effective. Chapter I briefly describes the process in Peru. Similar efforts would be needed in other countries to produce comparable measures. After the production of a measure of enforcement in reality, it can be included in models of turnout to test the effects of degrees of punishments. The literature indicates that enforcement matters, but we still do not know whether there is a threshold over which compulsory voting works. This question also remains an avenue for future research.

In conclusion, these considerations need to be included in a balance of compulsory voting. Making such a balance, Birch (2009) concludes that positive consequences of compulsory voting outweigh negative ones. This dissertation adds some negative considerations to this balance. It shows that compulsory voting does not fulfill completely its promise of full participation and of closing all differences in electoral participation across socioeconomic and political groups. Further, it tests an alternative negative consequence of the implementation of compulsory voting: a decrease in levels of citizens' sense of duty, which is a substantive predictor of voting turnout. Despite these findings might tip the scale towards the negative side,

positive consequences are still prevailing. The question is whether there are alternatives to maximize positive outcomes and to minimize negative consequences.

Further Considerations

The literature has found that voting is a habit-forming behavior (Blais 2006; Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003; Geys 2006). This is one reason why previous voting behavior is a powerful determinant of current voting behavior, either participation or abstention. If this is the case, the time period when a citizen is young is fundamental to set the habit. In the very first election, young citizens decide whether to vote or abstain based on a group of parental, demographic, and personal factors and this decision would be fundamental for their future electoral behavior (Plutzer 2002). Not only do individual factors play a role, but also contextual factors help to develop this habit. In this frame, compulsory voting contributes to a habit-forming behavior of participation. However, if the critical moment is the very first election, the obligation to vote persists during the citizens' entire political life. Thus, a question arises: why does compulsory voting oblige citizens during the whole life when the critical moment is the first election? Some scholars, for this reason, propose that compulsory voting should apply only for first-time voters (Birch 2009; Birch, Gottfried, and Logde 2013). In this case, the electoral rule minimizes the compulsion with the same substantive long-lasting effect. Further, this modification would target a core group of abstainers in voluntary voting countries: the young cohort.

Even though it is a persuasive idea, the legislation of compulsory first-time voting faces the same barriers as the legislation of traditional compulsory voting. Chapter II shows how the

historical implementation of this electoral rule in Latin America depended on strategic consideration of political actors. Legislators, those who are in charge of proposing electoral reforms, do not have incentives to change the status quo -a set of rules under which they have won seats. Potentially, legislators from minority parties can propose such a change as a way to increase their electoral share if they see a large base of untapped supporters among abstainers.

In reality, though, countries barely discuss the idea of an implementation of this rule in countries with voluntary voting. Lijphart (1997) recognizes that the probability of being enacted in more countries is very small, but not impossible. Further, legislators in countries with compulsory voting often discuss whether the implementation of voluntary voting is preferable. As I said previously, compulsory voting is a short-term solution for a long-term problem: citizens' disengagement and disillusion with politics. In Latin America, it seems that this solution is a lesser evil to prevent massive absenteeism that might have pernicious effects on authorities' legitimacy, trust in electoral procedures, and finally on democratic consolidation.

Lastly, this dissertation rests on the assumption that more participation is desirable because, as Lijphart (1997) also expects, it leads to equality of voice and influence. This expectation is probably more accurate in well-established democracies. It, alas, is not widely supported in Latin America. Stokes (2001), for example, shows that politicians may change promised policies once elected with the expectation that new policies will improve voters' well-being and consequently they will serve their political ambitions. Paradigmatic cases of these policy switches are in Latin America, where voting, as an expression of preferences, did not transform into preferred policies. In Latin America, more participation of poor or young citizens, for example, does not imply they will have more influence on government decisions all the times. This situation conveys a problematic consequence: a diminishing value of voting. Thus,

compulsory voting countries where there were policy switches, such as Argentina or Peru, display higher levels of turnout, but voting may be devaluated and therefore trust in election would be debilitated and finally the quality of democracy is hurt. Yet, an alternative scenario in which voter turnout is low in a voluntary voting setting and policy switches occur is even worse because this scenario adds the problem of lack of representation and legitimacy of elected authorities.

In sum, this dissertation focused on Latin American countries, the region where compulsory voting is more prevalent, and where this electoral rule seems to be more required to assure high levels of electoral participation, despite the fact that it also carries some negative effects. On balance, I suggest that compulsory voting may be considered as a lesser evil in Latin America. Politicians, policy-makers, and political scientist have to consider that this electoral rule is not perfect but it comprises more pros than cons. Thus, while much research remains, this dissertation goes beyond the direct effect of compulsory voting: the increasing levels of turnout –the quantitative effect-, and evaluates the origins of this electoral rule and positive and negative effects of compulsory voting –the qualitative effects. In doing so, this project has contributed to the scholarly community and has taken part in the research's collective academic enterprise.

APPENDICES

Appendix Chapter 1

Appendix 1. Turnout by Country and Year

Country	Type of Election	Year	Voter Turnout
Argentina	Parliamentary	2005	70.94
Argentina	Presidential	2007	71.81
Argentina	Parliamentary	2007	73.13
Argentina	Parliamentary	2009	72.39
Argentina	Parliamentary	2011	79.39
Argentina	Presidential	2011	79.39
Argentina	Parliamentary	2013	77.17
Bahamas	Parliamentary	2007	92.13
Bahamas	Parliamentary	2012	90.78
Belize	Parliamentary	2008	77.18
Belize	Parliamentary	2012	73.18
Bolivia	Parliamentary	2005	84.51
Bolivia	Presidential	2005	84.51
Bolivia	Parliamentary	2009	94.55
Bolivia	Presidential	2009	94.55
Bolivia	Parliamentary	2014	87.45
Bolivia	Presidential	2014	91.86
Brazil	Presidential	2006	83.25
Brazil	Parliamentary	2006	83.27

Brazil	Presidential	2010	78.5
Brazil	Parliamentary	2010	81.88
Brazil	Presidential	2014	78.9
Brazil	Parliamentary	2014	80.6
Canada	Parliamentary	2006	64.94
Canada	Parliamentary	2008	59.52
Canada	Parliamentary	2011	61.11
Chile	Parliamentary	2005	87.67
Chile	Presidential	2006	87.12
Chile	Parliamentary	2009	87.67
Chile	Presidential	2010	86.94
Chile	Presidential	2013	41.98
Chile	Parliamentary	2013	49.25
Colombia	Parliamentary	2006	40.49
Colombia	Presidential	2006	45.11
Colombia	Parliamentary	2010	43.75
Colombia	Presidential	2010	44.35
Colombia	Parliamentary	2014	43.58
Colombia	Presidential	2014	47.9
Costa Rica	Parliamentary	2006	65.13
Costa Rica	Presidential	2006	65.21
Costa Rica	Parliamentary	2010	69.11
Costa Rica	Presidential	2010	69.12
Costa Rica	Presidential	2014	55.64
Costa Rica	Parliamentary	2014	68.38
Dominican Republic	Parliamentary	2006	56.46
Dominican Republic	Presidential	2008	71.36

Dominican Republic	Parliamentary	2010	56.43
Dominican Republic	Presidential	2012	70.23
Ecuador	Parliamentary	2006	63.5
Ecuador	Presidential	2006	76.01
Ecuador	Presidential	2009	75.28
Ecuador	Parliamentary	2009	75.72
Ecuador	Parliamentary	2013	80.84
Ecuador	Presidential	2013	81.08
El Salvador	Parliamentary	2006	52.56
El Salvador	Parliamentary	2009	53.58
El Salvador	Presidential	2009	61.91
El Salvador	Presidential	2014	60.17
El Salvador	Parliamentary	2015	45.91
Guatemala	Presidential	2007	48.15
Guatemala	Parliamentary	2007	60.46
Guatemala	Presidential	2011	60.83
Guatemala	Parliamentary	2011	69.38
Guyana	Parliamentary	2006	68.82
Guyana	Parliamentary	2011	72.89
Guyana	Parliamentary	2015	72.19
Haiti	Parliamentary	2006	28.31
Haiti	Presidential	2006	59.26
Haiti	Presidential	2011	22.36
Haiti	Parliamentary	2011	22.77
Honduras	Parliamentary	2005	45.97
Honduras	Presidential	2005	55.08
Honduras	Presidential	2009	49.88

Honduras	Parliamentary	2009	50.05
Honduras	Presidential	2013	59.14
Honduras	Parliamentary	2013	61.16
Jamaica	Parliamentary	2007	60.4
Jamaica	Parliamentary	2011	53.17
Mexico	Presidential	2006	58.55
Mexico	Parliamentary	2006	58.9
Mexico	Parliamentary	2009	44.61
Mexico	Parliamentary	2012	62.45
Mexico	Presidential	2012	63.14
Mexico	Parliamentary	2015	47.72
Nicaragua	Presidential	2006	61.23
Nicaragua	Parliamentary	2006	66.73
Nicaragua	Parliamentary	2011	79.09
Nicaragua	Presidential	2011	79.09
Panama	Presidential	2009	68.57
Panama	Parliamentary	2009	70.05
Panama	Parliamentary	2014	75.19
Panama	Presidential	2014	76.76
Paraguay	Presidential	2008	60.34
Paraguay	Parliamentary	2008	65.48
Paraguay	Presidential	2013	68.02
Paraguay	Parliamentary	2013	68.24
Peru	Presidential	2006	87.71
Peru	Parliamentary	2006	88.66
Peru	Presidential	2011	82.54
Peru	Parliamentary	2011	83.72

Suriname	Parliamentary	2005	46.68
Suriname	Parliamentary	2010	73.21
Trinidad and Tobago	Parliamentary	2007	66.03
Trinidad and Tobago	Parliamentary	2010	69.45
United States	Parliamentary	2006	47.52
United States	Parliamentary	2008	64.36
United States	Presidential	2008	70.33
United States	Parliamentary	2010	48.59
United States	Parliamentary	2012	64.44
United States	Presidential	2012	66.66
United States	Parliamentary	2014	42.5
Uruguay	Presidential	2009	89.18
Uruguay	Parliamentary	2009	89.91
Uruguay	Presidential	2014	88.57
Uruguay	Parliamentary	2014	89.62
Venezuela	Parliamentary	2005	25.26
Venezuela	Presidential	2006	74.69
Venezuela	Parliamentary	2010	66.42
Venezuela	Presidential	2012	80.28
Venezuela	Presidential	2013	79.64

Appendices Chapter 3

Appendix 2. Reported Turnout by Country, 2014, 2012 and 2010




Uruguay
Ecuador
Bolivia
Brazil
Panama
Peru
El Salvador
Dominican Republic
Argentina
Mexico
Nicaragua
Guatemala
Venezuela
Paraguay
Chile
Honduras
Colombia
Costa Rica
93.5%
92.2%
89.4%
83.2%
81.8%
80.0%
79.3%
76.1%
75.2%
71.0%
69.4%
69.0%
68.6%
66.8%
63.8%
60.9%
60.2%
58.0%
0.0
20.0
40.0
60.0
80.0
100.0
Turnout (%)
95 % Confidence Interval
(with Design-Effects)
Source: © AmericasBarometer, LAPOP. 2010

Appendix 3. Countries by Type of System

Country	Classification	IDEA's classification
Argentina	Compulsory with enforced sanctions	Compulsory with enforced sanctions
Bolivia	Compulsory with enforced sanctions	Compulsory with not enforced sanctions
Brazil	Compulsory with enforced sanctions	Compulsory with enforced sanctions
Chile	Compulsory with enforced sanctions[73]	Compulsory with enforced sanctions
Colombia	Voluntary	Voluntary
Costa Rica	Compulsory with no sanctions	Compulsory with no sanctions
Dominican Republic	Voluntary	Compulsory with no sanctions
Ecuador	Compulsory with enforced sanctions	Compulsory with enforced sanctions
El Salvador	Voluntary	Voluntary
Guatemala	Voluntary	Compulsory with no sanctions
Honduras	Compulsory with no sanctions	Compulsory with no sanctions
Mexico	Compulsory with no sanctions	Compulsory with no sanctions
Nicaragua	Voluntary	Voluntary
Panama	Voluntary	Compulsory with no sanctions
Paraguay	Compulsory with no sanctions	Compulsory with no sanctions
Peru	Compulsory with enforced sanctions	Compulsory with enforced sanctions
Uruguay	Compulsory with enforced sanctions	Compulsory with enforced sanctions
Venezuela	Voluntary	Voluntary

[73] Chile used voluntary registration and then compulsory voting for registered citizens. From 2014, this country changes to automatic registration and voluntary voting.

Appendix 4. Determinants of Voter Turnout in Latin America, 2014, 2012 and 2010

	2014 AB	2012 AB	2010 AB
Variables	**Coefficient** **s.e.**	**Coefficient** **s.e.**	**Coefficient** **s.e.**
Illiterates	-0.118	-0.413**	-0.233*
	0.097	0.089	0.096
Lower class	-0.192**	-0.188**	-0.151**
	0.036	0.035	0.033
Rural	0.093*	-0.091*	0.019
	0.043	0.039	0.039
Woman	0.131**	0.081*	-0.009
	0.036	0.035	0.032
Young citizens	-1.107**	-1.759**	-1.606**
	0.042	0.038	0.034
Older citizens	0.315**	0.064	0.223**
	0.074	0.075	0.077
Party identification	0.860**	0.816**	0.735**
	0.043	0.043	0.039
Persuasion		0.336**	0.104**
		0.058	0.038
Campaigning		0.985**	0.678**
		0.088	0.064
Support for democracy	0.184**	0.246**	0.413**
	0.065	0.062	0.058
System support	0.082	0.164*	0.042
	0.082	0.083	0.077
Internal efficacy	0.367**	0.214**	0.158**
	0.064	0.061	0.059
Constant	1.000**	0.536**	0.774**
	0.093	0.090	0.089
N	24,323	25,069	27,649
% Correctly predicted	82.52%	81.65%	79.67%
Prob > chi2	<.000	<.000	<.000

** p<0.01 * p<0.05

Appendix 5. Results from Models Splitting the Sample of Countries for the 2014, 2012, and the 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer

	2014 AB				2012 AB			
	Countries with Voluntary Voting		Countries with Compulsory Voting		Countries with Voluntary Voting		Countries with Compulsory Voting	
Variables	**Coefficient s.e.**	**Discrete Change min → max**	**Coefficient s.e.**	**Discrete Change min → max**	**Coefficient s.e.**	**Discrete Change min → max**	**Coefficient s.e.**	**Discrete Change min → max**
Illiterates	-0.041 0.100		-0.519* 0.249	-0.067	-0.415** 0.093	-0.086	-0.830** 0.328	-0.089
Lower class	-0.144** 0.040	-0.026	-0.153* 0.066	-0.017	-0.172** 0.042	-0.033	-0.215** 0.067	-0.017
Rural	0.125** 0.045	0.022	-0.173* 0.080	-0.019	-0.114** 0.045	-0.022	-0.011 0.082	
Woman	0.081* 0.039	0.014	0.160* 0.064	0.017	0.075 0.041		0.093 0.067	
Young citizens	-1.497** 0.043	-0.314	-2.956** 0.067	-0.514	-1.787** 0.046	-0.39	-1.777** 0.069	-0.212
Older citizens	0.254** 0.080	0.042			0.235** 0.089	0.043		
Party identification	0.894** 0.045	0.150	0.539** 0.078	0.054	0.955** 0.049	0.172	0.287** 0.112	0.021
Persuasion					0.353** 0.068	0.064	0.287* 0.112	0.020
Campaigning					1.234** 0.106	0.179	0.319* 0.155	0.022
Support for democracy	0.078 0.070		0.379** 0.126	0.043	0.156* 0.071	0.030	0.518** 0.126	0.044
System support	-0.026 0.094		-0.204 0.166		0.220* 0.097	0.042	-0.008 0.167	
Internal efficacy	0.445** 0.069	0.079	0.086 0.122		0.264** 0.071	0.050	-0.064 0.128	
Constant	0.894** 0.085		3.593** 0.183		0.494** 0.098		2.469** 0.160	
N	16,479		9,625		14,666		10,403	
% Correctly predicted	78.81%		86.89%		76.48%		88.88%	
Prob > chi2	<.000		<.000		<.000		<.000	

** p<0.01 * p<0.05

	2010 AB			
	Countries with Voluntary Voting		**Countries with Compulsory Voting**	
	Coefficient s.e.	**Discrete Change min → max**	**Coefficient s.e.**	**Discrete Change min → max**
Illiterates	-0.132 0.109		-0.693** 0.203	-0.086
Lower class	-0.120* 0.041	-0.024	-0.206** 0.055	-0.020
Rural	0.010 0.047		0.052 0.078	
Woman	-0.004 0.040		-0.039 0.055	
Young citizens	-1.554** 0.043	-0.337	-1.742** 0.059	-0.238
Older citizens	0.402** 0.108	0.072		
Party identification	0.827** 0.045	0.154	0.455** 0.073	0.041
Persuasion	0.126* 0.049	0.024	0.093 0.060	
Campaigning	0.875** 0.079	0.143	0.215* 0.109	0.019
Support for democracy	0.430** 0.070	0.087	0.342** 0.109	0.035
System support	0.082 0.096		-0.051 0.132	
Internal efficacy	0.237** 0.072	0.046	-0.033 0.104	
Constant	0.624** 0.099		3.166** 0.138	
N	14,939		12,710	
% Correctly predicted	74.41%		85.75%	
Prob > chi2	<.000		<.000	

** p<0.01 * p<0.05

Appendix 6. Results of Hierarchical Logistic Model restricted to elections in the last three years for the 2014, 2012 and 2010 rounds of the AmericasBarometer

Individual-level	**2014**	**2012**	**2010**
Illiterates	-0.038	-0.349**	-0.111
	0.121	0.123	0.136
Lower class	-0.192**	-0.146*	-0.080
	0.054	0.059	0.054
Rural	0.143*	-0.095	0.012
	0.061	0.063	0.060
Woman	0.052	0.083	-0.014
	0.053	0.058	0.056
Young	-1.284**	-1.407**	-1.455**
	0.060	0.063	0.056
Older	0.393**	0.253*	0.191
	0.102	0.122	0.139
Party identification	0.785**	1.180**	0.818**
	0.063	0.079	0.063
Persuasion		0.406**	0.131*
		0.099	0.066
Campaigning		1.023**	0.960**
		0.157	0.108
Support for democracy	0.019	0.079	0.335**
	0.097	0.102	0.093
System support	-0.007	0.361**	-0.050
	0.167	0.100	0.125
Internal efficacy	0.572**	0.362**	0.218*
	0.093	0.010	0.095
Country-level			
Closeness of elections		-0.136	0.088
		0.248	0.345
Compulsory voting	0.466*	0.812**	0.409
	0.200	0.183	0.240
Cross-level interactions			
Illiterate x CV	0.025	-0.076	-0.274*
	0.202	0.153	0.139
Lower class x CV	0.043	-0.067	-0.059
	0.054	0.046	0.043
Rural x CV	-0.153*	0.035	0.034
	0.064	0.052	0.052
Woman x CV	0.044	0.008	-0.053
	0.053	0.045	0.043
Young x CV	-0.240**	-0.119*	0.058
	0.058	0.048	0.046

Older x CV	-0.513**	-0.240*	-0.003
	0.097	0.094	0.096
PID x CV	0.114	-0.364**	-0.093
	0.067	0.063	0.057
Convince x CV		-0.077	-0.041
		0.077	0.050
Campaigning x CV		-0.279*	-0.309**
		0.118	0.090
Support for democracy x CV	0.099	0.222**	0.021
	0.099	0.083	0.078
System support x CV	-0.073	-0.128	0.106
	0.128	0.110	0.101
Internal efficacy x CV	-0.188**	-0.216*	-0.063
	0.096	0.082	0.077
Constant	0.853	0.895	0.572
	0.215	0.740	0.826
Random effects parameters			
Std Dev. (constant)	0.242	0.290	0.389
	0.098	0.112	0.155
Number of observations	17,716	19,777	20,252
Number of countries	13	14	13
Prob > chi2	<.001	<.001	<.001

** p<0.01 * p<0.05

Appendix 7. Figures for Predicted Probabilities by Determinants of Turnout, and Compulsory Voting, 2014 and 2012

2014	2012
	
	
	


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Compulsory Voluntary
Low Support for Democracy
High Support for Democracy


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Compulsory Voluntary
Low Support for Democracy
High Support for Democracy


Predicted probability
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Compulsory Voluntary
Low System Support
High System Support
Low Internal Efficacy
High Internal Efficacy

Appendices Chapter 4

Appendix 8. Results from Factor Analysis: Rotated Factor Loadings and Unique Variance

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2	Uniqueness
In order to preserve democracy it is important you vote	0.1152	0.8103	0.3301
If I didn't vote, I'd feel guilty	0.0675	0.8042	0.3487
So many people vote that it doesn't matter much to me whether I vote or not (inverted)	0.7884	0.1647	0.3513
If a person doesn't care how an election comes out he shouldn't vote in it (inverted)	0.7578	-0.0120	0.4256
It isn't important to vote when your candidate or party doesn't have a chance to win (inverted)	0.7955	0.1209	0.3525

Appendix 9. Balance Between the Treatment and the Control Groups

Variable	Obs.	Treatment	Control	C-T	P-value
Age	760	39.5	39.6	0.07	0.96
Woman	760	0.49	0.54	0.05	0.27
Quartiles of wealth	620	2.40	2.61	0.22	0.04
Education	758	2.57	2.51	-0.06	0.45
Left – Right scale	564	5.96	5.86	-0.10	0.65
Catholic	760	0.76	0.78	0.02	0.61
Authoritarian predisposition	719	2.59	2.42	-0.17	0.01
Party identification	724	0.52	0.52	0.003	0.93
Evaluation of performance of president	742	49.73	51.37	1.63	0.27
Democracy is preferable	729	0.80	0.79	-0.002	0.96

Appendix 10. Analyses of reminders of punishments on levels of duty and importance of voting

Variables	Level of duty	Level of duty
Reminder of monetary fee	-0.15 (0.21)	-0.46 (0.66)
Reminder of civic penalties	-0.24 (0.20)	-0.21 (0.66)
Reminder of monetary fee and civic penalties	-0.33* (0.20)	0.24 (0.68)
Authoritarian predispositions	0.27* (0.09)	0.30* (0.17)
Income	0.10* (0.05)	0.11* (0.05)
Refused to report income	-0.47* (0.19)	-0.48* (0.19)
Authoritarian pred. x Reminder of monetary fee		0.12 (0.15)
Authoritarian pred. x Reminder of civic penalties		-0.01 (0.25)
Authoritarian pred. x Reminder of both		-0.22 (0.25)
τ_1	-0.82 (0.43)	-0.73 (0.55)
τ_2	-0.13 (0.43)	-0.03 (0.55)
τ_3	1.54 (0.43)	1.63 (0.55)
Prob>F or Prob > chi2	0.00	0.00
N	691	691

Table entry is the ordered logit coefficient with standard error below.
*p<0.1, one-tailed

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