

CHAPTER IV

HABITUS AND JEONG

This chapter will mainly focus on dealing with the second and third major challenges of Korean spiritual and psychological development, the challenge of religious and cultural identity formation and of the embodiment of religious beliefs from anthropological and cultural perspectives. If people do not experience the formation of cohesive self structure in early childhood, it is difficult to experience firm process of cultural and religious identity formation in adolescence, young adults and adult years. The challenge of identity formation is directly connected to the problems of the role and function of family, neighbor, and community in contemporary Korean culture. In Korean culture, the identity formation process is particularly challenging because of the presence and influence of multiple religious and cultural ideals, values, and teachings.

In the introduction to this dissertation, I have explored the similarities and slight differences between narcissism and identity confusion, and the self and identity. Narcissism and identity confusion are not identical but highly convergent. The common experience is the fragmentation of the self, which shows lack of firmness or cohesiveness and brings emotional and cognitive experience of emptiness, loneliness, and depressive mood.

Kohut uses the concept of the self and focuses on the archaic formations of the self in the earliest childhood through the interactions between infants and primary caregivers. Erikson uses more comprehensive term, identity, than the self, and deals with identity formation throughout

people's lifetime. The notion of identity is larger than the self and encompasses both the earlier and later formations. Kohut rarely mentions social and cultural forces in explaining the early formation of the self, while Erikson explicitly claims the social and cultural factors in the formation of identity and identity confusion.

Erikson recognizes widespread identity confusion among adolescents and young adults because of the social factors such as rapid social change, cultural and social pressures on adolescents and young adults, and frequent dislocation and confusion in families. Erikson's description matches well with the current Korean situation. He realizes the difficult task of these people in accomplishing the complex synthesis of various values, ideals, and ideologies for identity formation. He also points out the fact that relatively healthy young adults and adults often confront trauma and experience sickness because of the tough task of complex synthesis in complex contemporary society.

Contemporary Korean Christians live in the twilight zone where old and new, Christianity and Confucianism, and Western and Eastern ideals and values coexist, and are experiencing the tough task of complex synthesis of different and often conflicting teachings and values of multiple religious and cultural traditions. Western values of autonomy, independence, and freedom are dominant in their lives, while the society and family system still values the meaning of community, extended families, and harmony. Interpersonal dynamics that are necessary in forming religious and cultural identity are hard because of hierarchical interpersonal relationships in Korean culture. In this context, it is extremely hard to experience harmony and creative synergism among diverse religious and cultural traditions in forming the self and identity.

Kohut's concept of *selfobject* discussed in the previous chapter is originally developed to explain exclusive relationship between infant and primary caregiver and between client and therapist. It is also used to explain the internalizing process of emotion and cognition from *selfobject* to self for the development of the structure of the self. He focuses on earliest development of the self without much consideration of social and cultural surroundings in later developmental stages in adolescents, young adults, and adults.

The original meaning of *selfobject* can be gradually expanded to wider, inclusive relationships between a person and various surrounding *selfobjects*. In the formation process of the self and identity throughout lifetime, there are many possible *selfobjects* that exist and function to mirror persons' basic needs and values such as extended family members, friends, teachers, relatives, pastors, and members of a faith community. *Selfobject* in wider meaning can also denote cultural surroundings in which people live daily lives, and their self and identity are continuously being shaped. However, Kohut does not explicitly claim the importance and particular function of wider groups and communities as *selfobjects* in forming religious and cultural identity.

The religious and cultural identity formation needs concrete interpersonal dynamics among participants in groups and communities. Self psychology offers a sound explanation about the dynamic process of internalizing certain psychic enzyme such as empathy between the self and the *selfobject*. However, it does not offer detailed explanation about interpersonal dynamics of more than two people in a larger group and community, which is essential for religious and cultural identity formation throughout lifetime.

Self psychology does not have interest or emphasis in history and tradition as major forces of forming cultural and religious identity. Kohut noticed the reality that the growing self

often encounters religious and cultural symbols, messages, and beliefs, but he thought that earliest formation of the self has a strong, enduring influence than the later encounter with these religious and cultural products. Self psychology neither counts the importance of the growing self's encounters with religious and cultural symbols, rituals, figures, beliefs, and ideologies nor emphasizes the significant changes and transformations of the self and identity through the encounter. These encounters are central experiences for psychological and spiritual development of adolescents, young adults, and adults throughout lifetime.

In this chapter, crucial concepts in anthropology (*communitas* and *habitus*) and in Korean culture (*jeong*) complements self psychology by providing a more concrete explanation about cultural and religious identity formation process in a group or community, which can eventually be a foundation for the embodiment of religious beliefs and practices. In dealing with the challenge of religious and cultural identity formation, it is necessary to have interpersonal dynamics in a group or community both in ritual setting and in daily practices, which provide cognitive and affective formation and transformation.

As anthropological sources, I will use Victor Turner's theory on ritual and *communitas* and Pierre Bourdieu's concepts of *habitus* and *hexis*. Both of them value the significance of community as the intermediary space of co-creation and transformation through dynamic and dialectic interactions among human actors. Turner emphasizes the importance of communal religious ritual for transforming participants, while Bourdieu values mutual, dynamic interactions among human actors and their bodily practices in a group or community. They acknowledge not only the power of a community, history, and tradition in shaping a person but also the power of human ability and creativity in transforming community, tradition, and culture. These theories

are particularly helpful in understanding and explaining interpersonal dynamics in a group or community setting.

Ritual and *Communitas*

The field of anthropology had been under the strong influence of Cartesian dualism between mind and body and the sharp dichotomy between subject and object. It is similar to how psychoanalytic theories had been influenced by the Freudian self-object dichotomy. The influence of these two theoretical foundations in anthropology and psychoanalysis was powerful. Many later scholars, consciously and unconsciously, developed their theories and methods based upon these guiding principles until the 1950s.

In anthropology, French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) played a crucial role. For many decades, one of the most controlling paradigms and guiding directions in anthropology was the theory developed by Durkheim who stressed ‘mechanical solidarity’ or ‘organic solidarity’ of the society. Durkheim had a vision of individual actors functioning within society independently and harmoniously, just as various organs work together in the human body.¹

Durkheim prioritized social coherence over social change and dynamics, though he also valued both independence and harmony of individuals in his theory. In his view, as society increased its organic solidarity, the works and interactions of individual actors were easily superseded by the larger “social interactions” or “social facts,” which were “collective representations” of “collective consciousness” or “group mind.”² Thus, there was little room for

¹ Paul A. Erikson and Liam D. Murphy, *A History of Anthropological Theory* (Peterborough, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press, 1998), 92.

² *Ibid.*, 92.

the creativity, freedom, and action of individual actors in the process of dynamic social formation and transformation for the sake of organic solidarity.

Scholars in later schools such as French structural anthropology and British social anthropology made distinctions by adding their own interests and colors, though those two schools still stayed within the overall structure of the Durkheimian theoretical foundation. Basically, the structuralists such as Marcel Mauss (1872-1950) and Claude Levi-Strauss (Born 1908) and structural-functionalists such as Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942) in these two European schools understood the society as a structure or an organism in which individuals played roles to maintain the structural whole of the society. They were also primarily concerned about the ways through which the society achieved meaning, order, and coherent and stable structure so that the society can remain in harmony without dramatic changes and conflicts.

However, these two schools made some changes to the Durkheimian foundation: 1) interests in the individual minds than in the group minds; 2) attention on individual (conscious and unconscious) needs and interactions; 3) a detailed analysis and description of genealogy based on reciprocity; and 4) an integrating approach to anthropological fieldwork by employing both subjective participation and objective observation.³

Despite these two European schools' efforts to overcome limitations and weaknesses of the Durkheimian foundation, they were still within the boundary of the Durkheimian paradigm, and their theories and methods were still not enough to deal with the complex, dynamic social process and the dialectic interactions between the social structure and individual actors. Thus, there were strong reactions against structural and structural-functional approaches to

³ Ibid., 94-105.

understanding the society and human beings. Especially, their lack of attention to the relevant functions and roles of intentional human actors in a dynamic, dialectic social process and their ignorance of the significance of history and its impact on social structure and human relationships were problematic.⁴

There have been two major reactions against structuralism and structural-functionalisms: symbolic and interpretive anthropologies of Victor Turner (1920-1983) and Clifford Geertz (1926-2006), and the practice theory of Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002). Symbolic and interpretive anthropology, which flourished during the 1960s and 1970s, criticized the existing research methods of structuralism and functionalism that were mainly statistical analyses aiming at rigorous scientism and objectivism. They provided “only limited insight” into the understanding of the dynamic social process and “little understanding of the motives and characters of the actors” in the emotional and meaningful social events.⁵

Thus, Turner and Geertz changed the direction of anthropological research by stressing the other end of the spectrum – more inward, subjective, and dynamic processes within human actors and the social structure. Symbolic and interpretive anthropologists highly value 1) the potentials and abilities of individuals as creative human agents who can create, change, and maintain cultural and social forms, and 2) the transforming power of ritual and ritual symbols.

They believed that ritual and ritual symbols, which have both cognitive and emotional aspects, act as active, powerful operators, forces, instigators, or even creators that induce persisting and powerful feelings and moods. The ritual symbols formulate meanings or conceptions such as attitudes, ideas, values, beliefs, ethos, and worldviews. However, Turner and

⁴ Sherry B. Ortner, “Theory in Anthropology since the Sixties,” in *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory*, ed. Nicholas B. Dirks, et al. (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 382.

⁵ Victor Turner, *From Ritual to Theater: The Human Seriousness of Play* (New York: PAJ Publications, 1982), 12.

Geertz did not disregard the power of the social structure even while emphasizing the importance of the mutual formation and transformation between social structure and human actors through a dialectic and dynamic process.

Another contribution of symbolic and interpretive anthropology, especially theories of Geertz, is the effectiveness of the approach by adding historical materials in tracing the social process. Geertz' approach is effective especially when studying societies that have experienced a complex, rapid social change through the historical process of colonization, independence, modernization, urbanization, and population growth. These historical events dramatically changed the lives of individuals who experienced them. Thus, Geertz believed that anthropologists often miss crucial clues if they do not have the right understanding of specific historical events. By employing historical materials, Geertz tries to overcome the limitations of functionalism and to address deeper struggles within society.

For Turner and Geertz, the major context of the transforming social process and of the creative human actions is religious ritual, which is the place where meanings, conceptions, moods, and motivations “meet and reinforce one another.”⁶ They believed that participants in religious rituals enter the consecrated time and space, experience transformation, and return to reality with an enhanced common sense. Thus, both Turner and Geertz are constantly interested in how sacred symbols shape the ways actors perceive, sense, and think about the world.⁷

A prominent contribution of Turner is his passion and effort to designate religious beliefs and practices as an important area of study in anthropological fieldwork and research. The study of religion generally and ritual specifically had been a neglected topic in anthropology. Turner explains the tendency of research in anthropology when he began investigating religion in his

⁶ Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 112.

⁷ Ortner, “Theory in Anthropology,” 375.

field work. Among various forces that are influential for shaping a society, ritual “had a very low priority” and interest in ritual “has never been strong” when he began his field work.⁸ In his intensive fieldwork, Turner realized the importance of religion and ritual.

Turner’s respect for rituals and symbols and his fascination with group experiences and performances are value-laden from his early life experiences and impressions. He was raised in the theater and enjoyed and was fascinated by the dynamics and playfulness of group experiences in people’s everyday lives. Turner highly values the group dynamics in ritual, and religious beliefs and practices: “In matters of religion, as of art, there are no simpler peoples, only some peoples with simpler technologies than our own. Man’s imaginative and emotional life is always and everywhere rich and complex.”⁹ Turner further claims that:

Religious beliefs and practices are something more than grotesque reflections or expressions of economic, political, and social relationships; rather are they decisive keys to the understanding of how people think and feel about those relationships, and about the natural and social environments in which they operate.¹⁰

Turner argues that rituals generate liminal status that is “neither here nor there” and “betwixt and between positions,” and it eventually causes a dialectical, dynamic movement between structure and anti-structure, structure and *communitas*.¹¹ Ritual symbols are indispensable tools for facilitating and supporting the ritual process, which are “a set of evocative devices for rousing, channeling, and domesticating powerful emotions, such as hate, fear, affection, and grief.”¹²

In ritual liminality, people experience a dramatic shift from one model of a society to another, from structure to *communitas*. It is a sudden, momentary change from “a structured,

⁸ Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* (New York: Aldine De Gruyter, 1969), 5.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 95.

¹² *Ibid.*, 42-43.

differentiated, and often hierarchical system of politico-legal-economic positions with many types of evaluation” to “an unstructured or rudimentarily structured and relatively undifferentiated *comutatus*, community, or even communion of equal individuals.”¹³ In this sudden shift, the powers of the masses or “powers of the weak” play a prominent role.¹⁴ However, the shift is a temporary one and has the tripartite model: structure – *communitas* – structure, or separation – margin – aggregation. Turner explains: “men are released from structure into *communitas* only to return to structure revitalized by their experience of *communitas*.”¹⁵

Turner defines *communitas* both as a model and process, and explains the features of *communitas*:

Communitas is a relationship between concrete, historical, idiosyncratic individuals . . . These individuals are not segmentalized into roles and statuses but confront one another rather in the manner of Martin Buber’s “I and Thou” . . . But the spontaneity and immediacy of *communitas* . . . can seldom be maintained for very long. *Communitas* itself soon develops a structure, in which free relationships between individuals become converted into norm-governed relationships between social personae.¹⁶

Turner believes that a society or a community is not a “thing” but a dialectical “process” with “successive phases of structure and *communitas*”¹⁷ No society or community can exist and function without this dynamic movement and dialectic process because of the psychological need of human actors:

There would seem to be a human need to participate in both modalities. Persons starved of one in their functional day-to-day activities seek it in ritual liminality. The structurally inferior aspire to symbolic structural superiority in ritual; the structurally superior aspire to symbolic *communitas* and undergo penance to achieve it.¹⁸

¹³ Ibid., 96.

¹⁴ Ibid., 109.

¹⁵ Ibid., 129.

¹⁶ Ibid., 132-132.

¹⁷ Ibid., 203.

¹⁸ Ibid., 203.

Turner's model is applicable in explaining the importance of ritual performance, the liminal period, and *communitas* in Korean society. Turner's major claim is that no society can exist and function without this dynamic movement and dialectic process. As Turner explains, "the structurally inferior aspire to symbolic structural superiority in ritual" and "the structurally superior aspire to symbolic *communitas* and undergo penance to achieve it."¹⁹ Thus, Turner's goal to provide "future implications for the study of culture and society" through his model of society is accomplished.²⁰

Turner's concept of *communitas* complements Kohut's concept of *selfobject* matrix. Kohut's equal interpersonal dynamics in the self-*selfobject* relationship helps contemporary Korean Christians change the fixed metaphor or image of God-human relationship from hierarchical, sharply separated relationship to horizontal, intersecting-overlapping relationship. Through the mutual interpersonal interactions, the self incorporates *selfobject*'s healthy psychic function into the self structure to strengthen and grow. Kohut's model gives contemporary Korean Christians a clue for spiritual and psychological development through interpersonal dynamics, but it does not say how they can enter into the self-*selfobject* dynamics in hierarchical society and culture. For Kohut, the place of interpersonal dynamics in the self-*selfobject* relationship is therapeutic environment between two people, while Turner's place is religious ritual setting in a larger group or community.

Turner claims that experiencing mutual, equal self-*selfobject* dynamics is possible in religious ritual in community, where religious symbols facilitate ritual process and channel powerful emotions and cognitions. In ritual, people experience liminal status and the shift from structure to *communitas*. In *communitas*, hierarchical social system and unequal human

¹⁹ Turner, *Ritual Process*, 203.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 94.

relationships according to social status, age, and power are temporarily suspended, and it becomes community or communion of equal individuals. In ritual *communitas*, participants experience I-Thou relationship between two actors, which is philosopher Martin Buber's (1878-1965) term describes mutual and holistic existence of two human beings. Participants in religious ritual enter into *communitas* with a sole purpose of returning to structure with revitalized and enhanced cognition and emotion. Turner defines community or society as a dialectical process, and there is no society without this dynamic process because of the psychological need of human actors.

Turner's claim has a universal validity. Clark W. Sorenson, who was an anthropology professor at Vanderbilt University and is currently teaching at the University of Washington, points out that sociologists and anthropologists used to believe that modernization and secularization would eventually lead to the inevitable decline of religious and cultural ritual.²¹ Like the U.S. and other non-European countries, the present state of Korea, however, proves that such belief is premature. As Sorenson denotes, ritual seems to flourish even more rather than die out during the time of rapid social change in Korea.²² Sorenson explains that "continued creativity and vitality of ritual performance in urban, industrializing Korea" can be explained as "a result of the nature of ritual itself and of the nature of Korean society."²³

Ritual performance is needed even more during a time of national identity confusion of contemporary Korean society because it has the power to create a space from the stressful daily situation in reality, and new meanings and directions by using dramatic technique, symbols, and heightened cognitive recognition and emotional mood. In relation to the second challenge of

²¹ Clark W. Sorenson, "Introduction: Ritual and Modernization in Contemporary Korea," *Journal of Ritual Studies* 3, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 158.

²² *Ibid.*, 159.

²³ *Ibid.*, 163.

Korean spiritual and psychological development, the challenge of religious and cultural identity formation, ritual is necessary to deal with both cognitive and emotional aspects of strengthening and forming the self and identity through interpersonal dynamics in human-God and human-human relationships in community.

A major reason for the popularity of ritual is that Korean society has maintained “bounded social groups” despite modernization process and the influence of Western individualism.²⁴ The nature of Korean society supports the continuous presence of ritual as a crucial means of creating new cultural and religious identities, values, and meanings. Korean society is moving from a sociocentric to an individualistic society. On the one hand, people’s ordinary lives are still governed by society’s regulations and rules. On the other hand, Koreans as a group also experience a national identity confusion caused by the rapid socio-cultural movement toward individualistic society. As Turner points out, human beings have the psychological need for ritual despite their social location. Ritual performance is needed to create new meanings and relationships in this particular social and cultural context, which is the reason of the ongoing popularity for ritual performance in Korea.

Korean anthropologist, Kil-song Ch’oe, points out the continuous presence and meaning of “*nanjangp’an*” in contemporary Korean society as an example of anti-structural anarchy.²⁵ The literal meaning of *nanjangp’an* is the place and moment of disorder or chaos, which denotes liminal status and *communitas*. The Korean word is used in describing a special shamanistic ritual and festival from Korean villages where music, song, dance, and drama are performed by bands and dance groups that heighten the mood of the festival. At the festival, hierarchy and

²⁴ Ibid., 164.

²⁵ Kil-Sung Ch’oe, “The Symbolic Meaning of Shamanic Ritual in Korean Folk Life,” *Journal of Ritual Studies* 3, no. 2 (Summer 1989), 227.

social relations are collapsed and people enjoy momentary freedom and catharsis from ordinary stress and the problems of boundary in human relationships in their daily lives. *Nanjangp'an* is an effective tool but not many people can participate in this special shamanistic ritual and festival.

Contemporary Koreans constantly experience different types of *nanjangp'an*, anti-structure, in interpersonal relationships in their daily lives. For example, the informal occasion of drinking is a special time and place where people experience the collapse of hierarchical relationships. People often drink too much and pass out. People on the bottom rungs of the social ladder are excused for not using an honorific form in their language. Communal drinking is highly valued because of the “excited communication with others in a sacred state outside one’s own consciousness.”²⁶ As Ch’oe explains, communal drinking is analogous to *nanjangp'an*, anti-structure or *communitas*, of the shamanic festival of village. Through the moment of *nanjangp'an*, people discover new meanings and establish new social relationships.

Another cultural and religious ritual in Korean culture and society is the shamanistic ritual, *han-p'uri*. Many Koreans have believed that *han-p'uri* is an effective way of the resolution of *han*. As anthropologists and scholars of religion have acknowledged the “efficacy of ritual processes,”²⁷ *han-p'uri* is effective in many ways by providing momentary suppression and catharsis. However, this communal activity cannot be a permanent solution, especially for people struggling with *han*.

In Korean culture, there is a well-known shamanistic ritual for a drowning victim called *soo-mang-koot*. It is a religious and cultural practice, which is usually performed in rural villages

²⁶ Ibid., 229.

²⁷ Volney P. Gay, *Joy and the Objects of Psychoanalysis: Literature, Belief, and Neurosis* (New York: SUNY Press, 2001), 47.

where Korean traditional religions are still influential. Andrew S. Park describes this public ritual as follows:

A possessed shaman replays the process of the drowning step by step and shows the bereaved and friends the way the victim was drowned. The shaman speaks and acts as if she or he were the victim, reliving the traumatic accident. This ritual helps the bereaved and friends recognize the *han*-filled reality of the accident and the uselessness of fostering *han*, and seek positive ways to divert their energy from *han* into the prevention of a future drowning. In the midst of watching the reenactment, the bereaved and friends experience the point of transcendence.²⁸

Jung Young Lee provides more vivid description of this ritual:

The shamaness takes off the ritualistic gowns and dances around the alter raising her arms over the head. Then she takes up the clothes of the dead from the alter and starts to swing them in front of the family of the deceased. This signifies the soul of the dead has returned for the ceremony. As soon as the presence of the soul of the dead is made known by the shamaness, the family starts to lament with loud voices. A few minutes later the shamaness wraps herself with the clothes of the dead and begins to talk with the family of the dead. This talk is known as the “nokduri” or the talk of the soul . . . Through the shamaness the dead soul speaks to the family members.²⁹

As Volney P. Gay explains the characteristics of ritual processes, this ritual has the ability “to suspend ordinary time consciousness” and “to invoke ritual time” which refers to “an experience of contemporaneous occurrence.”³⁰ People who attend this shamanistic ritual may indirectly experience the drowning moment of one’s loved one through the shaman’s action as if they were at the very same moment and place of the tragedy. From a psychoanalytic perspective, however, this kind of ritual cannot be a permanent way of resolving *han*.

Gay points out that the goal of ritual is “the transformation of the ritual actor” through ritual symbols and actions.³¹ In Korean shamanistic rituals, the resolution of *han* is carried out by performing symbolic ritual actions, such as the shaman’s dancing for the return of the dead soul,

²⁸ Park, *Wounded Heart of God*, 175.

²⁹ Jung Young Lee, *Shamanistic Rituals* (Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1981), 124.

³⁰ Gay, *Joy*, 47.

³¹ Volney P. Gay, “Ritual and Psychotherapy: Similarities and Differences,” in *Religious and Social Ritual: Interdisciplinary Explorations*, ed., Michael B. Aune and Valerie Demarinis (Albany, NY: The State University of New York Press, 1996): 223.

the shaman's reenacting the process of the drowning, the survivors' weeping and lamenting, and conversation between the soul of the dead and participants through the shaman.

This ritual pursues a dramatic change of the ritual actors through action. Gay explains that dramatic actions in ritual "alter self understandings by adding to one's original repertoire 'new images of oneself'" and the logic of the ritual is that "the 'old person' is dead only because new understandings of 'person' supplant those associated with the past."³² However, the ritual process still remains public and cannot accomplish intrapsychic change though the ritual may provide momentary escape and catharsis. Gay points out that "evoking intense occult experience" within the participants of ritual through ritual techniques and manipulation is highly "unempathic."³³

The limited ability of the shamanistic ritual for resolving *han* is also acknowledged by Korean scholars. Suk-Mo Ahn, a Korean pastoral theologian at Methodist Theological University in Seoul, asserts that the ritual cannot complete the process of resolving *han*, and *han* would recur throughout one's lifetime. Ahn suggests that "some-kind of 'work-through' of *han* is yet needed in this traditional *han-p'uri*."³⁴

Ritual is powerful and effective for spiritual and psychological development because participants can experience mutual, equal self-*selfobject* or I-Thou, human-God and human-human relationships and return to daily lives with enhanced and revitalized emotion and cognition. However, it also has limitations. It often provides momentary emotional catharsis or relief, while not providing permanent, enduring effect on cognitive and emotional changes, which need to be experienced in working-through process in therapy setting or long-term process

³² Ibid., 225.

³³ Ibid., 229.

³⁴ Suk-Mon Ahn, "Toward a Local Pastoral Care and Pastoral Theology: The Basis, Model, and Cases of *Han* in Light of Charles Gerkin's Pastoral Hermeneutics" (PhD diss., Emory University, 1991), 318.

of formation and transformation in communal setting. In order to experience emotional and cognitive change or growth, human actors should participate in some form of communal ritual practices, but not many people attend religious rituals in their daily lives. Thus, the role of religious ritual for spiritual and psychological development needs to be complemented by daily participation in interpersonal interactions in a group or community, which will be explained by Bourdieu's practice theory.

Daily Practices and *Habitus*

Despite its contribution to anthropological research, however, symbolic anthropology is often criticized by later anthropologists because of its underdeveloped theory of practices of human actors though it asserted an actor-centered approach.³⁵ This is an area where Pierre Bourdieu's practice theory of practice is more explicit, elaborated, systematic, and complete than Turner's theory.

Practice theory provides a more concrete and elaborated explanation of interpersonal dynamic interactions in a larger community, which is a good complement of Kohut's self-*selfobject* dynamics. Practice theory is more comprehensive in dealing with the challenge of identity formation for Korean spiritual and psychological development. It explains communal dynamic process through which people's identity is being shaped while their participation also transforms the society and culture. Thus, the interactions are mutual.

Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002) was a well-known French sociologist whose works influenced many academic disciplines such as philosophy, anthropology, literary theory, religion, and sociology. He originally studied philosophy in Paris and was a schoolteacher for a year. Max

³⁵ Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology," 375.

Weber, Karl Marx, and Emile Durkheim mainly influenced him. He employed Weber's idea of social orders, which he used in his own theory of fields, and the importance of symbolic systems and domination in social life. He used Marx's definition of society as the sum of social relationships, and the necessity of dialectic development of social theory from social practice. From Durkheim, he inherited deterministic structuralist style and its emphasis on social structures' reproduction process of themselves. In addition, he also critically received Durkheim's emphasis on the important role of social agent in enacting symbolic orders through the embodiment of social structures. Overall, Bourdieu's theory is an effort to transcend oppositions such as micro vs. macro, subjectivism vs. objectivism, and freedom vs. determinism. In making this effort, he used unique terms such as *habitus*, field, and capital as a way of overcoming such oppositions.

Bourdieu's practice theory, which flourished throughout the 1980s and 1990s, was another major reaction against structuralism and had a dramatic impact on anthropological and sociological theories. Since the 1980s, there have been growing concerns about the concepts of "practice" (or action) and "actor" (agent or subject), and many calls for more concrete and elaborated action-based or practice-oriented approaches within the field of anthropology.³⁶ Bourdieu's major work, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, was published in 1972 in France and translated into English in 1977, and became a central work among diverse theories labeled practice or praxis approach.

Bourdieu's practice theory, as well as those of others, on the one hand, is in direct opposition to the Durkheimian paradigm, which understands the social world as a structure determined and ordered by norms and rules. On the other hand, however, Bourdieu, as well as

³⁶ Ibid., 389.

other practice theorists, accepts the controlling and even determining power of the social system upon the characteristic, shape, and social relations of human actors. Bourdieu and other practice theorists usually take the structuralists' and structural-functionalists' view of the social system. Practice theorists generally accept the powerful existence and influence of the social system just as structuralists emphasized, but a difference is that they see this shaping power of social structure and culture quite negatively, as apparent in the connotations of the terms, hegemony, domination, and constraints.³⁷

Bourdieu basically places the creativity, power, and active participation of human actors at the center of social change and transformation process. For him, human actors have two simultaneously opposing characteristics like the flip sides of a coin. He believes that human agents are strong enough to generate and reproduce 'taxonomies,' ruling or ordering principles, that can be powerfully imposed on to others, while they are also weak enough to passively exist under the absolute control of the taxonomies that are created by others.³⁸ Human actors as powerful operators of social process are also simultaneously unable to completely overcome or escape from their social positioning set by others.

Bourdieu believes that human actors always exist in mutual relationships with others, and the social structure or culture is not like a machine. The society and culture are not a structured thing but a web or network of relationships. It is named a "field," which are open-ended, fluid "networks" of "objective relations between positions."³⁹ This understanding shares a common

³⁷ Ibid., 390-391.

³⁸ Erikson and Murphy, *History of Anthropological Theory*, 143.

³⁹ Ibid., 143.

ground with the Kohut's concept of self-*selfobject* matrix and a pastoral theologian, Bonnie Miller-McLemore's notion of a "living human web."⁴⁰

Bourdieu's view of the social system still takes the position of French structuralists, but his understanding of the interactions between human actor and social system and between human actors have a different perspective and emphasis. Bourdieu goes beyond structuralism's position in order to overcome the sharp dichotomy and boundary between the individual actors and the social system, as well as the one-way traffic and influence mainly from the system toward human agents.

For Bourdieu, the boundary between the system and actor and between human actors is blurred, fluid, or open-ended, and the interaction is mutual. He understands that the social system shapes, guides, and often dictates human actions as many anthropologists do, but the system or culture is not a sharply separated object from the perspective of human actors. Rather, the system or culture is a part of the human agent or the self, and the human actor is also a part of the larger system.

Bourdieu's understanding of the relationship between the human actors and social system and between human actors is not that of a vertical, oppressive, one-way influence from the social system to human agents but rather a more horizontal, mutual, dialectic, dynamic, interdependent, two-way interaction through which the social system and human agents can make a mutually supportive relationship in the ongoing process of personal and social formation and transformation.

⁴⁰ Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore, "The Living Human Web: Pastoral Theology at the Turn of the Century," in *Through the Eyes of Women: Insights for Pastoral Care* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996): 9-26.




Figure 5. Bourdieu's Interpersonal Dynamics of Human Actors
 Motivation: Gaining Capital / Power
 Images of Competition or Battlefield

Bourdieu's notion of the field is more mutual, egalitarian than Kohut's *self-selfobject* model, in which *selfobject* mainly influence and strengthen the weak self structure through the process of *transmuting internalization*. Bourdieu's model of field shares an affinity with Turner's model of *communitas* in communal ritual, which is the interpersonal dynamics in the communion of equal individuals. In Bourdieu's model of field, human actors have both strength and weakness. Human actors influence and shape others, while they are also influenced and shaped by others such as other individuals, culture, religious tradition, and social structure. They are shaped by culture and tradition, but not completely forced by the social and cultural structure. They exist in more organic web or network of human interactions.

Bourdieu's notion provides two crucial insights for developing a model of spiritual and psychological development for contemporary Korean Christians. In the Korean culture, people have hierarchical relationships. Korean Christians have a vertical, detached image of human-human, human-divine relationship, and metaphors of God as strict Father or King rather than as Mother or Friend. Religious and cultural identity formation in the mind and image of Koreans often means one-way teaching and shaping flows from religious teachings and cultural ideals to people. It also means the flow from the religious and cultural leaders' teaching, advising, and directing to members of the community or society.

First, Bourdieu's concept of field helps to understand that religious and cultural identity formation is not one way enforcement from religious or cultural tradition to people. Rather, it is two-way traffic between human actor and religion or human actor and culture. Religion and culture help people to form firm religious and cultural identity, but they can neither completely change nor entirely create people's original program, innate personality, self, and identity. Thus, religious and cultural identity formation is a mutual interaction and formation between human actors and religion and culture.

Second, it also helps us to understand that culture, tradition, community, or faith community that is necessary for religious and cultural identity formation is not a rigid structure or machine but more mutual, intimate, open-ended, fluid, web or network of human relationship. In the field, every human actor's creativity, motivation, power, and participation is valued, respected, and activated through interpersonal dynamics where they can experience strong emotional bond such as empathy, friendship, or *jeong*.

Bourdieu also provides a different emphasis from that of symbolic and interpretive anthropology in explaining the way human practice shapes the system. In symbolic and

interpretive anthropology, the emphasis is on religious and cultural ritual, which is a major place or field where human actors experience transformation of their cognition and emotion, though it does not ignore the role of human actions in their everyday lives. Symbolic and interpretive anthropology's emphasis on communal ritual and participation is important for personal formation and transformation, but ritual often provides a momentary effect. Moreover, ritual is effective only when human actors participate at that moment and place.

Bourdieu places emphasis on human actors' ordinary practices in their everyday lives – the particular actions people do routinely and repeatedly such as working, sleeping, and eating.⁴¹ He believes the mutual influence and shaping occurs between the human actors and system through the sum of small actions people do everyday – little by little or bit by bit. However, Bourdieu's practice theory mainly sees human action as a relatively short-term choice or instant decision rather than a part of a long-term plan or larger project.

Both ritual and daily practices, both *communitas* and field, and both cognition and emotion are crucial for religious and cultural identity formation. However, Bourdieu's emphasis on daily bodily practices of human actors is crucial for developing a model of spiritual and psychological development for three major reasons.

First, religious and cultural identity formation occurs not only in communal ritual settings but also in daily practices. Human actor's cognition and emotion direct daily practices, and ordinary practices also shapes human actor's cognition and emotion. Thus, identity formation is mutual, two-way interaction between human actors and religion or culture and between human actors.

⁴¹ Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology," 398.

Second, Bourdieu's emphasis on bodily practices of human actors connects two major challenges of Korean spiritual and psychological development: religious and cultural identity formation and the embodiment of religious beliefs and practices. Bourdieu believes that concrete daily practices are involved in the mutual formation and transformation process in human-human, human-society, human-culture, human-religion interactions. Thus, there is an affinity between Bourdieu's practice theory and contemporary spirituality or spiritual discipline movement, which aims at both development of people's cognition, emotion, and changes of their daily practices in community.

Third, religious and cultural identity formation always involves group dynamics or communal interactions. There is no identity formation without surrounding people and interactions with them in communal setting, in either religious ritual or daily interaction. This point helps contemporary Korean Christians understand that religious and cultural identity formation is not acquiring self-knowledge, accomplishing self-transformation or self-cultivation in an isolated setting. Rather, it is experiencing dynamic process among human actors in a community.

In relation to two major challenges for Korean spiritual and psychological development, the challenge of religious and cultural identity formation and the embodiment of religious beliefs and practices, Bourdieu's practice theory has three major contributions: 1) *habitus* for identity formation, 2) *hexis* for bodily practices, and 3) human motivation, desire, and need.

1) *Habitus* for Identity Formation

As a means of emphasizing the primacy of dynamic, dialectic relationships between human actors and the social system, Bourdieu develops two central notions: *habitus* and fields.

For Bourdieu, these two terms are transitional, borderline, and/or fluid concepts that facilitate and support the dynamic relationship between two separate entities. *Habitus* is a part of human actors, but it is also a part of the social system or culture. It is similar to Kohut's idea that a *selfobject* is an object, but the self feels it as a part of the self. Similarly, the field is a part of the social system, but it is also a place where human agents (*habitus*) are actively functioning. In other words, *habitus* and field are not either-or concepts but both-and notions.

When we visualize the dialectic, dynamic relationship between the human actors and the social system, they are like two circles in a Venn diagram, placed horizontally with an intersecting-overlapping area between two circles. One circle represents human actors, and the other circle symbolizes the social structure. The intersecting-overlapping area is the place where *habitus* and field meet and build up dynamic, dialectical relationship. The area sometimes gets bigger or smaller according to the intensity of dynamic interactions between two entities and the change of situations. From this perspective, *habitus* is not only a part of human agents but also a part of the social system, and the field is not only a part of social system but also that of human actors.

Bourdieu's notion of *habitus* is not easy to define in simple words. It is a "borderline concept," which is neither "fully determined" by the social structure nor "fully willed" by the individual actor.⁴² *Habitus* belongs fully neither to human agents nor to the social system or culture. It is also a comprehensive notion because it embraces contradicting aspects simultaneously: the objective and subjective, the conscious and unconscious, the individual and collective, and the cognitive and affective.

⁴² Lois McNay, "Gender, *Habitus* and the Field: Pierre Bourdieu and the Limits of Reflexivity," *Theory, Culture, and Society* 16, no. 1 (February 1999): 100.

Bourdieu himself defines the characteristics of *habitus* in various ways: “history turned into nature,”⁴³ “the product of history, the system of dispositions, a past which survives in the present and tends to perpetuate itself into the future by making itself present in practices structured according to its principles,”⁴⁴ and the “embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history.”⁴⁵ The concept of *habitus* is also defined by Bourdieu as follows: “systems of durable, transposable dispositions,”⁴⁶ “the conductorless orchestration,”⁴⁷ “the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations,” which produces practices,⁴⁸ “the strategy-generating principle enabling agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations,”⁴⁹ “the internalization of externality,”⁵⁰ and “an internal law relaying the continuous exercises of the law of external necessities.”⁵¹ In understanding *habitus* as systems, Bourdieu believes that *habitus* belongs not only to an individual actor but also to a “group” or “class,” and has the characteristic of “homogeneity” that gives regularity and unity among thoughts, perceptions, and behaviors of individual actors in the same class or group.⁵²

In developing the notion of *habitus*, Bourdieu adds the essential role of history in human existence and actions that has often been missed or less emphasized in structuralism and structural-functionalism. Bourdieu believes that human agents who are working with current situations are not blank paper. Rather, human actors are inevitably influenced and predominated

⁴³ Pierre Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 78.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁴⁵ Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 56.

⁴⁶ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 72.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 80.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 78.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 72.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 82.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 80.

by various durable dispositions that are formed in the past. Thus, there is continuity and consistency between the past and present of human existence.

The essential part of the whole past is still alive in human thoughts, perceptions, emotions, and actions in the present moment. In facing specific situations, human agents actively work out in light of the directions and principles of the *habitus*, which has been transmitted from past experience into the present moment “without consciousness or will.”⁵³ Bourdieu points out that the *habitus* “ensures the active presence of past experience, which, deposited in each organism in the form of schemes of perception, thought and action, tend to guarantee the correctness of practices and their constancy over time.”⁵⁴

Bourdieu’s use of the term, *habitus*, is a descriptive term from anthropological perspective, which describes particular behaviors and interactions that anthropologists have observed. It is different from theological use of the notion as a normative term, which describes idealistic hopes and visions such as passion, love, and grace. In both cases, however, *habitus* is a generative principle that facilitates and produces concrete practices of human actors.

Bourdieu’s use of individual, group, or class *habitus* is a similar concept to religious and cultural identity of an individual, group, or class, which is formed through the essential role of history and tradition. *Habitus* is a history and tradition turned into human nature, self, and identity. *Habitus* is a part of the social system, culture, and religion and is also a part of human actors. *Habitus* of culture and religion is their traditional teachings, ideals, and values, and *habitus* of human actors is religious and cultural identity already formed and embodied in human actors, which generates particular human practices. Thus, the meaning of *habitus* can deal with two major challenges of spiritual and psychological development: identity formation and

⁵³ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 56.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 55.

embodiment of religious beliefs. With Bourdieu's meaning of *habitus*, religious and cultural identity and the embodiment of religious beliefs and teachings are mutually interconnected.

Bourdieu also believes that *habitus* gives practices “their relative autonomy with respect to external determinations of the immediate present” because of the guidance of the internal law formed in the past but actively working in the present.⁵⁵ If human actors do not have durable dispositions that generate actions and provide guiding principles, they will be much more passive and powerless in their relationship with the dominating, external social structure or culture. When the external structure begins influencing the human actors, they are already well prepared to face the forming forces of the structure. Thus, there is no one-way influence between the social system and human actors. Human actors are active, autonomous operator prepared with the principles inherited from the past experience, rather than passive parts of the machine doing simple mechanical operations.

Bourdieu claims another essential characteristic of *habitus*, harmony, which is explicitly expressed in his own terms such as “conductorless orchestration,” “the harmony of *habitus*,” and “the harmony of ethos and tastes.”⁵⁶ For Bourdieu, *habitus* is “orchestration” in the sense that it is a coherent whole that provides consistency and organization without notable contradictions among various dispositions, even though *habitus* is “an internalized collection” of diverse dispositions.⁵⁷ *Habitus* is also “conductorless” because it becomes a coherent whole without the effort of conscious coordination or willful regulation by human actors. Bourdieu himself evaluates that a “fundamental effect” of the “conductorless orchestration” of *habitus* is “the

⁵⁵ Ibid., 56.

⁵⁶ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 80-82.

⁵⁷ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 59.

production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity secured by consensus on the meaning of practices.”⁵⁸

Along with the “conductorless orchestration,” Bourdieu also asserts the affinity of *habitus* among human actors in the same group or class because of their similar past experiences and life situations. In this sense, *habitus* is similar to religious and cultural identity formed in particular group or class. Bourdieu calls it group *habitus* or class *habitus*, which indicates the harmony of individual *habitus* within the same group or class. Class *habitus* is firmly based on individual *habitus*, and the individual *habitus* can be regarded as a part of class *habitus* when it reflects or expresses the principles of ethos and values of the individual actor’s specific class or group. In the same manner, human actors in particular cultural and religious group or community share a group *habitus*, which is a particular religious and cultural identity, but they do not exactly have same *habitus*. Thus, religious and cultural identity in individuals in same group or faith community varies despite common sharing of a group *habitus*.

The similarity of the social conditions of existence and life experiences of group members, human actions show objectively harmonized results, though the diversity among individual actions is also still found.⁵⁹ Human actors have their own uniqueness through the active presence of past experience on the one hand, but on the other hand, they are also the product of the social structure – specific situations, events, and social process where individual actors live.

The notion of *habitus* is a fluid, open-ended, bridge-building concept, and thus Bourdieu fundamentally refuses the static, rigid understanding of structure. He believes that the social structure is not a rigid structure like a fixed building frame, but a much more dynamic, forming

⁵⁸ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 80.

⁵⁹ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 60.

force. Similarly, *habitus* is also a kind of structure, which is “the cognitive and motivating structure” within human actors that is a forming, motivating force for human actions.⁶⁰ As a result, the correlation between *habitus* and social structure is not a vertical relationship between the stronger social structure and weaker dispositions but a more of an equal, horizontal relationship between two different types of structure – between “the objective structures” and “the cognitive and motivating structures.”⁶¹

Thus, *habitus* has a mutually informing, interdependent, dialectical relationship with the social structure where the continuous, dialectic operation of “incorporation and objectification” occurs between “the internalization of externality” (*habitus*) and “the externalization of internality” (structure).⁶² For Bourdieu, “the dispositions” and “the situations” combine “synchronously to constitute a determinate *conjuncture*” which are “never wholly independent.”⁶³ In other words, the mutual, dialectical relationship is possible only when both *habitus*, which is “a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions,” and “an objective event,” which “exerts its action of conditional stimulation calling for or demanding a determinate response” meet together and actively interact with each other.⁶⁴

As a way of recognizing and highly valuing the dynamic characteristic of social structure, Bourdieu formulates a relational, dynamic notion, “field,” which is a place where the dialectic process between *habitus* and the social structure occurs. Bourdieu himself defines field as “a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined, in their existence and in their determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents, or institutions, by

⁶⁰ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 83.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 72.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 83.

their present and potential situation.”⁶⁵ A field is a “structured system of social positions” or a “system of forces” where interactions and struggles occur.⁶⁶

For Bourdieu, field is a part of the structure, especially the dynamic aspect of the social structure where individual actors’ *habitus* meets the social structure and works. It is an intersecting-overlapping area between two circles in a Venn diagram. He also understands that field is a place of tension or struggle. It is a battlefield for pursuing power and control. Thus, the boundary between *habitus* and field is often blurred. There is an “ontological complicity” between *habitus* and field, and *habitus* “feels at home like a fish in the water” when it enters into the dynamic relationship with the social world.⁶⁷

Bourdieu also employs a sporting term when he uses the expression “feel for the game” to describe the “almost miraculous encounter between the *habitus* and a field” between an “incorporated history” (actor) and “objectified history” (system, rule, or structure).⁶⁸ The feel for the game is important because it provides not only a “subjective sense” but also an “objective sense” such as “a direction, an orientation, and an impending outcome.”⁶⁹ For example, soccer players (human actor with guiding *habitus*) will feel at home when they enter the soccer field. In the field, the players are a part of the field and the field is the players’ land of opportunity. They play strictly according to the rules and regulations of the game, but every game has a different dynamic, episode, content, and outcome according to the particular interactions between players in the specific game. Likewise, players (scholars with specific disciplined *habitus*) in an academic “field” have been formed and transformed by the rules and language of the discipline,

⁶⁵ Richard Jenkins, *Pierre Bourdieu* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 85.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 85.

⁶⁷ Frederic Vandenberghe, “The Real is Relational: An Epistemological Analysis of Pierre Bourdieu’s Generative Structuralism,” *Sociological Theory* 17, no. 1 (March 1999): 49.

⁶⁸ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 66.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 66.

but they have different voices, alternative ideas, theories, and methods, though these alternative ideas and theories are often within the larger boundary of the discipline.

Scholars in the same field share a group *habitus* in which they work, but the detailed results of their academic work are different. Through the works of *habitus*, the field may take a different shape as time goes on through the direct result of an ongoing changing, transforming process by active scholars in the field. Bourdieu defines this long dialectical process as the “vocation” of players and believes that the players must be born into the game, with a native membership in the specific social field.⁷⁰

Bourdieu believes that the dynamic, dialectical operation between *habitus* and field often produces *doxa* or doxic experience, which is the coincidence of ‘the objective structures’ and “the cognitive and motivating structures.” Bourdieu defines the doxic experience as a “quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization.”⁷¹ The doxic experience is the result of an ongoing, dynamic, dialectical process through which “socially and culturally constituted ways of perceiving, evaluating and behaving become accepted as unquestioned, self-evident, and taken for granted – i.e. natural.”⁷²

In a Venn diagram of two circles, the doxic experience is the moment when two circles, human actors and the social system, are fully overlapped and make one circle. Two sharply separated circles that are placed horizontally begin making intersecting-overlapping area when *habitus*, a part of human actors, and field, a part of the system, begin working. In the beginning, the intersecting-overlapping area is very small, but it gets bigger and bigger when the dynamic interactions between two entities are heightened and intensified. When the interaction reaches its

⁷⁰ Ibid., 67.

⁷¹ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 164.

⁷² Jason C. Throop and Keith M. Murphy, “Bourdieu and Phenomenology: A Critical Assessment,” *Anthropological Theory* 2, no. 2 (2002): 189.

peak, the intersecting-overlapping area is fully expanded to the size of an entire circle. It is the moment of doxic experience, which is a ‘quasi-perfect correspondence.’

The doxic moment, however, does not last forever. Crisis often makes human actors question the state of *doxa*. “The field of doxa,” which is “beyond question” is challenged by “the field of opinion,” which is “explicitly questioned.”⁷³ The prerequisite of this challenging movement is crisis, but the crisis itself is not sufficient to produce a critical discourse. When crisis occurs, on the one hand, “the dominated classes” want to expose “the arbitrariness of the taken for granted,” while, on the other hand, “the dominant classes” hope to defend “the integrity of *doxa*,” or to establish a substitute of *doxa*.⁷⁴

The dynamic movement is getting more and more heated as the dominating classes try to move toward the right extreme, “orthodoxy – straight, or straightened opinion,” while the dominated classes are moving toward the left, “heterodoxy – heresy or competing possibles.”⁷⁵ Thus, the moment of *doxa* is temporary, while the dynamic, dialectic movement between *habitus* and field is continuous and endless.

Turner and Bourdieu’s key notions help us understand the dialectic, dynamic process of religious and cultural identity formation. Turner raises ritual as a consecrated place and time where participants experience *communitas*, while Bourdieu emphasizes daily interactions in the field where human actors experience *doxa*. Both *communitas* and *doxa* are special moments through which human actor’s *habitus* is strengthened and changed.

In ritual liminality, human actors experience a sudden, dramatic shift from structure to *communitas*, which is the perfect moment of emotional catharsis and cognitive change through

⁷³ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 169.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 169.

interpersonal dynamics in the communion of equal individuals. However, *communitas* soon return to structure, but with enhanced and revitalized cognition and emotion. Similarly, human actors experience *doxa*, which is an ideal moment of coincidence between the social structure and human actor's *habitus*. Both *communitas* and *doxa* is the meaningful moments for the formation and transformation of *habitus* or religious and cultural identity, in which participating human actors experience changes in cognition, emotion, and practices.

2) *Hexis* for Bodily Practices

Bourdieu's second emphasis, *hexis*, in direct relation to *habitus*, points out the inseparable connection between religious and cultural identity formation and the embodiment of religious and cultural beliefs and practices. Bourdieu points out that *habitus* must exist inside the human body because it functions only through the bodily practices of real human actors and their interactions with other human agents and the social environment.⁷⁶ Thus, human body is a device like a piece of paper or board upon which "the very basics of culture, the practical taxonomies of *habitus* are imprinted and encoded in a socializing or learning process."⁷⁷

In emphasizing the importance of the integration of the mind and body, Bourdieu asserts that "practical belief" is not a "state of mind" but a "state of the body."⁷⁸ Thus, for Bourdieu, practical belief cannot be reduced to "a body image or even body concept, a substantive representation largely based on the representation of one's own body produced and returned by others."⁷⁹ For this reason, Bourdieu is critical of the theories of social psychology, which locates "the dialectic of incorporation at the level of representations" rather than the real, physical

⁷⁶ Jenkins, "Practice, *Habitus* and Field," 75.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 75-76.

⁷⁸ Bourdieu, *Logic*, 68.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 73.

relationships.⁸⁰ Bourdieu believes the centrality of human body in dynamic, dialectical social process by saying that “the body believes in what it plays at . . . It does not represent what it performs, it does not memorize the past, it enacts the past, bringing it back to life.”⁸¹ There is no sharp boundary between mind and body.

The Greek word, *hexis*, which Bourdieu employs in emphasizing the role of the body is similar to the Latin concept, *habitus*. Body *hexis* is “political mythology realized, embodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable manner.”⁸² When Bourdieu uses the term, body *hexis*, it refers to “the performative aspect of *habitus*” as “a durable organization of one’s body that is charged with a host of social meanings and values.”⁸³ Body *hexis* is also “a form of body memory,” which is gradually formed through dynamic interactions with the social environment. It is directly related to the body’s “motor function in the form of a pattern of postures that is both individual and systematic . . . linked to a whole system of techniques involving the body and tools.”⁸⁴

Body *hexis* has three major characteristics. First, it is “beyond the grasp of consciousness.”⁸⁵ Certain behaviors of human actors in facing specific situations are the product of conscious thinking process, but they are also automatic, bodily, responses to the outside situations without the conscious. In other words, they are the unconscious that triggers automatic reactions. Bourdieu points out that “schemes are able to pass from practice to practice without going through discourse or consciousness,” but that does not mean that “acquisition of the

⁸⁰ Ibid., 73.

⁸¹ Ibid., 73.

⁸² Bourdieu, *Outline*, 93.

⁸³ Ibid., 87.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 87.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 94.

habitus comes down to a question of mechanical learning by trial or error.”⁸⁶ Thus, for Bourdieu, the formation of bodily *hexis* is not a mechanical learning, though there exists the unconscious aspect of learning.

Second, bodily *hexis* is formed not only through one’s own experience but also through explicit teachings by significant others.⁸⁷ Children learn specific ways of behaviors by listening to the teachings of their parents, grandparents, or other significant others during their formative years. However, they also learn how to perform specific body gestures, postures, and movements by simply observing and imitating others’ actions. Bourdieu believes that children’s initial relationship to their parents is actually to “the paternal body and maternal body,” which offers “the most dramatic opportunity to experience.”⁸⁸

Third, and most importantly, bodily *hexis* includes both the cognitive and affective as Bourdieu defines it as “a permanent disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking, and thereby of feeling and thinking.”⁸⁹ For Bourdieu, just as *habitus*, bodily *hexis* is a comprehensive notion that embraces contradicting aspects simultaneously: the objective and subjective, the conscious and unconscious, the individual and collective, and the cognitive and affective.

Bourdieu's notion of bodily *hexis* as a performative aspect or motor function of *habitus* and his use of the term “practical belief” provide a sound explanation about the inseparable connection between religious, cultural identity, and the embodiment of religious beliefs and practices. Bourdieu claims that belief is fundamentally practical, and *habitus* has performative aspect. Religious and cultural identity can be defined as a kind of group *habitus* and practical belief imprinted and encoded in the human body through socializing or learning process within

⁸⁶ Ibid., 88.

⁸⁷ Jenkins, *Pierre Bourdieu*, 76.

⁸⁸ Bourdieu, *Outline*, 93.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 93-94.

particular cultural and religious tradition. Human actors who have particular religious and cultural identity also have concrete bodily *hexis*. The bodily *hexis* eventually produces particular bodily practices in daily lives. It explains the inseparable connection between religious and cultural identity and the embodiment and practice of religious beliefs. Religious and cultural identity provides an innate potential for particular bodily practices.

3) Human Need, Motivation, and Desire

In relation to bodily *hexis* that produces particular bodily practices, Bourdieu also points out the importance of motivation for people's particular practices. Human motivation is a necessary factor because it facilitates or triggers *habitus* and bodily *hexis* to move directly bodily practices. Bourdieu understands that the *habitus* of human actors in the field interact, compete, struggle, and conflict with the social system such as culture and religious tradition as well as with other human actors. His theory of motivation belongs to the interest theory, which regards human actors' desire and need in active participation in the field for gaining more capital, power, and prestige as the major motivation of human actions.

Bourdieu believes that gaining more capital is the major motivation of human actors actively working in the field. For him, capital includes both material and non-material capital: economic, cultural (i.e. skills and knowledge), symbolic (i.e. honor and prestige), and social (social networks and human resources) capital.⁹⁰ Whether human actors are seeking economic or cultural capital, they are acting according to their own interests. Human actors actually go after what they want in terms of material and political usefulness of specific power, resource, and capital.

⁹⁰ Frederic Vandenberghe, "The Real is Relational," 52.

Bourdieu places greater emphasis on human actors' motivation for gaining more capital and on ordinary practices in their everyday lives – the specific actions people choose to perform routinely and repeatedly such as exchanging material goods, arranging, negotiating, communicating and building relationships with others. Bourdieu asserts that the human actors can shape and change the social system mainly through the sum of small actions people actually do little by little, bit by bit every day.

According to Bourdieu's theory, human actors tend to ceaselessly pursue desires, goals, and material and non-material benefit. It seems that they are always very energetic to endlessly perform specific actions according to their own interests in order to own more capital and change their surroundings. Because of these characteristics, Bourdieu's theory is often criticized for attributing "too much rationality" and "too much activeness" to human agents.⁹¹

Bourdieu's theory of human motivation for gaining more capital is fundamentally different from Kohut. Contemporary psychoanalytic object relations theorists generally and Kohut specifically claim that human beings have a motivation, desire, and hunger for growth, and intimate, deeper interpersonal relationships. Human beings continue to have their motivation and desire for deepening the quality of human relationships throughout the lifetime. Even after they have already acquired higher levels of psychological growth, they always exist in the continuous presence and support of a *selfobject* matrix. Thus, the process of growing for Kohut is a long-term project rather than a short-term choice and action as Bourdieu claims.

Kohut's self psychology explains that human beings have fundamental need and hope for empathic responses, basic trust, and friendship in order to experience empathy, a powerful emotional bond, from the *selfobject* and the process of growth through *transmuting*

⁹¹ Ortner, "Theory in Anthropology," 395.

internalization. In addition, human beings have needs for idealizing or merging with powerful *selfobjects*, mirroring for reflecting human empathy and divine grace, and twinship with others in a community for support and further growth.

Kohut provides developmental stage-like lifelong process, which is different from Bourdieu's theory of motivation that lacks a developmental theme with the consistency and systematicity in human actions throughout their lifetime. Kohut's theory also has a similarity with Bourdieu when he mentions ambitions, ideals, desire for fame and acclaim, which is similar to Bourdieu's symbolic (honor and prestige) and social (social networks and human resources) capital. Kohut explains that people who already have cohesive structure of the self have an innate motivation and will to participation in the process of further growth, driven by ambitions and ideals. Human beings have a desire for fame and acclaim that lead them to education, training, and active participation in creative activities. Human beings grow in five aspects: creativity – empathy – transience – humor – wisdom. In the latter three steps that people usually experience later in life, Kohut deals with the universal, existential issue of death that helps human beings to overcome extreme fear and denial with humor and wisdom.

The Korean Cultural Dynamics of *Jeong*

Kohut's self-*selfobject* relationship, Turner's emphasis on *communitas*, and Bourdieu's notion of *habitus* emphasize the necessity of mutual interpersonal dynamics in forming self and identity, either between two persons or in a larger community. All of these notions have universal validity regardless of cultural, racial, and religious backgrounds, and correct the fixed image or metaphor of hierarchical, detached human-human, human-divine relationship in the Korean mind.

These theories also help contemporary Korean people revalue Korean cultural experience of *jeong*. *Jeong* is a facilitator and the source of power for religious and cultural identity formation and embodiment of religious beliefs and practices. In this section, we will explore Korean cultural dynamics of *jeong* in comparison to Bourdieu's anthropological use of *habitus* and *hexis*, McFague's model of friendship, and Kohut's notion of empathy. These terms denote similar dynamics, but they are not identical.

Bourdieu provides a crucial insight that there exist intersecting-overlapping area among human actors, and between human actors and the cultural system. Human actors are not sharply separated objects from other human actors and the community. In the intersecting-overlapping area called field, the *habitus* of individual actors and of culture and social structure meet and interact with each other. *Jeong* is a kind of group *habitus* in Korean people and culture, and *jeong*-dynamics are like the interpersonal dynamics of group *habitus*.

Like *habitus*, *jeong* is a deeper, heavily loaded Korean term, which cannot be directly translated into a simple English word. *Jeong* has both individual and communal aspects. It is a part of all human actors but is also a part of the Korean culture. *Jeong* exists within the human body as both emotion and cognition. It also exists in the space among human actors in Korean community. When *jeong* exists between two or more people, a strong mutual recognition, concern, bond, love, and friendship exists between those human actors.

In defining the meaning and function of *jeong*, there are serious misunderstandings among Korean scholars and people. First, many people see *jeong* mainly as a strong emotion or affection. However, *jeong* is not only an emotion but also a harmonious combination of cognition, affection, and concrete bodily practices of human actors in a community. Second, Korean scholars and people often misunderstand that *jeong* relationships are enmeshed

relationships without private space. Rather, *jeong* is a healthy bond, friendship, and empathy that maintains both enough space and intimate connection.

Jeong has both cognitive and affective dimensions in it; human actors have *jeong* in their minds. A human actor recognizes the presence of *jeong* in one's mind when one is thinking or concerned about other human actors. A human actor also experiences the presence of *jeong* in one's heart as a strong, durable emotion toward others. A person with *jeong* is the type of person who has a strong feeling of endearment and empathy for others and expresses one's *jeong* through concrete practices in interpersonal dynamics. *Jeong* is expressed, felt, and experienced through concrete human practices among human actors in a genuine, friendly community. The subject of *jeong* can be both singular and plural, and *jeong* exists both within a person and between persons.

Bourdieu's notion of *habitus* has both historical and communal aspects. He believes that the essential parts of the culture and tradition that had been formed in the past are still alive in a human actor's thoughts, perceptions, emotions, and actions in the present moment. Bourdieu also recognizes the affinity of *habitus* among human actors in the same group, class, or race. It is because of the similarity of the social context and life experiences of human actors in the same group, though the diversity among individual actions is also still found.

Like the notion of *habitus*, *jeong* also has both historical and communal aspects. *Jeong* is a cognitive recognition, a strong emotion, and consists of the concrete practices of human actors, which are formed, transmitted, and educated by the life of human actors in the past. *Jeong* as a group *habitus* exists and works both consciously and unconsciously. In the Korean language, there is no sharp boundary between the first person singular "I" and plural pronoun such as "we." The Korean word, *woori*, literally means "we" in English, but it also means "I," though there is a

Korean word, *na*, which means “I.” Korean people often say our parents and our family rather than my parents and my family. The language reflects that there is no sharp boundary between “I” and “we.” These cultural characteristics are directly related to *jeong*-relationships among persons.

Among various aspects of *jeong*, Andrew S. Park highly values *jeong* [*jung*] for its emotional effectiveness. He defines *jeong* as “the feeling of endearment,” “the warmth of human-relatedness,” “compassionate attachment,” and “an intense longing for somebody or something.”⁹² *Jeong* is closely related to empathy, and embraces the values of interdependence, friendship, the Christian ideal of *koinonia*, and the ‘living human web.’ In emphasizing *jeong* for its affective dimension, Park points out that most Koreans overcome loneliness, anxiety, narcissism, and depression through sharing *jeong* with families and friends. “As a major mindset,” *jeong* transcends “the rational mind in many affairs,” and the *jeong*-mind “overwhelms the business mind.”⁹³

Jeong, “the warmth of human-relatedness,” generates concrete human practices among human actors. *Jeong* as a resource for mutual interpersonal dynamics, cultural and religious identity formation is also a powerful generator of bodily practices. Koreans not only feel and express *jeong* with others but also share their *jeong*-heart with others by gratuitous gift-exchanging and generous food-sharing with families, friends, neighbors, and even strangers. These are natural human practices learned by the formation process in Korean culture and custom. *Jeong*-dynamics in Korean communities in the past was not only an ideal value of

⁹² Andrew S. Park, *Racial Conflict & Healing: An Asian-American Theological Perspective* (Orbis Books, Maryknoll, NY, 1996), 110-111.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 110.

Korean community but also served as the support group, group counseling, and social welfare program.

Jeong as “compassionate attachment” is performed consciously and unconsciously when human actors observe the difficulties, sorrows, and sufferings of others. Through *jeong*-emotions and *jeong*-practices, people who are in deep sorrow and suffering can feel connected with and supported by others. Moreover, *jeong*-relationships help them to transcend and overcome tough life situations, tragedies, and wounds.

Jeong as “an intense longing for somebody or something” implies the social and cultural context of Korean society and culture. Many contemporary Koreans have lost their *jeong*-relationships with their loved ones which are necessary for psychological well-being because of the rapid Westernization and globalization of the Korean society. These social phenomena caused wide-spread separations of family members, relatives, and close friends in contemporary Korean culture and society. These reasons weaken *jeong*-dynamics and *jeong*-relationships among contemporary Koreans, which are crucial for emotional and mental support and growth for Korean people.

In Korean culture and community, *jeong* is a major source for both maintaining psychological health, and preventing and healing psychological problems such as anxiety, loneliness, narcissism, and depression. A major reason for contemporary Koreans’ ever-increasing psychological suffering is the loss of *jeong*-dynamics and *jeong*-relationships by a sudden and/or long-lasting separation or broken relationships with families and friends. Andrew S. Park explains:

When we cannot exchange our *jung* [jeong], it turns into *han* . . . Any kind of separation in Korean can create deep anxiety, breaking their *jung* and generating the *han* of people . . . Koreans

are the people of *jung*. When the heart of *jung* is broken by separation, oppression, and repression, *jung* becomes *jung-han*.⁹⁴

Jeong is a facilitator for bringing the feeling of connection and of being enlivened. It has more feminine characteristic and quality of love, which emphasizes connectedness, bond, friendship, and caring and nurturing for each other. *Jeong* is not only a Korean cultural phenomenon but also a universal human phenomenon in the contemporary world. People in general yearn for intimate relationships and friendships with family members, friends, and lovers.

In order to experience *jeong*, it is necessary to have a communal, intermediary space where human actors coexist and interact with others. Turner and Geertz emphasize the communal religious ritual as the major context for personal and social transformation. Bourdieu places his emphasis on human actors' ordinary practices in their everyday lives, though he also recognizes the importance of rituals and rites. *Jeong* is experienced both in communal rituals and ordinary everyday practices in the community, the field. *Jeong* works most effectively and strongly when human actors experience it in their everyday lives both in ritual and in communal activities.

Jeong as group *habitus* exists cognitively and affectively in human actors, while *jeong* as bodily *hexis* performs in bodily practices. Bodily *hexis* is formed not only through a human actor's own life experiences but also through direct teachings of parents, grandparents, and other family members during their formative years. Human actors also learn the bodily *hexis* through simple observation and imitation of other's actions. *Jeong* activates the concrete bodily practices of human actors and thus it is not an abstract cultural concept but the activator and power for directing the bodily practices of human actors.

⁹⁴ Park, *Racial Conflict*, 112.




Figure 6. Korean Cultural Dynamics of *Jeong*
 Motivation: Emotional Bond, Sharing Love, Providing Helping Hands

When Korean people think about *jeong*, it naturally involves not only human cognition and emotion but also particular bodily practices in their daily lives. A good example of *jeong*-practice or *jeong*-sharing is *woo-jeong*, which means *jeong* between friends. *Woo-jeong* involves a powerful emotional bond, thinking or care of friend's difficulties and sufferings, and practicing something good for friends. It is also love for friends and sometimes even sacrificial practices for friends. Genuine *woo-jeong* may sacrifice one's life for friend's sake.

Another good example of *jeong*-practice is small gift-giving such as sharing food, drinks, or snacks with others. *Jeong*-practice usually occurs between close friends, family members, neighbors, or colleagues in the work places. It is cognitively and affectively recognizing and feeling others' need, hunger, or thirst, which is possible when there is trust and empathy between people. In this case, *jeong*-practice is usually accepted by others.

On the other hand, *jeong*-practice also occurs between strangers, too. When Koreans notice others' needs, even strangers, they simply ask these strangers, whether they can share what they have with them. In this sense, *jeong*-practice is more than empathy. It is closer to the meaning of love and grace. Whether others accept it or not, it is a moment of sharing *jeong* among human actors. Thus, *jeong* is not only emotion and cognition but also concrete bodily practices by extending their hands to others.

The genuine meaning of *jeong* and *jeong*-practice share common interests, visions, and even implicit ethical and theological statements with Kohut's notion of empathy and McFague's model of God as Friend. First, human beings' empathic love for others is necessary for their survival and well-being, and they cannot survive without others' empathic love. Second, human beings should act empathically and love others because of their inherited capacity and responsibility.

McFague further claims that friendship is the freest, the strongest, and the most inclusive human relationship, which goes beyond the barriers of race, class, gender, age, and religious beliefs. The genuine meaning of friendship in human-divine relationship has a vision for salvation, which is a co-operative work between God's initial work and human responsibility. The Korean cultural value of *jeong* and *jeong*-practice has implicit psychological, ethical, theological, and spiritual claims for explaining Korean spiritual and psychological development.

Kohut's self-*selfobject* relationship and his notion of empathy also share similarity with Korean cultural notion of *jeong*. Human actors in *jeong* relationships are also not sharply separated objects from other human actors. In *jeong* relationships, there exists an intermediary area among human actors, which is the place where *jeong* of individual human actors meet, interact, and share. *Jeong*-relationships are mutual, intimate, and interdependent relationships,

which connects people in fondness and affection. It is mutual and horizontal even when there are power imbalances among human actors.

In order to experience *jeong* relationships, there must be a chance and time to build up basic trust – “basic intuneness” in Kohut’s term – among human actors. Human actors usually have a basic need and longing to be recognized, supported, and strengthened. When human actors build up trust, the dynamics of *jeong* begins. The meaning of *jeong* is similar to empathy in Kohut’s term. *Jeong* is like “a powerful emotional bond between people” and “a real saving power (i.e. like oxygen).”⁹⁵

In the process of *jeong* dynamics, *transmuting internalization* occurs among human actors. *Jeong* as a psychic enzyme is transferred from person to person. The psychic enzyme has both cognitive and affective dimensions. In *jeong* dynamics, people transfer thoughts, perceptions, emotions, and actions. They share compassionate empathy, agreements of beliefs, friendship, and mutual support. A self is a *selfobject* for others, and a *selfobject* for others is also influenced by another self and therefore the process of *transmuting internalization* is mutual. In *jeong* dynamics, human actors are mutually supported and strengthened. Just as empathy is “a real saving power,” *jeong* is also an activator and power for *jeong* practices of human actors.

The Korean Cultural Emotion of *Jeong-han*

In the introduction of this dissertation, we have explored the challenges of narcissism and of religious and cultural identity formation. These two challenges are related to noncohesive self structure, identity confusion in the midst of heavy task of complex synthesizing of diverse values, ideals, beliefs, and ideologies, and problems and malfunctions of families and communities in

⁹⁵ Peter J. Gorday, “The Self Psychology of Heinz Kohut: What’s It All About Theologically?” *Pastoral Psychology* 48, No. 6 (2000): 458-459.

forming and transforming the self and identity. Then, as examples of the problems of the development of the self and identity in Korean culture, we explored two Korean culture-bound syndromes in close relation to narcissism and identity-confusion, *noon-chi* and *jeong-han*.

Just as dealing with narcissism requires strengthening the self through empathy, *jeong-han*, a Korean culture-specific depression and narcissism requires *jeong*-dynamics. The metaphor of hunger is used by Kohut in describing the painful experience of a narcissistic person. Likewise, a person struggling with *jeong-han* also feels hunger. Koreans often use the expression, “hunger for *jeong*,” when describing people with deep hunger for intimate relationships. Two culture-specific struggles, *noon-chi* and *jeong-han*, need *jeong*-sharing or *jeong*-practice with other human actors in a group or community. We will briefly revisit those two issues before we talk about the necessity of *jeong*-practice to deal with them in the next section.

Volney P. Gay explains the forming process of neurotic suffering and the description of neurotic suffering as the lack of joy or little joy. It is formed by intense, inverted, thus unhealthy interactions between children and parents. Children’s efforts to read their parents’ minds and moods, and the parents’ own narcissistic needs and exaggerated wishes in having children of whom they can be proud, burden children heavily. In facing parents’ demand, children try to please them by adopting particular patterns of behavior that can please their parents and elicit the parents’ emotional responses. However, the task is too heavy for little children and almost impossible to accomplish. In this situation, children form pathogenic beliefs, guilt, and the absence of joy.

Gay’s description of neurotic suffering has a culture-specific counterpart in the Korean society called *jeong-han*, which is widespread in the contemporary Korean culture. In the Korean culture, there is a culture-specific pattern of behavior called *noon-chi*. It is children or younger or

lower people in social hierarchy being sensitive and attempting to figure out their parents or higher people's emotions, perceptions, and needs, while not being able to take care of their own needs and feelings. It is formed in rigid, hierarchical social structure and malfunctioning families. When the situation persists, children or people in lower social status often experience problems in self-esteem and identity, and an absence of joy as Gay describes.

An indigenous Korean culture-bound emotion in relation to *noon-chi*, narcissism, and depression is *jeong-han*. It may be regarded not as a serious psychological issue, but it is actually a destructive emotion. As we have defined before, *jeong-han* is a dimension of *han*, which is a psychosomatic pain caused by frustrated hope, which produces sadness, helplessness, and aggression. *Jeong-han* literally means affection and hatred. Common emotions of *jeong-han* are emptiness, longing, loneliness, worthlessness, and resignation.

Korean people often misunderstand *han* and *jeong-han* mainly as a powerful emotional suffering, but it is also a strong cognition, especially in relation to pathogenic beliefs. Moreover, many Korean people still have a misconception that *han* is primarily emotional suffering caused mainly by catastrophic events. However, if we understand *han* primarily as emotional suffering caused by a tragedy or the loss of loved ones, how can we explain the existence of *han* among contemporary Korean people who have never experienced tragic events in their lives? Why do some people experience depressive moods while others do not recognize the feeling of *han* at all? How can we explain the inheritance of *han* from older people to younger people without having common life experiences between them? We can easily notice that a specific aspect of *han* still exists in the heart of contemporary Korean people.

Soo-Young Kwon claims that the “Korean psyche of *han*” has a crucial cognitive dimension and is “an embodied property that arises out of *interpersonal relatedness*.”⁹⁶ In religious rituals, the healing of *han* occurs through “cognitive action” in that “it offers a way of coming to know by naming the suffering spirits that need to be healed.”⁹⁷ A Korean shamanistic ritual, *kut*, is performed for both “the *han* of the departed soul” and “psyche of living people.”⁹⁸ The most notable aim of the healing ritual is the cognitive “recognition of *han*,” which is a “fundamental human need” and “important prescription in the process of psychotherapy.”⁹⁹

It has often been believed among Korean people that resolving *han* is a similar process of mourning because the formation of *han* is mainly caused by the tragic and sudden loss of one’s beloved one. However, the inner dynamics of *jeong-han* is different from a normal mourning process. Rather, the formation of *jeong-han* is very close to that of melancholia. The dynamics of *jeong-han* has a similar inner struggle and process with melancholia as described by Sigmund Freud.

Freud, in his well-known article “Mourning and Melancholia,” compares and contrasts the processes of normal mourning and depression.¹⁰⁰ The most prominent difference between mourning and melancholia is that the object of loss is in the “outside world” in normal mourning whereas the depressive person experiences the loss of “one part of the ego” in melancholia. So, mourning is a natural and healthy, emotional and mental process that is common for every individual in losing an important object.

⁹⁶ Soo-Young Kwon, “How Do Korean Rituals Heal?: Healing of *Han* as Cognitive Property,” *The Journal of Pastoral Theology* 14, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 32.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 43.

¹⁰⁰ Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia (1917),” in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, vol. 14, trans. and ed. James Strachey (London: Hogarth, 1957), 243-258.

On the contrary, melancholia is a pathological condition that only exists in some people, whether the object of loss is of a real or ideal kind. Freud further describes that in melancholia the patient usually cannot “consciously perceive what he has lost” though in some cases one actually experiences the real loss of an object whereas “there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious” in mourning.¹⁰¹ In melancholia the grieving process of the loss of an object is mainly at the unconscious level while in mourning it is at the conscious level.

When one realizes the loss of the loved object, one’s reality testing demands that “all *libido* shall be drawn from its attachments to that object.”¹⁰² Although there exists a resistance, and the process cannot be accomplished immediately, each memory that is attached to the object can be brought up little by little and finally total detachment from the object can be possible. This process makes it possible for the ego to completely free itself from the lost object.¹⁰³

In melancholia, according to Freud, the good “object-relationship” is shattered by one’s feeling of “disappointment” or “hate” caused by the object in the situations of being “slighted, neglected, or disappointed.”¹⁰⁴ Like mourning, the withdrawal process of *libido* from the loved object begins, but the direction of the movement is different from that of mourning. Instead of moving on to another object, the “free *libido*” is withdrawn into one’s own ego. Experiencing a frustrating situation intensifies the ambivalent feelings of “love” and “hate,” and “hate” operates against the “substitutive object,” which is the part of one’s ego, to “abuse,” “debase,” and “make it suffer.”¹⁰⁵ As a result, “countless separation struggles are carried on over the object, in which

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 245.

¹⁰² Ibid., 244.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 245.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 248, 251.

¹⁰⁵ Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” 251.

hate and love contend with each other.”¹⁰⁶ These struggles take place wholly on an unconscious level.¹⁰⁷

These intense inner struggles between the part of the ego and the substitutive object are similar to the inner dynamics of *jeong-han*. A person with *jeong-han* projects his or her hatred not onto others but toward his or her own self. It is understandable because *jeong-han* is a mixed emotion of affection and hatred. While concerned about the well-being of the loved one, one hates and harms oneself, which can be regarded as a kind of depression and masochism. The orientation of both depression and masochism are “adaptations of unconscious guilt.”¹⁰⁸ They often coexist in many cases, though the therapist must assess which type is more dominant for an effective psychoanalysis.¹⁰⁹

In addition to similar inner dynamics, *jeong-han* and depressive-masochistic personality share similar types of emotions such as sadness, guilt, masochistic self-reproach, emptiness, longing, and worthlessness; sadness and guilt are two especially predominant feelings. A person with *jeong-han* often feels an agonizing sense of guilt as if they did something terribly wrong to the other who is often his or her mother or other family members. The feeling of sadness is also very acute for people struggling with *jeong-han* through they often function normally when they are not seriously disturbed. This emotion is a form of racial ethos as those of the Irish, the Jewish, or African-Americans.

Nancy McWilliams, a psychologist and psychoanalyst at Rutgers University describes the affection of a masochistic person, which also matches well with that of a person with deep *jeong-*

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 256.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 256.

¹⁰⁸ Nancy McWilliams, *Psychoanalytic Diagnosis: Understanding Personality Structure in the Clinical Process* (New York: Guilford Press, 1994), 275.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 275.

han. According to McWilliams, masochistic people easily feel “anger, resentment, and even indignation on their own behalf,” and regard themselves as “suffering, but unfairly.”¹¹⁰ In addition, they share similar emotions such as sadness and “deep unconscious guilt feelings” with depressive people.¹¹¹ Overall, *jeong-han* can be regarded as indigenous depression and masochism because it shares similar inner dynamics and emotions with depression and masochism.

Another inner dynamic directly related to *jeong-han* is the role and work of unconscious pathogenic beliefs in the formation process of *jeong-han*. McWilliams affirms the causal and developmental-stage-like relationship among the experiences of early loss or other kinds of frustration, unconscious beliefs out of the frustration, unconscious guilt, and the depressive neurosis.¹¹² When children experience feelings of disappointed, neglect, or rejection, they have an unconscious conviction that the cause of their unhappiness comes from themselves. McWilliams often hears in her clinical work that “the internalized object speaking” from her patient such as “It must be because I am selfish.”¹¹³ Depressive parents’ typical type of introjection is “the unconscious internalization of the more hateful qualities of an old love-object.”¹¹⁴ This negatively internalized unconscious belief causes guilt in making demands or maintaining relationships, and the guilt eventually develops into depression.¹¹⁵

Psychoanalysts Joseph Weiss and Harold Sampson’s explanation about the existence of the role of unconscious guilt, which is rooted in unconscious beliefs, provides an important

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 261.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 261.

¹¹² Ibid., 229, 237.

¹¹³ Ibid., 232.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 232.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 236-237.

insight in understanding the causal relationship between pathogenic beliefs and *jeong-han*.¹¹⁶ In explaining several types of guilt, Weiss and Sampson focus on separation guilt and survivor guilt that are common in many patients. Separation guilt is usually developed from a child's unconscious belief that she will harm her mother or father by having a wish to become independent from them. Survivor guilt stems from a person's belief that his or her acquisition of good things is made possible at the expense of his or her family members.¹¹⁷

Survivor guilt is one of the most popular themes in Korean literature, dramas, and movies especially during the 1970s and 1980s, which depict the Korean culture's unique depressive mood and lamentation. In these movies and novels, the protagonists' survivor guilt, usually riddled with depression and masochism, are sadly portrayed.

A typical story is about a successful man, usually the oldest son in the family who was born in a poor and powerless family that cannot support all of their children for education and material goods. The family supports the oldest son's education by paying the tuition for his high school, college, and professional training. The son passes the bar exam or medical exam and later becomes successful and wealthy at the expense of his family members' sacrifice.

This story is typical and can be easily observed among many Korean families. The successful man often struggles with survivor guilt, which slowly and gradually causes depressive neurosis, pathogenic beliefs, and survivor guilt in him. The depressive neurosis is *jeong-han*, which is similar to depression and masochism but intermingled with racial and cultural ethos and lament.

¹¹⁶ Joseph Weiss and Harold Sampson, *The Psychoanalytic Process: Theory, Clinical Observation, and Empirical Research* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1986), 48-54.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 50, 52.

Andrew S. Park points out the causal relationship between children's early experience of frustration and the formation of *han*. He observes that children's "mistrust" about their parents brings "hopelessness" and "despair" in their mind, and those feelings and beliefs play crucial roles in the formation of *han*.¹¹⁸ Park describes:

Sometimes, people's hostility cannot be steered directly to the source of frustration, because the culprit is unknown or too powerful to strike back against . . . If the relationship is between child and parent, the hostility can be accumulated or directed toward oneself . . . Children who have been abused often mistrust their parents and fall into hopelessness and despair. This hopelessness is . . . *han*.¹¹⁹

Park's illustration shows a cause-effect relationship between unconscious belief and the formation of *han*. It also implies that children's traumatic experience in being raised by abusive parents is brutal enough to form *han* in their mind though they do not necessarily experience a catastrophic event such as war. This is the reason for the existence of *jeong-han* among contemporary Korean people who have never experienced tragic events in their lives.

Volney P. Gay points out that adults' experience of war and the children's experience of traumatic conditions under abusive parents have similar impacts. Gay uses the reflections on a life by Czeslaw Milosz, a renowned Polish poet, in "Nazi-occupied Warsaw" and "postwar life under Soviet Union."¹²⁰ Molosz's illustration of lives under traumatic condition is quite striking: "learned philosophers fight over scraps of bread and elegant bourgeois families hunt for potatoes and scavenge amidst corpses" in "concentration camps and in burned-out cities"¹²¹ A more striking fact is that children raised under abusive conditions feel the same level of fear, anxiety, and frustration as those of adults under war. Gay explains:

For adult Polish intellectuals, that so many refined and otherwise elite persons perished in the midst of war, and that their values evaporated in the death camps, proves that their

¹¹⁸ Park, *Wounded Heart of God*, 16.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹²⁰ Gay, *Joy*, 119-120.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 120.

prewar values are worthless. In a similar way, abused children discover certain truths about themselves, for example, while cowering in a bedroom closet, hiding from an alcoholic parent.¹²²

There is a close relationship between *jeong-han*, shame, and narcissism, and they share crucial similarities: 1) emotional, cognitive, and physical dimensions in them; 2) close relations to unconscious pathogenic beliefs; 3) abusive parent-child relationship often by a depressive parent in the formation process; 4) common emotions of emptiness, pain, loneliness, sorrow, longing, resignation, and self-reproach; and 5) self-hatred.

Jeong-han, shame, and narcissism are relatively new territories that analysts who were trained in classic Freudian psychoanalysis were unfamiliar with in the past. They are widespread phenomena among contemporary people who have ambivalent, mixed emotions such as love and hatred at the same time.

Robert Karen, a clinical psychologist and psychotherapist in private practice in New York, claims that shame is “the pre-eminent cause of emotional distress in our time, a by-product of social changes and child-rearing practices that have made us unusually insecure about who we are.”¹²³ He mentions that the recent research supports the claim that shame is a crucial element in several widespread psychic syndromes in our time such as addictions, aggression, narcissism, depression, and obsessions.

Many therapists now believe that shame is a foundational cause for many forms of narcissism and depression, and shame is often conveyed from parents to children non-verbally employing tones of voice and facial expressions, which can be “more shaming than rigid commands.”¹²⁴ Contemporary parents often struggle with their own unmet needs, anger, and

¹²² Gay, *Joy*, 121.

¹²³ Robert Karen, *Shame*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1992, 40.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 46, 61-62.

bitterness. They cannot accept their children and cannot provide the necessary respect and appreciation that the children need for their development. Karen claims that “security gained from parental love, especially the sort of sensitive love that sees and appreciates the child for what he or she is and is respectful of the child’s feelings, differences, and peculiarities. Nothing seems to make shame cut more deeply than the lack of that love.”¹²⁵

Karen points out two important aspects of shame: identity confusion and unconscious pathogenic beliefs.¹²⁶ When shame strikes, one experiences confusion about one’s own identity. At one moment, one experiences acceptance, confidence, and superiority while in the next moment one has negative self-portraits and beliefs such as stupidity, ugliness, and inferiority. Such beliefs are unconscious pathogenic beliefs, which are usually false. Those pathogenic shame beliefs are a major roadblock in experiencing healthy interpersonal relationships in a group or community because one has a fear and belief that one is fundamentally unacceptable, unlovable, and unworthy as a member of the group or community.

In Korean culture in which harmonious integration of persons in a group is valued, shame has stronger impacts and causes deeper wounds. People have a profound sense of fear that they are unacceptable, unlovable, and unworthy. As a result, they may experience the loss of relationships and expulsion from the community. Parents who are struggling with their own sense of shame and anxiety, rear children who often experience constant unhealthy observation, involvement, and control by their parents. These children often experience a serious lack of distance, separation, and privacy and, as a result, have a tendency to develop an extreme sense of dependence on their mothers. These interactions between parents and children in this situation

¹²⁵ Ibid., 43.

¹²⁶ Ibid., 40, 42.

are often unhealthy and abusive. Children do not have the opportunity to develop a healthy self, which results in the experience of *jeong-han*, shame, and narcissism throughout their lives.

Jeong and Unhae in Korean Community

Jeong is the major source of dealing with the Korean cultural context and the Korean culture-bound emotion, *jeong-han*. Revitalizing *jeong*-dynamics and the strong sense of dynamic community is both a prevention and solution of dealing with the problems of contemporary Koreans who struggle with *jeong-han*. *Jeong*-dynamic is used as a device not only for the healing of *jeong-han* in contemporary Korean minds but also for the prevention of the formation of *jeong-han* in young children and the transmission from generation to generation.

In dealing with *jeong-han*, shame, and narcissism among contemporary Koreans, experiencing the dynamics of *jeong* in the community is necessary. In their recent studies, a new generation of Korean pastoral theologians has emphasized the necessity of interdependent interpersonal dynamics in a genuine community in forming and caring for people.¹²⁷

Young Gweon You emphasizes the importance of interdependency among Korean people in an “authentic and active community,” which “should be generative.”¹²⁸ You points out that it is necessary to restore “the spirit of community” as a “holding environment,” though the effective role of community seems to be weakened and diminished among contemporary Koreans. It is made possible by the rediscovery, re-visioning, and restoration of the role of community in contemporary Korean society. Through the role of an active and authentic community, one can experience the significant change of one’s self that can be extended toward

¹²⁷ Soo-Young Kwon, “Codependence and Interdependence: Cross-Cultural Reappraisal of Boundaries and Relationality,” *Pastoral Psychology* 50, no. 1 (September 2001): 39-52; Young Gweon You, “Seeking Authentic Self in Community,” *Pastoral Psychology* 51, no. 1 (September 2002): 87-94.

¹²⁸ You, “Seeking Authentic Self,” 92.

others. The goal of changing patterns of the self's interactions with others is forming a relational, responsible, and healthy self.

Soo-Young Kwon also emphasizes the necessity of the interdependent relationality of human beings for survival and continuous growth.¹²⁹ Kwon points out that this relationality refers to the relational characteristics of God and of human beings. God maintains interpersonal dynamics among three different Persons within God: God the Father, the Son, and the Spirit. God also makes intimate relationships with human beings through dynamic, dialectic interactions. Human beings are programmed from the moment of creation to live with others in dynamic, dialectic interactions in a community, and in mutual relationship with God.

In comparing and contrasting American and Korean cultures, Kwon makes an important claim that “the American-ness of boundaries and the Korean-ness of relationality need to interact with each other.”¹³⁰ American culture's emphasis on autonomy and boundaries should be complemented by the Korean cultural value of interdependency, empathy, and *jeong*. The Korean culture's unique characteristic of merged, enmeshed, often unhealthy interpersonal relationships need to be balanced by the American cultural value of autonomy and boundaries, which provides more space and distance.

Kwon claims that Koreans may have a tendency of being codependent, which defines a person who was wounded as a child, often called an “adult child.”¹³¹ These persons are relationship addicts and usually have frozen feelings. Kwon quotes Anne Wilson Schaef's description of persons who are codependent: “Not only are they not supposed to express their

¹²⁹ Kwon, “Codependence,” 39-52.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 41.

¹³¹ Ibid., 41.

feelings, they do not even feel what they feel.”¹³² These people ask a question, “how is my anger viewed by others” rather than expressing “this is what I feel.”¹³³ In quoting codependency theorists, Kwon claims that Koreans experience “the process of rooting one’s self-identity in one’s connections to (rather than autonomy from) others.”¹³⁴ Thus, Koreans are relational selves, and have “other-focused emotions” such as *jeong*, *han*, and shame.¹³⁵ These are particular cultural products and culture-bound emotions.

Among other-focused, culture-bound emotions, *jeong* is an important Korean ethos in relation to cultural and religious identity formation of Koreans. Through the dynamics of *jeong*, Koreans “feel connected and enlivened.”¹³⁶ Quoting L. I. Kim, Kwon explains that the *jeong* emotion “has more feminine quality of love, similar to the self-in-relation theory of the feminine psychology which emphasizes caring, connectedness and nurturing relations in love.”¹³⁷ Through *jeong* dynamics, the self of Koreans is an interdependent self.

Korean’s other-focused, culture-bound emotions have both positive and negative impacts in building human relationships in a community. It is important for Koreans to experience the *jeong* emotion and dynamics, but it is also necessary to learn “how to set boundaries” in “official matters in the public life.”¹³⁸ On the other hand, Americans “who want to control relationships with others” need to learn “how to be in relation” from the Korean culture.¹³⁹ The healthy, well-balanced, relationships are important not only in personal life but also in public life.

¹³² Ibid., 44.

¹³³ Ibid., 44.

¹³⁴ Ibid., 44.

¹³⁵ Kwon uses a term, *jeong*, instead of *jung*. A Korean word is often spelled differently in English. Andrew S. Park, in his book *The Wounded Heart of God* (1993), uses the term, *jung*. In this dissertation, I use *jeong* instead of *jung*.

¹³⁶ Kwon, “Codependence,” 45.

¹³⁷ Ibid., 45.

¹³⁸ Ibid., 47.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 47.

Young Gweon You provides two concepts that are important in interpersonal dynamics in Korean culture: the norm of reciprocal relationship and the concept of *unhae* or “gracious favor.”¹⁴⁰ Reciprocity is a rule through which human actors interact with others. In reciprocity, human actors balance between “mutual rights and duties, social assets and liabilities, debt and payment, give and take. Shame and guilt emerge when such a balance collapses.” You points out that the ideal of reciprocity is foundational in Korean culture, which is derived from the Confucian classics where Mencius provides the essential five relationships in human life:

Between father and son there should be affection, between ruler and minister there should be righteousness, between husband and wife there should be proper distinction, between elder and younger there should be proper order, and between friends there should be faithfulness.¹⁴¹

Those five foundational relationships are based upon the meaning and practice of *unhae*.

You explains *unhae* as follows:

Its meaning is “gracious favor,” which is parallel to that of rights and duties in the society of the West. One hears the term mentioned most often in contexts where a person feels indebted to someone . . . The gift of life and nurture one has received from one’s parents is considered the most fundamental *Unhae* of all. It is traditionally described as being “as vast and boundless as Heaven” and is beyond the possibility of adequate repayment. The character *Un* is made up of three characters which when joined literally mean, “The grace of feeding to the mouth.” When we were babies, our mother fed us. So, it is the greatest grace.¹⁴²

The Korean word, *unhae*, often literally translated into grace in English, though *unhae* has a different connotation from Western Christian notion of grace. The meaning of *unhae* is close to *jeong*, which has cognitive, affective, and practical aspects in it. When people experience *unhae*, they experience a cognitive recognition of the fact that they are indebted to

¹⁴⁰ Young Gweon You, “Shame and Guilt Mechanism in East Asian Culture,” *Journal of Pastoral Care* 51, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 56-64.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 61.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, 62-63.

someone special, an affective emotion of appreciation and heart-filled thankfulness, and actually paying back to someone special.

The awareness of *unhae* that Koreans experience is also a foundation of all human relationships in the community and society. As *jeong* has both positive and negative impacts, *unhae* has both positive and negative impacts on human relationships. You points out that it causes shame by feeling indebted to someone: “If someone doesn’t pay back grace, he or she feels shame.”¹⁴³ The shame that Koreans often experience is usually an unconscious pathogenic belief. In human relationships, especially between parents and children, parents who provides *unhae* for children usually does not expect payback from their children. Thus, there is nothing to be ashamed of from the part of recipients of *unhae*.

The concepts of *jeong* and *unhae* share two similar strengths. First, they are the foundation for unconditional cognition, affection, and practices toward others in community. Second, *jeong* and *unhae* involve concrete bodily practices of human actors. Persons with *jeong* and *unhae* not only recognize and feel the needs and sufferings of others, but also act concretely in order to support and help them. The meanings of *jeong* and *unhae* had been the powerful sources, ideals, values, and motivations for facilitating human interactions in Korean culture and society. However, the practices of *unhae* often causes shame and guilt in the recipient’s mind and heart by feeling indebtedness to someone, though the person who provides *unhae* does not ask or want payback. Thus, the ideals and values of *jeong* and *unhae* should be complemented by the Christian understanding of grace for Korean spiritual and psychological development, which will be explored in depth in the next chapter.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 63.

Contributions and Limitations for Korean Spiritual and Psychological Development

Anthropological theories and the Korean cultural concept of *jeong* complement and correct the limitations of self psychology for Korean spiritual and psychological development. Self psychology's notable limitations are: 1) overall inability to effectively deal with the second and third challenges for Korean spiritual and psychological development, challenge of religious and cultural identity formation and the challenge of the unity of religious beliefs and practices; 2) the lack of attention on and interest in later developmental stages in adolescents, young adults, and adults; 3) insensitivity to psychosocial, cultural, and religious factors (i.e. the self's encounter with cultural and religious stories, faiths, figures, and symbols) for identity formation by employing smaller, limited concept of the self than the wider and more comprehensive term of the identity; 4) the lack of concrete explanation on the interpersonal dynamics within a larger religious and cultural group or community for identity formation and the embodiment of religious values and ideals; and 5) limited perspective of development as a one-way traffic from *selfobject* to self, without much consideration on the mutual influence and creative activity of the self.

Overall, anthropological theories of Turner, Geertz, and Bourdieu we have explored in this chapter provide more balanced and comprehensive explanations for Korean spiritual and psychological development than Kohut's self psychology in various ways: 1) emphasis on the significance of community (*communitas* and field) as an intermediary place of interactions and changes, and the dynamics of human actors within the community; 2) the use of a more comprehensive term, human actor, which includes both mind and body than Kohut's self and Erikson's identity; 3) emphasis on both daily practices and religious ritual for spiritual and psychological development; 4) the balanced emphasis on both cognitive and affective aspects of

human formation and transformation; and 5) the emphasis on mutual influence between culture/religion and human actors by recognizing both the power of history and tradition and the creativity and activity of human actors.

Bourdieu's practice theory has several crucial contributions for understanding Korean spiritual and psychological development. First, it raises *field* (community), which is the communion of equal human actors, as a matrix or foundation for human development. Human development, whether it is mental, psychological, or spiritual, is accomplished through the interpersonal dynamics in a web or network of human actors, rather than acquiring individual self-knowledge or accomplishing self-transformation and self-cultivation in an isolated setting.

Second, practice theory values the important aspect of ordinary human life – concrete daily practices of human actors. Religious ritual provides a consecrated place and time where participants experience both affective and cognitive changes. However, religious ritual where participants experience the moment of *communitas* does not happen daily in most communities, and not many people participate in the ritual on a regular basis. Most people often experience changes in their cognition, emotion, and daily practices through the sum of the routine and repeated daily actions, which are a major tool for formation and transformation of both actors and community. Human actor's cognition and emotion direct daily practices, which also shapes human actor's cognition and emotion in turn.

Third, practice theory's emphasis on daily practices, through the notion of *hexis*, has an implicit ideal of spiritual and psychological development. It also makes a connection between the challenge of religious and cultural identity formation and the embodiment of religious beliefs, teachings, and ideals. Psychological development in general pursues the changes of cognition, emotion, and behavior in daily lives. Spiritual development also aims at not only cognitive and

affective change but also significant changes of daily disciplines and practices in community.

Practice theory also reminds us that particular identity formation within a community is always interconnected with the embodiment of the beliefs and ideals in daily lives.

Fourth, practice theory's emphasis on two-way traffic and mutual change between human actors and between human actors and culture/religion/community provides an implication for the interplay of personal change and social transformation. The interplay of personal and social transformation is not only the direction of research in the field of pastoral theology in recent years but also the goal of Korean spiritual and psychological development.

Practice theory provides a general, sound description of dynamic interactions of human actors and the process of formation and transformation in the community through its major notions of *habitus* and *hexis*. Its explanation and insight are applicable in explaining Korean spiritual and psychological development in community through the Korean cultural, group *habitus* and *hexis* of *jeong*. *Jeong* is the central component of Korean interpersonal relationship and the major source of psychological and spiritual development.

However, practice theory also has misunderstandings and limitations in explaining the culture-specific process of Korean spiritual and psychological development. First, Bourdieu's fundamental understanding of *habitus* is different from the foundational meaning of *jeong*. Practice theory provides a similar, general explanation but cannot effectively explain the particular interpersonal dynamics of Korean community, which is a foundation for spiritual and psychological development.

Bourdieu understands the meaning of *habitus* from the perspective of interest theory in anthropology. Interest theory understands human motivation, need, and desire in order to gain more capital and power, and the field as a place of competition, struggle, and conflict. Bourdieu

seems to emphasize the basic instinct and automatic behavioral response of human actors that are similar to those of animals, though he does not completely ignore the positive aspect of human interactions such as intimate relationship building and mutual communication among human participants in the field.

Despite similar dynamics between *habitus* and *jeong*, *jeong* has a different foundation and motivation. It is closer to the theological use of *habitus*, which describes visions, hopes, and practices such as passion, love, and grace. *Jeong* neither has the dynamics of battlefield nor involve severe competition and struggle like those of the animal world. The motivation of human actors is not gaining more capital but experiencing emotional bond, sharing love, and providing helping hands for others. People who make *jeong*-practices act according to others' needs. In this sense, the meaning of *jeong* is closer to Kohut's notion of empathy and McFague's meaning of friendship than Bourdieu's *habitus*.

The motivation and desire of *jeong* are much closer to self psychology's understanding of human beings who have a basic motivation, hunger and desire for growth, and intimate, deeper interpersonal relationships with others throughout the lifetime, though self psychology does not explicitly provide the theory of later development. *Jeong*-practices and *jeong*-dynamics in Korean culture and community do not aim at gaining more power, prestige, and capitals. It has the meaning of unconditional love and even sacrifice for others without expecting and asking payback from others. In this sense, *jeong* is close to the theological meaning of Divine love, grace, and sacrifice.

Second, practice theory lacks a developmental theme and process. It understands the development of human actors as a by-product or unintended result of the accumulation of repeated actions and instant choices for gaining more power and capital. It cannot explain the

consistency of human actions and does not offer a theory of human development as a long-term plan.

Third, practice theory cannot properly explain the source of power and motivation for continuous human development. Bourdieu emphasizes too much activeness, energy, and creativity of human actors. Human actors tend to continuously pursue material and non-material capital and benefit according to their own interests as if human actors have self-generated power plant that does not need recharging. Practice theory does not say more fundamental need and motivation of human actors for deeper, intimate human relationships and the continuous growth of human actors throughout the lifetime.