

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, framing activity in contentious politics has attracted increasing attention and enthusiasm from researchers of social movements (Benford and Snow 2000; Croteau and Hicks 2003; Johnston and Noakes 2005; Snow 2004). The important role of collective action frames in movement emergence, development, and outcomes is now well documented and widely recognized in the field (Cress and Snow 2000; Gamson 1992; McCammon et al. 2007; Zuo and Benford 1995).¹ Another more recent trend in movement scholarship is the explosion of interest in the dynamics of transnational social movements (della Porta et al. 2006; Juris 2008; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002; Moghadam 2008; Smith 2004, 2008; Tarrow 2005; Wiest 2007). Researchers have utilized existing theoretical tools and worked to develop new ones to deepen our understanding of social movements that cross boundaries of nation, culture, religion, race, and class. My dissertation project examines the convergence of these two vital topics in the field through a study of framing dynamics within the contemporary transnational women's movement.

Using a feminist methodological approach and drawing on multiple data sources, including an original dataset of online texts of movement organizations and participant

¹ The term “framing” refers to the meaning, or “signifying,” work in which movement actors engage. Snow and Benford (1988) write that “they frame, or assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (198). I discuss key concepts in framing theory in great detail in chapter 2.

observation of transnational activist meetings, I undertake three interrelated analytical endeavors in this dissertation. Focusing substantively on contemporary transnational women's activism, I structure my investigation around the following research questions:

- 1) In the contemporary global context, what are the primary collective action frames used by transnational women's movement organizations, specifically, transnational feminist networks?
- 2) What meso-level (organizational) factors influence organizational framing strategies of transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs)? In particular, what organizational-level characteristics influence a transnational feminist network's discursive response to hegemony?
- 3) How do transnational feminist organizations use collective action frames as discursive tools in their efforts to manage intramovement differences and build solidarities?

In addressing these questions, I extend existing research on transnational social movements and framing, much of which relies on case studies, by providing a theoretically grounded, systematic analysis that employs a comparative design meant to enhance generalizability. In so doing, I generate theoretical, substantive, and methodological insights of interest to scholars of social movement framing and transnational activism, and also to feminist theorists.

At the heart of this dissertation lie several key themes in relation to social movement framing. The first is strategy. In using the term "strategy" here, I do not necessarily mean to describe the multi-step process a movement or movement organization might take toward reaching a goal, but rather I mean to highlight the fact that movement decisions are not driven by ideology alone, but by strategic or instrumental concerns, too (McCammon, Hewitt, and Smith 2004; Meyer and Staggenborg 2007). Movement actors confront a range of strategic choices in their work, including which demands and claims to emphasize with the public, potential supporters,

political leaders, and also among themselves. Such strategic choices are not made in a vacuum, but rather are subject to various constraints. As Meyer and Staggenborg (2007) note, key questions currently facing social movements researchers include "...how the repertoire of contention is limited, how and why different groups select various tactics" (4). My project addresses just these issues, as I devote ample attention both to the variation in framing strategies within a movement and to the reasons underlying such variation.

A second crucial theme is intramovement difference. My study, based on a highly diverse movement that continues to struggle with multiple identities (as I discuss below), highlights the heightened challenges faced by transnational movements in their efforts to promote consensus. In fact, as I will illustrate, the transnational movement of and for women represents about as many layers of diversity as a researcher could imagine. While ideological, strategic, and identity differences within movements are most often studied at the local level (Levitsky 2007; Reger 2002; White 1999), I advance this scholarship by undertaking an investigation of intramovement difference that makes central the concerns of a globalized social movement.

I engage each of these themes and their relationship to framing at the meso-level, which has generally received less attention than either the macro and micro levels of social movement dynamics (Reger 2002). As part of this endeavor, I examine the interplay of structural and cultural forces at the meso-level, and ultimately argue for an inclusive perspective that recognizes the continued importance of resource mobilization theories, even in studies where the cultural aspects of movements (e.g., framing) are central.

In the remainder of this chapter, I explicate the importance of studying framing dynamics within the contemporary transnational women's movement. I then provide an overview of the chapters to come.

The Case for Studying Framing Practices in the Transnational Women's Movement

In any political struggle, there is a great deal at stake with regard to discourse; it is not simply about words, but about coherent, collaborative strategy and agenda-setting. However, transnational women's activism is an especially interesting case because global discourse has, for some time, constituted the very site of contention. Discursive politics has in fact served as the dominant tactic of women's and feminist activists, as I discuss below. Therefore, when we study the framing work of transnational women's movement organizations, we are inherently investigating at the site where major questions of movement strategies and development can be addressed, as well as where contentious issues in transnational feminist theory can be interrogated.

In an address to the Beijing² Plus Five Global Feminist Symposium in New York City in 2000, well-known feminist scholar-activist Charlotte Bunch discussed the work and accomplishments of transnational women's movements over the last thirty years. Bunch highlighted that women "have been doing the crucial basic work of redefining the world from the point of view of women's lives, of putting the problems and issues on the agenda, of actually changing the way people understand what the world is about" (National Council for Research on Women, 2000). Scholar and grassroots activists have successfully argued to the international community that *all* issues are women's issues,

² "Beijing" is frequently used as shorthand for the United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women (FWCW) and the parallel NGO forum held in Beijing, China in 1995.

and they have done so by engaging in a very intentional, strategic “discursive politics,” a tactic described by Katzenstein (1998: 17) as “the effort to reinterpret, reformulate, rethink, and rewrite the norms and practices of society and state.” Feminists and women’s groups, especially transnational feminist networks, have flooded international leaders with crucial information on the global status of women. They have worked to develop shared frames among themselves - for example, “women’s rights as human rights,” and most recently anti-fundamentalism/neo-liberal globalization/militarism – that can both promote intramovement solidarity and also be strategically deployed to external targets. Transnational women’s movements have literally transformed the “terms and nature of the debate” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 3), particularly at the supranational level. Implicit in this work has been the hope that a unified discursive and political strategy would not only transform the thinking of international institutions and leaders, but also heighten the potential for further activist collaboration across borders, cultures, and issues, and ultimately bring about meaningful change in the lives of women globally.

As feminists and women’s activists across the globe have engaged in diverse forms of collective protest, they have also necessarily confronted the same rocky terrain of intersectionalities and multiple identities with which feminist theorists have long grappled (Mendoza 2002; Mohanty 2003; Moya 2001; Narayan 1997; Santiago 2004; Spivak 1999). Such differences continually threaten to splinter women’s movements, yet many activists remain committed to finding paths to solidarity. Movement actors have repeatedly disrupted important boundaries and negotiated cultural, racial, national, religious, sexual, and material differences, ultimately achieving what Manisha Desai (2005, 2006) has called “solidarities of difference.” The development of strategic

discourses, or frames,³ that connect seemingly disparate issues, such as violence against women, economic development, sexual identity, and militarism has been a vital piece of this process. But to date we have little systematic evidence demonstrating how and why particular frames are deployed by different movement organizations. Movement scholarship would benefit from a clearer understanding of how the aforementioned types of differences may be implicated in these dynamics.

Of course, feminist and women's activists are not the only social movement actors to have faced the challenge of crafting effective frames for heterogeneous constituents, identities, and issues at a global level. In fact, transnational activism around issues of economic globalization, environmental justice, peace, and human rights has exploded in recent years and, accordingly, has received increasing attention from scholars of social movements (della Porta et al. 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Guidry, Kennedy

³ It is only recently that the term "discourse" has gained popularity in the study of social movements, perhaps partially reflecting the postmodern and poststructural influence of other disciplines. With the introduction of terms like discursive fields and opportunity structures, some scholars of social movements have begun to use concepts of frame and discourse almost interchangeably, as I will do in this work. While it is not my primary purpose here to argue the merits of such use, I take a brief moment to mention a few shared characteristics in an effort to justify my fluid use of frames and discourse. When reviewing the relevant literature in preparation for this project, I came across a plethora of terms used to describe essentially the same phenomena: frame, discourse, trope, narrative, story line, rhetoric, just to name a few. Johnston (2002:63) notes that, "ideational concepts are inherently imprecise, and distinctions between frames, ideologies, and discourses are frequently blurred." Johnston (1992) also notes the similarity of a frame to a Weberian ideal type. The overriding point here is that different terms are often used to describe essentially the same concepts. Take Hajer's (1995) discussion of environmental discourse, for example. Hajer defines discourse as "a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities" (44). He outlines a model of discourse analysis that he labels the "argumentative approach," which actually bears remarkable similarities to the type of analyses suggested by Benford, Steinberg, and other scholars attentive to social constructionist processes. In this argumentative approach, Hajer uses as a central theoretical tool the "story-line," which is conceptually analogous to a frame, or even to Steinberg's discursive repertoire (1998, 1999). "Story-lines are narratives on social reality through which elements from many different domains are combined and that provide actors with a set of symbolic references that suggest a common understanding" (62). Hajer goes on to say that story-lines provide a means of overcoming fragmentation and of achieving "discursive closure." The power of the story-line lies in the fact that it enables a kind of short hand; that is, by virtue of using a single particular element of it, the entire story-line is conjured. Even when actors may not be aware of or fully understand the full range of complexity in a story-line, they may make use of it and effectively communicate with others who have familiarity with any element of it. Much in the same way that social movement scholars think of frames, Hajer argues that discursive practices like the story-line play a critical role in creating social change.

and Zald 2000; Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997; Smith and Johnston 2002; Bandy and Smith 2005). Not surprisingly, much of this work has also pointed explicitly to the difficulties and importance of creating and sustaining shared perspectives among movement participants who vary so widely in their life experiences, social locations, identities, and priorities. In fact, Snow (2004) notes the heightened importance of shared frames and collective identities for movements seeking coalition at a supranational level. However, despite growing interest in the discursive politics of transnational social movements, systematic empirical analyses represent only a small portion of the existing scholarship (e.g., della Porta et al. 2006; Smith 2002). Instead, scholars have devoted much of their attention to theory-building (e.g., Tarrow 2005), and to the illumination of particular campaigns or movements through case studies (Bandy and Smith 2005; Smith and Johnston 2002). And while such pursuits have been crucial to the development of research on transnational social movements, more systematic studies – especially those that explicitly recognize intramovement differences at the organizational level – are needed to advance the field.

Likewise, while a broad range of feminist scholars has written on the emergence and development of contemporary transnational feminisms (e.g., Basu 1995; Friedman 1995; Grewal and Kaplan 1994; Naples and Desai 2002; Narayan 1997; Petchesky 2003), only a few integrate into their analyses the theoretical tools offered by a social movements perspective (Desai 2005; Ferree 2003; Ferree and Pudrovska 2006; Joachim 2003; Moghadam 2005; Sperling, Risman and Ferree 2001). In fact, it is not uncommon for the concerns raised by researchers of social movements to be quite separate from those raised by feminist theorists. Take, for example, feminist standpoint theories, which

are preoccupied with questions about *who* can speak for *which* women, and whose knowledge should be valued. Social movements scholars, even those who pay close attention to culture and discourse, tend not to be as concerned with questions of “authentic” representation, but rather the influences on and consequences of the claims constructed by activists. Furthermore, while postmodern, Third World, and postcolonial feminist theorists, in particular, recognize the importance of inter and intra-group differences, research in the field of social movements often tends to overlook such differences in an effort to illuminate meaningful patterns about movement development.⁴ And finally, although there is no shortage of critical feminist discussion on the complexities, challenges, and efficacy of activist discourses (Ackerly and D’Costa 2004; Cornwall and Brock 2004; Mendoza 2002), much of it takes place without engaging theoretical concepts in the movements literature that could enhance our understandings of discursive processes. For instance, rarely are concepts such as political opportunities and framing utilized in scholarship geared toward the interrogation of transnational feminist practices and discourses; bringing such conceptual tools into conversation with critical and postcolonial feminist theoretical work holds great potential for more fruitful interdisciplinary research. Again, what we now need are more systematic analyses of how and why activists deploy, or choose not to deploy, particular frames.

Through identifying weaknesses in existing research on the discursive work of global feminist activists and transnational social movements more generally, an opportunity emerges to provide a more integrated analysis in the service of advancing

⁴ For instance, recent studies of GLBT (Valocchi 2005) and labor (Fantasia and Voss 2004) movements leave intramovement differences largely unexamined. But see Rupp and Taylor (1999) and Weldon (2006) for notable exceptions that highlight intramovement differences and also utilize concepts from social movement theory.

both fields. My dissertation research seeks to intervene at the nexus of the literatures on social movements and feminist theory through an analysis of frame variation across transnational women's movement organizations in the contemporary period. The majority of existing research on global women's activism deals with the UN Decade for Women (1975-1985), as well as the 1980s and early 1990s, while neglecting the post-Beijing period. Transnational feminist efforts around UN conferences, in particular, are quite well documented (Chen 1995; Friedman 1995; Dodgson 2000; Joachim 2003; Meyer and Prügl 1999; Moghadam 1999 and 2005; Peters and Wolper 1995; Pietila and Vickers 1996), but we know far less about more recent women's activism in the post-millennium period.

The significant changes in global politics in recent years have shifted the terrain of collective action in a number of ways. Among the most notable changes for women's movements are the decreasing role of the UN in bringing movement organizations together for face-to-face gatherings; the anti-WTO protests in Seattle, which catalyzed a whole host of anti-globalization activism (Fisher and Ponniah 2003; Starr 2001); the emergence of the World Social Forum (WSF) as the premiere site of transnational activist collaboration; and the rise of militarism and fundamentalism in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The convergence of these transitions constitutes a new and different political context in which transnational activists are working and to which they must respond. Further study of this period is sorely needed to gain a deeper understanding of the shifting dynamics of transnational social movements, broadly speaking, and also of women's political action specifically. Thus, my research ultimately addresses substantive needs in the literature on transnational women's activism, as well

as theoretical and empirical needs in the literatures on framing and global social movements.

Overview of Chapters

I now present a brief outline of each chapter in the manuscript. In chapter 2, I discuss the historical and theoretical foundations for the project. I define key concepts, provide a historical overview of transnational women's activism, and review the theoretical and empirical literatures relevant to my three analytical endeavors. Specifically, I engage scholarship in the areas of social movement framing, transnational social movements, and feminist theory to illuminate the importance of my questions and guide my research expectations. I conclude the chapter with a review of the hypotheses examined in chapters 4, 5, and 6.

Chapter 3 includes extensive discussion of the feminist methodology that informs my research, as well as the data sources, data collection strategies, and analytic techniques employed. I describe the careful generation of a representative sample of transnational feminist networks (N=31), a key organizational expression of contemporary global women's movements, and discuss the content analysis of their online texts that serves as the basis for chapters 4 and 5. I explain my use of qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), and discuss the operationalization of the variables in the analysis. I then highlight the context and importance of my participant-observation of transnational activist meetings from which the evidence for chapter 6 is drawn.

In chapter 4, drawing on evidence from a content analysis of organizational texts from a representative sample (n=31) of transnational feminist networks (TFNs), I map the

landscape of variation in framing practices among these transnational women's organizations. I explain and provide examples of the substantial heterogeneity in the collective action frames of organizations, and document the relative prevalence of those frames.

In chapter 5, I focus on a particular aspect of frame variation: organizational discursive responses to hegemonic ideas. Utilizing resource mobilization and framing theories, I employ qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to investigate the influences of organizational-level factors on organizational framing responses to hegemony. I show that organizational resources, structure, and identity converge to shape framing outcomes in this regard, thus demonstrating the continued relevance of structural and cultural factors in explaining social movement dynamics.

Chapter 6 entails a discussion of the discursive tools being used by transnational women's organizations in their efforts to manage intramovement diversity. Drawing on ethnographic evidence collected at three major transnational activist conferences, I use a narrative approach to document key sources of movement fragmentation in the contemporary context, and show how activists are employing collective action frames in their efforts to mitigate differences and build consensus.⁵ I then argue that activists are attracted to frames with particular types of characteristics as they seek to promote solidarity.

Finally, in chapter 7, I review the key findings of the dissertation, and discuss the major theoretical and empirical contributions represented by the project, highlighting the pieces that will be of interest to different scholarly audiences. I then conclude with an

⁵ These activist meetings include the World Social Forum and the Feminist Dialogues, each of whose political significance I discuss in detail in chapters 2 and 3.

explanation of implications of the research, and I propose suggestions for future research in the field.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Introduction

In this chapter, I provide historical and theoretical context for the project and elucidate the scholarly importance of my inquiry. The chapter proceeds as follows: I first address the historical development of contemporary transnational feminism as a social movement, and then move into a theoretical discussion of social movement framing. Beginning with an explanation of key terms and concepts, I consider the significance of collective action frames for social movements, and the factors theorized and demonstrated to exert an influence on the framing practices of movement organizations. I give particular attention to research that has examined discursive heterogeneity within movements, and also discuss the ways in which feminist theorists provide useful tools for such analysis. Finally, drawing on each of these bodies of literature, I lay out my hypotheses regarding variation in organizational framing practices that will be examined in the chapters to come.

Transnational Women's Movements: A Historical Look

Conceptual Foundations

The central topic of this dissertation is riddled with highly contested and/or ambiguous terms (e.g., “global,” “feminist”). As such, I take care to be very explicit and

transparent about my understanding and use of the terms for the purposes of this project. Before moving forward with the historical discussion, it is worthwhile to pause for a reflection on some key concepts. Let us consider the notion of a “global feminist movement,” as such an exercise will also help us think about why feminist theory can benefit studies of social movements (particularly of global women’s activism). In recent years, the terms “global” and “transnational” have been used at unprecedented levels by scholars and activists, often with different or unclear meanings. I understand the term “transnational,” in the context of collective protest, to mean that the site of activity shifts from place to place, transcending national borders, and often targets supranational institutions (not simply local or national ones) for social change. Global has a slightly different connotation. While some understand global to mean “foreign,” “imperial,” and/or the opposite of “local,” my use of the term “global” is inclusive of, rather than the opposite of, local action (Ackerly and Attanasi 2009). With this understanding, I resist the universalizing character sometimes thought of as inherent in the term.⁶ I find especially useful Ackerly and Attanasi’s (2009) perspective on global feminisms, treating it as “the study of feminisms from around the world and the world around each of us, of local feminisms, of feminisms transnationally, and of global politics through feminist lenses” (4). Thus, while locally-based activism is outside the empirical scope of this dissertation (which focuses explicitly on transnational action), I recognize the theoretical

⁶ “Universalizing” is a term commonly used by postmodern and postcolonial scholars to critique the misrepresentation inherent in the homogenization of experiences, perspectives, and narratives of a certain analytical category (e.g., women). For example, Mohanty (1991) is widely cited for her critique of white, Western feminists’ attempts to universalize women’s experiences and issues while ignoring the differences and complexities introduced by race, nation, class, and culture. Some theorists bristle similarly at the use of the term “global.”

and practical connections between activism in local, regional, national and transnational venues.

I use the term feminism with great caution, but I use it nonetheless. I use it with an awareness and attention to the fact that there are in fact many, many versions of feminism conceived of and practiced across the globe. Furthermore, I use the term while recognizing that many of the activists and organizations working on behalf of women do not themselves identify as feminists, and in some cases even actively shun the label for political reasons (Ferree and Hess 2000; Ferree and Tripp 2006; Rupp and Taylor 1999). In an effort to respect this choice, I often use the phrase “feminist and women’s activists” when referring broadly to individuals who engage in collective action on behalf of women. However, as I will clarify below, I do use the term “transnational feminist network” to refer to transnational advocacy organizations working on behalf of women’s issues, whether they self-identify as feminists or not. I make this choice largely to utilize a concept that has gained substantial traction in the literature on global activism, and thus I am better able to situate my work in that lacuna of interlocutors.

I do not view feminism merely as the theory of gender oppression, nor as simply the basis of an identity politics; instead, I embrace a broader understanding of a feminist mission (hooks 1984, 2000). I understand feminism as simultaneously a theory and a movement – one that seeks to end a wide range of oppression and domination, not just those that have (or appear to have) their basis in gender. As such, I use the feminist label with an attention to the complicated ways in which sources of oppression such as class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, disability, nationality, culture, and religion intersect to create different kinds of experiences and concerns, and I acknowledge that some feminists are

quite skeptical about the possibilities of building meaningful coalitions across such vast differences (Mendoza 2002). Moreover, I discuss feminism with an acute awareness of the historical marginalization, silencing, and misrepresentation of particular groups even within feminist theory and activism (Mohanty 2003; Schueller 2005), and strive to be critical of any such tendencies in my own research. As I will discuss in greater detail later, the above considerations influence my project in a pervasive manner, from the questions I ask, to the data collection and coding, to the analysis and eventual dissemination of the work.

Linked closely to my understanding of feminism is my conceptualization of the social movement associated with it. Tarrow (1994) defines social movements as “collective challenges...by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and authorities.” Donatella della Porta et al. (2006) add to this notion, arguing that, “The fundamental characteristic of a social movement is its ability to develop a *common interpretation of reality* to nurture solidarity and collective identifications” (18). Though, as I have already noted, the differential experiences, identities, and concerns of would-be feminist activists create enormous difficulty for achieving shared interpretations, perhaps the important component to consider is that attempts are in fact being made to develop solidarities (Ackerly and D’Costa 2004; Antrobus 2004; Eschle 2001; Hawkesworth 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Moghadam 2005). As Bandy and Smith (2005) remind us, examining transnational social movements challenges our use of standard concepts in social movement theory, and forces us to question what constitutes a social movement. And while it is true that contemporary transnational feminist activism looks different (e.g., fluid organizational

boundaries, diffuse networks of activists, non-state targets, different kinds of tactics), than the kinds of social movement activity that have historically been the subject of scholarly inquiry, this is not an indication that the label “social movement” is inappropriate, but rather that theoretical understandings may still be catching up to rapidly changing forms of collective protest in a globalizing world. For instance, della Porta and Tarrow (2004), citing Cunningham’s (2001) study of collective action on the U.S./Mexican border around issues of immigration and trade, point out that state-centered activism has given way to new forms of resistance that tend toward coalitions, and that out of these empirical shifts arise opportunities for theoretical expansion.

Bandy (2004), drawing on Tarrow (2001), defines a transnational social movement network as “a collaboration of movement organizations in at least two countries that exchange information and experiences, provide mutual support, share a partially organized social base, and engage in joint strategic campaigns” (411). Keck and Sikkink (1998) develop the concept of a transnational advocacy network (TAN), which is characterized by diverse international actors united by a set of shared values and discourses. Keck and Sikkink point out that, “What is novel in these networks is the ability of nontraditional international actors to mobilize information strategically to help create new issues and categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments” (2). Common to these different conceptual labels is an understanding that the types of organizations making up the global social movement industry, while different than local or national SMOs in terms of constituency and targets, still share some key characteristics with our traditional notion of

an SMO, like the need for shared interpretations of the world, as well as ways of talking about those perspectives.

Valentine Moghadam (2005) has adapted such concepts to define an explicitly feminist incarnation that is characterized by, among other things, a more formal organizational structure. She argues that the major development of contemporary feminism is the rise of the transnational feminist network (TFN): “The global social movement of women is characterized by a set of grievances, claims, and objectives (global feminism), and an effective organizational type (the transnational feminist network)” (2005: 19).⁷ Sperling, Ferree, and Risman (2001) call these types of umbrella organizations a “major vehicle” for the travel of feminist ideas, discourses, and strategies. Each network often comprises NGOs, social movement organizations (SMOs) individual activists and scholar-activists, and in some cases even other networks. These networks focus considerable, though not exclusive, attention on global targets – global governance institutions such as the UN, World Bank, or World Health Organization. Membership in the networks is sometimes quite fluid. Most often, TFNs (like other feminist organizations) also attempt to avoid hierarchy, centralization, and bureaucracy, and are committed to a feminist, democratic process. Although the leaders of TFNs are typically middle-class and very well educated, they often have strong connections with grassroots NGOs and women of the “popular classes” (Moghadam 2005). TFNs might focus on a particular feminist issue such as reproductive health (e.g., Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights), or might be broader in scope (e.g., the Association for Women’s Rights in Development).

⁷ It is important to note that Moghadam’s use of the term “network,” as well as my own use of the term, does not correspond perfectly to classic definitions offered by social network theorists (e.g., Berkowitz 1982; Wellman 1983).

For the purposes of my study, the concept of a TFN is the analytical equivalent of a transnational social movement organization (TSMO). To further clarify, the network implicated in the concept “TFN” is not just a set of loosely connected movement actors, but rather a particular kind of organization, each with its own leadership, mission statement, goals, and structure. It is true that the global women’s movement, in its entirety, might be thought of as a network (in the broader sense that Keck and Sikkink have used the term) that includes other discrete networks (such as TFNs) as well as smaller organizations. However, when I use the term network in this study, I am not referring to the entire network of actors who might be considered part of the movement; rather, I am referring to Moghadam’s more specific use of the term, which conveys a particular type of transnational movement organization that has clearer, more structured boundaries. As I will discuss later, the social movement organizations whose mission statements serve as the empirical substance of chapters 4 and 5 are all transnational feminist networks.

Moghadam’s characterization of transnational feminism as a collective, unified project is actually quite optimistic in comparison to that of some other feminist scholars. For instance, Mendoza (2002) expresses tremendous skepticism about “transnational feminism” as a project; she argues that, although more recent postcolonial versions of transnational feminisms have attempted to pay theoretical attention to intersectionalities, they have failed to incorporate adequately a political economic perspective. Mendoza believes that such theorizing has failed in providing a basis for solidarity across differences of class, race, ethnicity and sexuality; practically, she further worries about

the ways in which transnational feminist practices have intensified inequalities *among* women.

Desai (2005) is another skeptic, if a bit gentler in her critique. She questions the utility of transnational feminism, pointing out the contested nature of the concept among some feminist scholars and activists. While acknowledging the discursive and policy success of transnational feminist activism, Desai makes visible its historical limitations and weaknesses in producing real, material change in women's lives; she also echoes Mendoza's concerns about power and resource gaps among differently situated activists.

With all of these cautions in mind, while I ultimately refer to a global or transnational feminist movement, I do not mean to convey a monolithic set of harmonious ideas and actors. Rather, I understand such a "movement of movements" in a very critical, pluralist sense, with an awareness of the tenuous, heterogeneous and complicated nature of coalitions, as well as an acknowledgement that there are voices that remain unheard in even the best collaborative efforts.

The Development of Contemporary Transnational Women's Activism

A concise review of the development of contemporary transnational women's activism is instructive as we consider the context of this study. The emergence and development of feminist transnational collaboration beginning in the 1970s is well documented (Antrobus 2004; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Moghadam 2005; Peters and Wolper 1995). Shifting availability of resources and political opportunities, as well as the agency of movement actors, converged to shape the development of the movement over time; this journey included explosive growth in the 1980s and early 1990s, a

decrease in movement visibility during the late 1990s, and now transformation in the new millennium. Moghadam (2009: 63-64) points out that “While not all feminists agree on the matter, many argue that ‘the women’s movement’ is a global phenomenon, and that despite cultural differences, country specificities, and organizational priorities, there are observed similarities in the ways that women’s rights activists frame their grievances and demands, form networks and organizations, and engage with the state and intergovernmental institutions.”

The contemporary phenomenon many think of as the global women’s movement began taking shape in the 1970s, and was facilitated in part by United Nations World Conferences, particularly those associated with the UN Decade for Women. The earliest efforts saw tensions in priorities between women of the global North and South (Desai 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Confronting those differences ultimately led to learning and growth for the movement, as well as discovery of common ground in spite of material and identity differences. Transnational networks proliferated and resources were on the rise for new organizations and initiatives, face-to-face meetings, and other forms of communication and collaboration. Effective movement-building continued well into the 1990s, during which feminist activists seized upon a series of UN World Conferences and parallel NGO forums to infuse a feminist human rights framework, and “gender the agenda” for global politics (Friedman 2003). While activists celebrated political gains leading up to the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, many worried about the lack of concrete improvements as well as the growing strength of forces opposed to women’s rights. The post-Beijing era is often characterized as one of stalled progress, as women’s rights activists faced increasing internal and external challenges.

Some leaders felt that feminist concerns had been compartmentalized, or “siloeed,” (largely unintentionally) to the point that building coalitions across issues and cultures was once again difficult (Ackerly 2006). To cite a specific example, the Beijing Platform for Action divided women’s issues into “critical areas of concern,” which promoted narrower issue focus and arguably impeded the potential for coalition-building around cross-cutting frameworks. Resources available to the movement had begun to shrink; fundamentalisms, militarism (e.g., the Bush administration’s “war on terror”), and unbridled neoliberalism were manifesting ever more oppressively in women’s lives. Even so, the global justice movement was growing in strength and organization, mounting resistance to many of the same oppressive forces that women were confronting.

In the post-Beijing, post 9/11 world, women’s movements have looked for new ways of working. Cognizant of the somewhat reactive, UN-driven nature of previous change efforts, women’s activists are determined to maintain autonomy, creating their own agendas and articulating their own priorities. Feminists have sought new spaces and partners in their quest for social justice, and have seized opportunities to build sustainable alliances with extra-feminist social justice movements interested in toppling the same enemies. For many, the World Social Forum (WSF) has offered refreshing possibilities for such partnerships. Now the largest political gathering in human history (Smith and Karides 2007), the WSF is attended by tens of thousands of activists, academics, policy-makers and donors from around the world. This venue is an international conference that serves as “...an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and inter-linking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neo- liberalism and

to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are committed to building a society centred on the human person” (WSF Charter of Principles, <http://www.wsfindia.org/charter.php>). The conduciveness to coalition-building, relatively low bureaucratic barriers, holistic approach that recognizes intersections, and critical and inclusive method of organizing are all positive features of the WSF space and process that feminists have identified. That said, the WSF has not been a panacea for transnational collaboration. Women’s and feminist activists have approached the space with a combination of hope and skepticism (Hewitt 2008), equipped with the lessons of previous decades of experience, thoughtfully asking “Will this be a productive space for us?”

Theoretical Underpinnings of the Study: Frames and Framing in Social Movements

In this section, I first provide some brief remarks on the foundations of the framing perspective in social movements. Second, I highlight some of the important weaknesses in existing framing research in order to foreground key concerns of this project, and then follow by laying out the study’s major interventions. I then move to a discussion of theory and research that explicitly relates to my key research questions.

Recall from the first chapter these questions:

- 1) In the contemporary global context, what are the primary collective action frames used by transnational women’s movement organizations, specifically, transnational feminist networks?
- 2) What meso-level (organizational) factors influence organizational framing strategies of transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs)? In particular, what organizational-level characteristics influence a transnational feminist network’s discursive response to hegemony?

- 3) How do transnational feminist organizations use collective action frames as discursive tools in their efforts to manage intramovement differences and build solidarities?

My approach to the questions is informed by research that examines: 1) intramovement differences in framing practices, 2) contextual and organizational factors we can expect to influence movement framing, and 3) feminist theories that address the challenges of forging shared understandings among differently situated constituents. Throughout my treatment of this research, I note especially those studies that have utilized evidence from transnational/global movements to investigate movement discourse.

Collective Action Frames 101: Defining Key Terms

The cultural shift in the study of social movements over the past twenty years has been well documented by social science researchers (Benford and Snow 2000; Gamson 1992; Jasper and Goodwin 2004; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; McAdam 1994), and the explosion of research on collective action frames and framing processes is certainly the most prominent example of this phenomenon (Johnston and Noakes 2005). In the mid-1980s, scholars began to criticize the structural emphasis of most social movements research. Although resource mobilization and political process models contributed a great deal to our understandings of collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam 1982), very little attention was given to the ways that culture, ideology, and meaning construction came to bear on the emergence and development of social movements. The framing perspective arose out of attempts to remedy this deficiency, and has since become highly influential in the field.

Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina (1982) first applied the concept of framing to social movements with their notion of the “injustice frame.” David Snow and his colleagues (1986) later penned their foundational theoretical piece on frame alignment processes, in which they adapt Goffman’s (1974) frame analytic perspective to explain the role of social psychological factors in micromobilization. Snow et al. describe frame alignment as “the linkage of individual and SMO interpretations, such that some set of individual interests, values and beliefs and SMO activities, goals, and ideology are congruent and complementary...By rendering events or occurrences meaningful, frames function to organize experience and guide action, whether individual or collective” (464). Scholars of social movements have come to understand framing processes as the means by which movement actors translate grievances into action, as a major impetus for participation in protest, and as a vehicle for creating and sustaining collective identity (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2004). This symbolic, or “signifying,” work is now widely viewed as an important tool not only for recruiting participants during the early life of a movement, but also for maintaining membership and morale, cultivating collective identity, and communicating with other targets such as the media, the state, and movement opponents in order to achieve both political and cultural outcomes (Cress and Snow 2000; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; McCammon 2001).

Snow and Benford (1988) extend their theoretical perspective by outlining three core framing tasks, which they call diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing.⁸

⁸ In Joachim’s (2003) discussion of NGO framing for women’s rights, the three-stage agenda-setting process she describes within the UN is virtually conceptually identical to Snow and Benford’s core framing tasks. The *problem stream* involves the identification of “unacceptable situations,” the *policy stream* the generation of solutions, and the *politics stream* the motivation for action. She asserts that when these

Diagnostic framing refers to the identification of the problem or the injustice at hand along with its causes, while prognostic framing refers to the presentation of a solution to the problem. *Who* is labeled as the enemy and *how* to attack the problem are both highly important and often contentious features of frames. Finally, motivational framing entails the construction of a rationale for engaging in collective action; it articulates that participation is the path to achieving the desired solution.

Collective action frames often contain an identity component, as well. Gamson (1988, 1992) describes this identity component as defining the “we” (the group with shared grievances, interests, and values) versus the “them.” Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994) note also that identity is implicated in all framing, even if unintentionally.

I shift direction now to think for a moment about conflicts and differences in intramovement framing as a way of highlighting the heterogeneous nature of movement groups and actors even while working toward the same or similar goals. Intramovement differences and their relationship to framing, along several dimensions, constitute a primary theme in my study. I am concerned with documenting the diversity of collective action frames employed within the transnational women’s movement, examining organizational-level differences that lead groups to utilize particular framing practices, and also with understanding how collective action frames are being used by activists in their efforts to address intramovement differences such as strategy and identity.

In their discussion of framing political opportunity, Gamson and Meyer (1996) note that, “The degree to which there are unified and consensual frames within a movement is variable and it is comparatively rare that we can speak sensibly of *the*

streams occur together, agendas are created. Thus, one could argue that when the three core framing tasks are attended to simultaneously, movement actors are doing the work of agenda-setting.

movement framing. It is more useful to think of framing as an internal process of contention within movements with different actors taking different positions” (283). They make the statement as if it is an obvious point recognized by all movement researchers, and while few would argue with them, the truth is that we do not always consider it in our analytical endeavors; often, framing scholarship leaves intramovement differences unexamined (e.g., Valocchi 2005; Zuo and Benford 1995). Much is made of the discursive contestation between movements and their opponents (Benford and Hunt 2003; Klandermans 1992; McCaffrey and Keys 2000; Ryan 1991), but there is comparatively little attention given to intramovement contestation (for a recent exception, see King 2008). As Benford (1997) argues, much more research is needed to explain the dynamics of internal discourse.⁹ Because achieving consensus mobilization (Klandermans 1984),¹⁰ or constructing shared interpretations designed to lead to participation, is a crucial task for any social movement, intramovement discursive difference is a worthy topic of analysis.

To date, movement scholars have examined discursive differences using two primary concepts: “frame disputes” (Benford 1993; Haines 1996) and “frame variation” (McCammon 2009; Snow, Vliementhart, and Corrigan-Brown 2007). Scholars interested in movement factionalism have also touched upon the issue of discursive difference, but in most cases the root of divergent framing is attributed to competing ideologies, most commonly radical vs. moderate/mainstream (Barkan 1986; Haines 1984; Reger 2002). That is, framing differences are treated as the logical and obvious extension of the identities and beliefs of movement actors. While the influence of ideological factors

⁹ Although Benford asserted this point over a decade ago, scholarship in this area has not grown considerably.

¹⁰ Klandermans’ concept is not unlike what Snow et al. (1986) call frame alignment.

should not be ignored, they (alone) may be an overly simplistic explanation for disparate framing practices among groups within the same social movement.

Benford (1993) provides one of the earliest empirical investigations that explicitly references internal frame disputes as the central topic of analysis. Introducing the concept, he argues that internal frame disputes are ubiquitous features of social movements, and that they can occur in constructing and deploying diagnostic, prognostic, or motivational frames. Diagnostic disputes indicate disagreement about the source of the injustice, about where the blame resides; prognostic disputes concern the proposed solutions or remedies appropriate for addressing the problem. Disagreements that involve motivational frames are actually frame resonance disputes, or rather disputes over how and which frames should be disseminated to which audiences in order to boost mobilization. Benford finds evidence of all three types of disputes in the nuclear disarmament movement, and concludes that they are in fact quite common. Furthermore, he observes that internal discursive conflicts most often involved the radical and moderate factions of the movement, thus locating the source of the tensions in competing ideological positions. He concludes that such conflicts had both negative and positive consequences for the movement and its constituent organizations.

Haines (1996) documents framing disputes within the anti-death penalty movement in the U.S., attributing them largely to ideological conflicts, but otherwise the concept has remained unexplored. Recently, a few movement scholars have begun again to take up questions around frame differences within movements. King's (2008) study of conflict within the Sierra Club in the United States suggests that ideology only partially

explains frame disputes, and that other factors such as strategic concerns also influence divergent organizational framing practices.

Other scholars have also noted that differences in strategic choices can result in the deployment of different frames (McCammon, Hewitt, and Smith 2004), or in differential success with the media (Rohlinger 2002). For instance, McCammon, Hewitt, and Smith (2004) find evidence that framing activity in the U.S. state suffrage movements was quite strategic, influenced largely by target audiences and opportunities in the cultural environment. Rohlinger also shows the importance of agency, demonstrating how clear and intentional strategic goals helped the National Organization for Women in its efforts to gain media coverage. Gamson and Meyer (1996) and Meyer and Staggenborg (2007) affirm the importance of strategy in framing, as well.

Croteau and Hicks (2003) introduce the concept of a “consonant frame pyramid,” which refers to the difficult task faced by coalitions (or networks) of ensuring that the interpretations of individual actors link up with those of organizations, and finally with the larger collection of organizations. Collections of organizations, whether they be temporary or permanent in nature, must attend carefully to this task in order to avoid debilitating frame disputes. Croteau and Hicks advance our theoretical understanding of discursive disputes, particularly among coalitions of diverse movement actors, by pointing out these multiple levels of alignment necessary to create shared frames within a coalition.

While “dispute” carries with it the assumption that there is animosity and/or heated deliberation within the movement, “variation” merely points out that different movement actors may interpret issues differently, resulting in heterogeneous goals and

strategies, and thus, frames. More recently, some researchers have moved toward examining heterogeneity in framing using this less politically charged concept of “frame variation” (McCammon 2009; Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigan-Brown 2007).¹¹ Although contention (i.e., disputes) over framing may be present within a movement, this need not be the case, particularly in a transnational social movement where many actors never communicate directly with one another, much less meet face-to-face to engage in a heated negotiation over framing strategy. The notion of variation may be especially useful in research that seeks to uncover influences on the framing practices of different movement actors who are geographically disparate, or who work at different time periods. Thus, given the substantive topic of interest in my study, frame variation is the more appropriate concept; I discuss this in additional detail later in the chapter.

Critiques of the Framing Literature

I now provide some brief remarks that place the framing perspective under an “intellectual microscope” to hone in on its weaknesses and gaps; this discussion serves to illuminate further my study’s intervention into the extant framing scholarship. While the meaningful contributions of framing research to the investigation of social movements are widely acknowledged, more than a few movement scholars have noted critical shortcomings in both the theoretical and empirical work (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow 2004; Johnston 2005). Benford (1997) provides a thoughtful set of criticisms, beginning with the fact that the majority of framing scholarship has emphasized either conceptual discussion or has focused on a single case. Although there is no shortage of empirical research in general, particularly of a descriptive nature, “we lack systematic empirical

¹¹ I return to a discussion of frame variation, reviewing its organizational influences, later in the chapter.

studies across cases, movements, and time” (411). Moreover, much of the existing work only identifies and describes various collective action frames, rather than attempting to substantiate causal claims about the role of framing in movement development. Benford also notes that analyses at the descriptive level, in particular, tend to mischaracterize frames as monolithic, static entities rather than as malleable, contested, complex, and evolving social constructions. He provides four suggestions that he argues can move us toward a more fruitful analysis of framing in social movements: 1) to give greater attention to the context in which framing occurs (such as the multi-organizational field), 2) to study movements that transcend nation-state borders, 3) to examine framing dynamics over time, so that changing social and political contexts can be taken into account, and 4) to “study more carefully negotiation and conflict processes endemic to the development of collective action frames” (417). As I will discuss further, my study responds explicitly to numbers two and four in Benford’s list, and compares evidence across cases for a systematic empirical analysis of variation.

Over a decade since Benford’s “insider’s critique,” others are still calling for more comparative research in the field, particularly on the topic of frame variation (McCammon 2009; Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigan-Brown 2007). Snow and his colleagues write that, “The scant research on frame variation has generally focused on changes in the way an issue or movement is framed from one point in time to another, with even less attention devoted to variation in framing the same event across different actors” (388). There exists a continued need to flesh out these dynamics in future research, particularly as movement forms and targets evolve globally.

Steinberg (1998, 1999) also articulates some pointed critiques of the framing perspective. While Benford's criticisms focus mostly on the ways in which the theory has been applied empirically, Steinberg takes issue with the theory itself. He contends that framing theory has tended to ignore the discursive foundations of framing, and has not adequately "problematized" discourse. That is, it fails to attend to the ways in which discursive repertoires are "produced and transformed" in situated historical contexts. He argues for a dialogic analysis that would explicitly recognize the production of discourse as context-specific and laden with conflict, and would treat frames as emergent, evolving, multi-voiced entities. Gita Sen's (2004) characterization of feminist development frameworks beautifully illustrates Steinberg's point about the contested nature of discourse: "In the field of gender and development, many such struggles have been waged to gain acceptance and use for concepts such as 'gender,' 'empowerment,' 'women's human rights,' 'reproductive and sexual health,' and 'sexual and reproductive rights.' But such a struggle is not a once and for all event. As the new frameworks and concepts begin to be used, they are also interpreted and reinterpreted to suit the predilections of the user. In the process their meanings may become more fuzzy and multivalent with different people and institutions using the same terminology in very different ways. As Humpty Dumpty said to Alice, a word can come to mean whatever the user wants it to mean" (Sen 2004: 12). Steinberg's argument, and others like it,¹² have already had a substantial impact on the study of social movement framing, as

¹² See Naples' (2003) investigation of the "community control" frame of public education activists. Naples, not primarily a scholar of movements, documents how local activists "lost control" of the frame over time such that it no longer conveyed the same meaning, and in fact was no longer a useful tool for the movement.

scholars have begun to pay greater attention to power, culture, and difference (see Ferree 2003; Johnston 2002, 2005; Kurzman 2004; Snow 2004).

And though Steinberg essentially calls for the abandonment of the framing language in favor of an entirely new set (or at least a reformulation) of conceptual tools,¹³ I argue that framing researchers can effectively incorporate his concerns without abandoning our core concepts. As Ferree (2003) asserts, the replacement of the term “frame” with “discursive repertoire” would lead to the loss of an important unit of analysis. Gamson and Modigliani’s (1989) notion of a frame as an “interpretive package” is an important one, and can continue to be employed productively. We need only accord attention to the problematic nature of some framing scholarship, as both Benford and Steinberg have pointed out, and avoid such pitfalls in the future by explicitly treating frames as inherently dynamic entities that exist in equally dynamic political and cultural contexts.

To the above critiques of the framing literature, I would add that in this era of globalization, we cannot be sure that existing theoretical tools are sufficient to help us understand the discursive developments of movements that have “gone global.”¹⁴ Particularly when movement actors are faced with the challenge of constructing effective, unifying messages across different cultural and political contexts, often without the benefit of frequent face-to-face interaction (della Porta et al. 2006; Snow 2004), scholars must modify their conceptual and analytical tools accordingly. While a number of well-known researchers have solidly addressed certain facets of transnational movement dynamics (della Porta et al. 2006; Smith 2008; Smith and Johnston 2002; Tarrow 2005),

¹³ Most significant among these is the “discursive repertoire,” that would essentially replace “frame.”

¹⁴ See the introduction to Goodhart (2005) for an anecdotal illustration of the dangers associated with the inappropriate application of existing theory to new and different types of phenomena.

the rapidly changing, growing nature of empirical realities in transnational activism mean that abundant, ongoing attention will be required to unpack thoroughly the influences on and impact of discursive practices within globalized social movements.

Kurzman (2004) notes that the recent shift in social movement theory from a structural to a more cultural and constructivist focus should change the ways that researchers study social movements; I mean for this research to be one such example. However, while I am sympathetic to critiques of the over-emphasis on structural factors as movement scholarship has developed (Jasper and Goodwin 1999, 2004), I take care not to abandon the relevant and useful insights that resource mobilization and political process models provide (Amenta, Carruthers and Zylan 1992; Jenkins 1983; McAdam 1992; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Meyer 2004). There is ample room for consideration of both structural and cultural factors shaping social movement dynamics, and a need to understand more carefully the relationships between them. Organizational resources, in particular, have been undertheorized in examinations of influences on framing practices (Johnston and Noakes 2005; Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigan-Brown 2007); given the demonstrated impact of organizational resources on other movement outcomes (Ganz 2000; McCammon 2001; Soule et al. 1999), we have good reason to consider their role in shaping collective action frames. I will discuss such organizational factors and their influence on framing below.

Situating the Contributions of the Study

In my examination of transnational feminist discourses, I pay explicit attention to many of the aforementioned critiques by not just accepting the possibility that particular frames might vary across groups (even within the same broader movement), but in fact *expecting* to find such differences. Importantly, I employ an empirical approach that enables comparison across organizational cases; this comparative dimension of the project is an important move that responds to calls for such systematic research (Benford 1997; Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigan-Brown 2007). Finally, in choosing as my substantive material a transnational social movement, I advance existing knowledge with respect to both intramovement frame variation and also the dynamics of framing in global activism.

In this study, I consider several aspects of frame variation. In the first stage of my analysis (discussed in Chapter 4), I map out the landscape of framing practices among transnational feminist networks in the contemporary period. I discuss the overall prevalence of particular types of frames, and illuminate points of divergence among groups using Snow and Benford's notions of diagnosis and prognosis. In the second stage of my analysis (discussed in Chapter 5), I examine a particular dimension of frame variation that has received increasing attention recently: discursive responses to hegemony (Maney, Woehrle, and Coy 2005; Steinberg 1999; Westby 2002). For instance, Maney, Woehrle, and Coy (2005) utilize Gramsci's concept of "hegemony" as it relates to movement discourse, arguing that movement organizations may frame in ways that harness/appropriate *or* challenge hegemonic ideas.¹⁵ In the final stage of my analysis (discussed in Chapter 6), I take up a question of particular importance to social

¹⁵ I develop this concept in greater detail later in the chapter.

movements whose participants collaborate across borders. I seek to illuminate how, and what kinds of, frames are being used as discursive tools to manage intramovement differences. Such discursive tools may be especially valuable for transnational movements seeking to build consensus.

In addressing these empirical questions of interest, I rely on several bodies of literature to inform my analysis. I consider research that examines influences on movement framing, relevant dynamics within global movements, and I also draw on feminist theory. Taken together, these strands of social movements and feminist scholarship converge to lay the foundation for my study. I now review these literatures as they pertain to my research questions, and articulate hypotheses with respect to each question.

The Role of Political and Discursive Contexts in Movement Framing

I focus first on the ways in which framing practices are influenced by different historical, political, and discursive contexts. Although the present research is cross-sectional in nature, this discussion will illustrate the character and significance of the global political conditions in which contemporary feminist activism is situated. Some attention to shifting context, while not explicitly operationalized in this study,¹⁶ is necessary to orient the reader toward these broad themes shaping and constraining feminist collective action globally. Furthermore, an understanding of the contemporary global political context shapes our expectations as to which kinds of frames will be most prevalent among TFNs; as I mentioned in chapter 1 and elaborate further below, broad

¹⁶ In order to empirically investigate changes over time, data at multiple time points would be required. I intend to collect and analyze longitudinal data on this topic in my future work.

constraints related to the role of the United Nations, the World Social Forum, and other global governance institutions in global politics, are likely to influence the dynamics of transnational women's activism.

Substantial evidence has mounted indicating that a movement's discursive strategy and the efficacy of that strategy are subject to contextual factors such as political and cultural opportunities and the framing of opponents. Such factors constrain the set of frames that movement actors choose to use and amplify (Benford and Hunt 2003; Evans 1997; Johnston and Snow 1998; Marullo, Pagnucco and Smith 1996; McCaffrey and Keys 2000; McCammon, Hewitt, and Smith 2004), and they also shape and even determine whether or not particular frames will be effective (Diani 1996; Hewitt and McCammon 2004; Mooney and Hunt 1996; Zuo and Benford 1995). For instance, Evans (1997) suggests that movements rely on signals from the multi-organizational field to select a dominant organizational frame that will be palatable to targets perceived as most important at the time. Diani (1996) makes the case that changes in political opportunity structure are more conducive to certain master frames than others, thus privileging the discursive strategies of some movements over others and influencing their ultimate success. Ferree (2003) echoes this claim in her study of abortion discourses in Germany and the United States.

There is also increasing evidence that the targeted audience of a given speech event influences what kind of frame movement actors choose to use. For example, McCammon, Hewitt and Smith's (2004) study of framing in state-level suffrage movements demonstrates that the particular discursive strategy used by activists was influenced heavily by the intended audience; some frames were likely to resonate more

with politicians, while others may have been a better fit for the general public, and the evidence suggests that movement actors were aware of this and made decisions accordingly. On a related note, Kubal (1998) argues that the venue of framing efforts will influence the character of frames used; specifically, in his examination of anti-toxics/anti-incinerator activists, he provides evidence that frames looked very different depending upon whether the venue was “front region” or “back region.” In private group meetings and internal movement literature, activists were willing to be more radical in their framing, and more critical and honest regarding their own shortcomings; on the other hand, discursive efforts in the public view tended to be more conventional, and sometimes even involved completely different frames. Thus, both intended audience and the public or private nature of the venue in which speech acts take place also constrain framing practices.¹⁷

A few studies also attempt to explain why and how movement actors change their framing strategies over a cycle of contention, and these are particularly insightful for my purposes. Though not all of them explicitly address meaning variation within frames across movements and over time, their findings provide clues as to the reasons why movement actors make decisions to change some aspect of their discursive strategy. In a study of frame changes in the U.S. peace movement, Marullo, Pagnucco, and Smith (1996) find evidence of a shift after the end of the Cold War to broader, more inclusive frames that emphasized themes of global interdependence. They argue that such changes

¹⁷ In the first two stages of my analysis, I examine collective action frames present in the mission/value statements of transnational feminist networks. These statements are publicly available on organizational websites; therefore, the intended audience is public and the venue is front region. In the third stage of my analysis, the data are based on fieldwork in which I observed and participated in transnational meetings of activists; thus, the audience and venue are different from the earlier analyses. While not exclusive or private, these meetings constitute a middle ground where the audience is semi-public and the venue is closer to back region than front region. I revisit the implications of these differences in Chapter 7.

may be reflective of what they call “retention framing,” which is geared toward holding on to highly committed members. More specifically, their findings indicate that movement actors will respond to diminishing or changing political opportunities by choosing discursive strategies that will emphasize the most salient ideological principles of core, committed participants in order to retain them. McCaffrey and Keys’ (2000) analysis of abortion-related framing strategies used by the National Organization for Women yields similar results. Their data demonstrate that, in the face of heated discursive conflict with a countermovement,¹⁸ movement actors will turn their attention to mobilizing their base by engaging in the tasks of polarization and vilification, debunking, and frame saving. That is, they will attempt to portray themselves as moral agents battling evil opponents, they will work to undermine competing ideas, and finally will make efforts to re-assert the credibility of frames that have been contested (perhaps by reframing; see Benford and Hunt 2003), all with the goal of “rallying the troops.” McCammon, Hewitt, and Smith (2004) also provide evidence that throughout the campaign for woman suffrage, activists made strategic discursive decisions based both on existing political and cultural opportunities and also on which frames were most likely to resonate with particular targets.

Finally, Mooney and Hunt (1996) introduce the concept “repertoire of interpretations” to accentuate the point that movement participants often draw on an arsenal of multiple discourses, rather than only one or two, and that selections of which ones to emphasize are made according to ideological and political changes over time. “Within a repertoire of interpretations, at any given historical conjuncture, it is likely that

¹⁸ Although I will not explicitly operationalize conflict with a countermovement, I mention it here as an example of the broader discursive forces constraining movement framing.

one master frame has greater salience than the others and thus acts as the primary interpretive screen through which objects, acts, individuals, collectivities, conditions, and contingencies are understood” (179). Mooney and Hunt identify three general components of such a repertoire for U.S. agrarian mobilizations: agrarian fundamentalism ideology, competitive capitalism ideology, and producer ideology; they illustrate that these master frames ebbed and flowed largely as a result of changing material conditions, but that each one persisted to some degree over time.

Just recently, the term “discourse” has crept into the work of researchers interested in social movement framing. A few scholars have begun to explore the notion of *discursive* opportunity and the ways in which it influences the collective action frames of social movements. Koopmans and Statham criticize the concept of political opportunity structure for its “inability to deal with the discursive content of movement mobilization” (227), or more specifically, the mobilization of “symbolic resources.” They argue that political opportunities are typically operationalized in such generic ways (e.g., electoral competition, type of political institution) that they tend to apply equally to many or all social movements at a given time. They introduce discursive opportunity structure to capture the constraints that “determine which ideas are considered ‘sensible,’ which constructions of reality are seen as ‘realistic,’ and which claims are held as ‘legitimate’ within a certain polity at a specific time” (228). As Ferree (2003) theorizes and demonstrates in her study of abortion debates in Germany and the U.S., different discursive opportunity structures will privilege the use of different frames; frames that are consistent with prevailing cultural discourses will be considered resonant, while those that contradict them will be viewed as radical. Several other studies have also made

empirical use of the concept of discursive opportunity, (Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Koopmans and Statham 1999; McCammon et al. 2007) and have further shown the impact of discursive opportunities on both the use of frames and their ultimate efficacy. Such findings, taken collectively, demonstrate a subtle shift in framing theory that both elevates the importance of discourse and takes more seriously the external political *and* cultural influences on the production of activist discourse.

Research repeatedly suggests that there is a complex configuration of external factors influencing how and why movement actors make the choices they do. The overriding points suggested by this collection of studies are that 1) the changing extramovement landscape – including external threats and opportunities – plays a significant role in shaping discursive strategy, and 2) movements will “read the tea leaves,” or interpret the meanings of these external factors and make strategic choices, sometimes with the chief concern of retaining and mobilizing members. Thus, at any given moment in the development of a movement, activists face a difficult set of choices regarding which frames should be deployed and what factors should be prioritized when making such decisions.

I now move to a discussion of the specific ways that existing theoretical and empirical scholarship relate to my analysis and guide the development of my hypotheses. The analysis is divided into three parts, each of which corresponds to one empirical chapter in the dissertation. In the first stage of the analysis, I examine broad patterns in the framing of transnational feminist networks; in stage 2 of the analysis, I investigate organizational-level influences on a particular set of framing practices – response to hegemony – among transnational feminist networks; finally, in the third stage of my

analysis, I document how certain collective action frames are being utilized by feminists and women's activists in transnational venues in their efforts to address intramovement differences.

Stage 1 of the Analysis: Theorizing Movement-Wide Patterns in Framing

It is reasonable to assume that all transnational feminist networks, in their pursuits to seek changes at the supranational level, would be subject to the same broad *global* opportunities and constraints. Although regional, national and local politics might influence the discursive choices of movement organizations, especially when their targets are regional/national/local, global opportunities would not be different for one TFN versus another. Certainly, certain organizations might fare better or worse according to their issue focus, resources, etc., but the broad context is consistent across organizations working at the global level.

The period of contemporary transnational women's activism that my analysis covers (2007-2008) is characterized by a political and discursive context unlike that of previous periods of global feminist protest. The early 1990s are widely considered a heyday of transnational women's activism not only because of the explosion in participation, but also because of the receptiveness of supranational institutions, specifically the United Nations, to women's concerns, and because of activists' recognition and consequent seizing of this elite support. A series of World Conferences (1992 World Conference on Environment and Development in Rio, 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, 1994 World Conference on Population and Development in Cairo, the 1995 FWCW in Beijing) and their parallel NGO forums

provided opportunities for activists to meet face-to-face and share ideas, concerns and strategies, and to push for the inclusion of their concerns in conference documents.

After the successes at the UN Conferences of the early 1990s, fundamentalist backlash from the Vatican and from countries such as Iran increased substantially, and neoliberal economic principles continued to intensify across the globe. Furthermore, while myriad women's issues had been articulated as integrated leading up to Beijing, the division of issues into "critical areas of concern" in the Beijing Platform for Action (BPA) may have (unintentionally) contributed to the demobilization of collaborative efforts. Although there was a series of "Plus Five" UN Conferences corresponding to the conferences mentioned earlier, these meetings did not present the same kind of opportunities to carve out a new women's agenda. They are widely viewed as failed endeavors (Brunelle 2006), as overall participation was lower, and fewer organizations were represented in the process. Instead of advancing new pieces of a feminist agenda, activist efforts centered on holding the ground that had previously been gained. Particularly in areas of women's reproductive health and sexuality, fundamentalist forces were collaborating to roll back the UN agenda. The language of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are just one manifestation of diminishing opportunities since Beijing; while women's reproductive and sexual health had been articulated as important concerns in the BPA, these concerns were completely absent from the MDGs.

In addition to shrinking monetary resources and transnational fora for women's collective action, the new millennium brought with it an unparalleled dominance of neoliberal economic ideology, dramatically increased religious and political fundamentalism, and the Bush administration's War on Terror, which translated into

pervasive militarization and, many argue, a general disregard of feminist concerns. President Bush sent a clear message of outright hostility to women across the world when, upon arriving in office in 2000, he immediately re-instated what is known as the “Global Gag Rule,” which prevented any foreign NGO receiving USAID funds from providing abortions (even if they are legal), advocating for abortion rights, or even providing counseling or referral services for abortion. It would be fair to say that this time period has represented a somewhat hostile environment for transnational women’s activism.

However, this historical moment is also quite interesting and somewhat contradictory because of the emergence of the World Social Forum (which originated in a context of strong support on the part of progressive political parties and governments in the global South) and later the Feminist Dialogues, as important new sites of transnational collaboration and protest.¹⁹ A diverse mix of NGOs and political organizations used the WSF as a venue to construct and disseminate radical critiques of economic globalization, war and militarism, and a range of other social issues (Blau and Karides 2008; Fisher and Ponniah 2003; Sen et al. 2004; Smith 2008). Feminist activists, and TFNs in particular, have had an increasing presence since the first WSF in Porto Alegre in 2001 (Alvarez, Faria, and Nobre 2003; Conway 2007; Karides and Hewitt 2009; Vargas 2003). Eager to utilize these new mobilizing opportunities, feminist and women’s activists have become increasingly aware of and attentive to the need to forge alliances with extra-feminist global justice movements such as those organized around

¹⁹ The Feminist Dialogues meetings emerged in 2004 as an autonomous venue in which feminists from around the globe could convene and strategize immediately prior to the World Social Forum. The stated objectives of the Feminist Dialogues (FD) include strategizing to infuse the WSF with a feminist perspective, and laying the groundwork for building alliances with other social movements. I discuss the Feminist Dialogues further in chapter 3.

workers' and peasants' rights (Mangalubnan-Zabala 2004), and thus have made explicit efforts to reach out to those movements, particularly leading up to and during meetings of the World Social Forum.

Ultimately, the important points to note here are the elements of the global political environment that have the potential to shape the framing practices of transnational women's organizations. In light of these global developments, namely the unprecedented political, economic, and discursive dominance of neoliberal economics, the increasing militarization of women's lives, the introduction of the WSF (originally a largely anti-globalization venue) as a critical new mobilizing structure, and the desire of feminists and women's activists to build bridges with the broader global justice movement, we can anticipate that TFNs, on the whole, are interested in deploying frames that: a) reference the dominant grievances of the political and historical moment, and b) are geared toward connecting with other social movements and, therefore, are broadly applicable. Thus, on the whole, we can hypothesize the following about prevalent frames among transnational feminist networks in the period of study:

H1: Frames that reference the dominant grievances in the current political context (e.g., neoliberal globalization and militarization) will be prevalent in the online mission statements of TFNs.

H2: Frames that are broadly applicable and likely to be palatable to extra-feminist movements for global justice will be more prevalent than narrowly defined frames in the online mission statements of TFNs.

Stage 2 of the Analysis: Theorizing Meso-Level Influences on the Framing Practices of Transnational Movement Organizations

In this section, I focus on organizational-level factors that influence movement framing practices. This theoretical discussion sets up the second stage of my analysis, in which I specifically seek to reveal organizational causes of framing that harnesses or challenges hegemony (Maney, Woehrle, and Coy 2005). Therefore, I pause here to elaborate on this notion as the outcome of interest. Gramsci's (1971) explanation of hegemony emphasizes the fact that power holders exercise ideological coercion as a means of extending their values and interests to those of the broader society; the interests of power holders are best served when their policies and values are viewed by the masses as consistent with the interests of society at large. Thus, hegemonic culture is legitimized.

As I mentioned earlier, the concepts of harnessing and challenging hegemony, recently introduced by Maney and his colleagues, represent an important dimension of frame variation. Similar to Ferree's (2003) distinction between "resonant" and "radical" frames, Maney et al.'s concepts show how organizational frames can harness the themes of the "dominant symbolic repertoire" (Williams 2002), or, in contrast, challenge those themes. Maney and his colleagues write, "...ideas exist that, because of their frequent invocation by those with disproportionate access to and influence over the primary means of mass communication, carry an authority extending beyond the individuals referencing them" (45-46). When groups attempt to appropriate ideas that are consistent with this

dominant symbolic repertoire, they are harnessing hegemony; when they frame in ways that work to undermine those dominant themes, they are challenging hegemony.²⁰

How SMOs position themselves in response to hegemony also relates to Snow et al.'s (1986) notion of "frame alignment." Harnessing hegemony constitutes a form of "frame bridging," a type of frame alignment process that refers to "the linkage of two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem" (Snow et al. 1986: 467). By explicitly illuminating the similarities between movement goals and ideas, and those present in the dominant symbolic repertoire, movement organizations can establish ties between their interests and the interests of power-holders. While frame bridging represents the most modest of frame alignment processes, "frame transformation," which encompasses discursive challenges to hegemony, resides at the other end of the spectrum. Frame transformation is generally considered the most ambitious of all frame alignment processes because it requires ideological conversion (Oliver and Johnston 2000); rather than drawing on ways of thinking that are familiar and dominant, movement actors engaging in attempts at frame transformation (and, thus, challenging hegemony) seek to encourage the adoption of new perspectives that are often at odds with prevailing beliefs and worldviews.

I look now to meso-level factors to explain why certain organizations (within the same global movement) might promote different types of discursive strategies than others at a given time. Surprisingly, a relatively small portion of empirical work has addressed this issue. However, existing research on the topic points to three broad clusters of factors that are likely to influence the framing practices of movement organizations:

²⁰ I discuss the themes that constitute discursive hegemony in the context of transnational women's activism in Chapter 5.

group composition and identity, organizational structure, and organizational resources. I discuss each in turn, and articulate relevant expectations about the influence of these factors on organizations' decisions to frame in ways that harness, versus challenge, hegemony.

Composition and Identity. Some framing scholars have theorized the importance of movement (or group) composition in determining which kinds of frames are advanced (Coy and Woehrle 1996; Maney et al. 2005; Ryan 1992; Valocchi 1996; Whittier 1995). Not surprisingly, the ideologies, social locations, age, and other identity dimensions of activists have an impact on what kinds of discourses are developed and circulated. This is not to say that frames are simply the logical result of activist identity and ideology; such a characterization oversimplifies that complex strategic process that discursive efforts entail. Likewise, it is important to recognize that movement groups are not merely instrumental agents making discursive decisions based on signals from the external context, as was discussed earlier. Rather, their framing strategies are also facilitated and constrained in substantial ways by their organizational make-up.

Maney, Woehrle, and Coy (2005) find that framing strategies, vis-à-vis hegemony, vary over time in response to changing political opportunities, but also across organizations within the same movement. Their data show that organizations with “oppositional identities rooted in consciousness of structural inequalities” (486) are more likely to challenge hegemony in their framing than are organizations without an oppositional identity. These findings buttress the conclusions of Coy and Woehrle’s

earlier work (1996), which also presented evidence showing that the identities of peace activists influenced their discourse.

Whittier's research on second wave feminist activism in the U.S. indicates that intramovement differences in ideologies and identities, in this case generationally-based, can also have an appreciable impact on movement rhetoric. McCammon's (2009) investigation of frame variation in U.S. women's jury movements bolsters this claim further. Her study reveals that in states where organizations with more "traditional" or essentialist understandings of gender were active in jury campaigns, their presence led to the use of more essentialist framing.

I should note, however, that some studies have found that group identity and composition influence organizational framing only marginally, if at all, relative to other factors (McCammon, Hewitt, and Smith 2004; Snow, Vliegenthart, and Corrigan-Brown 2007). But enough evidence exists to support a relationship that we cannot afford to ignore the possibility in ongoing research. Movement composition and identity may place broad constraints on framing, but still allow for variation that is driven by other factors, within these broad constraints. While movement organizations are unlikely to utilize frames that are antithetical to the beliefs and identities of their membership, they still face choices among a range of frames that are consistent with those identities. For instance, both rights-based frames and anti-globalization frames could conceivably be compatible with the organizational identities of a transnational women's organization, but other factors such as resources or structure (which I discuss below) could lead that group to utilize one or the other. Perhaps the important task now before movement scholars is to understand more carefully how various factors, including but not limited to identity,

combine to exert an influence on framing practices. Comparative studies such as mine will enable us to learn more.

On the whole, previous literature encourages us to continue thinking about how features of group composition and identity affect organizational framing. What I intend to capture by examining the identity and composition of organizations is that facet of SMOs which does not necessarily flow from external or structural factors, but rather from internal factors directly related to agency. In other words, by looking at composition and identity, we are able to see how frames are influenced by who the participants are, and to some degree what their experiences and ideological positions are. As Maney and his colleagues find, group composition and identity associated with oppositional consciousness (e.g., marginalized classes, races, or genders) are most relevant to an organization's propensity to challenge hegemony in its framing. Three aspects of organizational identity/composition emerge that hold particular importance in this respect for the TFNs in my study: self-articulated feminist identity, regional constituency/identity, and multi-issue focus.

The decision of a transnational women's network to articulate an explicitly feminist identity may indicate a willingness to be perceived as more political, and potentially radical, than organizations who distance themselves from feminism.²¹ The feminist label connotes attention to power, recognition of the interrelated nature of oppressions faced by women (Hill Collins 1990), and generally a more combative

²¹ There are, of course, a number of reasons why activists may not feel free to make public their feminist identity, regardless of their potentially oppositional perspectives backstage. For some groups, the absence of the articulation of a feminist identity is an intentional ideological choice; for others, it may be a coerced choice driven by political or financial concerns about the sustainability and success of the organization. I attempt to account for some of this by examining the role of organizational resources, which I discuss later in the chapter.

identity. Therefore, we would expect that TFNs who explicitly embrace a feminist identity might deploy more radical frames.

H3: Transnational women’s organizations that articulate a feminist identity are more likely to deploy frames that challenge hegemony than those who do not self-identify as feminist.

Related somewhat to feminist identity, or feminist perspective, is an organization’s decision to focus explicitly on multiple issues affecting women, and thus to work from an intersectional ideological perspective (Crenshaw 1991; Hill Collins 1990). Much like a feminist identity, a multi-issue focus reflects a TFN’s attention to the connections among the various obstacles women are facing; such an ideological position is highly consistent with the views expressed in frames that challenge hegemony. This is not to say that single-issue TSMOs (e.g., PeaceWomen Across the Globe) cannot hold an intersectional perspective, but rather that TSMOs explicitly working on multiple issues (e.g., Association for Women’s Rights in Development) may be more intentional in pursuing actions that reflect intersectionality, and thus be more likely to use counter-hegemonic frames. These insights lead to the following hypothesis:

H4: Transnational women’s organizations that hold a multi-issue focus are more likely to deploy frames that challenge hegemony than those that have a single-issue focus.

The third compositional/identity consideration in the study relates to differences in North-South identities. Based on the findings of previous researchers who have

studied transnational feminist activism, it is reasonable to expect that some compositional differences may be based in geopolitical location (e.g., feminists of the global North vs. the global South, or European vs. non-European groups).²² For instance, Ferree and Pudrovska (2006) find that European feminist organizations tend to have concerns and discourses that look different than those of organizations in the global South and in North America. Keck and Sikkink (1998) document the different concerns of Northern and Southern feminists during the UN Decade for Women; while Northern feminists tended to advance an “anti-discrimination” frame, feminists of the South promoted themes of economic development and redistribution. And while Keck and Sikkink also describe how Northern and Southern groups eventually came together around a human rights frame that emphasized eradication of all forms of violence against women, it would be misguided to assume that geographical and cultural differences among women were settled permanently in the early 1990s.

Bandy and Smith (2005) note a similar phenomenon among global justice activists more generally; they suggest that North-South identity conflicts may be among the most problematic differences to resolve. Smith (2002) writes that, “...political conditions faced by activists from much of the global South lead them towards more radical critiques and more confrontational strategies for change. Northern activists may

²² I take care, though, not to overstate the politics of place/location. For transnational networks, unlike organizations focused at the local or state level, location of headquarters or home office is in most cases only somewhat relevant to the issues and discourses taken up. Because, by definition, TFNs target supranational institutions and raise issues of concern to diverse groups of women, their agendas and strategies are not influenced as dramatically by their physical location. Thus, the operationalization of regional identity is highly important; as I discuss in the following chapter, I use leadership composition and self-articulation of regional identity, rather than location of office, to measure this concept. Furthermore, my measure allows for the possibility of a transnational identity that is neither Northern nor Southern. Because many transnational organizations, even some based in the North, have incorporated into their goals and strategies the radical material critiques of Southern activists, I argue that Southern and transnational identities should not produce major differences in discourse; rather, the Northern vs. non-Northern distinction is most important.

or may not adopt the structural critiques of their Southern counterparts, but they tend to adopt reformist strategies that are more consistent with institutionalized political discourse and practices” (521). Activists of the global South sometimes contend that their counterparts in the North cannot understand the material realities they face, and thus cannot relate to their (potentially) more radical perspectives. Thus, I expect to find evidence that different framing practices across groups are, in fact, in part the result of differing cultural compositions and identities.

H5: Transnational women’s organizations who hold a non-Northern identity are more likely to deploy frames that challenge hegemony than organizations whose identities are Southern or transnational.

Organizational Structure. Movement scholars have established the importance of organizational structure in influencing movement dynamics including emergence and outcomes such as eliciting media attention or achieving policy gains (Gamson 1990; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Rohlinger 2002). However, little attention has been given to the relationship between organizational structure and organizational framing practices. This as yet under-explored relationship is worthy of further consideration, as Rohlinger’s (2002) study of opposing women’s organizations demonstrates. Rohlinger looks at the influence of organizational structure and identity on an SMO’s ability to effectively garner media attention. Although the SMOs she investigates are not part of the same movement, but rather are on opposing sides, her findings are relevant to the study at hand. Her data suggest that a more formal,

bureaucratic structure enables movement groups to package their frames in ways that are likely to resonate with mainstream audiences, thereby attracting media coverage.

In a related vein, Staggenborg's (1988) research on the professionalization and formalization of pro-choice SMOs indicates that formalization tends to lead organizations to engage in institutionalized, less disruptive tactics. It is unclear whether this occurs because an SMO's goals become less radical, or because its goals become absorbed into institutionalized politics over time.²³ However, there appears to be a connection between formal, professional structure and tactics that are perceived as more acceptable to the public and to mainstream political institutions. Such findings indicate that levels of professionalization and bureaucracy may also influence a movement organization's discursive orientation toward hegemony; specifically, highly professional organizations may be more able and/or willing to tap into discourses that dominate the mainstream, and less likely to "rock the boat" by challenging hegemony. This insight leads to the following hypothesis:

H6: Highly professionalized transnational feminist networks are less likely than TFNs with low professionalization to deploy frames that challenge hegemony.

Organizational Resources. The resource mobilization approach to social movements alerts us to the importance of financial, political, and human resources in the emergence, development, and success of movements (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977). For some years, this perspective was considered dominant within the study of social movements, and contributed a slew of useful insights to our understandings of movement dynamics. The role of movement resources has been considered in

²³ See Gamson (1975 [1990]) on co-optation as a movement outcome.

examinations of outcomes such as mobilization and policy success, but their influence on organizational framing practices has yet to be studied thoroughly. In some ways, I argue in this study for the continued relevance of the resource mobilization perspective, not at the expense of cultural dynamics (as some have worried about), but rather in the service of developing more nuanced understandings of the relationship between cultural and structural dynamics within social movements. Examining the influence of organizational resources on framing practices is one step in that direction.

Feminist scholars and researchers of movements have drawn modest attention to the inequalities in resources, power, and status among movement actors who are differently situated (Basu 2004; Mendoza 2002; Desai 2005, 2009; Smith 2002). Desai (2005, 2009) points out the threats to solidarity and efficacy that are posed by inequalities between Northern-based women's organizations and Southern-based women's organizations, but also among organizations within the global South. Smith (2002) documents how the disparate economic realities of Northern-based and Southern-based movement organizations contribute to divergent interpretations of problems, and especially regarding the relative importance of local versus global level campaigns. Staggenborg (1989) writes about the particular challenges of building effective coalitions when there are differential resources, and perhaps competition, among organizations.

Croteau and Hicks (2003) argue convincingly, based on their analysis of a local coalition of organizations addressing homelessness, that organizational power and resources have significant implications for a group's ability to influence the frames ultimately deployed in a coalition context. Though their research is not focused on transnational activism, Croteau and Hicks' findings nonetheless underscore the important

role that resources might play in shaping constructions of reality at the organizational and coalition level.

Despite the fact that existing research has scarcely begun to explore and demonstrate an empirical relationship between organizational resources and framing practices, the studies discussed above suggest that it is a question worthy of continued investigation. If differential organizational resources can influence other dynamics, it is plausible that they would affect framing practices, as well. It may be the case that organizations that are well resourced in human and financial capital, and thus are more stable, may be freer to challenge hegemony in their framing. On the other hand, it may be the case that poorly resourced organizations feel that they have little to lose by challenging hegemony, and therefore are likely to engage in more challenging rhetoric. Due to this uncertainty, I leave the direction of my hypothesized relationship open.

H7: TFNs with high levels of financial resources will differ from TFNs with low levels of financial resources in terms of their discursive responses to hegemony.

Other studies give us reason to examine not just quantity or level of financial resources, but also the sources of those resources. Valocchi (1996) presents compelling evidence that the emergence of the integrationist ideology and the rights frame within the U.S. Civil Rights Movement was due in large part to the dependence of key organizations on white liberals for funding. Valocchi argues that the integrationist perspective, which was preferred by white liberal supporters of and donors to the movement, crowded out alternative perspectives, thereby shaping organizational strategies and discourses. Similarly, Noonan's (1998) study of the Chilean women's movement documents how the

presence of material resources in the form of maternal institutions (e.g., mother's centers) contributed to the rise and sustained dominance of a maternalist feminist frame. This evidence suggests that we should expect sources of material and institutional support to play a role in shaping organizational framing practices; organizations receiving funding or institutional support from entities connected to hegemonic ideologies and discourse may be less inclined to employ frames that challenge hegemony, lest they risk losing support.

H8: TFNs receiving financial and institutional support from non-neutral sources (e.g., those associated with hegemonic ideology) will be less likely to challenge hegemony than those who receive their resources from neutral sources.

Finally, I introduce one additional hypothesis that articulates combinatorial expectations. As I explained above, I expect that identity-based factors, structural factors, and resources may each play a role in shaping TFN responses to hegemony. However, I further refine my expectations by considering the possibility that the causal relationships may be combinatorial rather than simply additive. I contend that neutral funding sources and an oppositional identity may combine to produce challenges to hegemony. The presence of both of these factors simultaneously may contribute to a particularly robust oppositional consciousness, which Maney and colleagues (2005, 2008) have found to be a crucial component in SMO decisions to challenge hegemony. Stated differently, an organization that does not accept substantial funding from governments or corporations, and that holds an oppositional identity status, is likely to be

quite radical regardless of its structure or level of financial resources. Therefore, I hypothesize the following.

H9: Neutral funding sources *and* an oppositional identity may combine to lead organizations to challenge hegemony.

**Stage 3 of the Analysis:
How Global Movements Use Discursive Tools to Negotiate Difference**

In the third and final phase of my analysis (discussed in Chapter 6), I turn my attention to a related, but different, question about the framing of transnational women's organizations. I ask how, and what types of, collective action frames are being used by transnational women's activists in their attempts to address intramovement differences and build consensus.²⁴

As I have discussed, feminist scholarship, particularly of the postcolonial variety, offers valuable insights about intramovement differences. Feminist theorists argue forcefully for the recognition, rather than erasing, of differences among women. They warn us against universalizing a woman's experience, and by extension, the priorities and issues of activists (Mohanty 1991, 2003; Narayan 1997). Feminists further illuminate what kinds of differences are important, aiding projects such as mine, which strive to remain inclusive of an array of feminist concerns. But there is less offered in the way of concrete discussions regarding *how* women are working through, or might be working through differences in their activism (but see Ackerly 2008 for a rare exception).

Research that empirically addresses questions about "difference management" tends to rely on localized movements for substantive material (Levitsky 2007; Reger

²⁴ I discuss the nature of intramovement differences in detail in Chapter 6. These differences include varying experiences, identities, social locations, strategies, and goals.

2002; White 1999). For instance, White's (1999) case study of a black feminist anti-rape campaign discusses how intramovement ideological and discursive differences were negotiated and overcome to arrive at a collective document reflecting a united stand. Reger's (2002) study of two different chapters of the National Organization for Women (NOW) explores how organizations dealt with differences based in class and ideology to construct multiple feminist identities. These studies underscore the point that the interests of movement actors are varied in spite of one or more shared goals, and that there is in fact conflict that occurs on the journey to building consensus and deploying a coherent message.

But it is not so easy to translate the design and insights of this type of study to a transnational scale. In fact, much of what we know about how movement actors negotiate tensions among themselves may not be applicable to transnational movements, which (by definition) include participants who are highly diverse in terms of geography, culture, life experiences, and priorities. Furthermore, these actors' opportunities to confront their differences via face-to-face meetings are few and far between.

We can begin to think about these challenges by considering the nature of potentially splintering differences, and the characteristics of frames that might serve to promote consensus. In order for frames to have the power to unite participants across vast differences, they must have wide *intramovement* appeal; activists who are differently positioned (e.g., due to differences in race, class, nation, religion, sexuality, etc.) must be able to find ways of connecting with the ideas contained in the frames. There are several features of collective action frames that may be relevant here.

Smith's (2002) study of solidarity among transnational social movement organizations provides some important clues. Smith presents robust evidence that activists seeking to collaborate transnationally are far more likely to agree on problems and targets than they are on appropriate solutions or alternatives to those problems. For example, della Porta et al. (2006) cite the global justice movement's successful creation of a master frame that honed in on neoliberalism, noting that it "allowed a logical connection between the different problems imputed to the same causes" (74). Using Benford and Snow's language, then, we might expect transnational women's activists to employ in their efforts to manage differences diagnostic, rather than prognostic, frames that reference forces that are widely perceived as threats to movement actors (even if those threats manifest in different ways). Examples of these diagnoses include frames that are explicitly critical of neoliberal globalization, militarization, and fundamentalisms, all of which are widely considered among movement actors to be impediments to women's flourishing in the contemporary period (Feminist Dialogues 2005 Global Report; Reed 2002). Such frames highlight the commonality of enemies, but do not necessarily move beyond critique to offer specific solutions and, thus, may be attractive as tools for promoting solidarity. This leads to following hypothesis.

H10: Diagnostic frames that reference "master grievances" will be used to promote consensus/manage differences. In the case of transnational women's activists, these frames are likely to take the specific form of anti-neoliberalism, anti-militarization, and anti-fundamentalism arguments.

We can also expect another type of frame, the multi-issue frame, to be useful in managing intramovement differences, particularly within a transnational social movement. Smith (2004) and Sikkink and Smith (2002) note the recent emergence of this important discursive dynamic among transnational organizations seeking to build solidarity and consensus. They discuss the fact that these groups are increasingly deploying multi-issue, as opposed to single-issue, frames. The rise in the use of multi-issue frames may represent a growing awareness of the interconnected nature of global problems, but also, as Bandy and Smith (2005) note, an attempt on the part of activists to promote “broad-based transnational mobilization” (6). Therefore, in talking about multiple issues and their connections to one another, movement actors who cast a broader net may be more likely to overcome hurdles of divergent perspectives.

On a related point, the multi-issue approach is more consistent with feminist concerns about intersectionality (Hill Collins 1990). Multi-issue frames can signal the explicit recognition that women’s issues cannot be “siloes” (Ackerly 2006), but rather should be addressed with an understanding that oppressions, whether based in race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, etc., are inextricably linked in terms of their causes and solutions.

Finally, Hewitt and McCammon (2004) present a complementary insight, although not at the transnational level, about frames that are likely to resonate with diverse movement constituents. In their study of the impact of different types of frames on the mobilization of activists in the U.S. state woman suffrage movements, they find that frames addressing a broad range of issues were more likely to mobilize suffrage activists than frames that were narrow in scope.

Thus, based on these existing insights, frames that address multiple issues of potential concern to movement participants and that signal an intersectional analysis may be particularly effective in neutralizing intramovement differences and building solidarity. A leading example of this type of frame that has been historically successful in the global women's movement is the human rights approach (Friedman 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998); due to the fact that a huge range of issues may be couched in terms of rights, coupled with the flexibility of its application as appropriate to local situations, it embodies the major advantages of multi-issue, intersectional frames. It is reasonable, then, to expect that the movement would use rights-based frames with the intent of transcending intramovement tensions.

H11: Frames that are broad-ranging and intersectional will be more commonly used in efforts to manage differences than narrow and/or single-issue frames. Among transnational women's activists, this will commonly take the form of a rights-based frame.

Feminists theorists such as Grewal and Kaplan (1994) and Mohanty (1991; 2003) highlight another political strategy that may be useful for managing differences among feminists and women's activists. Concerned with building transnational solidarity among women, they articulate modes of operating that do not necessarily rely on shared consensus around problems and solutions, but rather on a shared commitment to particular ways of working. Desai (2009) summarizes the early work of these scholars: "They underscored the need for feminist political *practices* that addressed the concerns of women around the world in their historic and particular relationships to multiple

patriarchies as well as to international economic hegemonies” (italics mine). Weldon’s (2006) research on transnational activism against gender-based violence provides empirical evidence of such practices in use; she shows how “norms of inclusivity” (manifested in both discourses and actions) contributed to effective collaboration across differences among women.

These ideas partially encompass the attention to intersectionality and range discussed above, but go beyond such notions to include an explicit focus on practice, or process, and on mutual support of goals. What these ideas have in common is an inward focus on the movement and, often, a celebration of inclusivity and diversity. Rather than articulating external forces as the locus of change, feminists and women’s activists look inside the movement as a site for positive change. Such arguments are unlikely to be used exclusively, but may provide a useful supplement to other types of frames that locate solutions outside the movement, particularly in the service of promoting solidarity. Armstrong (2002) documents a similar phenomenon in the San Francisco gay and lesbian movement during the 1970s; movement organizations seemed to find common ground in a “unity through diversity” approach.

Specific examples of frames in this tradition include those that argue for strengthening the movement, networking and sharing strategies with one another, and offering support for one another’s specific goals. This is sometimes articulated in a solidarity frame, when activists speak of “standing in solidarity” with one another. Other times, activists might use the language of “linkage” and “sharing strategies” among groups. Thus, we arrive at my final hypothesis regarding frames that address intramovement differences.

H12: Frames that are inwardly focused on the movement (e.g., capacity-building and movement process frames) will be used by activists in their efforts to manage differences.

Review of Contributions

As I bring this chapter to a close, I take a moment to review the critical interventions of the study and provide a summary of the hypotheses examined therein. The insights that emerge from my analysis are useful for scholars of social movements, transnational politics, and feminisms alike. My study builds in important ways on existing knowledge about intramovement differences, and breaks new ground in its examination of the causal relationship between structural and cultural dynamics. I highlight the continued importance of the resource mobilization perspective, and aim to flesh out a more nuanced understanding of the influence of organizational resources on framing. Furthermore, I explore the ways in which transnational women's movement organizations are using discourse as a difference-management tool, and consider the implications of such practices for transnational activism and for feminist theory.

In the table below, I present a summary of the hypotheses addressed in the study. Hypotheses 1 and 2 concern the impact of contemporary political and discursive opportunity structures on the framing practices of the movement as a whole; these issues are addressed through a content analysis of organizational texts, which is discussed in chapter 4. Hypotheses 3-9 deal with the influence of meso-level, organizational factors (identity, structure, and resources) on organizational framing; I investigate these topics using qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), the results of which are reported in chapter

5. Finally, hypotheses 10-12 reference those features of frames that we might expect to be present/useful as groups seek to manage intramovement diversity and difference; I discuss this third and final stage of my analysis in chapter 6.

Table 2.1. Research Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Chapter in which Hypothesis is Addressed
H1: Frames that reference the dominant grievances in the current political context (e.g., neoliberal globalization and militarization) will be prevalent in the online mission statements of TFNs.	Chapter 4
H2: Frames that are broadly applicable and likely to be palatable to extra-feminist movements for global justice will be more prevalent than narrowly defined frames in the online mission statements of TFNs.	Chapter 4
H3: Transnational women’s organizations that articulate a feminist identity are more likely to deploy frames that challenge hegemony than those who do not self-identify as feminist.	Chapter 5
H4: Transnational women’s organizations that hold a multi-issue focus are more likely to deploy frames that challenge hegemony than those that have a single-issue focus.	Chapter 5
H5: Transnational women’s organizations who hold a non-Northern identity are more likely to deploy frames that challenge hegemony than organizations whose identities are Southern or transnational.	Chapter 5
H6: Highly professionalized transnational feminist networks are less likely than TFNs with low professionalization to deploy frames that challenge hegemony.	Chapter 5
H7: TFNs with high levels of financial resources will differ from TFNs with low levels of financial resources in terms of their discursive responses to hegemony.	Chapter 5

<p>H8: TFNs receiving financial and institutional support from non-neutral sources (e.g., those associated with hegemonic ideology) will be less likely to challenge hegemony than those who receive their resources from neutral sources.</p>	<p>Chapter 5</p>
<p>H9: Neutral funding sources <i>and</i> an oppositional identity may combine to lead organizations to challenge hegemony.</p>	<p>Chapter 5</p>
<p>H10: Diagnostic frames that reference “master grievances” will be used in efforts to promote consensus/manage differences. In the case of transnational women’s activists, these frames are likely to take the specific form of anti-neoliberalism, anti-militarization, and anti-fundamentalism arguments.</p>	<p>Chapter 6</p>
<p>H11: Frames that are broad-ranging and intersectional will be more commonly used to manage differences than narrow and/or single-issue frames. Among transnational women’s activists, this will commonly take the form of a rights-based frame.</p>	<p>Chapter 6</p>
<p>H12: Frames that are inwardly focused on the movement (e.g., capacity-building and movement process frames) will be used by activists in their efforts to manage differences.</p>	<p>Chapter 6</p>

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY AND METHODS

Introduction

In this chapter, I discuss in detail my methodological orientation and strategies for addressing the research questions of interest in this project. Sandra Harding (1987) has argued convincingly for a distinction between methodology and methods in social science research. Many critical and feminist scholars in particular have found her clarification of conceptual boundaries quite useful; “method” refers to a technique for gathering and analyzing evidence, while “methodology” refers to theoretical understandings about how research should be done. In keeping with this rationale, I begin my discussion with an exposition of the feminist methodology guiding my work and of the impact that such methodological commitments have on my choice of data and methods. I then lay out my research design for the project, including a description of the data sources and analytic techniques. Finally, I provide a more detailed look at the specific questions and methods driving each of the three analysis chapters.

Methodology

I turn first to a discussion of the epistemological and methodological underpinnings of my project. My approach to the research is explicitly feminist. Below I outline some of the most critical pieces of feminist methodology and explain why it is particularly appropriate for this inquiry.

Essential to an understanding of the key elements of a feminist approach is the recognition that feminist theory and methodology originated outside the academy, in the real-life struggles of women, specifically women's activism. The consciousness-raising of women's movements brought to light the ways in which women's experiences had been systematically ignored and devalued by scholars in all disciplines (DeVault 1996). Thus, early feminist scholarship tended to have at least one feature in common: the recognition of gender as a central structure in the shaping of material life (Gottfried 1996), and the consequent placement of women at the center of scholarly inquiry (Smith 1974, 1979). Feminist scholarship sought to incorporate and value the voices of women – voices that had previously not been acknowledged due to the male-centered, positivist norms of research.²⁵ Not surprisingly, the development of feminist theory and methodology occurred simultaneously among feminist scholars in social science and humanities disciplines (e.g., Dorothy Smith in sociology, Nancy Hartsock in political science, Sandra Harding in philosophy, Gerda Lerner in history). Many of these scholars were activists themselves. This parallel development again reflects the roots of feminism not in a particular theory, but rather in women's activism.

Related to this central tenet of feminist methodology (women-centered inquiry/focus on women's experiences) are a number of other guiding principles. Since the inception of second wave women's movements, and during the 1980s in particular, gender scholars in various disciplines have participated in a continual dialogue around

²⁵ Feminists have critiqued positivist approaches primarily for their (uncritical) notion of objectivity and for their lack of attention to power relations inherent in social research (Sprague and Zimmerman 1993). Although positivism is commonly associated with quantitative methods and with attention to rigor, a researcher need not adopt a positivist epistemology in order to value and practice rigorous, empirical social science produced using qualitative or quantitative methods. On the contrary, many feminists adopting critical realist or standpoint epistemologies (which both offer criticisms of positivism) also produce empirical work. Thus, positivism and empiricism do not necessarily go hand in hand.

feminist theory, epistemology, methodology and methods (see, for example, Fonow and Cook 1991; Gottfried 1996; Harding 1987; Smith 1987; Stanley 1990). Feminist academics have engaged in rigorous debate over how to do feminist research, but over time the debate has given rise to a rich body of work in which we actually find a great deal of consensus about certain core issues (Cancian 1992; Cook and Fonow 1986; DeVault 1996). Among these core issues are several that are especially relevant to my analysis:

1) A commitment to reducing gender inequality/effecting social change – Many feminist scholars describe their work as contributing to a broader collective project oriented toward the disruption of gender inequality. Some use terms like “emancipatory” research, but the major theme is the quest to produce scholarship that carries with it the possibility of benefiting women in some way.

2) Reflexivity/commitment to critique – Feminist methodology requires a staunch commitment to criticism of both dominant forms of research practice and feminist research practice. Particular attention is paid to the myth of objectivity, as feminists assert that knowledges (including scientific knowledge) are situated, and are not based on a neutral perspective (Haraway 1988). Furthermore, this reflexivity demands an accommodation of and sensitivity to differences based on race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, religion, and ability (hooks 1984; Mohanty 1988; Ingraham 1994).

3) Minimizing hierarchical power relationships between researcher and researched (sometimes associated with making women subjects, rather than objects) – Feminist scholars remain acutely aware of the possibility of exploiting the individuals and

communities they research, and they take great pains to avoid or at least minimize it. In many cases, though not always, attempts to place themselves in the “same critical plane” as the women they study (Harding 1987) include participatory research methods (Acker, Barry, and Esseveld 1983; Cancian 1996).

Feminist approaches to research give attention to content, method, *and* purpose/intent (Westkott 1990). Though critique of the historically male-centered content of social research characterized much of the earliest feminist scholarship, critiques of knowledge construction, development of research questions, and methods used have all more than caught up with content-related critiques. Also, though there are traces in earlier feminist scholarship of quests to find **A** feminist method, **A** feminist epistemology, or **A** woman’s voice, researchers have long since abandoned such ideas. There is wide recognition in the feminist community that a plurality of ideas, experiences, and methods must be accommodated. In fact, postcolonial feminist scholars in particular remind us that attempts to construct a monolithic woman’s experience or perspective should be viewed with skepticism at best (Mohanty 2003; Narayan 1997). Built into a feminist methodology is the *requirement* of self-reflection; part of this self-reflection is the accommodation of difference – difference based on class, race, sexuality, religion, education, culture, etc. Feminist methodology allows and in fact demands continual contestation, a feature that proves especially beneficial in studies that must account for difference in a variety of forms.

Finally, feminist methodology does not, in my view, require a commitment to or rejection of any particular data collection method or analytic technique; rather it requires a consistency among epistemology, methodology, and choice of method (Risman 1993).

Specifically, it requires that our methods be driven by our questions, and that our questions be driven by a commitment to principles such as those outlined above.

A feminist methodology is well suited to the study of transnational women's activism. In fact, I would argue that a feminist methodology is particularly well suited to study *any* marginalized or oppressed group. I would even further assert that the features of feminist methodology position it especially well toward studying groups attempting to change their social circumstances (e.g., via a social movement). As I mentioned earlier, feminist methodology is specifically oriented toward social change; thus, it would be appropriate to employ a feminist approach in any situation where an implicit or explicit goal of the research is to effect change for the individuals or communities involved. In that sense, the use of feminist methodology is appropriate for studying postpartum depression self-help movements in the U.S. (see Taylor 1998), as well as studying transnational advocacy networks for women's rights (see Friedman 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998).

I would, however, add a corollary to this point: the more marginalized the group being studied, the more appropriate and in fact crucial is the use of feminist methodology and methods. When undertaking a study of a group facing disadvantages on multiple fronts (what Collins 1990 refers to as interlocking systems of oppression), the risk of exploitation on the part of the researcher is much higher, and the difficulties of negotiating the research relationship while maintaining standards of evidence may be much greater. Furthermore, for those researchers with ethical commitments to producing research that may be useful to the communities involved, or disrupting power relations

more generally, the stakes are very high. An attempt to achieve this kind of work without the benefit of a feminist methodology would be difficult at best.

Clearly, there are numerous examples of movements of marginalized groups both within nations and across national boundaries. There is little point in trying to identify criteria to discern which groups are “most marginalized.” However, there are a few factors that make a feminist methodology even more crucial for the study of movements that involve transnational collaboration. First, due to the obvious barriers of geography, language, and culture, the study of transnational phenomena poses challenges that may not exist in a national or local study. Furthermore, many facets of difference exist among movement actors, both individuals and organizations. Gathering data and conducting analyses that allow one to make claims about the movement as a whole are therefore more difficult. When studying a transnational movement, there is no one country or conference to which one could travel and interview a truly representative subset of participants. These greater challenges, I believe, increase the need for a feminist approach.²⁶ A feminist methodology works very hard to take into account these sorts of issues, and considers what sort of methods would be most appropriate to examine movement dynamics in the face of these challenges.

I wish to emphasize that my commitment to feminist methodology and methods does not preclude rigorous, empirical analysis in any way. In fact, a careful, self-critical approach promotes the production of good data. In describing the essence of my goals, I invoke Barbara Risman’s (1993) term “feminist standpoint empiricist.” As a feminist sociologist, I find this identity to be very salient. Risman’s label simultaneously

²⁶ Although even a feminist approach necessarily excludes particular voices and perspectives due to the often nomothetic nature of social science, feminist researchers attempt to be self-critical and transparent about these limitations and exclusions.

communicates a belief in studying empirical social phenomena in a rigorous manner, but also a commitment to doing so in a way that recognizes sources of hidden power, questions the status quo of theory and research practices, and values multiple forms of knowledge.

In tangible terms, my feminist methodological commitments influence this research in a few key ways. First, a feminist perspective enabled me to develop research questions that I believe are interesting and meaningful not only to movement and feminist scholars, but also to movement activists and organizations. Second, this perspective provides me with theoretical and methodological tools to illuminate difference – a central concern of this research; such differences might be material (e.g., power, resources), identity-based, ideological, or strategic. Third, it gives me a continued awareness of my subject position, and of the limits of my vantage point. Fourth, my commitment to feminist movements compelled me to exercise particular care and rigor in sampling strategy (a process which I describe below). Finally, my feminist methodology led me to utilize both unobtrusive and participatory approaches to data collection and analysis. I rely heavily on content analysis of organizational documents, a technique whose virtues include low levels of inconvenience and risk to movement organizations; however, if I were to stop there, the integrity of my project would be compromised, both in terms of my ethical commitments to the movement and in terms of data quality. By engaging in participatory methods as well, I diffuse some of the tension inherent in my subject position as a white, western, educated person situated in the academy. For such a person to study a contemporary anti-oppression movement without any form of participation would risk interpretive myopia, and potentially reify historical colonialist relationships

between researchers and their subjects. I believe this triangulation of data sources thus enhances both the quality and ethics of my project.

Finally, I should also note that I intend to circulate my findings not only in scholarly venues, but also in relevant movement outlets. While not all aspects of my research are useful in concrete ways for movement actors, some information may be of interest.²⁷ It is true that conducting research *on* social movements is not the same as conducting research *for* social movements (Hoynes 2005), but I am hopeful that my analyses will have implications for both movement theory and practice.

Research Design

I utilize multiple methods of data collection and analysis to address the research questions of interest in this study. Pairing a content analysis of texts with fieldwork permits me to see movement discourse from multiple angles. The textual analysis enables examination of a moderate to large number of groups in a systematic way, revealing variation within a representative sample. On the other hand, the participatory approach facilitates attention to “lived realities” and provides a “sense of being there” (Geertz 1988); furthermore, it provides an opportunity to observe framing (and framing differences) in action. Below I discuss both the unobtrusive and the participatory methods of data collection in greater detail, as well as three particular techniques I used to analyze the data.

²⁷ In my conversations with activists and movement leaders over the past few years, a number of women have expressed interest in my research and have affirmed the practical significance of this work.

Data Sources and Collection

Organizations and Organizational Texts. The chief purpose of my data collection process was to gather information on the discursive strategies used by transnational feminist networks, and also on their organizational characteristics, in order to illuminate variation across groups. The primary data for the project come from texts produced by a randomly selected representative sample of transnational feminist networks in 2007 and 2008.

Transnational feminist networks are umbrella organizations that transcend national borders, share ideas, goals, and strategies, and seek change for women at the supranational political level (Moghadam 2005). Recall that Moghadam characterizes TFNs as **the** organizational expression of contemporary transnational feminism, making them an ideal subject of examination for the purposes of this research. As is common in social science research, the true population of interest (in this case, all transnational feminist networks) is unknowable, and therefore unattainable. However, I made exhaustive efforts to generate a study population that is wide-reaching and inclusive. Following other scholars who have studied transnational social movement organizations, (Ferree and Pudrovska 2006; Smith 2005, 2008), I began generating my study population of TFNs by extracting all women's and/or feminist organizations from the list of international women's organizations that appears in the *Yearbook of International Organizations*. Smith (2008) characterizes the YIO quality in this way:

The Yearbook is edited by the Union of International Associations (UIA), which was formally charged by the United Nations with the task of assembling a regular database of all international and transnational organizations— that is (by UIA's definition), all organizations involving different national governments and/or citizens from at least three countries. The UIA makes extensive efforts to identify new groups and to identify inactive or disbanded groups. Once identified,

responsible authorities within each organization are asked to complete an annual questionnaire that details the organization's work, its members, its links with international organizations and NGOs, among other information. The UIA has made systematic efforts to improve its data collection methods, and as a result we can be quite confident about their accuracy for more recent years. While it is not a perfect census of all transnational organizations – and it is likely to be comparatively less accurate in tracking the less formal and more fluid social movement groups...it remains the best record we have over a long period of time of transnational organizational activity.

I used the online, searchable version of the YIO in the summer of 2007 to identify an initial, broad list of organizations that I then narrowed down according to a number of factors. While not all included organizations are explicitly “feminist,” all deal in some way with women's or gender issues. Organizations in the database are categorized by a number of features, including “subject.” TFNs inhabited one or more of the following subject groups: “women,” “sex-related questions,” or “justice/innovative change.” After a series of searches designed to catch all possible organizations working on these issues, and after removal of all duplicate entries, I was left with 293 organizations.

In order to be included in the final study population, groups needed to meet a set of criteria that were derived largely from theoretical concerns about what constitutes a TFN, but also in a few cases derived from logistical limitations (e.g., language constraints). I visited the websites (if available) of each of the 293 organizations to further determine the appropriateness of inclusion in the study population. Upon so doing, I removed from the list any group that appeared defunct or that failed to maintain a website. Additionally, I retained only organizations that posted at least some of their communications in English; this decision stems both from my inability to read non-

English texts and from the fact that the vast majority of transnational organizations tend to translate at least some of their key documents and publications into English.²⁸

I also excluded any organizations that were individual SMOs or NGOs, as opposed to transnational networks. That is, I only included networks, or umbrella groups that link other smaller organizations and individuals together for the purposes of working toward supranational political change. SMOs and NGOs are likely to be much smaller and more homogenous than networks, and are also more likely to be involved in local and grassroots efforts (often with a primary focus on service provision) as opposed to transnational ones. Truly globally-oriented movement groups have no choice but to confront differences within their large and diverse constituencies.

Finally, I also excluded organizations whose chief purpose, affiliations, and/or activities indicated that they lay outside the definition of a transnational feminist organization working for political change at the global level. Some groups, while globally focused on women's issues, straddled the boundary between SMO and research institute, foundation, or government organization; I chose not to include these types of

²⁸ It could be argued that significant limitations are introduced by the exclusion of groups who do not maintain a website and/or who provide no communications in English. Specifically, my study population may exclude some groups who are under-resourced (in terms of both funds and personnel) and therefore unable to develop or sustain a web presence, or who have no connections with or leadership by English speakers. These concerns are not unimportant, and I address them at several levels. First, recall from chapter 2 the conceptual import of transnational networks as the unit of analysis; while clearly not the only manifestation of contemporary transnational feminist activism, these networks have for some time been the primary forces of collective action on behalf of women at the global level. There are likely very few networks that meet all other criteria of a TFN, yet do not communicate at all in English or make use of an organizational website. The nature of working in global politics all but requires such communication. Second, I do not seek to make claims about small or locally-based organizations that fall outside the definition of a TFN; while I hope to incorporate these kinds of organizations into my future work for comparative purposes, they are not within the scope of the current project. So, to sum up, my decisions about criteria for the study population, while limiting the *types* of groups about which I can make claims, do not compromise the validity of the claims.

groups in the study population.²⁹ To be clear, I did not exclude organizations from the study population simply because they received substantial government support, conducted their own research, or awarded funds to smaller organizations as part of their mission; rather, organizations were excluded if their purpose was *primarily/solely* grant-making, research, or if they reported directly to a government body. In short, because consistency in organizational criteria was a top priority, I chose to avoid the possible confusion introduced by organizations whose categorization as a TFN could be questionable.

After culling the list of 293 groups based on these criteria, I then re-visited the secondary literature on transnational women's activism to consider additional TFNs that, for whatever reason, did not appear in the YIO. With one or two exceptions, this search yielded only organizations that I had already uncovered elsewhere. To further assure inclusivity, I took two additional steps. I searched the database of organizations that participated in the World Social Forum 2007 process site (<http://wsfprocess.net/>)³⁰ for groups that might qualify as TFNs, but may not have appeared in the YIO database. Although I picked up an additional five TFNs in that phase of the search, my confidence in the list was boosted by the fact that so many of the TFNs participating in the WSF process site were already present in my data. As a last effort to ensure due diligence, I circulated the working list to a number of feminist scholars and activists familiar with transnational women's issues and asked them to alert me to other organizations they

²⁹ Examples of such excluded organizations include the Global Fund for Women (primarily a foundation/grant-maker), UNIFEM (the women's fund at the United Nations, a global governance institution), and the International Gender Studies Centre (a research institute/think tank), housed at the University of Oxford.

³⁰ The World Social Forum is described in further detail later in the chapter. In preparation for the 2007 WSF in Nairobi, Kenya, an online "common space" was created for participating organizations to connect with one another, share ideas, and make plans in advance of the meetings. Over 1800 organizations participated.

knew of that I might have overlooked. Although I received several suggestions from this pool, in most cases the suggested organizations failed to meet at least one of the aforementioned criteria.

Following the final round of culling and review, the study population contained a total of 94 transnational feminist networks. Although, as I previously noted, my list does not constitute the “true,” or theoretical, population of transnational feminist networks, I argue that this study population constructed through careful procedures is a reasonable substitute for the population. From the list of 94 I then randomly selected 31 organizations for examination in my study; this random, representative sample allows me to make generalizable claims about the population of TFNs. TFN names and websites for the 31 sampled organizations are listed in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. List of Sampled Transnational Feminist Networks

Name of Organization	Address of Website
African Women's Development and Communication Network (FEMNET)	www.femnet.or.ke
Asian Women in Cooperative Development Forum	www.coopwomen.org/awcfcms
Association for Women's Rights in Development	www.awid.org
ASTRA - Central and Eastern European Women's Network for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights	www.astra.org.pl
Coalition Against Trafficking in Women	www.catwinternational.org
Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era	www.dawnnet.org
Equality Now	www.equalitynow.org/english
European Women's Lobby	www.womenlobby.org
Family Care International	www.familycareintl.org/en
Global Women's Strike	www.globalwomenstrike.org
GROOTS International (Grassroots Organizations Operating Together in Sisterhood)	www.groots.org
Indigenous Women's Network	www.indigenouswomen.org
International Gender and Trade Network	www.igtn.org
Int'l. Network on Gender & Sustainable Energy	www.energia.org

Name of Organization	Address of Website
International Women's Rights Action Watch - Asia Pacific	www.iwraw-ap.org
Isis International - Manila	www.isiswomen.org
Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights	www.cladem.org/english
Network Women in Development Europe	www.wide-network.org
Pacific Institute for Women's Health	www.piwh.org
PeaceWomen Across the Globe	www.1000peacewomen.org
RAINBO - African Partnership for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights of Women and Girls	www.rainbo.org
Vital Voices Global Partnership	www.vitalvoices.org
Women for Water, Water for Women (WfWfW)	www.waterforwomen.org
Women for Women International	www.womenforwomen.org
Women in Black (WIB)	www.womeninblack.org
Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF)	www.wecf.eu
Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing	www.wiego.org
Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children	www.womenscommission.org
Women's Global Network for Reproductive Rights (WGNRR)	www.wgnrr.org
Women's Learning Partnership	www.learningpartnership.org
World March of Women	www.worldmarchofwomen.org

The texts of interest for the TFNs are statements of organizational mission and values.³¹ Unlike other researchers who have examined the frames of transnational movement groups as represented in the media (e.g., Tsutsui 2006), I very intentionally choose to rely on original activist-produced text as opposed to media accounts of frames because such accounts may not accurately portray the emphasis and level of complexity in collective action frames. Statements of mission and values are a particularly useful unit of analysis for several reasons. First, they are representative of key messages that

³¹ As I mention here, the texts that I coded included more than just those statements officially referred to as “mission” by the organizations themselves. The coded texts also included information on organizational values, vision and goals. However, for the sake of simplicity, I use the term “mission statement” as shorthand to refer to this broader set of information. I discuss the coding in further detail later in the chapter.

the organization wants to emphasize and make public. Second, they are likely to have been carefully and collectively developed with input from many organization members, and refined over time. Thus, it is highly improbable that the statements represent a marginal view within the organization (as could be the case with a document such as a position paper or newsletter article written by an individual member or staff person at the organization). A third reason to use mission statements is that they are present across all organizations. While TFNs vary widely in volume of publications such as newsletters, press releases, and position papers, information on organizational mission and values is a consistent feature of TFN websites. Therefore, I was able to avoid the methodological challenges presented by vast disparities in numbers of texts among groups.

I collected these statements through careful combing of organizational websites between January and July of 2008. In many, but not all cases, such statements were easy to locate due to clear headings or links. For each TFN, I created a document into which I copied all text that dealt with the organization's mission, vision, beliefs, values, and/or principles. I then imported each document into Atlas.ti for coding. These documents ranged in length from a few paragraphs to a few pages. One advantage of using the Atlas.ti software, as I will discuss later, is that I could look at the documents in their entirety at any point during the coding process.

Because I am concerned with organizational-level influences on framing, I also collected information on various organizational characteristics of each TFN. In keeping with my theoretical interests discussed earlier, I carefully examined organizational websites to extract the following features: organizational structure, stability, age, funding, issue focus, feminist identity, and status within and outside of the movement. In some

cases, information was well labeled and easy to find; in many other cases, locating the information entailed searching publications and documents such as annual reports. While I explain specific operationalizations of measures in a later section, let me say for now that I originally collected information on these organizational features at a high level of detail in order to maximize my coding options. For example, in many instances, groups provide a list of funders/donors; rather than classifying types of funders and recording categories, I copied the entire list and made decisions about coding and operationalizations later. All organizational information was entered into a Filemaker Pro database for storage.

Participant-Observation at Meetings of Transnational Activists. In addition to collecting organizational texts, I also collected data via participant observation at a series of major global activist meetings, the World Social Forum and the Feminist Dialogues.³² Now convened biennially and attended by as many as one hundred thousand activists, academics, policy-makers and donors, the WSF is an international conference that serves as “...an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and inter-linking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neo-liberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are

³² I received IRB approval for this fieldwork as part of a team of graduate student researchers under the direction of principal investigator Brooke Ackerly, associate professor of political science. Our team received an exemption due to the public nature of the venues and the limited risk to research subjects.

committed to building a society centred on the human person” (WSF Charter of Principles, <http://www.wsfindia.org/charter.php>).³³

A diverse mix of NGOs, SMOs, and political organizations have used the WSF as a venue to construct and disseminate radical critiques of economic globalization, war and militarism, and a range of other social issues. Feminist activists, and TFNs in particular, have had an increasing presence since the first WSF in Porto Alegre in 2001. Immediately prior to the Mumbai WSF in 2004, the first Feminist Dialogues meeting was held as a means of bringing together activists from around the world to discuss feminist issues and challenges, and to infuse the WSF with a gender perspective. Spearheaded primarily by a small group of TFNs based in the global South, the FD meetings have continued at each WSF since 2004, with the exception of the 2009 WSF in Belem, Brazil.³⁴ The Feminist Dialogues describe its key objectives in this way:

In having the meeting before the WSF we hope to achieve a two-way political exchange: firstly, we hope to effectively intervene in the broader WSF process as feminists organizing for change, and to establish strategic and politically relevant links with other social movements. As a site of resistance, the WSF is one of the most dynamic spaces available to us as feminist activists and it is important to participate in it while at the same time retaining our autonomy within the FD (Feminist Dialogues 2006).

A number of prominent scholars studying global social movements and/or transnational women’s activism have found the WSF and FD meetings to be an important space and source of data (Conway 2007; Desai 2006; Fisher and Ponniah 2003; Reese et al. 2007; Smith 2008; Smith et al. 2007). They provide an ideal opportunity to observe and interact with many different movement actors and organizations in one place, and

³³ From 2001 to 2005 the WSF was held annually. Beginning in 2006, the International Council made the decision to change the frequency of global meetings to every second year, in part to encourage regional and local social forum meetings during the off years.

³⁴ At the 2009 WSF, the leadership of the FD held events within the Forum, rather than convening a separate conference in advance.

over a relatively short period of time. Juris and his colleagues (2009) argue that ethnographic approaches in these sorts of transnational activist spaces are particularly valuable in making differences and power dynamics visible; they contend that this kind of “politically engaged” ethnography enables researchers “...to uncover important empirical issues and generate critical insights that are simply not accessible through traditional objectivist methods” (4).

An active participant and observer in events at both the WSF and the FD, I carefully documented my observations with extensive field notes on sessions and on informal conversations with participants/activists. Simply put, field notes are “...detailed accounts of people, places, interactions, and events that the researcher experiences as a participant-observer” (Lichterman 2002: 121). Following strategies articulated by Emerson (2001) and Lichterman (2002), I took notes during sessions, and often wrote memos in between sessions and typically at the end of each day to capture additional observations and initial ideas for analysis. When possible, I also documented sessions using a digital voice recorder.³⁵

My participatory approach to studying feminist activism within these transnational spaces enabled me to observe closely the discursive strategies of women’s organizations. I was able to note and appreciate differences and tensions among groups, and how they were rendered visible through different ways of talking about issues. I observed the speech of plenary speakers, panelists at smaller sessions, and also the questions and comments of audience members, many of whom provided information about their organizational affiliation and/or the political and cultural context of their

³⁵ I include the disclaimer “when possible” because, as any previous attendee of the WSF knows, sessions often take place outdoors in a tent or stadium with substantial background noise (e.g., drums, music, speeches), making it very difficult to hear clearly.

activism. I particularly noted the use of frames coupled with acknowledgements of intramovement differences in order to discern the types of frames commonly used as tools in addressing the management of diversity and the building of consensus.

In 2004 I attended 16 sessions at the WSF in Mumbai, India; in 2007 in Nairobi I attended 13. A listing of session titles and sponsoring organizations appears in Appendix A. There are literally hundreds of sessions one might attend during the 4 or 5 days of the forum, and often well over 30 options available during any given time slot. Some sessions are quite large, have ample seating, involve one or more high-profile speakers sitting at a table with microphones; these types of sessions do not lend themselves well to questions and discussion. At the other end of the spectrum, many sessions are small, informal, and highly conducive to group discussion. I selected sessions to attend based on their engagement with women's issues and transnational activism, and gave particular preference to those that explicitly dealt with transnational collaboration, engagement with global governance institution, or the challenges of intramovement differences. I meticulously reviewed the entire WSF program in advance in order to identify these sessions, and made explicit efforts to attend events organized by TFNs.

I attended the Feminist Dialogues meeting only in 2007;³⁶ the sessions, consisting of plenary panels, small group breakouts, and open forums took place during the three days immediately preceding the World Social Forum in Nairobi. The FD meetings are organized differently than the WSF in that there are not multiple options for sessions to

³⁶ The year 2004 marked the first meeting of the Feminist Dialogues. It was an "invitation-only" event in which invited parties included mostly well-established organizations and individual activists who had at least loose pre-existing connections with one another; I was not invited to participate. Subsequent FD meetings in 2005 and 2007 required participants to make application in advance to be guaranteed a spot, but the proceedings were otherwise relatively open. Interestingly, though, participants were asked to indicate that they self-identified as "feminist."

attend during any given time slot; rather, all participants attended the same plenary sessions, and were assigned to one of six small groups for breakout discussions. In some cases, each of the small groups discussed the same topic; in others, different topics were assigned to each small group. After each breakout session, the small groups would report back to the larger whole through one person who had been elected as the spokesperson. Over the course of the three days, there were a total of seven large group/plenary sessions, two “open microphone” sessions that included the entire group, and three small group discussion sessions. The program and subsequent report can be viewed online at <http://feministdialogues.isiswomen.org/>. Many, but not all networks in my sample of TFNs also had representatives present at FD and WSF, enabling me to gain a deeper familiarity with the personnel, activities, concerns, and framing practices of some organizations.

Overview of Analytic Techniques

I use the following techniques to analyze the data in this project: 1) content analysis of frames, 2) qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), and 3) a detailed, in-depth qualitative analysis of evidence gathered through my participant-observation in transnational venues. I include three analysis chapters, each of which corresponds to a central research question and the previously noted techniques. In the first analysis chapter, I discuss the results of a detailed content analysis of organizational mission statements, thereby illuminating the various framing strategies used by TFNs; moreover, I use the results of this analysis to construct a methodological critique of existing framing scholarship. I devote the second analysis chapter to a qualitative comparative analysis

that serves to explain the influence of meso-level, organizational characteristics on TFN framing strategies. Finally, in the third analysis chapter, I draw largely on ethnographic evidence to explicate the differences and tensions among activists and organizations that are rendered visible through their discursive practices; I further use these data to show how particular framing strategies are deployed in attempts to manage and negotiate such differences.

Stage 1: Mapping the Landscape of Transnational Feminist Framing.

Chapter 4 revolves around a detailed content analysis of organizational mission statements. The first step was to identify key movement frames (i.e., those used by a reasonable portion of the sample of TFNs), with particular attention to the different ways in which the frames have been used.³⁷

I conducted a content analysis with frames as the primary objects of interest. A content analysis typically focuses primarily on words or word combinations and enables quantification of words or sets of words, if the researcher so desires.” The results of this detailed content analysis are presented in chapter 4, and are used to construct the dependent variables for the qualitative comparative analysis in chapter 5.

I used Atlas.ti, a qualitative data analysis software, to code all organizational texts for the presence of collective action frames. Qualitative software presents several advantages over more traditional forms of analyzing qualitative data. Perhaps most importantly, it enhances efficiency, easily keeps electronic records of notes, memos, and comments, and enables the researcher to perform queries and counts quickly.

Furthermore, having engaged in the analysis of texts both with and without software, I

³⁷ I include in my discussion only those frames that are used by 10 percent or more of the sample of TFNs.

have found that the visual organization of the software gives me greater confidence in the consistency of my coding. In instances where I was unsure about the category in which a frame belonged, I could easily and quickly re-visit other previously coded passages (in a sense, conferring with myself); with the click of a mouse, I was immediately taken to another screen containing the information I needed. This kind of procedure, although certainly possible with more conventional hand-coding practices, would be more laborious without the use of software. One final advantage worth mentioning is comment and memo functions, which enabled me to keep a codebook that could easily be added to and modified right there within the application.

I consider texts as holistic constructs; that is, during each phase of the coding process I was able to review entire statements³⁸ rather than simply the phrase or sentence(s) containing the frames of interest. Qualitative software is particularly helpful in this regard because I could look at each complete text during each round of coding; I never coded from only a partial passage. Recall that one document per TFN was imported into Atlas.ti, and that each document contains statements of mission and values for the corresponding TFN. Statements, in their entirety, ranged from 2-3 short paragraphs to 6+ pages long; most were around 3 single-spaced pages. I first approached the texts using a procedure commonly referred to as “open coding” (Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1990). At a basic level, coding is the process by which the researcher begins to extract meaning by identifying and providing labels for pieces, or “chunks” of the data (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2005). Open coding is often the first step in analyzing

³⁸ I use the terms “document,” “entire text,” and “complete/entire statement” interchangeably to refer to the individual documents I created to represent each TFN’s mission, vision, values, and goals; so, there are 31 statements, documents, or texts. Later, when referring to “passages” of text, I mean to convey the passages (within a text) that constitute a collective action frame.

qualitative data, and consists of “breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualizing, and categorizing data” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 61).

I first carefully scrutinized the texts for the presence of collective action frames by considering whether passages engaged in one of the core framing tasks of diagnosis or prognosis (Snow and Benford 1988).³⁹ I also noted instances where organizations made a statement about their collective identity, or engaged in meaning work that attempted to construct boundaries of the group (Silver 1997). This first pass through the data was followed by numerous coding sessions through which the coding scheme was refined repeatedly. Although I anticipated the presence of frames such as human rights and democracy based on my pre-existing knowledge of the movement, I did not begin the coding process with a formal list of codes; rather, I allowed codes to emerge from the data (Charmaz 2006). I attempted to code the text of one TFN in its entirety before moving on to the next one. Each time I identified a new frame, I re-visited the previously coded text of TFNs in order to assess whether I had overlooked the presence of that frame. This procedure entailed multiple examinations of each text.⁴⁰ Ultimately, my coding scheme accounted for differences on several dimensions of the frames: problem/enemy definition, solution articulation, and identity/boundary work.

Although I coded multiple uses of the same frame (when they existed), ultimately I am not concerned with how many times each organization used a particular frame, but rather, how many organizations use each type of frame. As I will discuss later, the

³⁹ Snow and Benford also identify a third core framing task, motivation. It is often the case that motivational frames overlap heavily with diagnostic and prognostic frames, and the purposes are difficult to disentangle in the process of operationalization. Therefore, I did not code specifically for motivational frames; following Benford’s (1993) model, I focus on variation in diagnoses and prognoses.

⁴⁰ I did not keep a count of how many times I visited each document, as there was no theoretical or methodological rationale for doing so. However, I can report that I consulted each text no fewer than 10 times.

primary outcome of interest in the causal analysis is simply the presence or absence of frames in the mission/vision statement of each TFN.

Here I provide only a brief overview of the categories of collective action frames present in the texts of the TFNs. I provide a much more thorough description in the following chapter. Table 3.2 contains a list of the frames as well as the percentage of TFNs (n=31) utilizing each frame. As shown in the table, frames were categorized as diagnostic, prognostic, or identity-based. TFNs could simultaneously employ diagnostic, prognostic, and identity frames, and many did so. However, not all TFNs used each of these three types of frames in their statements. Furthermore, individual TFNs could and did utilize multiple *forms* of diagnostic, prognostic, and identity frames at the same time.

Passages of text that identified a problem or enemy were categorized as diagnostic. Passages that identified a specific solution or goal were coded as prognostic. The most common diagnostic frames identified the key problems facing women as either economic, or systemic/institutional. The prognostic frames offered by TFNs proposed a wide range of solutions to combat problems; these frames fell into one of six broad categories: institutional, economic liberal political, rights-based, capacity-building, and movement process. Finally, in instances where the TFN made a statement about its identity, the passage was coded as an identity frame. Examples of this included a group's self-identification as "feminist," and also as women of the Third World or global South.

Table 3.2. Overview of Collective Action Frames of TFNs

Frame Category	*Percentage of TFNs Using the Frame (Total number of TFNs = 31)
Economic Diagnosis	35.5%
Neoliberal globalization/capitalism	12.9%
First world consumption	12.9%
General economic inequality	19.4%
Systemic/Institutional Diagnosis	38.7%
Discrimination	29%
Militarization & war	22.6%
Violence	22.6%
Institutional Prognosis	48.4%
Gender mainstreaming	16.1%
Legislative/policy change	35.5%
Education of leaders and the public	29.0%
Economic Prognosis	41.9%
Economic redistribution	12.9%
Economic development	35.5%
Liberal Political Prognosis	51.6%
Equality	35.5%
Democracy	19.4%
Justice	25.8%
Rights-based Prognosis	58.1%
Human Rights	41.9%
Women's Rights	32.3%
Capacity-building Prognosis	74.2%
Leadership/empowerment	32.3%
Education/knowledge (for women)	12.9%
Movement-building/networking	61.3%
Movement Process Prognosis	45.2%
Inclusivity/diversity	32.3%
Internal democracy	19.4%
Identity	35.5%
Feminist	35.5%
Third World/Global South	9.7%

* Percentages in each cell do not add up to 100 because it was possible for organizations to offer more than one type of frame.

Stage 2: Meso-Level Influences on the Framing Strategies of TFNs. I make use of the findings from the content analysis to construct the dependent variables (the frames) for the subsequent phases of the analysis. In contrast to the descriptive nature of the earlier chapter, in the next phase of the analysis I seek to make causal claims about meso-level influences on intramovement frame variation.

The second stage of the analysis, discussed in chapter 5, utilizes qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to assess the relationship between meso-level factors and organizational framing. Specifically, I investigate the impact of differential organizational characteristics (especially resources) on framing responses to hegemony. Developed by Charles Ragin (1987), QCA utilizes the logic of Boolean algebra; both dependent and independent variables are coded dichotomously, where “0” indicates the absence of some condition, while “1” represents its presence. Matrices known as “truth tables” are constructed to reveal the path or paths that produce the given outcome, which is indicated by the dependent variable.

QCA is an analytic technique that is particularly appropriate when N is relatively small, and in cases where the researcher suspects that causal relationships are not simply additive (as is often assumed in traditional quantitative analyses using inferential statistics), but possibly conjunctural. Moreover, QCA allows for the possibility of multiple paths leading to the outcome of interest. Some researchers have noted that QCA retains the strengths of both case-oriented research and variable-oriented quantitative methods, while avoiding certain weaknesses of each (Ragin 1987; Rihoux 2009).

My data are particularly well suited to the use of QCA, as I have a relatively small number of cases (n=31), and I expect conjunctural causation, which QCA can

accommodate. Furthermore, all key measures in the analysis are easily dichotomized.⁴¹ Logistic regression is another common choice of method for analyzing cross-sectional data in which dependent variables are dichotomous. However, logistic regression is typically used when samples are substantially larger than mine. Because logistic regression relies on maximum likelihood estimation, case requirements per parameter estimate are more stringent than they are when using, for instance, ordinary least squares regression; it is standard to have a minimum of 10 to 15 cases per parameter estimate. With only 31 cases in my sample, using this technique would severely limit my ability to consider the influence of multiple causal factors within the same model. In short, I do not have enough cases to ensure reliable parameter estimation.⁴²

Construction of Variables for the QCA

Extensive combing of organizational websites yielded the information used for constructing the independent variables. For instance, information about the issue focus of organizations is often revealed in mission statements, or in parts of websites with headings such as “About Us” or “Who We Are.” Funding sources are also commonly reported transparently in documents such as annual reports; many groups even have a link from their homepage entitled something like “Our Funders.” While some websites were organized logically and, thus, were easy to follow, others required me to search more carefully to locate the necessary information for variable construction. Data were

⁴¹ Because each of the variables in the analysis are dichotomous, I utilize what is known as “crisp set” QCA, as opposed to “fuzzy set” QCA, which enables the inclusion of categorical variables with more than two attributes (Ragin 2000).

⁴² I have already collected some additional data on the 63 TFNs included in the study population, but not present in my sample. My future plans include completing this dataset (i.e., collecting full information for all 94 organizations) and using inferential statistical methods as appropriate.

originally collected at the highest level of detail available, and later recoded as appropriate for the subsequent analyses; for example, in cases where detailed data were available on organizational finances (i.e., a list of all funders, an annual report with full budget information), I recorded all available data and later condensed it according to my coding scheme.

As I discussed in Chapter 2, three types of meso-level factors will be examined to determine their influence on organizational framing practices: organizational identity/composition, resources, structure. The variables of interest include Northern identity/composition, feminist identity, multi-issue focus, level of financial resources, funding sources, UN affiliation, and institutionalization/professionalization.⁴³ Below, I discuss the operationalization for each measure and present two summary tables for further illustration. All data were extracted from publicly available organizational websites. The first table includes an explanation of how each independent variable was constructed for the QCA, while the second provides an overview of the variation on each feature among the TFNs in the sample.

Table 3.3. Construction of Independent Variables in the QCA

Measure	QCA Variable Label	Operationalization
Feminist Identity	FEMINIST	Measure of a TFN’s feminist identity, where “1” indicates the presence of a self-articulated feminist identity/label, and “0” indicates the absence of it

⁴³ I also considered including a measure of organization size/membership as an indicator of resources, but was unable to do so due to lack of availability and consistency in the data sources. Only some organizations report such information publicly and, even when membership is reported, the nature of the measure is not consistent across organizational cases.

Measure	Variable Label	Operationalization
Non-Northern Identity/Composition	NON-NORTH	Measure of a TFN's regional identity, where "1" indicates the lack of Northern identity, and "0" indicates a Northern identity
Multi-Issue Focus	MULTI-ISSUE	Measure of whether an organization focuses on a single issue, or on multiple issues. Multi-issue TFNs are coded as "1," while others are coded as "0."
High Level of Financial Resources	HIGH RESOURCE	Measure of whether the organization enjoys high resources or not. Organizations with a number of paid staff members that exceeds the mean of the sample were coded "1" (high resources), while those below the mean were coded "0" (lack of high resources).
Neutral Funding Sources	FUND NEUTRAL	Measure of the organization's primary funding source where "1" indicates that the TFN receives the greatest portion of its funding from neutral sources such as foundations, while "0" indicates that it does not.
UN Association (Institutional support)	UN	Measure of a TFN's connection, or lack thereof, with the UN. TFNs that are recognized as a resource by UNIFEM, or who hold consultative status with the Economic and Social Council are coded "1." All others are coded "0."
Institutionalization/ Professionalization	INSTITUTE	Measure of an organization's professionalization as indicated by a composite measure including high formality and high longevity. Organizations receiving a "1" on both formality and longevity were coded as "1" (high institutionalization/ professionalization); those coded as "0" on either formality or longevity received a "0" (absence of high institutionalization/ professionalization).

As I discussed in chapter 2, I explore the influence of composition/identity, resources, and structure on organizational framing responses to hegemony. I utilize three indicators of composition/identity, three measures of organizational resources, and one (composite) measure of structure. The first identity measure is whether or not an organization explicitly identifies itself as “feminist.” Each TFN is coded “1” if it articulates a feminist identity, perspective, or uses the feminist label in its online organizational materials; in the absence of evidence that a group explicitly embraces a feminist identity, it is coded “0” on this indicator.

Secondly, I use an indicator of regional identity. This measure was constructed based on a TFN’s self-articulation of its regional identity, but also on the composition of its leadership (including unpaid board and committee members). If an organization articulates a Southern identity in its texts, or if its leadership is diverse transnationally or composed largely of women in the global South, then the organization is coded “1” on the non-Northern identity variable. Two things are important to note about this measure. First, it is not based in any way on the location of a secretariat or headquarters; I argue that using geographic location alone in this way is overly simplistic because it assumes that the physical location of a group is reflective of identity and composition. This is not always the case, particularly for organizations that are based in the North but have highly diverse leadership, constituents, and activities. Second, while previous research has tended to emphasize North-South divisions, I contend that it is not the presence of a Southern identity that matters, but rather the absence of a Northern one. Compositions and identities are, in many cases, truly transnational.

The final measure related to organizational identity is whether or not a TFN holds a multi-issue focus. In some cases, this is easily assessed simply by observing the name of the organization. For instance, it is clear that the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) focuses its work around the issue of human trafficking; on the other hand, an organization such as the Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights addresses a wide range of issues falling under the umbrella of women's rights. For each organization, I also reviewed the online materials (e.g., the goals, activities, and/or objectives) to determine issue focus. TFNs with a multi-issue focus are coded as "1," while single-issue TFNs are coded as "0."

The next three indicators I discuss each measure some aspect of organizational resources. First, I consider the amount of monetary resources enjoyed by each TFN. This measure is constructed based on the number of paid staff each organization employs; as personnel costs can be among the highest encountered, organizations that are able to employ large numbers of paid staff tend to have enjoy reasonably high financial resources on a consistent basis. Thus, paid staff is a sound indicator of financial health. The mean number of paid staff in the sample was 13; any TFN that exceeded this mean number was coded "1" on the high financial resource variable, while TFNs with fewer than 13 paid staff were coded "0." Note also that the absence of high resources does not necessarily mean that a TFN has low resources, but rather the absence of exceedingly high financial resources.

Recall from chapter 2 that it is not only the amount of resources, but also the sources of such support that may influence framing. Therefore, I include measures of funding sources and institutional political support. The neutral funding sources variable

is constructed based on the sources that provide substantial amounts of organizational funding.⁴⁴ TFNs that do NOT receive substantial funds from corporate entities, governments/government agencies, or global governance institutions are coded “1” on this variable, while TFNs who do receive substantial funds from such sources are coded “0.” Note that most organizations with neutral funding sources tend to receive their money from foundations, sometimes only a few, but sometimes many different ones.

In addition to monetary support, I also consider the role of institutional support. TFNs who have an association with the United Nations may benefit from a perception of enhanced credibility due to the UN’s high visibility as a global governance institution working on women’s issues (Marchand and Runyan 2000; Meyer and Prügl 1999); however, these TFNs may also be influenced in part by the hegemonic discourses (e.g., equality, empowerment) disseminated and touted by the UN. Therefore, I include a measure of institutional support from the UN. If a TFN either: a) is listed as a resource with the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), or b) holds consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN, it is coded “1” on the UN measure; any organization not meeting one of these criteria is coded as “0.”

I combine two measures to assess the level of professionalization or institutionalization for each TFN. The measure is constructed based on how long an organization has been in existence, thus taking longevity/stability into account, as well as how centralized/formal a structure it maintains. Regarding organizational age, there was

⁴⁴ I recognize that some will take issue with my choice of the label “neutral” for funding sources that are not connected to governments and/or private corporations. In using the term “neutral,” I do not mean to imply that foundations cannot have political agendas; in fact, many do. However, the agendas of foundations that fund the types of women’s organizations in my analysis are not connected to sources of hegemonic power (e.g., multinational corporations or national governments). Thus, in labeling funding sources “neutral,” I mean to convey the absence of connections to hegemonic political and financial power.

a natural break in the sample due to the fact that many TFNs emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s, followed by a lull, then a new wave of organizational formations beginning in 1999. Therefore, rather than using mean age as a cutoff, I took advantage of this naturally occurring break in the sample. TFNs formed prior to 1999 received a “1” on the age measure, while TFNs formed in or after 1999 received a “0.” The second part of the institutionalization variable deals with formality of structure. For this measure, TFNs whose organizational structure is formal and centralized, as evidenced by the presence of steering committees, boards of directors, or hierarchical leadership, are coded “1.” In the absence of such leadership structures, TFNs are coded “0.” The final composite measure of institutionalization combines both organizational age and formality. Organizations that are older than 10 years (formed prior to 1999), *and* that exhibit professionalized leadership structure are coded as “1.” All others are coded “0.”

Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics for the Sample of TFNs (n=31)

Measure	Percentage of TFNs for which the condition is present
Organizational Resources	
Neutral Funding Sources	23 (74.2%)
High Financial Resources	8 (25.8%)
UN Association	19 (61.3%)
Organizational Structure	
Formal Structure	25 (80.6%)
High Longevity	23 (74.2%)
Institutionalized (composite of previous 2)	20 (64.5%)
Organizational Identity	
Feminist Identity	11 (35.5%)
Non-Northern Identity	24 (77.4%)
Multi-issue focus	12 (38.7%)

Note: All variables appearing in the table are coded dichotomously, with “0” indicating absence, and “1” indicating presence of the condition.

Presented in Table 3.4 are descriptive statistics illustrating the characteristics of the sample. These data provide information on the distribution of the independent variables utilized in the QCA; the numbers in the second column indicate the raw number and also the proportion of TFNs for whom each measure/condition is present. The majority of TFNs (74.2 percent) have neutral funding sources. Just over a quarter of the sample (25.8 percent) falls into the high resource category, and 61.3 percent have an association with the UN. Many of the organizations, 64.5 percent, are highly professionalized, which is not surprising given that I sampled only organizations that qualified as transnational networks. As for TFN identities, 35.5 percent of the sample embraces a feminist identity; the majority (77.4%) have a non-Northern identity/composition; 38.7 percent of the TFNs have a multi-issue focus.

Finally, while in chapter 5 I include a more detailed discussion of the outcome variable, challenging hegemony, I provide a brief overview here. The data for construction of this outcome variable were extracted from the organizational texts; I coded each text according to whether there was evidence of frames that challenged hegemony. Frames that challenge hegemony are those that directly critique sources of power (e.g., neoliberal globalization) and/or call for radical prognoses, such as economic redistribution. Each case was coded “1” if there existed evidence of challenging frames, and “0” if there was no evidence of challenging frames. Although not used as an outcome variable in the QCA, I also coded for the presence or absence of frames that harnessed hegemony in order to distinguish between organizations that only challenged hegemony and those that both challenged and harnessed hegemony in their framing. Frames that harness hegemony invoke or tap into broadly resonant themes that are often

touted by powerful global institutions; examples of frames that harness hegemony include democracy, human rights, and equality. I discuss these framing practices in greater detail and provide additional examples in chapter 5.

Stage 3: Framing as a Tool for Negotiating Intramovement Differences. In Chapter 6, I examine the question: How are transnational networks using discursive tools (frames) to account for and attempt to negotiate intramovement difference? Such a question is not easily addressed through the investigation of text alone; accordingly, I take a somewhat more inductive, grounded approach. Using a detailed narrative account of women's activism in the spaces of the World Social Forum and the Feminist Dialogues meetings, I document how transnational organizations have used discursive strategies as tools for addressing group differences. In so doing, I identify the common characteristics of frames being employed in this manner.

While in the earlier two empirical chapters I employ the TFN as the exclusive unit of analysis, I broaden my lens in this chapter to include other types of organizations and activists. Independent activists, as well as activists working with organizations that are much smaller and/or regionally or locally focused (as opposed to transnationally-focused), also participate in transnational spaces such as the WSF and FD meetings. Largely because the nature of my fieldwork enabled me to have access to these different kinds of feminist actors, I made the decision to include them in my discussion of findings. Much of the evidence I report is in fact based on the speech of activists affiliated with TFNs, and I note that accordingly. But in some cases, I draw on evidence from the speech of non-TFN movement actors to illustrate my arguments. This lens-

broadening does not compromise the validity of the analysis because in chapter 6 my question shifts such that I am not seeking to make claims about TFNs specifically, but rather about the framing practices of women's movement actors engaging in transnational dialogue.

For this analysis, I draw on the evidence present in my field notes, which document my participant-observation of the 2004 and 2007 World Social Forums and the 2007 Feminist Dialogues meetings. The field notes and accompanying memos for these three events exceeded eighty pages. I approached the content analysis of my field notes much as I did the analysis of organizational texts, beginning the coding process by examining my notes for instances of activists' frame utilization, but in addition I looked for references to intramovement differences or tensions.⁴⁵ Since my driving question in this stage of the analysis deals with frames being employed with the intent of mitigating differences, I especially noted instances in which speakers both employed a collective action frame *and* made reference to intramovement differences or, more specifically, collaboration across or in spite of differences. These references to intramovement differences often appeared as mentions of "local particularities" or "our different experiences."

Because the total amount of text to be coded was smaller than with the TFN texts, and because I had already developed a broad classification scheme based on the frames present in the TFN texts, I chose to code my field notes by hand rather than using computer software. All instances of frame usage in my field notes fit into my existing

⁴⁵ Because I have already explained the general procedures associated with content analysis and coding (see discussion of analytic techniques for stage 1 of the analysis), I will not repeat those here. The primary analytical differences between stage 1 and stage 3 are the data sources (organizational texts vs. real-time activist speech) and the tools for coding (software vs. hand-coding).

coding scheme. I used a combination of highlighters and multi-colored post-it notes to flag examples of framing that were relevant to my question. Beginning with the earliest set of notes and moving chronologically through them, I scrutinized my entire set of notes a total of four times, and then re-visited particular sections as appropriate to ensure the utmost care and precision. While I took note of the number of instances of different types of frames and mentions of intramovement differences, I do not rely heavily on the precise frequency of usage (i.e., specific counts of usage) because of the nature of the data source. Note taking in the field is not a perfect representation of all the speech that occurs in a given session (particularly considering occasional language barriers and hearing difficulties in these venues); therefore, I cannot be confident in a total count of frames used in the sessions. Rather, I rely on a more general estimation of prevalence in my presentation of the evidence (i.e., a frame was frequently used, or not frequently used). The categories of frames that I discuss in chapter 6 were present repeatedly and used by multiple activists throughout my field notes; while other frames may have been used with some reasonable level of frequency, I did not find evidence that they were used with the intent of addressing intramovement differences, which, again, is the central theme of the analysis.

CHAPTER IV

MAPPING THE LANDSCAPING OF FRAME VARIATION AMONG CONTEMPORARY TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST NETWORKS

Introduction

In this chapter, I survey the diverse landscape of collective action frames present in the online mission/vision statements of transnational feminist networks. Using data collected through a content analysis of organizational texts, I identify and explain multiple categories of frames currently being used by TFNs. The primary goal of this analysis is to demonstrate: 1) the relative prevalence of certain types of collective action frames to others among transnational feminist networks, and 2) that although organizations that participate in the broader global women's movement share many goals and concerns, their discursive strategies are quite heterogeneous. Therefore, rather than attempting to identify only one or two "master frames" being used by most or all organizations, my aim is also to make visible some of the nuances and differences in interpretations presented on publicly available websites.

Many have noted the obvious heterogeneity among actors and organizations within the same movement, particular those that entail transnational and cross-cultural collaboration (della Porta et al. 2006; Smith 2008); however, this acknowledgement most often comes in the forum of theoretical discussions, and is less often implemented in actual research design, partially because methodological implementation can be tedious and time-consuming (Johnston 2005). While I will not utilize in later chapters every

category of frames identified here, I contend that the exercise is a worthy end in itself as an empirical demonstration of intramovement discursive diversity.

In the sections that follow, I first provide a brief overview of the findings of the content analysis, and then move into a more detailed discussion of the types of collective action frames identified in the analysis, including examples of each. After documenting variation in diagnostic, prognostic, and identity frames among my sample of 31 TFNs, I conclude by suggesting implications of such findings for future research on framing dynamics, particularly among globalized social movements.

The Landscape of Transnational Feminist Framing

The content analysis of organizational texts revealed that transnational feminist networks are actively engaged in multiple types of framing activity in the contemporary period. As I will show, there is a substantial amount of variation across framing activity, and across prognostic framing, in particular. This finding is not surprising, given previous research that has demonstrated that consensus is more easily reached around enemies and problems than around effective solutions, especially among highly diverse movement actors (Bandy and Smith 2005).

Furthermore, because the statements examined are of a public nature and are about TFN mission, vision, and goals, we might expect the language to be more heavily focused on solutions and organizational action, as opposed to diagnosis of problems. This point is also important to note because it has implications for the claims I advance; in this discussion of frame variation among TFNs, I present evidence based only on the public framing in mission statements. As I mentioned in chapter 3, for various reasons

these mission statements are good (perhaps the best) representations of an organization's (collectively developed) collective action frames; however, I do not discount the possibility that framing practices vary across venues. In fact, it is possible and even likely that we would observe a wider variety of framing practices employed when examining the whole of an organization's communications (e.g., newsletters, press releases, speeches, reports, position papers, etc.) as opposed to only one type.

I employed a multi-level categorization scheme for the frames, whereby they were first coded as diagnosis, prognosis, or identity statements. At the next level, I divided diagnoses, prognoses, and identity frames into the following major categories: economic diagnosis, systemic/institutional diagnosis, institutional prognosis, liberal political prognosis, rights-based prognosis, capacity-building prognosis, economic prognosis, movement process prognosis, feminist identity, and Third World/Southern identity. Within each of the major diagnostic and prognostic categories I include subcategories indicating the most common forms taken by each major category of frames. As I noted in chapter 3, I did not begin with these particular categories in mind, but rather allowed them to emerge from the data.

Table 4.1 provides an overview of the most commonly employed diagnostic, prognostic, and identity frames among my sample, as well as the percentage of TFNs engaging in the use of each type of frame.⁴⁶ Note that the total percentage for each major category in bold type (e.g., economic diagnosis) is not simply the sum of percentages from each subcategory, as it was possible for a TFN to offer more than one frame within a major category (e.g., both a neoliberal globalization diagnostic frame and a first world

⁴⁶ Although I do not discuss co-occurrences of frame categories as part of my analysis, I provide an overview of co-occurrences in Appendix B.

consumption diagnostic frame). It was also possible for a TFN to offer an individual frame (e.g., a neoliberal globalization diagnosis) more than once. In such cases, the category was counted only once. I now discuss each category of frames in turn, providing examples from the TFN mission statements.⁴⁷

Table 4.1. Overview of Collective Action Frames of TFNs

Frame Category	*Percentage of TFNs Using the Frame (N=31)
Economic Diagnosis	35.5%
Neoliberal globalization/capitalism	12.9%
First world consumption	12.9%
General economic inequality	19.4%
Systemic/Institutional Diagnosis	38.7%
Discrimination	29.0%
Militarization & war	22.6%
Violence	22.6%
Institutional Prognosis	48.4%
Gender mainstreaming	16.1%
Legislative/policy change	35.5%
Education of leaders and the public	29.0%
Economic Prognosis	41.9%
Economic redistribution	12.9%
Economic development	35.5%
Liberal Political Prognosis	51.6%
Equality	35.5%
Democracy	19.4%
Justice	25.8%
Rights-based Prognosis	58.1%
Human Rights	41.9%
Women's Rights	32.3%

⁴⁷ Note that the passages of text I provide to represent a particular frame category may contain examples of multiple frames. I have attempted to select examples that best represent the core ideas underlying each frame category.

Capacity-building Prognosis	74.2%
Leadership/empowerment	32.3%
Education/knowledge (for women)	12.9%
Movement-building/networking	61.3%
Movement Process Prognosis	45.2%
Inclusivity/diversity	32.3%
Internal democracy	19.4%
Identity	35.5%
Feminist	35.5%
Third World/Global South	9.7%

Percentages in each cell do not add up to 100 because it was possible for organizations to offer more than one type of frame.

Diagnostic Frames

Diagnostic frames are those that serve the function of identifying the problem(s) and/or enemies defining the movement; often, a particular enemy is targeted as being ultimately responsible for the issues faced by movement constituents. In my content analysis of organizational mission statements, I found that the diagnostic frames most commonly used by transnational feminist networks in my sample fell into two broad categories: those targeting economic problems and enemies, and those targeting broad systemic/institutional problems.

Economic Diagnoses. Economic diagnoses were employed by 35.5 percent of TFNs in the sample. This category of frames references economic problems as serious (and, often, the *most* serious) obstacles to women’s flourishing. Frames articulating an economic diagnosis most commonly appear in the form of critiques of neoliberal globalization and capitalism, over-consumption on the part of First World countries, and general economic inequality or poverty. Identifying a devaluation of women’s labor as a core problem with broad impact, the Global Women’s Strike writes that, “...we have

been campaigning to get recognition and wages for all the unwaged work women do, as well as for pay equity – these are joint levers against women’s poverty, exploitation and discrimination of every kind.” The Coalition against Trafficking in Women, pointing out that women are often forced into sex work for the economic benefit of more powerful individuals, argues that, “Sexual exploitation is a vehicle for racism and ‘first world’ domination, disproportionately victimizing minority and ‘third world’ women.” Note that each of the TFNs mentioned above make reference to the theme of exploitation, which is not uncommon in economic critiques. Other organizations, such as Network Women in Development Europe, simply speak of the broad “negative impacts of globalization.” The World March of Women, on the other hand, presents a more specific and pointed critique, laying blame on powerful economic institutions. They attack “...international financial, economic and military institutions (IMF, NATO, WTO, WB, transnational corporations...) that are responsible for impoverishing and marginalizing women.”

Systemic/Institutional Diagnoses. Systemic/institutional diagnoses were also fairly common in the mission statements, and were used by 38.7 percent of the organizations in the sample. This category of frames represents arguments that identify broad systems or institutions, such as discrimination, violence, or military institutions, as the sources of women’s oppression. Discussions of war and violence are often linked. For instance, Women in Black describes itself as a “world-wide network of women...actively opposed to injustice, war, militarism, and other forms of violence.” Global Women’s Strike critiques investment in the budgets of military institutions, which they view as “investment in killing.” In other cases, TFNs identify multiple

manifestations of systemic discrimination as a core, underlying problem. The Association for Women's Rights in Development articulates the need for the "eradication of all discriminations based on gender, sexuality, religion, age, ability, ethnicity, language, nationality, class or other factors." Likewise, International Women's Rights Action Watch – Asia Pacific describes its program as "premised on the belief that discrimination is at the root of all forms of deprivation..." I should note here that in two cases patriarchy as a system of oppression was also mentioned in conjunction with violence or discrimination, but it does not appear in the table because I included only those examples that were present in at least 10 percent of the sample.

Prognostic Frames

Prognostic frames are those that serve the function of identifying appropriate solutions for the problems mentioned above; in many cases, these frames also include implications about the actor(s) responsible for pursuing the solutions. In my content analysis of the organizational texts, five broad categories emerged: institutional prognoses, economic prognoses, liberal political prognoses, rights-based prognoses, capacity-building prognoses, and movement prognoses.

Institutional Prognoses. Institutional prognoses, employed by 48.4 percent of TFNs in the sample, are those that identify the need for specific reforms within political institutions, including global governance institutions and national governments. Note that this category represents reformist, rather than radical, measures in that there is a commitment to working *with* existing systems. This category of frames is epitomized by statements that call for institutional gender mainstreaming, for policy changes that would

be beneficial to women, and for better education and awareness of the public and political leaders regarding women's issues.⁴⁸ Women for Water, Water for Women provides an example of such rhetoric: "In the philosophy of WfWfW, water management and service delivery interventions should be pro-poor, gender sensitive, participatory and demand driven. Effective political support is needed to implement the required changes in policies and institutions – including those constraints preventing the realization of gender equality at all levels." Like WfWfW, the Women's Commission for Refugees also locates policy change as a crucial mechanism for improving women's lives. They cite as one of their core activities "developing and promoting policies and practices that will lead to real on-the-ground change by advocating to policy makers, key organizations, donors and the public to ensure their implementation."

Other frames in this category focus on increasing attention to women's issues among political leaders and the public. For instance, the European Women's Lobby works to "monitor and raise awareness about the development and implementation of gender mainstreaming." Both Energia and the Coalition against Trafficking in Women also use the language of "raising awareness" and "bringing international attention" to women's concerns and the changes needed to alleviate their oppression. Likewise, Women in Black proclaims that "Together we can educate, inform and influence public opinion, and so try to make war an unthinkable option." Thus, as we see here, inherent in

⁴⁸ The language of "gender sensitivity" or "mainstreaming a gender perspective" in policy-making is commonly associated with international institutions working on women's issues. The United Nations and its affiliated agencies have been strong supporters of such policies among national governments. While initially embraced by many movement actors in the 1990s, such concepts have since been roundly criticized for lacking conceptual clarity, de-radicalizing movement goals, and ultimately ghettoizing women's issues (Charlesworth 2005).

these types of frames is the assumption that better policies and heightened awareness *on the part of the public* will improve women's situations on many fronts.

Economic Prognoses. Prognostic frames specifically citing economic solutions to women's obstacles were evident in 41.9 percent of the mission statements in the sample. In many cases, they represent the flip side of the economic diagnoses discussed above. The more moderate, reformist versions of this category call for economic development, while the more radical versions demand the redistribution of financial resources from the powerful to the marginalized. Energia, the International Network on Gender and Sustainable Energy, articulates a reformist economic prognosis in their core mission. They strive to: "Help provide women, and particularly poor women, with more options and better choices of energy for household use; Help provide women, and particularly poor women, with energy for income earning activities, existing and new...Facilitate women's access to credit and banking facilities and the means of producing energy for community level energy supply." The Coalition against Trafficking in Women provides another example in this vein, as they seek to "Provide education and employment opportunities that enhance women's worth and status, thereby diminishing the necessity for women to turn to prostitution." In both of these examples, the proposed solutions entail the provision of enhanced economic opportunity for women, thus making them better able to flourish under existing economic circumstances. In this way, these reform-oriented prognostic frames bear a mild resemblance to some of the capacity-building frames I will discuss below; what distinguishes them is their explicit focus on economic/financial solutions.

But other frames articulating an economic diagnosis are more radical in nature, calling for economic redistribution. Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) demonstrates one such argument. They write, “We want a world where the massive resources now used in the production of the means of destruction will be diverted to areas where they will help to relieve oppression both inside and outside the home.” These types of frames are less common (present in only 12.9 percent of TFN statements) than reform-oriented diagnoses and than most other types of prognostic frames. As I will show in the next chapter, there are multiple reasons why movement organizations may be reluctant to employ such radical framing practices that constitute a challenge to interlocking systems of power.

Liberal Political Prognoses. The next prognostic category of frames I have labeled “liberal political” because the concepts referenced are associated with the values of liberal political theory (Okin 1989; Rawls [1971] 1999; Walzer 1983; Young 1990). Specifically, this category entails the use of notions such as equality, democracy, and justice. The liberal political prognosis was used by 51.6 percent of TFNs, and in many cases included references to more than one of these liberal values. The frames in this category emphasize women’s relative lack of access to, and resultant need for, inclusion in the ideals of liberal democracy; a key assumption underlying these frames is that women should not be treated differently than men, and that they deserve the same opportunities. These appeals to liberalism tap into themes that have historically enjoyed particularly broad resonance, and have been prevalent among many different types of social change movements over time (e.g., the U.S. civil rights movement, woman

suffrage movements internationally). A few examples serve to illustrate the ways in which these ideas are commonly articulated.

The European Women's Lobby states that it "works towards equal rights of women and men to gain equal access to social, cultural and economic resources to strengthen their personal integrity and choice." Elsewhere in their text, they simply call for "Justice for all." The International Gender and Trade Network describes its activities as working "to achieve just and democratic economic policy domestically and globally." In very similar language, Network Women in Development Europe calls for development of "a more just and democratic world order." The Pacific Institute for Women's Health engages in "strengthening movements to secure and protect reproductive rights and justice." Finally, the Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights claims to "contribute from a feminist perspective to the construction of real democracies with social justice."

Rights-based Prognoses. Rights-based frames constitute the fourth category of prognoses.⁴⁹ Also one of the more common categories of prognostic frames, they were employed by 58.1 percent of TFNs in the sample. Given the history of rights-based frames among women's movements across the globe (Friedman 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998), it is not at all surprising that we would observe a majority of TFNs employing this category of frames in their mission statements. Some rights-based frames make reference

⁴⁹ Note that while rights are also associated with liberalism, those rights tend to be focused on civil and political issues, as opposed to economic, social and cultural ones. I choose to separate rights frames from liberal frames in my categorization scheme because women's movements overwhelmingly argue for a holistic understanding of rights that goes well beyond those historically accepted within the realm of liberalism. And while rights frames co-occur with justice and equality frames in many instances, my sample includes many examples of rights-based claims that do not make reference to the other liberal themes. Therefore, including activists' use of rights-based approaches in the same category as their use of liberal ideals could be misleading, or at least only partially accurate.

to human rights in a broad sense, while others call attention to *women's human rights*, and others still employ only the notion of women's rights.

Equality Now states that it was founded “to work for the protection and promotion of the human rights of women around the world. Working with national human rights organizations and individual activists, Equality Now documents violence and discrimination against women and mobilizes international action to support their efforts to stop these human rights abuses.” ASTRA, a European organization that centers its work on sexual and reproductive health, promotes an understanding of these issues as integral to basic human rights. ASTRA “works for the advancement of sexual and reproductive health and rights as fundamental human rights and advocates for their observance, prioritization and implementation on the international, regional and national agendas.” IWRAW – Asia Pacific appeals to the authority of CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women) in its rights claims. IWRAW “contributes to the progressive interpretation, universalization, implementation and realization of women's human rights through the lens of CEDAW and other international human rights treaties. We facilitate a process through which the CEDAW Convention is used as a tool for applying international human rights standards at the national level and in a wide range of contexts (e.g., political participation, armed conflict, rights in marriage, violence against women, trafficking, reproductive rights, employment, etc.)” Taken together, these examples of rights-based frames demonstrate the incredibly wide ranges of issues and contexts to which “rights” can be applied. I will return to this point in Chapter 6.

Capacity-Building Prognoses. The next category of prognostic frames, those which focus on capacity-building, were used in 74.2 percent of cases, making capacity-building the most prevalent type of frame in use by the TFNs in my sample. Capacity-building frames are those that argue for investment in or strengthening of either individual women or the movement as a whole. Implicit in these frames is the idea that women's oppression can be remedied (at least in part) by increasing the strength and capacities of women, activists, and the movement. When focusing on building the capacities of individual women, they take the form of leadership/empowerment frames or of frames that call for increased education and knowledge for women. Alternatively, when focusing on building the capacity of the movement, these frames speak of movement building or of the importance of linkages and networks within the movement.

Women for Women International utilizes the former type of frame, explaining that their programs are designed to help "women build upon existing skills and learn new ones in order to regain their strength, stability, and stature on the path to becoming active citizens." The Women's Learning Partnership and GROOTS (Grassroots Organizations Operating Together in Sisterhood) each articulate a version of the capacity-building frame that combines the two approaches, discussing empowerment of individual women as well as the movement. WLP states that its "primary objectives are to increase the number of women taking on leadership and decision-making roles at family, community, and national levels, and to improve the effectiveness of feminist movements in Muslim-majority societies and globally by strengthening the capacity of our partner organizations." Likewise, GROOTS presents its vision to "develop, over time, a movement giving voice and power to grassroots women's local visions and initiatives

attracting long-term partners, and creating new policies, to expand and strengthen their leadership.”

Other TFNs emphasize the need for working together and strengthening the women’s movement as a whole. Also notable in these arguments are the references to multiple levels of engagement, linkage, and networking. PeaceWomen Across the Globe includes the following in its mission statement: “We are connecting individual peacewomen and organizations at the national, regional, and international levels. Our goal is to connect and strengthen women’s peace efforts around the globe so that a strong, cross-sectoral and global women’s peace movement will emerge.” On a similar note, the Association for Women’s Rights in Development articulates its mission as strengthening “the voice, impact and influence of women’s rights advocates, organizations and movements internationally to effectively advance the rights of women.” The Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights provides a final illustration of the capacity-building frame, stating among its goals to “enable collaboration and networking at different levels – grassroots, local, national, regional and global – by strengthening the Network across regions through linkages to global commitments.”

Movement Process Prognoses. Finally, statements about movement process represent the last category of prognostic frames in my sample. Movement process frames, including those that make reference to inclusivity and diversity within the movement, and those that valorize the internal democracy of the movement, are present in 45.2 percent of the TFN mission statements. This category of frames entails specific references to process, to ways of working, and to the value placed on inclusivity and multiplicity by so many women’s organizations. In many cases, these values and

processes are articulated as an advantage that enables the movement to do its work better. Organizations contend that through the incorporation of diverse perspectives, the movement is able to develop sharper analyses and collaborate more effectively.

These process-oriented themes appear in the mission statements of organizations such as the World March of Women. The World March notes that its values center “on the globalization of solidarity...the respect and recognition of diversity among women; the multiplicity of our strategies.” The Pacific Institute for Women’s Health argues for the importance of “engaging communities that have largely not been included in the movement to date, for example, young people, communities of color and diverse ethnicities, and organizations in countries that have opposed international efforts to fully recognize reproductive rights.” The Women’s Learning Partnership includes in their statement a passage explicitly calling for discussion across differences: “WLP believes that dialogue across boundaries of culture, class, gender, generation, and nation is essential for achieving socially equitable and environmentally sound development.” The WLP further writes that, “We live our core values and beliefs. We are committed to the creation of tolerant, egalitarian, and democratic communities developed through partnerships based on cooperation, trust, and respect. We sustain our partnerships through open, ongoing and in-depth communication...We promote and sustain leadership that is horizontal, participatory, and inclusive.” Finally, the Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights illustrates the depth of its commitment to democratic process in this way: “Internal principles of democracy and allegiance to human rights must also guide WGNRR’s organisational environment. As part of its commitment and

methodology, WGNRR will develop policies and systems that will keep it self-reflective and accountable.”

The themes underlying these movement process frames are indeed different from other, more conventional prognoses, but may be no less significant in the thinking of movement actors. Particularly as a means of promoting collaboration across differences, these frames may have unique potential; I will discuss this at length in chapter 6.

Identity Frames

The final function of collection frames that I consider is that of identity, or boundary work (Taylor and Whittier 1992). These types of frames communicate messages to movement participants, potential participants, and to the broader public about the identities of movement constituents; they construct the “we” and the “them” (Gamson 1988, 1992). I found that identity frames were less common in TFN mission statements than were diagnostic and prognostic frames; they were explicitly employed by only 35.5 percent of the sample. Identity frames are among the most straightforward of all frames to locate and code, as they typically entail a simple self-designation on the part of the TFN.

Feminist Identity. As Table 4.1 shows, the largest share of identity frames articulated a feminist perspective or embraced the feminist label. A feminist identity is present among 35.5% of the sample. In many cases, TFNs succinctly (yet clearly) articulated their organization as working from a feminist perspective, using feminist analysis, or seeking to disseminate feminist principles. For instance, the European Women’s Lobby claims to “carry out its work within a feminist analysis.” The

International Gender and Trade Network claims to be “a network of feminist gender specialists.” Women In Black, however, goes a step further, not only claiming a feminist identity but also explaining what it entails. WIB states that, “A feminist view sees masculine cultures as specially [sic] prone to violence, and so feminist women tend to have a particular perspective on security and something unique to say about war.”

Southern/Third World Identity. In a few cases, TFNs identified themselves as being comprised of women of the global South, or of working specifically on behalf of women in the global South. Such claims were relatively rare, occurring in only 9.7 percent of the sample. For the sake of clear illustration, I share just a couple of examples of how these frames manifested. The International Gender and Trade Network includes in its mission the claim to be a “Southern-led network.” Similarly, DAWN describes itself as “a network of women scholars and activists from the economic South.” This reference to the economic South, rather than focusing on simple geography, highlights the symbolic importance of economic inequality and deprivation, regardless of physical location.⁵⁰

Discussion

In chapter 2, I put forward two hypotheses with regard to the prevalence of particular types of frames among TFNs in the contemporary period. Hypothesis 1 stated that collective action frames making references to dominant grievances such as neoliberal globalization and militarization would be prevalent. Based on the evidence, Hypothesis 1

⁵⁰ In my engagement with feminist scholars and activists over the years, I have repeatedly heard statements such as “There is a South in the North, and a North in the South.” This assertion is meant to convey the message that there are economically and politically privileged individuals residing in the global South, just as there are marginalized, oppressed individuals residing in the global North.

is only mildly supported. As Table 4.1 shows, diagnostic frames in general were used far less often than prognostic frames, and anti-neoliberal frames and anti-militarization frames were both used in less than 25 percent of cases. One possible interpretation of this finding is that such frames are, in fact, not that common. However, I submit two other likely possibilities. First, we must remember, as I discussed earlier, that the sources of these data are highly public representations of organizational framing. The relatively low prevalence of diagnostic frames in these statements could be explained by the fact that TFNs simply endeavor to focus more heavily on solutions in their core online texts. Second, recall from the many examples of passages I presented that grievances such as the neoliberal economy or militarization and violence were often referenced, if sometimes implicitly, in prognostic statements. Thus, the absence of an explicit diagnostic frame may not necessarily mean that a TFN does not share a particular grievance, but rather that the prognostic language is disproportionately emphasized.

Hypothesis 2, which articulated the expectation that broadly applicable frames would be more common than narrowly defined frames, was strongly supported by the data. Capacity-building prognoses, rights-based prognoses, and liberal political prognoses, all of which are able to encompass a wide range of issues, were the three most common types of frames used in the sample. Themes of empowerment, movement building, equality, justice, and human rights can be applied to a diversity of issues affecting women as well as other marginalized groups; thus, it is not surprising that they would appear in a majority of organizational statements, particularly in this era where solidarity and alliance-building within the women's movement and with other global justice movements is so important. Conversely, as shown in Table 4.1, even the frames

that were less common among TFNs tended to be broadly applicable. With the exception of a few frames that focused specifically on women or gender, there was a dearth of narrowly defined frames present in the texts.

Other related insights emerged from the content analysis, as well. Note, for instance, the intersectional approach evident in many of the examples I presented. Many TFNs identified women's issues as being not only multiple, but also interconnected, in terms of causes and solutions; organizations are expressing the notion that, beyond the fact that numerous challenges are confronting women, many such challenges (and thus, potential solutions) are inextricably linked to one another, and therefore cannot be discussed or addressed in an additive sense. Moreover, in most cases (as is evident from the examples), frames are not issue-specific, even if the organizations themselves are. Holistic perspectives appear to be quite prevalent, which, again, may be partially reflective of the venue. Mission statements may constitute the first impression offered by an organization, and therefore it is in their best interests to be as inclusive as possible.

Despite these commonalities among the sample, there is also substantial frame variation among TFNs, especially in terms of prognoses. While it is true that a number of TFNs offered multiple diagnostic and prognostic frames, some also emphasized particular problems and solutions over others. These differences are brought into sharp relief if we consider, for example, the implications of offering a solution that calls for women's economic empowerment (i.e., placing responsibility on women themselves) as opposed to a solution that calls for economic redistribution (i.e., placing responsibility with power holders). Likewise, criticizing economic inequality is not necessarily the same thing as attacking and holding responsible multinational corporations or the World

Bank, IMF, WTO, etc. In other cases, multiple frames may be used concurrently by the same organization without the credibility of any one frame being compromised by the use of the others; however, this may not be true of the concurrent usage of certain radical and reformist frames. Based on the evidence I have analyzed, the most interesting facet of framing heterogeneity among TFNs may be this radical versus reformist dichotomy. Such divides are even more evident in my next analysis, discussed in chapter 5, as I shift to a different coding scheme according to whether frames embrace or attack hegemonic ideas.

In closing, some frames are particularly prevalent across organizations within this transnational movement, indicating consensus among movement actors on certain points; however, we must continue to be cautious in our empirical studies of transnational movements, lest we homogenize in ways that are inaccurate. On the whole, my analysis demonstrates that researchers should not assume, theoretically or methodologically, discursive homogeneity among organizations within the same movement, and should engage in efforts to take this into account.

Now that I have documented the prevalence of particular frames in relation to one another, and provided an overview of the landscape of frame variation among contemporary TFNs, I move to the analysis of an understudied causal dynamic. In the next chapter, I examine organizational-level causes of variation in the framing practices of TFNs. Utilizing data from the content analysis of the frames I have described in this chapter, I develop a broader scheme that categorizes frames according to whether they

appropriate or reject hegemonic ideas.⁵¹ I explain and provide examples of such frames in detail in chapter 5.

⁵¹ Note that challenging or harnessing hegemony, which I discuss in the next chapter, can occur via diagnostic or prognostic framing. Although the “reform vs. radical” dichotomy may be more visible in the prognostic frames I discussed in this chapter, there is relevant evidence present in diagnostic frames, as well (e.g., those frames that attack neoliberal globalization). This will become clearer in chapter 5.

CHAPTER V

ORGANIZATIONAL-LEVEL EXPLANATIONS FOR INTRAMOVEMENT DIFFERENCES IN FRAMING RESPONSES TO HEGEMONY

Introduction

The previous chapter provided a descriptive analysis of the key themes evident in the frames of transnational feminist networks. I shift direction now to an investigation of causal forces influencing organizational framing practices. The central question addressed in this chapter concerns the organizational-level factors that lead a transnational social movement organization to challenge hegemony in its framing. I focus on investigating the differences between organizations that challenge hegemony and those that do not. It is not surprising that an SMO would choose to harness hegemony – there are multiple reasons to do so. An SMO can advance its cause while at the same time pre-empting powerholders' resistance to its claims, through the use of familiar and authoritative ideas (Woehrle, Coy, and Maney 2008). On the other hand, an SMO's choice to challenge hegemony is more complicated. In challenging hegemony, an SMO may face risks to its image and credibility with the public or with powerful institutions (though not necessarily with its constituents). As Maney et al. (2005) write, "...challenging ideas from the dominant symbolic repertoire can invite incomprehension, ridicule, dismissal, and active opposition from policy makers and the general public" (362). Asking what leads or enables an SMO to use more radical, counter-hegemonic frames is therefore the more revealing question. Thus, I center our attention in this chapter on discursive challenges to hegemony. I do, however, include the harnessing

concept in my analysis insofar as I am interested in uncovering differences between groups that use *only* challenging frames, and those that *both* challenge and harness hegemony in their framing practices.

Utilizing empirical evidence based on qualitative comparative analysis (QCA), I show how organizational resources, structure, and identity/composition converge to influence transnational feminist networks' discursive responses to hegemonic forces. I conclude that sources of funding and regional identities are crucial features distinguishing between groups who challenge hegemony and those who do not. The presence of neutral funding sources (i.e., those not connected to governments or capital), along with the presence of non-Northern group identities promote discursive challenges to hegemony. In specifying more precisely the factors that contribute to "oppositional identities rooted in the consciousness of structural inequalities," my research does not contradict, but rather builds on Maney et al's. (2005) conclusions about intramovement organizational differences in discursive responses to hegemony.

The chapter proceeds as follows. I first explicate what constitutes hegemony for transnational women's activists in the contemporary global context, and outline the nature of frames that challenge and harness hegemony. I then move into a discussion of the QCA results that illustrate the causal dynamics in question. Finally, I discuss the broader implications of my findings for research on framing among transnational social movement organizations.

Hegemonic Ideology in the Contemporary Global Context

I now elaborate on my earlier discussion of hegemony in relation to organizational framing practices (see chapter 2). Maney and his colleagues tell us that, within the general public, "...ideas exist that, because of their frequent invocation by those with disproportionate access to and influence over the primary means of mass communication, carry an authority extending beyond the individuals referencing them" (359). Such ideas constitute what Williams (2002) has referred to as the dominant symbolic repertoire. Westby (2002) likewise provides a useful definition of hegemonic ideology; he elucidates it as "an ideology promoted by an elite but shared by at least a sector of the non-elite, and also embedded in widespread cultural practices" (297). Moreover, as I mentioned in chapter 2, hegemonic ideas also hold great potential for "frame resonance" (Snow and Benford 1988) with multiple audiences and, therefore, provide fertile ground for frame bridging (Snow et al. 1986) to those organizations who choose to harness them.

In the contemporary global context in which women's activists are working, several key themes are present in the dominant symbolic repertoire, and thus represent hegemony. Broadly speaking, these include liberal democratic principles such as equality and democracy, and neoliberal economic principles, such as the primacy of individual freedoms.⁵² As I explained in my earlier discussion of the contemporary global discursive and political context, the Bush administration's "War on Terror" had wide-reaching implications for women's movements, including their strategic choices. After 9/11, the U.S. state and its allies consistently appropriated liberal democratic

⁵² By the end of 2008, neoliberal economic principles were subject to intense questioning and attack by the general public and policy makers alike, due to the global financial crisis. However, all my data were collected well prior to these events.

principles to justify their military action to the international community. For example, in President Bush's second inaugural address in January 2005, he stated that, "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world... We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world" (<http://www.cnn.com/2005/ALLPOLITICS/01/20/bush.speech/index.html>).

While democracy and freedom have been the preferred themes of Western governments wielding great economic and political power globally, different (but related) themes are often emphasized by other powerful multilateral institutions. The language of human rights, in particular, has long been embraced by the UN, as evidenced by numerous key documents such as the Vienna Declaration, the Beijing Platform for Action, and the Millennium Development Goals. The UN's promotion of a human rights framework, along with its more recent support for gender mainstreaming, have helped these discourses to gain greater and greater traction among national governments across the world.

Finally, the prevalence and power of neoliberal economic principles have left little room for alternative visions to gain widespread traction among the general public, especially in the global North. Thus, while critiques of multi-national corporations and international financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank and IMF) have received only a lukewarm reception at best among the public in the North and policy makers globally, discourses that invoke women's empowerment and economic autonomy (e.g, via micro-

credit programs) have enjoyed greater legitimacy, perhaps due to their emphasis on solutions that lie within the ability of individuals to maneuver the market. For example, in 2006 the World Bank published an action plan entitled “Gender Equality as Smart Economics,” which included multiple references to gender equality and women’s economic empowerment.

Thus, powerful political and financial institutions have advanced discourses that tap into widely accepted liberal political and neoliberal economic ideals. As I continue to discuss in the following section, some TFNs engage in framing practices that harness such hegemonic rhetoric, while others mount direct challenges to it.

Transnational Feminist Networks Harnessing and Challenging Hegemony

What does it mean, in practice, for a TFN to challenge or harness hegemony? I turn first to consider framing that is consistent with harnessing hegemony. Speaking of equality, human rights, gender mainstreaming and democracy, particularly in the abstract, is a means to contesting power relations in a non-threatening manner. As discussed above, these tropes enjoy high resonance among a wide range of audiences, and are present in the language of powerful states and global governance institutions such as the UN or the World Health Organization; for instance, the UN’s Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, or CEDAW, embraces the language of human rights and equality, and is cited and affirmed repeatedly by the WHO, IMF, and other global governance institutions.⁵³ In calling for reformist as opposed to revolutionary measures, frames that harness hegemony can still “affirm rather than deny

⁵³ See <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2003/pr0328.htm> for one such press release from the International Monetary Fund.

the basic legitimacy of the system” (Westby 2002: 297). Furthermore, SMOs can use harnessing frames to advocate for women’s issues without explicitly pointing fingers at targets whose cooperation they might need to advance their agendas. For example, even in calling for equality between men and women, individual men need not be targeted, but rather a more general, abstract injustice. As Westby argues, this type of framing carries with it the luxury of remaining ambiguous in identification of grievances.

Challenging hegemony, on the other hand, requires more aggressive and radical framing in a number of ways. It often places blame and responsibility for change explicitly with powerholders, and in many cases also rejects ideas that many take for granted as “just the way things are” (e.g., at least until very recently, the reality and permanence of the market-driven global economy). In contradicting themes that so many find resonant, frames that challenge hegemony have the potential to alienate certain potential supporters, and perhaps even some would-be funders.

In Table 5.1, I present examples of frames that challenge and frames that harness hegemony. Frames that harness hegemony, while levied by organizations arguing vehemently on behalf of women and women’s issues, rely on different sources of legitimacy in their reasoning than do frames that challenge hegemony. “Harnessing” argumentation often fails to identify a specific enemy or target, even while recognizing problems more abstractly. These frames draw on language that holds broad appeal (e.g., human rights, equality, democracy) in a global context. Moreover, notice that the prognostic dimensions of these frames may focus on the need to equip women to deal with their circumstances, or on the importance of working *with* global governance institutions to improve or enforce existing policies that affect women. These frames

imply a certain trust that existing economic, political, or social systems can be reformed and/or negotiated, whereas the challenging frames imply a need for radical reconstitution of power relations.

Note that the language used by organizations challenging hegemony is heavy on diagnosis and critique of powerful institutions; such ideas can be perceived, especially by the general public, as combative, radical, and unfamiliar. The themes are not broadly resonant. Furthermore, the prognoses proposed tend to call for systemic change and/or the redistribution of resources, signaling a distinctly oppositional political economic perspective. These frames do not place responsibility with women themselves for any lack of ability to maneuver difficult or unfair obstacles, but rather they focus on the brokenness of the systems. While the onus may be upon women and other justice activists to call attention to the nature of problems and to articulate demands for change, the blame lies squarely with individuals and institutions in positions of power (e.g., financial institutions).

Table 5.1. Examples of Frames that Challenge vs. Harness Hegemony

<p><u>Challenging Hegemony</u></p> <p><i>“[We] challenge and denounce the international financial, economic, and military institutions (IMF, NATO, WTO, WB, transnational corporations, cooperation agencies that impose conditions on women’s struggles, etc.) that are responsible for impoverishing and marginalizing women and intensifying the violence committed against us...”</i> – World March of Women</p> <p><i>“The Global Women’s Strike Network...is demanding the return of military budgets to the community, beginning with women the main carers [sic] of people and the planet.”</i> – Global Women’s Strike Network</p>

Challenging Hegemony (cont'd.)

“Information, how it is distributed, constructed, produced, who owns and controls the technological means to do so, even define power. In this globalized age, communication systems are pivotal in the shaping of socio-economic and political relations. We witness an increasing control of the media in the hands of transnational enterprise, effectively using media as a tool to perpetuate prevailing inequities.” – Isis International

Harnessing Hegemony

“We enable women to become change agents in their governments, advocates for social justice, and supporters of democracy and the rule of law.” – Vital Voices

“We strongly believe that women, working in partnership, will learn the skills and implement the strategies needed to secure human rights, contribute to the development of their communities, and ultimately create a more peaceful world.” – Women’s Learning Partnership

“We see ourselves as catalysts in building capacity for change and in enhancing the realization of the human rights of women through: the effective implementation of human rights standards, as seen through the lens of CEDAW and other international human rights mechanisms, at all levels of society; the inclusion of women in standard-setting processes at the national and international levels, and in the formulation of policies and laws...” – IWRAW Asia-Pacific

Now that we have considered the nature of collective action frames that harness versus challenge hegemony, I turn to a discussion of the QCA results that reveal the organizational factors associated with TFNs who challenge hegemony.

QCA Results

The outcome of interest in this analysis is the discursive response to hegemony on the part of TFNs; specifically, I examine the organizational factors that lead a TFN to challenge hegemony. The dependent variable is a simple dichotomous measure, absent (equal to 0) if the organization does not challenge hegemony, and present (equal to 1) if the organization does challenge hegemony. As discussed above, some TFNs deploy in

their mission statements only frames that challenge hegemony; others utilize frames that challenge hegemony, as well as frames that harness hegemony; others do not challenge hegemony at all. As shown below in Table 5.2, three TFNs fall into the “only challenge” category, while twenty-one TFNs fall into the “only harness” category. I refer to the group of TFNs who deploy both challenging and harnessing frames as “hybrids” (Woehrle, Coy, and Maney 2008); six organizations comprise this category.

Table 5.2. Descriptive Overview of the Outcome of Interest: Response to Hegemony

Category	No. of Cases
<i>Only Challengers</i> Women in Black (WIB) Global Women’s Strike (GWS) World March of Women (WMW)	3 (9.7%)
<i>Hybrids</i> Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) ISIS International - Manila PeaceWomen Across the Globe (PWAG) Network Women in Development Europe (WIDE) Women in Informal Employment Globalizing & Organizing (WIEGO)	6 (19.4%)
<i>Only Harnessers</i> GROOTS International International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN) Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) Central and Eastern European Network for Sexual & Repro. Health & Rights African Partnership for Sexual & Reproductive Health and Rights (RAINBO) Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights (WGNRR) European Women’s Lobby (EWL) International Network on Gender and Sustainable Energy (Energia) Vital Voices Global Partnership Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF) Women’s Learning Partnership African Women’s Development and Communication Network (FEMNET) Women for Women International	21 (67.7%)

<p><i>Only Harnessers (cont'd.)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Women for Water, Water for Women Family Care International Equality Now Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children International Women's Rights Action Watch – Asia Pacific (IWRAW) Pacific Institute for Women's Health Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights Asian Women in Cooperative Development Forum 	
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Note: Numbers do not add to 31, or 100%, because one TFN neither challenged nor harnessed hegemony.⁵⁴

Results of the qualitative comparative analysis are presented in Table 3. Recall from chapter 3 the independent variables of interest and their expected influences. I expect that neutral funding sources, feminist identities, and a focus on multiple issues will be present among the TFNs who challenge hegemony; on the other hand, I anticipate that high overall financial resources, UN affiliation, institutional/bureaucratic structure, and Northern identity/composition will be absent among the groups who challenge hegemony.

My strategy for selecting these independent variables for the analysis most closely resembles what Amenta and Poulsen (1994) refer to as the “perspectives” approach. This strategy calls upon the researcher to look to relevant literatures in order to determine appropriate measures that should be included in the analysis. I relied on existing scholarship in social movements and selected a small number of theoretically-driven indicators of the key concepts demonstrated in the literature to influence organizational framing. Amenta and Poulsen argue for a different approach, which they label “conjunctural;” the conjunctural approach explicitly encourages the researcher to expect

⁵⁴ The Indigenous Women's Network uses language that neither harnesses nor challenges hegemony, but rather focuses almost exclusively on issue-based arguments, largely around caring for the earth. Although the IWN makes a passing reference to human rights in its statement of values, this lone mention does not meet the criteria I set out for harnessing hegemony.

interactions in causation, and/or the possibility that multiple combinations of variables will lead to the same outcome. However, they note that the perspectives method can be used effectively as long as the researcher anticipates some combinatorial explanations, and provided that the QCA results are interpretable. Thus, in this way my approach actually represents a combination of the perspectives and conjunctural approaches. I expect that different combinations of variables may lead to the same outcome. For some TFNs, cultural factors may drive their challenges to hegemony; for others, it may be resources. As I articulate in Hypothesis 9, it may be that groups need to meet certain resource conditions *and* hold particular identities/compositions in order to challenge hegemony. As I demonstrate below, there are some nuanced combinatorial explanations that emerge in the results. Also, the results do not suffer from the “unwieldiness,” or lack of interpretability, Amenta and Poulsen worry about; in fact, the configurations are quite interpretable, both theoretically and with respect to the empirical cases.

In conducting QCA, the researcher must decide how to handle what are known as “contradictions,” that is, identical configurations of independent variables that produce the presence of the outcome of interest in some cases, and the absence of it in others (Ragin 1987; Rihoux and Ragin 2008). Treating contradictions as “true” includes in the analysis all instances in which the outcome in question is *possible*; in other words, configurations of independent variables that resulted in contradictory outcomes (i.e., both the presence and the absence of the outcome) remain in the analysis. However, some researchers consider this approach “too permissive” (Amenta and Poulsen 1996). Treating contradictory combinations as “false” generates results only for those instances in which the outcome is certain; thus, any configuration that produces the absence of the

outcome in some cases, and the presence of it in others, does not appear in the results. Due to its exclusion of ambiguous configurations, this approach is considered the most conservative and, in the eyes of some, is the more sound and appropriate course of action. Following this strategy, the model presented in Table 3 reflects a treatment of contradictory configurations as resulting in the *absence* of the outcome.⁵⁵

I present the QCA results in Table 5.3. Appearing in the first column of the table are rows representing each configuration of variables that resulted in the presence of the outcome of interest, challenging hegemony. A measure in all capital letters indicates that the condition is present in the configuration, while a measure in lower case letters indicates that the condition is absent. In the second column, I list the number of cases and the names (acronyms) of the TFNs that inhabit each configuration. Note that there were two contradictions in the model; only one case in which an organization challenged hegemony was excluded.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Only two contradictions existed in my analysis. Although not presented here, I ran the same model, treating the contradictions as true instead of false. Results differed in a negligible manner, generating one additional path that did not disturb the key explanatory patterns.

⁵⁶ DAWN was the excluded organization that challenged hegemony. Its contradictory configuration was: FUND NEUTRAL * high resource * UN * NON-NORTH * FEMINIST * INSTITUTE * MULTI-ISSUE.

Table 5.3. QCA Results for Challenging Hegemony

Configurations Producing Challenges to Hegemony	Cases in Configuration
1. FUND NEUTRAL * high resource * un * NON-NORTH * institute +	4 (GWS, WIB, WMW, PWAG)
2. FUND NEUTRAL * high resource * UN * NON-NORTH * feminist * INSTITUTE * multi-issue +	2 (CATW, WIEGO)
3. FUND NEUTRAL * HIGH RESOURCE * UN * NON-NORTH * FEMINIST * INSTITUTE * multi-issue +	1 (Isis International)
4. fund neutral * high resource * UN * non-north * FEMINIST * INSTITUTE * MULTI-ISSUE	1 (WIDE)

A measure in all capitals indicates its presence; a measure in lower case indicates its absence. An asterisk indicates *and*; a plus sign indicates *or*.

Below I discuss some general patterns evident in the results, and then delve into a more detailed exposition of each configuration and the organizational cases associated with them. An initial overview illuminates further why QCA is a particularly helpful method for analyzing these data. Because we are easily able to locate which organizational cases inhabit each configuration of variables leading to the outcome of interest (challenging hegemony), an important pattern becomes visible. Note first that each of the three TFNs who are “only challengers” (Global Women’s Strike, Women in Black, and World March of Women) appear in the same configuration (#1), while the “hybrids” (PeaceWomen across the Globe, Coalition Against Trafficking in Women, Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing, Isis International, and Network Women in Development Europe) are distributed across all configurations. Thus, there are appreciable differences not only between challengers and non-challengers, but also between “only challengers” and “hybrids.” The “only challenge”

group is characterized by five features: they are funded primarily by neutral sources, they do not have high financial resources, they are not formally associated with the UN, they hold non-Northern identities, and they are not highly institutional organizations. The hybrid groups, for the most part, share three features with “only challengers” (the presence of neutral funding, the absence of high resources, and the presence of a non-Northern identity), but diverge on the remaining two (institutionalization and UN affiliation). The hybrids tend to be more professionalized, established organizations than the “only challengers” and also enjoy the institutional resource of connections with the UN. Thus, organizational structure distinguishes “only challengers” from hybrids.

In all but the final configuration resulting in framing that challenges hegemony, two key variables are consistently present: neutral funding sources, and a non-Northern identity.⁵⁷ This suggests that both organizational resources and identity are important influences on a TFN’s decision to deploy framing packages that include a radical critique of the dominant symbolic repertoire. More precisely, it suggests that the presence of *both* neutral funding sources *and* a non-Northern identity, along with the absence of high resources (in all but one case), are crucial conditions for challenging hegemony; in no configuration was the neutral funding condition present without the non-Northern identity. Therefore, particular organizational resources and organizational identities *combine* to predispose TFNs to challenge hegemony, which also indicates that economic and identity factors distinguish challengers (including the hybrids) from non-challengers.

The absence of high resources is the case in all but one configuration, #3, which contains one case. By and large, the TFNs who enjoy very high financial resources are

⁵⁷ This final configuration is inhabited by only one case, which has a unique set of characteristics that I will discuss in detail later in the chapter.

not the ones challenging hegemony in their framing. There is one exception to this pattern, Isis International, and I will say more about this case when I discuss configuration #3 below.

The feminist identity and multi-issue variables are irrelevant in some configurations, and inconsistent across others, making their influences more difficult to interpret. I ran a number of other models not presented here, some that excluded the feminist identity and multi-issue variables. Although these two variables appear to be playing only a minor role in explaining why TFNs challenge hegemony in their framing, I left them in the analysis for two reasons. First, based largely on my qualitative knowledge about the empirical cases, I suspect that these two variables each work in a similar way as a sort of “trump card” for certain types of organizations. Both feminist identity and multi-issue focus imply a holistic view of women’s issues, an intersectional perspective, which is consistent with much of the counter-hegemonic discourse. Thus, in cases where resources or structure might be working to prevent TFNs from challenging hegemony, the presence of a feminist identity and/or a multi-issue focus might intervene to swing the pendulum the other way; WIDE is an example of one case where this dynamic may be at work. Second, excluding these variables from the model resulted in a high number of contradictions, which further suggests that their presence helps to differentiate those organizations that challenge hegemony from those that do not.⁵⁸

I now offer one final comment about the overall results. Note that the “institute” and “UN” variables appear in tandem throughout the configurations: If one is present, the other is also present; if one is absent, so is the other. Recall that “institute” represents a

⁵⁸ I present the more parsimonious model (without the feminist identity and multi-issue variables) in Appendix C.

combined measure of an organization's age and formalization; "UN" is a measure of whether an organization is listed by UNIFEM as a resource or has been granted consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). That these two variables would go hand in hand is not particularly surprising, given what is required to: a) be visible and credible enough to appear on UNIFEM's resource list, or b) maneuver the bureaucratic hoops in the process of achieving consultative status with ECOSOC. Organizations that are older, more formal and centralized, and generally well-established are better structurally situated to gain favor with the UN, or at least warrant a nod.⁵⁹

Let us now consider each configuration in greater detail.

Configuration #1: GWS, WIB, WMW, and PWAG

As mentioned above, configuration #1 contains all three TFNs who comprise the category of groups that challenge, but do not harness, hegemony. This configuration contains the presence of neutral funding sources, the absence of high financial resources, absence of UN connections, the presence of a non-Northern identity, and the absence of a highly institutional structure. Feminist identity and multi-issue focus are both irrelevant in this configuration.

It is meaningful that the "only challengers" all come to challenge hegemony through the same configuration of variables. Global Women's Strike, Women in Black, and World March of Women are all highly decentralized in terms of their leadership

⁵⁹ I also ran additional QCA models in which the "institute" and "UN" variables are combined into one measure. These models proved rather unwieldy and difficult to interpret, suggesting that the two measures are better left separate. I also ran a bivariate correlation between institutionalization and UN to ensure the absence of multicollinearity. The result was a low correlation ($r = .24$).

structure, as well as activities, and have a presence in many countries. Compared to other organizations in the sample, these groups disseminate relatively few (if any) regular publications, focusing more heavily on actions beyond the discursive realm. All three organizations emerged in a “bottom-up” fashion, and all maintain strong grassroots connections. Based on this particular analysis, it is difficult to know if fluid organizational structure necessarily precedes more radical discourse, or if more ideologically radical organizations tend to choose decentralized structure.⁶⁰ But there is no doubt that the least formal TFNs in my sample are the ones who choose to challenge, and NOT harness, hegemony.

While none of these organizations have strong connections with the UN, they are well known within the movement. All participate in various international conferences such as the World Social Forum and the AWID triennial forum. Women in Black and World March of Women, in particular, enjoy substantial name recognition and respect within the broader women’s movement, and are quite influential. In fact, WMW was among the earliest feminist leaders in the World Social Forum, and continues to be a crucial voice for women among global justice activists, forging meaningful connections with locally-based women’s groups all over the world and also with groups of workers and peasants (e.g., Via Campesina, the most prominent SMO expression of the international peasant movement). WMW is respected for its authenticity, its noticeable lack of elitism, and its strong support among locally-based activists (Conway 2007). I mention these characteristics to point out that a lack of formal UN connection does not necessarily equate to invisibility, low status, or inactivity within the movement. And in

⁶⁰ Scholars have recently devoted greater attention to the study of causal order in QCA (e.g., Caren and Panofsky 2005; Ragin and Strand 2008). However, due to the unknown sequence of particular independent variables in my data, I am unable to utilize such methods.

fact, the strong grassroots connections and credibility, coupled with the absence of UN association, may translate into greater discursive autonomy for TFNs.

None of these four TFNs receive substantial funding from powerful corporations or governments. Thus, they are free from the discursive constraints that may work to silence (partially or completely) organizations that do receive large amounts of funding from hegemonic entities with particular political interests. Moreover, none of these TFNs have excessively high levels of financial resources; this may be a reflection of the fact that their core work does not require tremendous funding and paid staff, and/or it could mean that they have difficulty securing high levels of consistent funding (either because of their more fluid organizational structure or because of their radical ideology and discourse).⁶¹

Although neither feminist identity nor multi-issue focus was present in this configuration as a whole, it is worth noting that each of the three “only challengers” holds either an explicitly feminist identity or focuses on multiple issues; WMW does both. As I alluded to above, what may be underlying these features is an intersectional perspective on issues affecting women’s lives. Organizations who articulate a feminist identity in a global context tend to operate, partially in response to problematic transnational feminist practices of the past, with a highly holistic understanding of the connections among women’s oppressions; the same is true for organizations whose work encompasses a broad range of women’s issues (e.g., economic empowerment, violence against women, peace, environment, health). In neither case is it possible to work without an awareness

⁶¹ A different research design, one that takes a deeper look at only a handful of organizations, would be better suited to unpacking such possibilities.

of the interconnected nature of the problems facing women in various geopolitical contexts.

Also inhabiting this configuration is PeaceWomen Across the Globe (PWAG), a hybrid organization. PWAG is the youngest of the TFNs in this configuration, having only formed in 2005. It differs from its companions in this first configuration on several facets, making it an interesting case. Unlike, WMW, WIB, and GWS, PWAG is not a multi-issue organization, nor does it claim an explicitly feminist identity. We might conclude from this that funding sources, levels, and non-Northern identity (rather than feminist identity or multi-issue focus) are the crucial predictors of challenging hegemony, and in fact such a conclusion is entirely reasonable. However, I want to suggest that there may be something else going on, as well. PWAG's challenging rhetoric revolves around redefining existing dominant understandings of peace and critiquing the exercise of military power. It calls for a paradigm shift: "Peace is not simply the absence of war. Peace is based on justice and the attainment of human security. Redefining peace to understand it in its fullest sense also leads to a new understanding of what peacebuilding means." While PWAG draws connections among economic justice and security, the basis of its framing is very issue-specific. That is, its challenge of hegemonic discourse seems to emerge as much from its issue focus as its identity, structure, and financial situation. Perhaps issue focus is irrelevant in the presence of other key economic and identity-based predictors, but it is possible that there is something about the issue of peace/security that particularly encourages discursive challenges to hegemony.⁶² A

⁶² Women in Black, also present in this configuration, is the only other organization in the sample whose sole issue focus is peace.

singular focus on peace and security necessarily entails a critique of militarization, war, and violence, which (as I have shown) tends to utilize highly charged, critical rhetoric.

Overall, this configuration suggests that, in order for transnational women's organizations to deploy frames that challenge hegemony (while avoiding frames that harness hegemony), they must have non-Northern identities/compositions, be funded primarily by neutral sources, and operate in the absence of excessively high financial resources. Rather than simply considering why they challenge hegemony, the operative question for these organizations may be: *Why don't they harness hegemony?* To understand this more fully, it is helpful to focus on the differences between the "only challengers" and the hybrids: structure. The discussion of the next three configurations enables a sharper focus on this point.

Configuration #2: CATW and WIEGO

The second configuration is populated by two groups, the Coalition Against Trafficking in Women (CATW) and Women in Informal Employment Globalizing & Organizing (WIEGO). These TFNs differ from the ones in the first configuration on two points: "institute" and "UN." Therefore, CATW and WIEGO share the key features of neutral funding sources, absence of high financial resources, and non-Northern identity with each of the four TFNs discussed above, but they are more formally structured and are recognized in some way by the UN. Also, whereas feminist identity and multi-issue focus were irrelevant in the first configuration, both of these features are explicitly absent in this second configuration.

CATW and WIEGO, while differing in issue focus (human trafficking vs. women's informal employment) are structurally similar to each other in a number of key ways. Both have central offices in the global North, but maintain staff and satellite offices in multiple countries across the world. Both have moderately-sized staffs, disseminate various publications in the form of newsletters, reports, and research briefs, and participate regularly in transnational gatherings such as the annual UN meetings of the Commission on the Status of Women.

While CATW and WIEGO, both hybrids, may be equally ideologically inclined as the “only challengers” to challenge hegemony, and also just as free from constraint to do so (in terms of their funding sources), their more established structural situations might compel them and/or situate them better to harness hegemony. Organizations like CATW and WIEGO, given their professionalized structures and consistent engagement with the UN and its activities, may be more familiar with and invested in emulating institutional language, and thus more likely to use discourses such as human rights and gender mainstreaming, which are so pervasive among global governance institutions. Such an explanation also coheres with Rohlinger's (2002) findings indicating that formal organizations tend to be more effective at tapping into broadly resonant themes.

So, in sum, what do we learn from this configuration? Perhaps most importantly, we see that funding sources and non-Northern identity are consistent predictors of organizational framing practices that challenge hegemony. As an aside, we are reminded that Northern location of an organization's central office does not preclude challenging rhetoric; this finding bolsters my earlier contention that a group's regional identity and composition are better representations of oppositional consciousness than its physical

location. Additionally, this configuration enables us to see that institutionalization of an organization, in the presence of neutral funding sources and non-Northern identity, produces hybrid discursive responses to hegemony. Absent the formal structure and UN status, an organization would likely be in the “only challenge category”; absent the neutral funding sources and non-Northern identity, an organization might fall instead into the “only harness” category.

Configuration #3: Isis International - Manila

In both of these final two configurations, #3 and #4, there is only one TFN present. Isis International is the oldest organization that challenges hegemony; in fact, having formed in 1974, it is the longest existing organization in my sample. It is one of the few TFNs dedicated specifically to the issues of communication and technology. Isis is very well established, well-known among women’s activists and global institutions, and also runs the Feminist Dialogues meetings that take place in conjunction with the World Social Forum.

As in each of the earlier configurations, both neutral funding sources and a non-Northern identity are present. Structurally, Isis resembles CATW and WIEGO with its organizational formality and UN relationship. What sets Isis apart from the combinations of features already discussed is its high organizational resources, along with its feminist identity. With over twenty paid staff members, Isis is among the best-funded SMOs in the sample. It is likely that this consistent, high level of funding is due in no small part to its longevity, deep and wide networks both within and outside the movement, and reputation for getting things done.

Isis is also among the most ardent and vocal defenders of the feminist label in the population of transnational SMOs working on women's issues. As mentioned above, Isis and its staff have been the lead organizers of the Feminist Dialogues meetings since 2005. The significance of this goes beyond the "Feminist" label; for instance, Isis has played a key role in developing the criteria for FD participation. The criteria require that all applicants, among other things, self-define as feminist and support sexual orientation as a human right.⁶³ Isis's advancement of feminism, as an identity and the basis of a politics, is no accident; the leadership of Isis is staunchly committed to infusing feminist perspectives into all aspects of global discourse, action, and policy-making. Therefore, it is easier to understand how such an organization might come to challenge hegemony in their framing, despite their divergence from other TFNs on the level of financial resources.

Configuration #4: WIDE

In this final configuration, we see perhaps one of the more surprising, even anomalous, combinations of variables. Most noteworthy is that Network Women in Development Europe (WIDE), unlike each of the other TFNs who utilize frames that challenge hegemony, receives substantial government funding (much of it from government agencies in EU countries) and is a distinctly Northern (or more specifically, European) organization. WIDE uses a rights-based approach, and focuses on international economic and development policy, which ultimately encompasses a very broad spectrum of women's issues; this multi-issue focus is a key distinguishing

⁶³ The notion of sexual orientation as a human right remains one of the most contested issues within transnational women's movements (Ackerly 2008; Hewitt field notes).

characteristic of the organization. Although WIDE has various partner organizations from around the world, its leadership is composed predominantly of European women, and its work occurs largely among and on behalf of European women. Founded in 1985 in the wake of the UN's Third World Conference on Women, WIDE is well established with a highly professionalized structure that includes a secretariat, a board, and a steering group. The network holds its own annual conferences on myriad topics such as economic globalization, poverty and inequality, trade, and development policy, and it regularly disseminates publications advancing "critical analysis" that is relevant to women in and outside of Europe.

WIDE is also one of twelve organizations that constitute the Coordinating Group for the Feminist Dialogues; notably, it is the only organization based in the global North that holds a slot on this planning committee. Until recently, the WIDE board was chaired by Wendy Harcourt, who has long been a prominent voice in transnational spaces such as the World Social Forum, Feminist Dialogues, and UN meetings. Dr. Harcourt, a scholar-activist, has written extensively for the UN and in the academy on feminist issues, and has built strong connections over time with feminist leaders and organizations in the global South. I suspect that Harcourt's leadership, which has undoubtedly contributed to WIDE's critical feminist perspective, may help explain WIDE's willingness to engage in challenging rhetoric, despite its structural, economic, and regional identity similarities with organizations who tend solely toward mainstream frames that harness hegemony.

Although one might be tempted to discount this configuration as largely inconsequential because it contains only one case, I urge us not to do so. The particulars of this case demonstrate that a feminist identity and/or multi-issue focus (potentially

influenced by organizational leadership) can lead to challenging frames regardless of funding sources and regional identity that would prompt us to expect a different outcome. Perhaps neutral funding sources, coupled with non-Northern identity, are *sufficient but not necessary* conditions that produce challenging frames. Through this important case, we find that feminist identity and multi-issue perspective can in fact “trump” funding sources and regional identity in predicting discursive challenges to hegemony.

The “Only Harnessers”

In order to better contextualize these results, it is helpful also to notice the characteristics of the TFNs that we do not see in either of categories that challenge hegemony. The TFNs who only harness hegemony in their framing are, in many cases, receiving substantial funds from governments or capital, enjoying high resources (e.g., to hire many paid staff), and have Northern group composition/identities; these types of organizations may either be less ideologically willing or too structurally constrained (or both) to challenge hegemonic ideas in their public discourse.

A couple of brief examples shed some additional light on the matter. Vital Voices provides an especially unequivocal illustration. Founded in 2000 and based in Washington, DC, Vital Voices now claims to be:

the preeminent non-governmental organization (NGO) that identifies, trains, and empowers emerging women leaders and social entrepreneurs around the globe, enabling them to create a better world for us all. We provide these women with the capacity, connections, and credibility they need to unlock their leadership potential (organizational overview on Vital Voices website).

Like other organizations that harness hegemony (including the hybrids), Vital Voices has a formal structure, with a large board of directors and a global advisory council. It is the

composition of its board, as well as its sources of funding, that best illuminate the significance of this case. Vital Voices appears to be harnessing hegemony not just in its framing, but also via its leadership composition. The BOD includes highly visible, powerful leaders in the financial and political world, as well as celebrities; examples include: U.S. Senator (R-TX) Kay Bailey Hutchison, former Hewlett-Packard CEO Carly Fiorina, actress Sally Field, Wells Fargo Executive Vice President Kathleen Vaughan, and former World Bank director for the U.S., Jan Piercy. A slate of leaders/advisors such as this one is well outside the norm for transnational feminist networks.

Vital Voices also stands apart from many other TFNs because of its active, successful courting of corporate sponsors (in fact, there is a link on the homepage specifically for interested corporations). Funders of Vital Voices include Boeing, CitiGroup, Shell, ExxonMobil, Goldman Sachs, Microsoft, and Coca-Cola. Although these funding streams enable Vital Voices to maintain a large staff of over twenty people, and to engage (and even invest) in women's leadership programs in many regions of the world, such corporate funders are simultaneously the targets of scathing critique on the part of other TFNs and women's NGOs. Many TFNs would no sooner accept funds from these corporate sources than they would commit acts of violence; from the perspective of some women's and feminist activists, as evidenced in the challenging frames, multinational corporations are greedy, evil, and must be toppled in order to ensure women's flourishing.

Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF) is another telling example of a TFN that harnesses, but does not challenge, hegemony in its framing. Structurally, WECF looks much like Vital Voices, but is based in Western Europe and focuses on

energy and environmental issues. Also like Vital Voices, it lacks a feminist identity and its leadership is composed almost exclusively of women of the global North. WECF receives substantial funding from European governments (e.g., the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Environmental Agency), and also from corporations such as Hewlett-Packard and Polo Ralph Lauren.

One possible explanation for these TFNs that “only harness” hegemony is that they are not ideologically compelled to challenge hegemony in their framing, and that they do not find it ethically problematic to use funds from the profits of global capital. Another possibility is that these types of TFNs do experience ideological tension, but choose not to challenge hegemony in their rhetoric for fear that such public critique might threaten the images of corporate and government sponsors, thus jeopardizing funding that enables the TFNs to do important work. In either case (or both), it is clear from examining the conditions present among groups in these three categories – only challengers, hybrids, and only harnessers – that funding sources and regional identities, taken together, have a considerable impact on the public framing of transnational feminist networks.

Discussion

There are a number of interesting implications of these findings, as well as further questions raised. Each of the hypotheses were supported, at least in part, by the results of the qualitative comparative analysis. As I outlined in detail in chapter 2, I expected that organizational identity/composition, amount and sources of resources, and

professionalization would all influence an organization's decision to challenge hegemony in its framing practices. I now review each of the hypotheses and the relevant evidence.

Hypothesis 3 indicated my expectation that organizations holding an explicitly feminist identity would be more likely to challenge hegemony than organizations without a feminist identity. The evidence on this point was mixed. For six of the eight cases of TFNs that challenged hegemony, feminist identity was either absent or irrelevant. In the two remaining cases, feminist identity was present in the configuration. It is crucial to note that feminist identity only plays a role for hybrid organizations and may in fact be acting as the "trump card" I discussed earlier; that is, in cases such as Isis International and WIDE, whose configuration of variables pertaining to structure and resources might lead us to expect them not to challenge hegemony at all, the presence of an oppositional identity appears to be sufficient to produce challenging frames (even if coupled with harnessing frames). This finding also suggests that an oppositional identity could be powerful enough, on its own, to cause a group to challenge hegemony.

On a related note, hypothesis 4 predicted a positive relationship between multi-issue focus and challenging frames. As the multi-issue focus condition was present in only one case (WIDE) that challenged hegemony, support for this hypothesis was weak at best. However, as I alluded to earlier, it would be premature to dismiss the relationship entirely, given that some support (in the case of WIDE) was found.

There was substantial, largely unambiguous support for Hypothesis 5, which stated that TFNs holding a non-Northern identity would be more likely to challenge hegemony than those with a Northern identity. This variable was among the most consistent across cases, as only one case with a Northern identity/composition, WIDE,

challenged hegemony in its framing. The influence of regional identity is a particularly important finding, a point to which I will return later in the discussion.

Hypothesis 6 stated that organizations with low professionalization would be more likely to challenge hegemony than organizations with high professionalization. This turned out to be a less straightforward relationship than expected, as the condition varied across configurations. It is clear that organizations with low professionalization are more likely to challenge hegemony, coupled with an absence of harnessing hegemony; as we see in the first configuration, all of the “only challengers” had low professionalization/institutionalization. However, high institutionalization was present in all other configurations, which also happened to contain only hybrid cases. Thus, it may be that professionalization of an organization does not diminish its likelihood of challenging hegemony (so long as it meets other key resource and identity conditions), but may in fact increase the likelihood that it will harness hegemony.

Hypothesis 7 indicated an expectation that TFNs with high levels of financial resources would respond differently to hegemony than those without high resources. This hypothesis was largely supported, as the presence of high resources only occurred in one configuration resulting in challenging hegemony, and this configuration contained only one case. However, that particular case, Isis International, had both neutral funding sources and also non-Northern and feminist identities; as I discuss below with regard to Hypothesis 9, the co-occurrence of these two conditions seems to be the most robust predictor of challenges to hegemony, and thus may be rendering other conditions such as levels of resources irrelevant.

Along with non-Northern identity, neutral funding sources proved to be a highly consistent condition across configurations leading TFNs to challenge hegemony. Therefore, the results showed substantial support for Hypothesis 8, which stated that TFNs receiving financial and institutional support from non-neutral sources (e.g., those associated with hegemonic ideology) would be less likely to challenge hegemony than those who receive their resources from neutral sources. The UN variable behaved less consistently than the funding variable, possibly indicating that sources of financial support exert greater influence than institutional (not necessarily monetary) support. An alternate interpretation of this finding is that, although the UN propagates certain hegemonic discourses, it may more tolerant of anti-hegemonic critiques than institutions with direct connections to global capital, thus affording its affiliated organizations greater discursive freedom.

In Hypothesis 9, I articulated an interactive expectation. I posited that, for some cases of challengers, both neutral funding sources and an oppositional identity would be necessary conditions. My results demonstrated strong support for this contention; both neutral funding sources and a non-Northern identity were present across all but one configuration, suggesting that these factors are working in conjunction with one another to encourage challenges to hegemony. The only exception to this pattern was the last configuration, which included only one organization – WIDE. I have already discussed the reasons WIDE seems to violate the prevailing causal patterns, and therefore will not revisit the point here.

Therefore, on the whole, my analysis demonstrates the importance of organizational identity, resources (especially neutral funding sources), and structure in

shaping the framing practices of transnational social movement organizations; importantly, the analysis further reveals several layers of complexity in how these influences operate in conjunction with one another. I have built on previous findings about influences on frame variation, and in particular on Maney et al.'s research on framing and hegemony. In revealing the importance of neutral funding and resistant identities, I have further specified the conditions that contribute to (or prevent) oppositional consciousness on the part of movement organizations, thus leading them to challenge hegemonic ideas in their framing. Moreover, the analysis demonstrates that the configuration of variables resulting in challenging frames for “only challengers” tended to be different than the configurations for “hybrids.” The use of QCA illuminated these complexities, whereas inferential statistical methods may have masked them.

An important theoretical implication of this analysis emerges through its illustration of the continued relevance of materiality and of resource mobilization theory for the study of social movements. Many movement researchers tend to approach their work from either a structural *or* a cultural perspective (Dixon, Roscigno, and Hodson 2004). My study illustrates the ways that cultural features interact with material ones, indicating a need for all the theoretical tools at our disposal. Thus, well beyond the questions examined here, there is a continuing need to bring the cultural and structural literatures into conversation with one another in order to further flesh out such relationships. I will say more about this future research below.

Among the most important conclusions of this chapter is that “neutral” funding sources (i.e., those without strong connections to states or global capital) are crucial in securing discursive and ideological freedom for women’s organizations. Foundation

funding may enable TFNs to construct and disseminate critiques of powerful institutions, when such critiques could be politically dangerous (i.e., may threaten the livelihood of the organization). A comprehensive assessment of current funding opportunities for women's issues recently revealed that financial support for women's organizations has been on the decline globally (Clark et al. 2006); this type of movement-wide obstacle has the potential to create or contribute to a competitive atmosphere in which organizations feel pressure to differentiate themselves from one another in hope of increasing their chances for securing funding. My fieldwork in transnational spaces (discussed at length in the next chapter) confirmed that feminists and women's activists are acutely aware of the funding problem, are worried about the livelihoods of their organizations and, as a result, may be pursuing strategies based in part on their perceptions of what funders want.

An activist perspective helps to bring this into sharper focus. One participant at the 2007 Feminist Dialogues meetings expressed the desperate need for greater investment in women's issues globally, particularly on the part of non-state and non-corporate entities; she went on to share her deep concern that women's groups are likely to be co-opted and de-radicalized when they become dependent on state governments for monetary resources (Hewitt field notes 1.19.07). Her comments, and the many nods of agreement that followed them, suggest that at least some feminists and women's activists are concerned that the acceptance of certain types of funding (i.e., those connected with political or financial power) would compromise the goals, activities, and discourses of movement organizations. The data I have presented here indicate that their concerns are valid. Transnational women's movement organizations are not just providing services or even just contributing to material changes on a local or regional level, but also are

working to reform or revolutionize powerful cultural and political forces. If organizations are constrained by their funders, this has significant implications for the broader movement and its outcomes. This piece of my analysis is consistent with Valocchi's findings about the ideological constraints placed on the U.S. civil rights movement by its white liberal supporters and funders; my comparative design provides additional evidence supporting this relationship. Not only are these constraints evident in the U.S. civil rights movement, but in the transnational women's movement, as well.

Particularly when coupled with the fact that many organizations successfully accessing funds are highly institutionalized, this insight is important for movement activists and the funders who support them. Activists' perceptions of the criteria necessary for securing financial support are quite telling. At a small group session entitled "Claiming Spaces and Leadership" during the 2007 Feminist Dialogues, one participant noted that donors tend to favor organizations with "qualifications" such as highly professional, hierarchical structures (Hewitt field notes 1.19.07). Similarly, Nosipho, a 2007 WSF participant and coordinator of the South African organization Remmoho Women's Forum, expressed her frustration that donors tend to perceive her group as disorganized or confused because of their decentralized structure and intersectional approach (Hewitt field notes 1.21.07). Finally, FD 2007 participant and Canadian scholar-activist Janet Conway shared the concern that many established organizations enjoying great longevity have become too institutionalized, and over time have become de-radicalized (Hewitt 1.19.07). Such comments indicate that circulating perceptions about funder preferences are having an impact, either through shaping goals of movement organizations and/or through creating tensions among different types of

organizations. Thus, both feminists and movement scholars would do well to continue exploring the ideological, discursive, and strategic consequences of movement institutionalization.

The other robust conclusion of this chapter relates to the importance of regional identity. In some ways, the results of my analysis echo previous findings about North-South differences in framing among transnational movement actors. But my work contributes a key nuance to existing understandings. It reveals that the absence of a Northern identity, not necessarily the presence of a Southern one, could be the crucial predictive factor. Given the increased voice and leadership of Southern-based activists and organizations within the movement in recent years, many women's SMOs have diversified their constituencies, identities, and perspectives. This fact, in addition to the increasing irrelevance of the physical location of secretariats, means that truly transnational organizational identities and compositions are more and more common. Thus, scholars of transnational social movements and of transnational feminist theory should reconsider prevailing assumptions about the influence of regional identity.

In addition to revealing important empirical and theoretical insights, my analysis also raises a number of compelling questions and paves the way for future investigations. For instance, although the combination of causal forces driving hybrid organizations to challenge hegemony are different from those driving the "only challengers," the reasons for this are only partially clear. Do hybrids choose to harness because they feel pressured to do so (e.g., by their UN association)? Or, are they simply more savvy, and better positioned to do so (e.g., by virtue of their highly professional structures)? Unpacking these relationships further would enhance our understanding of the interconnections

between cultural and structural dynamics within social movements, and also of the power dynamics within movements.

The findings of my analysis also raise questions about the importance of movement agency relative to material resources in determining strategic decisions (including those of a discursive nature). While I have speculated that movement organizations may choose to frame in certain ways because they hope to acquire or retain support, the causal order deserves further investigation. It may be the case that radical ideology and framing precedes funding situations, and positions more oppositional organizations with fewer types of funding opportunities. In order to flesh out the precise theoretical implications of my findings, future research should employ multiple methods to study different kinds of organizations over time. Shifts in resources and discourse could be tracked such that causal order could be discerned while still benefiting from a comparative design.

Finally, future research should also tease out the influences of different kinds of foundations, rather than assuming a homogeneous category of neutral funder. Such a detailed analysis would require careful examination of SMO budgets, which would present some methodological challenges. Collecting the necessary data would likely limit the number of SMOs that could be included in a study, largely due to the realities of researcher time and resource constraints, but also due to the fact that some SMOs would decline to share what they perceive as sensitive financial information. However, a comparative study that includes detailed data on the types of funding sources, and how they are distributed, would be a fruitful endeavor for social movement theory and movement activists alike.

As we have seen in this chapter's analysis, intramovement organizational differences – identities, resources, and structures – have consequences. In the next chapter, I consider the role of collective action frames in dealing with some of these and other intramovement differences. I will demonstrate that actors within the transnational women's movement are acutely aware of the differences, and of their potential to create fragmentation. I will show how activists are engaging in efforts to promote solidarity through the use of particular kinds of frames. In contrast to the highly public nature of the mission statements analyzed in this chapter, the data for the next chapter come from participant-observation of transnational activist spaces. In examining discursive dynamics within these venues, I am able to see how activists from different organizations and geopolitical contexts talk with and to one another in an environment that is not so "frontstage."

CHAPTER VI

FRAMING ACROSS DIFFERENCES, BUILDING SOLIDARITIES



Women's Solidarity Quilt, The World March of Women

“One of the important questions we need to ask is – Have we taken the politics of difference too far? Have we allowed our politics to trap ourselves into small boxes and lose our ability to connect our oppressions because we are so focused on our little piece of the oppression project? This, to my mind, is one of the biggest challenges facing the women’s movement today.” -- Nandita Shah, co-director of Akshara India

Introduction

Thus far, I have examined the landscape of transnational feminist framing through a content analysis of organizational texts, demonstrating the heterogeneity of frames offered by transnational feminist networks in the contemporary context. I have also shown the impact of organizational-level differences (identities, resources and structures) on TFN framing practices in terms of their response to hegemony. Having illuminated the ways in which such differences are consequential for organizational framing, I now consider how activists confront these (and other) differences in their interactions with one another in transnational spaces and, further, how they employ collective action frames in

the process. As I will discuss at the end of the chapter, such an investigation has important implications for studies of solidarity in transnational movements and also for feminist theory.

My analysis in this chapter centers on the following question: How, in the face of tremendous intramovement differences, are transnational women's movements using collective action frames (identified in chapter 4) as discursive tools in their efforts to manage contestation and build consensus? Desai (2005) argues that transnational women's movements have built "solidarities of difference," but to date we have little systematic understanding of how frames are implicated in this process.

Here, I argue that women's movement organizations continue to make concerted efforts to work with one another despite their differences, and that they utilize particular kinds of frames as discursive tools in this process. This chapter documents the types of frames commonly deployed to transcend the serious differences that sometimes threaten transnational collaboration among feminist and women's organizations, and identifies shared characteristics of those frames. To develop my arguments, I draw on evidence gathered through participant-observation of three major transnational conferences: the 2004 World Social Forum in Mumbai, India, the 2007 Feminist Dialogues meetings in Nairobi, Kenya, and the 2007 World Social Forum, also in Nairobi. For several reasons, these transnational spaces of activists provide especially appropriate empirical material through which to examine the topic at hand. First, an analysis based on participant-observation of face-to-face political activism undoubtedly makes visible some important patterns, ideas, and dynamics that could not be captured through an investigation of organizational texts alone. Second, there is a tremendous amount of diversity and

difference present in such venues; movement actors and organizations attend from many parts of the world and have a variety of strategies, identities, priorities, and goals.

Finally, in part because of this diversity, movement organizations use these spaces to build connections with other organizations focused on global justice issues; they seek to identify and emphasize commonalities among groups and, in so doing, rely on discourses that promote such commonality.

As Desai (2007) has pointed out, educated, privileged feminist activists are overrepresented in these transnational spaces; however, we must also recognize the ways that such spaces provide a venue for some actors to make their voices heard when they have been marginalized within national-level activism.⁶⁴ Some of the participants who come to WSF and FD are well-networked women who frequently participate in transnational conferences, while other participants come from local, grassroots organizations that have somehow managed to find funding in spite of having been marginalized by or shut out of their national-level movements.

This chapter will illustrate both the obstacles confronting movement organizations as they attempt to build alliances, and also the discursive strategies they have developed and used to deal with such challenges. I begin with a brief discussion of the kinds of issues that threaten to divide feminists and women's activists in the contemporary global context; Ackerly (2008) refers to such situations as "terrains of difficulty," while Escobar (2008) has labeled them "territories of difference." This discussion provides a sense of the worries on the minds of movement actors as they seek frameworks that will meet

⁶⁴ For example, some Indian activists and organizations are critical of Delhi-based feminists' dominance of national-level conversations about women's issues, and thus they find more room for their voices in transnational spaces (conversation with Srilatha Batliwala, Indian feminist activist and former board chair of the Women's Environment and Development Organization).

external movement goals, but also be palatable and effective for building cohesion among movement participants. I then identify and explain three particular types of frames, which were also present in the TFN mission statements analyzed in chapter 4, being used in attempts to transcend differences and build solidarity among movement actors: rights-based frames, “anti” frames (i.e., diagnostic frames) and finally, capacity-building and movement process frames (i.e., inwardly-focused frames). After providing examples of these discourses and the ways in which they are being employed, I conclude by laying out theoretical implications of these findings, for scholars of transnational social movements and for feminist theorists.

Sources of Division for Contemporary the Transnational Women’s Movement

Historically, many of the differences emphasized in feminist scholarship stem from regional identities and experiences, intersecting with issues of class and race (Antrobus 2004; Hill Collins 1990; Mohanty 1991; Narayan 1997). As I articulated in earlier chapters, these facets of difference are certainly still present, and still constitute significant concerns for movement actors; however, in the contemporary global context, other sources of difference have also emerged that require theoretical, ethical and strategic consideration. While I do not attempt to provide an exhaustive list, I outline below some of the key intramovement tensions that are currently challenging collaboration within women’s movements: positions on neoliberal global capital,

generational schism, sexuality, feminist identity, and local/global status and resource differences.⁶⁵

The first concern deals with the orientation of movement actors toward capitalism and neoliberal globalization. While most women's activists are critical of the global market economy and its negative impact on women, some advocate a complete dismantling of the capitalist system while others see themselves as working from a feminist perspective to critique (and hopefully reform) a largely unmovable system that is not likely to be toppled in the foreseeable future.⁶⁶ The most radical perspectives consider any attempt to reform or work within the neoliberal framework as using "the master's tools" (Lorde 1984), and thus doomed to fail. Those with more moderate perspectives tend to voice concern about what happens to people while they "wait for the revolution." In some instances, as INFORM executive director Sunila Abeysekera explained at the 2007 Feminist Dialogues, women's groups have found such different strategic approaches to be irreconcilable; movement actors in the moderate camp may view the more radical actors as unrealistic and unnecessarily rigid in their thinking, while the radical camp tends to view their counterparts as selling out. Over time, these kinds of differences can result in the growth of resentment on both sides, ultimately preventing continued dialogue due to hard feelings.⁶⁷ Abeysekera lamented the fact that divergent positions on this issue in her part of the world has impeded cooperation among feminists

⁶⁵ These facets of difference were raised repeatedly at the sessions I observed during my fieldwork, and many have also been documented in recent scholarship on transnational women's movements (Antrobus 2004; Basu 2000; Conway 2008; Hawthorne 2007).

⁶⁶ This difference corresponds to the radical versus reformist types of economic diagnosis frames I identified in chapter 4.

⁶⁷ Conway (2008) mentions a similar tense dynamic between two particular transnational networks, the World March of Women and *Articulacion Feminista Marcosur*.

and resulted in repeated failed attempts at collaboratively organizing a South Asian feminist forum (Hewitt field notes 1.18.07).⁶⁸

Another wedge that is particularly salient for some women concerns generational conflicts. Many young feminists feel that veteran feminists are dismissive and patronizing of their ideas. This problem was particularly visible at the 2005 meetings of the Feminist Dialogues when less-experienced activists were pressured to serve as rapporteurs for the small group breakout sessions; a number of the younger participants felt silenced and undervalued, and were subsequently quite resentful.⁶⁹ Although visible efforts were made at the 2007 FD meetings to remedy this misstep on the part of established movement leaders, the generational issue loomed in the background. Multiple young women voiced dissatisfaction with what they perceived as ongoing exclusion or marginalization. One Senegalese activist expressed her continuing concern that the “old guard” is “dominating the discourse of feminism” and has generally failed to link with the new generation of feminist leaders (Hewitt field notes 1.17.07). Given that many older feminist activists share a long history of transnational collaboration and struggle (dating in some cases back to the 1970s), it is not surprising that their tight networks might appear impenetrable to movement newcomers.⁷⁰ But what the veteran feminists understand as trust and community with one another, younger feminists sometimes interpret as unreflective exclusion of fresh perspectives in order to retain

⁶⁸ Abesekera shared this example during a large discussion session at the Feminist Dialogues; given the circumstances of that social situation, I did not intervene in the discussion to follow up, and therefore do not have information regarding the specific groups on different sides of this debate

⁶⁹ I did not attend the 2005 Feminist Dialogues Meeting, which was held in Porto Alegre, Brazil. My knowledge of the dynamics at this meeting comes from conversations with colleagues who did attend, and from secondary accounts of the event (e.g., Desai 2006; Wilson 2007).

⁷⁰ Prominent, high-profile feminist activists such as Charlotte Bunch (Center for Women’s Global Leadership), Gita Sen (DAWN), Rosalind Petchesky (independent scholar-activist), Nandita Shah (AKSHARA), Barbara Klugman (Women’s Health Project), and Sonia Correa (DAWN; Sexuality Policy Watch) have worked together steadily since the UN World Conferences of the 1980s and 1990s.

power within the movement.⁷¹ It is not necessarily the case that veteran feminists hold vastly different perspectives on issues than the younger feminists, but rather that they are being perceived as controlling, and crowding out new voices from the conversation. The seasoned activists remain concerned about the schism, though, and continue to discuss it openly (e.g., Shah 2004).

It is also widely acknowledged that the notion of sexual rights remains contested among women's movement actors; while the right to experience sexual pleasure, decide on number of sexual partners, and frequency of sexual activity are all debated issues, sexual orientation is the chief source of disagreement. For example, Ackerly and D'Costa (2005) document tensions around the inclusion of sexual freedom in the women's human rights framework. They quote a WSF 2004 attendee from Burkina Faso who is active with the World March of Women:

For me, feminism means that I commit myself, with all of my force, with all of my faith, in the struggle so that women succeed in this endeavor...Nonetheless, we've had the time to ascertain that feminism, it means that we have to agree that everything is allowed, and I think that, here on earth, everything is not allowed...But we realized that, in the World March, there is something called sexual orientation. And we, we are not ready to commit ourselves to fight, to ask for the authorization to have a sexual orientation other than what one normally has. I am talking about homosexuality. Whether it is right or not, for us, this is a difficult situation. It is not one of our primary concerns. Therefore, this is a difference between the North and us, which means that, from time to time, there are tensions (26).

Her comments reflect palpable tensions and discomfort around women's sexual freedom that often stem from differences in religion, culture, and education. And while her voice still represents the beliefs of a legitimate segment of the women's movement, others articulate a different perspective. Gigi Francisco, DAWN regional coordinator for

⁷¹ Whittier (1995) describes a similar phenomenon occurring among generational cohorts during the second wave of feminist activism in the U.S.

Southeast Asia, enthusiastically chanted at a 2007 WSF session, “Sex whenever I want! Sex with whoever I want! Pregnancy whenever I decide! Respect our sexualities!” (Hewitt field notes 1.22.07). Her arguments suggest a more holistic view of women’s sexual autonomy that would enable women to exercise full agency, free from cultural or legal constraint, in determining their sexual partners (including the possibility of other women) and the frequency and purpose of their sexual activity.

Also note that the activist quoted above interprets sexuality as a North-South difference, but her analysis represents only a partial account of this landscape. Many women and organizations in the global South have long advocated for an expansion in understandings of sexual freedoms and rights, such that same-sex relationships would no longer be viewed as deviant. Fikile Vilikazi, a South African activist who directs the Coalition of African Lesbians, expressed her dismay at the prejudice her organization encounters when trying to build alliances both locally and transnationally (Hewitt field notes 1.23.07). A number of lesbians also report that they still feel marginalized within other global justice movements, including feminist ones. They feel that their issues are not taken as seriously, and are troubled at the unwillingness of some to include sexuality as a human rights issue.⁷² Hawthorne (2007) discusses lesbians’ experiences of marginalization even at the World Social Forum itself, writing that “so too in this ‘new world’ of diversity, lesbians have been pushed off the tree” (130).

Furthermore, even among movement actors who affirm sexual freedom and rights (including that of sexual orientation), there is conflict about how such rights should be exercised and/or protected. For example, Leila, a Brazilian activist affiliated with the

⁷² Several participants in the audience expressed this sentiment during a sexual diversity session hosted by the South-South Dialogue at the 2007 World Social Forum (Hewitt field notes 1.23.07).

South-South Dialogue and the Brazilian League of Lesbians, articulated the tensions between those who advocate civil unions or marriage rights for GLB persons and those who demand what they deem as “full rights,” questioning the institution of marriage because of its propensity to reproduce patriarchy (Hewitt field notes 1.23.07). Leila went on to describe how some lesbian feminists are so critical of what they interpret as an inherently unjust institution that they would not accept same-sex marriage rights as a real victory, but rather consider such a policy incomplete; instead they feel activists should work toward the deconstruction of binary understandings of gender and sexuality in favor of more fluid ideas that would ultimately render marriage obsolete.

Another interesting fault line within the movement relates to the necessity of a feminist identity and, further, what constitutes a “feminist” perspective. Movement organizations are making different choices in this regard. Some leaders, such as the organizers of the African Feminist Forum, insist that articulation of an explicitly feminist identity is a crucial political move; the coalition of organizations responsible for putting together this event in 2006 argued that they needed to hold the forum for those who “publicly identify as feminists,” not the “I’m a feminist, but...” crowd (Hewitt field notes 1.18.07).⁷³ They noted that the feminist movement and the women’s movement are not the same thing, and they viewed infusing the women’s movement with a feminist perspective as an important goal of their organizing. Likewise, one South Asian activist lamented the fact that “gender” workshops are very common in her region, but that feminism and critique of patriarchy are rarely part of the discussions (Hewitt field notes 1.19.07).

⁷³ The organizing coalition included representatives from DAWN, FEMNET, and WLUML, to name a few.

Other women's activists and organizations make the intentional choice not to use a feminist label, at least not publicly. Some activists cite fears of being perceived as man-hating lesbians if they identify themselves as feminists (Hewitt field notes 1.21.07). Nosipho, coordinator of a South African women's organization, reported that this worry is particularly common in the African context; she noted that women want to advocate for themselves, but also remain respected in their communities and in their marriages, and thus tend to shun any association with feminisms. In other cases, activists report that their reasons deal with cultural perceptions that feminism is a nefarious concept imported from privileged intellectuals of the West; it is not uncommon for women to note that they have greater success mobilizing and achieving their goals, particularly at local and national levels, when they utilize frameworks that are accepted as indigenous. For example, Isatou, a former academic and current activist in The Gambia, shared that women's groups there have achieved progress on issues such as marriage and inheritance laws and female genital cutting by drawing on the language present in the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (commonly referred to as the African Women's Protocol). Isatou went on to explain that in using less threatening language (i.e., eliminating the notion of feminism) that is understood as indigenously generated, activists are better able to disarm political leaders because they cannot claim outside imposition of ideas (Hewitt field notes 1.18.07).

A second layer of the debate over feminist identity is the validity of the strain of feminism a group espouses. This tension goes beyond a dichotomous understanding (embrace the label vs. don't embrace the label) toward different notions of what in fact constitutes "feminism." I observed at the Feminist Dialogues a desire on the part of some

established, well-networked feminist leaders for other activists, often from different regions or generations, to “get it” or “get it right.” The most vivid demonstration of this came during an informal dinner conversation that I shared with Nandini and Bishnu, both South Asian activists who suggested that African feminism “had a long way to go.” The view these leaders articulated suggested that there is a certain version of feminism that must be respected and adhered to in transnational spaces, if a group is to be accepted by high-profile women’s organizations.⁷⁴ Contained in this particular brand of feminism is: 1) the recognition that all issues are feminist, 2) a requirement of inclusivity and tolerance (particularly in the realm of sexual freedom), 3) an embracing of the feminist label, and 4) the use of particular insider jargon that is often associated with powerful alliances among South Asian and Latin American feminists (although this would not likely be acknowledged).⁷⁵ At work here is a judgment whereby certain insider feminists are critical of what they view as underdeveloped feminism among other, often locally or regionally based, organizations.⁷⁶

This brings us to the palpable tensions that are rooted in differences between movement organizations working at the local or national level and those working in transnational spaces (Alvarez 1998; Desai 2007). Susanna George, former executive director of Isis International, writes “There is a vast difference between the priorities of women working locally and those working in the corridors of the UN” (2004: 26).

⁷⁴ I observed these views expressed during informal, semi-private conversations, and thus feel ethically bound to protect the anonymity of the actors involved. The names I have used are pseudonyms, and I have intentionally chosen not to provide any additional identifying information about organizational affiliation.

⁷⁵ Activists and organizations who question freedom of sexual identity are viewed by some feminists as unsophisticated. Also, for some, the claiming of the feminist label is a crucial act in response to fundamentalist backlash against feminism.

⁷⁶ Intramovement norms such as this one, when based in inter-regional or inter-organizational tensions, can constitute additional meso-level constraints on framing activity. I do not explore this specifically in the dissertation, but hope to consider it further in my future work.

Moreover, there exists the perception (often warranted) among activists working in local and national contexts that transnational venues are dominated by women and organizations with greater privilege in terms of education, resources, and language. Margaret, a women's rights activist in Zimbabwe, shared her concern during an open microphone session at the 2007 FD that "grassroots women" face significant obstacles in getting their interests on the transnational feminist agenda. She noted that there are far too many educated English-speakers advocating on behalf of, rather than with, locally-based activists, and went on to assert that "Anything you do for us, without us, is against us" (Hewitt field notes 1.17.07).

Taken together, these types of differences and tensions present very real challenges for alliance-building and, more specifically, for constructing appropriate frames geared toward this goal. But, particularly in transnational spaces, feminists and women's activists are looking to find ways of building bridges and working together (Eschle 2005; Karides and Hewitt 2009; Vargas 2003). As Nandita Shah noted in a speech delivered during a plenary session of the Asia Pacific NGO forum for Beijing Plus Ten, "In these fragmented times, as Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003: 250) writes, it is both very difficult to build these alliances and never more important to do so" (Shah 2004). In the next section, I discuss in greater detail the need for and unique difficulties of promoting shared meanings within the global women's movement.

The Need for Constructing Shared Frames within Diverse Movements

A number of movement scholars have cited the heightened importance of "meaning work" in transnational social movements (della Porta et al. 2006; Nepstad

2001; Smith 2002; Snow 2004). Ironically, the characteristics of globalized movements that make shared meanings so crucial are also the very features that make their creation so difficult. Della Porta et al. (2006) identify three such facets of transnational movements: the heterogeneity of movement constituencies, the heterogeneity of ideologies and political positions represented by mobilizing structures, and the geographically dispersed mobilization context. The transnational women's movement faces these broad challenges of heterogeneity and geographic dispersion, as well as the more movement-specific challenges discussed above, in their discursive efforts to promote solidarity. Despite these challenges, as I show, feminists and women's activists continue to call for unifying discourses and to work thoughtfully to construct and utilize them.

Feminist scholar-activist Rosalind Petchesky (2008) recently argued that we need a feminism that coalesces very diverse bodies; she asserted that discourses effective in promoting solidarity within a movement full of multiplicity must be intersectional, integrative, and able to encompass local particularities. North African activist Ayesha Imam, a well-known organizer with Women Living Under Muslim Laws (WLUML), made a similar point at the Feminist Dialogues in 2007, insisting that if feminists are to take on issues together, the issues must be ones that all can "get behind" in their local particularities (Hewitt field notes 1.19.07). Gigi Francisco of Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), echoes her sentiment and calls for integrated feminist approaches: "We must commit to interlinkages despite our differential locations" (Hewitt field notes 1.19.07). Few would argue with the need for such strategies, but developing and implementing them is often difficult. Lydia Alpízar Durán, executive

director of the Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID), underscores this point in her identification of the sweeping post-millennium political and economic changes as one of the great challenges of the contemporary period; she goes on to note the urgent need for developing new frameworks to accommodate current issues and their intersectionalities (Hewitt field notes 1.18.07). Women's groups, then, must adapt their framing practices appropriately to accommodate both internal differences and rapid changes in the movement environment.

Constructing shared frames that account for the kinds of differences, intersections, and particularities discussed above is fraught with obstacles of one kind or another. Consider the example of the politics surrounding access to abortion in different regional contexts. In Latin America, many feminists and women's activists have fought locally and regionally for women's access to safe abortion (Correa 2004); as activist Nandita Gandhi shared at the 2007 FD, many activists in India have instead struggled with the wide availability of abortion because of the growing number of selective terminations of female fetuses (Hewitt field notes 1.17.07). A frame that is effective transnationally needs to be able to account for these complex situational differences around the issue of abortion, affirming the specific problems in each context, but also maintaining theoretical coherence.

In addition to situational strategic differences, unifying frames must also recognize material and identity differences among women. In the mid-1980s, the theme of "global sisterhood" (Morgan 1984) was temporarily taken up by some transnational feminists and women's activists as a rallying cry, but was quickly critiqued for its universalizing character and its perceived erasing of differences in race, class, and nation

that work together to create disparate lived experiences for women across the world. Third World feminists, in particular, were concerned that Morgan's notion of women's commonality required that women's race and class be rendered invisible (Mohanty 1997); these pointed critiques prevented the global sisterhood frame from gaining and sustaining broad-based support within the movement.⁷⁷ Thus, women's groups learned that collective action frames that effectively manage difference must not attempt to hide it, but rather should acknowledge and move through it.

For a successful example of a unifying frame, recall that Keck and Sikkink's (1998) account of networking around the issue of violence against women demonstrates how the emergence of a shared frame – women's rights as human rights – led to effective collaboration and management of intramovement differences within transnational feminism during the early 1990s. Though women's and feminist activists converged around this common collective action frame by the mid-1980s, relationships between activists from the global North and South were quite tumultuous prior to that. Major divisions at that time were attributed largely to disparate understandings of the most pressing issues facing women. While Northern activists tended to use an anti-discrimination/equality frame, Southern activists relied primarily on a frame of economic development/social justice. The Southern activists were highly critical of what they viewed as elitist ignorance of their material concerns on the part of some Northern leaders; certainly, issues of perceived imperialism and racism lay at the root of their

⁷⁷ Rupp and Taylor (1999) argue that the theme of "international sisterhood" created the basis for a shared collective identity during the first wave of the transnational women's movement. While this trope may have been effective for the movement during a particular historical moment (and when movement constituents were far more homogeneous than they are now), critiques emerging from postcolonial feminist scholarship and the experiences of activists have pushed the contemporary movement well beyond discourses of sisterhood.

critique. The women's human rights frame, coupled with a focus on this issue of violence against women (broadly understood), effectively bridged the gap in priorities and conceptual understandings among women's organizations at that particular historical moment. Weldon (2006) adds that the human rights frame really only became successful once all forms of violence against women – not just those perpetrated by the state – became accepted within the movement as rights violations; she credits Southern activists for expanding Northern perspectives on this issue. Thus, making the frame as broad and inclusive as possible was a crucial step in successfully mitigating difference.

Since the UN conferences of the 1990s, transnational women's organizers have branched out in their strategies, still highly aware of past missteps that fragmented the movement, but also fervently seeking common ground. Nandita Shah, co-director of Akshara India, reflects on the legacies of the past and provides a succinct and clear account of the strategic challenges of the contemporary movement in this way:

We started with a simple and easy analysis: women because they were women, shared social discrimination and oppression, in different degrees perhaps, were linked by a common bond of oppression and struggle. Life in the movement was much easier then. We had a neat analysis and uncomplicated strategies...The women's movement has made an important radical shift. We shifted from notions of sisterhood is global, one women's movement, one category of women to recognizing the politics of difference. That woman, as a biological being, is not the only identity. That for each of us there are multiple, layered, often contradictory identities. The multiple identities appear, disappear or assert themselves at different times in different situations...How can we evolve a common vision without subsuming our specificity and without giving up our differences? How can we assert collective power in a different way and not only through our oppressed identities? (2004: 1-2).

One session at the 2007 World Social Forum in Nairobi further confirmed both the continued importance and the challenges of developing shared frames in contemporary transnational organizing. The session, entitled "Feminist Movement

Building,” was exclusively devoted to strategizing around a (potentially new) transnational slogan or campaign. Session participant and co-facilitator Nandita Gandhi, a representative of the National Network of Autonomous Women’s Groups and co-founder of Mumbai-based women’s organization Akshara, articulated the goal of the meeting as generating a “slogan” or “campaign” that would have transnational appeal, but that women’s activists could implement in different ways at the local level in order to attend to the specificities of those situations (Hewitt field notes 1.24.07). I was struck at this session by the intense consternation around specific word choices and the criteria used for assessing the quality of these messages. For instance, some suggestions that dealt with the need for education were criticized for being too issue-specific and not “cross-cutting” in nature. One Colombian woman’s argument about the need for a feminist food sovereignty campaign was apparently dismissed because it failed to fit neatly into the categories that had been predetermined by the organizers (e.g., anti-neoliberalism and anti-fundamentalism). Others still were excluded from the conversation for fear that their similarity to slogans of other movements or campaigns might prove confusing for some; for example, when one participant suggested the theme of “My body is mine,” another, more experienced activist pointed out that this slogan has been used in reference to reproductive rights issue since the 1980s, and insisted that any new slogans should be both cross-cutting and unique.

The facilitators pushed hard to come to some consensus by the end of the session, so that the women’s organizations and leaders present could leave the WSF having co-constructed a message that could be put into action in diverse settings. However, the result was ambiguous. While several slogans discussed toward the end of the session,

including “Stop Corporate Control of Our Bodies, Our Labor, Our Sexualities” and “Defend Our Personal and Social Sovereignities” appeared to receive moderate support from the group, there was no ultimate consensus, no crescendo. Time ran short, and the facilitators proposed that we continue the discussion online through the Feminist Dialogues website. Although I signed up to receive any relevant communications, I was never contacted; moreover, to my knowledge, no such discussion ever took place using the FD website.

As my anecdote illustrates, thinking through appropriate and effective discursive approaches to consensus-building in the face of diversity is a crucial concern (and a challenge) for transnational women’s movements in the contemporary context. Thus, the importance of the question is affirmed: How can movement actors construct frames and identities in a way that promotes solidarity, not giving way to these divisions (strategic or otherwise), but at the same time respecting the variations in positions?

Collective Action Frames as Tools for Managing Differences

In the sections that follow, I lay out three categories of frames being utilized by contemporary women’s movements to unite diversely situated actors and organizations. Consistent with Hypotheses 10-12, the data reveal that activists in transnational spaces are commonly using three types of frames to address intramovement differences. They are: multi-issue rights-based frames, “anti” (i.e., diagnostic) frames, and movement process/capacity-building frames (inwardly focused frames). I present them in this order

partially because of their historical development within the movement.⁷⁸ As I have mentioned in earlier chapters, multi-issue frames arguing for human rights have been widely utilized in transnational women's movements for some time (Friedman 1995; Keck and Sikkink 1998). The popularity of diagnostic discourses such as anti-globalization and anti-fundamentalism rose dramatically in the new millennium, and have been particularly popular among global justice activists participating in the World Social Forum in recent years (DAWN 2005; Reed 2002). By contrast, process-oriented frames focusing on solidarity and movement-building have recently become more common, and may in fact be the favored approach of the moment.

Rights-based Frames

One prominent coalescing framing strategy that the global women's movement has been using for many years, and continues to use, is that of the broad, intersectional, rights-based frame (Ackerly 2008; Friedman 1995; Hawkesworth 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Human rights and women's rights frames encompass a wide range of issues and goals, and are thus likely to garner broad support and diminish the visibility of internal differences. Movement groups working on issues such as trade, peace, education, gender-based violence, sexuality, or climate change can easily find nodes of connection. Democracy and justice frames are regularly used in similar ways, but not with the same prevalence as rights frames. It is feasible to frame many, if not all, women's concerns as rights violations. Such frames embody what Keck and Sikkink

⁷⁸ I do not claim to present primary, original evidence of the development of framing strategies over time within the movement, but rather I base this point on evidence provided in secondary scholarship, cited above.

(1998) refer to as “languages that cannot be rejected;” these frames offer claims that are difficult for people to argue with, whether inside or outside of the movement.

Rights-based frames are prevalent in the formal organizational materials of transnational networks (i.e., they were present in the mission statements of 58.1 percent of my sample), but are also highly common across individuals and organizations in the transnational activist spaces I observed. Below I share several examples of this frame in action.

In a WSF session focusing on local impact and implementation of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights (WGNRR) affirmed the usefulness a human rights approach across issues, regions, and political contexts (Hewitt field notes 1.23.07). Panelists included activists working in the areas of sexual rights, maternal health, and HIV/AIDS, in countries such as Bangladesh, Ghana, and Zimbabwe. Each person discussed her/his organization’s efforts to use the MDGs in their work, and all noted the shared challenges of fighting for women’s sexual health and rights across their different contexts. Furthermore, in the materials disseminated at the session, the WGNRR pointed to the rights protected in the MDGs as a means of holding governments accountable, and also of promoting cross-cultural and cross-institutional dialogue. They advanced the rights-based approach as holistic, integrative framework: “WGNRR seeks to integrate women’s sexual and reproductive rights at all levels and therefore supports involvement in broad coalitions.”

Similarly, at a DAWN-sponsored panel on democracy and rights, representatives from multiple issue sectors and regions of the world spoke of the importance of

protecting women's rights, particularly in the realm of health and family, regardless of the different manifestations of rights violations across cultural contexts. Gloria Archibong, an obstetrician for twenty-six years, described an array of women's health problems in the African context (e.g., cultural restrictions on family planning, husbands transmitting HIV to their wives) and noted the applicability of human rights to each specific challenge. Soheila Vahdati discussed the violent punishments to which women are subjected for so-called sexual crimes in Iran. Yvonne Underhill-Sen, a Fiji-based activist, was particularly firm in her insistence that the movement must continue to push the women's rights as human rights framework, along with a core belief in interrelated rights. She stated vehemently, "We must ensure that the notion of human rights is upheld" (Hewitt field notes 1.22.07). Throughout the workshop, panelist and facilitator Gigi Francisco reiterated the need for access to human rights in multiple sectors, and the importance of rights-based strategies across all these contexts.

The rights-based frames provide a very big tent, enabling many movement actors to join in the use of common language and still feel that their priorities are receiving attention and being validated; it is not surprising, then, that they are still so commonly used in efforts to bridge intramovement differences. They also take advantage of broadly resonant themes in the global political environment (e.g., human rights, democracy, justice), which enables organizations to claim heightened legitimacy when working with one another and with powerful political actors.

But rights frames may not offer a perfect solution for dealing with internal movement differences. One potential strategic problem with multi-issue, rights-based frames is that they can become so dominant within the movement that they marginalize

or silence those movement actors who are unable or unwilling to frame their issues and goals in “cross-cutting” ways (Ackerly and D’Costa 2005). Even if the original intent is to be as inclusive as possible, the fact remains that some groups may be left out because of their failure to embrace the dominant multi-issue message. For example, let us return to my earlier anecdote of the strategy session around discursive consensus. There were a number of participants who made forceful arguments about the importance of education or the environment as underlying issues that link firmly to many other women’s concerns. In each instance, these participants’ ideas were politely (or not so politely) dismissed; the reason cited was that these more specific, issue-based frames were not broad enough to encompass the range of local particularities confronting women transnationally. The moderators seemed to want an approach *like* a human rights frame in terms of broad, local and global applicability, but also something new, and perhaps unique, to add to their toolboxes. We must consider, then, what the (perhaps unintended) effects of privileging rights-based frames might be for consensus-building within the movement.

Another downside to these types of frames is that their meanings can easily be diluted and/or co-opted, or can be highly contested within the movement. Sonia Correa, DAWN research coordinator for sexual and reproductive rights, discussed the co-optation problem during a session at the 2004 WSF (Hewitt field notes 1.18.04). Correa highlights the ongoing struggle between the women’s movement and political opponents over the meaning of human rights:

...feminists have never taken human rights for granted from start. We have entered the human rights discourse understanding it is a contextual situation, and we have struggled within it to infuse it with a gender dimension. Human rights are not international law, or in a narrow interpretation of international law. It is the process through which consensus is reached in regard to what human rights are or can be. So we are talking process, we are

talking movement, we are talking political action. We don't think, as Bush administration and IMF, that human rights is rule of law, respect of property, and respect of country. This is a very different approach, and I think this is critical to call attention to.

Internal ideational contestation can also be a challenge for rights frames. It is next to impossible for a movement organization, much less an entire transnational movement, to come to agreement on the precise boundaries of a frame and then retain control over that meaning. For instance, as I have indicated with the above examples, many women's and feminist activists for human rights espouse what they call an "indivisibility" approach, but this version of rights is not necessarily accepted by political actors beyond the movement, or even by all activists within the movement. Rosalind Petchesky, a political scientist and prominent scholar-activist for global women's health and sexual rights, passionately advocated for the indivisibility perspective in response to a question about the viability of the human rights frame during a DAWN-sponsored workshop at the 2004 WSF:

"...for those of us who have used human rights language and frameworks, with this co-optation of human rights language by the right wing, my first response is to say that we approach human rights differently and we need to be saying it over and over and over again. We approach human rights from a much more comprehensive and what we call 'indivisibility' perspective. For example, on this question of sex work and human trafficking, there is no way on earth we would talk about outlawing criminal [prostitution]; we would immediately have to talk about the economic and social human rights of those...and the conditions in neo-liberal globalization, global capitalism, that have created the necessity of sex work for so many people all around the world. So, I think that distinguishes our politics. What's very complicated also though is not just that different people espouse human rights from very different perspectives, but also that different people claim the name 'feminism.' The Bush administration has allied itself with certain feminist groups on this trafficking issue. And I think in certain UN talks the same thing was happening. This is very, very difficult. We need to think through how we both pluralize feminism and welcome and embrace the many feminisms, and also feel able in public spaces to air our conflicts and differences" (Hewitt field notes 1.18.04).

Petchesky's remarks simultaneously illustrate the importance of the specificity with which we understand frames, and also the varied meanings of umbrella concepts like human rights. Implicit in Petchesky's brand of human rights is an awareness of intersectionality and a fervent belief that all rights are interconnected, but she understands the necessity of continually fighting for that meaning, both within and outside of the movement.

“Anti” Frames

“Anti-fundamentalism is what unites us.” – Activist with Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) at the 2004 WSF

“Militarization is the shield of corporate globalization.” – Lilian Celiberti, founder and head of Articulacion Feminista Marcosur (AFM), at 2007 FD

I move now to a discussion of a second type of frame that feminists and women's activists are using to communicate across differences, the “anti” frame. At a 2004 World Social Forum workshop sponsored by Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN), one Indian activist asserted that “anti-fundamentalism is what unites us [feminists].” Her voice represented one of many feminists at the WSF who identified fundamentalism as a religious and political force that is harmful to women in a range of ways. This claim is significant, in part, because it is symbolic of a departure from the human rights discourse so dominant in the 1990s. While very often a commitment to human rights is characterized as the tie that has bound women in their global struggles, in the wake of resurging power among fundamentalist movements and governments (e.g., The Vatican, Iran, Sudan) in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many women's activists were identifying commonality in their *opposition to* fundamentalism, rather than a

commitment to human rights or justice for women (DAWN 2004; Reed 2002). Also significant about the claim is the reference to being *united*, indicating an understanding that there are differences among women, but that commonality can indeed be found.

The anti-fundamentalist frame gained momentum to some degree in the late 1990s, but in particular during the early years of the new millennium (Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law and Development 2008; DAWN 2004; Howland and Buergenthal 2001; Reed 2002). There are several plausible and related reasons why this frame became widely used when it did. First, in the aftermath of the 1995 UN World Conference on Women, many activists felt that feminist concerns had been compartmentalized to the point that building coalitions across issues and cultures was once again very difficult. The Beijing Platform for Action divided women's issues into "critical areas of concern" which arguably impeded the potential for coalition-building.⁷⁹ The anti-fundamentalist frame offered a means of uniting women across cultures, across borders, and across issues of concern. In many cases, the anti-fundamentalist frame also offered a point of convergence for feminists/women's groups and other progressive causes concerned with militarization, neo-liberal economic policies, and sexual rights. Second, the concurrent political success of fundamentalist groups⁸⁰ all over the world created a sense of solidarity among feminists that they were battling the same kinds of forces, in spite of other differences. Moreover, the U.S. terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 gave rise to a heightened awareness of religious fundamentalism, which further catalyzed galvanization around this issue for feminists.

⁷⁹ Ackerly (2006) dubs these "issue silos."

⁸⁰ Examples include the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India, the Bush administration in the U.S., and the power of the Vatican in international politics.

The anti-fundamentalism frame and other diagnostic framing strategies, namely those critiquing neoliberalism and militarization, have also enjoyed popularity due to their promotion on the part of women's coalitions such as the coordinating group of the Feminist Dialogues. The "trinity" of women's enemies – religious fundamentalism, neoliberal globalization, and militarization – figured prominently into their conference agendas during 2004, 2005, and 2007 (FD Global Report 2005; FD Global Report 2007; FD 2007 Concept Notes on Sub-Theme 2: Fundamentalism and Body Politics, and 3: Globalisation). Furthermore, the contemporary global justice movement more generally, including the large portion of it that participates in the World Social Forum, has advanced the anti-neoliberalism and anti-militarization arguments as key bases for their collaborative organizing (Blau and Karides 2008; della Porta et al. 2006; Fisher and Ponniah 2003; Smith 2008). Unlike the human rights frames, though, these diagnostic frames were not terribly common in the organizational texts of transnational feminist networks. Anti-globalization frames were present in 12.9 percent of the mission statements in my sample, and anti-militarization frames appeared in 22.6 percent of the statements. Frames specifically referencing opposition to religious fundamentalisms appeared in fewer than 10 percent of the sample, and therefore were not included in the discussion in chapter 4. Note, however, that the relatively limited presence of these "anti" frames may not reflect a lack of ideological fervor so much as a conscious effort on the part of social movement organizations to present a more positive message in the texts of mission statements, which represent their public face.

What characterizes these "anti" discourses is their sole focus on the enemy, the problem. Essentially, these are diagnostic frames that do not move to the next step;

movement organizations can identify common enemies without explicitly suggesting common solutions. These types of frames are particularly common in efforts to promote a sense of shared suffering and solidarity, even if differently manifested, as I witnessed repeatedly at the transnational conferences of 2004 and 2007.

For example, during both the 2004 and 2007 meetings, militarization was a concern that was consistently raised. During an open forum discussion following a session at the 2007 FD, one participant noted that although militarization has different meanings and realities for individuals depending on the context, many women and children are harmed by this phenomenon (Hewitt field notes 1.19.07). She remarked that women regularly face violations as a result of multiple forms of military power, whether through witnessing violence, losing loved ones, or having one's own bodily security threatened. Her comment conveyed a sense that, even though the precise effects of war and militarization vary, there is a common root of people's suffering which can be the basis for solidarity.

Neoliberal globalization is also targeted as a ubiquitous obstacle to women's flourishing. During a session on the opening day of the 2007 FD, a number of participants shared their local experiences with neoliberal forces. Guacira de Oliveira, an activist with Articulacion Feminista Marcosur in Brazil, discussed the negative impact of neoliberal globalization on unemployment and inequality in Latin America, and also criticized the transfer of social responsibilities from the public to the private sphere (Hewitt field notes 1.17.07). She went on to argue that feminism means nothing without a redistribution of wealth, a virtually impossible goal within the confines of a neoliberal economy.

In a later session, one 2007 FD participant lamented that, “Neoliberalism spoiled our way of thinking about the future” (Hewitt field notes 1.18.07). Another participant pointed to the exacerbation of health problems for HIV-positive women in South Africa who are unemployed because their jobs have been filled by Chinese women working for next to nothing. A Latin American woman currently working as an activist in South Africa emphasized the different manifestations of the neoliberal economy, but also its pervasive nature, calling it a “giant.”

On the last day of the FD meetings, the references to commonalities in facing neoliberalism continued. One panelist explained that the impact of economic globalization is complex, and that the neoliberal economy is also a source of creation of culture that affects us all; on a more hopeful note, she argued that there are many forms of resistance to neoliberalism in which feminists can engage, including demanding land and water rights or questioning the role of the state in national economies, and she encouraged each woman to find her role in the collective struggle (Hewitt field notes 1.19.07).

Throughout the transnational meetings I attended, women attributed a whole slew of problems to the giant that is neoliberal globalization, and pointed repeatedly to the devastation it has caused for women’s economic opportunities. And lest we fall into the trap of separating so-called material issues from identity issues, Fikile Vilikazi (Coalition of African Lesbians) noted the ways that sexual freedom is located squarely within struggles against neoliberalism and patriarchy (Hewitt field notes 1.23.07). She argued forcefully that the intersecting enemies of neoliberalism, patriarchy, and fundamentalism

come together to diminish the life chances of LBT women in developing countries, in particular.

One strategic advantage of frames that are solely diagnostic is that they do not require consensus about solutions, or even necessarily issue priorities. There is far more agreement that fundamentalisms, militarization, and neoliberal globalization are problematic for women than there is on what to do about them; recall that Smith (2002) also found this to be true within global justice movements generally. Ayesha Imam's statement about coming together when/where enemies are common highlights this advantage. Focusing on the problem or the enemy provides a clear indication as to when groups should even try to collaborate, and when they should not. Furthermore, a focus on problems enables activists to express disappointment, frustration, grief, and even rage at the targets they have identified as responsible for their situations; although some might question the productivity of these emotional expressions, at least in backstage circumstances they seem to promote meaningful connections among women who otherwise might not come together.

But for some, these types of frames suffer from an inherent flaw: they fail to articulate what a movement is *for*. The future of a broad movement for social change may be worrisome if participants find that they are only able to collaborate around what they are *against*. If movement actors cannot successfully articulate solutions to the problems they identify, they may leave themselves open to criticism from opponents, political leaders, and the public, and thus potentially risk the outcomes they desire; such challenges may be especially problematic as movements seek to gain favorable media attention for their causes. This concern is often extended to the global justice more

generally, which has also encountered difficulties coming to consensus on alternative visions to neoliberal globalization (Bello 2007). On the one hand, “anti” frames may serve an important function insofar as they promote dialogue and connection. On the other hand, if commonality can only be found in enemies, the possibility of collaboration in working toward solutions seems tenuous at best.

Movement Process and Capacity-Building Frames: The New Rallying Cry?

“... Create capacity building resources and strategies for and with women’s rights advocates, organizations and movements that will strengthen our overall impact... Build alliances across differences based on age, sectors, social movements, regions, issues, and communities in order to build a stronger movement for women’s rights.” – AWID Goals: What We Hope to Achieve

I intentionally leave this inwardly focused category of frames for last because it is the one that is most innovative and emergent, based on my observations.⁸¹ Furthermore, it represents an important strategic move beyond “business as usual” that I will discuss in detail after providing some concrete examples. In referring to inward focus and movement process, I mean to convey a category of frames that draw attention to the need for and importance of supporting fellow activists and fostering growth in multiple sectors of the movement; I stress here the importance of the emphasis on what happens within the movement, rather than outside of it. Included in this category are several frames that were also present in the TFN mission statements discussed in chapter 4; chief among these are movement-building and networking frames, and inclusivity/diversity frames.

⁸¹ Of the three categories of frames I discuss in this chapter, this final set of frames has perhaps the most fluid boundaries. This is likely due in part to the relatively recent rise in prevalence of such frames within the movement. Early in the development of the life of a frame, we might expect to see less consistent articulations of concepts among movement actors, even if they are circling around similar ideas. Rather than force one specific label onto this genre of framing, I felt it more methodologically appropriate and accurate to allow my analysis to reflect the messiness inherent in the data. Although I use the broad labels of movement process and capacity-building to encompass multiple manifestations of similar frames, I argue that their commonalities warrant treatment within the same discussion.

Visible in these types of frames are arguments about nourishing and strengthening the movement (e.g., movement-building and networking), and those that reference solidarity and inclusivity. What the messages have in common is an awareness of and attention to the ways in which movement actors work and relate to one another, not necessarily face-to-face, but more abstractly. In many cases, the concept of intramovement difference is explicitly mentioned as a strength. Also inherent in many of these expressions is an understanding that different movement actors play different roles, have different priorities, and that the broader movement needs all such actors in order to succeed. Growth and support at both the individual and organizational levels are thus implicated in these kinds of statements.

The themes of movement-building and transnational solidarity were perhaps the most consistent I encountered during the 2007 transnational meetings; in fact, of the WSF sessions I attended, movement process and building was invoked by panelists or audience members in over fifty percent of them. Such language is also pervasive in organizational mission statements; recall from chapter 4 that 74.2 percent of TFNs in the sample utilized frames with a capacity-building prognosis, while 45.2 percent proposed a prognosis related to movement process.

There is ample evidence that these kinds of frames may be the “next big thing” for transnational feminisms. At feminist conferences during the last few years, major portions of time – even entire days – have been devoted to conversations around investing in and building the movement, and/or to fostering solidarity (Hewitt field notes 1.18.07).⁸² At the Feminist Dialogues meetings and World Social Forum sessions, these themes were visible across many different sessions and organizations. This pattern

⁸² For example, the African Feminist Forum in 2006 and the AWID Triennial Forum in 2008.

stands in contrast to the rights-based and issue-based themes (e.g., health, violence) that dominated transnational women's conferences during the previous decade (Meyer and Prügl 1999; Moghadam 2005).

The Association for Women's Rights in Development (AWID), which hosted several 2007 WSF sessions on procuring resources for women's movements, promoted the concept of movement-building as much as any organization present. Relying on the assumption that the movement is a collective effort requiring multiple kinds of actors, a key part of AWID's mission is to "strengthen the voice, impact and influence of women's rights advocates, organizations and movements internationally to effectively advance the rights of women" (Hewitt field notes 1.22.07). GROOTS International (Grassroots Organizations Operating Together in Sisterhood), who also had a strong presence at the 2007 WSF, shared their materials advocating the nurturing of "relationships of mutual support and solidarity among women engaged in redeveloping their communities." South African activist Fikile Vilikazi also noted the crucial importance of alliance-building and networking with one another in the contemporary context (Hewitt field notes 1.23.07).

Nigerian-based scholar-activist Ayesha Imam (WLUML) emphasized the importance of explicitly "recognizing and reaffirming" differences of religion, language, class, and sexual orientation, and to *build on existing solidarities* when trying to bring people together around common goals (Hewitt field notes 1.18.07). Her remarks suggest a belief in the need for mutual support and growth in spite of differences, which should be thought of as a strength. Also employing the idea of collaborative struggle, representatives from the Women's Global Network for Reproductive Rights noted that

work in support of women “is most effectively and efficiently achieved collectively” (Hewitt field notes 1.23.07).

Peruvian scholar-activist Virginia Vargas argued at the Feminist Dialogues that democracy *within* the global movement is perhaps one of the greatest contributions of feminist theory and practice, and shared her view that the challenge before the movement is to “transform ourselves at the same time we transform the world” (Hewitt field notes 1.17.07). WIDE board chair Wendy Harcourt added that democracy (within the movement) must *thrive* on disputes if it is to be healthy. Harcourt also invoked the tradition of shared authority in the movement, and argued for the continued importance of learning from all areas of the movement and working in “horizontal” ways. Such views were affirmed and augmented by discussions of diversity at the World Social Forum. One activist working on LGBT rights in Ecuador asserted that, “Diversity means not leaving anyone suffering outside [the movement]. Not women, not LGBT persons, not those suffering from racism or economic oppression” (Hewitt field notes 1.24.07).

At one Feminist Dialogues session, Philippines-based activist Rodelyn Marte stressed the need for showing solidarity with one another “in times of victory and celebration, as well as during times of struggle” (Hewitt field notes 1.19.07). Following up with a particularly moving set of remarks, Fiji-based activist Yvonne Underhill-Sen called on FD participants for an expression of solidarity with “women who do not have the resources to be here” (Hewitt field notes 1.19.07). She went on to share her particular worries for a group of women in Fiji who had been unlawfully arrested and were still being held in custody, but extended her comments to include all women who were unable to attend the gathering due to various challenges and limitations. Her comments served

as an important reminder to all participants that by virtue of being present in this transnational space, we possessed certain privileges – freedom of movement, access to knowledge about the conferences, the economic resources to travel long distances and pay for lodging – that other women did not; but rather than encouraging us to feel guilty for such privilege, Underhill-Sen was suggesting that we can still “be in solidarity with one another,” and that such solidarity happens in part through public recognition of those not present.

Viewed alongside one another, these examples illuminate multiple modes of articulating movement values that promote solidarity. I observed that, although there are many differences in what issues are articulated to be most important for women, what solutions are appropriate for tackling these issues, and even in what constitutes feminism, the one thread that appears to be nearly universal is the desire to support one another in the struggle, to foster connection, and to work in ways that strengthen the broader movement (with the understanding that the battle is occurring on many fronts, and thus requires different kinds of actors). Built into this notion is the explicit recognition of and respect for differences in experiences, beliefs, understandings, and strategies. Framing practices focusing on movement process and movement-building tend not to dismiss or ignore difference, but rather accommodate for it.

Smith (2002) notes that TSMOs support group identities and solidarity that contribute to transnational mobilization. Given the importance of mobilization for the development of social movements, this insight is not insignificant. However, we may be missing something if we assume that fostering shared frames is just about growing or sustaining mobilization. Herein lies an opportunity to learn something valuable not just

about transnational social movements, but about transnational feminisms more specifically. In the case of transnational women's movements, movement actors are accountable to the rich traditions of feminist theory and practice, and the many historical lessons they provide. Similarly, they are accountable to the insights that have evolved from years of trying to work together across great chasms of difference; they have learned the dangers of universalizing and compartmentalizing, and do not want to repeat their mistakes. As they move forward, they continually incorporate these lessons into their discourse, whether it be in the academy, in the halls of political institutions, or in the streets. What I am suggesting here is that framing across differences is not just a means to mobilizing people, but rather is also about remaining true to deeply held ideals related to the methodology of a movement. In this way, such framing may be a particularly important vehicle for promoting solidarity, which Taylor and Whittier (1992) argue is a key component of collective identity.

What, some may ask, is uniquely feminist about this? Are not other movements (historical and contemporary) committed to egalitarian, horizontal, and intersectional modes of working and thinking? Certainly, such attention to movement process is present among other movements for justice globally (e.g., labor, anti-racist movements). Furthermore, as scholar-activist Peter Waterman notes, feminists are responsible for disseminating this attention to movement process among their own movement, but also for infusing extra-feminist movements with their methodological perspective:

There can be no doubt of the debt the global justice movement...owes to women's movements and feminist thinkers of the 1970s-80s. The influence can clearly be seen within the CSM [Call of Social Movements] and the [WSF] Charter themselves. Much of the thinking of the new movement (on counter-power resting in a democratic diversity) and behavior (public cultural outrage and celebration) can be traced back to feminists (2002: 8).

In sum, the emergent discourses invoking process, capacity-building and solidarity within the transnational women's movement in recent years may be a crucial tool for dealing with intramovement differences. I want to suggest that, from the perspective of transnational women's activists, these inwardly focused framing practices may hold particular advantages that others lack. These frames are highly inclusive, broadly applicable, indigenously generated, maintain a constructive tone (as opposed to "anti" frames), and do not require a particular hierarchy of issues or agreement on any one strategic approach. Although such frames are deeply consistent with feminist principles, their use does not require embracing of the feminist label, but rather allows for differences on this point, as well. Furthermore, frames with an inward focus may be just as effective as rights-based or diagnostic frames in terms of building bridges with other movements, as they call attention to shared ways of working. Given these features, it is not surprising that women's activists interested in transnational collaboration are using movement process frames more and more in attempts transcend their differences.

However, movement process and capacity-building frames may also suffer from a significant shortcoming in that they can be vague. Talk of solidarity and movement-building may generate positivity and excitement, and may also provide a productive tool for holding differences in, but it can be difficult to discern the precise meaning of such frames beyond the surface. What, for instance, constitutes women being in solidarity with one another across the world? How specific are the criteria, in terms of practices, that must be met in order to achieve solidarity or participate in movement-building? These questions may not necessarily prevent the efficacy of process-oriented frames in

managing intramovement differences, but are worth considering for other strategic functions.

Commonalities among Collective Action Frames Invoked in Attempts to Address Intramovement Difference

The evidence presented above demonstrates that rights-based, “anti” (i.e., diagnostic), and inwardly-focused frames are all being utilized by feminists and women’s activists in transnational spaces in efforts to promote solidarity. Other types of frames such as institutional prognoses, economic prognoses, and identity frames were used far less frequently in the sessions I observed, and the cases in which they were used tended to be quite issue-specific as opposed to accounting for difference.

There are several important characteristics shared by each of these types of frames that reveal something about activists’ perceptions of how best to deal with intramovement differences; in looking at the features that are shared by rights-based, diagnostic, and inwardly-focused frames, we learn what aspects of collective action frames are perceived by activists to be effective in promoting transnational solidarity. While making this knowledge visible is not the same as demonstrating a frame’s efficacy in dealing with difference, it is important nonetheless. Feminists and women’s movement actors, as I have discussed, are highly aware of their history of fragmentation and are actively concerned with working collaboratively across differences. Assuming the presence of these underlying concerns, it is unlikely that they would engage repeatedly in framing that is ineffective or harmful in terms of promoting solidarity. Therefore, illuminating what these frames have in common may be a first step on the path toward identifying the

features of frames that are in fact effective in transcending differences and promoting solidarity.

First, all of the frames implicated in this process, not just the rights-based frames, are actually very broad (although not necessarily intersectional, as the rights frame is); in using the term “broad,” I mean to convey that they are capable of encompassing a multitude of issues of concern to activists in a variety of material, cultural, and political contexts, and that they stay away from specific prognostic proposals, especially. None are confined to a particular region or issue. Second, the rights-based, anti, and internally focused frames are frequently paired with language that explicitly acknowledges and, in many cases, celebrates diversity within the movement.⁸³ They do not push difference aside, but rather explicitly call it out and start with it as a premise.

As we note the commonalities in terms of what these three types of frames offer, it is also important to make visible what is absent in the frames. Neither the rights-based, anti, or internally focused frames offer an analysis that entails individuals and organizations remaining confined to their particular issues of interest; these frames explicitly reject the “silo” model encouraged by the Beijing Platform for Action. That is, each type of frame described here is not narrow, not exclusive, does not privilege particular regions, or even specific, narrowly defined issues (for the most part, except the diagnostic ones). Note, for example, that the institutional and economic prognostic frames that were reasonably common in the mission statements of TFNs (as discussed in chapter 4), were not among those used by activists seeking to build consensus in transnational spaces. Moreover, none of these frames suggest that transnational solidarity or cooperation is impossible or not worth fighting for, but rather they indicate an

⁸³ Hunt (1991) reported a similar finding among Nebraska peace activists during the Gulf War.

underlying belief in both the desirability and possibility of solidarity in spite of difference. Finally, the frames rarely reference any sort of ascribed identities, indicating that activists may now be more comfortable with a politics based on mutual interests and ways of working, as opposed to a politics of identity. I will return to this point later.

Discussion

In chapter 2, I articulated three hypotheses regarding the types of frames that are likely to be used by feminists and women's activists in transnational spaces as discursive tools for addressing intramovement differences and promoting solidarity. They are:

H10: Diagnostic frames that reference "master grievances" will be used in efforts to promote consensus/manage differences. In the case of transnational women's activists, these frames are likely to take the specific form of anti-neoliberalism, anti-militarization, and anti-fundamentalism arguments.

H11: Frames that are broad-ranging and intersectional will be more commonly used to manage differences than narrow and/or single-issue frames. Among transnational women's activists, this will commonly take the form of a rights-based frame.

H12: Frames that are inwardly focused on the movement (e.g., capacity-building and movement process frames) will be used by activists in their efforts to manage differences.

Each of these hypotheses was supported by my analysis. The evidence I presented shows that diagnostic frames (most notably anti-neoliberalism, and anti-fundamentalist frames), multi-issue rights frames, and internally focused frames (e.g.,

capacity-building and movement process frames) are being utilized as tools to deal with intramovement differences. Across a variety of sessions in major transnational activist spaces, these frames emerged as prominent in comparison to other types of frames; they were frequently employed in conjunction with references to the challenges of intramovement differences and/or were often highlighted as ways of promoting commonality even while respecting local particularities.

These findings offer valuable insights for researchers of social movements, especially those who study framing and strategies among transnational movements. Benford and Snow (2000) note that many case studies indicate that prognostic frames are the types of frames that most differentiate movement organizations from one another; if that is indeed the case, we would not expect movement actors to rely on prognostic framing as a means of building consensus across differences. The evidence I present here is in part consistent with such assertions, but perhaps offers a clarification, as well. While activists did not utilize narrowly defined prognostic frames, such those relying on institutional and economic solutions, they did utilize prognostic frames that are rights-based and frames that are internally focused on the movement. This finding suggests that there may be additional nuance worth fleshing out in terms of what types of collective action frames amplify commonality versus differences.

The findings in this chapter also have implications for thinking about how diverse movements construct collective identity. Hunt, Benford, and Snow (1994) write that, "...identity constructions, whether intended or not, are inherent in all social movement framing activities" (185). If the discursive efforts of feminists and women's activists are any indication, the collective identity invoked by this movement seems to be based not on

ascribed identities per se, but rather on a sense of shared struggle due to common enemies and challenges, a shared value of human rights, and a shared desire to provide mutual support. Given the historical contestation over multiple identities within the movement, it is fitting that contemporary activists are relying on the discourses I have presented as they engage in these constructions.

There are also useful lessons here for feminist theorists, particularly those concerned with questions around transnational feminisms. While some theorists have devoted countless pages to skepticism about transnational cooperation and solidarity among women (Chowdhury 2009; Grewal and Kaplan 1994; Mendoza 2002), activists are showing us that they do not believe this effort is futile. Women's and feminist activists advocating at the transnational level, though working in different contexts, are by and large still striving to identify and capitalize on points of synergy and collaboration. My analysis indicates that they display an understanding of the seriousness of the differences, as well as the threats posed by those differences, but that they refuse to let this be an excuse for inaction. They make visible the inequalities among activists that Mendoza (2002) and Desai (2005) worry about, but continue to seek out and attempt to use different collective action frames as appropriate in their efforts to collaborate.

Lyshaug (2006) describes the following question as a crucial and ongoing problem for feminists: "How can feminists acknowledge and accommodate important differences among women without giving up the unity on which feminism's viability as a political movement depends" (78)? She reminds us that notions of difference and solidarity in transnational feminisms constitute well-trodden ground, but that feminist

theorists tend focus their attention on theoretical and ethical dimensions of these questions with comparatively less focus on what activists are actually *doing*. Thus, my findings are particularly important insofar as they reveal activists' discursive strategies for dealing with this central dilemma that she and others have posed.

As I conclude, let me also say a word about the scope of this analysis. Although I speculate about the efficacy of particular types of frames in overcoming intramovement differences, based on the empirical material at hand, I stop short of making concrete assertions on this point. My data do not enable me to assess the outcomes of utilizing particular frames over others, but rather to document the uses of frames (as they relate to difference) in key transnational spaces at a certain moment. In order to craft a valid argument about outcomes, one would need systematic, comparative evidence of the influence of the various frames in minimizing or transcending differences among activists, collected at more than one point in time; this might take the form of interviews with activists about their interpretations of and reactions to organizational framing, or surveys of organizational leaders about their understandings of framing in transnational spaces and of its effectiveness in remedying differences.

My primary interest has been to capture the language being used by activists, assess the ways in which they are using such language, and draw out insights based on these dynamics. In this spirit, I have demonstrated that: a) feminists and women's activists working in transnational spaces express acute awareness of previous movement fragmentation, as well as contemporary sources of division; b) they also express a desire to work through divisions in a way that acknowledges and respects, but is not paralyzed by, movement differences; c) they are using particular types of frames in their efforts to

promote solidarity; and d) these frames share certain characteristics. It is my hope that future research will use methodologically appropriate strategies to pursue questions of frame effectiveness not only in terms of its consequences for mobilization, as has so often been studied, but also for transcending differences in the service of transnational solidarity.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, I have undertaken three interrelated analyses of framing dynamics within the contemporary transnational women's movement. Utilizing a feminist methodological perspective and multiple methods of data collection and analysis, I have generated theoretical and empirical insights relevant to the literatures in social movement framing (especially frame variation), transnational social movements, and feminist theory. In the sections that follow, I review the key findings of my analyses, highlight the most significant scholarly contributions, and offer suggestions for the direction of future research.

Key Findings of the Dissertation

I began my investigation in chapter 4 with a content analysis of publicly available mission and vision statements of a representative sample of transnational feminist networks (N=31). My analysis yielded a comprehensive overview of common framing practices among TFNs, and demonstrated substantial heterogeneity among the diagnostic, prognostic, and identity frames employed by the organizations. Prognostic frames were more common than diagnostic or identity-based frames, and of the prognoses offered, those that were rights-based, liberal political, or that dealt with capacity-building occurred the most. The most visible point of divergence appeared in the form of moderate/reformist frames versus radical frames, particularly in terms of economic

forces. This finding laid the groundwork for chapter 5, an examination of factors that lead groups to utilize more radical frames, or frames that challenge hegemonic ideas.

In chapter 5, I utilized qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) on the same representative sample of TFNs to assess the organizational-level determinants of a particular aspect of frame variation, response to hegemonic ideas. I demonstrated the nuanced ways in which organizational resources, structure, and identity converge to influence a TFN's decision to challenge hegemony in its framing. The simultaneous presence of neutral funding sources and an oppositional identity was the most consistent predictor of challenging rhetoric. I also found that the causal configurations tended to look different for "only challenger" organizations than they did for "hybrid" organizations; organizations that only challenged hegemony tended toward low professionalization/institutionalization, while organizations that challenged *and* harnessed hegemony were highly professionalized.

Finally, in chapter 6, I employed participant-observation methods in transnational spaces to investigate how frames are being used among feminists and women's activists as discursive tools in their efforts to manage intramovement differences and build solidarities. I found that diagnostic frames ("anti" frames), rights-based frames, and internally focused frames (i.e., capacity-building and movement process frames) were all utilized by activists in their attempts to create a sense of shared struggle. Each of these frames is able to encompass a wide range of issues and is not confined to particular issues or locales. Additionally, these frames were often deployed in conjunction with acknowledgements of intramovement differences and/or references to diversity as a movement strength.

Theoretical, Empirical, and Methodological Contributions

The findings of my analyses have theoretical, empirical, and methodological implications for researchers of framing, transnational activism, and for feminist theorists. I now discuss the major contributions in turn.

First, my research design responds effectively to need for cross-cultural and comparative work on social movement framing. In shifting away from the case study method that is so commonly employed in studies of framing, I have been able to compare data across organizational cases (social movement organizations in the form of transnational feminist networks), thus enabling greater confidence in conclusions that are generalizable to other transnational social movements. This constitutes a significant strength of the study.

Second, my findings demonstrate convincingly that we cannot homogenize social movements, particularly transnational social movements. This is a theme that emerged in chapter 4, but carried throughout each of the analyses. There are important, consequential differences among movement activists and organizations, not all of them ideological or identity-based. Some of these differences, for instance, are rooted in funding sources and organizational structure. These differences manifest and converge in complicated ways to influence organizational framing strategies, and likely other types of movement outcomes as well. Taking such differences into account in studies of social movements presents some methodological challenges, but holds potential that is worth pursuing.

Third, the findings of both chapters 5 and 6 push prevailing assumptions about how regional identities exert influences on movement framing strategy and solidarity.

Regional identities are undoubtedly still important, but perhaps in more nuanced ways than current scholarship reflects. Many previous analyses of transnational feminism have, I argue, oversimplified the roots of disconnection by relying too heavily on identity/politics of place to explain intramovement disparities and tensions (e.g., Desai 2007). My study shows that social movement organizations possess identities and compositions that are increasingly transnational in nature, and that physical office location may be increasingly irrelevant.

The dynamics among feminists in the transnational spaces of the FD and WSF suggest that strategic concerns, specifically around the mitigation of difference and promotion of solidarity, play an equally important role in movement framing practices. We cannot pursue our research as if North-South differences are the only sources of tension, and therefore the only sources worthy of analysis. Other differences, such as those discussed in chapter 6, may be equally consequential. Moreover, we must recognize that there are numerous differences *among* women and organizations in the global South. As writer/activist Jessica Horn argued at the 2007 FD, the North-South dichotomy has been stripped of some of its utility, for there is a North in the South and a South in the North (Hewitt field notes 1.19.07).

A fourth major contribution of my research deals with the relevance of material differences among social movement organizations. Bandy and Smith (2005) write that, “Often, activists and scholars have left unexamined the inequalities among movements in an emerging global civil society and the ways these inequalities affect the capacities of transnational alliances to meet the needs of groups whose interests don’t readily mesh with those of Northern activists” (11). While I would caution against their narrow

understanding of such differences as occurring primarily along North-South lines, I wholeheartedly echo their comments about unexamined inequalities. The findings in chapter 5 reveal that the sources and levels of movement organizational resources play a significant role in shaping discursive strategy, which in turn has multiple implications for other aspects of movement strategy, development, and impact (Johnston and Noakes 2005; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; Snow 2004). My analysis convincingly demonstrates the continued need for the resource mobilization perspective in the study of social movements, and suggests that scholars should pursue further investigation of the relationship between structural/material and cultural dynamics.

Finally, my study has revealed important insights, generally, about the influence of meso-level factors on the strategic framing decisions of movement organizations. This constitutes a significant intervention because it pushes the scholarly conversation on framing strategy that has, up to this point, remained mostly at the macro-level.

Limitations of the Project

Despite the substantial contributions of the project, there are some challenges and problems worth mentioning. First, my study has not explicitly addressed the relationships *among* movement organizations, either theoretically or methodologically. Inter-organizational dynamics, both positive and negative, may well play a constraining role in organizational framing strategies, and may also specifically shape how activists think about and address intramovement differences.

Also potentially problematic is the fact that I focus on transnational networks as the unit of analysis. I excluded from my sample any organizations that work solely or

primarily at the local, regional, or national levels, and therefore my claims are only valid for a particular type of transnational social movement organization. On a related point, I only analyzed one type of organizational text in chapters 4 and 5, the mission statement. Therefore, the validity of my claims may not extend to other types of publications and venues.⁸⁴

Additionally, some of the findings in chapter 5 are incomplete because the causal order of the relationships remains unclear (e.g., between resource level, funding sources and challenging hegemony). As I mentioned earlier, using QCA with this particular cross-sectional dataset did not enable me to flesh out with certainty questions of time order. A longitudinal research design that included data at multiple points in time would remedy this issue.

Another limitation of my research is that I do not explore how changes over time, not only in meso-level characteristics of movement groups (such as changes in funding sources), but also in broader contextual circumstances (such as changing political or economic environments), may influence the framing of TFNs. While my original project proposal included a plan to examine temporal variation in addition to cross-sectional variation, the laborious nature of data collection prohibited such investigation at this time. I intend to build longitudinal variation into my dataset in the future, which would address some of the issues raised here. In fact, many of these limitations could be addressed effectively through additional research with particular types of designs. I now discuss some of these promising possibilities.

⁸⁴ I actually collected far more data than I was able to analyze with the time and resources available. For most of the organizations in my sample, I also have a wide range of newsletters, press releases, position papers, etc., and hope to utilize them in my future research.

Future Research

I have alluded already to several opportunities for further research, in particular the need for deeper understandings of intramovement differences and their consequences, as well as the need for more careful examination and nuanced explanations of regional identities within transnational movements. But there are several other points worth mentioning.

First, the relationship between organizational funding sources and framing is worthy of significant attention. Particularly intriguing are questions about causal order: Do organizations who receive funding from sources associated with hegemony shy away from radical rhetoric because they are afraid of losing their funding? Or do organizations who are already radical choose to avoid such funding sources intentionally? There is good reason to suspect that both dynamics are at work, but more research is needed to flesh this out. Also of interest is the need to further differentiate types of foundation funders from one another. It may not be the case that a relatively small funding organization such as the Global Fund for Women exerts constraints in the same way that a huge, well-established and highly resourced foundation such as the Ford Foundation does. Some types of foundations may in fact view themselves as part of the movements they fund, while others may understand themselves only as outside supporters. Such differences are likely to have consequences on the strategic decisions of movement organizations, including framing.

The evidence presented in chapters 4 and 5, when juxtaposed with that of chapter 6, reminds us of the constraints presented by different venues for framing activity. While the data examined in chapters 4 and 5 were extracted exclusively from public

organizational statements, the data in chapter 6 were taken from a venue that is both less public and more interactional in nature. Diagnostic frames referencing neoliberalism and militarism were far more prevalent at the Feminist Dialogues and World Social Forum than they were in the public mission statements of TFNs. Analytical endeavors that simultaneously take into account the multiple possible influences on frame variation, including organizational-level characteristics, but also variation in venue and historical context, would be immensely useful. Meyer and Staggenborg (2007) affirm the importance of such studies, arguing for the necessity of research that focuses not solely on any single set of causal factors, but rather includes multiple factors at once. In future work, I intend to extend my dataset longitudinally while maintaining my consideration of meso-level causes in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of organizational framing. This is particularly fertile ground for future empirical research, as it would enable the simultaneous comparative examination of the role of shifting political and discursive contexts, past strategic decisions, venues and audiences, inter-organizational relations, resources and structure, as well as identities in shaping movement framing.

Furthermore, as scholars continue to pursue research on the efficacy of collective action frames in different settings, research designs should attempt to encompass both successful and unsuccessful instances of frame usage. While we have a number of solid studies of the impact of framing on movement outcomes such as mobilization and policy change, the impact of framing on solidarity is less clear. We may assume that frames accomplish such work, often because we find co-occurring evidence of frame usage and

the presence of solidarity, but in order to illuminate a causal relationship with any confidence, there must be more rigorous comparison across frames and cases.

Although the concept of collective identity has not played a significant role in my study, the findings of chapter 6 suggest an opportunity to engage further with this literature. Della Porta and her colleagues (2006) point out that, due to the immense heterogeneity of global movements, an analysis of framing activity in those movements is especially useful in “investigating the building of a transnational social movement through the symbolic construction of the collective identity” (62). This brings us to an important point about the relationship between framing, solidarity, and collective identity. Hunt and Benford note that solidarity and collective identity are “conceptually distinct,” but “intertwined” (2004). They define solidarity as “the ability of actors to recognize others, and to be recognized, as belonging to the same social unit,” and as an “identification with a collectivity such that an individual feels as if a common cause and fate are shared” (439). Such articulations are quite consistent with the ways in which feminists and women’s activists express their own understandings of and desires for solidarity. Collective identity, on the other hand, refers to a “shared sense of ‘we-ness’ and ‘collective agency’” (Snow 2001). Certainly, efforts to build solidarity are part and parcel of collective identity construction, but the diversity of the transnational women’s movement reminds us that collective identity is often not based on traditional understandings of identity, in the ascribed sense (e.g. race or gender), but rather on a broader, more abstract set of commonalities and connections.

Recently, Einwohner, Reger, and Myers (2008) have argued that “identity work” within movements can range from being virtually no “work” at all (e.g., music festivals)

to being an arduous task for movement actors, depending on the conditions. As my evidence demonstrates, identity work in the transnational movement of and for women holds particularly difficult challenges for numerous reasons.⁸⁵ Attempts to create “sameness” within the transnational women’s movement carry risk in that, to some, such efforts have the potential to erase differences all over again. My data indicate that activists are quite wary of this possibility; hence, we see their attempts to construct solidarity based on common enemies (e.g., neoliberalism), common values (e.g., commitment to human rights), and common ways of working (e.g., movement-building). Thus, we might expect that many efforts on the part of other transnational movements to create solidarity would take this form; the immense intramovement differences among transnational movement actors may require it.

⁸⁵ Note that in using the term “identity work” I do not confine my interest to those frames that explicitly reference identity (e.g., feminist), but rather the broader set of meaning negotiation that takes place around constructing the “we” within a movement. Included in such negotiations are frames that offer different ideas about movement enemies, goals, and strategies (Jasper and Polletta 2001).

APPENDIX A

World Social Forum Seminars and Workshops Attended⁸⁶

2004

“Experiences in Organizing Garment Workers.” 17 January, B32, 9-12 noon. Organized by the *Centre for Education and Communication (CEC)*.

“LGBT Alternative Strategies to Exclusionary Globalization.” 17 January, A6, 9-12 noon. Organized by *LGBT South-South Dialogue*.

“A Dialogue Between Various Movements on Sexuality Issues.” 17 January, Hall 2, 1-4 p.m. Organized by *Rainbow Planet*.

“Changing Faces of Dowry.” 17 January, A16, 5-8 p.m. Organized by *Vimochana*.

“Gender and Permanent War.” 17 January, B34, 5-8 p.m. Organized by the *Rosa Luxemburg Foundation*.

“The Many Faces of Fundamentalism.” 18 January, A7, 9-12 noon. Organized by *Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN)*.

“Education for Inclusion: A Gender Perspective.” 18 January, B50, 1-4 p.m. Organized by the *Gender and Education Office of the International Council for Adult Education*.

“Networking for Women’s Human Rights: A Workshop on Collaboration for Activists, Scholars, Policy Makers, and Donors.” 18 January, C75, 5-8 p.m. Organized by Brooke A. Ackerly, Vanderbilt University.

“A Dialogue Between Movements: Breaking Barriers and Building Bridges.” 19 January, Hall 3, 9-12 noon. Organized by the *National Network of Autonomous Women’s Groups, DAWN, AFM, and WICEJ*.

“Overcoming the Public/Private Divide.” 19 January, A9, 1-4 p.m. Organized by *APRODEV-ICCO*.

“Overcoming Gender-Based Violence in the Private Sphere.” 19 January, A11, 5-8 p.m. Organized by *Bread for the World*.

⁸⁶ In some cases, there is more than one session listed for a given time slot. In such cases, I attended only part of each session. Reasons for this include: 1) when a session ended early and I decided to attend another for the remainder of the slot, and 2) when I found a session to be poorly organized, not well attended, or otherwise unproductive, and thus chose to go to another session for the remainder of the time slot.

“Sex Selection: the Hidden Femicide.” 19 January, B31, 5-8 p.m. Organized by *Vimochana*.

“Women in Conflict and Peace Building.” 20 January, C100, 9-12 noon. Organized by *ActionAid Rwanda*.

“Honour Killings.” 20 January, A10, 1-4 p.m. Organized by the *All India Democratic Women’s Association*.

“Sexuality, Nationalism and Fundamentalism.” 20 January, C73, 1-4 p.m. Organized by *PRISM*.

“Gender Justice and Globalisation.” 20 January, C79, 5-8 p.m. Organized by *Gana Unnayan Parshad*.

2007

“Sponsorship, Scholarship, and Human Rights Activism: Building Bridges and Fostering New Leadership.” 21 January, 11:30-2 p.m. Organized by *The Human Dignity and Human Rights Caucus & the Global Feminisms Collaborative*.

“Gender Equality May Finally Arrive: UN Reform Brings New Hopes.” 21 January, 2:30-5 p.m. Organized by *The Women’s Environment and Development Organization*.

“Scholar-Activists and the World Social Forum Process.” 21 January, 5:30-8 p.m. Organized by *AlterUQAM and the International Network of Scholar-Activists*.

“Revolutionizing Women’s Consciousness.” 22 January, 8:30-11 a.m. Organized by *Sociologists for Women in Society*.

“Citizenship: Democracy, Retribution, and Rights.” 22 January, 11:30-2 p.m. Organized by *Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era*.

“Women Under Occupation in the Arab World.” 22 January, 2:30-5 p.m. Organized by *Women Network*.

“Campaigning Experiences of the Grassroots Movement to End Female Genital Mutilation.” 22 January, 2:30-5 p.m. Organized by *Equality Now*.

“Human Rights Assembly.” 22 January, 2:30-5 p.m. Organized by the *Human Dignity and Human Rights Caucus*.

“Adapting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the Needs of Women and Girls from Different Communities.” 23 January, 11:30-2 p.m. Organized by *Women’s Global Network for Reproductive Rights*.

“Social Forum for Sexual Diversity.” 23 January, 2:30-5 p.m. Organized by *LGBT South-South Dialogue, World March of Women, and Via Campesina*.

“Controversy Dialogue on Fundamentalisms and Anti-Globalization Alliance Building.” 23 January, 5:30-8 p.m. Organized by *FEMNET and the Feminist Dialogues Coordinating Group*.

“Human Rights and Academic Activism.” 23 January, 5:30-8 p.m. Organized by *Sociologos sin Fronteras*.

“Feminist Movement Building.” 24 January, 11:30-2 p.m. Organized by *Articulacion Feminista Marcosur, INFORM, FEMNET, WLUML, and others*.

APPENDIX B

Co-Occurrences of Frame Categories Among the Sample of TFNs

Name of Organization	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
African Women's Development and Communication Network (FEMNET)				X	X	X	X	X	X
Asian Women in Cooperative Development Forum			X	X	X		X		
Association for Women's Rights in Development		X	X		X	X	X	X	X
ASTRA - Central and Eastern European Women's Network for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights			X		X	X	X		
Coalition Against Trafficking in Women	X	X	X			X			
Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era	X	X		X		X	X		X
Equality Now	X		X	X	X	X			
European Women's Lobby		X	X		X	X	X	X	
Family Care International						X		X	
Global Women's Strike	X	X		X				X	
GROOTS International (Grassroots Organizations Operating Together in Sisterhood)							X	X	
Indigenous Women's Network						X		X	
International Gender and Trade Network	X			X	X		X		X
International Network on Gender and Sustainable Energy			X	X			X		
International Women's Rights Action Watch - Asia Pacific			X		X	X	X	X	
Isis International - Manila	X	X			X		X		X
Latin American and Caribbean Committee for the Defense of Women's Rights		X			X	X	X		X
Network Women in Development Europe	X		X		X	X			X
Pacific Institute for Women's Health					X	X	X		X
PeaceWomen Across the Globe	X	X			X		X	X	

Name of Organization	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
RAINBO - African Partnership for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights of Women and Girls					X		X		
Vital Voices Global Partnership			X	X	X		X		
Women for Water, Water for Women (WfWfW)		X	X	X	X		X		
Women for Women International		X		X		X	X		
Women in Black (WIB)	X	X						X	X
Women in Europe for a Common Future (WECF)				X			X		
Women in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing	X		X	X			X		
Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children			X			X		X	
Women's Global Network for Reproductive Rights (WGNRR)			X			X	X	X	
Women's Learning Partnership			X			X	X	X	X
World March of Women	X	X		X		X	X	X	X

Key for Column Numbers (Frame Categories):

1 – Economic Diagnosis

2 – Systemic/Institutional Diagnosis

3 – Institutional Prognosis

4 – Economic Prognosis

5 – Liberal Political Prognosis

6 – Rights-based Prognosis

7 – Capacity-building Prognosis

8 – Movement Process Prognosis

9 – Identity Frame

APPENDIX C

QCA Results for Challenging Hegemony (excluding “feminist” and “multi-issue” conditions)

Configurations Producing Challenges to Hegemony	Cases in Configuration
1. FUND NEUTRAL * high resource * un * NON-NORTH * institute	4 (GWS, WIB, WMW, PWAG)

A measure in all capitals indicates its presence; a measure in lower case indicates its absence. An asterisk indicates *and*; a plus sign indicates *or*.

This model produced only one configuration (inhabited by 4 cases, as shown above), but had 12 contradictions.

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