

"WE SWEAT AND TOIL": SELF-INTEREST, LABOR, AND THE POWER OF THE
PEOPLE IN EARLY AMERICAN POLITICS, 1607-1692

By

Kevin S. Vanzant

Dissertation

Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Vanderbilt University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

in

History

August, 2013

Nashville, Tennessee

Approved:

Daniel H. Usner, Jr.

Catherine Molineux

Jane G. Landers

Dana D. Nelson

Copyright © 2013 by Kevin S. Vanzant
All Rights Reserved

For Eve, Henry, and my Parents

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
DEDICATION.....	II
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. "WHERE EVERY MAN SEEKES HIMSELF, ALL COMMETH TO NOTHING": THE TRIUMPH OF SOCIAL ORTHODOXY IN THE EARLY ENGLISH COLONIAL LITERATURE.....	27
III. "NOTHING MORE PLEASURABLE THAN PROFIT": SELF-INTEREST, INDUSTRY, AND A NEW APPROACH TO OLD PROBLEMS IN THE MID- CENTURY VIRGINIA PROMOTIONAL LITERATURE.....	68
IV. "ANY WHO WILL BE INDUSTRIOUS, MAY LIVE COMFORTABLY HERE": THE LIBERAL LANGUAGE OF EMPIRE IN THE LATE STUART PERIOD.....	120
V. "WEE ADVENTURED OWR LIVES FOR IT": MIGRATORY AMBITIONS AND THE POLARIZATION OF COLONIAL POLITICS IN EARLY MARYLAND.....	162
VI. BY "VOICE, AND VOTE, AND CONSENT OF THE <i>WHOLE PEOPLE</i> ": THE NEW ENGLAND REBELLION OF 1689 AND THE CREATION OF "THE PEOPLE" IN EARLY AMERICA.....	214
VII. CONCLUSION: THE POLITICS OF "PEOPLING" THE NEW WORLD.....	263
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	273

INTRODUCTION

"We Sweat and Toil" is a study of the origins of early American political thought and argues for a more expansive approach, both chronologically and methodologically, to our understanding of colonial politics. Most studies of the political history of early America begin with the end of the French and Indian War. In this well-known telling of Anglo-American history, the debts accrued by England in fighting to secure their Atlantic holdings left the home government in dire need of new sources of revenue, which led it to implement a series of new taxes on the colonies. These imperial acts redefined the relationship between colony and metropole, one that, from the perspective of the colonists, newly encroached upon the political power and autonomy of colonial leaders. The change in imperial policy was vital to the emergence of a uniquely American political thought because it forced colonists to justify their claims to political authority and to explain their role and place within the empire. Political thought in America, or at least its formal articulation in print, has thereby been understood as being largely reactive, pushed into existence by imperial actions. Given the concentrated nature of this brief gestational period of American political thought, historians have examined these years in microscopic detail and have identified the key issue as one of ideological origins, giving rise to two distinct versions of the politics of the Revolution, one liberal and the other republican. In the "republican thesis," the classical politics of virtue dominated American political thought, which explained the fears, goals, and governing solutions of

the rebelling colonists.¹ The republican interpretation of the Revolution has been highly influential, peaking in prominence in the 1970s and 80s, but never fully succeeded in supplanting the older "liberal thesis." Historians have continued to find evidence that liberal ideas of rights, property, and consent were central to Revolutionary ideology.² The importance of this debate in understanding early American political thought, however, is connected to and largely dependent upon the particular periodization that posits its creation in the late eighteenth century.³

A new, revisionist approach to the study of early American politics has emerged that is intent on expanding its chronological parameters. The pioneering voice in these

¹ For the classic account that captures the older "liberal" thesis, see Carl Becker, *The Declaration of Independence: A Study of the History of Political Ideas* (New York: Knopf, 1942). On the republican challenge to the "liberal" explanations, see Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1967); Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969); and J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). For a direct attempt to downplay the importance of Locke in Revolutionary politics, see John Dunn, "The Politics of John Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century," in John Yolton, ed., *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). The 1970s and 1980s marked a high point for the influence of republicanism in the historiography of the late English empire and early United States. A prominent article in the 1990s, though, exposed the broad and sometime vacuous definition of the term that become prominent with its rising popularity and criticized its often excessive application. See, Daniel T. Rodgers, "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept," *Journal of American History* 79, no. 1 (June 1992): 11-38. Michael Winship has attempted to test with the falloff of the use of the term "republican" in the historiography with modest, but still largely indicative results. See fn. 2 in "Godly Republicanism and the Origins of the Massachusetts Polity," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd series, 63 (Jul., 2006): 427-462. For an argument pushing for more specific definition of the term, see, Blair Worden, "Republicanism, Regicide, and Republic: The English Experience," in *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage*, ed. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 307-308.

² For the liberal response to the "republican" thesis, see Joyce Appleby, *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Thomas Pangle, *The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Paul Rahe, *Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); Steven Dwoletz, *The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Revolution* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990), and Yuhtaro Ohmori, "The Artillery of Mr. Locke": *The Use of Locke's "Second Treatise" in Pre-Revolutionary America, 1764-1776* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 1988).

³ See Michael Zuckert's "amalgam" thesis in his *Natural Rights and the New Republicanism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 164-166. For a recent account of the debate and where it stands, see Alan Gibson, *Understanding the Founding: The Crucial Questions* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2007).

efforts has been Craig Yirush and his recent work on the roots of American political theory.⁴ A key piece of evidence for Yirush and the revisionist position is the set of instructions given by the Massachusetts General Court in 1762 to its London agent, Jasper Maudit, one year before the French and Indian War had reached its conclusion. The instructions were complex and offered numerous justifications of colonial rights. Clearly influenced by Locke's *Second Treatise*, the instructions referenced the "natural rights" of all British subjects as well as "of all humankind" and laid claim to the liberty "of all men" to live free from any arbitrary power. Beyond a claim to "natural rights," they also pointed to their allegiance to the sovereign, which they argued did not dissipate over long distances, so neither should the various privileges that accompanied their birthright as Englishmen. And finally, the instructions put forth an additional argument, appealing to the economic "interest" of the Nation, which they argued would be best served by the continuing grant of certain liberties to the English colonists.⁵ For Yirush, the colonial position in 1762, as reflected in these instructions, was too sophisticated for this to have been its first iteration. This document, he claims, even falls outside of the standard chronological parameters of most studies of early American political thought and is proof of a developing colonial political theory far earlier than 1763.⁶

The complex justification of colonial rights in 1762 was the result of numerous battles between colonial elites and English officials that preceded the French and Indian

⁴ Craig Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early American Political Theory, 1675-1775* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 1-26.

⁵ On the language of "interest" and its prevalence by the end of the seventeenth century, see Alan Houston and Steve Pincus, "Introduction. Modernity and later-seventeenth-century England" and Pincus, "From Holy Cause to economic interest: the study of population and the invention of the state," in Houston and Pincus, eds., *A Nation Transformed: England and the Restoration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1-19; 272-298.

⁶ Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire*, 4.

War. As early as the 1660s, for instance, the crown was pressuring the leaders of Massachusetts to adjust some of their political practices in ways that the local leaders considered to be violations of their charter. The 1680s witnessed revocations of several charters and the creation of the Dominion of New England, and in the early 1700s, the crown launched multiple attacks against the charters of the private colonies.⁷ These challenges to local authority within the empire encouraged colonial leaders to develop tactics and formulate rationales to secure their political power. The political thought on display in Jasper Maudit's instructions had a long history in early America, as colonists constructed complex legal and constitutional defenses of their political rights.⁸ All of

⁷ On these late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century attacks of colonial charters, see , David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Robert M. Bliss, *Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); Michael Winship, "Godly Republicanism and the Origins of the Massachusetts Polity," *William and Mary Quarterly* 63 (2006), 427-462; J.M Sosin, *English America and the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II: Transatlantic Politics, Commerce, and Kinship* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980); Michael Hall, *Edward Randolph and the American Colonies, 1676-1703* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960; Richard Dunn, "Imperial Pressures on Massachusetts and Jamaica, 1675-1700," in Alison G. Olson and Richard M. Brown, eds., *Anglo-American Political Relations, 1675-1775* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970), 52-75; John C. Rainbolt, "A New Look at Stuart 'Tyranny': The Crown's Attack on the Virginia Assembly, 1676-1689," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 75 (1967), 387-406.

⁸ On literature on the colonial of a constitutional argument is extensive. See Barbara Black, "The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 124 (1976), 1157-1211 and Charles Mcllwain, *The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation* and Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986) and Greene, "John Phillip Reid and the Reinterpretation of the American Revolution," in Hendrick Hartog and William E. Nelson, eds., *Law as Culture and Culture as Law: Essays in Honor of John Phillip Reid* (Madison, WI: Madison House, 2000). For an overview of the literature, see Greene, "From the Perspective of Law: Context and Legitimacy in the Origins of the American Revolution," in Greene, ed., *Interpreting Early America: Historiographical Essays* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1996). On the English common law in the seventeenth century, see J.G.A. Pocock, *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957) and Glenn Burgess, *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Legal and Political Thought, 1603-1642* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992).

these important political arguments would play a major role in the political thought of the Revolutionary period.⁹

"We Sweat and Toil" extends Yirush's revisionist agenda even further back into the history of English colonization. Even with the revisionist approach, colonial historians have been reluctant to include the politics of seventeenth century America. Yirush's study of early American political theory, for instance, begins with the imperial interventions that would lead to the Glorious Revolution in America in 1689. Interestingly, the logic of starting with the rebellions of 1689 is actually quite similar to the rationale for beginning in 1763. In 1685, James II embarked on a series of innovative and aggressive attacks on colonial charters, similar in effect to the ones enacted after the French and Indian War, which forced the colonies to defend their liberties in a more direct way than had occurred previously.¹⁰ The revisionist position agrees, then, that this process gave rise to a colonial defense of their political rights in America, but argues for a longer period of its development. Understanding imperial policies as the crucial spark to the creation of these political and ideological developments in America is limiting, however, and largely excludes the possibility of its emergence before 1689. But throughout the seventeenth century, internal political disputes within the colonies often resulted in broad commentaries on the empire and the rights and contributions of the colonists. As long as imperial support of a governing regime was crucial to the maintenance of power in the colonies, which was the case throughout the seventeenth

⁹ Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire*, 1-26.

¹⁰ For analysis of the Glorious Revolution and early example of the colonial position of English rights, Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America*; Jack M. Sosin, *English America and the Revolution of 1688: Royal Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982); and Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire*, 51-80.

century, then factions contending for power would often search out that support by formulating their place within a larger colonial vision. These types of local disputes were not dependent on the imperial measures of the 1680s and were possible far earlier than 1689.

The dissertation examines these "local" political tracts within the broader context of political ideas present in the extensive colonial literature of the seventeenth century, much of which has escaped the attention of political historians. The seventeenth century saw the development of an expansive and growing literature on America in the form of promotional literature. The publication of these tracts ebbed and flowed for individual colonies depending on various circumstances, but they constituted a specific genre of literature.¹¹ The authors of the promotional tracts wrote about everything from the ecology to the political organization of the colonies, but most importantly, for the sake of effective advertisement, they debated and discussed the various means of colonial success. Although not usually treated as "political" texts, these authors, in claiming that a particular colony would prosper in the future, had to think seriously about the social and political conditions that would most effectively indicate to potential migrants the future prospects of a colony. This task inevitably led these authors to tackle the politics of the colonies and the rights of individuals within the empire.

When the colonists pursued their "English Rights" in America, for instance, in 1689, the colonial promoters had already been writing and debating about the role of elected assemblies in America. Since the founding of Jamestown, they had debated the effects on empire of representative government in the colonies. By 1689, the political

¹¹ On the idea of the promotional literature as a cohesive genre, see, Catherine Armstrong, *Writing North America in the Seventeenth Century* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 17-20.

trajectory of early English colonization was becoming increasingly clear, as every attempt at autocracy in America had failed to bring about a prosperous colony. The promoters understood this and by the end of the century began to incorporate, almost without exception, the idea of elected government into their vision of a sustainable and expanding empire. So when the colonists protested for their rights in 1689, they did so within a wider colonial discourse that had established a close connection between local rights and empire. This project operates from the premise that both sides were fully capable of formulating a compelling constitutional case, either for or against the extension of "English Rights" to America.¹² The project is less concerned with the legal legitimacy of their political arguments than with how both sides attempted to situate their political demands within the most compelling vision of empire.

The ideas on colonization that were developed and promulgated in the promotional literature would offer the colonists a powerful justification for representative government in America and provide a new context for our understanding of colonial politics in the seventeenth century. Political studies of early America have long embraced a transatlantic approach.¹³ Carla Pestana's recent synthesis of politics of the

¹² See Barbara Black, "The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 124 (1976), 1157-1211.

¹³ On the Atlantic approach to colonial studies, see essay collection, David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), especially Armitage's essay, "Three Concepts of Atlantic History," 13-29. See also Bernard Bailyn, *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Nicholas Canny, "Writing Atlantic History: Or Reconfiguring the History of Colonial British America," *Journal of American History*, Vol. 86 (Dec., 1999), 1093-1114; Steve Sarson, *British America, 1500-1800* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005); and Alison Games, "Whose Atlantic History?," *International Journal of Maritime History* 13 (2001), 198-203 and "Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities," *American Historical Review*, 111.3 (2006): 741-757. For a stilly largely laudatory but increasingly critical examination of the Atlantic approach, see Jack P. Greene and Philip D. Morgan, eds., *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). See especially Trevor Burnard's essay, "The British Atlantic," 111-136, and Peter Coclanis's essay in support of a more global approach, "Beyond Atlantic History," 337-350. For a

English Atlantic during the revolutionary years in England, for instance, has underscored the constant interactions of center and periphery and the insufficiency of studying the colonies without highlighting these connections.¹⁴ In her analysis of the colonists' political agenda during this period, she reiterates the contention that has dominated this approach to colonial politics, ever since David Lovejoy's foundational study of the "Glorious Revolution in America." Lovejoy argued that the colonists pursued their political rights through identity, laying claim to a "shared Englishness" and its attendant liberties, including, most importantly, the right of representative government.¹⁵ This approach is thoroughly transatlantic and vital to our understanding of the colonial position throughout the seventeenth century, but has limited our understanding of these

recent circum-Atlantic approach to the history of early America, see Daniel K. Richter, *Before the Revolution: America's Ancient Past* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011).

¹⁴ Carla Pestana, *The English Atlantic in the Age of Revolution, 1640-1661* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).

¹⁵ See David Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1972). On its continuing influence of his study on the colonial historiography, see Richard R. Johnson, "Empire," in *A Companion to Colonial America* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003). For its influence on more recent interpretations, see Pestana, *The English Atlantic*, 157-182; James Horn, *Adapting to a New World: English Society in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 334-380; Horn, "Tobacco Colonies: The Shaping of English Society in the Seventeenth Century Chesapeake," in *The Oxford History of the English Empire, Vol. 1* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 170-192; Natalie Zacek, "A Death in the Morning: The Murder of Daniel Parke," in *Cultures and Identities in colonial British America*, eds. Robert Olwell and Alan Tully (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2006), 223-243; and Zacek, *Settler Society in the English Leeward Islands, 1670-1776* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For important transatlantic studies of colonial politics in the seventeenth century, see Richard S. Dunn, "The Glorious Revolution and America," in *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise and to the close of the Seventeenth Century*, vol. 1 of *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford, 1998), 445-66; Richard R. Johnson, "The Revolution of 1688-89 in the American Colonies," in *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact*, ed., Jonathan Israel (Cambridge, 1991), 215-240; Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981); Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America*; Jack M. Sosin, *English America and the Revolution of 1688: Royal Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982); Phillip S. Haffenden, *New England and the English Nation, 1689 - 1713* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974); Alison Games, *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in the Age of Expansion, 1560-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Stephen Saunders Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (New York: Knopf, 1994); and Ian K. Steele, *Warpaths: Invasions of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

debates. From this perspective, imperial policies pushed against a static conception of English rights in America, which the colonists clung to for a variety of social and economic reasons. This approach has trouble, however, accommodating any evidence of a progressive agenda on the part of the colonists. Pestana points to the upward mobility possible in the colonies and the lack of sufficient social credentials for many leading colonists, but fails to integrate this fact into her analysis of the rhetoric of "English Rights" in America. Pestana's struggle to integrate the ambitions of the colonists into the rhetoric of their political demands reflects a larger problem in the historiography, which this project seeks to overcome. Through the lens of the promotional literature and the promises of empire, this project reverses the prevailing approach by emphasizing empire, not in eighteenth century terms as a threat to colonial liberties, but as a potential avenue in the seventeenth century towards more political freedom. The colonists would argue for "English Rights" through the workings of empire as they had come to be defined by the colonial promoters. This changed perspective on empire redefines both the origins of American political theory and the full implications of the colonists' political rhetoric going forward.

The dissertation is organized into two parts. The first (chapters 1 – 3) examines how colonization came to be defined and understood in the colonial literature by the end of the century, and the second (chapters 4 – 5) analyzes how these definitions came to play an important role in the political debates in the second half of the century. The first section focuses on the promotional literature of the English colonies. Throughout the century, almost every colony embarked on significant promotional campaigns to

advertize their respective colonies.¹⁶ These campaigns varied in scale and duration. The Virginia Company, for instance, launched an aggressive publication campaign for early Virginia, which included short advertisements by the company, often in the form of broadsides, numerous printed sermons dedicated to the colony, and firsthand accounts by individual settlers like the Reverend Alexander Whitaker and John Smith.¹⁷ The literature for New England in the 1630s was also expansive, while the promotion of Maryland during the same decade was much more modest. Pennsylvania, Carolina, and New Jersey would all embark on extensive promotional campaigns in the 1680s, leading to another high point in the colonial literature. Overall, the individual authors of these different texts were a diverse group. Many of these authors were religious figures, including the Puritan clergyman William Crashaw in Virginia, the Jesuit Andrew White in Maryland, and the renowned Quaker, William Penn, in Pennsylvania. Others were military men, like John Smith and Richard Rich in Virginia, or wealthy investors, like William Bullock of Virginia or George Scot in New Jersey, or even the proprietors themselves, like William Penn. And occasionally, the authors were of more humble background, like George Alsop in Maryland, who had arrived in the colony as an indentured servant. The large majority of these works would be published in London, but in the 1680s, these tracts would begin to have a wider reach, as some were published in Ireland, Scotland, France, and Germany. The backgrounds of the promotional authors and the populations that they targeted were varied, but the task before them was clear. They had to make the colony's future look bright and had to describe the political and

¹⁶ On this literature, see quantity and dissemination of this literature, see Armstrong, *Writing America*.

¹⁷ On the volume of promotional publications for Virginia and the other southern colonies, see, Hugh T. Lefler, "Promotional Literature of the Southern Colonies," *The Journal of Southern History* 33 (Feb., 1967), 3-25.

social arrangements in America that would make that future success seem most likely. They thought deeply about what exactly made the colonies work, how colonists would be involved in that process, and how this vision could be successfully conveyed in their writings. As often as these tracts are criticized for hyperbole in their descriptions of the New World and in their predictions of individual success, they had to integrate the demands and hopes of migrating colonists within a plausible and credible projection of societal prosperity.

Chapter One examines the promotional literature produced through colonizing efforts in Virginia, New England, and Newfoundland during the early period of English colonization. During these early years, Spain was the dominant power in the Atlantic World and archenemy of the English nation. English colonizers strove to achieve an empire in America that would both challenge this hegemony and stand in stark contrast to Spanish precedent.¹⁸ This different approach to colonization was as ideologically appealing to the English as it was necessary given the characteristics of the Atlantic seaboard and its Native peoples.¹⁹ As stories of Spanish atrocities circulated in England, English writers claimed that English settlers would pursue an honest commerce, courting only amicable relationships with the Indians.²⁰ This combined with the humanist

¹⁸ For a compelling argument about the importance for the early English colonial planner of distinguishing between English and Spanish imperialism, see Thomas Scanlan, *Colonial Writing and the New World: Allegories of Desire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 93-122. For reference to Spain as the "ultimate other" during the seventeenth century, see Karen Kupperman, "Forward," in *Envisioning an English Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World*, eds. Robert Applebaum and John Sweet Wood (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2005), xi.

¹⁹ For an expansive argument about the importance of environment and native peoples to the trajectory of the Spanish and English empires, see, John Elliot, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

²⁰ On the "black legend" and its popularity in England, see William S. Maltby, *The Black Legend in England: The Development of Anti-Spanish Sentiment, 1558-1660* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1971); Joseph P. Sanchez, *The Spanish Black Legend/La Leyenda Negra Espanola: Origins of the Anti-Hispanic*

predisposition of many colonial planners to help create a vision for the English empire that prioritized virtue, encouraging the colonists to be willing to sacrifice private interest for the higher ideals of religion, virtue, and the English Nation.²¹ For these authors, the potential wealth promised by the American environment was often perceived as a threat to the virtuous principles of English colonization, which could tempt settlers into self-interested behaviors, and led to a hyper-vigilance among colonial planners about the motives of migrating colonists. So worried about the opportunity for personal profit and selfish pursuits in the New World, for example, Robert Cushman delivered a sermon in the Plymouth in 1621, which was ultimately published in London the following year, and announced his intention in his title to "show the danger of self-love." For his sermon, he chose to analyze the verse from 1 Corinthians 10:24: "Let no man seek his owne, But every man another's wealth."²² The problem for the colonial promoter, the large majority of whom understood the broader appeal of this virtuous, anti-Spanish vision of English colonization, was that many also acknowledged that self-interest was a powerful motivating force for many people, making it a characteristic as tempting to the promoter as it was potentially hazardous to this imperial vision. Not surprisingly, there were

Stereotypes/Origenes de los estereotipos antihispanicos (Albuquerque: National Park Service, 1990); Charles Gibson, *The Black Legend: Anti-Spanish Attitudes in the Old World and the New* (New York: Knopf, 1971); and Eric Nelson, "Un-Sainting James: Othello and the 'Spanish Spirits' of Shakespeare's Globe," *Representations* 62 (1998), 58-100. On some of the contradictions that emerged between the anti-Spanish rhetoric and some English colonial policies, see Eric Smith's essay, "The Shadow of the Black Legend in John Smith's *Generall Historie of Virginia*," a commentary delivered as part of NEH Institute, *Texts of Imagination and Empire*, Summer 2000, http://www.folger.edu/html/folger_institute/jamestown-new/c_griffin.htm

²¹ On the importance of humanism in early English colonization, see Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Humanism and America: An Intellectual History of English Colonisation, 1500-1625* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Chapter 7 in Phil Withington's *Society and Early Modern England: The Vernacular Origins of some Powerful Ideas* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 202-231. Withington notes in his analysis of Irish colonization in the 1570s that the colonial endeavor "attracted humanists like wasps to a dollop of jam" (203).

²² Robert Cushman, *A Sermon Preached at Plimmoth in Nevv-England* (London, 1622), 1.

isolated efforts during this period to come up with a new conception of English colonization that would not be so threatened by the self-interested individual.²³ These efforts proved unsuccessful, however, because colonial promoters were unable to formulate an individual characteristic capable of displacing virtue as the building block of a healthy society. Without that sort of ideological development, unleashing self-interest was too cynical a promotional tactic for most colonial authors to employ because it portended a dysfunctional society and seemed, at the same time, to be embracing a Spanish approach to empire. This early period of colonial promotion thus ended with virtue and its perceived importance to the colonial endeavor maintaining its prominence in the literature.

Chapter Two focuses on the colony of Virginia and an important transformation that occurred in its promotional literature during the 1650s. Considered by many to have been a disappointment, if not a complete failure, Virginia's promoters sought a new path to prosperity in the colony. The end goals of the earlier promoters had not changed: these authors also wanted Virginia to court amicable relations with the Indians and to establish a diversified economy. The changing political circumstances in England gave many observers of the colony hope that the political organization of the colonies would be examined anew by the powers that be. Emboldened by the possibility of reform, there was an upsurge of literature on the colony during the 1650s that offered a new understanding of how colonization worked and how a colony would be successful. To make their claims, these authors applied an emerging economic ideology in England to circumstances in America. In mid-century England, a group of influential

²³ One prominent example is John Smith's *A Description of New England* (1616). Another less well-known example is William Vaughan's *The Golden Fleece* (1626).

Commonwealth supporters began to understand the world in increasingly commercial terms. For these writers, national power was determined by wealth, which was a result, not of natural resources, but of the industriousness of the population. Because they were convinced that self-interested motivations were a crucial spur to individual labor and economic activity, these authors were interested in challenging the perception of self-interest as destructive in nature.²⁴ This ideology was incredibly attractive to the colonial promoter. With self-interest connected to industriousness and industriousness crucial to the increase in societal wealth, self-interested pursuits were interpreted as acts beneficial to the larger common good. For the first time in the promotional literature, the colonial promoters could fully appeal to the self-interested motivations of potential migrants without jeopardizing their simultaneous claims to stable and lasting New World societies. The colonial promoters should be understood alongside the English economic thinkers from earlier in the century, as described by Joyce Appleby, and the Commonwealth thinkers at mid-century as another group of people particularly anxious to liberate self-interest from its negative connotations.²⁵ For the sake of more effective promotion, the Virginia promoters of the 1650s began to support this new conception of self-interest and its necessary protection through political rights. The result was an articulation and endorsement by colonial promoters of a liberal political economy in America as the best way forward.

²⁴ See Steve Pincus, "Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth," *The American Historical Review* 103 (June, 1998), 705-736.

²⁵ Joyce O. Appleby, *Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). Andrea Finkelstein has offered a critical view of Appleby's thesis, arguing that she has overstated the prevalence of these emergent proto-liberal ideas. See *Harmony and Balance: An Intellectual History of Seventeenth Century English Economic Thought* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

Chapter Three analyzes the colonial literature into the second half of the century and the widespread embrace of the benefits of a liberal political economy in America. During the early 1680s, three colonies – South Carolina, East Jersey, and Pennsylvania – embarked on significant promotional campaigns. Despite the wide variety of religious backgrounds and political dispositions of the various proprietary groups, the promotional literature, almost without exception, adopted the economic ideology of mid-century and its implications for society. The promotional authors emphasized the importance of labor, acknowledged, if not approved, of the role of self-interest in society, and promised powerful elected assemblies. These tracts were often penned by colonists in America, even if published abroad, and some even included letters from individual colonists to validate their economic and political recommendations. The literature reached a wider circulation than the previous promotional campaigns as well, with some tracts being published in Ireland, Scotland, France, and Germany, and the prose of these tracts was always intended to be accessible to a large portion of the population. The result was a widespread dissemination of an ideology of colonization that ceded great power to the industry of the settlers and great importance to the protection of their political rights. The colonists, if they needed to resist any effort at centralized power in America, would have a ready-made and cohesive ideology that connected their political liberties to a sustainable and prosperous empire.

The second half of the dissertation examines how these ideas came to play an important role in the colonial politics at the end of the century, especially in the colonists' pursuit of local government. Chapter Four examines an internal political conflict in

Maryland that occurred in 1676.²⁶ A group of colonists led a short-lived and thoroughly unsuccessful rebellion against Lord Baltimore, the proprietor of the colony. Shortly after its demise, however, a document surfaced outlining the rebels' agenda. These dissidents had hoped to gain the King's support for their rebellion through their past contributions and future importance to the colonial endeavor. They argued for their political empowerment in Maryland through the same language of empire that had risen to prominence in the promotional literature. They pointed to the vital importance of their labor to the colony's success, the continuation of which, they argued, required certain political rights. Baltimore responded with a different understanding of colonization, highlighting the contributions of wealthy investors and colonial proprietors, and contended that the important contributions of men like himself also depended on their political empowerment. This rebellion is an early example of how internal conflicts in the colonies and their politics became imperial in scope. As long as the approbation of English officials was vital to the maintenance of authority in the colonies, political power would find its most powerful justification in its connection to the empire. Both the colonists and Baltimore utilized colonial circumstances in an effort to augment their political power, and in the process, polarized the politics of the colony. The colonists' political position offers an important early example of how the economic ideology of

²⁶ Maryland experienced political crises throughout the seventeenth century. In the 1640s, the colony was plundered to an inch of its existence; in the 1650s, it suffered through a civil war; in 1658, there was an effort, which was briefly successful to deprive Baltimore of his governing power in the colony; in 1676 and 1681, there were attempted rebellions; and in 1689, there was the successful rebellion that cost Baltimore control of the colony. On the political instability in seventeenth century Maryland, see David W. Jordan, *Foundations of Representative Government in Maryland, 1632-1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and "Political Stability and the Emergence of a Native Elite in Maryland" in *The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century: Essays on Anglo-American Society*, eds. Thad W. Tate and David L. Ammerman (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 243-273.

mid-century could be mobilized by the colonists towards a justification of political rights abroad.

Chapter Five considers the imperial debates at the end of the century, examining the New England rebellion of 1689. Colonial leaders in Massachusetts protested the revocation of their charter and ultimately rose in rebellion against imperial officers shortly after the Glorious Revolution in England.²⁷ They, like the Maryland dissidents of 1676, sought royal approval and support for their actions through the same colonial vision. They argued for and elaborated on the full political implications of the liberal economic ideology. To highlight the importance of labor, for instance, they depicted America as a dangerous wilderness at the time of European discovery and solely the creation of settler labor. They argued that this labor had been encouraged through a "free and easy" government that rewarded self-interested pursuits and individual labor. A decentralized empire with local political rights, they contended, was a prosperous empire. This approach to colonization pushed the New England dissidents to begin theorizing about "the people" in New England as an idealized entity with an important role to play in government. The foundational acts of "the people" in New England that justified this depiction were their many contributions to colonization. In 1689, the New England colonists did not only resist imperial intrusions by claiming a common English identity and the extension of "English Rights" abroad, but proactively argued for their political

²⁷ The rebellion in New England is considered to be the most important colonial rebellion in what was a series of rebellions that have become known as the "Glorious Revolution in America." See Dunn, "The Glorious Revolution and America."

empowerment through a liberal economic ideology and a populist understanding of empire.²⁸

This dissertation argues that the conception of "English Rights," as important and omnipresent as it was in the imperial political discourse, has actually obscured the ideological complexity of colonists' political claims. As many historians have identified, the New England colonists repeatedly tried to associate themselves with the principles espoused by William III upon conquering England, arguing that the rights secured by the Glorious Revolution in England should be extended abroad. According to this analysis, the Glorious Revolution established the ideological basis by which the colonists pursued their own liberties.²⁹ But the ideological influences on the colonial position in 1689 were more numerous and varied. Ever since the beginning of English colonization, the colonies had raised fundamental questions about the proper relationship between the individual and society. The colonists made political claims in 1689, but they did so within longstanding political and economic discourses about colonial development. Approaching the colonists' defense of colonial liberties from the perspective of these debates throughout the century provides a different perspective on the events of 1689 and a more complex understanding of the claim of "English Rights" abroad.

By privileging the colonial history of the seventeenth century and the promotional literature in particular, this project integrates the aspirations of individual colonists into the developing political thought in the colonies. Jack P. Greene, in what he called the

²⁸ For one example of how colonists could define empire in a self-serving and beneficial way, see, Douglas Bradburn, "The Visible Fist: The Chesapeake Tobacco Trade in War and the Purpose of Empire, 1690-1715," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 68 (July, 2011), 361-386.

²⁹ See Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America*.

"most important element in the emerging British-American culture," defined the dominant conception of America during this period "as a place in which free people could pursue their own individual happiness and with a fair prospect that they might be successful in their several quests."³⁰ The idea that colonists sought to improve their lives through migration implies that they sought change. The vast majority of promotional materials supported this vision of colonization, which clearly suggests that something had to be offered to entice an individual to migrate. Many colonists and promotional authors questioned the sanity of anyone who would do so for any other reason. In his 1631 *Advertisements for the Unexperienced Planters of New England*, John Smith declared, for instance, a person to be "double mad that will leave his friends, meanes, and freedome in England, to be worse there than here."³¹ The ambition for an improved life had political, social, and economic implications, which were all interconnected. Lord Baltimore, for one, saw very little distinction between the separate categories. In his defense of the expansive powers allotted to him and his descendants in his royal charter for Maryland, he contended in 1653 that no man "that is well in his wits" would invest as much as he had in a colony and then give the people the "power to make Lawes to dispose of him, and all his estate there."³² It was clear, throughout the seventeenth century, that the colonists, or at least the ones who wrote about their motivations to participate in colonization, expected to gain in some way by their migration to America. To do so in

³⁰ Greene, *Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), quotation on p. 5.

³¹ Philip L. Barbour, ed., *The Complete Works of John Smith*, Vol. III (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 287.

³² Cecil Calvert, Lord Baltimore, *The Lord Baltemores case concerning the province of Maryland, adjoining to Virginia in America* (London, 1653), 10.

pursuit of something even approaching the status quo, would be, at least in the minds of most colonial writers, utter madness.

Despite the evidence of colonists' political ambitions, a counter narrative in the colonial historiography emphasizes colonial hopes, not for change, but to recreate the old world in America. Bernard Bailyn, in his recent work on early America, captures this contention with his description of the early migrants in Virginia, who sought in the "crude, stump-filled tobacco farms of this subtropical lowland, to re-create a world they had known."³³ The colonial political agenda of 1689 seemingly offers powerful support for the validity of this approach. Colonists like Increase Mather, echoing the language of Lord Baltimore and John Smith, laid claim to their "English Rights" in America: "No English men in their Wits will ever Venture their Lives and Estates to Enlarge the Kings Dominions abroad . . . if their reward . . . [is] to be deprived of their *English Liberties*."³⁴ This analysis, however, lends a static quality to the colonial political agenda. Imperial officers, like Edmund Andros, or colonial leaders, like Lord Baltimore or William Berkeley, pursued a governing power in the colonies that broke with English customs, which the colonists would resist, determined to have the same rights in America that they would have had in England. This pattern to colonial rebellion has been applied to political action across the seventeenth century. In his study of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia, for instance, James Horn has argued that the rebellion is best understood as an

³³ Bernard Bailyn, *The Barbarous Years: The Conflict of Civilizations, 1600-1675* (New York: Knopf, 2012), quotation on p. 83. Some of the more prominent works that stress the important impulse of English settlers to create in America what had been familiar to them at home include, David Grayson Allen, *In English Ways: The Movement of Societies and the Transferal of English Local Law and Customs to Massachusetts Bay in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Horn, *Adapting to a New World*; and David Hackett Fisher, *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).

³⁴ [Increase Mather], *A Vindication of New-England* (Boston, 1690?), 26.

effort by the colonists "to restore the traditional rights of Englishmen . . . conserving old liberties and defending the status quo."³⁵ The end result of this approach to political action in the colonies has been that both sides have specific and predictable roles. The imperial officers or the occasionally colonial leader pursued increased political power in America, while the colonists sought only the status quo.

This approach to colonial rebellion and early American political thought has been important and influential, but is partly explained by the available sources. Colonial leaders and imperial officers, men like Lord Baltimore and Edmund Andros, have left to posterity extensive writings, explaining their political ambitions and their particular colonial visions.³⁶ There are far fewer sources to work with concerning the political aspirations of the broader colonial population. For the Maryland rebellion of 1676, for instance, there is a single surviving document that speaks to the political aims of the rebels and their demands for an elected assembly. This is one reason why early American political thought, usually begins, either in 1689 or 1763, only when the colonial leaders were forced to respond publicly to newly aggressive imperial measures. Because these are the primary documents by which historians have interrogated early American political thought, the conservative nature of the colonial political position has been overstated. This lack of primary sources has helped lead to an assumption, which this project argues is a false one, that while almost everyone who wrote about

³⁵ James Horn, *Adapting to a New World*, 378.

³⁶ On the governing philosophy of the various Lords Baltimore, for instance, see Jon Krugler, *English and Catholic: The Lords Baltimore in the Seventeenth Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2004). On Edmund Andros, see Mary Lou Lustig, *The Imperial Executive in America: Sir Edmund Andros, 1637-1714* (Madison, NJ: Associated University Press, 2002).

colonization admitted a connection between migration and political empowerment, the colonists pursued only a predominantly static political agenda in America.

The promotional literature of the seventeenth century has a vital role to play in our understanding of colonial politics because it helps to fill this void in the historical record. For the promotional literature and its varying authors targeted an expansive audience, from the wellborn to the poor English subject. Any reasonable effort at promotional literature, to be successful, had to gauge correctly the desires of those considering migration and make plausible promises about the potential realization of those goals. Any good work of propaganda has to know its audience well.³⁷ And by the end of the century, the promotional literature unanimously promised representative government and the same suffrage limits that existed in England, even though wealth and land was within reach of a larger percentage of the population in the colonies. The emerging focus on industriousness appealed to the colonial promoter because it allowed those authors to integrate the settlers' aspirations from all ranks and backgrounds within a larger social vision of colonial success. Instead of the status quo, the promotional literature offers powerful evidence that the broader population sought change and political empowerment just as much as elite men like Baltimore and Andros.

From the perspective of 1607 and with the promises of the promotional literature in clear view, the rhetoric of "English Rights" becomes a political strategy to maintain the colonial rights that had been established through migration and to give what was new and different in America the legitimating guise of customary rights. The colonists,

³⁷ For a sophisticated analysis of propaganda and the importance of the audience in its successful construction, see Tim Harris, *London Crowds in the reign of Charles II: Propaganda and Politics from the Restoration until the Exclusion Crisis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 1-13.

throughout the seventeenth century, were constantly on the defensive about their social qualifications. English observers frequently heaped abuse on the colonial population, which functioned as an important justification for the denial of representative government in America. Lord Baltimore, for instance, in the same tract where he defended his governing privileges, accused the population in Maryland of being comprised of "such necessitous factious people as usually new Plantations consist of."³⁸ In the New England rebellion of 1689, Edward Randolph was accused by his opponents of labeling the colony's leaders as upstarts, accusing the "Faction" that resisted imperial authority as being men "of mean Extraction," the majority of whom migrated to the colony as "poor servant[s]."³⁹ Many colonial writers, throughout the seventeenth century, had grasped the social mobility inherent in the economic opportunities available in America. John Smith was not alone when he identified this facet of colonization, but was exceptional in his enthusiastic embrace of its societal implications. Smith boasted that in America, "every man may be master and owner of his owne labor and land . . . If hee have nothing but his hands . . . [he can] by industrie quickly grow rich." Smith argued that through the "pains & vertues" of hard work, people could become "Lords of the world," but through the "ease of vices" such as idleness, those same people would quickly fall back, becoming "slaves to their [former] servants."⁴⁰ The colonists then, with their assertions of "English Rights," were reacting to the imperial measures enacted by James II, but they were also justifying the social and political elevation made possible by colonization and foreseen by

³⁸ *The Lord Baltimore's Case*, 10.

³⁹ *An Appeal to the Men of New-England* (Boston, 1689), 13. For how these attacks on the credential of the colonial elite continued throughout the eighteenth century, see Michal Jan Rozbicki, *Culture and Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2011), 78-131.

⁴⁰ John Smith, *A Description of New England*, 27, 43.

Smith. And to do this, they relied on the same narrative of colonization that had risen to prominence in the promotional literature, focusing on the people in America and their essential role in colonization. The colonies had been created by the colonists, they argued, not by the contributions of wealthy proprietors like Lord Baltimore or the assistance and protection from the English crown. The empire had depended on their contributions and would continue to do so well into the future. Drawing on the same connections between industriousness, self-interest, and representative government, the dissenting colonists constructed an imperial vision where they had earned their "English Rights," not through their English identity because many in fact lacked the proper pedigree for elite status, but through their contributions to empire, both past and future. To establish and defend their local authority in the empire, the colonists had to create, develop, and rely upon a populist understanding of empire, establishing in the process a populist understanding of their own origins.

The social philosophy adopted by the colonists to secure their power in the empire was potentially much more radical than the immediate goal of achieving "English Rights" abroad. In his recent work on the Revolution in 1776, Michal Rozbicki has argued that the revolutionary leaders created the idea of "the people" to further their own political gains. He argues that in the process, they brought "the people" into the political process symbolically, which ultimately led to an empowered populace in actuality, ready to challenge the rule of the elite once the rebellion ended. For Rozbicki, "the people" in America was a late eighteenth century invention of the elite colonists, one in which the broader population, for which the term referred to, had little to do with their own

creation.⁴¹ But the idea of "the people" in America had a much deeper and richer history. The empowering conception of "the people" and their role in colonization that appeared in the political agenda of the Maryland settlers in 1676 and in New England in 1689 took its persuasive power from the colonial narrative that was emerging in the promotional literature during the seventeenth century. And the driving force behind this literature was the task of creating a plausible vision of the New World that would satisfy the demands of potential migrants. "The people" in America had helped to create themselves through the everyday demands of English settlers, who sought to leverage their decision to migrate into a better life in the colonies. The vision of a decentralized English empire, defined by the extension of "English Rights" abroad, made sense in 1689 because the actions of countless settlers throughout the seventeenth century had made it make sense.

"English Rights" and its mimetic implications have taken attention away from the attempts of colonial leaders to secure their privileges through an idealistic conception of "the people" and their role within the empire. Whether understood through a liberal or republican paradigm, this conception of "the people" in America would become the central characteristic of colonial political thought that would endure throughout the following century and would help both ideologies reach the same radical conclusions in 1776. The origins of this conception of "the people," so important in the Revolution and in the subsequent history of the United States, rests in the imperial history of the seventeenth century and in the settler communities that formed the early history of the English colonies. The characteristics of the people were first understood and defined in relationship to their roles within the English empire and their willingness to migrate to

⁴¹ Rozbicki, *Culture and Liberty*, 114-126.

the New World. The many challenges that accompanied English efforts at "peopling" the New World with English settlers eventually led, by the end of the century, to a particularly empowered conception of "the People" in America.⁴² This process began in 1607, not 1689, so this dissertation, in search of the roots of early American political thought and a better understanding of seventeenth century colonial politics, will begin with the first efforts by the English to establish their place in the wider Atlantic world.

⁴² On the challenges of "peopling" the English colonies, see, Bernard Bailyn, *Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1986); Alison Games, *Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Games, "Migration," in *The British Atlantic World*, 33-52; and Nicholas Canny, ed., *Europeans on the Move: Studies on European Migration, 1500-1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).

CHAPTER ONE

"WHERE EVERY MAN SEEKES HIMSELF, ALL COMMETH TO NOTHING": THE TRIUMPH OF SOCIAL ORTHODOXY IN THE EARLY ENGLISH COLONIAL LITERATURE

To bolster the finances of its struggling colony, the Virginia Company received permission by the king in 1612 to organize a lottery. Despite the fact that the lottery offered a new and much needed way to bolster the Company's coffers, the new fundraising method did not receive a warm response in the company literature. Virginia promoters often responded defensively to this method of raising revenues, admitting that the lottery was "no usual course in England" and acceptable only for the "most commendable actions."¹ The preferred model for raising money for the colonies was first to enflame individual concern for the common good and then to associate the colony with that goal. That sort of promotion attempted to inspire a person's better nature and then funnel that goodwill into the specific act of supporting the colony. The lottery operated differently and appealed predominantly to an individual's desire for personal wealth. The discomfort caused by this fundraising method highlights the prevailing anxieties about self-interest and society in early modern England.

A central challenge of colonization during this period that ushered in so much concern about self-interest in the colonial literature was the fact that the English colonies,

¹ Robert Johnson, *The New Life of Virginea*, E5 (1612).

to be successful, would have to become populous and permanent settlements. The Virginia promoters were selling a vision of community in the New World just as much as they were promising the possibilities of individual advancement. The contemporary social orthodoxy in England, however, and its condemnation of economic individualism limited their ability to sell a colony in both directions. The early promoters repeatedly chose community over self-interest and advertized their colonies in a thoroughly orthodox way, promising prosperous communities by way of virtuous colonists, who were always willing to sacrifice private gains for the larger good. Their rampant anxieties about the role of self-interest in colonies, however, combined with the isolated challenges to this orthodoxy by some authors indicated a close and unavoidable connection between self-interest and the colonial endeavor. The early writers would prioritize community in their advertisements for the colonies, which necessitated a vigorous opposition to economic individualism, but the temptation to appeal to self-interest in the colonial promotion was never fully vanquished.

This chapter situates these concerns about the role of self-interest in the early English promotional literature within the larger context of social thought and controversy in sixteenth century England. The first section examines some of the most virulent attacks in England on economic individualism in the form of agrarian complaints. These tracts established an orthodox interpretation of self-interest, establishing it as the central threat to social order in England. The second section turns to the early promotional literature for Virginia, New England, and Newfoundland and follows its commitment to a similarly aggressive indictment of self-interest and its destructive potential in the New World. The many opportunities for profit in America actually heightened anxieties about

the consequences of self-interested behaviors and resulted in a colonial promotion that resembled the agrarian complaint in its strident morality. The third section examines the few challenges to this approach in the colonial promotion and the failure of those authors to establish an acceptable alternative.

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the English began a series of initiatives to establish colonies in the New World. Pushed to the periphery of the Atlantic World by Spanish power, the English would first look to establish colonies along the eastern seaboard of North America or on the smaller islands in the Caribbean, such as Barbados in the Lesser Antilles or Providence Island, which was located much closer to the coast of Central America. Spanish power and wealth was dominant during this period, as Providence Island would learn in 1641 when the settlement was decimated by Spanish forces.² Raiding Spanish treasure ships had been a profitable business for England during the sixteenth century but, after peace was established in 1604, the English looked for a new way to establish their presence in the Atlantic. With the writings of Richard Hakluyt the Younger, the English would find their particular roadmap to success in the New World. In *Principal Navigations*, Hakluyt suggested that the English could diverge from the Spanish example of Native enslavement and the extraction of precious metals and build more complex economic settlements in the New World. The English could then turn a whole list of New World commodities into saleable goods that could

² On the history of Providence Island, see Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island, 1630-1641* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). On the early English experience in the Atlantic, see Kenneth R. Andrews, *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). For a comprehensive study of the connected history of the English and Spanish empires, see John Elliot, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

significantly bolster the English economy at the expense of its European adversaries. The Native Americans, he theorized, would embrace English culture and willingly provide labor for these endeavors as would the poor and underemployed in England.³ In England, where populations and prices were rising and "masterless" men were becoming an increasingly visible social problem, Hakluyt established the New World as the answer to these pressing problems.⁴

Hakluyt's call to colonize rested on a negative depiction of England's present circumstances. His plan was to bolster England's suffering economy through new production and to provide a home for its excess population. England's demographic and economic troubles were pushing men like Hakluyt to dream of an Atlantic empire, but the ideological tumult caused by the crises of the sixteenth century would not be so easily solved. Hakluyt assumed the easy creation of communities in the New World because of the availability of land and the presence of valuable commodities, but developments in England throughout the century had raised basic questions about what exactly sustained and created a community. English colonization and the attempt to establish stable and lasting communities in America would highlight, instead of solve, the ongoing struggle in England to define the proper relationship between the individual and society.

³ See Richard Hakluyt, *The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation* (1589). See also, Peter Mancall, *Hakluyt's Promise: an Elizabethan's Obsession with an English America* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007).

⁴ For the economic developments in early modern England, see Keith Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). On the social problems associated with "masterless men," see, A.L. Beier, *Masterless Men: The Vagrancy Problem in England, 1560-1640* (London: Methuen, 1985); Patricia Fumerton, *Unsettled: the Culture of Mobility and the Working Poor in Early Modern England* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); and Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution* (New York: Viking, 1972), 34-40.

During the sixteenth century, English society was changing in fundamental ways, which led to new questions about the relationship between the individual and society. Demographically, England's population was expanding dramatically as were the prices of basic commodities and the need for increased agricultural production. Whether predominantly cause or consequence of these changes, agricultural practices began to change: regions became increasingly specialized and landowners looked to maximize the productive capacity of their lands, most notably through the strategies of enclosure and engrossment.⁵ Enclosure quickly became the most prominent and symbolically powerful manifestation of agrarian change in England. The controversial nature of enclosure and its many critics led to a flourishing literature in the form of an agrarian complaint, which targeted changing circumstances in the countryside and looked back to an idealized past. The message of this literature in sixteenth century was clear: too many landowners had given into the sin of covetousness, and their behavior, spurred on by personal greed, would continue to destabilize and weaken English society if left unchecked. Publications in the style of an agrarian complaint would peak in influence during the Edward VI's reign, but its core message would become a "culturally authoritative orthodoxy" for the remainder of the century.⁶ There were, however, challenges to this understanding of enclosure and its condemnation of self-interest. In parliamentary debates at the end of the century, the renowned colonizer Sir Walter Raleigh put forth the most coherent

⁵ On enclosure, see Mark Overton, *Agricultural Revolution in England: The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy, 1500-1850* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Joan Thirsk, *Agricultural Change: Policy and Practice, 1500-1750*, vol. 3 of *Chapters from the Agrarian History of England and Wales, 1500-1750*, 5 vols., gen. ed. Thirsk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); John Chartres and David Hey, eds., *English Rural Society, 1500-1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and J.A. Yelling, *Common Field and Enclosure in England, 1450-1850* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

⁶ On the agrarian complaint in England, see Hal McRae, *God Speed the Plough: the Representations of Agrarian England, 1500-1660* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), quotation on p. 25.

challenge yet to this social orthodoxy. This dissension would ensure that, on the eve of England most substantial efforts to colonize the New World, self-interest and its role in society would constitute a prominent and contested issue in English society.⁷

The form of the agrarian complaint in the mid-seventeenth century was simple and its message inherently conservative. It idealized the past and interpreted change as a negative rupture in society, which was explained by the actions of covetous individuals. The complaint reached its peak in England as a literary form during the reign of Edward VI (1547-1553). Edward embraced a radical strand of Protestantism, which combined with the turbulent social and economic conditions of the 1540s to produce a virulent and potentially radical complaint literature. One of the leading figures involved in this movement was Robert Crowley, who was, either as author or publisher, involved in the publication of at least nineteen works of Protestant polemic from 1549-1551. In a prose pamphlet of 1548, he attacked the "possessioners" in England who ignored the effect of their actions on their neighbors and needed to "shew themselves through love to be brothers of one father & membres of one body wyth them." If not, he intoned, "they shall not at the laste daye enherite wyth them the kyngdom of Christe." In these writings, the community was understood as an organic whole or as a body politic, where all parts of that body had an important role to play. He elaborated on the metaphor of the body politic later in the text, when he compared the nobility to the head, shoulders, and arms and the peasantry to the legs and feet. Concerned about the mistreatment of the poor in society, he argued that "that body is far unworthy to have either legges or feete: that wyll

⁷ On the parliamentary debates that featured Raleigh's position on various land policies, see McRae, *God Speed the Plough*, 7-12 and Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities*, 209-211.

lette them goe bare, haveynge wherwyth to cover them."⁸ The metaphor of the body was such a helpful metaphor because it allotted specific functions to different body parts within a single system. This vision of English society imposed a strict moral code on the elite and the responsibilities of stewardship that accompanied their ownership of land.

Within the conception of society that dominated the complaint, enclosure, highlighted by the rise of the great sheepmasters at the beginning of the century, clearly represented an anti-social act. Opposition specifically to enclosure became almost an "independent subgenre of agrarian complaint" during the seventeenth century. The Edwardian protestant leaders put forth some of the most aggressive attacks against enclosure and the self-interest that they believed was motivating such actions. A royal proclamation of 1548-49 announced the establishment of the enclosure commission and noted: "all the land which heretofore was tilled and occupied with so many men, and did bring forth . . . divers families in work and labor . . . is now gotten, by insatiable greediness of mind, into one or two men's hands . . . and Christian people, by the greedy covetousness of some men, eaten up and devoured of brute beasts and driven from their houses by sheep and bullocks."⁹ For the opponents of enclosure at mid-century, the culprit was unanimously the moral sin of covetousness among the landholding class. The lower ranks in society were static and powerless victims in their understanding of the social forces at work. The problem allowed for an easy solution through personal reformation. If the individuals pursuing the enclosure of their lands would resist the temptations of personal gain and put the needs of the wider community first, then the problems plaguing the English countryside would quickly disappear. Hugh Latimer, the

⁸ McRae, *God Speed the Plough*, 23-75, quotations on pp. 38-39.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 50.

leading Protestant voice in the Edwardian reign and court preacher from 1547-1550, delivered a sermon in 1549, generally known as his "Last Sermon Before King Edward VI," that was dedicated to the issue of enclosure and began with the admonition: "Take heed & beware of covetousnes: take heede & beware of covetousnes: take heede & beware of covetousnes: take heede & beware of covetousnes." John Hales, a member of Parliament and leading supporter of the enclosure commission of 1548-9, put a similar emphasis on the destructive nature of self-interest: "everye man must use that he hathe to the most benefyte of his Countreie. Ther must be some thyng devysed to quenche this insatiable thurst of gredynes of men, Covetousness must be weded out by the rootes, for it is the destruccion of all good things."¹⁰ The attack against enclosure during this period was the agrarian complaint at its most vitriolic. The clear culprit was a greedy and misbehaving elite class.

This rhetoric embraced by the many Edwardian leaders had dangerous implications, which for many of its critics was fully evident with the popular rebellions of 1549. The rebellions often targeted the markings of enclosure, were anti-aristocratic in nature, and marked the most serious challenge to the social order in England since the Peasant's Revolt of 1381. The rebellions were quickly put down and order restored, and although some, like Latimer, continued in the same vein, the agrarian complaint in England would never reach the same rhetorical heights that it had in the late 1540s. The Elizabethan state retreated from the rhetorical excesses of the Edwardian leaders and preferred a more empirical and rationalistic approach to social and economic problems. The lack of any serious rural crises comparable to the 1540s helped maintain stability

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, quotation on pp. 45 and 50.

throughout most of the Elizabethan age but, from 1596 to 1598, England experienced a period of extreme dearth that resulted in alarming increase in the mortality rates for various communities across England. When political leaders gathered to address this crisis, the practice of enclosure would once again become a key issue in the debates in the House of Commons in both 1597 and 1601. Sir Francis Bacon expressed the government's desire to see the enclosure statutes reimposed and represented the new approach to resisting enclosure, arguing that "inclosures of groundes bringes Depopulacion, which brings .1. Idleness. 2 decay of Tillage, 3. subversion of howses adn decrease of Charitie, and charges to the poores mayntenance. 4. the Impoverishing of the State of the Realme." Bacon moved away from the intense moral focus on the sin of covetousness and laid out the specific social and economic consequences of enclosure. But while the tact of his argument was different, its central premise was not. The practice of enclosure to Bacon, just as it had at mid-century, represented the economic actions of individuals in pursuit of private gain to the detriment of the wider community. He bemoaned the depopulation of the countryside, for instance, that accompanied enclosure and regretted the likely consequence that "England instead of a whole Towne full of people, [would become] nought but Greenfeildes a Shepheard and his Dogg."¹¹ Although Bacon resisted the emotive language of the mid-century Complaint, another member of Parliament recalled that language and the conception of England as a body politic. He decried covetousness, declaring that "it is strange that men can be so unnaturall as to

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 9.

shake off the poore as if they were not part of the bodye" and conjured up the old image of England as a land "where sheep shall devoure men."¹²

The language of the complaint and the dictates of the moral economy occupied a powerful position in these debates, but they did face a measure of opposition. Henry Jackman, a London cloth-merchant, offered an uncertain and sometimes incoherent defense of enclosure. His posture was markedly defensive, which has been interpreted by Hal McRae as evidence of the cultural orthodoxy of his opponents' arguments, and he bemoaned that any person who opposed the bill immediately stood accused of taking "the use of the ploughe from the bowells of the earth, or the nourishment of bred from the bellyes of the poore." He argued against the complete vilification of self-interest, asserting that "men are not to be compelled by penalties but allured by profite to any good exercise." Sir Walter Raleigh supported Jackman's position through a broader understanding of England's economic circumstances. He cited the wide variety of regional specializations and the availability of goods through foreign trade as reasons not to limit the agricultural options of the landowner. "For my part," he asserted, "I do not like this Constraining of Men to Manure, or use the Grounds at our Wills; but rather, let every Man use his ground to that which it is most fit for, and therein use his own discretion." He claimed to have evidence of farmers who had made themselves "poor," for instance, by complying with the tillage laws. For Raleigh, the landowner was in the best position to decide the proper use of his land. He argued that "the best course is set [agricultural practices] at liberty, and leave every man free, which is the desire of a true

¹² Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities*, quotation on p. 210.

English man."¹³ Around the time he was making these arguments, Raleigh was actively pursuing enclosure on his properties in Dorset, and in the process forcing several tenants off his land.¹⁴

The debate over enclosure in 1597 and 1601 had put a spotlight on the nature of self-interest and its relationship to society. The older rhetoric may have won the day, as the enclosures statutes were continued, even if inconsistently enforced, but dissent had entered the political discourse. W.R.D. Jones has argued that these debates in Parliament at the turn of the century demonstrated that the "unity of belief concerning the type of society which it was the duty of the government to maintain had broken down."¹⁵ These debates occurred less than ten years before England would establish its first permanent settlement in the New World and provided a range of ideological possibilities for how the colonial planners and promoters would approach self-interest in the New World. Jess Edwards has recently argued in his study of early Virginia that America appealed to men like Raleigh precisely because they conceived of the land in the New World as "desocialized" space.¹⁶ To Raleigh, this may have been appealing, but to his opponents in Parliament, this prospect would have elicited the opposite reaction. In Francis Bacon's commentary on the English colonies in 1625, for instance, he may very well have had colonizers like Raleigh in mind when he observed that "the principal thing that hath been the destruction of most plantations hath been the base and hasty drawing of profit in the

¹³ McRae, *God Speed the Plough*, 11-12. See also, Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities*, 209-211.

¹⁴ McRae, *God Speed the Plough*, 14.

¹⁵ Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities*, quotation on p. 210.

¹⁶ Jess Edwards, "Between Plain Wilderness" and "Goodly Corn Fields": Representing Land Use in Early Virginia," in *Envisioning an Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World*, eds. Robert Appelbaum and John Wood Sweet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).

first years.”¹⁷ The intellectual challenges posed by enclosure would be transported to the New World. Those promoting colonization would have to project prosperous and stable communities in their efforts to attract people to the New World and, in so doing, they would have to weigh in on the current controversies in England.

In the first three decades of the seventeenth century, English began colonizing efforts in Virginia, New England, Newfoundland, and Barbados. All but Barbados would embark on aggressive publication campaigns to promote English colonization and their respective colony in particular.¹⁸ The vast majority of these authors characterized English colonization predominantly as a religious undertaking. With anti-Spanish sentiment cresting in England at the turn of the century, the presentation of English efforts in the New World as the polar opposite of Spanish efforts would, these authors believed, make for the most attractive characterization of the colonizing endeavor. The Black Legend had come to define Spanish imperialism for most English observers with its focus on Spanish exploitation and greed. The promoters of English colonization were intent on the English doing it differently. The English promoters targeted self-interest as anathema to the colonial endeavor and repeatedly stressed the importance of individual restraint in the New World. These efforts recalled the language and emphasis of the Edwardian agrarian complaint. In the initial efforts to define and promote English colonization, it was not the emerging language of individual rights put forth by Raleigh

¹⁷ Francis Bacon, *Of Plantations*, in *The Essays or Counsels, civill and morall*, ed. Michael Kiernan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 106.

¹⁸ On the complete absence of promotional literature for Barbados during the 1630s, see, Larry D. Gragg, *Englishmen Transplanted: The English Colonization of Barbados, 1627-1660* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Allison Games, "Survival Strategies in Early Bermuda and Barbados," *Revista/Review interamericana*, 22 (1992), 55.

and others that was deemed the best way to make colonization attractive to the English population but the heavily moralizing and communal rhetoric that had reached its peak in England fifty years prior.

There was a steady stream of colonial literature in England throughout the seventeenth century, but the period from 1607 to 1626 saw a significant upsurge in this production. Catherine Armstrong has tracked the production of colonial literature from 1607 to 1660 and has noted four peak periods of production, two of which, 1607 to 1610 and 1622 to 1624, occurred during the first three decades of colonization.¹⁹ The biggest factor in this increased production was the Virginia Company and its commitment to advertizing its colony in print. The Company's literary production ranged from short broadsides to learned sermons. Some of the authors of these works, like John Smith and Alexander Whitaker, had actually lived in the New World, while others, like John Donne and Edward Sandys, had never journeyed across the Atlantic. The individual authors and forms of the publications varied, but what did not, throughout the Company's existence, was its commitment to utilizing the printed word as key method for garnering support for the colony.

The Virginia Company was not alone in this belief. While the Company dominated in terms of volume, most colonies started during this period produced their own literature. The Bermuda Company, an offshoot of the Virginia Company, produced a few promotional tracts advertizing the colony. During the 1620s, the Plymouth Company in New England printed various sermons to describe and advertize their efforts. Throughout this period, there were various attempts to drum up support to colonize Newfoundland.

¹⁹ Catherine Armstrong, *Writing North America in the Seventeenth Century: English Representations in Print and Manuscript* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 175

William Alexander, who was connected to colonizing efforts in Newfoundland, branched out on his own and received a grant from the king to start a new colony just south of Newfoundland, to be called New Scotland. To this end, he not surprisingly published a tract on his plans and hopes for the colony. There were also publications, like Richard Eburne's *A Plaine Pathway to Plantations*, that wrote about all the English colonies, or authors, like John Smith, who wrote about various regions. Despite this variety, this genre, as Armstrong has argued, warrants being examined as "single body of literature." Despite the various voices, these works were all united by a common desire to "spread the word" about the New World.²⁰

The dominant characteristic of this literature across the various regions was its religious character. In a sermon in support of Virginia printed in 1609, William Symonds defined the fundamental rationale of colonization in biblical terms. Symonds told the story of Abraham and God's call to him to "goe into another countrey." For Symonds, God called Abraham away from his land and family to spread the knowledge of God to all nations. He wrote that God, in fact, "with-held some mercy from [his people], til all nations haue the meanes of falvation." "*The Heathen may knowe the Lord,*" he continued, so that God will "*be magnified, and sanctified, and knowne in the eyes of many Nations.*" That same call to Abraham, Symonds asserted, "doth binde all his sonnes, according to the faith, to goe likewise abroad." Symonds argued that this general calling to leave one's home and spread the word of God to new nations was as applicable in the early seventeenth century as it had been in Abraham's time.²¹

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

²¹ William Symonds, *A Sermon Preached at White-Chappel* (London, 1609), 9.

Symonds laid out the many rewards that God would bestow on individuals willing to enlist in such a risky and challenging endeavor. "*The Lord*," he asserted, "*doth promise to enrich him with many blessings, if he be obedient to his calling.*" These blessings were all encompassing, including both temporal and spiritual rewards: "In this blessing then are there all things, *having the promise of the life present, and of that which is to come, for this is the profit, is got by Godliness.*" Symonds twice rephrased the same point earlier in the text: "*God will blesse him, by giuing him the good things of this present world, and that which is to come*" and "*the Lord will blesse them, and cause them to prosper.*" God also promised fame to Abraham: "*I will be thine exceeding great rewarde, I will by thee doe fo greate things in a ftrange place, that thy name shall be remembred, as my name, which I shall put vpon thee.*"²² The rewards God gave to Abraham would be the same for the colonists who did God's work in Virginia.

The one requirement for God's blessing, however, was religious sincerity. The colonists "muft have a longing, and a liking to fspread the Gospel abroad." For Symonds, this could not happen by accident or by other motives, but only by a sincere desire to spread the word of God to new nations. In fact, God actually tested the purity of Abraham's motives by not telling "him whither he shall goe, to keep him fufpenfe" so that the "obedience of faith may the more effectually appeare." The "general calling" to spread God's word remained, and so did, for Symonds, the focus on the actions and motives of those called. Symonds warned the colonists not to test God in this manner: "you muft doe your diligence to walke in thofe wayes, by which the Lord doeth giue his blessings. You muft not with Idlenesse, inforce God to worke myracles of mercie on the

²² *Ibid.*, 26, 29, 4, 32.

wilfully sinful.” For Symonds, God’s assistance was necessary to this endeavor, and that assistance was dependent on the process as much as the results. If Englishmen migrated to Virginia for the wrong reasons, whether it be personal profit or “carnall pleasure,” God would turn his back on the colony. To succeed, the colonizing effort, as Symonds portrayed it, had to be fully dedicated to its religious purpose.²³

Within this godly framework of English colonization, self-interested individuals and actions would have to be avoided. The colonies either had to serve God or the larger good of England, but the motivation had to be greater than the individual self. In a printed sermon by William Crashaw in support of Virginia, he agreed with Symonds and intoned that “By [other activities] we may enrich our purses: but by this our consciences.”²⁴

The attacks on those people participating in the colonies for selfish or ungodly reasons were frequent and pointed. In a 1624 tract on New England, Edward Winslow opens with an introduction outlining the three main things that are “the overthrow and bane” of the colonies. The first reason on his list was “the vain expectation of present profit.” His third reason involved the low quality of individuals migrating to the colony, who “oft times . . . are rather the Image of men endued with bestiall, yea, diabolical affections, then the image of God, endued with reason, vnderstanding, and holiness.” These men were “too desirous of gaine” and ended up being “seekers of themselues” instead of pursuing the common good.²⁵ In a list of three reasons why the colonies were failing, the pursuit of personal gain accounted for two of the three. With the first, Winslow pointed to the pursuit of self-gain as its own entity and its destructive nature.

²³ Ibid., 8-9, 23, 37.

²⁴ William Crashaw, *A sermon preached in London* (London, 1610).

²⁵ Edward Winslow, *Good News from New England* (London, 1624).

With the third reason, he attacked colonial malefactors but explained their behavior by their willingness to pursue private gain over the interests of the common good. Reason one was the dangers of the pursuit of personal gain broadly stated and reason three was its real world consequences. Even though Winslow claimed to offer a list of three separate things that were tearing apart the colonies, the pursuit of private gain was his dominant concern.

In a sermon preached in New England in 1621 and published in 1622, Robert Cushman focused on the problem of self-love in the colonies and its potential solution. In his title, he claimed the purpose of demonstrating “the danger of self-loue, and the sweetness of true Friendship,” and in his epigraph, called the colonists to action: “*Let no man seeke his owne, But euery man anothers wealth.*”²⁶ Like Winslow, he located all the troubles of the colony in the sin of self-love. The “bane of all these mischeifes” in New England was that “men are cleauing to themselves, and their owne matters, and disregard and contemne all others.” He asked the New England colonists to “turne the streame another way” and “seek the good of your brethren.” To this end, he instructed them to treat self-love in their community like a dangerous “disease” and to seek out its root so that “it may be cured.” New Englanders needed to test themselves to see if they had become too attached to “riches and worldly wealth,” too unfamiliar with “hard labour,” and too sensitive to the “scornes” of worldly men.²⁷ A similar call was made the same year in a separate text, commonly referred to as *Mourt’s Relation*: “let every man repress in himself and the whole bodie in each person, as so many rebels against the common good, all priuate respects of mens selues, nor sorting with the generall

²⁶ Robert Cushman, *A Sermon Preached at Plimmoth in Nevv-England* (London, 1622), 1-3.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

convenience.”²⁸ The consequence of any action that put self in front of others, which a Virginia writer had earlier referred to as the “common corruption of time,” was the destruction of the colony.²⁹ For Cushman, the disease of self-love did not only infect the individual but reached out into the larger society: “This vein must bee pricked, and this humor let out, els it will spoyle all . . . and the contagion of it is such . . . as will hazard the welfare of that societie, where selfe seekers and self louers are.”³⁰ He applied this lesson specifically to New England, asserting that “one selfe-louer will weaken and disharten a whole Colonie.” An earlier Virginia pamphlet agreed with the larger threats of individual self-love: “*Priuate ends* have been the bane of many excellent exploits, and *priuate plots* for the gaine of a few, have given hindrance to many *good and great* matters.”³¹ With the general vulnerability of the colonies in their early years, the belief was that the colonists would have to be especially vigilant towards all possible threats. The primary danger that necessitated the most attention, however, was not the external menace of Spain or the Indians, but the internal threat of solipsism. The self-loving English colonist, not the savage native or the power-hungry Spaniard, appeared to Cushman and other promoters to be public enemy number one.

The colonial writers during this period often underscored their concern for the self-loving individual through analogy, comparing an egocentric individual to base farm animals and threatening beasts. Crashaw scolded those only willing to act on behalf of private motives and compared them to “sowes,” who “*wallow in the mire* of their profit

²⁸ Edward Winslow, *A Relation or Journal of the Beginning and Proceedings of the English Plantation Settled at Plimoth in New England* (London, 1622), 3.

²⁹ Robert Johnson, *Nova Britannia*, (London, 1609), 3.

³⁰ Cushman, *A Sermon Preached at Plimmoth*, 4.

³¹ Crashaw, *A Sermon Preached in London*, 16.

and pleasure.”³² Cushman utilized the same analogy in his sermon for New England: “Euen hoggs, doggs, and bruit Beasts know their own ease, and can seeke that which is good for themselues; And what doth this shifting, proggings, and fat feeding which some vse, more resemble then the fashion of hoggs?”³³ With this comparison to livestock, these authors focused on the individual’s own baseness and his/her fall from civility. Some authors chose the more threatening analogy of a beast to highlight not only the self-serving individual’s own lowliness, but his/her threat to the community as well. Robert Gray, in Virginia sermon from 1609, used this specific analogy in castigating those interested in Virginia only for personal profit: “we are not borne like beasts for our ielues.”³⁴ Cushman made explicit in his sermon the full implications of the comparison. “A man without naturall affection or loue,” he argued, is “transformed into a beast-like humor He is a beast in the shape of a man; or rather an infernall Spirit, walking amongst men which makes the world a hell what in him lieth.”³⁵ Better than a senseless livestock animal that could be easily contained, the comparison to a “beast” more accurately captured authorial fears about self-love in the promotion of the English colonies in America.

The colonial promotion was full of exhortations for the colonists to rid themselves of self-love for the good of the colony. Two Virginia publications from 1610 included separate calls to “let Religion be the first aim of your hopes” and to “disperse the clowd of avarice which darketh his spiritual sight.”³⁶ A Virginia sermon from the same year

³² *Ibid.*, 7

³³ Cushman, *A Sermon Preached at Plimmoth*, 8-9.

³⁴ Gray, *A Good Speed to Virginia*, (London, 1609), 7.

³⁵ Cushman, *A Sermon preached in Plimmoth*, 11-12.

³⁶ Anon., *A True Declaration* (London, 1610), 12; Anon., *A True and Sincere Declaration* (London, 1610), 6.

called for colonists to “cast aside all cogitation of profit, let vs look at better things,” and again in 1613, a promoter cautioned colonists to be “those that lightly esteeme riches.”³⁷ From 1622, a Virginia promoter asked the colony’s supporters to “let not the riches and commodities of the World, be in your contemplation in your aduentures,” and 1624, a New England author intoned that “every good subiect is bound to preferre the publicke, before his owne private good.”³⁸ Even given the dire need for English migrants during this period, the promoters discouraged contributions from those driven by the wrong motives. In 1622, a New England writer recommended that for those “who looke after great riches, ease, pleasure, dainties, and iollitie in this world . . . [he] would not aduise them to come here.”³⁹ A Virginia author was even more adamant: “If there be any that came in only or principally for profit, or any that would so come in, I wish the *latter* may neuer bee in, and the *former* out again. . . . If any that are gone, or purpose to go in *person*, do it only that they might liue at ease and get wealth; if others that *adventure their money* haue respected the same ends, I wish for my part *the one* in England again, and *the other* had his money in his purse.”⁴⁰ The author of *Mourt’s Relation* put it most succinctly: “*He whose liuing is but for himself, it is time he were dead.*”⁴¹ For an endeavor that needed support in people and money, it was an aggressive stance to take to resist any channel of possible contributions. For the early colonial promoter, however, encouraging that sort of support and participation would destroy colonization just as assuredly as an insufficient number of colonists would.

³⁷ Crashaw, *A Sermon Preached in London*, 16; Alexander Whitaker, *Good Nevves from Virginia*, (London, 1613), 8.

³⁸ Christopher Levett, *A Voyage into New England*, (London, 1624), 19, 31.

³⁹ Cushman, *A Sermon preached in Plimmoth*, 2.

⁴⁰ Crashaw, *A Sermon Preached in London*, 16.

⁴¹ Winslow, *A relation or Journal*, 27.

With failure resulting from human failings and success only coming through God's blessing, colonial writers worked hard to demonstrate God's support for the colonies. In the preface to Alexander Whitaker's *Good Nevves from Virginia*, William Crashaw laid out four occurrences that clearly demonstrated God's support for Virginia. The first three all had to do with the tempest and resulting shipwreck of 1609. The miraculous survival of the passengers, the even more miraculous discovery of Bermuda, and the timely arrival in Virginia to save a flailing colony were all interpreted as clear acts of God to save the colony. His fourth proof though did not depend on the shipwreck nor was it limited to any one colony. While some colonists pursued private gain and put the colonies at risk, the ones that supported the colony with no hope of "speedie profit" acted as proof of God's support for colonization. Crashaw had observed "able and worthy men . . . voluntarily vndergoe the danger of sea, and all the miseries and difficulties that necessarily and vndoubtedly attend a new plantation." For these individuals to have done this with a "very vncertaine hope of profit, and most certain danger of life it selfe" could only be explained, for Crashaw, by the "extraordinary motio~ of Gods Spirit." He listed names, like Thomas Gates, Thomas Dale, George Somers, and even the author himself, Alexander Whitaker, to prove this claim. These gentlemen, he argued, had "easie, pleasant, and wealthy liues in England" and could not be lured away from England simply by profit. By Crashaw's logic, they had wealth at home, so that could not be their motive in coming to the New World. As the pursuit of profit had been the most powerful threat to God's blessing, the willingness of many to subordinate personal profit was a clear indication of God's support. Crashaw asserted that anyone upon hearing this list for

the first time “would certainly change their minds, and say with [him], *Doubtlesse here is the finger of God.*”⁴²

As much as the colonial promoters disdained the pursuit of personal wealth, they had no problem asserting that wealth would be a rightful reward for their actions. In a single paragraph of text, Cushman moved through how this would happen. He argued that the colonists must first “settle religion here, before either profit or popularitie” and recruit “Godly men” over people with “wordly experience,” despite the pragmatic problems that may cause. To the colonists, Cushman maintained that with this policy even “though you lose, the Lord shall gayne,” and they will thus most “honour God” with their contributions to the colony. This godly focus though would have tangible rewards in this life. Their actions would be remembered for generations for the honor of the endeavor and God would reward their sacrifice in the next life, but there would also be material rewards in this life. “Your profit is comming,” he advised, “even in this life.” The colonists could expect their efforts to “be repayed again double & treble in this world.”⁴³ Robert Johnson, in his earlier work on Virginia, promised in the colony an “assured hope of gaine, but only if the profit was “not chiefe” in the colonists’ hearts.⁴⁴ The promoters promised profit to colonists, sometimes in grandiose terms, but it would be accomplished through divine means and approval. In a Bermuda pamphlet from 1615, the author put forth the same idea: “There is great hope that (by the blessing of God) men may in time

⁴² Whitaker, *Good Nevves from Virginia*, 5-6.

⁴³ Cushman, *A Sermon Preached in Plimmoth*, 3.

⁴⁴ R. Johnson, *Nova Brittania*, 5.

live very comfortably heere, and grow rich.”⁴⁵ William Crashaw laid out this process in detail:

*If in this action wee seeke first the Kingdome of God, all other things shall be added vnto us . . . If wee first and principally seeke the propagation of the Gospell and conuersion of soules, God wil undoubtedly make the voiage very profitable to all the aduentures and their posterities euen for matter of this life . . . there wants only Gods blessing to make it gainfull: now the high way to obtaine that, is to forget our own affections, & to neglect our own priuate profit in respect of Gods glorie; and he that is zealous of Gods glorie, God will be mindfull of his profit: and he that seekes only or principally spiritual things, God will reward him both with those Spiritual and temporal things . . . so though we do not intend our profit in this action, yet, if wee intend Gods honor, and the conuersion of soules, God will assuredly send vs great profit, which we may take lawfully and thankfully as his blessing.*⁴⁶

God would reward only the virtuous, but when that reward came, it would be large and fully commensurate with the sacrifice.

This overall narrative of the way to colonial wealth was so powerful when the authors discussed individual profit, they did so in a way that posited only a passive role to the individual. In the promotion of Virginia, one author claimed that if the colonists “bee honest, and painefull, the place will make them rich.”⁴⁷ Another wrote that for the colonists, “it is required at their hands that they be faithfull, painefull, and honest in their callings; for if they be thus qualified, the countrie itself will make them rich.”⁴⁸ This sort of unintentional “way to wealth” was more comfortable for the promoters given their concerns about private interest and selfish actions. In both cases, the “land” or the “countrie” replaced God as the acting agent and would make the colonists rich. If they

⁴⁵ Lewes Hughes, *A letter, sent into England from the Summer Ilands* (London, 1615), 5.

⁴⁶ Crashaw, *A Sermon Preached in London*, 16.

⁴⁷ Johnson, *Nova Brittania*, 9.

⁴⁸ Robert Gray, *A Good Speed to Virginia* (London, 1609), 8.

worked hard and were honest, wealth would be their reward, but importantly, as with the larger discourse on colonization, wealth should not be their goal. Even in discussing the individual, wealth only came by misdirection. The colonies were places where wealth would come but should not be pursued.

Colonial authors often approached the issue of self-gain on a large scale, but many were also happy to focus on the specific consequences of colonists who only eyed a quick profit. Robert Johnson, for instance, in his tract on Virginia from 1609, retold the story of the Roanoke colony, pinpointing a single instance of selfish economic behavior as the sole reason for its failure. As he told the story, the original plan for the colony included the scheduled landing of a supply ship from England in its second year. The initial settlers arrived in the colony with some success and survived the winter. The supply ship, however, did not show up the following year and forced the settlers to abandon the colony and return to England. Those in control of the supply ship for that year “turned their head another way, and with greedie minds, betooke themselues wholly to hunt after Pillage vpon the Spanish Coast . . . and . . . were not able . . . to make vp into the land to visit and relieue their friends.” In Johnson’s telling, that one moment of self-serving behavior wrecked the colony, and without it, Roanoke colony would have “long since become a most royall addition to the Crowne of England, and a very nursery and fountaine of much wealth and strength to this Kingdome.”⁴⁹

Robert Johnson later complained in a separate pamphlet about the lack of commitment from investors only interested in gain. In the *The New Life of Virginia*, he divided up all the investors for Virginia into three categories. One of these groups

⁴⁹ Robert Johnson, *Nova Britannia*, 3-4.

“looked for present gaine” and responded to any sign of trouble in the colony by “bidding it adiew, and neuer lookt after it more.” This group would not stand by the colony in its time of need. A separate group of adventurers would, however. Johnson heaped praise on the individuals who “have not ceafed to giue their counfels, spend their times, and lay down their monies . . . for effecting . . . fo great a worke for their King and Countries honour.” These men maintained their support of the colony through difficult times because they were focused on the bigger goals of colonization. Economic failures acted as little discouragement to these “constant adventurers,” who even “in the greatest disasters neuer fainted.”⁵⁰ In his earlier work on Virginia, he complained again about investors driven by “greedy gain” who will “flinke away with discontent, and draw [their] purses from the charge” if profits do not come in “presently to their expectation.”⁵¹ For Johnson, the right kind of Virginia adventurer was a supporter of the colony first and a financial investor second. The title “adventurer” simply meant somebody who invested money into the endeavor; a “constant adventurer” did it for the right reasons. These were the men that would make Virginia a success, while the others would fail the colony in tough times.

William Alexander published his *Encouragement to the Colonies* in 1624 to support the founding of New Scotland and expressed grave concern for how “avarice, and ambition” could ruin a colony. The Spanish colonies provided one such example. In pursuit of riches in the New World, the Spanish had been “drawing yearly a great number of *Negroes* from *Angola*, and other parts, which being but an vnnaturall merchandife, are bought at a deare rate, and maintayned with danger.” These slaves were always “hoping

⁵⁰ Robert Johnson, *The New Life of Virginea* (London, 1612), 21-22

⁵¹ Johnson, *Nova Britannia*, 5.

for better by a change” and would “Joyne with any strong enemy.”⁵² The Spanish had made a decision to maximize profit at the expense of the community, and the result was a colony always hanging on the precipice of disaster. Something similar had happened in Virginia. Alexander claimed the English colony could have attained to “great perfection” by now. The colony had already received enough suitable migrants, “who had no care but . . . how to build, plant, and plenifh in such fort as might best establishe a fortune for their Posteritie.” They were well on their way towards making “vp a new Nation.”⁵³ This progress had been stunted by troubles with the natives, but also with misguided direction from investors. In Alexander’s view, the investors in England had instructed the Virginia planters to produce only tobacco because they wanted a quick profit. They were “strangers” to Virginia and had “no care but how the best benefit may presently bee drawn backe from thence.”⁵⁴ In both these examples for Alexander, the decisions made in pursuit of immediate profit had placed the colonies at risk.

In his promotional tract for Newfoundland, Richard Whitbourne also provided examples of the pursuit of personal gain destroying the long-term sustainability of a colony. Giant stones were his big concern: “diuers of our Nation doe take into their ships very great stones, to press and dry fish withall; which work being done, they cast those stones into Harbors where their ships use to ride at anchor; which will utterly spoile the Roades and Harbors in that Countrey.” Dropping the stones in the water was the easiest way to dispose of them and did not hurt the immediate profit of the offending sailors. In the long term, this practice would destroy the accessibility of the coast line. These

⁵² William Alexander, *An Encouragement to the Colonies* (London, 1624), 163.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 192.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 193.

fishermen pursued immediate profit with no concern for the island itself. For Whitbourne, a plantation would solve this destructive economic competition by “the setting of some better order and government amongst the fishermen.”⁵⁵ Like Alexander, Whitbourne viewed the pursuit of gain as short-sighted and destructive, so even if it did not bring forth the wrath of God, it would ruin the colonies all the same.

Whether it was drastically conceived as the hand of God or more mundanely as a logistical mishap, the promoters of the early colonies viewed the pursuit of personal profit as destructive to the colonies. The vastness and perceived openness of the American environment to English settlement did not have the effect that Walter Raleigh hoped it would. In fact, it moved the pendulum in the opposite direction. The inchoate and undeveloped nature of the English colonies led to heightened concern about the destructive consequences of self-interested behavior. In one Virginia Company publication, the author claimed that “wicked” persons in England could be contained because they were “surfet, of an able, healthy, and composed body.” The colonies would not be so lucky; those same people “must needses bee the poison” of societies that were still “so tender, feeble, and yet vnformed.”⁵⁶ Not only were the infant colonies more susceptible than more established communities, they also potentially attracted the wrong sort of people. William Alexander talked about how men full of “avarice, and ambition” did hope to “transfere their fplene to forraine parts . . . where leaft harme was feared, and

⁵⁵ Richard Whitbourne, *Newfoundland, A Discourse and Discovery of New-found-land* (1622) in *Newfoundland Discovered: English Attempts at Colonisation, 1610-1630*, ed. Gillian T. Cell (London: Hakluyt Society, 1982), 158.

⁵⁶ Anon., *A True and Sincere Declaration*, 7.

most benefit expected.”⁵⁷ For the promoters, the colonies were potentially a magnet for the type of person that was most dangerous to the survival of a community.

The result was that the colonial situation in its earliest days did not free up economic individualism in the promotional literature, but led instead to an increased vigilance against such behavior. The rejection of self-interest in this early vision of English colonization was partly explained by the fervent desire of most English promoters to delineate English from Spanish efforts in the New World.⁵⁸ The widespread participation of humanist intellectuals and their emphasis on the classical conceptions of virtue and the common good was also a contributing factor.⁵⁹ But the opposition to self-interest also highlights the focus on community in early English colonization. The promoters had to convince potential migrants that a society would form and prosper in their respective colonies in order to attract sufficient numbers of migrants. The reputation of the New World as a place of expansive individual opportunities could not easily coexist with orthodox thought on community formation.

There would be a few important challenges to this vision of English colonization and its deprecation of self-interested actions in the New World. The fact that colonial societies did not exist but needed to be created posed a problem for a colonial promotion

⁵⁷ Alexander, *An Encouragement to the Colonies*, 160.

⁵⁸ For a compelling argument about the importance for the early English colonial planner of distinguishing between English and Spanish imperialism, see Thomas Scanlan, *Colonial Writing and the New World: Allegories of Desire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 93-122. For reference to Spain as the "ultimate other" during the seventeenth century, see Karen Kupperman, "Forward," in *Envisioning an English Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World*, eds. Robert Applebaum and John Sweet Wood (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2005), xi.

⁵⁹ On the important influence of classical humanism in the history of early Virginia, see, Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Humanism and America: an Intellectual History of English Colonisation, 1500-1625* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

intent on opposing self-interest. The agrarian complaint, for instance, was directed at an extant society with an idealized past, which made the proactive and innovative individual appear dangerous and disruptive. The colonial endeavor, in contrast, relied on proactive individuals to embrace change, leave home, and travel across the Atlantic. The colonial endeavor, by definition, could not be about stasis. The main objective of promoters was to encourage new activities and project societal development and progress in the colonies. In many ways, these colonial circumstances resembled the economic circumstances that were so important to the Scottish Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. David Hume, Sir James Steuart, Adam Smith, and the leading figures of that intellectual movement, after the Act of Union in 1707, became "painfully aware" of the "backwards, almost barbarous" state of their native society. In light of this observation, "improvement" became the order of the day and eventually led to their important reconsideration of the role of self-interest in society.⁶⁰ The same basic economic conditions were present in the colonies, and even within the wider colonial literature that disparaged self-interest, there was a frequent acknowledgement of how helpful it could be in attracting sufficient migration. In their examination of the Henry Jackman and Walter Raleigh's argument in Parliament at the turn of the century, Keith Wrightson and Hal McRae have both observed that the supporters of enclosure struggled in their arguments because they lacked "an acceptable oppositional language."⁶¹ The same obstacles existed for the few promotional authors who attempted to alter the dominant view of the relationship between self-interest and English colonization. These challenges

⁶⁰ For the Scottish Enlightenment and its relationship to economic conditions in Scotland, see, Michael Guenther, "A Peculiar Silence: The Scottish Enlightenment, Political Economy, and the Early American Debates over Slavery," *Atlantic Studies* 8 (Dec., 2011), 447-483.

⁶¹ Wrightson, *Earthly Necessities*, 209-210 and McRae, *God Speed the Plough*, 10-12.

would not overturn the prevailing approach to the promotional literature. Subsequent colonial efforts in New England, Maryland, and Providence Island would all promote and organize their colonies with similar concerns about the destructive capabilities of self-interest in America, but these early challenges reflected the pressure inherent in the colonial endeavor to push for a more permissive understanding of self-interest and the types of behavior that it encouraged.

Even within this colonial vision that was so strongly opposed to self-interested motivations, there were occasional admissions that selfish motives were indeed influencing some to participate in colonization. Alexander Whitaker in *Good News from Virginia*, a tract dedicated to countering any frustrations about the lack of early profit in the colony, admitted as much: “there may be some, that wish their money in their purses; it may be so, but for [each] base-thoughted man, I dare say we haue many, that wish a great deale more out of their purses.”⁶² William Crashaw was not so sure. He complained bitterly about the unwillingness of many to support Virginia despite the good that the colony would do, but if there was “certaine and present profit” in Virginia, these same reluctant investors would “run, and make meanes to get it.” If private profit was possible, he continued, “oh how they bite at it, oh how it stirres them!”⁶³ Robert Cushman lamented the same behavior: “even amongst professors of Religion, almost all the loue and fauour that is shewed vnto others is with a secret ayme at themselues . . . [they] labor hard so as all the profite may come to themselues, else they are harltesse and feeble.” He continued this indictment of human behavior: “men blow the bellowes hard, when they haue an Iron of their owne a heating, worke hard whilest their owne house is

⁶² Alexander Whitaker, *Good Nevves from Virginia*, 5.

⁶³ Crashaw, *A Sermon Preached in London*, 7.

in building, dig hard whilest their owne garden is in planting, but is it so as the profit must goe wholly or partly to others, their handes waxe feeble, their hearts waxe faint.”⁶⁴ Robert Gray, in 1609, complained that some “men must be vsed like sponges, they must be squeased . . . [or they] will yeeld to nothing, though It concerne the common good neuer so greatly.”⁶⁵ Christopher Levett made a similar complaint in 1624, claiming that “most men in this age respects their own profit 100 times more then the publicke good” and that some would actually restrain from doing “themfelves good” if it meant that “others shall have some [good] by it” as well.⁶⁶ In these criticisms of people drawn to colonization for the wrong reasons, they acknowledged, however reluctantly, the inherent attractiveness of self-interest to those promoting colonization. Throughout the literature, the authors constantly used the same phrase—to “stirre up” the people—to describe the impact that they hoped their writings would have, and that was exactly the power they ceded to private interests.

A few authors went beyond bemoaning the inevitable presence of self-interested individuals and actually attempted to appeal to that sort of individual. Two authors, Richard Whitbourne and most famously, John Smith, used the demands of colonization and the limitations of man as sufficient reasons to call on self-interest in colonial promotion. Both Smith and Whitbourne understood the colonies as beneficial to the greater good of England and attempted to attract people to the colonies by virtue, but in their texts, they directly confronted the limits of that appeal. John Smith famously proclaimed in his *A Description of New England*: “I am not so simple, to thinke, that ever

⁶⁴ Cushman, *A Sermon Preached at Plimmoth*, 5.

⁶⁵ Robert Gray, *A Good Speed to Virginia*, 7.

⁶⁶ Levett, *A Voyage into New England*, 35.

any other motive then wealth, will ever erect there a Commonweale.”⁶⁷ Richard Whitbourne’s promotional piece for Newfoundland in 1622 exhibited a similar realization. He dedicated the first part of his work to loftier claims of the colonies, arguing that Newfoundland was a “worke both profitable and necessary for his Maiesties Kingdomes in generall.” He concluded his work with a separate, smaller section, dedicated to showing the future colonists “what particular profit may redound to themselves.”⁶⁸ As John Smith had done before him, he explained this focus with a realistic assessment of man and his shortcomings, recognizing that the more magnanimous “affections and resolutions of men, doe sometimes freeze.” Whitbourne and Smith used the attraction of gain in the same way; they both hoped that “gain” would “affect that, which Religion, Charity, and the Common good cannot.”⁶⁹ Importantly, for Smith and Whitbourne, religion, charity, and the common good had been their first choices.

Both Smith and Whitbourne registered significant dissent against the larger vision of English colonization that had been adopted by the majority of colonial promoters, but its impact was limited. Historians have focused a great deal, in particular, on Smith’s isolated comment about appealing to self-interest and its importance to future developments in the colonies. Leo Lemay, for instance, has used that quotation as one

⁶⁷ John Smith, *A Description of New England* (London, 1616), 37. The literature on John Smith and his importance as a colonial author is extensive, much of it emphasizing and often overstating his impact on later promotional writers. For three prominent examples, see Karen Kupperman’s “Introduction” in *Captain John Smith: A Select Edition of his Writings* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 1-25; Stephen Innes’s chapter, “An ‘Honest Gaine’: John Smith, John Winthrop, and the Political Economy of Colonization” in *Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of Puritan New England* (New York: Norton and Company, 1995); and Mary Fuller, *Voyages in Print: English Travel in America, 1576-1624* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For an argument that the exceptional nature of Smith’s writings have been overstated, see Armstrong, *Writing North America*, 1-8.

⁶⁸ Whitbourne, *Newfoundland*, 164.

⁶⁹ John Smith, *A Description of New England*, 36.

piece of evidence in a larger argument about Smith's "proto-American" qualities, emphasizing his strident support of individualism in particular.⁷⁰ Smith's writings overall, however, indicate a far different and much more conventional understanding of self-interest. Kevin Hayes, for instance, has examined the entirety of Smith's published works and has argued that Smith's ideal colonist carried two crucial characteristics: the ability to work hard and the willingness to "help his fellow colonists unselfishly."⁷¹ Walter Woodward has analyzed Smith's extensive promotional efforts for New England and has arrived at a similar conclusion, arguing that Smith consistently emphasized the necessity that colonists be willing "to defer the demands of self-interest."⁷² Although Smith did anticipate the later promotional literature with his focus on the importance on industry and labor, he did not challenge the negative perception of self-interested actions and their corrosive effect on a community. His comment about self-interest is analogous to Henry Jackman's objection in the parliamentary debates to the reigning orthodoxy on enclosure. It represented an isolated moment of dissent against prevailing attitudes, but not a coherent oppositional position.

The most ambitious attempt to re-conceptualize how self-interest should be understood in the New World did not come from John Smith, but from the Newfoundland promoter, William Vaughan. Vaughan was a landed aristocrat in England, part-time poet, and supporter of colonization, who purchased a piece of land from the

⁷⁰ Joseph A. L. Lemay, *The American Dream of Captain John Smith* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1991), 224.

⁷¹ Kevin J. Hayes, "Defining the Ideal Colonist: Captain John Smith's Revisions from *A True Relation* to the *Proceedings* to the Third Book of the *Generall Historie*," *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 99 (Apr., 1991), 123-144, quotation on 130.

⁷² Walter W. Woodward, "Captain John Smith and the Campaign for New England: A Study in Early Modern Identity and Promotion," *The New England Quarterly* 81 (Mar., 2008), 91-125, quotation on 123.

Newfoundland Adventurers in 1616 and attempted to start a colony there as an individual proprietor.⁷³ As a part of his ultimately unsuccessful attempts to build a colony, Vaughan published *The Golden Fleece* in 1626, which dismissed the weighty morality of the earlier colonial promotion. This move was made possible for Vaughan by his willingness to reduce the colonies to their economic purposes and fully subordinate colonial society to its imperial function. The earlier writers had understood English colonization as an extension of English society and as a powerful symbol of the righteousness of English character and religion. For Vaughan, the colonies were not an extension of English society but an entity created and organized to bolster England's financial resources. The primary goal of wealth production changed the rules for the social organization of the colonies and allowed Vaughan to embrace self-interest in the New World.

Vaughan's *Golden Fleece* was unique in the promotional genre for its extended discussion of England's social problems. Like many colonial authors, including Hakluyt, he highlighted England's problems in an effort to underscore the necessary importance of colonization, but unlike many of these authors, Vaughan offered an extended discussion on what was causing England's deteriorating state. Part of the problem was the lack of colonization. England was falling behind other European countries like Spain and Portugal, who were extracting wealth from the New World in huge quantities. The bigger problem for Vaughan was internal, however. England was failing to colonize, but at the same time, it was also becoming more fractious and less productive internally.⁷⁴ In

⁷³ On Vaughan, see Peter Pope, *Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 51-54.

⁷⁴ William Vaughan, *The golden fleece diuided into three parts, vnder which are discovered the errours of religion, the vices and decayes of the kingdome, and lastly the wayes to get wealth, and to restore trading so much complayned of* (London, 1626), 3-4.

his explanation of why this was happening, Vaughan put forth a thoroughly conventional diagnosis that focused on the rise of self-interest in England and its social consequences. The social hierarchy was fraying, he maintained, because of the “proud affectation of men of Inferiour Rankes, who contrary to the Prescriptions of Ciuill Gouerment, following the example of *Lucifer* the Prince of Pride, had perked vp so high, that they wore gorgeous Garments, more glorious than *Princes*.” For Vaughan, no person or profession captured the rise of individual ambitions in England better than the legal profession. In former times, lawyers had “endeuoured by all meanes to establish Love and Charity among Neighbours, and were glad to heare those good newes of their Conuersions, though their Gaine came in the lesse.” Now, however, they put private ambitions ahead of public concerns: “All their mind runnes on *Gaine*. *Gaine* is their God . . . *Gaine* is their *Iosuah*, that governes their battels, and gives them superioritie and victory, not over the vncircumcised *Philistines*, but over their owne Brethren.” They even attacked the most vulnerable members of society as they “polish[ed] their wits, and with hired tongues goe about to defeat O[...]phans, Widowes, and other innocents.”⁷⁵ Lawyers, like so many individuals in England, were choosing selfish interests over the larger good of the community and the predictable consequence for Vaughan was a nation in decline.

Vaughan was clearly a proponent of the classical conception of virtue and its importance to society. In a separate work on Newfoundland, entitled *Quodlibets*, Robert Hayman dedicated a poem to Vaughan in conventional terms: “Your noble humor indefatigable, / More vertuous, constant yet, then profitable, / Striuing to doe good, you

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 76, 67, 73.

have lost your part, / Whil'st lesser losse hath broken some *Tradesmens* heart."⁷⁶

Vaughan's ambitions were greater than just the mere profit of the "Tradesman," and he hoped that his fellow countrymen would be similarly inclined. In a fictional scene from the *Golden Fleece*, a narrator presents to an English audience a persuasive case for how a colony in Newfoundland would save England. The response was dramatic: "the Auditors and standers by shouted for joy . . . [and] there were many *Ladies* which purposed out of hand to imitate *Isabella Queen of Castile*, in selling their Jewels, Rings, and Bracelets, for the furthering of this *Plantation and Fishing* . . . Great was the *zeale*, & and most hopeful for the *Charity* like to spring from this zeale, (for euery man prepared an auspicious *offring* for the gratulation of these ioyfull newes)." This was the appropriate response when a virtuous people were presented with an opportunity to assist the public good, but like so many other colonial promoters, Vaughan was disappointed with the difference between fiction and reality and was dismayed with the reluctance of the wealthy in England to support colonization. Instead of contributing to such a worthy endeavor, they remained "besotted with the lullabies of carnall ease, caring more for this worlds vanity, then for heauenly Blisse purchased by workes of *charity*." He attacked the selfishness of the elite in particular: "What a deale of *Plate* is there in *London*, and in rich mens houses, which some had rather goe directly into *Hell*, then to sell it for the common good." Throughout the *Golden Fleece*, Vaughan echoed previous sentiments about the power of profit to make people act: "There is no other way to draw money out of *misers* hands, but by hope of profit" and "nothing but *gaine* could moue the careless minds of

⁷⁶ Robert Hayman, *Quodlibets lately come ouer from New Britaniola, old Newfoundland Epigrams and other small parcels, both morall and diuine* (London, 1628), 51.

our *Islanders* to seek abroad for new habitations.”⁷⁷ For Vaughan, the lack of virtue and rising self-interestedness of the English people was responsible for both England's internal deterioration and its reluctance to pursue an external solution in colonization. Vaughan's criticism and solution for the problems that ailed England and its support of colonization focused on the necessary control of self-interest.

When Vaughan shifted his attention from England and its support of colonization to his colony in Newfoundland, however, his view on the role of self-interest within society changed dramatically. For Vaughan, Newfoundland represented a great potential for personal profit, just as all the colonies did, but he did not interpret this as a potential threat to the colony. Vaughan claimed that the profitability of the colony had been divinely ordained: “*God had reserved the Newfoundland for vs Britaines*” and “*hath allotted Newfoundland, the grand Port of Fishing, to the Professors of the Gospell.*” As purveyors of the true “gospel,” Vaughan asserted that God wanted a colony in Newfoundland to succeed and bring in the much-needed revenues to England, but God also, he asserted, took a realistic view of human nature, accepting that “the depraved nature of mankinde delighteth in appetite and some appearance of profit.” Vaughan claimed then that God had made Newfoundland very profitable to the individual in order “to allure [the English people] from our home-bred idlenesse, to this necessary place of *Plantation.*”⁷⁸ God would not rely on the virtue of the people to create a colony so beneficial to England, but would work through sinners, channeling their self-interested behavior in Newfoundland towards a greater good.

⁷⁷ Vaughan, *Golden Fleece*, 98, 114, 97

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 97.

In Vaughn's vision of empire, the intentions of individual colonists had no bearing on the success or failure of the colony. To this end, he cited a biblical passage from Psalms: "*Their sound is gone out into all Nations.*"⁷⁹ Vaughan interpreted the passive nature of the passage to mean that the deliverer of God's word is unimportant. He contended that the "*Word of God* should not onely be spread abroad and planted by those which ought of zeale and charity to teach it; but by those, which like the *frogs out of the Dragons mouth*, might publish it for temporall ends." He provided the example of the Spanish, who had colonized the New World out of greed, in the minds of most English, but at the same time, had successfully converted many to the Christian religion. As any good Englishman would, however, he added that the Spanish spread the Christian faith "not so purely, as wee could wish," but the results had to be acknowledged. "Many thousand Heathen people," he reported, "haue receiued the *Christian Religion*." His conclusion was powerful: "*our Sauour makes vse of our worlaly desires to serue his diuine intentions.*"⁸⁰ To Vaughan, this was an important analogy for colonization. The colonies were not a test of English character and religious fervor as they had been for the earlier authors. One promotional author, Alexander Whitaker, for instance, had worried how colonial organizers would be able to distinguish the "faithful giver" from the "covetous wretch" if the colonies did turn out to be immediately profitable.⁸¹ The intentions of the colonists were so vital to the colonial vision of the earlier writers that some even celebrated colonial hardships as a way to screen out selfish and unfaithful

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 97. The quotation is from Psalms 19:4. In the King James Version, it reads: "Their line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world."

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 97

⁸¹ Whitaker, *Good Nevves from Virginia*.

colonists. Vaughan, in contrast, argued that God was willing to work with both sinners and the godly in America.

For Vaughan, the colonies were nothing more than a means to an economic end. They were not important in and of themselves nor were they an extension of English society and a reflection of English character. With this contention, Vaughan revealed the influence of Giovanni Botero, an Italian theorist and important humanist thinker in the late sixteenth century, who had challenged Machiavelli's assertion that colonial riches would lead to corruption and dissipation at home. For Botero, the major threat to European civilization came from the eastern Turks, not the western colonies. Worried that Europe was newly vulnerable to invasion due to its internal religious dissension, he wanted Spain to re-unite Christian Europe under one religious banner and put the Christian nations in a better position to fend off any invasions from their eastern neighbors, the true infidels. He admitted the difficult task that he proposed for Spain but theorized that the profits from the New World would make it possible. For Botero, colonial revenues would make a necessary contribution to what he anticipated would be a positive development for Europe and its safety.⁸² Vaughan took a similar position on the salutary benefits of colonial revenues, which he acknowledged immediately in the title of his tract: *The Golden Fleece . . . under which are discovered . . . the vices and decayes of the kingdome, and lastly the ways to get wealth. . .*⁸³ He elaborated on this position in the text: "This no *Eutopia* is, nor *Common-wealth* / Which *Plato* faign'd. Wee bring

⁸² For Botero and his importance to early English colonizing efforts, see, Andrew Fitzmaurice, "The Commercial Ideology of Colonization in Jacobean England: Robert Johnson, Giovanni Botero, and the Pursuit of Greatness," *The William and Mary Quarterly* 64 (Oct., 2007), 791-820.

⁸³ For Vaughan's connection to the intellectual circles responsible for Botero's translation into English, see Fitzmaurice, "The Commercial Ideology," 806-807.

your *Kingdomes* health / By true receipts.”⁸⁴ This was a direct attack on the priorities of the earlier colonial writers. The greater good that a colonial promoter needed to worry about was not the nature of colonial society and its members, but its production of wealth. In this way, Vaughan laid the intellectual framework for a colonial justification of anything that would bolster colonial, and thereby, English revenues. If Newfoundland produced great profits for England and did so in the form of a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah, Vaughan would have called it a success for both England and ultimately Protestantism.

Vaughan put forth a strikingly amoral vision of the colonizing individual, which he justified through the creation of an "invisible hand" of God in Newfoundland. The primary benefit of this move to the promotional author was the increased ability to appeal to the self-interested motivations of the individual. Despite this appeal, Vaughan's approach failed to have any significant influence on subsequent colonial planners. Colonial promoters and planners of English colonizing efforts in New England, Providence Island, and Maryland during the 1630s and 1640s would not adopt Vaughan's approach nor reference his promotional tract.⁸⁵ They would continue to prioritize virtue in the same manner of the earlier promoters. Vaughan's attempt to redefine the relationship between self-interest and society in the New World was ultimately deemed unpersuasive. In railing against the self-interested actions of individuals in England and praising similar behaviors in Newfoundland at the same time, he asked too much of the "invisible hand" of God. Like Henry Jackman, Walter Raleigh, and John Smith before him, Vaughan lacked an effective language and ideology that would have allowed him to

⁸⁴ Vaughan, *Golden Fleece*, 2.

⁸⁵ See Chapter 2.

redefine successfully the role of self-interest in society. But Vaughan's attempt to accommodate self-interest along with the other promoters' anxieties about the same characteristic reveal the pressures to appeal to self-interest that existed at the heart of the colonial promotion. The current social orthodoxy about community formation stifled any widespread appeal to this incentive in the first decades of English colonization, but authors like Vaughan, Whitbourne, and Smith reveal the active search among some promoters for an understanding of society that would allow for a direct appeal to self-interest without undercutting the prospects of community in the New World.

CHAPTER TWO

"NOTHING MORE PLEASURABLE THAN PROFIT": SELF-INTEREST, INDUSTRY, AND A NEW APPROACH TO OLD PROBLEMS IN THE MID-CENTURY VIRGINIA PROMOTIONAL LITERATURE

For many observers of Virginia at mid-century, the colony had proven to be a disappointment. There were no thriving towns, only dispersed individual settlements, and there was little economic diversity. Settlers produced tobacco to the exclusion of a wide variety of other New World commodities that seemed to be both possible and more profitable. And there was scant, if any, stories of successful conversions of the local Indians, which offered a searing indictment of the colony's religious and proselytizing ambitions. For colonial promoters, the revolutionary events and new government in England offered hope for change in America and a new approach to colonization. This led to a series of promotional pamphlets for the colony, as various writers stepped forward to offer their solution to the colony's past struggles. The promotional literature for a colony usually peaked during its first years and then steadily diminished over time, but the combination of the perception of Virginia as a failing colony along with the instability at home led to an upsurge in the literature on Virginia nearly forty years after its first settlement.

The mid-century promotional literature for Virginia offers a window into a changing approach to empire in England. The promotional literature of the 1650s was different in important ways from the earlier efforts to advertize the colonies and reflected important intellectual developments in England. Steve Pincus has examined the political

and economic thought during this period and has identified the 1640s and 1650s as the period when England became a "truly self-conscious commercial society." In his study of the pamphlet literature during the interregnum, he has identified the emergence of a new economic ideology that understood wealth as an unequivocal good, prioritized labor and industry as the engines of wealth, identified the Dutch as exemplars of these new economic principles, and developed a new "conception of interest" that was better suited for a commercial society. These authors had not abandoned the humanist concern for the common good, but sought a political and economic ideology that interpreted self-interest as working towards that ultimate goal. They put forth a new understanding of self-interest and created "a newly appropriate vocabulary of interests and rights in defense of the common good."¹ The writers promoting Virginia at mid-century would find this language particularly attractive in their efforts to promote the colony.

The earlier colonial writers had struggled with the proper role of self-interest in colonization. Most had exhibited great discomfort with assigning any productive role to self-interest and advertized the New World by encouraging its complete suppression. In their attempts to promote colonization, they operated within the conventional paradigm that posited self-interest as hostile to communal well-being. A few writers, however, tried to accommodate self-interested motivations in their promotion of the colonies. William Vaughan, for instance, a Newfoundland promoter, provided the most ambitious example. He argued that self-interested behaviors in America would benefit English society but failed to offer a compelling explanation for how those actions would not work

¹ Steve Pincus, "Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth," *The American Historical Review* 103 (June, 1998), 705-736.

against the creation of a community in Newfoundland.² The new economic ideology in England would do exactly that, however, and would solve the riddle of early colonial promotion by allowing for the dual promises of community and self-advancement in the New World.

The first section of the chapter examines the static nature of English perceptions on the form that a successful colony should take. Events in the colony had not led to any major adjustments in the end goals of the promoters. Despite the profitability of tobacco in Virginia, there were near constant efforts by colonial leaders in Virginia to diversify the economy. And despite numerous conflicts with the neighboring Indians, the colonial promoters continued to argue for amicable and beneficial relations with the Native Americans. The section follows the staying power of these two ideas. Tobacco and its many deleterious effects on society prevented most colonial observers from being able to accept its economic dominance in the region, and the continuing attractiveness of distinguishing English colonization from Spanish efforts in the New World hindered any reversal in Indian policy, even after the attack of 1622 and the pressures to adopt a more hostile approach. The result was the goals for Virginia in 1650 were the same as they had always been. The production of a single crop and Indian conflicts did not act as a corrective to the dreams of the earlier promoters, but offered clear examples, instead, of human error and lost potential. The second section will examine the new approach in the promotional literature of Virginia to meet these expectations. The promoters' adoption of a new economic ideology would have consequences for their political recommendations

² See Chapter One.

for the colony. Supporters of representative government in America would find an ally in this new understanding of the economics of empire.

When the mid-century promoters looked to Virginia and its recent history, tobacco production and Indian wars were two of its most dominant features. The original promoters for the colony had not anticipated these developments nor would they have supported them. The colony, from its earliest conception, was supposed to produce a wide range of valuable commodities and court a friendly relationship with the Indians. These two ideals for the colony had not diminished with time. Tobacco production, long criticized in the colony, represented an impoverished society at mid-century, despite its evident profitability, and amicable Indian relations, even after 1622, still represented an important goal of colonization. The promotional authors at mid-century maintained these expectations and declared Virginia to be seriously flawed and in need of major reforms.

The production and consumption of tobacco had many enemies in England, even before the first settlers arrived in Virginia. James I offered the most famous attack on tobacco consumption in his *A Counterblaste to Tobacco*, printed in 1604. He described tobacco consumption as “a custome lothsome to the eye, hatefull to the Nose, harmefull to the braine, daungerous to the Lungs and in the blacke stinking fume thereof, nearest resembling the horrible Stigian smoke of the pit that is bottomless.”³ He recounted a history of tobacco that was tawdry and uncivilized. For James, tobacco was used in the New World to fight the “Pockes, a filthy disease,” making tobacco a “stinking and vnsauorie Antidot.” After closely associating tobacco use with Native American culture,

³ James I, *A Counterblaste to Tobacco*, (London: 1604), (EEBO p. 7).

James depicted its use in England as a barbarous regression of a civilized people. He asked rhetorically what was it that could move Englishmen “to imitate the barbarous and beastly maners of the wilde, godless, and slauish *Indians*, especially in so vile and stinking a custome.” James then moved from the individual act of smoking tobacco to its effect on the larger community. He argued that the people of England are “ordeined by God to bestowe both [their] persons and goods for the maintenance both of the honour and safetie of your King and Common-wealth.” A “shamefull imbecilitie” attended the smoking of tobacco, “disabling” the individual on both charges. The lasting impression of this attack was that any revenues that accrued from tobacco production should be measured against the social consequences of its domestic consumption.⁴

The moral objections of James I and others did not prevent the establishment of tobacco as a vital colonial product, but the Chesapeake region’s growing production and dependence on the crop continued to cause concern for colonial leaders and promoters throughout the first half of the seventeenth century. Not only was the social impact of the product dubious, the settlement patterns that accompanied tobacco production caused concern for numerous colonial promoters. For many, the dispersed settlement patterns in Virginia demonstrated a lack of concern for the community on the part of the colonists.⁵

⁴ James I, *A Counterblaste*, (EEBO, p. 2, p. 6)

⁵ For classic treatments of early Virginia as an individualist society, see Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom*, and T.H. Breen, “Looking out for Number One: The Cultural Limits on Public Policy in Early Virginia,” in Breen, *Puritans and Adventurers: Change and Persistence in Early America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), 106-126. For work that generally emphasizes stability, see Lois Green Carr, “The Foundations of Social Order: Local Government in Colonial Maryland,” in Bruce C. Daniels, ed., *Town and Country: Essays on the Structure of Local Government in the American Colonies* (Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1978); Jon Kukla, “Order and Chaos in Early America: Political and Social Stability in Pre-Restoration Virginia,” *American Historical Review*, XC (1985), 275-298; and Darrett B. Rutman and Anita H. Rutman, *A Place in Time: Middlesex County Virginia, 1650-1750* (New York: Norton, 1984). For the most recent account of Virginia that offers a middle point between the two extremes of rampant individualism and community, see Lorena S. Walsh, *Motives of Honor, Pleasure, and*

Lionel Gatford was one of the many critical voices on this point: “The Planters (out of a covetous desire to take up great Tracts of land) disperse themefelves very far from each other in the Country, and ufually take up more land by an hundred parts, than they are able to manure or till, or make any use of.” For Gatford, the consequences were threefold. First, in their large appropriations of land, the planters left large portions uncultivated that could be, and would be given the opportunity, utilized productively by other planters. The isolated farmsteads also weakened the security of the colony, making many colonists vulnerable to Indian attacks, and lastly, the distance between farms prevented many planters from coming to the aid of their neighbors, “rendering themselves thereby both ufelefs to one another, & the more unferviceable to the publick.”⁶ The social analysis for Gatford was simple: the planters in Virginia were choosing individual profit over the greater good of the community. The focus of James I had been on the negative effects on society of smoking tobacco. Gatford attached similarly deleterious effects to tobacco, but in Virginia, it was the method of its production that was harming society.

The recommendation to diversify Virginia’s economy and create viable towns in the Chesapeake was common throughout this period. The most fervent of these voices was arguably Sir William Berkeley, the royally appointed governor of Virginia from 1641 to 1652 and then again from 1660 to 1677. Berkeley believed that diversification was vital to Virginia’s long-term prospects. His plans and practices for his own lands were indicative of his larger goals for the colony. Instead of dedicating his Green Spring Plantation to tobacco, he made it into what one historian has called a “laboratory of

Profit: Plantation Management in the Colonial Chesapeake, 1607-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 25-121.

⁶ Lionel Gatford, *Publick Good without Private Interest* (London, 1657), 9.

agricultural experiment.”⁷ Throughout his life in Virginia, he tried various colonial commodities, failing in his trials of rice and sugar but having reasonable success with exotic goods such as silk, potash, hemp, and wine.⁸ Silk, in particular, had a cadre of fervent supporters. John Bonoel, silk-master to James I, published a tract in 1620 specifically intended to promote silk production.⁹ Colonial promoters would continue to argue for silk as the best way to break Virginia’s obsession with tobacco throughout this period. Between 1649 and 1655 alone, three tracts aggressively pushed for silk production in the colony.¹⁰ Berkeley published his own tract in 1662, entitled *A Discourse and View of Virginia*, and argued for the benefits of a diversified economy.

The good that would come from economic diversification was more often asserted than explained by colonial writers. In Berkeley’s case, for instance, Warren Billings has attempted to explain his fervent support by his family’s agrarian background, implying that agricultural practices in England led to an appreciation of the merits of crop rotation. Billings also points to Berkeley’s probable familiarity with colonial tracts pushing for diversified production in the colonies, such as Francis Bacon’s *Of Plantations* and the copious writings of Richard Hakluyt the Younger and Samuel Purchas. There was a

⁷ Warren B. Billings, *Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004), 68.

⁸ Billings, “Sir William Berkeley and the Diversification of the Virginia Economy,” *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 104 (1996): 433-454.

⁹ *Observations to be Followed, for the Making of fit roomes to keep Silke-wormes in: Also For the Best Manner of planting Mulbery trees to feed them* (London, 1620).

¹⁰ See Ferrar, *A Perfect Description of Virginia* (London, 1649). John Ferrar was a dedicated and influential supporter of Virginia, and more specifically, an advocate of diversification and silk production in the colony. See Joseph Ewan, “Silk Production in the Colonies,” *Agricultural History* 43 (1969), 131-132 and Billings, *Sir William Berkeley*, 69. For other examples of works supporting silk production, see Edward Williams, *Virginia’s Discovery of Silk-wormes, with their benefit and the implanting of mulberry trees* (London, 1650) and the second edition, published in 1655, of Samuel Hartlib’s *A Rare and new discovery of a speedy and easie means found out by a young lady in England . . . for the feeding of silk worms in . . . Virginia* (London).

simpler explanation. Ever since Sandys had come to the realization that potential migrants would be more comfortable migrating to a place that resembled England, colonial promoters transposed the goals of English society onto the colonies. A dependence on rival empires for goods or necessities rendered a country vulnerable and indicated an impoverished state. For many, the same was true for the colonies. John Hammond, who published a tract about Virginia and Maryland in 1655, complained that the colonists were “neglecting discoveries, planting of Orchards, providing for the Winter preservation of their stocks, or thinking of any thing stable or firm; and whilest Tobacco . . . they wholly and eagerly followed that, neglecting their very planting of Corn, and much relyed on *England* for the chiefest part of their provisions.” Hammond was convinced that the potential migrants heard about how the Virginia colonists lived “in such want,” causing many of them to change their chosen destination to the “barren and freezing soyle of *New England*” rather than “joyn with such an indigent and fottifh people” as lived in Virginia.¹¹ This became yet another way to attack tobacco production in Virginia. It not only wrecked society in Virginia but also destroyed the appeal of the colony to potential migrants. Tobacco culture gave the appearance of poverty, no matter its actual profitability, and this would continue to stunt the growth of the colony.

By the early decades of the eighteenth century, Virginia would in fact become a prosperous colony. Tobacco production would dominate the landscape, return great profits to elite white planters, and constitute a consistent revenue stream for the English exchequer, but those results had not occurred by mid-century nor could the colonists or colonial promoters of the 1650s see into the future. At this time, nobody writing about

¹¹ John Hammond, *Leah and Rachel, or, the Two Fruitfull Sisters Virginia and Mary-Land: Their Present Condition, Impartially stated and related* (London, 1655), 4.

the colonies seemed content with Virginia's economic organization. This was partly due to the grand expectations of the early promotional literature. While later colonial writers had to temper exaggerations about certain aspects of life in the colonies, they steadfastly asserted, as earlier colonial writers had done, the bountifulness and variety of the American environment. The New World held the same potential then as it had in the beginning days of colonization. With these possibilities in mind, a colonial observer at mid-century looked at Virginia and saw a dispersed settlement dedicated to a single crop, whose social benefit was dubious at best. Far from being a model for future colonial success, Virginia's economic organization was considered detrimental to a greater prosperity possible in the New World.

If Virginia's economy was falling well short of expectations, Anglo-Indian relations in the colony were much closer to being judged a total failure. From the beginning, the announced intention of the Virginia Company was to spread Christianity in the New World by converting the local Indians.¹² The Company invested much in this goal of colonization, both in monetary terms and in print. Pocahontas's visit to London marked the high point of this campaign, which presented Pocahontas, or Rebecca, as a powerful individual example of an Indian population amenable to English culture and religion. For the Company, the Pocahontas trip provided some much needed positive publicity and also indicated a high level of public interest in the conversion narrative of English

¹² On the importance of religion to the early efforts in Virginia, see, Louis B. Wright, *Religion and Empire: The Alliance between Piety and Commerce in English Expansion, 1558-1626* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1942); Perry Miller, "Religion and Society in the Early Literature: the Religious Impulse in the Founding of Virginia," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 5 (Oct., 1948), 492-522 and 6 (Jan., 1949), 24-41; John Parker, "Religion and the Virginia Colony, 1609-10," in K.R. Andrews, N.P. Canny, and P.E.H. Hair, eds., *The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic, and America, 1480-1650* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979); and Douglas Bradburn, "The Eschatological Origins of the English Empire," in *Early Modern Virginia: Reconsidering the Old Dominion*, eds. Douglas Bradburn and John C. Coombs (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), 15-56.

colonization. Building off this momentum, the Company increased efforts at conversion in the colony, but the surprise attack of 1622 put a quick end to many of these projects. In the wake of the rebellion, the Company issued several publications that set out to dehumanize the Indians in Virginia and to impugn the earlier religious goals of the colony. For many historians, 1622 was a transformative moment in Anglo-Indian relations in the colony, but the larger English colonial literature remained committed to the goal of conversion in the New World. New England and Maryland, for instance, both begun in the 1630s well after the attack of 1622, specifically disavowed a hostile approach in their promotional materials. The result by mid-century was that friendly relations with the Indians and the accompanying conversions was still a goal of English colonization, and Virginia's history of almost continuous Indian warfare was understood, not as an inevitable feature of colonization, but as a failure of that colony.

The priority of conversion was built into the founding documents of the Virginia colony. In a publication in 1610, the Virginia Company, pushed by negative rumors of the colony, set out to “deliuer roundly and clearely, our *endes and Wayes* to the hopefull Plantations begun in *Virginia*.” The Company declared that the “*Principall and Maine Ends . . .* weare *first* to preach, & baptize into *Christian Religion*, and by propagation of that *Gospell*, to recouer our of the armes of the Diuell, a number of poore and miserable soules, wrapt vpp vnto death, in almost *inuincible ignorance*.”¹³ In a separate tract from the same year, the company turned its attention to the future, encouraging the colonists that would migrate to “let Religion be the first aim of your hopes” so that their names “shall be registred to posterity with a glorious title; *These are the men, whom God raised*

¹³ *A true and sincere declaration of the purpose and ends of the plantation begun in Virginia* (London, 1610), 3.

to augment the State of their countrey, and to propagate the Gospell of Iesus Christ.”¹⁴

Historians of Virginia have often been too willing to dismiss these religious protestations as a false veneer concealing an economic agenda in the New World.¹⁵ At the very least, this religious rhetoric established conversion as a criterion by which to measure colonial success or failure. Robert Johnson reminded company supporters of this in 1612 in *New Life of Virginea*: “This is the worke that we first intended and have published to the world to be chiefe in our thoughts.”¹⁶

The Virginia Company was more than anxious to underscore any moment that seemed to offer evidence of Native American conversion and assimilation. Pocahontas and the treatment of her story by the Company offered an example of just how powerful and attractive that narrative could be. At first, the Powhatan Indians, the most powerful chiefdom that the English encountered along the Atlantic seaboard in the seventeenth century, treated the colonists with a wary ambivalence.¹⁷ This relationship quickly turned hostile as the Powhatan leader, Wahunsonacock, tired of the persistent and increasingly

¹⁴ *A true declaration of the estate of the colonies in Virginia with a confutation of such scandalous reports as haue tended to the disgrace of so worthy an enterprise* (London, 1610), 66. See also the various sermons published by the Virginia Company during its control of the colony, all of which focused on the religious motivations and goals of colonization. For example, see Robert Gray, *A Good Speed to Virginia* (London, 1609); William Crashaw, *A Sermon Preached in London before the Right Honorable the Lord Lawarre . . . Feb 21 1609* (London 1610); Alexander Whitaker, *Good Nevves form Virginia* (London, 1613); and John Donne, *A Sermon upon the VIII verse of the I chapter of the Acts of the Apostles preached . . . to the Virginia Company* (London, 1622).

¹⁵ For the classic history of the Virginia Company that sees it as an exclusively economic endeavor, see Wesley F. Craven, *Dissolution of the Virginia Company: The Failure of a Colonial Experiment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932). See also Billings, Selby, and Tate, *Colonial Virginia: A History* (New York: KTO Press, 1986), 27-45. For examples of historians who take the religious impulse more seriously, see Miller, “Religious Impulse” and Thomas Scanlan, *Colonial Writing and the New World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

¹⁶ Quoted in James Horn, *A Land as God Made It: Jamestown and the Birth of America* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 200.

¹⁷ For more on Powhatan culture and diplomacy during this period, see Helen C. Rountree, *Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough: Three Indian Lives Changed by Jamestown* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005).

aggressive English demands for food. The sporadic fighting and raids that followed constituted the first Anglo-Powhatan war, lasting five years from 1609-1614. A key part of the treaty negotiation in 1614 was the fate of Pocahontas, Wahunsonacock's daughter and a current hostage of the English. Her role in the treaty was to stay with the English, living among the colonists and adopting their way of life. Sent upriver from Jamestown, Pocahontas was placed under the care of Reverend Whitaker, who took responsibility for her religious instruction. In a short amount of time, Pocahontas publicly renounced her former religious beliefs, embraced Western religion, and agreed to marry John Rolfe, taking on the new name, Rebecca. With the consent of Wahunsonacock, Pocahontas and Rolfe married on April 5, 1614 in the Jamestown church. The marriage secured the peace between the English and the Indians and symbolized the new accord to live in peace and friendship.¹⁸

The perspectives of Pocahontas and Wahunsonacock concerning these decisions have been difficult for historians to access.¹⁹ Due to the existing historical record, however, English understandings of these events are much clearer. John Rolfe, for instance, penned a detailed letter to Sir Thomas Dale, then governor of the colony, explaining his desire to marry Pocahontas. He acknowledged the "heavie displeasure which almightie God conceived against the sonnes of Levie and Israel for marrying strange wives" and asked what "should provoke [him] to be in love with one whose education hath bin rude, her manners barbarous, her generation accursed , and so

¹⁸ See Alan Taylor, *American Colonies* (New York: Viking Press, 2001), 125 -133. For a recent detailed depiction of the Pocahontas story, see Horn, *A Land as Made it*, 193-223.

¹⁹ Daniel Richter attempts to tell the story of Pocahontas from her perspective in *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 69-78.

discrepant in all nurtriture frome myself.”²⁰ For Rolfe, one possible answer to this question was sin, in particular lust, “hatched by him who seeketh and delighteth in mans destruction.” Rolfe understood that this was how the “vulgar sort” would understand his actions regardless of any godly intentions. In a preemptive defense, he asserted that he was not “in so desperate an estate” that he was unable to “obtain a mach to my great content” in England. He also claimed that if his intentions were really sordid, and he sought only to “gorge [him] self with incontineny,” then he would commit that act with “Christians more pleasing to the eie.” For a brief period, Rolfe admitted that he had become convinced of the devil’s hand in his interest in Pocahontas but a recurring thought kept entering his “holiest and strongest meditations”: “why dost not thou indeavour to make her a Christian?” Rolfe interpreted this call as the Holy Spirit demanding that he do God’s work on earth. As he understood it, Pocahontas had demonstrated her “great appearance of love to [him]” and “her desire to be taught and instructed in the knowledge of God.” Rolfe drew an equivalency between not marrying Pocahontas and a refusal to “leade the blinde into the right way . . . to give bread to the hungrie . . . to cover the naked.” In Rolfe’s personal consternation over his marriage to Pocahontas, he did not transcend the ethnocentrism inherent in the Company literature. Rolfe’s letter revealed two common English assumptions: the Native Americans were savage and, if exposed to “superior” English culture and religion, they would seek assimilation. The only question that remained was whether the colonists would

²⁰ “Letter of John Rolfe, 1614” in *Narratives of Early Virginia*, Lyon G. Tyler, ed., (New York: Charles Scribner’s and Sons, 1907), 239-244, quotation on 241.

overcome their “base feares of displeasing the world,” as Rolfe had claimed he had done, and commit themselves to working with the Indians toward this goal.²¹

For the promoters of the Virginia colony, the marriage of Pocahontas to Rolfe was a dream scenario. So inspired by these events, Governor Dale unsuccessfully attempted to arrange a marriage between himself and a different daughter of Wahunsonacock.²² The company had every reason to promote this story as evidence that the American Indians were amenable to English culture and religion. When Pocahontas traveled with Rolfe to England in 1616, the Company intended to maximize the promotional possibilities of this visit. Landing in Plymouth, Dale rushed the couple off to London where they participated in the heights of court culture, taking in a masque, *The Vision of Delight*, from the royal dais. The company also commissioned an engraving of Pocahontas to further publicize the visit. In this image, the visage of Pocahontas is non-European but her attire is English. The result was an image that proclaimed her English assimilation without undercutting her innate foreignness. As James Horn has argued, the engraving communicated the idea that the Indians could be converted and “made” English. The inscription reaffirmed this message: “Matoaks als Rebecka daughter of the mighty Prince Powhatan Emperour of Attanoughskomouck als virginia converted and baptized in the Christian faith, and wife to the worshipfull Mr. John Rolff.” News of their arrival in London spread quickly, and as one historian has remarked, “caused a sensation.”²³ The Virginia Company could not have been more pleased about the public interest in the story or its ostensible control over how that story was presented.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 241, 243, 242

²² Horn, *A Land as God Made It*, 220.

²³ *Ibid.*, 227-228.

The Pocahontas trip had its desired effect and there followed a renewed commitment to converting Native Americans in Virginia. In 1616, James I ordered the archbishops of Canterbury and York to organize collections for the religious education of the Indians. By 1620, the Company had received in total over 3000 pounds to put to religious uses in the colony, and in 1619, the assembly required planters across the colony to adopt native children and raise them in English homes. There were plans for an Indian college as well. These efforts were led in the colony by George Thorpe, a high-ranking gentleman, who had arrived in the colony in 1620 convinced that the blame for the lack of Indian conversions rested with the English colonists. The colonists simply needed to show the Indians more “love and hartie affection.”²⁴ These increased efforts to proselytize in Virginia were important part of the Great Charter of 1618. Edwin Sandys believed that it was important and still possible to improve relations with the Indians. Thorpe and his insights into the Indian reception of English ways, for instance, were influential in Company discussions in London for the overall management of the colony. As Rolfe had done in his letter, Sandys, Thorpe, and others understood the Indians to be desirous of and amenable to English culture. Any failure of assimilation on the part of the Indians, then, had to lie with settler behavior and an unwillingness on their part to welcome and instruct the Natives in English ways. In this view, the colonists could improve Indian relations by improving their own behavior. If they ramped up their own efforts at conversion, positive results would certainly follow. After 1616, a Company supporter could survey the colony, noting the recent Indian legislation in the colony and increasing donations, and conclude that Indian discord would no longer be a problem for the colony.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 250-252,

The English perspective, of course, demonstrated an Anglo-centrism that left a blind spot in the handling of Indian relations, which would be exposed with the massive Indian attack of 1622. From the Powhatan perspective, the peace treaty of 1614 had come to be viewed as destructive and dismissive of Indian concerns. Opechancanough, who had succeeded Wahunsonacock as leader of the Powhatan confederation after his death in 1618, saw little advantage in the current relationship with the English. The English treated the Powhatans as a subjugated nation instead of as equals, enforced the payment of tribute from surrounding Indians, and allowed a settler expansion that forced groups like the Chickahominies, Paspaheghs, and Weyanocks off their lands. These Indian groups were then forced to become dependent on the settlers' provisions. For Opechancanough, the peace settlement was a thin veil that attempted to conceal a relationship between the English and Indians that remained antagonistic. The Powhatan nation was losing land and being weakened by white encroachment while the English were getting stronger in both resources and population by the day. Opechancanough's earlier experience in Anglo-Indian warfare had taught him that direct and foreseeable assaults against the English were ineffective. A surprise attack, on the other hand, would minimize the armament advantages of the English and ensure that most fighting was hand-to-hand, a style of combat more favorable to the Indians. To set up the surprise attack, Opechancanough played off the credulity of the English leaders. He continually dismissed the problems that accompanied settler expansion onto Indian lands and professed his perpetual amity with the English. The level of surprise on the part of the English was best demonstrated by George Thorpe, who ignored the warnings of the attack, walked out to greet the Indians, and was promptly killed. For Thorpe and others,

the idea that the English could bring the “correct” religion to Virginia and that it would be refused was unimaginable. Thorpe walked out to meet the Indians that day confident in his sincerity to convert and better the Indians in Virginia. He could not understand how he had come to be classified as an enemy.²⁵

The attack of 1622 devastated the colony. The death toll for the well-coordinated attack was 347, almost one-third of the colony’s population. The colonists rallied at Jamestown and in a few other fortified settlements, but the damage was overwhelming.²⁶ The Virginia colony had been set back to its earliest days. News of the attack spread quickly in England.²⁷ Edward Waterhouse, the Virginia Company’s secretary, penned the company’s first official response to the attack and referred to the fact that “THE fame of our late vnhappy accident in *Virginia*, hath spread it selfe, I doubt not, into all parts abroad.”²⁸ Starting with Waterhouse’s text, the Company was quick to offer its rendering of events. Thorpe’s death became a powerful symbol for Company propaganda. For Waterhouse, Thorpe’s earnest dedication to converting the Indians was unmatched and “so tender ouer them, that whosoeuer vnder his authority had giuen them but the least displeasure or discontent, he punished them seuerely.” He included details of how Thorpe had killed mastiff dogs, much to the displeasure of their English owners, if they had threatened any nearby Indians, and how he had constructed an English style house for Opechancanough much to the Powhatan leader's delight. At his death, Waterhouse depicted a man “void of all suspition, and so full of confidence.” Waterhouse did not

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 253, 262.

²⁶ Taylor, 135.

²⁷ Kupperman, *Jamestown Project*, 307.

²⁸ Edward Waterhouse, *A declaration of the state of the colony and affaires in Virginia With a relation of the barbarous massacre in the time of peace and league, treacherously executed by the native infidels vpon the English, the 22 of March last . . .* (London, 1622).

stop with the death scene and included the treatment of Thorpe's body after death: "they not only wlfully murdered him, but cruelly and felly, out of deuillish malice, did so many barbarous despights and foule scornes after to his dead corpes, as are vnbeffitting to be heard by any ciuill eare."²⁹ The engraving by Theodore de Bry of the same year followed the same theme. De bry depicted the English colonists in the midst of a normal day's labor and activity. The bucolic scene is then overrun by bloodthirsty natives, who are seen attacking men, women, and children indiscriminately. Women cry for mercy unsuccessfully, and in the center of the engraving, lies a murdered and prostrate child.³⁰ The message the Virginia Company wanted to deliver was that the colonists had lived up to their end of the bargain in Virginia. They had sought the conversion of the Indians, as the story of George Thorpe indicated, and had sought only a peaceful life, as pictured in the de Bry piece. The colonists had not brought on this attack through their own actions, as Thorpe had written about earlier conflicts, but instead, had been innocent and well-meaning victims of "the perfidious treachery of a false-hearted people."³¹

The attack by the Indians in Virginia opened up a golden opportunity for the Virginia Company to alter the tenor of its promotional writings. Up until this point, the Company literature had been consistent about the amenability of the Indians and importance of conversion and peaceful trade. This method of colonization was attractive to an English audience because it offered a powerful contrast to Spanish efforts in the New World. With the publication of *Brevisima Relacion de la destruccion de las Indias* in 1552 by las Casas, Spain's efforts in the New World had come to be associated in England with greed

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 15, 17.

³⁰ On English versions and interpretations of the massacre, see Karen Kupperman, *Indians and English: Facing Off in Early America* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 223-226; Horn, *A Land*, 252-262.

³¹ Waterhouse, *A declaration*, 2.

and violence. The English colonial writers further propagated this depiction of the Spanish empire and portrayed English colonization as inherently different. The English would colonize through a just treatment of the Indians and a subordination of economic motives. This approach would lead to successful colonies, but more importantly for many, would symbolize to the world the gulf that existed between the true nature of Spanish Catholicism and English Protestantism.³² The treatment of natives offered a clear marker that would delineate national differences and help to secure a unique and powerful English identity. This colonial approach was also better suited for the North American environment. North America offered no gold or silver mines nor did it have centralized and populous Indian nations that could be conquered and enslaved.³³ The Spanish model of colonization, regardless of its moral dimension, seemed inapplicable in North America.

The attack of 1622, however, provided an opportunity for English colonizers to rethink their methods, and for many, to push for a more violent, and “Spanish,” treatment of the natives. Many in the colony celebrated the opportunity for more aggressive tactics. Sir Francis Wyatt, governor of the colony, wrote: “Our first work is expulsion of the Salvages to gain the free range of the countrey for encrease of Cattle, swine, &c . . . for it is infinitely better to have no heathen among us, who at best were but thornes in our sides, than to be at peace and league with them.” In England, John Smith described the disaster as “good for the plantation because now we have just cause to destroy them by

³² Scanlan, *Colonial Writing*, 93-122.

³³ For a colonial history that points to the environmental features encountered by colonizing powers as largely determining the differing styles of colonization that would emerge, see J. H. Elliot, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).

all means possible.”³⁴ The most explicit, however, in encouraging a change in Indian policy was Waterhouse himself.

Waterhouse listed several reasons why an aggressive Indian policy would make the colony safer and more successful. Waterhouse pointed to efforts at conversion as weakening the defenses of the colony. Colonists who believed the warnings of an imminent Indian attack were able to survive, he wrote, but too many, like George Thorpe, were “euer stupid, and auerted from beleeuing any thing that might weaken their hopes of speedy winning the Sauages to Ciuilitie and Religion.” The desire to convert the Indians left the colonists open to duplicity and vulnerable to attack. It was, Waterhouse declared, the desire of the colonists “to draw those people to Religion by the carelesse neglect of their owne safeties [that has] beene the greatest cause of their own ensuing destruction.” For Waterhouse, increased security was only one of many positive results of a new, more aggressive Indian policy. He offered a long list, but two of the more striking comments, relative to the earlier promotional literature, involved land and labor. “By right of Warre,” he wrote, the colonists could invade Indian lands and acquire their fields and other “cultivated places.” The colonists, he continued, could seize “cleared grounds in all the villages” and benefit by “possessing the fruits of others labours.” In a later section in the tract, he applied the general benefit of conquest to Indian labor: “the *Indians* . . . may now most iustly be compelled to seruitude and drudgery, and supply the roome of men that labour, whereby euen the meanest of the Plantation may employ themselues more entirely in their Arts and Occupations, which are more generous, whilst Sauages performe their inferiour workes of digging in mynes, and the like.” Waterhouse’s

³⁴ Quoted in Alan Taylor, *American Colonies*, 135.

solution would have been understood by his readers as adopting the Spanish model of colonization. He made that influence explicit in his text by reminding the reader that the “Spaniard,” by employing many of the tactics that he recommended, had “got two the greatest Kingdomes of the West Indies, *Peru* and *Mexico*.” This was more than an indictment of the Virginia Indians and the possibility of their Christian conversion. It was larger argument, using 1622 as a defining example, to remold the idea and methods of English colonization. For Waterhouse, conquest was quick, decisive, and final while the process of “civility [was] . . . slow, the effect of a long time, and great industry.” He argued that civilizing the Indians was an ambition that worked against the larger economic goals of society. Conquest and subjugation was for Waterhouse the clear and proven solution.³⁵

At the heart of Waterhouse’s argument was an attempt to reclassify the Indians as subhuman and thus incapable of civility or conversion. In one passage, Waterhouse detailed how the massacre, and more specifically the treatment of Thorpe, revealed the core inhumanity of the Indians:

Neither did yet these beasts spare those amongst the rest well knowne vnto them, from whom they had daily receiued many benefits and favours, but spitefully also massacred them, without remorse or pittie, being in this more fell then Lyons and Dragons, which . . . haue beene so farre from hurting, as they haue both acknowledged, and gratefully requited their Benefactors; such is the force of good deeds, though done to cruell beasts, as to make them put off the very nature of beasts, and to put on humanity vpon them. But these miscreants, contrariwise in this kinde, put not off onely all humanity, but put on a worse and more then vnnaturall

³⁵ Waterhouse, *A Declaration*, 18, 23, 25-6, 24-25. Also see, Kupperman, *Jamestown Project*, 278-327.

brutishness. One instance of it, amongst too many, shall serue for all.³⁶

Christopher Brooke, another individual like Waterhouse who was heavily interested in Company affairs, published his *A Poem on the late Massacre in Virginia* in 1622. The publication bore on the title page a reproduction of the company's official seal and offered more rhetoric on Indian inhumanity: "For, but consider what those creatures are, / (I cannot call them men) no Character / Of God in them: Soules drown'd in flesh and blood; / Rooted in Euill, and oppos'd in Good; / Errors of Nature, of inhumane Birth, / The very dregs, garbage and spawne of Earth"³⁷ This change in rhetoric has been noted by historians and has led to the argument that 1622 marked a shift in Indian/settler relations. Warren Billings has noted in his history of early Virginia that after 1622, the colonists "dropped all pretense of friendship for the original Virginians" and "henceforth the natives were seen as nothing more than a barbaric impediment to settlement."³⁸ In Virginia, this view is well supported. Colonists and Indian relations deteriorated after the attack, and from 1622 to 1632, the region was ravaged by brutal fighting. Another war

³⁶ Waterhouse, *A Declaration*, 14-15.

³⁷ Christopher Brooke, *A Poem of the late Massacre in Virginia. With particular mention of those men of note that suffered in the that disaster. Written by C.B. Gent.* (1622) published by Robert C. Johnson, ed., in *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, 72 (1964), 259-292. For another example of this type of rhetoric, see John Boneil's *His Maiesties Gracious Letter to the Earle of South-Hampton. . . . Also a Treatise of the Art of making Silking* (London, 1622). On page 85-86, Boneil refers to Indians as "most vnnaturall, and so none of mine."

³⁸ Billings, Selby, Tate, *Colonial Virginia*, 44. See also, Edmund Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975), 100; Steve Sarson, *British America, 1500-1800* (London: Hodder Arnold, 2005), 53; Tom Cain, "John Donne and the Ideology of Colonization," *English Literary Renaissance* 31 (2001): 440-476, see 453-455; Loren E. Pennington, "The Amerindian in the English Promotional Literature 1575-1625," in K.R. Andrews, Nicholas P. Canny, and P.E.H. Hair, eds., *The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic, and America, 1480-1650* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979), 175-194; Alden T. Vaughan, "'Expulsion of the Savages': English Policy and the English Massacre of 1622," *William and Mary Quarterly* 35 (1978), 57-84. For an argument that minimizes the change in Indian policy wrought by the Indian attack, see Bernard W. Sheehan, *Savagism and Civility: Indians and Englishmen in Colonial Virginia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

erupted in 1644 and ended with the capture and unceremonious murder of Opechancanough in 1646. By the 1660s, the population of the Virginia Algonquians had fallen from 24,000 in 1607 to around 2,000, most of their lands had been lost, and many ended up on small reservations or headed north after making peace with the Iroquois.³⁹

In the promotional literature for Virginia and the other English colonies throughout the seventeenth century, however, 1622 does not serve as a major shift in English colonial ideology. Even immediately following the attack, some colonial writers were not willing to revise their religious hopes for the colonies.⁴⁰ One example was John Donne's sermon, delivered to the Virginia Company members in St. Michael's, Cornhill on November 13, 1622, well after news of the massacre had spread and almost two months after the entry for publication of Brooke's poem and Waterhouse's pamphlet. Although the sermon gave no positive indication that Donne had read the recent company publications, it is hardly likely that he was unaware of the change in tone regarding the Indians.⁴¹ Donne signaled his intentions with the sermon in his selection of a New Testament text, Acts I.8. He would focus his attention, not on just, godly vengeance, but on the workings of the Holy Spirit, drawing attention to the common humanity of the Indians and the duty of conversion. Brooke had refused to grant the Indians a shred of humanity ("I cannot call them men"), but Donne pointedly used the appellation throughout his sermon: "before al things shal be subued to *Christ*, his kingdome perfected . . . the Gospell muft be preached to those men to whom ye fend; to all men . . . hasten you this . . . glorious confummation of all, and happie revnion of all bodies to their Soules, by

³⁹ Taylor, *American Colonies*, 133-137; Sarson, *British America*, 50-53.

⁴⁰ For more the evidence of the existence of a few dissenting voices within the Virginia Company, see Kupperman, *Jamestown Project*, 314-316.

⁴¹ Stanley Johnson, "John Donne and the Virginia Company," *English Literary History* 14 (1947), 127-138.

preaching the *Gospell* to those men.”⁴² For Donne, the Indians had innate knowledge that identified them as humans, or “men,” and it was the duty of the colonist to transform this natural understanding to a “saving” knowledge of Christianity. With a passing reference to the new vulnerability of the colony exposed by the attack, he asked the colonists to continue the work of God and of men like George Thorpe in Virginia: “Preach to them Doctrinally, preach to the Practically, Enamore [to inspire with love] them with your *Justice*, and, (as farre as may confit with your security) your *Civilitie*; but inflame them with your *godlineffe*, and your *Religion*.”⁴³ For Donne, the attack had not altered his view of the Indians nor had it diminished for him the importance of the religious dimension to colonization.

Donne and Waterhouse disagreed specifically on how the colony of Virginia should manage its affairs, but their argument was relevant beyond the Chesapeake. Donne, in his earlier writings as well as in his sermon for the Company, had demonstrated the influence of counter-reformation philosophers, most noticeably the works of Francisco de Vitoria. In the larger European debates over the treatment of the natives in America, Vitoria had been an influential voice, along with Las Casas and others, on the side of Indian humanity and their corresponding legal rights. On the other side of this argument stood voices like that of the Aristotelian Juan Gines de Sepulveda, who argued that the Indians were barbarians without rights and “slaves by nature.”⁴⁴ The earlier rhetoric of the Company had tended more towards the Vitoria end of this argument. Vitoria, for

⁴² Donne, *Sermon*, 42-43. On his use of the word “man,” see Tom Cain, “John Donne and the Ideology of Colonization,” *English Literary Renaissance*, 31 (2001), 440-476.

⁴³ Donne, *Sermon*, 43. Definition of enamore from OED, 1.

⁴⁴ For a detailed account of the intellectual influence of Catholic Thomists, see Cain, “John Donne,” 455-469.

instance, had asserted that “Nature has decreed a kinship between all men.” Alexander Whitaker, a preacher in Virginia, could be found echoing that sentiment in his promotional tract: “One God created us, they reasonable souls and intellectual faculties as well as wee; we all have Adam for our common parent.”⁴⁵ Waterhouse and Brooke may have been less versed in this intellectual history than Donne, but they clearly pushed for a colonial policy in Virginia that moved away from Vitoria and towards many of the tenets supported by Sepulveda and his followers. This was the move that Donne rejected in 1622, but the argument was not limited in its applicability to Virginia. Waterhouse and Brooke did not restrain their comments on Native Americans specifically to the Virginia Powhatans; they were offering an understanding of the Indians that should apply throughout North America. For other colonial planners and supporters, this larger European debate had been given an English face with the debates of 1622. Subsequent promoters now had accessible, English precedents for both colonial approaches.

If Donne’s sermon revealed the limitation of the attack’s impact even on Company supporters, the resistance to embrace Waterhouse’s position in the promotional rhetoric of Massachusetts and Maryland, both colonies beginning in the early 1630s and anticipating interactions with local natives, demonstrates its total rejection as a larger English, colonial ideology. In 1630, a conforming Puritan minister named John White sought ways in which to support English colonization. In the 1620s, White became involved in various fishing ventures, which sought to create a profitable fishing station in the New World. These endeavors proved unsuccessful but did not dissipate his interest in supporting colonial projects. He became an important supporter of the Massachusetts

⁴⁵ Quoted in Cain, "John Donne," 465.

Bay Company, which received its royal charter on March 4, 1629, and helped to recruit migrants for various voyages and even funded some individual migrations.

In line with these efforts, White published a promotional tract in 1630, entitled *The planters plea Or The grounds of plantations examined*. For White, the discovery of the New World was a miraculous, world-changing event. White's God controlled even the smallest things in this world, so God's guiding hand had to be "directing one of the most difficult and observeable workes of this age." With God's hand clearly at play in the discovery of these new lands, anything approaching Waterhouse's view that the colonies were places of war and economic exploitation was so ludicrous to White as to approach blasphemy. White wrote that it was "impietie" to miss God's influence in the discovery and "great folly" to think that all of this had occurred with "no other scope but the satisfying of mens greedy appetites." White understood colonial history in stages: the first stage witnessed the "Conqueurors cruelty" as punishment for the atheism of the "heathan and bruitish Nations," and the subsequent phase involved a "mixture" of civilized people with the Indians, which would "cause at length the glorious Gospell of Iesus Christ to shine out onto them." For White, this was the same process that had occurred with their English ancestors "after those sharpe times of the bitter desolations of our Nation, betweene the *Romanes* and the *Picts*."⁴⁶ This comparison had a history in the colonial literature, dating back to the watercolors of a different John White made famous (and altered) in Theodore de Bry's *The Great Voyages*. In these paintings, the earlier John White had assigned the Indians a common humanity through the same comparison

⁴⁶ John White, *The planter plea- Or The grounds of plantations examined, and vsuall objections answered Together with a manifestation of the causes mooving such as have lately vndertaken a plantation in Nevv-England: for the satisfaction of those that question the lawfulness of the action* (London, 1630), 15, 35.

to ancient Britons.⁴⁷ After asserting their common humanity in *The Planters Plea*, the later John White then, as the Virginia Company had done before him, called out the future colonists to make religion “the principall scope whereat the Colonie aimes.” In the farewell sermon to John Winthrop’s fleet, another Puritan clergyman, John Cotton, sent the Puritans off with a similar message. In his *Gods Promise to his Plantation*, published the same year it was delivered, Cotton called the colonists to “offend not the poore Natives, but as you partake in their land, fo make them partakers of your precious faith . . . They never yet refused the Gospell, and therefore more hope they will now receive it.”⁴⁸ For White and Cotton, a colony had to earn the approval and support of God to be successful, and a real commitment to converting the Indians was crucial to making it a godly endeavor first and an economic one second.

If any colony would be most tempted to adopt Waterhouse’s position on the Indians, Lord Baltimore’s colony in the Chesapeake seemed the best candidate. Baltimore received the royal charter in 1632 while the Virginia colonists were still at war with the Indians, and the colony’s first capital, St. Mary’s, would take on a similar location to Jamestown, just farther north up the Chesapeake Bay. If anyone had reason to heed the warnings of the 1622 disaster and potentially profit from joining the ongoing Indian war, it would be Lord Baltimore and his settlers. The colony’s first substantial promotional tract, however, took direct aim at those who recommended violence as the only proper Indian policy. The tract, *A relation of Maryland*, was penned by Andrew White, a London born Jesuit sent to found a mission in the Chesapeake. This document had the

⁴⁷ For analysis of John White’s paintings and the significance of de Bry’s alterations, see Kupperman, *Indians and English*, 41-76.

⁴⁸ John Cotton, *Gods Promise to his Plantation* (London, 1630), 19.

support of the proprietor. The title page mentions William Peaseley, Baltimore's brother-in-law, for anyone seeking more information on the colony. Baltimore's approval or at least acceptance of the missionary priest as a suitable promotional author indicates much about his position on the optimal English/Indian relations.⁴⁹ In the text, however, White made explicit any implications that arose with his authorship. White references Captain Smith and other colonial writers who had described the Indians as "War-licke . . . and made very terrible" or "base and cowardly People . . . to be contemned." For White, the result of these erroneous opinions was that, in a possible reference to Waterhouse, "it is thought by some who would be esteemed Statesmen, that the only point of pollicie that the English can use, is, to destroy the Indians, or to drive them out of the Countrey, without which, it is not hoped that they can be secure." White argued that the Indians only resisted when they were mistreated and that English weaponry was always capable of keeping the Indians in "awe" if need be. The Indians responded differently to "kind and faire usage," becoming "peaceable" and "friendly" with the colonists. This, for White, was a more "just and reasonable" interaction with the Indians that carried economic benefits as well. The Indians if "induced" to civility would learn husbandry and "Mechanick trades," which would enrich the "Planters themselves . . . by the trafficke and commerce which may be had with them." White concluded that "it is much more Prudence, and Charity, to Civilize, and make them Christians, then to kill, robbe, and hunt them from place to place, as you would doe a wolfe."⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Clayton Colman Hall, ed., *Narratives of Early Maryland, 1633-1684* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), 65.

⁵⁰ *A Relation of Maryland; together, A Map of the Countrey, The Conditions of Plantation, With his Majesties Charter to the Lord Baltemore, tranflated inot English* (London, 1635), in Hall, ed., *Narratives of Early Maryland*, 70-112, quotation on 83, 90.

In the founding documents of Maryland and New England, colonial writers shared much common ground on Indian issues. Andrew White in Maryland paid more attention to the economic benefits of conversion than John White and Cotton did for New England, but there was complete agreement on the humanity of the Indians and the importance of conversion to the colonial project. English colonial writers in the preceding decades had seized any opportunity to further demonize the Spanish, and reports of their cruel behavior in America provided a continuing opportunity to caricature the Spanish and to demarcate differences between the two nations. The appeal of this narrative and the logistical problems with applying the Spanish model in North America made for a colonial vision difficult to dislodge. The attack of 1622 produced both fear and rage for many Virginia colonists close to the situation and argued to many for a policy of Indian war and enslavement. The rhetoric of Waterhouse and Brooke represented only a flashpoint, however. The memory of 1622 and the heated rhetoric it induced barely made a dent in the future colonial promotion. In subsequent English colonies of New England and Maryland, the colonial promoters, ever aware that they were advertizing a colony and always sensitive to what might attract people to migrate, aggressively distanced themselves and their colonies from the Waterhouse, and ultimately, the Sepulveda model. By mid-century, peaceful and productive relations with the Indians remained a goal of a successful colony, one that would serve both religious and economic ends. In the colonial literature at mid-century, unfriendly or hostile relations with the surrounding Indians were viewed as a colonial failure, the same as it had been before 1622. Waterhouse and others had failed to offer a compelling alternative vision of English

colonization within which Indian war and destruction could be interpreted as effective colonial policy.

At mid-century, the idea that a colony should strive to be economically diverse and to have harmonious relations with the surrounding Indians was still dominant, and Virginia was struggling in both areas. It was producing a single crop, neglecting the production of necessities, and living in disparate communities ever vulnerable to Indian attack. On the Indian front, it had suffered a second dramatic surprise attack in 1644 and soon after participated in its third Anglo-Powhatan war. Despite these contemporary concerns, historians have granted the colony a high level of success during this period. Karen Kupperman has argued, for instance, that Virginia had discovered the model for colonial success in the reforms of 1618.⁵¹ In his recent study of the American colonies, Alan Taylor has also offered a positive account of Virginia during this period. By mid-century, he argues, what had once been a “tenuous beachhead had become two thriving provinces and dynamo for further expansion.”⁵² Just as the original promoters of colonization had hoped, Taylor continues, Virginia colonists were consuming manufactures and producing a staple agricultural crop. But the early promoters had hoped for much more than that and those expectations carried into the 1650s. Colonial realities in Virginia had not altered the goals for the colony, which remained a diversified economy and a peaceful cohabitation with the Indians. For those writing about the colony at this time, Virginia had great potential but a flawed present, making it an appealing target for the reforming spirit.

⁵¹Karen Kupperman, *The Jamestown Project* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2.

⁵²Taylor, *American Colonies*, 137.

With the perception of Virginia as a failing colony, the turbulent times of the 1640s and 1650s in England offered some hope that change was possible in the colony as well. From 1645 to 1660, several works appeared in England treating the Chesapeake area and its two sister colonies, Virginia and Maryland. These authors pursued the same goals in Virginia of a diversified economy and improved relations with the Indians, but they would develop an approach to those ends that differed significantly from their predecessors. The section will examine the promotional literature of Virginia in the context of the ideological conflicts that were occurring in England at the same time. In England, there were many supporters of the English Commonwealth desperate to create space in the current social thought for the self-interested individual. They attacked the traditional assumptions of humanist thought that considered interest to be the primary threat to community. These authors argued that wealth was the source of national power and that industry and labor, often propelled by self-interest, were the mechanisms of economic growth. They began to create and propagate an ideology where self-interest and the public good worked together instead of at cross-purposes. The majority of the promotional literature would embrace these ideas about society and political economy as a solution to Virginia's problems. The section will focus on two works published during this period. The first was authored by Lionel Gatford, entitled *Public Good over Private Interest*, which resisted this new ideology and closely resembled the approach to colonial promotion that had dominated the 1620s and 1630s.⁵³ The second work, written by

⁵³ Gatford was a Church of England clergyman who was ejected from his parish soon after the outbreak of the civil war. With his career stymied in England (he complained that he would have “to end his dayes in the privat teaching of Children”), Gatford sought any opportunity whereby he could “do God moft

William Bullock and entitled *Virginia Impartially Examined*, represented the new and now majority approach to addressing the colony's past problems.⁵⁴ Both approaches had clear and widely differing consequences for the ideal type of colonial government.

In England during the 1650s, classical republicanism, as J. G. A. Pocock has famously argued, was "given an English face."⁵⁵ The major figures of the republican revival were Harrington and Milton, who both focused on the necessary virtue of the people and their leaders. The crucial characteristic of a citizen in their mind was to act "as conscience dictates in the name of the common good."⁵⁶ In *Oceana*, Harrington, like the early colonial promoters, specifically targeted covetousness as the key threat to one's virtue, calling it "the root of all evil." The preferred ancient model for both Harrington and Milton was Sparta, not commercial Athens, and they registered a constant dismay at the inability of the people to live up to these virtuous dictates.⁵⁷ As Harrington and Milton increasingly lost faith in the abilities of the people, they became increasingly

service," and he found that calling in the misfortunes of the "poor neglected despised *Virginea*." See Lionel Gatford, *Publick Good Without Private Interest or, A Compendious Remonstrance of the present sad State and Condition of the English Colonie in Virginea* (London: Printed for Henry Marlh and are to be sold at the Crown in S.Paul's Church-yard, 1657). See also Jason Mc Elligott, "Gatford, Lionel (d. 1665)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

⁵⁴ Bullock's father, Hugh, had been an early Virginia settler, having migrated between 1626 and 1628 and departed the colony no later than 1639. At the time of his departure, Hugh Bullock's estate in Warwick County exceeded 5000 acres. William Bullock never visited Virginia but attempted to augment his estate before his father's death in 1650, and in the process, he claimed to have lost several thousand pounds worth of investment. See, Peter Thompson, "William Bullock's 'Strange Adventure': A Plan to transform Seventeenth Century Virginia," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., 61 (2004), 107-128.

⁵⁵ Steve Pincus, "Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth," *The American Historical Review* 103 (June, 1998), 705-736, quotation on 708. See also, J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

⁵⁶ Quentin Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 87; quoted in Pincus, "Neither Machiavellian Moment," 709.

⁵⁷ Pincus, "Neither Machiavellian Moment," 239. See also, Quentin Skinner, *The Foundations of Modern Political Thought*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) and J.G.A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

committed to aristocratic notions of government and made clear their disdain for any sort of powerful and deliberative popular assemblies. Their ideal political organization was based on virtue and the ability of those in power to resist self-interested desires for the sake of the common good.

Through a wider reading of the political literature during the interregnum, Steve Pincus has argued, however, that many supporters of the English Commonwealth rejected Machiavellian economic thought and significantly tweaked his celebration of civic virtue as they tried to come to terms with the increasingly commercial nature of society. On the heels of the two military conflicts, the English civil wars and the first Anglo-Dutch War, that demanded the ability to mobilize economic resources quickly, these authors began to see wealth, as opposed to virtuous citizen soldiers, as the key to military victory. They focused on wealth creation as an unequivocal good and emphasized the importance of an industrious population. They minimized the importance of a state's natural endowments and focused instead on the work habits of the people. In Henry Parker's *Of Free Trade* (1648), for instance, he noted that cities "having little of their own, being industrious, flow with more abundance, and swim in greater superfluity, than some other slothful cities that naturally want nothing."⁵⁸ These writers had given up on the ideal of civic virtue as an organizing principle of government. They accepted, and even embraced, self-interested behavior instead. As Pincus has pointed out, these writers "began to espouse a politics based on recognizing, deploying, and taming interest."⁵⁹ They naturalized interest, instead of treating it as a moral shortcoming, and emphasized its importance in the creation of national wealth, which was now understood as crucial to the

⁵⁸ Parker, *Of a Free Trade*, (London, 1648), 3, quoted in Pincus, "Neither Machiavellian Moment," 721.

⁵⁹ Pincus, "Neither Machiavellian Moment," 729-732, 708.

common good. This economic ideology fully re-defined self-interest in positive terms. Merchants, for instance, who traditionally had been treated very skeptically by humanist thinkers such as Milton because of the self-interested nature of their profession, were fully redeemed in this new ideology. One author praised merchants as the "most honourable profession and principal fountain from whose industrious streams floweth in the riches of a Common-wealth."⁶⁰ Far from being anathema to the well-being of society, personal interest, for these writers, actually had to be protected through governmental participation. These mid-century authors embraced a "more inclusive and varied political culture" as a way to protect self-interest, encourage industry, and bolster the nation's finances and thereby the larger public good.⁶¹

The group of Virginia publications published during the 1650s should be understood as the transatlantic extension of this ideological debate. The majority of these texts embraced the new ideology and its focus on industry and national wealth. The longest of these tracts was John Ferrar's *A Perfect Description of Virginia* (1649). Ferrar was a long-time and erstwhile supporter of the Virginia Company and was one of the most informed individuals at this time on Virginia affairs and its history. Edward Williams, with the help of Ferrar, published *Virgo triumphans, or Virginia in generall, but the south part thereof in particular* (1650). Other than his probable affiliation with Ferrar, Williams's background and why he came to be interested in Virginia is largely unknown.⁶² John Hammond, who published Bullock's tract in 1649, penned his own promotional piece in 1655, entitled *Leah and Rachel, or, the Two Fruitfull Sisters*

⁶⁰ Ibid., 722.

⁶¹ Ibid., 729-732, 708.

⁶² David R. Ransome, "Williams, Edward (fl. 1650)," *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004.

Virginia and Maryland.⁶³ Hammond was a long-time colonist in the Chesapeake, claiming to have lived there for 21 years from 1635-1656. So fond of Maryland, he wrote, that “it is that Country in which I desire to spend the remnant of my dayes, in which I covet to make my grave.”⁶⁴ His intention in writing the tract was to remove “thofe Foggy Mifts” that clouded a true understanding of the colony. In their descriptions of Virginia and Maryland, all of these authors, along with William Bullock, demonstrated a clear shift to a focus on the importance of labor to any future success in the colonies. Gatford was the lone exception to this trend. He did not embrace the tenets of the new economic ideology and focused instead on the importance of virtue in the colonial setting in much the same way as the earlier promotional writers had done.

As a whole, the authors of these tracts demonstrated a clear familiarity with each other and a similar approach to publication. Ferrar provided Edward Williams with much of the details for his tract, which he acknowledged in his opening dedication to the reader. References between authors were common but it did not indicate that they were always of one accord. Williams, for instance, took issue with Bullock’s valuation of colonial wheat but praised his Indian commentary.⁶⁵ When Hammond attacked the writings of people who had never ventured to the colonies themselves, calling them “infamous lyars,” Bullock was the only one that he mentioned by name.⁶⁶ Writing in 1649, Bullock could not respond to these future criticisms, but made it clear in his text

⁶³ John Hammond, *Leah and Rachel, or, the Two Fruifull Sisters Virginia and Mary-land: Their Present Condition, impartially stated and related* (London: Printed by T. Mabb, and are to be fold by Nich. Bourn, neer the Royall Exchange, 1656).

⁶⁴ Hammond, *Leah and Rachel*, 28.

⁶⁵ Edward Williams, *Virgo trimphans, or, Virginia in generall, but the south part therof in particular including the fertile Carolana, and the no lesse excellent island of Roanoak, richly and experimentally valued* (London: Printed by Thomas Harper, for John Stephenson, 1650), 20.

⁶⁶ Hammond, *Leah and Rachel*, B2.

that his work had been informed by the earlier colonial writers, “M. Heriot, M. Laine, and Captaine Smith.”⁶⁷ Gatford was the exception in this group, not mentioning other writers by name, but having never been to the colonies, he admitted his sources came from secondary materials.⁶⁸ Beyond their awareness of each other, the tracts also took similar forms. They were all relatively short, ranging from 19 to 76 pages, and the styles of their writing indicated an ambition for a wide circulation. Hammond and Williams made explicit appeals to poorer people throughout their tracts, and the forms of these texts supported that goal. In all the texts, Latin phrases and esoteric allusions were rare.

The result was a group of accessible texts arguing in print over the past and future of Virginia. In *Publick Good without Private Interest*, Gatford began his appraisal of the colony with a withering attack on Virginia's recent history. To convey the “prefent sad condition of the English Colonie in Virginea,” Gatford pointed to both economic and religious failures. For Gatford, Virginia’s history had been one of failed expectations: “That a Colonie, Planted in such a Country 60 yeares since or more . . . should in all this time make so little, very little profit or benefit of such a land, in respect of what it would yield, if well-husbanded . . . and (which is a grand shame and dishonour both to our Nation and to our Religion) instead of converting or civilizing any one of the Natives . . . they give them all too juft occasion to be scandalized at the very name of Christianity.”⁶⁹ For Gatford, the colony was failing because of a lack of virtuous colonists. Virginia settlers at all levels of society were behaving badly. The governors in the colony, for instance, were often “inexperienced, indiscreet, careles, [and] covetous” while ministers

⁶⁷ Bullock, *Virginia Impartially Examined*, 2.

⁶⁸ Gatford, *Public Good*, B2-B3.

⁶⁹ Gatford, *Public Good*, B1, 2.

sent to the colony often lived “loose lives” and took part in “un-Gospel-becoming conversation.” Gatford saved maximum vitriol for the average colonist. They were “the very scum and off-scouring of our Nation, vagrants, or condemned persons, or such others, as by the looseness and viciousness of their lives have disabled themselves to subsist any longer in this Nation.” These complaints recall the Company literature and the constant concern about the disposition of those migrating to the colony.⁷⁰ So rampant was the misbehavior in Virginia, Gatford asserted that good acts were overturned and well-meaning individuals were discouraged. A governor who did enact a positive reform in the colony had his good works “pulled down, or suffered to ruine” by subsequent governors. The rare ministers, who were “shining lights before the people in their holy exemplaire lives,” were so “dishonoured and despised” by the population that they were discouraged from staying in the colony. The only people behaving virtuously in Virginia were the Indians. Gatford recalled the massacre of 1622 and asserted that the Indians, instead of acting in a bloodthirsty rage as displayed in the de Bry print, exercised restraint during the attack. The Indians had refused to attack any colonist that had dealt honestly with them concerning the purchase of land. Anybody who had “covenanted” with Indians was safe because, unlike the colonists, the Indians “made good their convenants.” There were few shades of gray in Gatford’s depiction of Virginia. The New World environment, including the native groups, was hospitable to English colonization. Virginia was a “Languishing and dying Colonie” because of the shortcomings and misbehavior of the English colonists.⁷¹

⁷⁰ See Chapter 1.

⁷¹ Gatford, *Public Good*, 3, 4, 3, 15, 9, 17.

Like Milton, Harrington, and the colonial writers before him, Gatford explained these misbehaviors through the sin of self-interest. The governor of the colony, for instance, should be, and in most cases was not, a man “of more than ordinary publick Spirits, preferring the publick good of the Plantation before [his] own gain or privat intereft.” The tobacco planters who had spread out instead of living in towns, which had hurt the overall economy of the colony as well as weakened her defenses, had done so “out of covetous defire to take up great Tracts of land.” In relating a recent skirmish between settlers in Maryland and Virginia, he blamed the Virginian colonists for “thirsting after their brethrens blood, and a fordid coveting of their estates.” The phenomenon of migrants arriving in the colony in ill-health and susceptible to an early death, he continued, arose “from the wretched covetoufnefs of those that fet forth ships for the transport of passengers, merely for gain.”⁷² Echoing the title of his tract, Gatford’s solution for Virginia was to make colonists put the common good above private interest. If Virginia became a place of virtue, then colonists would be able to resist the quick profits that accompanied tobacco production and would reside in towns, build communities, and in the long run, produce a much wider variety of colonial goods. A virtuous colonist would also be willing to resist the temptation of exploiting or mistreating an Indian in the short term, knowing the damage such an action would have on the colony’s long-term safety and wider reputation.

In his solutions for Virginia’s current state, he first went through each category – Governors, ministers, and planters – and requested that the colony simply choose or attract better men. The ministers needed to be of better quality and to be encouraged and

⁷² *Ibid.*, 3, 9, 11.

compensated appropriately. The governors had to be willing to stay in the colony longer, had to be more familiar with commodities and trade of the region, and had to be paid more so that they “may spend [their] time wholly . . . in and for the publick good of the Colonie.” The migrating colonists should have “better manners” and “more honesty and piety.” The ships that trade there, Gatford argued, should “be well victualled” so that migrants arrive in good health.⁷³ He also recommended that “head townes” be built in each county and that each town in turn should build a church and that forts should be constructed throughout the colony and be better maintained in case of outside invasion. Gatford wanted to infuse Virginia with virtuous leaders and to build towns, churches, and forts in the colony by fiat, not at the behest of the colonists themselves. Gatford’s plan was to superimpose onto Virginia the structure of a virtuous society.

Many of the early promoters in Virginia and New England had attacked self-interest with a similar fervor as Gatford, but they had often chosen a different solution. In several early sermons dedicated to English colonization, the authors had dedicated themselves to the task of inflaming virtue in the individual colonist or potential migrant. Gatford did this when he called out to his reader in the epistle: “look not every man on his own things, but every man also on the things of others.”⁷⁴ Whole sermons in the earlier literature were dedicated to this theme, but Gatford’s approach was different.⁷⁵ Although he motioned to this type of personal reformation in his opening, his actual recommendations for the colony registered a more static view of the individual. He did not allot much space in his text to encouraging the individual colonist to behave better.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 22, 19, 3, 20.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, C2.

⁷⁵ For example, see Robert Cushman, *A Sermon Preached at Plimmoth in Nevv-England* (London, 1622).

Instead, he sought the creation of a legitimate, external power that could coerce such behavior, revealing the same skepticism about the virtue of the broader population that had also developed in the political thought of Milton and Harrington.

In his vision for the colony, Gatford sought increased political power for the now more virtuous governmental officials. He called for governors to be “armed with such power and authority, as is meet, for the reclaiming and regulating such a plantation.” He admitted the governor would need the consent of elected representatives, but was adamant that the governor needed the power to “make and constitute” laws that were “agreeable with the temper of the place and people, and the good and benefit of the whole plantation.” Magistrates and officers in the colony should be wholly accountable to the governor in all manners, Gatford continued, “the supreme power of this Nation.” Law and punishment needed to be toughened in the colony as well. The planters who attacked the Maryland colonists needed to be “severely and speedily punished” in order to deter future “wicked persons from the like barbarous practices.” Laws in general, Gatford continued, needed to be “more sharp and severe, and more strictly executed.” Planter behavior also needed to be restricted by force. In both “settling themselves, and in planting of Tobacco,” their behavior needed to be “more regulated and ordered.” And finally, for traders who did drop off mistreated passengers in the colony, the governor should have the power to impose a “severe mulct [fine] or other punishment.”⁷⁶ For Gatford, his focus on virtue coupled with a misbehaving colonial population led to his recommendation of an exclusive and severe political authority.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 18, 19, 20.

Bullock offered a different solution to Virginia's problems. As much as his recommendations would ultimately diverge from Gatford's, there was much common ground between the two authors in both their claim to virtuous motives and in their critical descriptions of Virginia. Gatford asserted his intentions in writing about Virginia by declaring his lack of a personal agenda: "I do not in this work seek myself, but the glory of God, and the good of fo many foules." Bullock made the same move, justifying his work in similar terms on the title page: "Looke not upon this BOOKE, as those that are set out by private men, for private ends; for being read, you'l find, the publick good is the Authors onely aime." Also like Gatford, Bullock's evaluation of the Virginia was highly critical, pointing to the "slight esteem this place hath amongst the generality of the people." He pointed to his own past experience in the colony, having "in this place lost some thousands of pounds," and avowed that his intention was, through his experience in the colony, to find the "impediments" to colonial success in Virginia, both for the individual and the colony as a whole.⁷⁷

Bullock viewed Virginia as a place of lost opportunity, and many of the same features of Virginia, which would come to bother Gatford, disturbed him as well. Bullock believed that Virginia should have constituted, at the moment he was writing his tract, a "great and flourishing people." Like Gatford, Bullock described a colony that had fallen woefully short of those ambitions. Like so many Virginia observers and colonists before him, he pointed to the settlement patterns in Virginia. The people were "disperst abroad in severall small numbers, at great distances from each other, which is very uncomfortable and disccusolate." The reason for this behavior in particular and the

⁷⁷ Bullock, *Virginia Impartially Examined*, 6, 1, 3.

struggles of the colony more generally was the familiar scapegoat of private interests. Bullock bemoaned early in the pamphlet: “Ambition . . . hat been none the least hinderance: Therefore he doth advise all such as intend to be labourers in this Harvest, to study meeknesse, and the generall good.” Dealing specifically with the settlement patterns, he was more specific, describing many settlers as harboring only “a desire to better their fortunes in remote places” and are “liberall to abuse all other places but their own.”⁷⁸ But Bullock, unlike Gatford, was looking to eradicate self-interest from Virginia society, but to limit its abuses. He targeted political officials in the colony in particular. The governors, for instance, were “strangers” to Virginia and often pursued their “owne Worke,” instead of the good of the colony. Political leaders in the colony were often persons “being bound to pay Mony-Debts,” who had supported acts only if they provided some personal benefit. Their self-interested agenda was attacked in conventional terms, but the real problem was that they had the power to exploit others. The result, Bullock concluded, was that “Justice [was] stifled” in Virginia.

Bullock contended that these domineering officials would jeopardize the colony by threatening the self-interested ambitions of the wider population. He offered his story as evidence of the necessary role of self-interest in colonization and how the current regime would bring about the ruin of the colony. Bullock’s initial interest in the colony had been to enlarge his father’s estate and invest in the colony, but those profit-seeking efforts had been thwarted, unjustly in his opinion, by corrupt colonial officials. He had refused any further involvement in the colony, as others would do in a similar situation, he argued, because he would have only a tenuous hold on any profits that he accrued

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

through his estate. If governmental officials remained unchecked, he predicted an inevitable decline for the colony: “no wise man will either transport himself, or send his estate to such a place where [there] is no settled Government, and wholesome Lawes to preserve mens lives and estates, and to maintaine honest commerce.”⁷⁹ Bullock's agenda was unabashedly economic and it required political rights and "wholesome laws" as the necessary security to the pursuit of New World profits. The problem in Virginia was not a self-interested population, as it had been for Gatford, but a lack of protection for self-interested ambitions.

Where Gatford had recommended more centralized authority, Bullock sought a greater diffusion of political power. Bullock focused on the role and responsibilities of the assembly, which he argued had to be elected by the freeholders and had to have real power. Bullock, for instance, gave lawmaking powers to the assembly in his proposed government while Gatford had delegated that power solely to the governor. The assembly was so important to Bullock because he wanted the government to be “drawn from the quintessence of the people.” Using the metaphor of a stone building, he described the role of the people: “the common people fitting and chusing the stones for this strong and sumptuous building.”⁸⁰ Gatford’s rhetoric, on the other hand, on an empowered populace was almost wholly negative: “such is the infeparable unhaippinefs and mifchief that constantly attends both the Governours and Governed, where the power of the Governours depends upon the favour and pleasure of the people, or is manaced and fettered by Plebeian Tribunes, or over-awed by any insulting Ephori.”⁸¹ Gatford did not

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 10 [11].

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 18 [15], 17 [14], 30 [21].

⁸¹ Gatford, *Public Good*, 8.

go so far as to recommend an autocracy in Virginia nor did Bullock advise something even nearing a democracy, but their views on a representative arm in government were nearly incompatible.⁸²

This type of government and the political influence of a wider portion of the population was vital to provide the necessary protections of property and self-advancement, which to Bullock was crucial to encouraging migration, investment, and labor. The main problem with the former organization of the colony had been that “industrie was discouraged.” Industry, as the Commonwealth authors were beginning to emphasize, was the key to societal wealth and prosperity. Bullock used New England as an example. That colony, “begun thirteen yeares since *Virginia*,” had no “Sugar, Indigo, Ginger, or any other of the rich Commodities.” Despite the comparatively barren landscape, that colony had “become a flourishing people . . . and drive a trade with all the world.”⁸³ It was the industriousness of the population that determined colonial success, not the availability of natural resources, and Bullock's governmental recommendations would ensure that “labour” in Virginia would be “sweetly recompensed” and that the colony would begin to thrive. The new ideas about political economy, if brought to Virginia, would solve the colony's past problems and, Bullock argued, lead to a brighter future.

The subsequent promotional authors in Virginia during the 1650s, with the exception of Gatford, would give the same priority to the importance of the industriousness of the settlers. Edward Williams published *Virgo triumphans*, one year after Bullock's tract on Virginia. In advertizing southern Virginia, he averred that “no

⁸² Bullock voting restrictions example

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 12, 25, 24, 21.

part of this Country may bee ungratefull to the Industrious.” In talking about salt production as a potential staple commodity, he asserted that “there wants nothing but industrious spirits and encouragement.” “Let him apply himself with his greatest industry and ability,” he continued, and reap the certain benefits because “God rewards the sweat of Industry.” Barbados offered a powerful example to Williams of the power of human labor. He marveled at how an island “so little in circumference of Ground should be able to vent the value of two hundred and fifty thousand pound yearly.” As Bullock had pointed to the success of New England despite its lack of a profitable staple commodity, Williams used Barbados to highlight the power of human endeavor. Williams gave full credit to the Barbadian colonists and “their industry and unwearied constancy.” Their success on the island gave hope to “all lovers of industry, that had a larger proportion of ground to improve upon,” as was the case in Virginia. Eyeing the fertile and expansive territory in southern Virginia, the only thing that could halt an “equal or greater” profit was, not surprisingly, if “an invincible sloth,” industry’s opposite, overtook Virginia’s colonists.⁸⁴

John Hammond, writing six years after Bullock in 1655, also embraced the move toward a focus on industry and elaborated more explicitly on the connections between industry, political rights, and self-interest. Unlike Bullock and Gatford, Hammond acknowledged the past struggles of the colony but argued that it had fully recovered. He first acknowledged Virginia’s reputation as “an unhealthy place, a neft of Rogues, whores, defolute and rooking perfons; a place of intolerable labour, bad ufage and hard Diet, etc.” He admitted that this had been true in the early years of the colony. The early

⁸⁴ Williams, *Virgo Triumphans*, 7, 12, 18, 15.

years in Virginia had been marked by all that “tyranny could inflict or act.” Hammond posited a change, however, and alluded to the reforms of 1618, when the people had been “set free.” The colonists had allowed to “live of themselves, and enjoy the benefit of their own industry; men then began to call what they laboured for their own.” The improved Virginia was a place where “industry may as much improve itself in, as in any habitable part of the World.” He pointed to the abundant wildlife of Virginia, but made sure to point to “how easy with industry to be had.” These changes had led to a transformation in Virginia’s reputation. Hammond claimed that instead of a place a death and poverty, the colony was now known by the great “preferment” with which it “rewarded the industrious.” “If men,” he continued, “cannot gain (by diligence) [e]states in those parts . . . it will hardly be done.”⁸⁵ Bullock prescribed a cure for the colony, while Hammond asserted that one had already occurred, but their solutions, whether past or future, were similar. Virginia’s needed transformation had come, or would come, when industry was encouraged and rewarded.

The Virginia authors were espousing a political economy that worked through self-interest, not against it. In his plans for vineyards, for instance, Williams proposed attracting skilled tradesmen from other countries to teach the colonists the “mysterie” of their profession. Worried that these men may be reluctant to reveal the secrets of the trade, Williams planned to offer them a “share of the profits of every mans Vintage.” This would ensure that they would be “faithfull in their instructions . . . since a publick advance of this designe cannot miscarry without a sensible losse to their particular

⁸⁵ Hammond, *Leah and Rachel*, 3, 6, 10, 11, 19.

interest.”⁸⁶ Bullock offered the same solution to maximize the industry of servants in the colony. He advised landowners in the colony to determine a satisfactory output on any given day for a servant and then provide additional payment for any effort that exceeded those expectations or, even better, “let him have a remainder of the day to plant a little Tobacco for himself, or any other thing.” The servants then, driven by the appeal of personal profit, would work harder for their masters because it allowed for additional benefits to themselves. This worked for both parties, Bullock asserted, because all servants “will work more to get themselves a Shilling, then to get [their master] ten.” The appeal of personal profit would make servants “shew the best of their abilities.”⁸⁷ For these authors, private interests could be channeled towards positive social ends. Private interest for Bullock, Hammond, and Williams was something to be directed, not stifled, and would result in the industrious population so crucial to colonial success.

This new approach to self-interest was most conspicuous in Bullock’s plan to improve relations with the surrounding Indians. Gatford, not surprisingly, had posited virtue as the key to converting and civilizing the Indians. He frequently bemoaned the lack of virtue on the part of the colonists as ruining any chance of converting the surrounding Indians. The colonists depraved lifestyles gave the Indians “all too just occasion to be scandalized at the very name of Christianity, to abhor and detest [the English] Government, as well as manners.”⁸⁸ The Indians would be persuaded of the merits of English society and culture by the colonists setting the appropriate example.

⁸⁶ Williams, *Virgo Triumphans*, 9.

⁸⁷ Bullock, *Virginia Impartially Examined*, 35.

⁸⁸ Gatford, *Public Good*, 2.

The virtuousness of Virginia society was the determinative factor, to Gatford, in the colony's ability to convert the Indians to English ways.

Bullock offered a dramatically different path to this goal. For Bullock, “love alone” would not work with the Indians because they were too “subtill and treacherous.” Force was not a great option either because it was expensive and time consuming, but Bullock promised to have found a “third way.” He would rely on nature, since the Indians, he asserted, were “endued with naturall reason.” Bullock asked the question of “what predominates in nature” and concluded “ambition to be the princpall marke that nature aymes at.” Ambition would be the “net” by which the colonists could “take these men.” In describing how ambition could be used with the Indians, Bullock offered several observations about the Indians. First, he asserted that they had little knowledge of worldly things besides what they needed for self-preservation, and because nature was so plentiful in the New World, they took little heed of preparing for the future. This lifestyle allowed the Indians an independence that freed them from any pressing need to trade with other nations. His solution set out to change this and 1) make them “sensible of their nakednesse,” 2) make them care about the future, “by taking them off from their confidence in nature,” 3) make them desire commerce, and 4) make them ‘be brought to depend.’”⁸⁹ Instead of reigning in the self-interested pursuits of the colonists, as Gatford had argued for, Bullock’s plan was to awaken ambition in the Indians and to establish their dependency on English goods and culture.

Bullock’s solution required a good bit of deception on the part of the colonists. They would have to give certain Indians, starting with the “Werowances” and other great men,

⁸⁹ Bullock, *Virginia Impartially Examined*, 33.

jewels and clothing. Accepted as gifts, this material goods would be enjoyed and start to distinguish one Indian from another. This, Bullock argued, “will kindle the fire of ambition” in others to be so recognized and for many indicate that it “is the time to work.” If some Indians were clothed, then many would realize their own nakedness, and when their “sight [was] cleared,” the English colonists will have them “in the snare.” The planters would then offer some work to the Indians, but not work that was too difficult. Bullock was careful about advising the planter to ease them into a life of labor. He asserted that the planters would soon find a less intransigent workforce, because as he had recommended with English servants, the Indians “for themselves they will work, but not for you.” Bullock projected the growing dependence of the Indians on material goods and an accompanying acceptance of the labor as a means to an end. The planters should have no concerns about the Indians falling back to their old ways with this plan because “their own ends shall keepe them” to labor. “Thus by degrees,” Bullock continued, “(God assisting) you shall make them conquer themselves.” He concluded his recommendations for the Indian relations: “And now have you opened their eyes, made them care for the future, drawn them to commerce, and made them depend. And in the end, by Gods mercy to them, make them good Christians.”⁹⁰ Williams approved of Bullock’s plan in *Virgo Triumphans*: “to fasten Cloaths upon them, which if once it were effected, that which Mr. *Bullocke* excellent patly calls, The Universal [k]not of Nature. Ambition would cement them to a more orderly course of life.”⁹¹ Ambition, or self-interest, was no longer a threat to amicable Anglo-Indian relations but was the key to directing the behavior of both the Indians and the English. A population free of ambition,

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁹¹ Williams, *Virgo Triumphans*, 20.

as the natives had been described by English writers in the past, was no longer a virtuous ideal, but represented a population dangerously independent and difficult to control.⁹²

This new understanding of self-interest in the promotional literature for Virginia and its many ramifications for how these authors envisioned colonial success represented an extension of the economic thought emerging in England in the 1650s, but was also a near total revision of the earlier colonial promotion. The earlier colonial writers had opposed the pursuit of self-interest in the New World and focused on the importance of virtue to the survival of colonial communities. A few authors, like John Smith and William Vaughan, diverged from this pattern and pointed to the importance of labor in the New World, the possibility of individual wealth, and the importance of colonial revenues, but they never succeeded in re-conceptualizing self-interest and its relationship to society. Smith and Vaughan praised the importance of labor and the possibilities of self-advancement without ever explaining satisfactorily how this would not destabilize and ultimately ruin the creation of settler communities.⁹³ This changed in the 1650s because there was now an available ideology that posited self-interest and the actions that it encouraged as working towards the common good.

The promotional authors of the 1650s now had the language by which they could appeal to self-interested individuals while promising the same types of virtuous societies that the earlier writers had aimed for. Industry was the key. Self-interested motivations were now transformed into industrious acts, which would lead to prosperous communities. Hammond elaborated on the logic of this process: “The inhabitants now

⁹² For an example of a promotional author praising the Indians for their lack of worldly desires, see *Relation of Maryland*, 90.

⁹³ See Chapter 1.

finding the benefit of their industries, began to look with delight on their increasing stocks: as nothing more pleasurable than profit, to take pride in their plentifully furnished Tables, to grow not only civil, but great observers of the Sabbath, to stand on their reputations, and to be ashamed of that notorious manner of life they had formerly lived and wallowed in.” In other words, colonial industry and the accompanying prosperity would lead to a reformed, prosperous, and religious community. After this transformation, Hammond claimed: the colonists sent “home for Gospel Ministers, and largely contributed to their maintenance” and began to search out better “Teachers” for the colony. The result was a religiously devout and economically diverse colony: “the Gospel began to flourish . . . famous buildings went forward, Orchards innumerable were planted and preserved . . . staple Commodities, as Silk, Flax, Pot-ashes, etc . . . attempted on, and with good success brought to perfection.”⁹⁴ Industry created everything that Gatford had sought to impose on the colony. These authors offered a different path to colonial success, but the end destination had not changed. Bullock, Williams, and Hammond wanted a stable community, a religious society, a diverse economy, and improved relations with the Indians, but they contended that self-interest, labor, and wealth, not virtue, would be the mechanisms of positive social change in the colony.

The ideas on political economy espoused by the Commonwealth writers was attractive to colonial promoters, but not simply because it allowed for a direct appeal to the self-interest of potential migrants. That had been tried before in the 1620s by William Vaughan and had little appeal to subsequent promoters. It was also not because the mid-century authors were any more willing to accept an atomistic and thoroughly

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 5, 13, 14.

individualistic society. The new political economy was so appealing to the colonial promoter because it could contain the appeal to self-interest within a larger claim to societal prosperity. As the Commonwealth writers were coming to terms with a more commercial society in England and its implications for the role of self-interest in society, so too were the colonial promoters, who could not ignore the power of self-interest in the individual decision to migrate. After the 1650s, this commercial ideology would become the dominant language of the colonial promotion and would promulgate a clear economic justification for political rights and representative government within the English empire.

CHAPTER THREE

"ANY WHO WILL BE INDUSTRIOUS, MAY LIVE COMFORTABLY HERE": THE LIBERAL LANGUAGE OF EMPIRE IN THE LATE STUART PERIOD

To help finance colonization in the late Stuart period, colonial proprietors often granted large tracts of land to joint stock companies, who would then take charge of settling the land and populating the area. In Pennsylvania, one such joint stock company was the Free Society of Traders. In 1682, they published their articles of incorporation, detailing the organization of the company and their interest in colonization. In the preface, they outlined the unique character of the company: "It is a very *Unusual Society*, for it is an *Absolute Free One*, and in a *free Country*: A *Society* without Oppression: wherein all may be concerned that will; and yet have the same *Liberty of private Traffique*, as though there was *no society* at all. . . it is such a *society*, as can do harm to none; but may do good to all."¹ The Free Traders put forth the idea, still rare in the seventeenth century, that unfettered self-interest was the engine of commerce.² They had

¹ *The articles, settlement, and offices of the Free Society of Traders in Pennsylvania agreed upon by divers merchants and others for the better improvement and government of trade in that province* (London, 1682), Preface.

² On proto-liberal economic and social ideas in the seventeenth century, see, Joyce O. Appleby, *Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century England* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); Andrea Finkelstein, *Harmony and Balance: An Intellectual History of Seventeenth Century English Economic Thought* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Steve Pincus, "Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth," *The American Historical Review* 103 (June, 1998), 705-736; and Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passion and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

no grand political ambitions in the colony, only to improve and profit from the colony's trade. The society's promise of total freedom, intended to attract investors and to encourage trade, should have nevertheless served as a warning to colonial proprietors of the economic pressures at play in the English colonies.

Unlike the Free Traders, the English colonies of the late seventeenth century represented a combination of political, religious, and economic ambitions, but by the 1680s, colonial promoters had gravitated towards a more commercial approach to colonization than had existed earlier in the century. They no longer worried about the corrupting possibilities of colonial wealth and pursued labor and production in the colonies with few reservations. The promotional authors of the 1680s embraced and expanded on the positive links between labor, self-interest, and representative government that had been first explored in the promotional literature during the 1650s. Almost without exception, these promoters emphasized the importance of industrious pursuits in America and the political liberties that would encourage those activities.

The English colonies begun during the Restoration, however, all took the form of proprietary colonies. The proprietors owned all the land in the colony and, through their individual charters, were granted wide-ranging powers in the organization and management of their colonies. The economic goals of colonization, however, worked against any great pretensions of political power. This chapter investigates the tension that existed between the dual pursuits of colonial prosperity and personal political power. The promotional literature of the period grappled with the difficult task of advertizing the colonies while asserting the proprietors' political authority.

From 1680 to 1685, three colonies—Carolina, East Jersey, and Pennsylvania—were the subject of extensive promotional campaigns. The first section of the chapter will follow the early history of the colonies and the reasons for the convergence of their promotional efforts. The second section will investigate the continuing move in the promotional literature towards a focus on industry, the attendant embrace of self-interest as a potentially positive force in society, and the political ramifications of this colonial vision.

Carolina, East Jersey, and Pennsylvania were proprietary colonies: Pennsylvania was under the control of a single proprietor, while political control in Carolina and East Jersey rested with small groups of individuals. They competed with one another for colonists, frequently offered criticisms of each other, and established independent methods of promotion. A unifying characteristic of their early histories was the tension between the expansive grant of power in the colonial charters and the constant pressure to give most of that power away in order to attract people to the colonies. The early history of these colonies reveals the political compromises of the various proprietors and why the promotional materials for the three colonies, begun at different times, peaked at the same time.

The original proprietors of Carolina formed a formidable political group, but none were primarily colonial entrepreneurs. They were all men of affairs and politicians who sought to make money from landed estates in the New World as they maintained their

focus on more important domestic matters.³ The original mover in the pursuit of the charter was Sir John Colleton, the least politically powerful of what would become the eight Carolina proprietors. Colleton had fought for Charles I and had fled to Barbados upon the King's execution. Upon the Restoration, he was back in England seeking his just rewards for services rendered and received a knighthood. With his experience during the interregnum, he understood current circumstances in Barbados and how attractive a new settlement in Carolina would be for many planters on the island. In 1661, as Colleton began his pursuit of the Carolina charter, Barbados was nearing the end of its transformation from a tobacco to a sugar economy. The rapid development of African slavery accompanied the move to sugar production with the result being a social and economic revolution with far-reaching effects for the future of the Island.⁴ During the 1650s and 1660s, servants who reached the end of their indenture were presented with scarce opportunities for either land or employment. Many chose to leave the island in 1650 to participate in the English planting of Surinam in Guiana and in 1655 to populate the newly conquered island of Jamaica. After 1650, the total number of colonists leaving

³ For studies on the colonial history of Carolina, see Robert M. Weir, *Colonial South Carolina: A History* (New York: KTO Press, 1983); L.H. Roper, *Conceiving Carolina: Proprietors, Planters, and Plots, 1662-1729* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Peter H. Wood, *Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion* (New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1975); Jack P. Greene, "Colonial South Carolina and the Caribbean Connection" in Greene, ed., *Imperatives, Behaviors & Identities: Essays in Early American Cultural History* (Charlottesville, Va.: Virginia University Press, 1992); Richard Waterhouse, *A New World Gentry: The Making of a Merchant and Planter Class in South Carolina, 1670-1770*. For broader studies that include careful analysis of Carolina's early history, see Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*, Vol. II (London: The Macmillan Company, 1904), 200-252; Wesley Frank Craven, *The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, 1607-1689* in *The History of the South*, eds., Wendall Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter ([Baton Rouge]: Louisiana State University Press, 1949), 310-359; Alan Taylor, *American Colonies* in *The Penguin History of the United States*, ed. Eric Foner (New York: Viking Press, 2001), 222-244.

⁴ On the impact of sugar production in the Atlantic World, see, Stuart B. Schwartz, *Tropical Babels: Sugar and the Making of the Atlantic World, 1450-1680* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

Barbados exceeded 10,000 people. When Colleton started to pursue the Carolina charter, he understood that the push factors for the settlers of Barbados were as strong as ever.⁵

Charles II issued the Carolina charter on March 24, 1663.⁶ As was the case with the Maryland charter from earlier in the century, the grantees were explicitly granted rights on par with those enjoyed by the bishops of Durham. The references to the Bishops of Durham signaled the intention of the crown to bestow onto the grantees similar territorial and governmental powers, which would make a colony into a great fief, an *imperium in imperio*. The charter granted the proprietors the rights to “have, use, exercise and enjoy, and in as ample manner as any bishop of Durham in our kingdom of England, ever heretofore have held, used or enjoyed, or of right ought or could have, use, or enjoy.” There were two provisions that provided some limits on the rights of the Proprietors to manage their colony as they saw fit. One was the customary stipulation that the laws be “consonant to reason, and as near as may be conveniently, agreeable to the laws and customs of this our kingdom of England.” The second was that the Proprietors had to govern “with the advice, assent, and approbation of the freemen . . . or of the greater part of them, or of their delegates or deputies.”⁷ Exactly what the second provision meant was a source of continual tension for English proprietors and their colonists.

The Proprietors targeted New Englanders and Barbadians for the first wave of migration and concentrated on two locations, one on the Cape Fear River, near current

⁵ Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 48-49; Craven, *Southern Colonies*, 319-321.

⁶ The eight Carolina Proprietors were Colleton; William Berkeley, the longtime governor of Virginia and member of the special Council for Foreign Plantations; Lord John Berkeley, William’s brother and privy councillor; Sir George Carteret, treasurer of the Navy and well known for his defense of Jersey Island (off the coast of France) during the Civil War; George Monck, the newly created Duke of Albemarle, who had helped to engineer Charles II’s return to the throne; William Lord Craven, another powerful royalist; Lord Clarendon, the king’s first minister; and Anthony Ashley Cooper, soon to become the first Earl of Shaftesbury.

⁷ *Charter of Carolina*, March 24, 1663. See also Craven, *Southern Colonies*, 324.

day Wilmington, NC, and the other near Port Royal, an inlet located north of the Savannah River. After negotiations with the prospective settlers, the proprietors issued the “Concessions and Agreement” in January 1665. This document, referred to by one South Carolina historian as “extraordinarily generous,” promised all prospective settlers an elected assembly with the sole authority to tax the colonists, an expansive freedom of conscience in matters of religion, and a headright system promising early colonists up to 150 acres per person.⁸ For the proprietors, the expansive powers made possible in the Carolina charter were absent from the “Concessions.” The proprietors retained only the right to veto legislation and to collect a quitrent of a halfpenny per acre per year. Despite these appealing terms of settlement, early efforts to colonize both areas ended in failure. Due to bad luck and bad policy, including the proprietors’ insistence on charging the same quitrent for swamplands as they did fertile areas, both Cape Fear and Port Royal remained unsettled by the fall of 1667, wasting much of the initial enthusiasm for the project. While there was still a small, struggling settlement in Albemarle Sound region, that area seemed to be forever stymied by a treacherous coastline.⁹ These setbacks combined with events in England (a recurrence of the plague in 1665, the Great Fire of 1666, and war with the Dutch and French that dragged on until 1667) could have put an end to the Carolina proprietorship and its colony, an endeavor too meager in accomplishment for many to notice its failure.

Into this vacuum stepped a reinvigorated Earl of Shaftesbury. Shaftesbury convinced the other proprietors that they would have to take more direct control over the promotion and settlement of the colony. Each proprietor agreed to contribute 500 pounds sterling

⁸ Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 49-52, quotation on 51.

⁹ Craven, *Southern Colonies*, 330-334.

apiece, and by August of 1669, three ships (the Albemarle, Port Royal, and Carolina) and over 100 colonists were set to sail directly from England to the Carolina coast.

Shaftesbury at this time, with the help of John Locke, also drafted the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina. The document, heavily indebted to the work of James Harrington, attempted to align political power in the colony to underlying social realities. The colony would be broken up into seigniories and baronies, a heritable nobility composed of landgraves and caciques would be established, and leetmen bound to the soil would populate the colony. With its elaborate attempt to create an aristocracy in New World, the Constitutions holds a unique place in the history of colonial promotion.¹⁰ The Carolina promoters made every effort to highlight the more liberal aspects of Shaftesbury's plan. They pointed to how the Carolina parliament, for instance, included representatives elected by the freeholders and that the property requirements for voting were consistent with other colonies. The feudal aspects were an easy target for rival promoters, however, who accused the Carolina proprietors of being above the law in their colony.¹¹ The overall effectiveness of the constitutions as a promotional tract was dubious. Migration into Carolina remained sluggish throughout the 1680s and the Carolina colonists consistently refused to ratify it.¹² In the competition for migrants, the

¹⁰ For more analysis on the Fundamental Constitutions, see Craven, *Southern Colonies*, 338-343; Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 53-59; Roper, *Conceiving Carolina*, Chapter 2; Vicki Hseuh, "Giving Orders: Theory and Practice in the *Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina*," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 63 (2002), 425-446; Barbara Arneil, *John Locke and America* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). On the degree of Locke's involvement in the composition of the Constitutions, see John Milton, "John Locke and the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina," *Locke Newsletter*, 21 (1990), 111-133 and David Armitage, "John Locke, Carolina, and the *Two Treatises of Government*," *Political Theory* 32 (2004), 602-627.

¹¹ [George Scot], *The Model of Government of the Proprietors of East-New-Jersey in America* (Edinburgh, 1685), 208-212.

¹² On the shortage of migrants to Carolina, see Roper, *Conceiving Carolina*, 34-39. See also Alison Games, "Migration" in David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds., *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800* (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 31-50.

Carolina charter demonstrated the danger that accompanied any perceived hostility to assembly rights.

The colonists who did make it to Carolina in March of 1670 started a settlement along the Ashley River, near modern day Charleston instead of their planned location at Port Royal. Despite the fact that this settlement would become permanent and slowly grow into a thriving colony, the 1670s were filled with disappointment for the proprietors. A high proportion of the original settlers came from Barbados, most notably the powerful Sir John Yeamans, who seized local control of the government. Coming from Barbados, they recognized the lucrative possibilities of the slave trade and began to build a business that relied on the sale of captured Indians into slavery. This practice could not have been more antithetical to the proprietors' hopes for the colonies, but Yeamans and his associates continued their business throughout the decade, either ignoring or impeding proprietary efforts to check the trade. Carolina traders at one point even precipitated a local war with the Westos to obstruct proprietary efforts to erode their influence. The proprietors understood this as self-interest run amok in the colony. Like the Virginia Company fifty years earlier, they pointed to a lack of virtue among the colonial leaders and specific circumstances of individuals choosing self-gain over the good of their community. Yeamans was an easy mark in this regard; at one point, he sold his own produce to Barbados for more money while the Carolina colony was still short on food. In his indictment of Yeamans, Shaftesbury spoke for the proprietors and captured the sentiment that could as easily have been applied colony-wide: "If to convert

all things to his private profitt be the marke of able parts, Sir John is without a doubt a very judicious man.”¹³

Earlier promoters often responded to colonial misbehavior by attempting to limit the powers of colonial assemblies. Shaftesbury employed a more circuitous route, and instead of restricting local government, sought to control it through the introduction of new colonists. Beginning in 1680, the proprietors embarked on a promotional campaign to attract settlers to the colony, targeting Scots, Huguenots, and English dissenters. They hoped the influx of settlers would undercut the local control of the Goose Creek Men, resulting in a government less hostile to proprietary goals.¹⁴ The complex plan to check the power of the Goose Creek faction through the local assembly rather than trying to limit the power of the assembly itself, reveals how essential the institution had become for colonial promoters. Despite the charter being issued in 1663 and settlement beginning in earnest in 1670, these colonial tensions resulted in the first concerted effort on the part of the proprietors to promote their colony in print. The influx of promotional material that usually accompanied a colony’s first years of settlement came, in the case of Carolina, occurred almost two decades after its start.¹⁵

Unlike Carolina, the history of Jersey began with the conquest of a European colony.¹⁶ The Delaware Valley, bound to the west by the Delaware River and to the east

¹³ Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 59-64, quotation on 60; Roper, *Conceiving Carolina*, Chapter 3. For more on the Indian slave trade in the region, see Alan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

¹⁴ Weir, *Colonial South Carolina*, 64.

¹⁵ For overview of Carolina promotional efforts, see introduction by Jack Greene in *Selling a New World: Two Colonial South Carolina Promotional Pamphlets*, ed. Jack P. Greene (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).

¹⁶ For early New Jersey history, see Wesley Frank Craven, *New Jersey and the English Colonization of North America* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1964) and John E. Pomfret, *Colonial New Jersey: A History* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973). For East Jersey specifically, see Ned C. Landsman, *Scotland and*

by the Hudson River, had attracted interest from English adventurers since the turn of the century. Despite this early English activity in the area, Dutch and Swedish adventurers accomplished the early European settlement of the region. The Swedes established New Sweden along the Delaware in 1638 and held the upper hand in the region until 1655. The Dutch had established two profitable settlements in the region, New Amsterdam on Manhattan Island and the trading outpost Fort Orange farther up the Hudson, and were strong enough in 1655 to seize control of their Swedish neighbors. The conquest gave the Dutch control of an important sliver of the American coastline, but its power in the region was tenuous. With expanding English colonies to its north and south, the Dutch colony lived under the ever encroaching presence of its imperial rival.¹⁷

In 1664, England finally looked to take advantage of Dutch vulnerability in the Delaware Valley. Encouraged by the Duke of York, a powerful supporter of the anti-Dutch faction in London, a plan was put into place that required three ships and a small armed force. The expedition, led by Colonel Richard Nicolls, easily conquered the Dutch settlement and established English control in the area. Just before the conquest, Charles II drew up a charter for his brother that conveyed to York all the lands between the Connecticut and Delaware rivers.¹⁸ The charter gave York full proprietary rights and made no provision for an elected assembly. Once England had gained control of the area, Nicolls took over as governor and began encouraging York to focus on the New Jersey region as the most favorable for a future settlement. Nicolls had started, with some success, to attract New England colonists to the area by promising extensive local rights

its First American Colony, 1683-1765 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). See also, Taylor, *American Colonies*, 245-272 and Osgood, *The American Colonies*, 169-199.

¹⁷ Craven, *New Jersey*, 1-27.

¹⁸ The "New York Charter" also included Nantucket, Martha's Vineyard, and a larger part of Maine.

for new settlements. Much to Nicolls's disappointment, York soon deeded away all of New Jersey. The two new proprietors of New Jersey were Lord John Berkeley and Sir George Carteret, both of whom had been heavily involved in the military planning of the conquest. Berkeley's interest in the project waned from the start so Carteret took the lead in naming the region and in attracting settlers to the region. Like Nicolls, he focused on attracting colonists from New England and published a slightly altered version of the "Concessions and Agreement" of 1665 that the Carolina proprietors had published that year. As with Carolina, the New Jersey concessions offered generous headrights, the freedom for each community to make its own provision for religious worship, and a representative arm of government. The Jersey proprietors were also insistent about the payment of quitrents, even if suspended for a short period of time in the initial stages of the colony's development. The first years of the colony attracted a smattering of New England colonists (about 2500 by 1673) and saw the creation of seven towns along the western bank of the Hudson. Politically, these years were dominated by settler discord over the collection of quitrents.¹⁹

Although most of the settlement was taking place in eastern New Jersey, the colony itself remained a single entity. After the brief reconquest of New York by the Dutch in 1673/4, the Duke of York sought and received confirmation of the original charter. In the same way, the New Jersey proprietors needed to secure confirmation of their grant from York. By this time, Lord Berkeley had lost interest in the enterprise entirely and sold his share in March of 1674 to two Quakers, John Fenwick and Edward Byllynge. In 1676, Carteret agreed to split the colony in two, a partition which left him the territory east of a

¹⁹ Pomfret, *Colonial New Jersey*, 22-48; Craven, *New Jersey*, 28-59.

diagonal line extending from the upper Delaware to Little Egg Harbor. New Jersey had been split into East and West Jersey, a separation that would last until 1702. West Jersey quickly became the first Quaker colony in the New World and brought William Penn, the most famous Quaker colonizer, to the forefront of English efforts in America. Upon purchase, Fenwick and Byllynge began to haggle over their respective shares of West Jersey. Unable to reach an agreement, William Penn, a fellow Friend, was called in to arbitrate in the hopes that the matter could be resolved without going to court. The two West Jersey Proprietors eventually resolved their differences, but more importantly for the history of the colony, Penn became one of three trustees responsible for handling Byllynge's troubled estate. Alongside Fenwick's own efforts to start a colony, the Byllynge's trustees formed a joint stock company with 100 shares, valued at 350 pounds each, and issued the West Jersey Concessions of March 3, 1677. The West Jersey concessions had many similarities with New Jersey and Carolina Concessions. It offered easy access to land, freedom of conscience, and participation in local and provincial government, although the West Jersey concessions were even more explicit in spelling out the many powers of the assembly. Penn published a promotional tract for the colony in September of 1676, and by 1681 over 1400 Quakers had migrated to the Quaker settlement of Burlington.²⁰

Of course, Penn had larger American ambitions than the eastern bank of the Delaware. Sir George Carteret died in 1680 and his share in the Jersey proprietorship came up for sale in 1682. Penn joined a group of twelve, made up almost entirely of Quakers, and purchased the Carteret share of Jersey, bringing all of Jersey under the

²⁰ Pomfret, *Colonial New Jersey*, 34-48; Craven, *New Jersey*, 60-80.

control of Quakers. At the same time, however, Penn was seeking his own grant for land west of the Delaware. Leveraging a sizeable debt owed to his father by the crown, Penn acquired a charter on March 4, 1681 for lands north of Maryland, south of New York, and extending five longitudinal degrees westward from the Delaware River.

Pennsylvania received Penn's full attention after 1681, even though he remained a member of both proprietary groups in East and West Jersey. When Penn received the charter, he had a long publication history, having written several religious tracts in England as well as a few promotional tracts for West Jersey. He utilized this experience to launch an intensive promotional campaign for Pennsylvania that met with resounding success. By April 1682, he had sold 500,000 acres of Pennsylvania land, primarily to "weighty" Friends, and by 1685, nearly eight thousand people, the vast majority Quakers, had migrated to his colony.²¹

Pennsylvania became a magnet for Quaker migration at the expense of its neighbor, New Jersey. The proprietors of New Jersey, like Penn, increasingly shifted their attention to Pennsylvania. The twelve East Jersey proprietors agreed in 1682, for instance, to take in twelve new associates, six of whom were Scots. A Scottish Quaker, Robert Barclay, would become a central figure as the original twelve proprietors ceded control of the direction of the colony to their new Scottish associates. A Scottish group was also active at this time in attempting to create a settlement in Carolina. The Carolina venture was dominated by southwestern merchants, motivated primarily by religious motives. In the

²¹ For early Pennsylvania history and William Penn, see Joseph E. Illick, *Colonial Pennsylvania* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976); Taylor, *American Colonies*, 245-272; Mary K. Geitner, *William Penn* (Harlow, England: Longman, 2000); and John A. Moretta, *William Penn and the Quaker Legacy* (New York: Pearson, 2007); Edwin P. Bronner, *William Penn's Holy Experiment: The Founding of Pennsylvania, 1681-1701* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1962).

early 1680s, religious persecution in the southwestern Scotland had become increasingly aggressive, and the Carolina venture was intended as a religious haven for religious dissenters. In the promotion of Carolina, the promises of religious freedom were especially explicit in part to attract this persecuted population. For the East Jersey proprietors, however, religious motivations were secondary. They mostly derived from the East or Northeast of Scotland. The proprietors belonged to Quaker or Episcopal communions and many were on good terms with the Stuarts; three ultimately became Jacobites after the Glorious Revolution. While many of the promoters of the Carolina venture had personally experienced religious persecution, the East Jersey proprietors were well protected and had little reason to flee Scotland on religious grounds. They would allow a degree of religious diversity in the colony, but their focus was on economic development and expansion. The proprietors wanted a Scottish colony and prioritized nationality over religious affiliation. East Jersey was to be a Scottish, not a Quaker, colony.²²

The upshot of all of this –Penn’s charter for Pennsylvania in 1681, Shaftesbury’s machinations to check the political power of the Goose Creek Men, and the newly empowered Scottish leadership of East Jersey—was a vast increase in the production of promotional materials from 1680 to 1685. During this period, each colony launched significant promotional campaigns that sought to encourage migration from the British Isles and increasingly from Europe as well. Taken together, the 1680s marked a high point in the English production of promotional literature during the seventeenth century. The proprietors of each colony established complex networks to spread their message,

²² Landsman, *Scotland and its First American Colony*, 99-130.

selecting agents to circulate the promotional materials and to meet with potential settlers in person. The agents were chosen with care. Wealthy merchants with experience overseas were attractive, for instance, because they could add credibility to the colonial message. Leading members of dissenting sects were also favored agents because of their influence with persecuted populations potentially seeking more accommodating locales. The key promoters of Carolina, for instance, beyond Shaftesbury himself, included Thomas Modyford, the former governor of Barbados; John Lord Cardross and William Dunlop, both Scottish Covenanters; and Rene Petit, Jacob Guerard, and Arnald Bruneau, all French Huguenots. Penn's agents included the prominent Quakers, Benjamin Furly and Philip Ford, while the agents for East Jersey included Robert Barclay, a Quaker apologist, but also George Scot, a vehement Calvinist. Barclay, the honorary governor and proprietor of East Jersey, established an especially impressive network of agents in Scotland, including twelve in Edinburgh alone. During this period, the geographic scope expanded beyond England as well. Carolina and East Jersey targeted Scotland specifically with their tracts. The Carolina proprietors published promotional tracts in French, while Penn did so in both Dutch and German. In all, between 1680 and 1685, ten promotional tracts were published for Carolina, ten for East/West Jersey, and nineteen for Pennsylvania. Colonial agents carried this literature throughout England and into Europe. The message of the various colonies was delivered in print and in person. The Carolina proprietors even established the Carolina Coffee House in Birching Lane near the Royal Exchange as an entrepot for colonial materials and information.²³

²³ Clarence Macdonald Warner, *Colonial Promotion and Promotion Literature of Carolina, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, 1660-1700* (Abstract of Thesis, Brown University, 1930).

The Proprietors of Carolina, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania—the men who approved or commissioned much of this literature and established the networks to disseminate those materials—were in many ways very different. Religiously, the individuals involved covered the spectrum, from fervent dissenters to devout Anglicans. Even those with similar religious backgrounds often disagreed on the extent to which a particular religious persuasion should define the colony. The political differences were significant as well. When the Scot proprietors seized control of the East Jersey, the colony came under the control of Stuart supporters and a few future Jacobites. Meanwhile, their competitor for Scottish immigrants from Carolina was the leading Whig in London seeking to exclude the Duke of York from the throne. They had some broad similarities as well, however. Most conspicuously, they were all British elites, well educated and wealthy. But beyond their wealth and status, the most salient, common characteristic was their involvement in colonization. During the early 1680s, the leading figures from each colony (Shaftesbury, Barclay, and Penn) were keenly aware of colonial efforts, both past and present. They would have been familiar with the generous “Concessions” in New Jersey and Carolina and would have understood the pressures on colonial promoters to offer local control to settlers and how that could work against the expansive powers granted to the proprietors by Charles II. The promotional literature of the 1680s would bring to light the underlying issues that created this tension between colonial prosperity and proprietary power.

The promotional literature in the 1680s continued and extended many of the developments that had begun in the 1650s. The mid-century promoters had employed a

new ideology that had been created to better fit a commercial society and was particularly attractive to the colonial promoter. This ideology had embraced wealth, redefined self-interest, and prioritized the individual characteristic of industriousness. The colonial promoters of Carolina, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania all embraced this ideology and its political implications in their advertisements of America. They pointed to the bountiful environment in America, as the earliest colonial promoters had done, but now the focus was on its encouragement of industry, not its potential challenge to virtue. William Penn even elaborated on the non-economic benefits of colonial labor, arguing that the work itself, encouraged by New World possibilities, would help to restore the English character that he argued was in decline. With labor so important to colonial success, self-interest continued to be redefined as a productive force in society, with Penn asserting that desires for personal gain were a particular and positive characteristic of the English people. With this reconsideration of self-interest, representative government in America gained an economic justification, with the result being that almost every colonial promoter in the 1680s, despite their varied backgrounds and their different target audiences, embraced assembly government as a necessary feature of a successful empire.

As their predecessors had done before them, the colonial promoters of the 1680s included lengthy descriptions of the American environment. For the Carolina pamphlets, Robert Ferguson's *The Present State of Carolina* published in 1682 was the most extensive in its praise of the ecology of Carolina. He first tackled the climate of the region, which for many in England had acquired a poor, even deadly, reputation. Ferguson reached for the other extreme: "the Heavens shine upon this famous Country the sovereign Ray of health; and has blest it with a serene Air, and a lofty skie, that

defends it from Infection.”²⁴ Winter in Carolina compared to “*March in England*” and was so mild and short that it acted as a “surprizal of an approaching spring.”²⁵ Ferguson and the other promoters of Carolina had to be careful in overemphasizing the mild winter in that it implied a sweltering summer as well. Samuel Wilson presented an extended discussion of the Carolina climate, admitting that despite its “Degree of Latitude of thirty nine and forty” and it being some “fix hundred Miles nearer the Sun than *England*,” the temperature was “many Degrees colder in the Winter.”²⁶ He reported stories of coastal rivers freezing “fix inches thick” and noted that it was rare for a winter to go by that does not produce “some ice.” His convoluted explanation for the cold weather was based on Northwest winds that traveled over the frozen lakes of Canada and some “nitrous Vapours” produced by the uncultivated earth. The upshot of this admission of colder than expected winters came two paragraphs later: “The summer is not near so hot as in *Virginia*, or the other Northern American English Collonys.”²⁷ For this claim, he again relied on “North-wind” and adds a breeze from the “*Tropicks*,” which cooled the region. A temperate climate with its close association to good health and longevity was a key potential selling point for all the colonies.²⁸

New Jersey and Pennsylvania were quick to trumpet their respective climates as well. An author of a West Jersey tract, published in 1681, used the shortcomings of other

²⁴ R[obert] F[erguson], *The Present State of Carolina with Advice to the Settlers* (London, 1682), 5.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 7.

²⁶ [Samuel Wilson], *An Account of the Province of Carolina in America together with An abstract of the Patent, and several other Neceffary and Ufeul Particulars, to such as have thoughts of Transporting themselves thither* (London, 1682), 8-9.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 8.

²⁸ For more general discussion of English representations of the landscape, see Catherine Armstrong, *Writing North America in the Seventeenth Century: English Representations in Print and Manuscript* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 72-77. For English representations of New England specifically, see William Cronon, *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1983), Chapter 2.

colonies to highlight the advantages of the Delaware Valley: “The *Air* of this *Province* is very Serene, Sweet, and Wholsome, which renders the *Clime* much more agreeable to *European* Bodies, than the severe Colds of *New-England* or the sulphurous Heat in *Virginia*; where, I say, the Bogs, Marshes, and corrupt Standing-Waters, have ever been very Noxious to the Planter.”²⁹ In what was a common move for many promotional writers, this author included letters from colonists in the publication. The presentation of information through “private” correspondence was one way in which the promotional authors tried to increase the credibility of their message. In one such letter, John Crips claimed that the West Jersey “*Country, and Air, seems [...]*o be very agreeable to our Bodies.”³⁰ William Penn claimed the same advantages for Pennsylvania: “The country it self in its *Soyl, Air, Water, Seasons* and *Produce* both Natural and Artificial is not to be despised.” He admitted “*sharp Frosty Weather*” in the winter,” but argued that it offered a pleasant contrast to the “foul, thick, black Weather” of England. For an appropriate comparison for his colony, he had to look outside of his home country: “The *Air* is sweet and clear, the Heavens serene, like the *South-parts of France, rarely Overcast.*”³¹ A healthy environment was an important attraction for a new settlement and the promoters of each colony, often at the expense of their neighbor colonies, laid claim to a uniquely beneficial climate.

The colonists echoed each other in numerous other ecological claims as well. The promoters of each colony praised the coastal waterways and interior rivers of the eastern

²⁹ *An Abstract and abbreviation of some few of the many (later and former) testimonys from the inhabitants of New-Jersey and other eminent persons who have wrote particularly concerning that place* (London, 1681), 8.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

³¹ William Penn, *A letter from William Penn, poprietary and governour of Pennsylvania in America, to the Committee of the Free Society of Traders of that province residing in London* (London, 1683).

coastline. Carolina, for instance, contained “Rivulets, whose christaline streams are clear, and transparent.”³² Robert Ferguson’s admittedly partial list of the many species that made their home in the Carolina streams included over thirty-six animals. The fertility of the soil was another common thread that united the promotion of the colonies. A tract for West Jersey provided a typical claim: “The Soyl of this *Province* is very Rich and Fruitful . . . And where it is any whit Mountainous or Rocky, there are also Valleys extream Rich and Fertile.” The author went on to offer lists of the various animals that lived in the area and the multiple goods that could be produced in the country, a long list that included honey, silk, flax and hops. His depiction of the various fruits that grew in the countryside offered a good example of how expansive they considered the possibilities of the New World to be: “The *Fruits* of your *Province* are all sorts of Delicate *Melons, Apples, Pears, Damsons*; and all other sorts of *Plumbs, Apricocks, Peaches, and Malagotoons, Cherries* of several kinds, *Quinces, Marucas, Grapes* of Six sorts I have seen, *Puchamines, Walnuts, Chesnuts, Strawberries, Rasberries, Currans Red and White, Gooseberries*, and a great many other *Wild-Fruits*.”³³ For Pennsylvania, Penn also pointed to “*Artificial Produce*,” which necessitated husbandry, such as “*Wheat, Barley, Oats, Rye, Pease, Beans, Squashes, Water-Melons, Mus-Melons*.”³⁴ Penn and his rival colonial promoters hoped to convey the expansive potentialities of the colonial environment, and as a result, long lists of commodities, animals, and trees appear throughout the colonial literature.

³² Ferguson, *Present State*, 16.

³³ *An Abstract*, 9.

³⁴ Penn, *A letter from William Penn*, 3.

The authors transformed almost every aspect of the American landscape into a merchantable commodity. Each ecosystem was broken down into the extractable units.³⁵ The extensive lists of plants and animals signaled to readers the profit that was possible and also the varied skill sets that would be applicable in the new environment. They wanted to attract those seeking great wealth as well as those seeking employment in a specific trade. Each colony announced its superiority. In Carolina, Ferguson, the most flamboyant of the Carolina promoters, declared Carolina to be “the most hopeful Settlement the King of England has in *America*.”³⁶ An East Jersey tract announced, in contrast, that it was “*the most proper seat for a Collony of this Nation*.”³⁷ After his description of the Pennsylvania, William Penn, once again expanding the basis of comparison, wrote: “Having given this general *account* of Lands in those parts of *America*, which for *Variety of Earth*, and *Number of Fountains*, falls not short, in my Opinion, of any Country I have seen in *Europe*.”³⁸ After such high praise of the environment, any failure in America had to become the sole responsibility of the settler. In a published letter from a West Jersey tract, the colonist reached this conclusion, writing “if a Man cannot Live here, *I do believe he can hardly live any Place in the World*.”³⁹ After nearly a century of settlement, colonial authors could not plausibly argue that things worked out for everyone, but by assigning complete culpability to the individual, they could continue advertizing the colonies as places of ample opportunity.

³⁵ Cronon, *Changes in the Land*, Chapter 2.

³⁶ Ferguson, *Present State*, 27-28 .

³⁷ [George Scot], *A Brief Advertisement concerning East-New-Jerfey, in America* (Edinburgh?, 1985), 1.

³⁸ William Penn, *Information and direction to such persons as are inclined to America, more especially those related to the province of Pensilvania* (London, 1686), 3.

³⁹ *An Abstract*, 18.

Descriptions of the America were as detailed and optimistic in 1680 as they had been half a century earlier.

A notable shift had occurred, however, in how these authors responded to their own descriptions of American bountifulness. The earliest colonial promoters of English colonization had followed their descriptions of America with healthy doses of fear and anxiety. Their perspective had been grounded in the conventional belief that virtue was defined by an individual's willingness to place the needs of the community, the common good, before any private aspirations or desires. Virtue and the virtuous sustained a city or a society just as those seeking private interest crippled it. There was a great risk then for these writers in the infinite opportunities for profit in America. In their effort to build new communities, they worried that the colonial opportunities would attract the wrong sort of people. In their analysis of past colonial failures, a lack of virtue among the colonists was the culprit, and in their forecasts of future success, a renewed commitment to virtuous behavior was always the answer. Virtue was a dominant feature of these earlier tracts and the key determinant of colonial success.⁴⁰

By the 1680s, the focus had shifted almost entirely to industry. Colonial success, both collectively and individually, depended on industry instead of virtue. Promoting East Jersey, George Scot explained why: "we are here sure that a sober and industrious People might make this a rich Countrey."⁴¹ The enemy to colonial success was now the idle and the lazy. The tracts posted warnings for those considering migration that this

⁴⁰ See Chapter 1; Thomas Scanlan, *Colonial Writing and the New World: Allegories of Desire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Chapter 4; Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Humanism and America: An Intellectual History of English Colonisation, 1500-1625* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), Chapter 3.

⁴¹ Scot, *The Model of the Government*, 173.

was “not a Countrey for idle people but such as will be at pains.”⁴² A letter from an East Jersey colonist included in Scot’s work reported the same: “*any who will be Industrious, may live very comfortably here . . . as for idle men who will neither work nor trade, need never come here, for there are none idle here.*”⁴³ Those who achieved success in the colonies did so by their own industry. In a Carolina tract, the author pointed to “industrious” servants who had finished their indenture and acquired “good Stocks of Cattle, and Servants of their own.”⁴⁴ William Penn presented in several of his publications a list of “*These Persons that Providence seems to have moft fitted for Plantations.*” The ordering of his categories was telling. First on the list was “Induftrious Husbandmen” and second were “Laborious” craftsmen, like carpenters, masons, and weavers. The third category was “Ingenious Spirits,” who without the stable employment in the England that they would find in the colonies, had no opportunity to “improve Science and help Nurseries of People.” The fourth category was the familiar appeal to “younger brothers” with “small inheritances,” who could procure great estates in the new world. Penn labeled the fifth and final category as “men of univerfal Spirits, that have an eye to the good of Posterity.”⁴⁵ This was the closest Penn got to the old definition of virtue so important to the early promoters. That sort of colonist would be important for the “good Counsel” that they could provide. For Penn, however, they were fifth on his list, and he allowed little space in his promotional tracts to target that type of colonists.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 198.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 206.

⁴⁴ Wilson, *An Account*, 7-8.

⁴⁵ *A Brief Account of the Province of Pennsylvania in America, lately granted under the Great Seal of England to William Penn, etc.* (London, 1682), 1-2.

Colonial planners had always intended to exploit the many saleable products of the New World, but with the shift to industry away from virtue, that exploitation became far less morally ambiguous. The most dramatic example of this shifting approach to the American environment is evident in the changing treatment of Native Americans in the colonial literature. The promoters in first few decades of colonization had emphasized the importance of converting and assimilating Native Americans. The influence of classical humanism on these authors along with a desire to delineate English from Spanish imperialism both played a role in the importance of a magnanimous element to English colonization. It also would help to indicate the virtue of the endeavors and the colonists, which constituted the most important indication for the promoter of future societal success. The Indians were a constant and important presence in the promotional literature of the first decades of English colonization. William Loddington's promotional tract, *Plantation Work The Work of this Generation* (1682), represented the only major exception to the promoters' embrace of the economic ideology during this period and recalled the language of the earlier literature: "be very wary and wife in the mannaging all Affairs, lest the *Indians* have as little regard to the Light of Christ in them when they are told of it, as they had to the *Spaniards* Heaven."⁴⁶ Loddington was unique in the 1680s literature for the emphasis that he put on Indian conversion, but also in his methods for achieving this end. The colonist would work through virtue by setting an appealing

⁴⁶ William Loddington, *Plantation Work The Work of this Generation Written in True-Love To all such as are weightily inclined to Transplant themselves and Families to any of the English Plantations in America The Most material Doubts and Objections against it being removed, they may more cheerfully proceed to the Glory and Renown of the God of the whole Earth, who in all Undertakings is to be looked unto, Praised and Feared for Ever* (London, 1682), 3.

example and attracting Indians to English ways and religion. This had been a common strategy in the earlier colonial literature.⁴⁷

By the 1680s, however, despite Loddington's allusion, English colonial efforts no longer existed in the shadow of Spanish America, and the conversion of natives accordingly lost much of its symbolic significance. There was still an anthropological interest in the culture and behavior of the Indians, but their economic services now warranted more mention than their possible conversion. The author of a West Jersey tract stated the new emphasis most succinctly, asking "what Advantage might be made of those Innocent, Good-natur'd *Creatures*, in point of Trade, &c."⁴⁸ The promotion of each colony emphasized how helpful the local Indians could be. A Carolina tract claimed that in that region the "Natives dwell peacably and friend'y among them, and are very serviceable to the *English* in *Hunting, Fishing, Gunning*, and otherwise."⁴⁹ A later work about Carolina listed the price of hiring an "Indian servant" to assist a colonial family.⁵⁰ In a tract for East Jersey, Penn made a similar claim: "they are really *serviceable* and *advantagious* to *English*, not only in *Hunting* and taking the *Deer*, and other wilde *Creatures*; and catching of *Fish* and *Fowl* fit for food in their *Seasons*, but, in the *killing* and *destroying* of *Bears, Woolves, Foxes*, and other *Vermine* and *Peltry*, whose *Skins* and *Furrs* they bring the *English*, and sell at less the price than the *value* of time an *Englishman* must spend to take them."⁵¹ Thomas Budd, in his tract for both Pennsylvania and New Jersey, made a nearly identical claim for the Indians living west of the Delaware

⁴⁷ Scanlan, *Colonial Writing*, Chapter 2.

⁴⁸ *An Abstract or abbreviation*, 8-9.

⁴⁹ *A New and Most Exact Account Of the Fertiles and Famous Colony of Carolina (On the Continent of America)*. . ., (Dublin, 1683), 6.

⁵⁰ *Carolina, Described more fully then heretofore, . . .*, (Dublin, 1684), A4.

⁵¹ Penn, *A Brief account of the province of East-Jersey in America*, 4.

as well.⁵² The focus of the early promoters had been on what the colonists could do for the Indians. The question in the 1680s had become what could the Indians do for them. The American environment, its inhabitants along with its natural commodities, were evaluated and presented as encouragements to individual industry with little regard, in comparison to the earlier literature, to any communal or religious considerations.

For William Penn, in particular, the labor and industriousness encouraged by New World environment would lead to successful colonial communities, but would also restore English character to its former glories. Penn's argument began as a rebuttal to a criticism of colonization during the Stuart period that the colonies were actually drawing too many people away from England. By the second half of the century, population growth in England had slowed, undercutting what had been an important impetus for colonization. Early English colonizers, most famously Richard Hakluyt, envisioned the colonies as landing points for England's excess population. The poor would be put to work in the colonies, becoming productive subjects in America as opposed to remaining beggars in England.⁵³ As the population growth in England dwindled, social commentators began to fear that England was losing too much of its workforce abroad.⁵⁴ The colonies, they feared, were growing stronger and more populous at the expense of the mother country.

Penn responded to these concerns, which he referred to alternately as a "common objection" and "the vulgar Opinion," and admitted that England did have a dwindling

⁵² Budd, *Good Order established in Pennsylvania & New-Jersey*, 28.

⁵³ On Hakluyt and his promotion of the colonies, Peter Mancall, *Hakluyt's Promise: an Elizabethan's Obsession with an English America* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007).

⁵⁴ For evidence of England slowing population growth in the seventeenth century, see E.A. Wrigley and R.S. Schofield, *The Population of England, 1541-1871* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

population. He referenced past nations that had achieved great power, including the possession of colonies, only to fall into decay, but for these nations, Penn argued, their colonies had not been the problem:

the cause of the decay . . . was not their *Plantations*, but their *luxury and corruption of Manners*: For when they grew to neglect their ancient Discipline, that maintained and rewarded Virtue and Industry, and addicted themselves to *Pleasure* and *Effeminacy*, they debas'd their Spirits and debauch'd their Morals, from whence Ruine did never fail to follow any People.⁵⁵

This domestic decline through luxury was for many, including Machiavelli, the main problem with colonization and the wealth that it would bring home. In the same paragraph, however, Penn defended the English colonies for bringing wealth into England, which had “manifestly inrich'd, and so strengthned her.”⁵⁶ For Penn, the riches streaming in from the New World were not connected to the luxurious living that was causing England's decline.

Penn blamed England's decreasing population, not on thousands leaving for America or on colonial riches, but on the increasing appeal of urban living. For Penn, agricultural pursuits had fallen out of fashion: “The Country being thus neglected, *and no due Ballance kept between Trade and Husbandry, City and Country.*” He went through various causes of this recent phenomenon. The first was that the “*Country-People*” were “so extremely addicted to put their Children into Gentlemens Service, or send them to Towns to learn Trades.” The second reason was the increased demand for those services that were tempting people away from the countryside. He pointed to the “*Pride* of the

⁵⁵ Penn's connection between luxury and effeminate populations has its intellectual roots in the classical critique of luxury, see Christopher J. Berry, *The Idea of Luxury, a Conceptual and Historical Investigation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 45-100.

⁵⁶ Penn, *Some Account of the Province of Pennsylvania*, 1-2.

Age in its *Attendance* and *Retinue*” and bemoaned the modern needs of a gentleman. The list of necessary attendees was long; a gentleman of one thousand pounds a year needed “a *Gentleman* to wait on upon him in his Chambers, a *Coach-man*, a *Groom* or two, a *Butler*, a *Man-Cook*, a *Gardner*, two or three Lacques [Lackies], it may be an *Huntsman*, and a *Faulkner*, the Wife of a *Gentlewoman*, and *Mmaids accordingly*.” In contrast, a gentleman of equal income in earlier days “kept but four or five Servants.” The demand for servants in the city combined with the “addiction” of the “Country-People” to create a continual drain on the rural population. A third cause was that the great men of England, “too much loving the Town and resorting to *London*,” no longer “spent their Estates in the Country.”⁵⁷ The expenditures of the rich were an important part of the rural economy, and their discontinuance further impoverished the countryside and forced more people to relocate to towns. The result of these three developments was a population centered in towns and dedicated to non-agricultural livelihoods.

Penn then argued for a deteriorating population on the basis of his evaluation of rural and urban lifestyles, assigning each with inherently masculine or feminine characteristics. Each of the developments that Penn had alluded to culminated in the loss of “manliness” in the English population. The children who had left their families to learn trades in the towns had been affected by their “soft and delicate Usage there” and were now “for ever unfitted for the Labour of a *Farming* Life.” The individuals that became servants to gentleman were “effeminated by a lazy and luxurious Living” instead of keeping to their former “Manly-labour.” Once ensconced in this lifestyle, they “rarely marry.” The urban lifestyle was too expensive for many to be able to support “a Family

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

at their own Charge,” so that if they did get married, they often were forced to do so only later in life. A dangerous pattern in light of the deteriorating life expectancy, which Penn claimed current lifestyles had cut in half. Penn offered the bleakest of consequences for most people in this situation. The men “vend their Lusts at an *evil Ordinary*” and “turn either *Souldiers*, or *Gamesters*, or *Highway-men*.” The women fared little better; they “too frequently *drest themselves for a bad market*, rather than know the *Dairy* again.” The consequences for England as a whole were equally dire. All these developments, Penn claimed, “obstructs the increase of our people.” In one case, Penn even argued that the emasculation of the English population was literal. “The great *Debauchery* in this Kingdom,” he claimed, had “rendered many unfruitful when married.”⁵⁸ Penn admitted, then, in his tract that England did have a population problem and offered much evidence in support of the concern that England was “not so populous . . . as formerly.”⁵⁹ Penn had replaced, however, the common scapegoat of colonization with the rise of urbane living. For Penn, rural labor had come to symbolize male virility, and the depopulation of the countryside portended an impotent population. The result was a people unmanned and the declining population to prove it.

The English colonies, however, could restore to England the proper balance between labor and luxury. The expanding populations in America were not explained by English emigration, but by natural increase. In England, industry and rural labor were becoming less appealing, even for those who chose to undertake it. The “poor Country-man,” Penn observed, could take “double toil,” but because of the lack of available laborers, could not “drefs and manure his Land to the Advantage it formerly yielded him.” In America,

⁵⁸ Berry, *Idea of Luxury*, 45-100.

⁵⁹ Penn, *Some Account*, 3.

the situation had flipped. In a common claim of colonial promoters, Penn declared: “their industry there is worth more than if they stay’d at home, the Product of their Labour being in a superior Nature to those of [England].”⁶⁰ Penn made the same point in a tract for East Jersey and this time drew out its consequence as it related to colonial families: “it’s proper for all *Industrious* Husband-men, and such who by hard *Labour* here [in England] on Rack Rents, are scarce able to *maintain themselves*; much less to raise any Estate for their Children, may, with God’s blessing on their *Labours*, there [in the colonies] *live comfortably*, and provide well for their Families.”⁶¹ A letter in a West Jersey tract made a similar claim about the opportunities found in the colonies: “All our People are very well, and in *Hopeful* way to *Live* much better, than ever they did; and not only so, but to provide well for their Posterities.”⁶² And for East Jersey, George Scot extended the point to include the poorer sort, claiming that servants “*work not so much by a third as they do in England*” but still “*feed much better*.”⁶³ Colonial circumstances would also allow for the creation of new families, Penn contended: “Such as could not *marry* here [in England], but hardly live and allow themselves Cloaths, do marry there [in the colonies].”⁶⁴ Colonial society, full of “manly” labors and expanding families, would correct the imbalance between city and country that had developed in the English nation. As it had with the promotional pamphlets at mid-century, industry would lead, not simply to individual profits, but to a larger good and a more stable society. Penn expanded the impact colonial labor to include England as well.

⁶⁰ Penn, *Some Account*, 3-4.

⁶¹ Penn, *A Brief Account of the Province of East-Jersey*, 4.

⁶² *An Abstract*, 24.

⁶³ Scot, *The Model of Government*, 169.

⁶⁴ Penn, *Some Account*, 2.

Embedded in Penn's description of the importance of labor was an acceptance of economic self-interest. Individuals would work in America and not in England, after all, because the rewards to their labor were so much greater. The promoters of the 1680s continued, almost unanimously, to treat self-interest as the engine of labor. The lone exception was again Loddington, who warned of the corrupting influence of interest in colonization. Loddington wanted men “whose Hearts I do believe are upright before him, aiming in the first place at his Glory, and then the good of all men, even as their own,” but worried that some colonists “may have too much an Eye to Self in transplanting themselves.”⁶⁵ In this passage, Loddington repeated almost verbatim the concerns and desires of an earlier generation of colonial promoter. In the closing paragraph of his pamphlet, Loddington claimed that sort of elevated motivation, proclaiming to his readers: “Let none think I write this for any self end.”⁶⁶ Almost every promotional writer of the earlier period made a similar assertion.

The promoters of the 1680s were hesitant, however, to lambaste the pursuit of self-interest because of its ability to spur industry and investment. They also expressed skepticism about the idea that an individual could rise above his own personal interest. Outside of Loddington, there was only an occasional gesture in the later promotional tracts to the claim of pure intentions. Penn, for instance, claimed in one of his tracts that he had “not fought to speak my Interest, but my Judgment.”⁶⁷ Much more common was the attempt to align colonial opportunity with the particular interest of colonial planners.

⁶⁵ Loddington, *Plantation Work*, 3.

⁶⁶ Loddington, *Plantation Work*, 10.

⁶⁷ William Penn, *Some Account of the Province of Pennsylvania in America; Lately Granted under the Great Seal of England to William Penn, &c. Together with Priviledges and Powers necessary to the well-governing thereof. Made Publick for the Information of such as are or may be disposed to Transport themselves or Servants into thofe Parts* (London, 1681), 4.

In a Carolina tract, the author located the “principal Power” in the assembly so that the proprietors were incapable “to do the meanest Setler any wrong.” The author, Robert Ferguson, admitted that this seemed to be a surrender of many of the “Rites” and “Powers” conferred to them in their “Patent Royal.” Such a concession implied that the proprietors had ignored “their own interest” in the colony. This is what the earlier literature would have claimed was in fact the intentions of the proprietors. Ferguson did the opposite and claimed this concession of power in the colony, despite first appearances, was in the interest of the proprietors. It was actually in “their own interest, and preservation,” he claimed, to make the government “as easie as possible” on the “people of *Carolina*.”⁶⁸ An earlier tract from Carolina published soon after the original charter was issued followed the promise of assembly rights with the same explanation. To an English audience rightly skeptical of any voluntary surrender of political power, the author asserted that this was perfectly rational. Not only had the proprietors already promised liberal powers to colonists, but they also were prepared to offer “what other Privileges may be found advantageous for the good, of the Colony.” The reason was not a virtuous disposition, however, but because it was in “their Interest so to do.”⁶⁹

In his promotion of East Jersey, George Scot also acknowledged that interest played a role in individual depictions of the New World. In his tract, he included several letters from individual colonists, who not surprisingly offered consistent praise of the

⁶⁸ Ferguson, *The Present State*, 22.

⁶⁹ *A brief description of the province of Carolina on the coasts of Floreda, and more perticularly of a new-plantation begun by the English at Cape-Feare, on that rive now by them called Charles River, the 29th of May, 1664 wherein is set forth the healthfulness of the air, the fertility of the Earth and waters, and the great pleasure and profit will accrue to those that shall go thither to enjoy the same: also, directions and advice to such as shall go thither whether on their own accompts, or to serve under another, together with a most accurate map of the whole province* (London, 1666), 8.

colony. He admitted the risk that these letters, “being written by Gentlemen,” may be dismissed by some readers because “it may be presumed, interest may oblige them to represent things otherwise than they are.” Scot did not follow that observation with any sort of rebuttal. There were no testimonials of the virtue of the Jersey colonists and their ability to put a concern for the common good above their own interest. Instead, he included a letter from “a Maffon, sent over as a Servant, by Captain *Hamiltoun*, he being a plain Countrey-man, it is not very probable he can have any design.”⁷⁰ The class condescension notwithstanding, Scot’s move to include a different perspective was an admission of the skepticism that accompanied any claims to impartiality. In the promotion of the 1680s, interest was an accepted force in life and maximal persuasion occurred when the promoter could align colonial promises with the interest of colonial leaders. Self-interest for these writers was no longer the great threat to their credibility, but when utilized correctly, was a force that could increase the plausibility of colonial promises.

The promoters used interest to bolster the credibility of their colonial promises, but also to explain labor, or the lack thereof, in the New World. In an East Jersey tract, the author included a letter from a settler who had traveled through Maryland. At this time, Maryland was not a particularly successful colony. It had nearly been destroyed in the 1640s by infighting connected with the Civil War and had had to rebuild its population. The colony’s population was still low by the 1680s, and it boasted no towns or populous settlements comparable to its northern neighbors nor did it rival Virginia in production of tobacco. The Jersey settler was not impressed: “I cannot but say it is a

⁷⁰ Scot, *Model of Government*, 263-264.

good Countrey, but its possessed with a Debauched, Idle, Laffie People . . . I believe it is the worst improved Countrey in the World.” He explained the state of Maryland through a lack a desire by the colonists to produce more than their basic needs. They only labor for “as much Bread as serves them for one Season, and als much Tobacco as may furnish them with Cloaths.”⁷¹ Penn made a similar point when he described the history of the Dutch people in the Delaware Bay, who like the Marylanders had not accomplished much in the way of establishing towns and erecting a populous colony. He admitted that the Dutch were normally a “*plain, strong, industrious People*”, but the colonists’ behavior had cut against that reputation. To Penn’s surprise they had “made no great progress in *Culture or propagation of fruit-Trees*”. The only explanation offered by Penn was that these colonists “desired rather to have enough, than *Plenty or Traffick*.”⁷² Like the Jersey settler, Penn connected the desire for "plenty" on the part of the colonists as crucial to industrious behavior and colonial development.

The behavior of the Indians in relationship to the American environment was potentially the most puzzling to the promoters. The colonial promoters had great hopes for the colonies made possible, they argued, by the bountiful American environment. They aspired for their colonies to become populous, secure, and permanent settlements. Key indicators of this achievement would be the presence of towns and an improved landscape. The promoters carried their English, colonial expectations into their accounts of the Indians, and what they observed was a people surrounded by the same plentiful opportunities but lacking in the English measurements of social progress. The promoters repeatedly pointed to the lack of population growth among the Indians, hoping in part to

⁷¹ *An Advertisement Concerning the Province of East New Jersey in America*, 18-19.

⁷² Penn, *A Letter from William Penn*, 8.

mitigate fears among prospective settlers of the possibility of Indian attacks. With Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia and King Philip's War in New England, the 1670s had been a particularly bloody decade of Anglo-Indian relations.⁷³ Each colony made its separate claims. In Carolina, the Indians were variously reported to "have not suffered any increase of People," were "inconsiderable in number," and were "few in number."⁷⁴ In 1682 tract for East Jersey, later repeated verbatim in a 1685 tract for West Jersey, the author made the same claim: "*The Indian Natives in this Countrey are but few.*"⁷⁵ And for Pennsylvania, a promotional author echoed the same claim for that particular region: "The *Indians* are but few in Number."⁷⁶ The Indians were not a people who were growing in number and power. Their populations were also described as highly mobile and rarely settled. One Carolina promoter pointed to the fact that they do not "dwell . . . in Towns, but in straggling Plantations."⁷⁷ And if industry or hard work was demonstrated by improvements to the land, they came up short in that regard as well, as the English often missed the impact of the Indians on the land because it did not take an English form.⁷⁸ One promoter summarized what all these individual failings portended about the Indians: they were "effeminate people, and inconsiderable as to number . . .

⁷³ On King Philip's War and its many ramifications for New England society, see Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Knopf, 1998); James D. Drake, *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999); and Jenny Hale Pulsipher, *Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest of Authority in Colonial New England* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005). On Bacon's Rebellion, see Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon's Rebellion in Virginia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957).

⁷⁴ *An Account* 14; Ferguson, *The present state of Carolina*, 13; *Carolina Described More Fully*, A4.

⁷⁵ Penn, *A Brief Account*, 4; Scot, *The Model of Government*, 71.

⁷⁶ Budd, *Good Order established*, 29.

⁷⁷ Ferguson, *The Present State*, 14.

⁷⁸ On the inability of the English to understand the impact of the Indians on the American ecology, see Cronon, *Changes in the Land*, Chapter 4.

supine, and of a soft Nature.”⁷⁹ The promoters portrayed the Indians as a failing people. They were growing weaker, not stronger, despite the fact that the American environment offered the same opportunities to the Indians as it did to the English colonists.

William Penn confronted the puzzle of the declining American Indians and offered an explanation that centered on their lack of material desires. About the Indians, he wrote: “They care for *little*, because they want but *little*; and the Reason is, a *little* contents them . . . they are ignorant of our *Pleasures* . . . [and] free from our *Pains*. . . We *sweat* and *toil* to live; their *pleasure* feeds them, I mean, their *Hunting, Fishing* and *Fowling* . . . their *Seats* and *Table* are the *Ground*.”⁸⁰ In this passage, Penn elaborated on his observation that a willingness to work was directly connected to a desire for wealth or worldly things.⁸¹ Penn did not declare the incessant desire for more to be a universal characteristic, as Adam Smith would later do, but the specific characteristic of the English people, which would lead to their success in the New World. More than any other moment in the promotional tracts of the 1680s, Penn's distinction between the Indians and the English captured the ideological transformation that had occurred in the promotional literature. In the first decades of permanent English colonization in the New World, the colonial promoters had promised successful English colonies in America, whose prosperity, amicability with the Indians, and religious purpose would depend on and thereby demonstrate to the wider world the virtue of the English people. The virtue

⁷⁹ Ferguson, *The Present State*, 16.

⁸⁰ Penn, *A letter from William Penn*, 6.

⁸¹ For the connection between desires and industry and its importance in the seventeenth century to the emerging theory of possessive individualism, see C.B. Macpherson, especially his section on Harrington's ambivalent feelings towards self-interest (174-182) in *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). For an opposing view, see J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). For an argument that the two should not be seen as mutually exclusive in the seventeenth century, see Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism.”

so important to all of these achievements would be defined by the willingness of the individual to suppress self-interest in all situations for the sake of the larger goals of colonization. The promoters of the 1680s imagined prosperous colonies in the New World as well, but it would now be self-interested individuals and their collective labor that would lead to this result. In their vision of English colonization, successful colonies in America would signal to the world a particular English characteristic, but it would be the opposite of what the earlier writers had hoped for.

With the full embrace of self-interest and labor in the New World, the promoters of the 1680s all supported the political corollary of this economic thought. This connection had been explored by earlier colonial authors. In the 1650s, William Bullock published a promotional tract in 1649 and described the necessary circumstances for his future participation in the colony. Bullock argued that individuals like him would not take on the risks of colonial investment or migration without the hope of bettering their condition. This aspiration demanded political rights. The opportunity for gain in the colonies was meaningless without financial security, which could only be guaranteed through representative government. Political power for the colonists was justified by the necessary protection of individual interests.⁸² Bullock offered his personal experience as support for this sort approach to political economy in the colonies but this position was supported by the larger history of English colonization. Anything approaching autocracy had repeatedly proven over the course of the seventeenth century to be inimical to the goal of a prosperous colony. The experiment in military rule in early Virginia, the manorial dreams of Lord Baltimore in Maryland, and the lack of any assembly rights in

⁸² See Chapter 2.

Providence Island had all failed in the first half of the century in attracting migrants to the colonies and in getting them to work upon arrival.⁸³

By the 1680s, the vast majority of promoters were committed to this political economy and the importance of promising a powerful assembly in America. Each colony repeatedly made clear its commitment to an element of participatory government. In a Carolina tract from 1682, the author claimed that it was “out of their Power (meaning the Proprietors) to do the meanest Setler any wrong, for the principal Power is lodged in the Assembly.”⁸⁴ A different tract from the same year repeated a similar claim but applied it specifically to wealth: “no Money can be raifed or Law made, without the confent of the Inhabitants or their Representatives.”⁸⁵ New Jersey proponents promised the same protections. In Scot’s *Model of Government*, he asserted that no “Fears” in the colony “of any incroachment upon their properties or liberties” because the proprietors were as “subject to the Law” as the “meanest Inhabitants.”⁸⁶ Again, the specific application of these rights concerned wealth: the government of New Jersey was “*not to impose, nor suffer to be imposed, any tax, cultome, subfidie, talladg, affelmant . . . other then what shall be imposed by the Authority and consent of the Generall Assembly.*”⁸⁷ The same promise appeared in an earlier tract for West Jersey: “And not any, the least Tax, either in Money or Goods, or any other Services, upon any Pretence whatsoever, to be imposed on

⁸³ On the struggles in Early Virginia, see, Wesley F. Craven, *Dissolution of the Virginia Company: The Failure of a Colonial Experiment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932) and Edmund Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975). On Providence Island, see Karen Kupperman, *Providence Island, 1630-1641* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). On Maryland, see Garry Wheeler Stone, “Manorial Maryland,” *Maryland Historical Magazine* 82.1 (1987), 3-36.

⁸⁴ Ferguson, *The Present State of Carolina*, 22.

⁸⁵ *An Account of the Province*, 6.

⁸⁶ Scot, *The Model of the Government*, 126.

⁸⁷ Scot, 89.

the People, but by the consent of these their Representatives in the General-Assembly.”⁸⁸ Penn was only keeping up with his fellow promoters when he described the functioning of the Pennsylvania government: “The *Governour* and *Free-men*, have the power of *making Laws*, fo that no Law can be made, nor Money raifed, *but by the People’s confent*.”⁸⁹ Penn even dedicated an entire promotional tract to a detailed description of the Pennsylvania government. Laws would be passed only with the approval of the assembly, and if anyone should enact a law or “shall Leavy, Collect or Pay any *Money* or *Goods*” outside of that process, they “shall be held a *publick Enemy* to the Province, and a *Betrayer* of the *Liberty* of the People thereof.”⁹⁰ Regardless of the expansive powers granted the proprietors in their respective charters, the business of colonization required the promise of participatory government in the colonies.

As rhetorically powerful as these promises were, they left much up to interpretation. Colonists and colonial leaders frequently debated the specifics of assembly power. One issue was who should create the legislation. Should it originate in the assembly, as it did in the Carolina Concessions of 1665, or should the assembly simply receive and approve legislation passed down from above, as was proposed in Penn’s *Frame of Government*? Other issues included suffrage restrictions, the property requirements for assemblymen, and the number of representatives. As long as there was an assembly of some form, no matter how weakened, the proprietors could claim the fulfillment of their promotional promises. And the proprietors of each colony were all interested in maintaining significant control over the colony. None gave away powers to

⁸⁸ *An Abstract or Abbreviation*, 1-2.

⁸⁹ *A Brief Account*, 11.

⁹⁰ Penn, *The Frame of Government*, 7.

the assembly easily. In Shaftesbury's opening to the Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina, he made clear his intention to "avoid erecting a numerous *Democracy*."⁹¹ He then set out to create a constitution full of feudal holdovers, including a heritable nobility. Shaftesbury's plan for South Carolina was harshly criticized by many, including East Jersey's George Scot who accused Shaftesbury of establishing arbitrary power on behalf of the proprietors and for limiting the possibility of upward social mobility in the colony. Even in Pennsylvania, Penn's *Frame of Government*, published in 1682 and altered in 1683, steadily diminished the power of the assembly as Penn went through multiple drafts. The original constitution of the colony, described in the *Fundamental Constitutions of Pennsylvania*, empowered an annually elected 384-member assembly to create and pass legislation. With the publication of the *Frame of Government* in 1683, the government of Pennsylvania had been transformed. The governor was now fully under the control of the proprietor, the 72-member council was chosen from among the colony's wealthy and elite, and the lower house, consisting of 500 members, played only an advisory role, approving or rejecting legislation passed down to them by the governor and council. Many of Penn's political associates back in England were sorely disappointed in these developments. Algernon Sidney labeled the document some of "the basest laws in the world" and added that "the Turk was not more absolute" than William Penn in Pennsylvania.⁹² Despite Sidney's criticism, the proposed governments of both Pennsylvania and South Carolina fell well within the powers granted to them by their respective charters.

⁹¹ *The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina*, A.

⁹² Moretta, *William Penn*, 112-113.

For the various proprietors during this period, having legitimate and defensible claims to the sovereignty of a colony only meant something if the colony itself existed. With the language of the charters often referencing the Bishops of Durham, these proprietors possessed paper claims to expansive powers in the New World that in important ways were rendered meaningless. What becomes clear from comparing the promises of the promotional tracts to proprietary actions in the colonies is the increasingly liberal language of empire. The colonial promoters, in their projection of colonial success and in their efforts to attract migration, promulgated a vision of empire that emphasized the importance of individual labor and necessitated political rights. By the 1680s, the volume and circulation of the promotional tracts had increased, as these publications were being circulated to potential migrants in England, Scotland, and across Europe. And unlike the 1650s, when a small groups of authors embraced this ideology in their promotion of a single colony, the number and diversity of the various authors increased as well. The proprietors of New Jersey, Carolina, and Pennsylvania were religiously and politically very different and so were their chosen scribes. The one thing these authors had in common was their intention to advertize the New World, a goal that propelled these authors to embrace an economic ideology focused on industry and self-interest.

By the 1680s, this ideology was squarely in the public sphere and could be mobilized by colonists to attack the proprietors' efforts to consolidate political power in the colonies. The political economy supported by the promotional writers demanded decentralized power abroad. Self-interest, labor, and political rights worked together in this colonial vision. When the proprietors moved to consolidate their own power, they

would have to counter a population empowered by this vision of empire, which could be equally useful in challenging imperial power. James II ascended the throne in 1685, just as the majority of these writings were being put into circulation, and he immediately sought to centralize imperial rule by eliminating assembly rights in the colonies. Colonists could resist these changes through a claim to "English rights," but also on the basis of this emergent colonial ideology. The colonial literature presented a coherent understanding of empire where colonial liberties worked towards a growing and prosperous empire. During the late seventeenth century, the English empire itself could offer the key justification for the political rights of the colonists.

CHAPTER FOUR

"WEE ADVENTURED OWR LIVES FOR IT": MIGRATORY AMBITIONS AND THE POLARIZATION OF COLONIAL POLITICS IN EARLY MARYLAND

In a spirited defense of his charter in 1653, Lord Baltimore proclaimed that no individual “that is well in his wits” would participate in colonization without the promise of political empowerment.¹ With this observation, Baltimore captured the central dilemma of English politics in early America. In the zero-sum world of political power, someone had to lose for another to gain, yet in Maryland, every colonist, not just Baltimore, was equally capable of demanding the political rights that attended the colonial experience. This dynamic was on display throughout Maryland’s many political conflicts. As proprietor of the colony, Baltimore pursued his own governing authority through the establishment of a ruling elite, but was challenged at every step by colonists who sought their own political empowerment through more democratic institutions.² Both sides used their colonial participation to justify their political ambitions. At the

¹ *The Lord Baltmores case concerning the province of Maryland, adjoining to Virginia in America. With full and clear answers to all material objections, touching his rights, jurisdiction, and proceedings there. And certaine reasons of state, why the Parliament should not impeach the same. Unto which is also annexed, a true copy of a commission from the late King’s eldest son, to Mr. William Davenport, to dispossess Lord Baltmore of the said province, because of his adherence to this Common-wealth* (London, 1653), 10.

² Maryland experienced political crises throughout the seventeenth century. In the 1640s, the colony was plundered to an inch of its existence; in the 1650s, it suffered through a civil war; in 1658, there was an effort, which was briefly successful to deprive Baltimore of his governing power in the colony; in 1676 and 1681, there were attempted rebellions; and in 1689, there was the successful rebellion that cost Baltimore control of the colony. On the political instability in seventeenth century Maryland, see David W. Jordan, *Foundations of Representative Government in Maryland, 1632-1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and “Political Stability and the Emergence of a Native Elite in Maryland” in *The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century: Essays on Anglo-American Society*, eds. Thad W. Tate and David L. Ammerman (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 243-273.

heart of these colonial disputes was the shared experience of colonization, its political possibilities, and the unwillingness of opponents to acknowledge that experience in each other. The result was a polarized politics in America. Local political disputes in England at this time often pitted aristocratic and democratic forces against each other, but the colonial experience widened the parameters of this discourse. The political tensions in Maryland are best understood not through the static search by many for English rights abroad, but through the dynamic pursuit of increased power in America.³

The political fragmentation caused by the colonial experience first became evident in the promotional literature for the colony. Baltimore's governing philosophy and his broad claims to authority were evident in his advertisements for the colony, but so were the contradictory promises of political participation for the average colonist. He was never able to describe the colony as he actually intended to govern it. These promises, forced upon leaders like Baltimore for the sake of effective promotion, reflected the democratic ambitions of English colonists before many even set foot in America. The promotional

³ For the classic statement of the importance of a developing conception of empire in the seventeenth century that was based on "an equality of Englishmen in dominions and realm," see David Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1972). On its continuing importance to colonial historiography, see Richard R. Johnson, "Empire," in *A Companion to Colonial America* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003). For its influence on more recent interpretations of colonial rebellions, see James Horn's *Adapting to a New World: English Society in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), where Horn argued that Bacon's Rebellion, for instance, was best understood as an effort to "restore the traditional rights of Englishmen." In his article, "Tobacco Colonies: The Shaping of English Society in the Seventeenth Century Chesapeake," in *The Oxford History of the English Empire, Vol. 1* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), he makes the more general assertion that "traditional attitudes, inherited from their English backgrounds, powerfully influenced the way settlers thought about themselves, social relations, and the institutions of state and church they sought to establish." For the same sort of analysis based on the colonists' search for English rights in a different context, see Natalie Zacek, "A Death in the Morning: The Murder of Daniel Parke," in Robert Olwell and Alan Tully, eds., *Cultures and Identities in colonial British America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2006), 223-243.

literature was an early indication of an acknowledged link between migration and political empowerment and first captured its conflicting possibilities.

As Maryland's population increased during the second half of the century, the unresolved tension in the promotional literature eventually began to play a more prominent role in the politics of the colony. Unlike colonial promotion, where paradoxical promises could more easily coexist, the promised benefits of colonization had to be denied to someone in the actual governance of the colony. Both sides responded by highlighting their own contributions to colonization, justifying the prioritization of their political demands. The colonists who opposed Baltimore would put forth the same vision of colonization that had been emerging in the promotional literature for the English colonies. They emphasized the importance of the settlers and their labor to colonization. Lord Baltimore, on the other hand, pointed to the importance of his virtuous leadership and his substantial financial investment in the colony. Both the dissident colonists and Baltimore argued that their vital involvement in colonization was contingent on their political empowerment. In this way, colonization nurtured a liberal political argument from all sides that openly pursued personal aggrandizement, but was defended on the basis of the larger good of colonization. This early American liberalism, born out of the colonial experience, offered support for two opposing political agendas and enflamed political tensions in Maryland.

The basis of these disruptive liberal demands was the colonial motivation that Baltimore had already identified. The problem for Baltimore was not the accuracy of his observation but in his insistence on limiting its applicability. If he had extended his analysis of his own motivations to the wider population, he would have been in a better

position to understand the political turmoil in Maryland. His struggles were not due to an incorrigible colonial population, as he so often claimed, but to the internal logic of early colonization.⁴ As long as migration proceeded in liberty, the task of populating a colony would always work against the authority of colonial leaders. Only when Maryland's migrating population shifted from English settlers to African slaves did the colony begin to establish some measure of political stability. Baltimore's preferred solution to Maryland's struggles throughout the seventeenth century had always been to try and attract higher quality colonists, who he believed would be more amenable to his rightful claims of authority. In reality, however, that sort of development would have only exacerbated tensions in the colony. The real answer existed in the move to a subjugated migrating population who were unable to seek political advantage through the colonial experience. Once migration to the colony became dominated by individuals preemptively excluded from the body politic, the colonial experience took on a muted role in colonial politics, setting the stage for the emergent political stability at the turn of the century.⁵

With the Maryland charter of 1632, the crown incorporated the prospective colony into the English polity, as it had done with towns and cities for centuries. As with England's urban communities, the colonies were often conceptualized during this period as commonwealths. In his influential early modern political text, *De Republica*

⁴ For Baltimore's opinion of the Maryland colonists, see *The Lord Baltimore's Case*, 10.

⁵ By the term "political stability," I am using a definition provided by David Jordan, who argued that stability "is not defined as complete harmony or the absence of factions or dissension, but rather as a people's ability to express and resolve differences within existing institutions without undue resort to violence, rebellion, and intrigue." See Jordan, "Political Stability," 244.

Anglorum, Thomas Smith provided a definition of the term: a commonwealth was “a society or common doing of a multitude of free men collected together and united by common accord and covenantes among themselves, for the conservation of themselves as well in peace as in warre.”⁶ With such a broad definition, which could easily include universities, companies, hospitals, parishes, boroughs, and cities, commonwealths and their politics were omnipresent in early modern England.⁷ The ideological tensions that dominated the commonwealth discourse in England would provide the linguistic and intellectual framework for early American politics.

The question of how and by whom a commonwealth should be governed was an open question in England, but the vocabulary was consistently Aristotelian. Government had its basic categories (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) and their degenerate forms (tyranny, oligarchy, and anarchy). In explicating these categories for the English public, Thomas Smith noted the unlikelihood that a commonwealth would be exclusively one or the other. Commonwealths were more often a mixture of all three and could easily transform, for better or worse, from one category into another. Thomas More’s *Utopia* (1516) and Francis Bacon’s *New Atlantis* (1621) offer helpful bookends for the variety of political thought that existed on the issue of the governing commonwealths. More famously envisioned an ordered commonwealth with diffuse political power. In *Utopia*, the virtue of its citizens was the fundamental building block of the commonwealth and its achievement of communal justice. Bacon rejected this template in favor of a monarchical state. Governors and local leaders did not represent the people, nor were they motivated

⁶ Sir Thomas Smith, *De Republica Anglorum*, Mary Dewar, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 57.

⁷ Phil Withington, *The Politics of Commonwealth: Citizens and Freemen in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 66-75.

by virtue, but instead were empowered and compensated by the state. Individual subjects, including the “middle sort,” had an important societal role to play, but it was purely economic. They had no business in the larger matters of state and empire.⁸ Both positions were vulnerable to particular and predictable criticisms. Supporters of active citizenry and diffuse political power akin to Thomas More were vulnerable to the charge of anarchy and excessive “popularity.” Supporters of aristocracy, on the other hand, were open to the critique of oligarchy. In More’s *Utopia*, for instance, Hythloday offered just such an attack: “When I consider and weigh in my mind all these commonwealths . . . God help me, I can perceive nothing but a certain conspiracy of rich men, procuring their own commodities under the name and title of the common wealth.”⁹ In early modern England, this ideological division framed and encouraged political debate across England’s many commonwealths.

Two chartered communities, Exeter and Norwich, demonstrate the diversity in English political practice. The common council was the key institution in the governance of cities and towns, so its makeup and authority was central to local political debate. In the town of Exeter, all political offices, including the mayor, justices and sheriff, were reserved for members of the common council, or the “twenty four.” If a member of the council died or departed the town, the then “twenty-three” had the sole power to select his replacement. With such a powerful council, a ruling faction, either aristocratic or oligarchic depending on your perspective, could quickly emerge. A few interrelated families could maintain control of the government within their own ranks with little

⁸ Withington, *Politics of Commonwealth*, 53-56.

⁹ Phil Withington, *Society in Early Modern England: The Vernacular Origins of Some Powerful Ideas* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 134-168, quotation on 143.

accountability to the freemen of the town. In Norwich, the much larger common council of sixty members was elected by the freemen of the city, as were one of the two sheriffs and twenty-four aldermen. The power of the council in Norwich was much more limited as were the opportunities for the consolidation of power by an elite faction. In Exeter, for instance, an estimated twenty families dominated the office holding in the last half of the sixteenth century, whereas in Norwich in the seventeenth century, family and friendship connections among magistrates was much more attenuated. The form of civic governance in Norwich did not on its own prevent the rise of ruling families (in the sixteenth century, Norwich has been categorized by one historian as oligarchic), but it certainly made the power of a ruling elite more tenuous and more difficult to sustain in the face of any widespread freeman dissatisfaction.¹⁰

In 1598, the town of Ludlow provided a specific example of this sort of ideological debate. If Exeter and Norwich offered two differing models of civic governance, then in 1598 there was an effort by some in Ludlow to move more towards the Exeter model. In Phil Withington's recent study of English towns in the early modern period, he provides a close analysis of the political friction in Ludlow as some of its citizens pursued a new charter. An elite group in the city, comprised of a group of friends and allies connected to two prominent citizens, Walter Rogers and William Langford, moved for more political power in the city through a new, revised charter. They negotiated and purchased the new charter from the Court of Exchequer in 1598, which officially endowed the Common Council, the "twelve and twenty-five," with expansive powers. Similar to what existed in

¹⁰ John T. Evans, "The Decline of Oligarchy in Seventeenth-Century Norwich," *Journal of British Studies* 14 (Nov., 1974), 46-76. See also Jonathan Barry, *The Tudor and Stuart Town: a Reader in Early English Urban History, 1530-1688* (New York: Longman, 1990).

Exeter, the Common Council in Ludlow would elect the civic officeholders for the town, control all of the town lands, and have full power to replace any council member who vacated his office. This move to purchase a new charter did not go unnoticed by the townspeople, some of whom had already grown critical of the civil government and its control by the Rogers/Langford alliance. The purchase of the new charter had nullified a *quo warranto* that a weaver in the city, John Bradford, had already brought against the government. The two factions in Ludlow would debate the town's past and argue about its future, one on the side of a democratic organization for the town and the other in pursuit of aristocratic powers.¹¹

The tactics of both parties offer a blueprint of the language and strategies employed by political actors throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One tactic, attempted by both sides, was to offer their own version of town history in an attempt to corral the power of custom to their particular agenda. In the Rogers/Langford version, the town, from its earliest beginnings, had been governed by the "better, wiser, and worthier sort," and the "twelve and twenty-five" had always had expansive authority. Bradford, on the other hand, offered a more democratic account, where a powerful council did exist but not in complete isolation from the rest of the town. He specified that the burgesses had only granted certain powers to the council, pointing specifically to the fact that the burgesses had never abdicated their right to general elections, especially in regards to council membership. Bradford wanted the new charter understood as an innovation in town government, orchestrated by a power-hungry faction. He specifically

¹¹ Withington, *Politics of Commonwealth*, 66-75. See also, Penry Williams, "Government and Politics in Ludlow, 1590-1642," *Transactions of the Shropshire Archaeological Society*, 56 (1957/8).

targeted their ability to select their own replacements as crucial to breaking their hold on power.¹²

A second tactic was the use of pejorative language to attack the civic credentials of their opponents. These were not simply ad hominem attacks against each other, but attempted character assassinations with a particular political goal. The audience for both sides was not their local government, but the Privy Council, House of Commons, and Court of Exchequer. The goal was to discredit their enemies individually along with the governmental structure that would allow them power. The “aristocrats” described their opponents as factional and self-interested. Their resistance to authority was not explained by any misbehavior on the part of the elite but by their inveterate unwillingness to accept any authority, no matter how just. They were “men impatient of good rule and government” and were willing “without any good cause of worthiness [to] seek to intrude themselves in rule and authority.” They were also more than willing to court the “meaner sort” in pursuit of their own goals. The aristocrats labeled them “troublesome and mutinous,” “light and disordered,” and “ignorant and simple people.” The fact that they wanted to elect their own leaders, in both the Common Council and in Parliament, would bring anarchy and confusion, not democracy. The accusation, which was omnipresent in the debates of this period, was that the democrats were willing to dismiss the common good of the town for their own selfish interests. John Bradford and his cohort were not exceptions to an otherwise virtuous citizenry but emblematic of the ability and behaviors of their social class. The “twelve and twenty five” were the “better, wiser, and worthier sort” that stood in sharp contrast to men like John Bradford, whom they termed a

¹² Withington, *Politics of Commonwealth*, 66-75, quotation on 70.

“common barrattor.”¹³ The aristocratic position, fueled by the increasing popularity of Ciceronian humanism, which posited a close association between wealth and virtue, was more than an attack on an individual in one place and time, but promulgated an understanding of society that justified an aristocratic government in any commonwealth, not just Ludlow.

The “democrats” launched similar attacks on their rivals. For Bradford, the unjustness of the new charter had required the aristocrats to work in secrecy and through deception. The Queen never would have approved the charter had she known the true intentions of Rogers/Langford alliance, so he set out to expose the oligarchic nature of their ambitions. As the “democrats” had been accused of pursuing self-interest over the common good, the “aristocrats” now stood charged with the same offense. They were “greedily coveting to enrich themselves” and pursued “their own private wealth and the wealth of their friends before the common wealth.” As with any corrupt oligarchy, the powerful exploited governmental power to attain personal aims. The “aristocrats” surrounded themselves on the Common Council with sons and kinsmen, so that their ambitions would go unchecked. The approbation of the Common Council, which in theory represented the best interest of the community at large, was only a cover for the selfish actions of a few. By stacking the council with family and close associates, the “aristocrats” were able to pursue their own personal agenda with the ostensible support of the town. They appropriated town lands at “small fines and rent,” misused the treasury, abused the law to persecute innocent burgesses, refused to abide by previous laws, and sought the abridgement of “privileges, liberties, and freedoms” lawfully granted to the

¹³ *Ibid.*, 71-73.

burgesses by the previous charter. They pursued aristocratic government, not because it was the best civil organization for the town, but because it offered a social justification for their corrupt consolidation of power.¹⁴ These personal attacks again served a clear political purpose. An attack on their motivations undercut the legitimacy of their preferred governmental organization. A more democratic government would limit the power of the Rogers/Langford alliance presently and also limit the possibility of an oligarchic power emerging in the future. As personal as these debates were, they manifested and were empowered by the ideological schism between aristocracy and democracy that was prominent in English political thought.

When Englishmen set out to colonize the New World, the tense politics of commonwealths, charters, and incorporation would follow them across the Atlantic. Royal charters, as in England, would often be targeted by disaffected colonists in an effort to alter political institutions in America. And locally, when transplanted Englishmen pushed for political power within the colony, they could utilize the example of urban governance as justification for their pursuits of power. When the first elected assembly met in Maryland on February 25, 1638/9, it approved an inaugural piece of legislation, entitled “An Act for Establishing the house of Assembly and the Laws to be made therein,” and attempted to define its role in government. They called for elections in Maryland by the freemen “in the same manner and to all the same intents and purposes as the Burgesses of any burrough in England.”¹⁵ In 1669, when Chancellor Phillip Calvert bristled over the assembly’s willingness to compare itself to Parliament, he put to different use a reference to urban politics, arguing that the assembly’s power was more

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 72-73.

¹⁵ Papenfuse, ed., *Maryland Archives Online*, Vol. 1, 82. See also Jordan, *Foundations*, 42-43.

limited than its pretensions and was “but like the common Council of the City of London.”¹⁶ Whatever purpose was served by the allusions to corporations in England, the various references only underscored the importance of urban precedents to colonial governance. There were certainly unique aspects to establishing a community on a new continent, but the colonists carried their English experiences with them to America.

The large majority of English colonists would have had some experience with urban life and government. Recent studies have underscored the fact that migration was a fundamental feature of English life and that any transatlantic journey was often preceded by several smaller migrations, first to larger towns, and if not successful there, to a major city like London. Only after those two smaller migrations had taken place and failed to meet expectations did the individual, generally speaking, then proceed to try his/her luck in the colonies.¹⁷ Studies in the social origins of migrants have also revealed that they did not come from the lowest orders of English society, but included many from the middle sort, even if tending towards its poorer members.¹⁸ In light of the increasing evidence of middling participation in local politics and office-holding in early modern England, the general migration patterns of American colonists have an important

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 2: 178.

¹⁷ Alison Games, “Migration,” in *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*, 2nd ed, David Armitage and Michael J. Braddick, eds. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 33-52 and *Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

¹⁸ Abbot Emerson Smith, *Colonists in Bondage: White Servitude and Convict Labor in America, 1607-1776* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1947); Mildred Campbell, “Social Origins of some early Americans,” in James Morton Smith, ed., *Seventeenth-Century America: Essays in Colonial History* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1959), 63-89; David Galenson, “‘Middling People’ or ‘Common Sort’?. The Social Origins of some Early Americans Re-examined,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 35 (1978), 499-524. For a useful summary of these debates, see Ned Landsman, “Migration and Settlement,” in *A Companion to Colonial America*, ed. Daniel Vickers (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 76-98.

implication.¹⁹ The typical English colonists came to the New World with some urban experience and had every opportunity to observe and even possibly participate in the politics of commonwealth. The humanist terms used by colonial promoters, like commonwealth, virtue, and self-interest, and their many political applications would likely have been familiar to the average colonist through their use in urban politics.²⁰

Alison Games has underscored the commonness of migration in early modern England, noting that even transatlantic migration did “not necessarily herald a new worldview.”²¹

The Maryland colonists brought with them English expectations of government and society. This would have included a familiarity with the term commonwealth and an understanding that there was room for debate concerning its governance. The challenges of erecting a commonwealth in the America would exacerbate the inherent tension between aristocracy and democracy that existed in English political thought, but the language and the typology of the political debate would stay the same. Aristocrats and democrats would do battle in Maryland for political control just like they did in towns like Ludlow, but colonial circumstances would offer both sides new rationales for their claims to political power.

¹⁹ For “middle sort,” I am using Brian Manning’s expansive definition of the of the term, which he describes as the “bigger peasants and richer craftsmen but also to the general body of small producers in agriculture and industry who had sufficient resources to live without having to work for wages,” from *Aristocrats, Plebeians, and Revolution in England, 1640-1660* (London: Pluto Press, 1996), 10. For the participatory nature of early modern England, see Patrick Collison, “The Monarchical Republic of Elizabeth I,” in Patrick Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays* (London: Hambledon Press, 1994), 31-57; M.J. Braddick, *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Steve Hindle, *The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1640* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).

²⁰ On the humanist involvement in early colonization and its prominent influence in the early literature, See also Andrew Fitzmaurice, *Humanism and America*; Thomas Scanlan, *Colonial Writing and the New World*; Ciaran Brady, “Spencer’s Irish Crisis: Humanism and Experience in the 1590s,” *Past and Present*, 111 (May, 1986), 17-49; and Phil Withington, *Society in Early Modern England: The Vernacular Origins of Some Powerful Ideas* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 203.

²¹ Games, “Migration,” 34.

Maryland's beginnings were heavily influenced by the political struggles of its southern neighbor. The Virginia Company had failed in its leadership responsibilities so conspicuously that the king had little choice but to revoke the charter of the struggling colony in 1624. Charles placed the blame for the disaster in Virginia in large part on the democratic organization of the company. The new form of a proprietary charter, instead of a company charter, offered a potential solution. As opposed to the democratic organization of a company, the proprietor alone would offer the kind of virtuous and steady leadership that had been lacking in Virginia. The English experience in Virginia had highlighted the dangers of too much democracy, and the crown reasoned that a more exclusive colonial government would work better. To this end, the Maryland charter granted Baltimore vast powers in the colony, but did little to extinguish the democratic pressures that attended colonization, ensuring that the politics of commonwealth would be as problematic in Maryland as they had been in Virginia.

By 1620s, the colony of Virginia had come to be defined by Indian conflict, economic failure, and factional discord. Sir Edwin Sandys and Sir Thomas Smith were the leaders of the two opposing factions that had battled for control of the faltering colony. Sandys replaced Smith as Treasurer in 1618 and initiated various reforms that dramatically altered the governance of the colony. The commercial and military characteristics, which Sandys had blamed for the early struggles of the colony, were replaced with a political organization that more closely resembled English institutions. The Virginia Company retained a strong prerogative element in the colony with a governor and council appointed by the company, but would now include the Virginia

House of Burgesses, which gave colonists at least a limited voice in government. In his criticism of the earlier management of the colony, Sandys had pointed to Smith's martial and autocratic rule of the colony. The result was that few colonists had any real intention of remaining in the colony and pursued only short-term goals. The colonists acted without "assurance of wives and servants . . . Without assurance of their estates . . . Without assurance of their Liberties," and accordingly, intended not "to settle . . . but to gett a little wealth by Tobacco . . . and to return to Englande." The reforms led by Sandys attempted to establish a government in Virginia more familiar to migrating colonists and more attractive to those considering a permanent relocation. This would lead, Sandys reasoned, to the creation of a stable community in Virginia, one that would not only survive but eventually turn a profit.²²

Any successes that may have resulted from the company reorganization took a major hit with the Indian attack of 1622. The colony was nearly destroyed and its population was decimated. With the colony in dire straits, the crown issued a writ of *quo warranto* challenging the charter, which was officially vacated in 1624. The resulting debate over what form the government should take revealed both the predisposition of the king and the realities of colonization. Sandys wanted the colony returned to the Virginia Company. The king, however, had turned against company management of the colony and its "popular government." With the onset of the Thirty Years War in 1618, James

²² Robert M. Bliss, *Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 8-28, quotation on 20-21. On the history of the Virginia Company, see Wesley Frank Craven, *Dissolution of the Virginia Company: The Failure of a Colonial Experiment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932); Warren M. Billings, John E. Selby, and Thad W. Tate, *Colonial Virginia: A History* (New York: KTO Press, 1986), 27-45; and Antoinette P. Sutto, "Built Upon Smoke: Politics and Political Culture in Maryland, 1630-1690" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 2008), Chapter 1.

had faced significant pressure to abandon his pro-Spanish policies and to enter the war in support of the Protestant Dutch. Despite James's fervent belief that matters of war were the prerogative of the king and should be closed off to any outside interference or input, certain members of Parliament, with the support of Prince Charles and the duke of Buckingham, used the funds provided to the king by Parliament as leverage to exert influence over his foreign policy decisions. Increasingly irritated by these invasions of his prerogative, James nourished the support of an anti-puritan faction, strongly in favor of a powerful prerogative and always aware of the inherent dangers of too much "popularity." A key member of the Parliamentary "popular" faction that was agitating for war with Spain was the Virginia Company's Edwin Sandys.²³ While James was king, Sandys's prospects for regaining control of the colony were bleak.

James's death in 1625, however, gave Sandys renewed hope as the crown had yet to reach a final resolution on the status of the Virginia Company. Unlike James, Charles had friendly ties with many associates of Sandys, which Sandys was confident would work in his favor. Charles appointed a committee of three in the Privy Council, including two supporters of Sandys, the Earl of Dorset and Lord Cavendish, to advise him on what to do with the old company. Sandys hoped that the company would maintain control over the colony and be "incorporated as before into a Legall Companie," even if he did allow for the possibility that a royal advisory council would be a beneficial addition to the colony's political organization. Sandys did not get the response that he had hoped

²³ Antoinette P. Sutto, "Built Upon Smoke," Chapter 1. Sutto argues that the issue of popular influence in government was an important part of the conflicts within the Virginia Company, challenging Craven's exclusively economic explanation for the revocation of the charter in *Dissolution of the Virginia Company*. For more a careful description of Sandys's pursuit of the new charter, see Bliss, *Revolution and Empire*, 18-23.

for. Despite his optimism, Charles repeated his father's concerns with popular government, which he felt the Virginia Company represented. If historians still debate the role of political ideology in the revocation of the company charter, it had a clear role to play in the debate over Virginia's future. For Charles, the company was a "multitude of persons of severall dispositions, amongst whom the affaires of greatest moment were, and must be ruled by the greater number of Votes and Voyces." The company's struggles had been evidence of how poorly this type of government functioned. The "Great Charter," after all, which had been instituted by the Company, had failed to revive the colony's fortunes. By 1624, the company was in bankruptcy, the colony had suffered dearly in the Indian attack, and those empowered by the reforms had seemingly exploited their political power for private gain at every turn. For Charles, this outcome was a foregone conclusion because the company form of government empowered persons unfit to rule. In objecting to company management, he explained that in the future "the Government of the Colonie of Virginia shall . . . not be committed to any Companie or Corporation, to whom it may be proper to trust matters of Trade and Commerce, but cannot bee fit or safe to communicate the ordering of State-affaires, be they never so meane consequence."²⁴ For Charles, the Virginia Company had failed because of a flawed political organization, a mistake that he wanted to avoid going forward.

Sandys had a counter-argument on behalf of the company, however. Sandys's years of experience leading the Virginia Company had left him well attuned to the realities of colonization. He did not defend the Company's actions on ideological grounds, an argument he would have surely lost, but instead pointed to the necessary building blocks

²⁴ Bliss, *Revolution and Empire*, 17-23

of colonization: migration and investment. No man would invest or adventure in any great undertaking, he argued, if “in the ordering of which they have no voice or interest.”²⁵ In other words, if the king refused colonists a voice in government, then the colony itself would never come into being. The economic goals of prospective investors and colonists had to have political protection for the colony to attract support. As Wesley Craven has argued, the reforms led by Sandys were not motivated by an ideological desire to give the assembly in Virginia more power than Parliament had in England. It was part of the much more mundane process of trying to make a colony economically viable.²⁶ Any ideological preference for more autocratic control in the colonies had to be considered alongside the difficult realities, which Sandys understood well, of enticing people to migrate to America. As long as financial ambitions were understood as crucial to attracting support for the colonies, then there would always be pressure to put a government in place that protected any economic gains. For Sandys, only a voice in government would offer the necessary assurance to potential colonists and investors.

In many ways, the proprietary charter for Maryland offered a defiant riposte to Sandys's position on colonization. Baltimore and his heirs were granted a power on par with the bishops of Durham. Those powers, which had been common in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, had grown obsolete by the seventeenth century. The original justification for such expansive powers had been the bishop's location on the Northern Border and the tough task of keeping the peace in less settled areas. The charter was specific, however, making Baltimore and his heirs the “true and absolute lords and proprietaries” of Maryland and giving them all of the “ample rights, jurisdictions, and

²⁵ Bliss, *Revolution and Empire*, 19.

²⁶ Craven, *Dissolution of the Virginia Company*.

immunities . . . as any bishop of Durham.”²⁷ Although antiquated in England, such a powerful grant of authority had renewed applicability in colonial circumstances that went beyond its analogous frontier geography. In an endeavor that had trended popular in its earlier attempts in Virginia and also in Massachusetts, which too would hear criticism in the 1630s from many of its supporters for having become too democratic, these powers appeared perfectly appropriate.²⁸ If colonization did in fact carry with it some democratic tendencies that had impaired early colonial efforts, then an especially powerful proprietor would constitute a sensible corrective to these popular pressures.

Despite the extensive prerogative powers granted to Baltimore, there were some limits to his authority. Baltimore was granted expansive legal powers by the charter, but only if “the said Lawes be consonant to reason, and be not repugnant or contrary, but as neere as conveniently may be, agreeable to the Lawes, Statutes, Customes, and Rights of this our Kingdome of England.”²⁹ A similar check existed for Baltimore’s legislative powers. Baltimore had the “free, full, and absolute power . . . to ordaine, make, enact . . . any lawes whatsoever,” but he was to exercise this power with “the advise assent and approbation of the Free-men of the said Province, or the greater part of them, or of their delegates or deputies.” Both these caveats to Baltimore’s “absolute” authority were vague, but they gave the charter a degree of ambiguity on issues of colonial governance

²⁷ *A Relation*, 103. For more the Maryland charters and the grant of expansive powers to Baltimore, see Wesley Frank Craven, *The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, 1607-1689* in *The History of the South*, eds., Wendall Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter ([Baton Rouge]: Louisiana State University Press, 1949), 183-191; Herbert L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*, Vol. II (London: The Macmillan Company, 1904), 8-9; David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 73-74.

²⁸ Bliss, *Revolution and Empire*, 39.

²⁹ *A Relation*, 105.

that could be exploited. Baltimore would use the charter to defend his prerogative, but many colonists would also find it useful in challenging his authority.

The ambiguities were only exacerbated by the dual purposes of a colonial charter. The charter was an official claim of prerogative by the grantee, formally sanctioning his power by direct grant of the king, but it also had a promotional role to play. It was often included in advertisements for the colonies, including *A Relation to Maryland* (1635), the most important promotional pamphlet for early Maryland.³⁰ The published charter functioned both as a claim of power by the proprietor and as a public promise of the privileges due to the colonists. Despite the expansive grant of authority to Baltimore, the logic of colonization articulated by Sandys manifested itself in the charter. The democratic pressures of promotion had not been stifled. To promote the colony, the charter included a promise to colonists of political power through an elected assembly, just as Sandys had argued it had to. Instead of ignoring or denying the democratic pressures that attended colonization, the Maryland charter proposed to overcome them by making Baltimore an “absolute Lord” of the colony. The proprietary charter only increased the gulf between the democratic and aristocratic positions that already existed in the English politics of commonwealth. In his study of the English colonies in the seventeenth century, Robert Bliss has noted that the “proprietary nicely married the realities of colonization with the political prejudices of the day.”³¹ He is right that the proprietary charter was an effort to deal with two forces that worked against each other, but wrong to conclude that it formed a nice marriage. The charter expanded the range of

³⁰ *A Relation of Maryland* in Clayton C. Hall, ed., *Narratives of Early Maryland, 1633-1684* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910), 70-112.

³¹ Bliss, *Revolution and Empire*, 24.

political debate and increased the likelihood of political conflict in the colony. The colonists would read the document for their liberties and the proprietor for his own power. The language of the charter legitimated the political claims of both sides, while it simultaneously pushed them farther apart.

With the landing of the Ark and the Dove in 1634, Baltimore began his leadership of the colony and immediately began to put his governing philosophy into practice. He constantly referred to the charter for a justification of his authority and hoped that a loyal group of elite colonists would emerge to help him govern the colony. This did not materialize as quickly as he had hoped, and leadership positions in the colony, including members of the assembly, had to be filled by poor and uneducated colonists. Despite the humble origins of many of its members, the assembly was not shy in challenging Baltimore's authority. With the numerous challenges to his authority throughout the first decades of settlement, Baltimore was forced to articulate his political philosophy. He attacked the democratic agenda of many in his colony in conventional humanist terms, questioning their virtue, challenging their intentions, and criticizing their methods. The population in Maryland or in any colony for that matter, he argued, was particularly unsuited for political power. Despite this clear governing philosophy, in 1666 a Maryland promotional document was published that reiterated the mixed message that had been present in the charter and suggested that, alongside Baltimore's absolute authority, there existed a powerful and independent assembly in the colony. As long as a colony relied heavily on English migration for its survival, Sandys's original observation would continue to pose a challenge to any efforts to consolidate political power in the

colonies. A proprietary colony and its promotion offer a clear example of this central colonial tension.

The early history of the colony was filled with governing frustrations for Baltimore. He had envisioned an early migration of the well-educated to help oversee the colony, and the first wave of migration met these expectations. The migrant flow of the wealthy and educated quickly dried up, however, and Baltimore was left with important offices to fill with few qualified candidates. Modest freemen began to fill important posts in the colony. Men like Robert Philpott, William Coxe, and Thomas Allen, all commissioners of Kent County, would never have qualified for analogous positions in England. Thomas Baldrige was a former servant who became sheriff in St. Mary's in the late 1630s, and Daniel Clocker, a justice of the peace in St. Mary's country, was illiterate. In these early years, freemanship alone established eligibility for participation in the political process. The members of the assembly during this period were most often of modest social origins, poorly educated, and sometimes landless. The members of the Maryland assembly also proved difficult to control. There was significant turnover in the assembly with a small percentage of members sitting in repeated assemblies, which gave Baltimore little to work with in terms of patronage and influence. Instead of a loyal and aristocratic assembly, the Maryland assemblymen had few ties to the Proprietor and even fewer claims to elite status.³²

³² For a careful analysis of political institutions in Maryland and the political participation of the common colonist, see David W. Jordan, *Foundations of Representative Government in Maryland, 1632-1715* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 11-59. See also, Aubrey C. Land, *Colonial Maryland: A History* (New York: KTO Press, 1981), 28-30 and Lorena S. Walsh, *Motives of Honor, Pleasure, and Profit: Plantation Management in the Colonial Chesapeake, 1607-1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 124-131.

Not surprisingly, the assembly was a source of continual frustration for Baltimore in the early decades of settlement. During this period, the Maryland assembly persistently drew parallels between their powers and the privileges of Parliament, and through the comparison, justified their assertions of power on a range of issues, including, for instance, the frequency and duration of meetings. Baltimore and his subordinates just as frequently challenged this comparison. The word, "Parliament," they claimed, never actually appeared in the charter, and they consciously chose throughout their debates with the assembly to use less suggestive language, preferring the term "general assembly."³³ The boldest assertion of assembly power in the colony occurred at the end of the interregnum. A Maryland assembly, meeting in February and March of 1660, declared that they "judge themselves to be a lawfull Assembly without the dependence on any other power in the Province." The proprietor's governor, Josiah Fendall, could sit in the now unicameral assembly, but had no additional powers outside of the right of a double vote.³⁴ Lord Baltimore soon recovered power in the colony, but Fendall's rebellion, even if in exaggerated form, gave clear evidence to the "democratic" spirit that seemed to exist in his colony and had caused Baltimore so many frustrations throughout his leadership of the colony.

The assembly made few official gains in this period, outside of the right of the lower house to meet separately. Throughout this period, Baltimore consistently resisted any claim of legislative initiative by the assembly and asserted that all sessions were called

³³ Jordan, *Foundations*, 28-29. On the early conflict between Baltimore's autocratic claims to power in the colony and the assembly's persistent mobilization of English standards as justification for their own authority, see Sutto, "Built upon Smoke," chapter two.

³⁴ On Fendall's Rebellion, see Jordan, *Foundations*, 56-59; Sutto, "Built upon Smoke," chapter eight; and Land, *Colonial Maryland*, 53-56.

and could be revoked at the pleasure of the proprietor.³⁵ All the discord, however, forced Baltimore to articulate his governing philosophy in the colony, the fullest statement of which came in his proclamation to the colony on August 26, 1649. Baltimore began by citing the legal rights granted to him in the charter, recalling its specific language and claiming that he had the same powers in Maryland “as the Bishops of Durham at any tyme heretofore ever had.” In response to criticism that he intended “slavery” for the colonists with such expansive powers, he highlighted the existence of the assembly in Maryland and its various powers, including the requirement of its consent to any taxes. He also laid claim, in humanist terms, to personal virtue. His actions in the colony, he hoped, had provided “sufficient Testimony” of his “sincere affection to [the Maryland colonists], and [his] reall desire to promote all the fitting meanes that may be, their happiness and welfare.” He did not pursue an economic agenda in Maryland and was always prepared to put the colonists’ “Welfare before [his] particular advantage.” So confident in his virtuous disposition and his continuing efforts to do what was best for the colony, Baltimore found it difficult to understand why “any Intelligent person that hold any thing vnder vs there should be soe blind” as to attack the rights of the proprietor.³⁶ In their opposition to Lord Baltimore, the colonists were attacking someone whose only pursuit was their own good.

With Baltimore’s view that any encroachment on his powers in Maryland was inherently self-destructive, he turned to the only explanation that made any sense. The dissent in the colony was self-interested acts of a minority faction, who were willing to

³⁵ In the January-March 1637/8 session of the assembly, for example, Baltimore refused to approve a set of laws proposed by the assembly on the basis that the right of initiation lied solely with the proprietor. See Jordan, *Foundations*, 34-43.

³⁶ Papenfuse, ed., *Md. Arch. Online*, Vol. 1, 262-272. See also, Sutto, “Built upon Smoke,” 234-242.

put personal interest ahead of the larger good of the community. The likely malefactors, he argued, had purchased large tracts of land directly from native groups, but had not received official title from the proprietor. In an effort to gain legal title, they hoped to inspire “Jellousies” among the colonists and so “exasperate” the people as to make them turn to “Violent proceedings, one against the other.” The hoped for result was “division and ffaction” among the people of Maryland, leaving the colony in such a confused state that the malicious actors could then seize governmental control and secure their land claims. In sharp contrast to his own intentions in the colony, Lord Baltimore claimed that they put their private goals before the public good, seeking to make “themselues Lords and Masters of the Province” at the risk of “the ruine of all the People there.” Baltimore’s explanation then for the challenges to his authority in Maryland involved the duplicitous actions of a few, who misled “well affected” and “Wellmeaneing” colonists through “subtile Suggestions,” “subtile Machinations,” and “evvell intention.” They gained popular support by concealing their private ambitions and “pretending” to act on the “Peoples behalf.”³⁷

The most useful tool for these malevolent actors, Baltimore reasoned, was the promise of liberty. If “slavery” did emerge in the colony, it would not be because of his expansive powers as proprietor, but from the popular pursuit of liberty:

By Wofull experience it hath bene found in divers nations that noe one thing hath soe certainly betrayed the People into true Slavery indeed, as the Deceptfull Suggestions of Subtile Matchiavilians pretending . . . an extraordinary care of the Peoples liberty . . . the direct Roade to bondage is vusually found in specious pretences of Preservation of Liberty.³⁸

³⁷ Papenfuse, ed., *Md. Arch. Online*, Vol. 1, 262-272

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 264-265.

Claims to liberty in Maryland, either by individual colonists or the assembly itself, were simply a ploy by self-interested individuals to gain power in the colony. This contention was only exacerbated by the low quality of the average colonist and assemblyman. In the 1650s, he offered a revealing description of colonial populations, condemning them as the “necessitous factious people as usually new Plantations consist of.”³⁹ For Baltimore, who personified himself as the paragon of virtuous leadership, any dilution of his authority meant the empowerment of a population particularly unsuited for political leadership and would only bring faction, discord, and personal interest into government. Baltimore called for unity as “one Body Politique” and argued that “By Concord and Vnion a small Collony may growe into a great and renowned Nation, whereas . . . by discord and Dissention Great and glorious kingdomes and Common Wealths decline, and come to nothing.”⁴⁰ A strong, large, and independent assembly had no role to play in Baltimore’s vision of Maryland. It had no legal basis in his interpretation of the charter and no political justification in that it allowed self-interested agendas into the body politic.

Despite the many tribulations that Baltimore’s colony suffered throughout the 1640s and 1650s, there was renewed reason for optimism for both Baltimore and his colony with the return of monarchy in England. Concerning his control of the colony, the restoration meant that Baltimore’s position on his own autocratic powers in Maryland

³⁹ *The Lord Baltemores case concerning the province of Maryland, adjoyning to Virginia in America. With full and clear answers to all material objections, touching his rights, jurisdiction, and proceedings there. And certaine reasons of state, why the Parliament should not impeach the same. Unto which is also annexed, a true copy of a commission from the late King’s eldest son, to Mr. William Davenport, to dispossess Lord Baltemore of the said province, because of his adherence to this Common-wealth* (London, 1653), 10.

⁴⁰ Papenfuse, ed., *Md. Arch. Online*, Vol. 1, 272.

were now more in line with the government at home. During the interregnum for instance, he had been forced to explain how a “monarchical” government in Maryland could or should exist within a republican nation.⁴¹ These recent developments increased Baltimore’s confidence in the security of his charter and of crown support for his management of the colony. The colony itself was also showing signs of growth. The population in the 1630s and 1640s never exceeded 500 people, but by 1660, there were approximately 2,500 inhabitants, and within the next fifteen years, that number would climb to 13,000.⁴² All of this offered a promising moment for Baltimore, who now had over twenty years experience in the colonizing endeavor, to deal with the most persistent political problem in Maryland: the power hungry assembly. But in his promotion of the colony, Baltimore was unable to escape the ambiguities and tensions that had existed in the original charter. Sandys’s objections to an autocratic colonial government were as relevant in the 1660s as they had been in the 1620s. Baltimore wanted absolute power in the colony, but he also wanted it to grow. Those goals would continue work at cross purposes, even as the colony was slowly becoming more established.

In 1666, a new Maryland promotional tract was published in England, written by a former indentured servant of the colony and in all likelihood financed by Baltimore. The author, George Alsop, had migrated to Maryland in 1658 as an indentured servant to Captain Thomas Stockett, one of the earliest settlers of Baltimore County and an exiled royalist. Stockett was a fixture in both county and provincial government, serving as a Burgess from 1661 to 1665, as elected spokesman of the lower house in 1663, and as

⁴¹ *Baltimore’s Case*, 8-9. On the increased security of Baltimore’s charter under monarchic government, see Sutto, “Built upon Smoke,” 274-275.

⁴² On improving conditions in the colony, see Land, *Colonial Maryland*, 58-59 and Jordan, *Foundations*, 14.

judge of the Baltimore County Court in 1664. Alsop completed his indenture to Stockett in 1664, returned to England, and provided only positive reports about his years of servitude. Baltimore was anxious to attract servants to the colony, so Alsop's rosy depiction of his time in the colony would have been a welcome challenge to the region's reputation for servant abuse and hard labor. Much of Alsop's background is unknown, but it appears that he was born into moderate or humble circumstances and had served a brief and probably unfinished apprenticeship in some handicraft. He displayed some level of education: he knew the bible, some Latin, and probably French as well as displaying some familiarity with new Copernican science and contemporary literature. Alsop, like so many other American colonists, first migrated to London to try his luck as a craftsman before eventually relocating to Maryland several years later. Baltimore was likely thrilled to have Alsop as the mouthpiece of his colony and the added credibility that Alsop's authorship brought to his claims of order and prosperity in Maryland.⁴³

Alsop wasted little time putting himself squarely on the side of monarchical government. He had, he wrote, "lived with sorrow to see the Anointed of the Lord tore from his Throne by the hands of Paricides, and in contempt haled, in the view of God, Angels and Men, upon a publick Theatre, and there murdered."⁴⁴ For Alsop, the household was still the appropriate metaphor, as his use of the word parricide indicates as well as his frequent analogies to family, by which to understand political authority. He

⁴³ For more on Alsop, see Harry Hanson Kunesch Jr., "George Alsop's *A Character of the Province of Maryland: A Critical Edition*" (Ph.D. Diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1970), Introduction; Land, *Colonial Maryland*, 58-61; J.A. Lemay, *Men of Letters in Colonial Maryland* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1972), 48-69; Jim Egan, "'To Bring *Mary-land* into *England*': English Identities in Colonial American Writing" in *Finding Colonial Americas: Essays Honoring J.A. Leo Lemay*, eds. Carla Mulford and David S. Shields (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 2001), 125-128; Lefler, "Promotional Literature," 14.

⁴⁴ Kunesch, Jr., "George Alsop's *A Character*," 122. All quotations from Alsop's work will come from the Kunesch, Jr. edition.

rejected the contractual, political language that was emerging among radical sects in the 1650s and posited instead a naturalized hierarchy of “Degrees and Diversities” and the “acknowledging of a Superiority from Inferiors to Superiors.”⁴⁵ There was “was no truer Emblem of Confusion either in Monarchy or Domestick Governments, then when . . . the Subject . . . strives for the upper hand of his Prince,” which is exactly what had happened in England. “Base Mechanicks” had overthrown the “King and Crown” and now “Brewers and Coblers, that have scarce an eye, / Walk hand in hand in thy Supremacy.” Also underscored the ludicrousness of the world turned upside down: “To see a Drayman that knows nought but Yeast, / Set in a throne like Babylons red Beast.” Day in England had turned to “dismal Night” and its leaders had been transformed into “lustful sodomites” who sought only “to satisfie each dark unsatiate will.”⁴⁶ England’s deterioration, Alsop claimed, was the reason that he finally decided to leave. Refusing to live in the shadow of “such base actions,” he traveled to Maryland, hoping to find the ordered society that had been lost in England.

Alsop claimed to have found what he was looking for in Maryland. “MARY-LAND,” he claimed, “not from the remoteness of her situation, but from the regularity of her well ordered Government, may . . . be called Singular.” In Maryland, there was a “Superiority with a meek and yet commanding power sitting at the Helme, steering the actions of State quietly” that was so unique for the age that observers had declared the colony the “Miracle of this Age.” Alsop admitted Maryland’s religious diversity (“the

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 87. On the new contractual language in early modern England, see Victoria A. Kahn, *Wayward Contracts: the Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640-1674* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 8-16.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 88, 123, 124, 123. The term “Red Beast” in Alsop’s text referred to the Pope. See Kunesch Jr., “George Alsop’s *A Character*,” 148, note 6.

several Opinions and Sects that Lodge within this Government”), but asserted that, unlike in England, they caused no trouble and obeyed the “legal commands of Authority” with “a reverend quietness.” Quietness was how Alsop repeatedly described Maryland’s political scene: the colony existed in “reserved silence” and “enjoys as much quietness from the disturbances of Rebellious Opinions, as most States or Kingdoms do in the world”; the government, he described, as “quiet and sober”; and the people in the colony, he reported, “live[] quietly.” The result, not surprisingly, was a society living in the “blessed Harmony of quietness.” Any noise in the colony in the form of dissent was “mutinous contempts,” “corroding humors,” or “unwarranted and tumultuous opinions.” As Baltimore had earlier asserted in his declaration to the assembly, Alsop worried about how the notions of liberty could act as a cover for these ulterior motives. These malcontents, he wrote, “would predominate upon the least smile of Liberty.”⁴⁷ Fendall’s rebellion was the worst example of how the chimerical pursuit of liberty could destroy a community by empowering the unqualified. The rebellion was led by “weak-witted men, which thought to have traced the steps of Oliver in Rebellion.” And just like the “base mechanics” and ludicrous “drayman,” they pursued only personal gain and illegitimate power. The malcontents, he wrote, “began to be might stiff and hidebound in their proceedings, clothing themselves with the flashy pretences of future and imaginary honor.” Had the rebellion not been quickly put down, they would “have done so [much] mischief . . . that nothing but utter ruine could have ransomed their headlong follies.”⁴⁸ Baltimore could not have agreed more. An attack on Baltimore’s authority, which the assembly’s consistent pursuit of more power represented, meant the infusion of the

⁴⁷ Kunesch Jr., “George Alsop’s *A Character*,” 76-78.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 136-137.

unqualified into government, who revealed their inadequacy for such authority by pursuing hidden agendas and private interests.

Alsop's support for Baltimore's autocratic control of the Maryland society was, as with the charter, only half of the colonial equation. Alsop's text carried with it the conflicting agenda of colonial promotion. Baltimore's power had to be asserted, but individuals also had to be offered encouragement to migrate. This side of the equation surfaced in Alsop's depiction of the assembly, which sounds a distinctly different tone than the majority of his tract and blatantly contradicts Baltimore's governing philosophy in Maryland. Alsop's tract extends and elaborates on the central tension that had existed in the charter and had plagued Baltimore's leadership in Maryland.

When Alsop discussed the assembly in Maryland, he veered away from his focus on Baltimore's singular leadership of the colony and embraced a more popular conception of a commonwealth. Alsop reported that an assembly was called in the colony "once every year" with "every respective County" choosing a number of men, and to them is deliver'd up the Grievances of the Country." In reality, the assembly in Maryland did not meet every year, and if it did, Baltimore would have insisted that it did so only at his pleasure. The assemblymen, Alsop continued, "maturely debate the matters, and according to their Consciences make Laws for the general good of the people."⁴⁹ This again was misleading. The colonists did not "make" the laws in the Maryland; Baltimore had consistently challenged any claim by the assembly to the right of legislative initiation. The only power willingly granted to the assembly was the power to assent to his laws and regulations.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 78.

After detailing the political powers of the assembly, Alsop offered a social description of the assemblymen: “These men that determine on these matters for the Republique, are called Burgesses . . . being for the most part good ordinary Householders of the several Counties, which do more by a plain and honest Conscience, then by artificial Syllogisms drest up in gilded Orations.”⁵⁰ This depiction of the colonists in Maryland was a far cry from Baltimore’s description of his colonists as a “factious people.” Alsop, however, continued this praise of the Maryland colonist later in the tract, writing that they were “generally conveniently confident, reservedly subtle, quick in apprehending, but slow in resolving.”⁵¹ Praising the “natural” abilities of the common sort as opposed to the learned attributes of the elite was one strategy used by commonwealth men and democratically inclined urban citizens to justify the political participation of the wider population. Compare Alsop’s passage, for instance, to the humanist scholar, Richard Stanihurst, and his description of the citizens of Waterford as “very heedy in all their public affairs, slow in determining of matters of weight, loving to look ere they leap.”⁵² The use of the word “Republique” is even more suggestive. In the mid-seventeenth century, the word could refer to the community generally or to the larger common good, but it also possessed a contemporary meaning that specifically indicated a “state in which power rests with the people or their representatives.”⁵³ Within Alsop’s encomiums to Baltimore’s authority was a passage that clearly intimated the people’s power in the colony. Alsop’s text reveals in glaring fashion the schizophrenic nature of English colonization. Through colonization, political leaders gained an additional rationale for

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 78-79.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁵² Withington, *Politics of Commonwealth*, quotation on 58.

⁵³ See OED, definitions 1 and 2.

the politics of exclusion because so many believed that the colonies attracted the self-interested and the uneducated. But for those colonies to survive, they needed to promise an inclusive political environment to attract the very people that they planned to exclude. *A Character of the Province of Maryland* is confused and contradictory because at its foundation, so was the colonial endeavor. Despite Baltimore's clear political preference for a weak and compliant assembly, he was unable to avoid employing a democratic language to advertize his colony in 1666 and was forced to promote an ideology that worked against his pretensions of power in the colony.

In the Maryland's charter and its promotion, colonization had pushed political thought in conflicting directions. For some, the New World demanded more autocratic political institutions; for others, just the opposite. This ideological division among the colonists would fully emerge in the colony's politics during the Restoration period. As acting governor of the colony from 1661 to 1676, Charles Calvert, son of Lord Baltimore, was even more determined than his predecessors to establish aristocratic rule in the colony. Dissenting colonists would respond to these efforts with a full articulation of their own political aims in a dissident document, entitled the "Complaint from Heaven," which surfaced in late 1676. On the surface, this conflict appeared to be an extension of the same sorts of political debates that were occurring in Ludlow and England's many other urban corporations. But there was a new colonial element emerging in Maryland's political discourse. Both Baltimore and his colonists outlined their own contributions to colonization and implicitly referenced Baltimore's original observation about political power as a necessary motivation for colonial participation. They threatened on that basis,

if their demands were not met, to withdraw their support. Both sides justified their political ambitions through a liberal argument made possible by this particular understanding of how colonization worked. The same element that had made the colonial promotion so contradictory exacerbated the practice of English politics in America. The nature of the colonial experience among the English population would have to change before a political stability would be possible in Maryland.

Charles Calvert's tenure as governor was marked by his desires to overcome the political problems of Maryland's past through the construction of a functioning aristocracy.⁵⁴ He immediately began the process of getting more qualified people in government for longer periods of time.⁵⁵ With its smaller numbers, this goal would be easier to accomplish with the Privy Council than the assembly. In 1666, he considered the superficial solution of requiring the councilors to wear "habbits medales or otherwise" so that "some visible distinction or distinctions might be drawn."⁵⁶ That this initiative even had to be considered underscored Calvert's concerns about the social credentials of Maryland's leaders. To ensure their loyalty and help bolster the social status of his favored colonists, Baltimore became more assertive with his powers of patronage during this period. He also began to arrange marriages to create political alliances, including the marriage of his daughter Anne Calvert to councilman Baker Brooke. After 1676, membership on the council in nearly all cases necessitated some

⁵⁴ Jordan, *Foundations*, 80.

⁵⁵ Before 1660, for instance, twelve of the thirty councilors sat for less than two years and an additional ten members had terms of only three to six years. The turnover in the assembly was even more dramatic than the council. Before 1660, sixty one percent of those elected only served a single term and an additional twenty-two percent served only two terms. See Jordan, David W. Jordan, "Maryland's Privy Council, 1637-1715" in *Law, Society, and Politics in Early Maryland*, eds. Aubrey C. Land, Lois Green Carr, and Edward C. Papenfuse (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), 67-68 and Jordan, *Foundations*, 24.

⁵⁶ Papenfuse, ed., *Maryland Online Archives*, 15:16. See also, Jordan, "Maryland's Privy Council," 71.

relation to the Calverts, either by blood or marriage. The council also trended heavily Catholic. The development of a wealthy and loyal council would be a long process, and although Calvert did not have one in place by 1676 that he could easily control, his efforts to stack the council with close associates began in earnest in the 1660s.⁵⁷

Calvert's efforts to exercise more control over the assembly were even more pronounced. The liberal franchise in Maryland, which David Jordan has argued created a "more fluid political arena than prevailed elsewhere in the English-speaking world," was one target.⁵⁸ In 1670, Calvert moved unilaterally to restrict the suffrage to property owners with "visible seated Plantations" of at least fifty acres. Massachusetts and Virginia had made similar moves, but in both cases, their respective assemblies had pushed the new laws. Calvert also looked to shrink the size of the assembly. In 1676, he summoned only two of the elected four delegates from each county.⁵⁹ Both actions demonstrated Calvert's twin goals of restricting the voice of the common colonists as well as ensuring a higher quality representative. With the colony's population growth, the transition to a wealthier and more elite body was already occurring. In 1658, for instance, twelve of the sixteen assembly members possessed more than 400 acres, none possessed less than 200 acres, and only one individual's literacy was in question.⁶⁰ With his new electoral policies, Calvert hoped to accelerate this process.

As with his efforts with the Privy Council, Calvert's efforts to exercise more control over the assembly would take time, and he had made few concrete gains by the 1670s.

⁵⁷ Jordan, "Privy Council," 68-72.

⁵⁸ Jordan, *Foundations*, 22.

⁵⁹ Jordan, *Foundations*, 80-89. Calvert would make the move to two delegates per county permanent in 1681, see Jordan, *Foundations*, 89.

⁶⁰ Jordan, *Foundations*, 33.

The assembly of 1671 was a good example of the limits of Baltimore's influence in government. That assembly proved so satisfactory to the proprietor that he continued the same body, instead of calling for new elections, for four consecutive sessions over the next five years, the longest such period in Maryland's history.⁶¹ During that year, however, the colonists declined to elect many of Baltimore's favorites, a list that included two prominent proprietary proponents, Thomas Notley and John Morecroft; Nathaniel Utie of Baltimore County, who would quickly be appointed to the council after failing to be elected a burgess; and William Stevens of Somerset and Robert Dunn of Kent, both dependable proprietary supporters. Several of the assembly's new members that year had never received a proprietary commission. The makeup of the assembly suggests that Maryland's colonists continued to rebuke incumbents in favor of sending new men to the assembly and seemed disinclined to support men currently enjoying the governor's favor. The political quiescence in the early 1670s was due to the lack of the serious economic problems that had dominated the tense assembly meetings of 1666 and 1669, not to any early returns on Calvert's efforts to increase his control of government.⁶² When Calvert, after the death of his father, called for new elections in 1676, the same year that the "Complaint" would surface, he was in a precarious political position. He had taken conspicuous steps to try and increase his influence in government by filling the council and the assembly with family members and favorites, but that process had not yet been completed.

⁶¹ Jordan, *Foundations*, 108. This decision to continue a compliant assembly was consistent with efforts at the local level. With the appointments of sheriffs and other officers, Charles Calvert began to keep satisfactory persons in the same positions as opposed to the earlier pattern of frequent turnover among incumbents. See Jordan, *Foundations*, Chapter 4.

⁶² Jordan, *Foundations*, 109.

The year of 1676 was particularly tumultuous for the entire Chesapeake region. To the south, Bacon's Rebellion exploded onto the scene in Virginia, leading to wars with the local Indians and the overthrow of its government. Maryland's government was vulnerable to the same sort of uprising and its leaders openly worried about the contagion of revolt spreading to Maryland. Thomas Notley, the acting governor during this period due to Charles Calvert's departure to handle his father's estate, wrote that the colony only lacked a "monstrous head to their monstrous body."⁶³ Despite this, there was only one attempt at rebellion that occurred late in August when an armed group, led by colonists William Davyes and John Pate, met in Calvert County to protest against proprietary leadership. The group refused to lay down their arms, but offered little real resistance. The two leaders were tracked down and hanged in their own county, sending a powerful message to any future dissidence. Their chief complaint was the high taxes of that year, 297 pounds of tobacco per poll, the highest ever levied in the colony.⁶⁴

In late 1676, Notley issued a remonstrance to the colony following the uprising and laid out a defense of proprietary government in the colony. The speech hit many of the same themes a Baltimore's proclamation had in 1649. Davyes, Pate, and their supporters were "desperate and ill Affected persons" and constituted a "malignant Spirit," who threatened the larger society through their actions. They were "rotten members" of the body politic and "doe Endanger the whole." They concealed their malevolent intentions and only pretended to pursue the common good. If the rebellion had not been put down in Maryland, the colony would have met the same fate as its southern neighbor, which had been "torne in peeces under the maske of publique

⁶³ Papenfuse, ed., *Maryland Online Archives*, V, 152-154.

⁶⁴ David Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1972), 78-84.

Reformacon & ease from taxes” and suffered the “Calamities of Intestine Warre.” Lord Baltimore’s leadership, on the other hand, had only the larger interest of the community in mind. He pursued the “Reall & permanent” prosperity of Maryland society: “That this happy day may once arive hath bn the long & unwaryed Endeavor of my Lords deceased ffather And . . . will be the constant Employ of my Lord that now is.” Lord Baltimore offered a “Paternal care” that extended throughout society, even to the “meanest of the People.” It was in the people’s best interest for Baltimore to retain his authority in the colony. They needed to regain the “quiett demeanour” that Alsop had described because the “peace & plenty of every individuall in the Province,” Notley maintained, “truly consists in the due preservacon of his Lordshipps rights.”⁶⁵

Importantly though, the proclamation did not rest with a declaration of Baltimore’s virtuous leadership and a reminder of his absolute authority in the colony. Notley did point to the “many Condescensions of his Lordshipp” in his “Absolute Comand” of the colony and admitted that the Council was disappointed by the “ingratitude of the People.” But Notley also repeatedly pointed to assembly approval as evidence of the legitimacy of the contested laws. Notley addressed the three central grievances of the disaffected population: high taxes, the new suffrage restrictions, and the poll tax that the dissidents’ claimed unjustly taxed the poor and the rich at equal rates. Concerning the initiatives that had raised the tax rate, these were, he asserted, “begun by consent of an Assembly.” And regarding the equality of tax rates, Notley asked: “why must my Lord or his Governor & Councell beare the blame of this which my Lord himselfe cannot helpe without the consent of an Assembly?” If the “Wisdom of future Assembly shall thinke fitt to alter”

⁶⁵ Papenfuse, ed., *Maryland Online Archives*, XV, 137-141.

the rate, then Notley was sure that the proprietor would “consent to itt.”⁶⁶ What was so notable about Notley’s proclamation was how the presence of an independent assembly had become, even for a defender of the proprietor, the most powerful indicator of a just government in Maryland. Notley assumed the presence of such an assembly and assigned full culpability for any nefarious law on the people and their representatives. Baltimore’s conspicuous and concerted efforts, however, to exert more control over the assembly undercut the effectiveness of Notley’s proclamation and left the proprietary position open to charges of deception and hypocrisy, which the “Complaint” would attempt to exploit at every turn.

The “Complaint” surfaced in Maryland in late 1676 as both a defense of the rebellion and a response to Notley’s proclamation. The vitriolic nature of the tract has captured the attention of most historians. For one historian, the author[s] “bared their suppressed emotions” and composed a “frenetic letter” that gave vent to “their collective spleen.”⁶⁷ It has alternately been described as an “anti-proprietary screed,” a “colorful indictment,” a “bitter document,” and as “half literate and charged with emotion.”⁶⁸ Beyond its emotive language, historians of early Maryland have chosen to focus on the document either as a statement of the social and economic grievances in the colony or as an example of early modern anti-Catholic invective.⁶⁹ Both of these themes, however,

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, XV, 137-141.

⁶⁷ Krugler, *English and Catholic*, 237-238

⁶⁸ Sutto, “Built upon Smoke,” 393; Jordan, *Foundations*, 95; Carr and Jordan, *Maryland’s Revolution of Government, 1689-1692* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), 31; and Land, *Colonial Maryland*, 79.

⁶⁹ John Krugler and Antoinette Sutto give high importance to the language of anti-Catholicism and how it offered an organizational framework for their attacks on Baltimore and an explanation for his autocratic policies. Carr and Jordan focus instead on the myriad political complaints of the colonists, including the suffrage restrictions, and give little attention to the anti-Catholic rhetoric. Stephen Saunders Webb mentions both but clearly views the economic grievances as primary. The dissidents, as in Virginia, attacked misgovernment, but in Maryland, he argued, they “added the indelible dye of religious hatred”

were subsumed by the larger attack on Baltimore's attempt to construct a ruling aristocracy. Baltimore's Catholicism and the economic struggles of the colony supported and substantiated the charge of self-interested and exclusive leadership. When the authors of the "Complaint" asked the king to revoke Baltimore's charter, they also included a request that the "free men" in the colony be able to "choose their delegates . . . in the Assembly; to enact for the comon Generall good for the people and Country."⁷⁰ Embedded in their request for imperial intervention was an assertion of the societal benefits of a more democratic government. The "Complaint" ultimately ended up in Whitehall with the Lords of Trade and was there considered important enough to keep.⁷¹ The "Complaint" was not simply an emotional outburst from the disaffected in Maryland, but a rational argument for the authorities in London to consider a different political organization for the colony, a plea that evidently did not fall on deaf ears.

The "Complaint" targeted almost all of Baltimore's efforts to gain more governing control. With the council, the "Complaint" criticized Baltimore's policy of promoting relatives, listing some of its current members for effect: "Young child charles Baltemore . . . son in law Deputy Governor . . . Philip Calvert . . . William Calvert nephew, secretary . . . Brooks surveyor generall, kindsman."⁷² Baltimore's recent efforts in the assembly also faced scrutiny. In decreasing the makeup of the assembly from four representatives per county to two, Baltimore gained the power to select the men that best

to their protests. For Webb, the dissident movement in Maryland would have likely moved forward for solely secular reasons. Krulger also points to the employment to the dissidents' opportunistic employment of the "facile connection between Catholicism and absolutism." See Krugler, *English and Catholic*, 236-239; Sutto, "Built Upon Smoke," 393-406; Carr and Jordan, *Maryland's Revolution*, 31-34; Stephen Saunders Webb, *1676: The End of American Independence* (New York: Knopf, 1984), 70-76.

⁷⁰ Papenfuse, ed., *Maryland Online Archives*, V, 149.

⁷¹ Sutto, "Built upon Smoke," 360; Carr and Jordan, *Maryland's Revolution*, 33.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 5:137.

served “his purpose,” which for the authors of the “Complaint” resulted in the election of “either papists, owne creatures and familiars or ignoramuses.” His use of patronage to influence assemblymen was particularly egregious, using “all Arts and devises . . . to perswade and create fit turne-coats.” Too many men had proved susceptible to these tactics and “betray[ed] [their] trust to [their] Country, for a Collonell’s or Captains name and office, or peculiar favour, to the oppression and ruyn of many of the King’s poore subjects.” Thomas Notley was a prime example. He had earned his position by his past support of proprietary policies as speaker of the assembly. In a previous meeting, he had led assembly support for a “2 shilling custom per hogshead to my Lords Heyre . . . and made it hereditary.”⁷³ His reward was the deputy governorship. The complaint also accused Baltimore of intimidation, which had been effective as well. If any assemblyman “stands out or up for the comon good,” they reported, then from the upper house “perswadinge spirits goe forth” and through “frowns and treathnings scares them to be quieth.”

Through the twin forces of patronage and coercion, Baltimore had gained control over the council and the assembly, so that the two bodies were not willing to do anything other than submit to Baltimore’s wishes. In the “Complaint,” the target was rarely Baltimore alone, but more often the “Lord and his Champions in their Prince-ship,” the Lord Proprietary and his “cloake of mutiniars and disaffected persons,” or the “proprietary with his familiars.”⁷⁴ The attack was not simply on a autocratic individual, but on the small group of people, who now occupied both the council and the assembly and were enabling Baltimore’s governing agenda. The “Complaint” paid particular

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 5:137, 141,

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 5: 138-139, 145, 143, 138.

attention to the role of the assembly in giving sanction to Baltimore's nefarious plots. When a plan was "hatched" in the "popish chamber," they claimed, the proprietor immediately called an assembly to provide a "Country cloack." When he wanted the power to raise a force for an ill-fated military expedition, he "overswaded an Assembly" into compliance. When he unjustly attacked a neighboring Dutch community, the "tyranny" was retroactively approved and "chalked over with an Assembly." Concerning the Indian controversies connected to Bacon's Rebellion, Baltimore again sought "to cloake his policy with an Assembly" and convinced them to take measures to conceal his transgressions. Baltimore had succeeded in maintaining a political structure that ostensibly gave the colonists a voice in government, when in reality the "Assent of the freemen within the Province . . . [was] utterly denied."⁷⁵ Even with the presence of an assembly, which Notley and Baltimore had both emphasized in their earlier proclamations, the government of the colony was run by Baltimore and a small, exclusive group of his subordinates.

Where Baltimore argued for the presence of a beneficent aristocracy, however, the dissidents saw only oligarchy. They accused Baltimore of selecting a small group of individuals to help run the government, not for the common good of the colony, but so that his selfish interests would go unchecked. His magnanimous intentions for the colony, they asserted, were as fraudulent as its political institutions. His only concern was how best to "convert the comon good to his privat ends."⁷⁶ They claimed that tax rates were high because Baltimore had used the local Indian conflicts as a pretense for raising an army whose only purpose was to enrich the proprietor. He had "raysted the

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 5:137, 136, 135, 141.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 5:137, 136, 135, 141.

People in Arms for his privat gain and Interest, onely to oppress the king's subjects with great taxes in his and own creatures pocket." Maryland's laws, they argued, were inconsistently administered because Baltimore's "selfe interest" was "irrevocable and perpetuall." When noting the lack of towns, they again accused Baltimore and his supporters of self-interest, having "made Merchandize of the land and now it is passed all most remedy."⁷⁷ The dissidents offered an inverse interpretation of Baltimore's actions in the colony. It was private interests, not a concern for the common good, which explained his governing philosophy in the colony.

On the surface, the contours of this debate seem to be simply an extension of English politics in America. Like the democrats in Ludlow, the authors of the "Complaint" decried an emerging oligarchic power in their community. Baltimore pursued an agenda of political exclusion, they asserted, not for the sake of the common good, but for the easier fulfillment of his self-interested pursuits. Baltimore, like the aristocrats in Ludlow, argued conversely that it was too democratic a government that would bring self-interest into the political realm through the participation of the unqualified. But during these debates in Maryland a new type of political argument was beginning to emerge. The same premise that had made Alsop's promotional tract so contradictory allowed both sides in Maryland to infuse these conventional English debates with an early American liberalism. These liberal political demands, which would polarize the political debate in Maryland, began with two very different understandings of Maryland's early history.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 5:144, 141, 135, 138, 140.

In Baltimore's depiction of the inaugural migration in *Lord Baltemores Case*, he reported that, at great cost, he had "sent two of his own brothers with about 200 people to begin and seat a Plantation there." He claimed expenditures for the colony of over 20,000 pounds "out of his own purse" and pointed to his familial sacrifices, noting the deaths of both "his said two brothers," who had lost their lives in "prosecution thereof." Outside of himself and his family members, few people had played an important role in the colony's beginnings.⁷⁸ The two hundred non-Calvert colonists, for instance, were static entities who did not act, but instead were acted upon. They arrived in the colony because Baltimore had sent them there. He had put the plan in motion, he had provided the necessary finances, and he had taken all the risks.

The dissidents in the "Complaint" offered a strikingly different account of Maryland's early history. They posited a far different role to the common settler:

wee ourselves thereuppon have transported our selves and our estates into this Country, purchased the land from the Indians with loss of Estate and many hundred mens lives (yea thousands) and must defend ourselves continually without the Lord Baltemores' ability, whereby our land and possessions are become ovr Owne.⁷⁹

It was not Baltimore's sacrifices that had built the colony, but the labor and courage of the common settlers. They, not Baltimore, had risked their "estates" and had gotten their "poore living with hard labour out of the ground in a terrible Wildernis."⁸⁰ The dissidents in Maryland anticipated Locke's theorization of property as the creation of human labor, in this case their labor. They did so because it erased Baltimore from the colonial

⁷⁸ Baltimore, *Baltemores Case*, 1.

⁷⁹ Papenfuse, ed., *Maryland Online Archives*, V, 140.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 5:140.

narrative.⁸¹ Throughout the “Complaint,” the dissident position was defiantly exclusive: “wee have made it a country for the glory and enlargement of the Dominion and Emperial Crowne of England.”⁸² There was no middle ground in these two depictions of early Maryland. For the dissidents, the labor of the colonist was everything. For Baltimore, it was nothing.

For Baltimore, he had played a vital role in the creation of Maryland, with all the risks and sacrifices that that entailed, and the promise of vast governmental authority had been crucial to eliciting his participation. If colonial governments trended towards democracy, as they had in the past, and allowed “factious people . . . [to] have power to make Lawes to dispose of him, and all his estate there,” then leading figures like himself would disengage from such endeavors. “Such a chargeable and hazardous things as Plantations are,” he continued, “will not be undertaken by any, whether it be a Company or a single man, without as great encouragements of priviledges as are in the Lo. *Baltimore’s Patent of Maryland.*” He admitted that it “may not be convenient for any one man” in England to have such power, but it was “necessary for any . . . that undertakes a plantation, in so remote and wild a place as *Mariland.*”⁸³ Baltimore was attempting to carve out an exceptional status for Maryland on the basis of the broader circumstances of colonization. For Baltimore, his colony would be comprised of English settlers, but that did not make it a miniature England. What worked at home did not

⁸¹ On Locke’s conception of property, see Barbara Arneil, *John Lock and America: The Defence of English Colonialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 132-167. Arneil focuses on Locke’s definition of property and its use in justifying the English appropriation of American lands. The Maryland case provides an example of how this definition of property could also be utilized to undercut the property claims of English leaders in favor of the laboring population.

⁸² Papenfuse, ed., *Maryland Online Archives*, V, 145, 140.

⁸³ Baltimore, *Baltimore’s Case*, 9-10.

necessarily make sense abroad. If England wanted prosperous colonies, it would have to attract the support of men like Baltimore, and to do so, it would have to give them a political authority that exceeded English norms. If not, and English norms were strictly applied in Maryland and throughout the other colonies, they would begin a period of inevitable decline and deterioration.

The dissidents in Maryland countered with their own attempt to use their colonial contributions as justification for their political demands. They had already identified the importance of their role in Maryland's early history, but the benefits of their labor, they claimed, extended far beyond the Chesapeake. They noted the "considerable custome" that the king received "out off the fruit of ovr labours and industry." They turned to the merchants of London next, "whom ovr labour and industry affords in exchange for the merchandize many a thousands of thousands of returnes, and employment for a great nombre of ships and men, which will increas by God's permission as wee increas and decreas iff wee decreas."⁸⁴ Having put themselves at the center of the colonial narrative, it stood to reason that they were also responsible for its many benefits. Their contributions deserved to be supported, and as with Baltimore, the necessary encouragement needed to take the form of increased political power. The dissidents acknowledged that they pursued a level of political participation that, by English standards, exceeded their social station. In the "Complaint," they admitted their low social origins, confessing that "many of [them] came [to Maryland] servants to others," but ignored the attendant political limitations on the basis of their colonial sacrifices: "but we [have] adventured ovr lives for it." English norms did not contain political

⁸⁴ Papenfuse, ed., *Maryland Online Archives*, V: 148.

aspirations for the common colonists any more than they had for Baltimore. The dissidents threatened that without this sort of political empowerment the common colonist would abandon the colony, claiming that many intended “to leave the Country” if they could get the “reall [value] for [their] estates.” Baltimore’s aristocratic governing approach would “depopulate the Country in stead of increasinge [it]” and would “not houlde longe, nor maintain the Country, [nor be] profitable to [the king’s] reelm of England.” For both Baltimore and the dissidents, their contributions had created the colony and their absence could just as easily destroy it.

The attempts to capitalize politically on the colonial experience is ultimately what distinguished colonial politics from its English counterpart. They infused the predominantly humanist political culture of the early modern world with a potent strand of liberal political thought.⁸⁵ At important moments in the political debate, both sides conceptualized the ideal form of government in Maryland as the one that best protected their own interests. The foundation of this claim was Baltimore’s original observation about why people were willing to migrate to America, which provided the crucial link between personal, even selfish, ambitions and the larger good of colonization. That colonial characteristic opened up new possibilities for justifying political participation that were particularly useful at the extremes of English politics. When Baltimore consciously pursued an individual governing authority in Maryland that had all but disappeared in England, he utilized a liberal argument. When the dissidents admitted that their social standing worked against their political aspirations, they too resorted to a

⁸⁵ On the possibility of coexistence and interaction of liberalism and republicanism in a different context in early modern England, see Steve Pincus, “Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth,” *The American Historical Review* 103 (June, 1998), 705-736.

liberal logic. The result in the promotional literature was a set of contradictory promises emanating in all directions. In colonial politics, the consequence was a perpetual instability. There was an ever-present possibility of extremism in Maryland that could work in both directions, but whose intellectual justification always took the same liberal form.

This colonial liberalism did not overtake the classical language and political typology that still dominated early modern politics. It was an insurgent political philosophy that was empowered by colonial circumstances and applied only selectively. Appeals to virtue and the common good were omnipresent in Maryland's political discourse. Baltimore aspired throughout his proprietorship to meet the classical definition of virtue and the colonists just as frequently attacked him on the basis that he had not met those expectations. In this intellectual context, their liberal political demands were easily misunderstood as the worst sort of individual corruption, which was why the one-sided, historical accounts of colonization were so important. Baltimore and his political opponents were very specific about their own contributions because they needed to limit the applicability of their own logic. The larger job of government was still to pursue the common good, and political leaders still needed to be virtuous; but in this one exceptional case, the protection of their private agenda was perfectly aligned with the larger goals of the community. For their opponents, however, they marshaled the highest forms of invective to disparage their political ambitions. What worked towards the common good for one was naked self-interest in another.⁸⁶ The humanist condemnations

⁸⁶ These internal criticisms have helped to foster the conception of colonists in the Chesapeake Region as individualistic to the point of being anti-social. The colonists' frequent attempt to connect their own agendas to the larger good of colonization has been often overlooked or dismissed. For classic treatments

of self-interest still reverberated, but the liberal argument had gained legitimacy through the particular demands of colonization. The result was a politics in America that was operating at extremes, both substantively and rhetorically. The colonial experience and its many ramifications had polarized politics in Maryland.

Political stability would eventually emerge in Maryland by the end of the century, however, as a new group of political leaders rose to power. During the closing decades of the seventeenth century, wages rose in England and economic opportunities declined in the Chesapeake, leading to a decrease in English migration to Maryland. This migrant pool was replaced by the increasing importation of African slaves. From 1680 to 1720, the enslaved population in the region grew at almost twice the rate of the white population, increasing as a proportion of society from 7 percent in 1680 to 25 percent in 1720. The white population took the opposite trajectory. By the 1690s, Maryland born creoles, not English migrants, were the adult majority.⁸⁷ The native-born creoles would become the crucial component in the formation of a new political order. They began to take advantage of their greater access to land and wealth and to separate themselves, both socially and economically, from the larger population. Slavery “facilitated and accelerated” this process, which resulted in an increasingly stratified society, sustained by the expansive economic power of the richest planters. Through wealth and patronage, these wealthy merchant-planters successfully established an alliance with the yeomanry

of the early Chesapeake as an individualist society, see Gloria L. Main, *Tobacco Colony: Life in Early Maryland, 1650-1720* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), Edmund Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975) and T.H. Breen, “Looking out for Number One: The Cultural Limits on Public Policy in Early Virginia,” in Breen, *Puritans and Adventurers: Change and Persistence in Early America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 106-126.

⁸⁷ Walsh, *Motives of Honor*, 239-246; 131-144, 200-210.

that allowed them to ignore, and even antagonize, the rest of white society. Edmund Morgan offered an additional explanation, positing a newly institutionalized racism as the reason the poorer planters were increasingly quiescent, having chosen race over class. What emerged in the colony at the turn of the century was an exclusive governing authority capable of exercising power without the intrusions of the wider population, the colonial aristocracy Baltimore had long dreamed of.⁸⁸

Maryland's polarized past, however, offers a new perspective on the rise of stability in the colony that emphasizes the ideological consequences of the transition to slavery for the average colonist. Due to the decreasing migration of white settlers in favor of black slaves, most English colonists were no longer migrants and their labor was no longer vital to the success of the colony. These sacrifices and contributions had been crucial to how they conceived of and ultimately justified their claims to political power. Both had been erased from their colonial experience and now resided with a people preemptively excluded from the body politic on the basis of race. The shift in the immigrant labor from white to black had completely undercut the foundation of the liberal arguments for an inclusive, democratic government in Maryland. There was a new elite in the colony with more wealth and cultural authority, but there was also a wider population unable to argue for their political inclusion on the terms that had been developed by their predecessors over the course of the century.

⁸⁸ On the emerging stability of Maryland society at the turn of the century, see Jordan, "Political Stability"; Carole Shammas, "English-born and Creole Elites in Turn-of-the-Century Virginia," in *The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century: Essays on Anglo-American Society*, eds. Thad W. Tate and David L. Ammerman (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 274-296; Trevor Burnard, *Creole Gentlemen: The Maryland Elite, 1691-1776* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 1-20; Allan Kulikoff, *Tobacco and Slaves: The Development of Southern Cultures in the Chesapeake, 1680-1800* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986). For a dissenting view on Maryland that contends the political chaos of the early decades has been overstated, especially on the local level, see Lois Carr, "Sources of Political Stability and Upheaval in Seventeenth Century Maryland," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, 79 (1984), 44-70.

Unfortunately for Charles Calvert, he would lose control of the colony in 1689, just as the demographics in the colony were becoming more favorable for the construction of a ruling elite. His loss only further stabilized the colony's politics, however, as it removed his liberal argumentation from the political discourse. The colony would no longer be led by an individual intent on translating his personal contributions into political power, but by a royal governor who would not lay claim to authority in the same way. By the end of the century, the common colonists were not the only ones who had lost the colonial foundation of their liberal demands for political power. Both Maryland's governor and its colonists could no longer claim such a vital importance to the colony or its recent past, and with their contributions diminished, so too was the potency of any liberal political demands. The early American liberalism, which had been used to justify the most extreme claims for democracy and aristocracy and had rendered the politics of the colony so unstable, had been removed. In *Baltimore's Case*, Baltimore had argued that nobody who was "well in his wits" would participate in colonization without demanding increased political rights. The observation was as salient after 1680 as before, but what had changed was colonization itself. The central problem posed by the colonial experience in early America had not been solved. It had simply disappeared. To understand the political turbulence of seventeenth century Maryland as part of a larger movement among colonists to establish English rights abroad is to misunderstand the nature of the early colonial experience and to perpetuate the exclusiveness of Baltimore's original observation. Colonial circumstances provided the opportunity to create new arguments for political power that all colonists were interested in taking advantage of. For most of the century, the imposition of English norms would have been no more

satisfactory to the average colonist than they would have been to Baltimore. What happened at the end of the century was a fundamental shift in the political opportunities afforded by colonization. At the same time that almost everything in Maryland was getting bigger, from its population to its territorial holdings, the scope of its politics was getting much smaller. The political ambitions of colonial leaders and average colonists would be more limited going forward. The polarized, unstable political world of the seventeenth century was gone, and so too was its expansive possibilities

CHAPTER FIVE

BY "VOICE, AND VOTE, AND CONSENT OF THE *WHOLE PEOPLE*": THE NEW ENGLAND REBELLION OF 1689 AND THE CREATION OF "THE PEOPLE" IN EARLY AMERICA

In 1689, New England colonists staged a rebellion against lawful authority. On April 18, colonists streamed into Boston to express their discontent with the leadership of the colony under Edward Andros, the governor duly appointed by the recently deposed James II. The rebelling colonists quickly accepted the leadership of a Council of Safety, filled with many of the leading members of society who had dominated the political scene before the arrival of Andros. These leaders, empowered by their leadership of "the people," soon restored the government in Massachusetts to its former ways. The colony now again operated as it had under the original charter, which had been revoked in 1684. This would remain the uneasy status quo until the English government and the new sovereigns decided on a resolution. Both sides waited on imperial intervention, which would be decisive in answering the question of who would rule in New England. With so much at stake, both sides did not remain silent, but launched aggressive polemical campaigns offering their various viewpoints on the rebellion and the future of the colony. This local controversy over authority and rebellion quickly became a proxy for matters of empire. The political arrangement that was best for Massachusetts carried with it a parallel claim of what was best for the empire. Both sides had to fit their local political claims into a coherent and appealing vision of English colonization.

The two factions offered competing imperial visions and disagreed most directly on the issue of extending "English Rights" to American colonists. The pro-Andros faction wanted a centralized empire, whereas the colonial authors underscored the importance of local political authority, employing an argument for such privileges based on their natural rights as English subjects.¹ The key "English right" at issue was representative government in the colonies. The colonial leaders supported an empire based broadly on the equality of Englishmen, so that the colonies would have elected assemblies *and* a colonial elite. This call for the equality of Englishmen within the empire has received considerable attention from colonial historians, who have exposed many of the inconsistencies that existed between the rhetoric and actions of the colonial leaders.² The Bay Colony, in particular, had long demonstrated a willingness to stray from English custom and example, even flirting at times with a claim of independence. The claim of "English Rights" in America, for many historians, reeks of political opportunism and has alternately been described as self-serving, hollow, and of equal

¹ On the colonists' use during the "Glorious Revolution in America" of both the common law and its conception of the subjects' rights and the an emerging idea of natural rights, see Craig Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early American Political Theory, 1675-1775* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 51-80.

² On "the Glorious Revolution in America," see Richard S. Dunn, "The Glorious Revolution and America," in *The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise and to the close of the Seventeenth Century*, vol. 1 of *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 445-66; Richard R. Johnson, "The Revolution of 1688-89 in the American Colonies," in *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact*, ed., Jonathan Israel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 215-240 and *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981); David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); Jack M. Sosin, *English America and the Revolution of 1688: Royal Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982); and Phillip S. Haffenden, *New England and the English Nation, 1689 - 1713* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).

usefulness to everyone, making it unhelpful even in distinguishing between the two sides.³

The question of the colonial leaders' commitment to the full implications of their professed ideology is of limited usefulness, however, in understanding the political debates in New England.⁴ The colonists were not the first group to point to an abstract right in order to procure political power for themselves, nor would they be the last, once in power, to try and limit the scope of the promised governing agenda that had helped bring them to power. Whether or not they were fully dedicated to their own rhetoric should not discount the importance of the language and ideas that they employed. The evident hypocrisy of their position is less important for what it says about the character of colonial leaders, but than for how it illuminates the structure of colonial politics and the particular challenges of maintaining local political power in a growing empire. Before the revocation of the Massachusetts charter, the colony's leaders had implemented the most restrictive suffrage requirements in English America, but in 1689 they mobilized a vision of empire that, to their opponents, was dangerously "popular." Instead of understanding this fact as an analytic endpoint, indicting, as it does, the ideological consistency of the colony's leaders, this chapter will examine how and why they were

³ On these critical appraisals of the colonial rhetoric, see Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution*, "Introduction," xxiii-xxvi, and Sosin, *English America*, "Preface," 1-5.

⁴ Michal J. Rozbicki has recently applied a similar approach the colonial rhetoric during the American Revolution. He has argued that there has been too much attention given to the abstract Enlightenment rhetoric of the colonists and the many evident contradictions, from a modern perspective, in colonial society. He searches out the contemporary meaning of liberty, which he argues was one of "privilege," which was rightly applied only to a select few. Instead of searching out inconsistencies, Rozbicki is more interested in explaining the political agenda of the colonials that was substantiated through the rhetoric of liberty. This type of analysis is equally beneficial for understanding the New England Rebellion of 1689 and provides a broader colonial context to many of the developments that Rozbicki locates only in the late eighteenth century, including the creation of "the people." See, *Culture and Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), 1-55.

forced into such a position. That the colonial leaders pursued their own political power by whatever means necessary is not surprising. More interesting is why and how the rapidly changing English empire required the colonists to embrace these political strategies in order to maintain their local authority.

The structure of imperial politics, with its many ramifications, becomes clear in the extensive pamphlet wars that followed the rebellion. Both sides published multiple tracts intended to destroy the governing legitimacy of their opponents, attacking each other in a conventional humanist language and accusing the other of pursuing a self-interested agenda to the detriment of the common good. But when the colonists switched from attacking their opponents to justifying their own political power, their argument took a liberal form and depended upon a populist understanding of colonization. As the Maryland rebels of 1676 had done before them, the New England dissidents emphasized the colonists' labor and argued that political liberty and its protection of self-interest were vital to their continued participation.

This vision of empire put forth by the New England colonists led to a depiction and conceptualization of the colonial population that differed dramatically from their opponents. For the pro-Andros authors, the people were uneducated, highly emotional, and easily misled, but for the colonial authors, imperial history argued otherwise. They used their understanding of the colonial past to create an idealized conception of "the people" in America. The political conception of "the people" in America was not an eighteenth century development, but a colonial phenomenon that surfaced originally in

1689.⁵ The narrative of colonization put forth by colonial leaders offered such an empowering conception of "the people" that they actually ran the risk of destabilizing their own authority in the colony, but it was necessary to secure their local authority within the larger empire. Going forward, the claims of authority by colonial leaders would continue to be linked to an idealistic perception of "the people."

For the many critics of the colony, the rebellion in 1689 had been perfectly predictable. The leaders of the colony had long demonstrated a complete disregard for any and all imperial obligations and, at times, seemed committed to a republican political ideology that threatened even a nominal loyalty to the king. For these critics, the rebellion itself had revealed the character of the Massachusetts colonists and had offered a justification, *ex post facto*, of their harsh appraisals of the colony's leadership. The colonial leaders offered a different interpretation of the rebellion. The rebellious subjects were a persecuted population, determined to save themselves from the treachery of the Andros administration. They declared that their "English Rights" had been under attack in the colony and that they rebelled only to secure their birthright. The sincerity, even the coherence, of this mantra of "English Rights," so popular among the dissenting colonists, has been questioned by historians, but it represented a real distinction between the colonial authors and imperial officers about the type of government most suitable for the colonies.

⁵ For the invention of "the people" in America as a late eighteenth century development, see Rozbicki, *Culture and Liberty*, 78-86. See also, Edmund Morgan, *Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America* (New York: Norton, 1988).

In March of 1689, news had begun to arrive in Boston, via West Indian merchant vessels trading in New England, that the prince of Orange had invaded England, landing in Torbay. Edmund Andros, governor of the Dominion of New England, had not received any official word of William's invasion or on his own governing status. Largely due to the efforts of Increase Mather, the colony's agent in London and implacable enemy of the Andros regime, William's administration had not yet sent word to Boston of Andros's continuing authority. Matters worsened for Andros on April 4, 1689, when John Winslow arrived in Boston with copies of William's famous declaration, "The Liberties of England and the Protestant Religion I will Maintain," issued the previous fall. For reasons that remain unclear, Andros threw Winslow in jail, but not before the copies of the declaration began to circulate throughout the town. This was not the first time that news of a rumored invasion in England had reached Massachusetts. Erroneous reports had circulated in 1686, claiming that Monmouth and Argyles had successfully overthrown James II, much to the delight of much of the colony's population. But acting on the basis of rumor was always a dangerous move, as had been the case in 1686. Andros was in an impossible position, unwilling to act until official news arrived but put in an increasingly vulnerable situation as the reports became more credible. Andros's government to this point had been heavy-handed and effective, giving those who opposed his leadership little to work with. His enemies in Boston would not miss the opportunity to exploit his newfound vulnerability. His opponents were now in a position to use Andros's silence on the news from England to argue that he sided with the deposed

Catholic king. The opponents of Andros argued that a conspiracy was afoot and Andros's silence on William's invasion was the key piece of evidence.⁶

With conspiratorial fears gaining steam in Boston, even a minor incident had the ability to ignite a rebellion. On April 17, a disgruntled seaman aboard the royal frigate, *Rose*, abandoned his ship and the town, but found time during his exodus to spread rumors that the captain of the ship was plotting to set fire to Boston. The Captain's accomplice, he claimed, was no other than Edmund Andros. This unsubstantiated and doubtful claim was enough to put the wheel of rebellion into motion. On the morning of April 18, the captain of the *Rose* was seized at eight in the morning, as soon as he stepped foot on shore. New rumors of dark conspiracies began to spread throughout the town. In northern Boston, the inhabitants heard tales of their southern neighbors rising in rebellion. The south heard similar reports about activity in the north. As one contemporary observer put it, "a Strange Disposition entered in the Body of the People." Deserting soldiers from the frontier, who had been streaming into Boston for months, added another combustible element to the situation and added to the fears that a "*bloody Revolution*" was in the colony's future.⁷ Hundreds of people gathered in the streets and began arming themselves, beating drums, and organizing themselves into militia companies.

Out of these circumstances, there quickly arose a leadership committee at the head of these armed colonists. They took the title of Council of Safety. Out of its fifteen

⁶ For detailed accounts of the rebellion of 1689, see Richard R. Johnson, *Adjustment to Empire*; David S. Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America*; Jack M. Sosin, *English America and the Revolution of 1688*.

⁷ Report of Samuel Mather, in *The Glorious Revolution in America: Documents on the Colonial Crisis of 1689*, eds. Michael G. Hall, Lawrence H. Leder, and Michael G. Kammen (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 39.

members, five had actually served under Andros as councilors in the Dominion, five had been magistrates under the preceding government, and five were merchants who had held no political power under either regime. The council attempted to strike a balance between those most opposed to the revocation of the charter and those persons, known as "moderates," who had attempted to varying degrees to work with the Dominion government. As the crowds were coming together at midday, the Council issued *The Declaration of the Gentlemen, Merchants and Inhabitants of Boston, and the County Adjacent*. The opening passage referenced an expansive "popish plot" that sought the "Extinction of the Protestant Religion." Not since the "death of Queen Mary" had the "Hopes of Success" for such a plot been as high as they now were "in [their] days." New England was an important mark for this worldwide conspiracy because, they argued, the colony was renowned and "so remarkable for the true Profession and pure Exercise of the Protestant Religion."⁸ Andros and his appointees had been connected to this Catholic conspiracy to destroy New England and its Protestant colonists. In pursuit of this goal, they accused "Popish Commanders" and "papists" in the Dominion government, for instance, of purposefully sabotaging military efforts against the neighboring French and Indian enemies.⁹ By the end of the second day of the rebellion, the Council of Safety was now in full control of the colony as Andros and the leading figures of his government had all been incarcerated. Only a few of the men imprisoned were New Englanders; the vast majority were military officers and officials appointed by the crown. On May 2, the Council of Safety voted to resume the government of the old charter without actually

⁸ The declaration is printed in Charles McLean Andrews, *Narratives of Insurrections* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), 175-182.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 181.

reinstating it, and on May 22, the colony held an election for deputies, putting many of the same people in power who had risen to prominence under the charter government.

For the longtime imperial observers of Massachusetts, especially its erstwhile critic Edward Randolph, these rebellious actions of the people of New England were predictable.¹⁰ The colony had long demonstrated an independent streak and took an uncompromising view of its rights as guaranteed by the founding charter. The Bay Colony Charter issued in 1629, which on its face was no different than an ordinary trading company patent, had quickly become for the Puritan settlers something much more than that. It was part of their covenant with God, and the governing independence promised by the charter, especially after it traveled with the first settlers to New England, was necessary in their efforts to create a holy commonwealth that would meet with God's approval. In John Winthrop's speech on the *Arbella*, he asserted that all of Europe would be taking note of whether they met with success or failure. The Council of Safety exhibited the same self-importance with their claim that New England, because of its religious purity and virtue, would be a target of utmost importance for Catholic conspirators. The charter was an integral part of their sacred mission, any attack on which would be resisted on both secular and religious terms.

The leaders of New England understood the charter as a grant of near total independence, providing the necessary freedom in their efforts to erect a godly community. They organized their society and their political institutions around these religious goals, and the resulting body politic quickly began to take on some republican

¹⁰ On Edward Randolph, see Michael G. Hall, *Edward Randolph and the American Colonies, 1676-1703* (Chapel Hill: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 1960).

characteristics. The suffrage requirements were based on church membership, not property ownership, and this voting population elected deputies, who sat in the lower house, and the governor and magistrates, who formed the upper house. The colony's officials stood for election in the General Court on an annual basis. It quickly became the only polity in all of King Charles I's realms where a representative assembly had final control over all of the officials who directly affected their daily lives. One recent historian has described the ideological foundation of New England's political order as "godly republicanism."¹¹ Michael Winship has connected the constitutional republicanism in Massachusetts to the ecclesiastical congregationalism that was widely dispersed among Puritans, as they feared the corruption that attended a church leadership given too much power, a phenomenon that was on display, of course, in the Catholic Church. At the heart of these fears was the humanist concern with excessive power and its corrupting potential. In the Massachusetts body politic, the church members were given extensive powers designed to check the authority of both the colony's political and religious leaders. In 1637, John Winthrop, for instance, referred to the colony's political organization as a "popular state" and to the people as a power "unlimited in its own nature."¹²

Winship is careful, however, to note that a level of governmental accountability, a rejection of hereditary rule, and rhetoric that emphasized the people did not necessarily add up to constitutional republicanism. Other English localities, especially urban centers and their chartered self-governments, defended their governing practices and traditions

¹¹ Michael P. Winship, "Godly Republicanism and the Origins of the Massachusetts Polity," *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., 63 (July, 2006), 427-462, quotation on 427.

¹² *Ibid.*, 448.

through a classical republican language. The key difference was that the chartered communities in England, unlike the Puritans in Massachusetts, never disputed that ultimate authority rested with the monarch. In 1644, for instance, an argument took place in the General Court over whether Parliament had the right to countermand the decisions of the assembly. There was a range of opinions on the matter with Winthrop's being particularly influential. Ideologically, he was sympathetic to the claims of independence but worried about the logistical consequences of such a move. He considered what the loss of English citizenship would mean for the individual, but was most concerned with loss of England's military protection. He was not yet confident that New England could adequately defend itself against the many potential threats to the colony. Winthrop ended up accepting the idea of Parliamentary influence in New England, but only in an extremely limited way and, it seemed, only for a limited time. As Massachusetts grew in size and military power, those logistical reasons to stay in the empire would diminish, giving the colony a better opportunity at a later date to assert its independence. In the 1640s, however, the independent posture of New England had caused few problems within the empire because the Crown rarely made any demands of the colony, although there was conflict over some minor issues, such as a parliamentary commission granted to a privateer in the area. When a Stuart returned to the throne in 1660, the General Court welcomed the new king with a restatement of their understandings of their rights within the empire. In its Report of 1661, the General Court asserted the "pattent . . . to be the first and maine foundation of our civil politye here . . . [and] the Governor and Company are, by the pattent, a body politicke, in fact and name," and then listed the "rights" of the colonists as they understood them, which included the power of the "freemen" to "choose

annually" their political leaders. These rights and privileges would soon come under attack by the new sovereign.

Conflict between the increasingly assertive monarch and the New England colony was inevitable and began soon after the Restoration.¹³ A Royal Commission arrived in the colonies in 1664 with the primary objective of conquering New Netherland, a task with which Massachusetts proved to be of little assistance. They were also given the task, however, of observing the colonists' compliance with the English laws. New England was of prime interest. There were numerous rumors that the leaders in Massachusetts ignored the Navigation Acts and had little intention of complying with two recent royal commands to extend the suffrage requirements beyond church membership and to stop discriminating against Anglicans more generally. Massachusetts, more so than any of the surrounding New England colonies, openly resisted the intrusion of the Commissioners into their local affairs, asserting that the presence of the commissioners alone was a violation of their chartered privileges. The colony gained a temporary reprieve from any immediate royal action, however, when a Dutch ship attacked the vessel carrying the Commissioner's reports, leading to their preemptive destruction so they would not fall into enemy hands. The commissioners themselves were later captured by the Dutch, but even if delayed and delivered only through second-hand reports, news of the colony's intransigence eventually reached the king.¹⁴ A second commission, determined to be more forceful than the first, was planned for 1672, but this too was delayed by war with the Dutch. The logistical difficulties of managing a

¹³ For the imperial policy put into place after the Restoration, especially the policies enacted by the Lord of Clarendon from 1660 to 1667, see Robert M. Bliss, *Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990), 103-131.

¹⁴ Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution*, 126-128.

transatlantic empire had helped to protect the status quo in Massachusetts in the short term. The colony had not yet had to assert openly how they understood and justified their resistance to imperial regulations.

By the middle of the 1670s, however, the colony would have to deal with an improved imperial bureaucracy. The Lords of Trade replaced the Council for Plantations in 1675 and would pursue its agenda with more determination and diligence. On order of the Lords of Trade, Edward Randolph arrived in Boston in June of 1676, hoping that King Phillip's War had significantly weakened the Bay Colony and made its leaders more amenable to imperial demands. The war had taken an extraordinary toll on the colony, both economically and psychologically.¹⁵ Tellingly though, as formidable as its Indian opponents were, the colony never asked for English assistance. The colony's leaders understood, as Winthrop had observed earlier, that such military dependence would undercut their claims to full local authority. That action would constitute one piece of evidence, among many others, that Randolph would compile in his efforts to convince crown officials that Massachusetts brazenly defied its imperial role and responsibilities. His arrival would mark the beginning of the English government's more sustained attack on the Massachusetts charter.

The report filed by Randolph, condemning the colony and its leaders had an immediate effect. In the summer of 1677, two agents for the colony were compelled to appear before the Lords of Trade in order to listen to the many accusations being levied against the colony by Randolph. The Lords of Trade listed the numerous demands of the

¹⁵ On the full ramifications of the King Philip's War on the psyche of New England leadership, see Jill Lepore, *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999).

crown, which included renouncing any land claims in the surrounding area, begging the King's pardon for coining money, repealing all laws repugnant to England, and closely observing the Navigation Acts. The representatives dutifully reported these demands to the General Court, and to the surprise of no one, especially Edward Randolph, the General Court remained intransigent. The Court in 1678 demonstrated, as had the colony's earlier leaders, a supreme confidence in the sanctity of the colony's mission. In 1637, Winthrop had written, "That which the King is pleased to bestow upon us, and we have accepted, is truly our owne."¹⁶ For the Puritan leaders throughout the century, the charter represented an integral part of a very complicated and tenuous endeavor. No single part of their current situation, including their chartered privileges, could be altered without risking the collapse of the entire undertaking. In 1678, the General Court captured the interdependent nature of the colony and its charter: "his majestjes charter being, vnder God, our only security against the malice of our adversarjes . . . any litle breach in the wall would endainger the whole, and therefore . . . wee would not that . . . any the least stone should be put out of the wall."¹⁷ The Puritan leaders refused to isolate the charter and its individual privileges. Everything was inextricably connected. The colony, their society, and their prosperity had all been the "genuine ofspring of his majestys charter." To attack the charter was to attack the colony and god. This logic made for a fervent resistance to unwanted change and any sort of proposed compromise.

Even with Randolph's presence in the colony, the Massachusetts leaders hoped that the tactics of delay would still be effective and prevent any need for open and direct confrontation. Unfortunately for them, however, there appeared to be no fourth war with

¹⁶ Winship, "Godly Republicanism," 448.

¹⁷ Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution*, 142; Shurtleff, ed., *Recs. or Mass. Bay, V*, 1674-1686, 202.

the Dutch on the near horizon. After the return of the original two agents, the king demanded the return of individuals with more powers of negotiation. The General Court delayed, earning a stern admonition from the King. They finally sent over two new agents in the summer of 1682 but with hardly any more authority than the original two. The king saw through the dilatory behavior and threatened a quo warranto against the charter. Edward Randolph presented official letters to the General Court in 1683, indicating that if concessions were not made, the quo warranto would be pursued to its conclusion. Faced with this difficult choice, the General Court chose to stay firm. Increase Mather led the opposition against any sort of compromise, arguing that surrendering to the King's demands in any one particular "would offend God."¹⁸ The elections of 1684, influenced heavily by Mather's preaching, put a new government in place that was committed to defiance. They sent a missive to London, requesting a delay in the proceedings and hoping for an alteration in imperial policy. Charles II had long tired of delays, and because of some concerns about how the sheriff of London could deliver a summons outside of his jurisdiction, the Court of Chancery issued a *scire facias*, instead of a quo warranto, in 1684. Judgment was entered for the King, and New England was offered the opportunity to respond later in the year. The company failed to plead and the decision was confirmed on October 23, 1684. The charter had been revoked. Charles II died in 1685, causing some delay in the resolution of matters, but a new governor, Joseph Dudley, chosen by the James II, took office in May of 1686. He would rule with the assistance of an appointed council, marking the beginnings of the

¹⁸ Lovejoy, *Glorious Revolution*, 154.

autocratic Dominion of New England. There would be no representative assembly in Massachusetts; the colony would no longer be governed and controlled by the elect.

Some in the Bay Colony responded with disbelief and a certain level of denial as this government entrenched itself in the colony. The government only grew stronger however. Edmund Andros would soon replace Dudley as governor of the Dominion in December of 1686, bringing a military efficiency to the position, and by 1688, the Dominion included New York as well as all of New England. The changes brought in by the new government were many. They taxed without the vote of elected representatives, restricted town meetings, instituted religious toleration, brought many Anglicans into power, reorganized the militia, challenged property holdings in the colony, and carefully enforced the Navigation Acts. Resistance to the new government emerged almost immediately as a new rallying cry of "English Rights" began to surface. Not surprisingly, new taxes brought about the most public early resistance to the actions of the Dominion government. In March of 1687, Andros pushed for a new revenue bill that received Council approval only reluctantly. The town of Ipswich, one among many towns unhappy with the new bill, refused to comply. They justified their resistance through the natural right of Englishmen to be taxed only with the approval of an elected assembly. Andros responded quickly and forcefully, throwing many in jail, and fining the ringleader John Wise an additional 50 pounds and demanding 1000 pounds surety for future good behavior. During their trials, the Magna Carta and the rights of Englishmen were a frequent refrain, but to no avail. The governmental response sent an effective message. There would be no more tax revolts led by town leaders. The power of the town assemblies, which could now meet only once a year for the purposes of electing

selectmen and other necessary officers, had been successfully curtailed. Andros's attempts to centralize political power in the colony and to establish his own personal authority were moving forward at a rate alarming to most New Englanders.

In the *Declaration of the Gentlemen*, the manifesto of the 1689 rebellion against the Dominion government, the authors reiterated many of the claims from the Ipswich protest. The document of rebellion declared that their English rights had migrated with the colonists to America, making the governing agenda of Andros and his supporters illegal. They decried the testimonials of Andros's council, which asserted that the colonists should "not think the Priviledges of English men would follow us to the end of the World." Echoing the complaints of the Ipswich dissidents, they laid claim to the "Rights" of the "Magna Charta," which had suffered "multiplied contradictions" in the colony. They spoke of honest people wrongly punished and fined for peacefully protesting the tax rates, of "packt and pickt Juries," and of persons incarcerated "without any the least Information appearing against them, or an Habeas Corpus allowed unto them."¹⁹ The comments of both the Ipswich rebels and the leading dissidents of 1689 give the distinct impression of a people confident and proud of their English heritage and determined to acquire the rights that accompanied that distinction.

In light of the consistent efforts of the colony's leaders to achieve independence, however, and secure their rights to diverge from English political norms, the sincerity of their claim to "English Rights" has come under consistent criticism from historians. David Lovejoy has noted the irony of the colonists, who as a last regard, championed the

¹⁹ "The Declaration," 178.

mantra of "English Rights," which they had consistently denied to others.²⁰ Much of the changes Andros was instituting, after all, were intended to bring New England more in line with English standards, such as swearing on the bible and tolerating, if not supporting, the Church of England.²¹ Despite Lovejoy's attention to their opportunistic embrace of this rhetoric and the role played by self-interest, J.M. Sosin argues that Lovejoy still gives too much credit to an emerging "republican ideology" in the colonies. Sosin argues that Lovejoy fails to distinguish "rationalizations and mere professions of belief from actual commitment to ideas as tested by consistent behavior."²² He contends that both colonist and imperial official were both equally happy to employ the language of English rights to serve their particular agendas. "English Rights" did not form the basis of a distinct colonial ideology, but instead offered a rhetorical device available to both sides to be used whenever possible. He argues that the New England colonists, if given the opportunity, would have happily returned to government by the "consent of a minority" and reinstated the strict religious qualifications of political participation. In Sosin's view, the New England colonists were not any more committed to republican ideology and individual rights than the people that they argued were threatening to deprive them of those privileges.

Lost in this focus on the sincerity of the colonists and their new colonial ideology was that fact that the call for "English Rights" in America was a conclusion more often than it was an argument. The colonists did at times pursue their political agenda through

²⁰ Sosin, in particular, emphasized the exclusive nature of the religious regime in New England. See *English America*, 1-5.

²¹ Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution*, 181, 229.

²² Sosin, *English America*, 2.

a "rights" argument. They cited natural law and laid claim to their natural rights.²³ But the Massachusetts leaders were rightly hesitant to justify their argument solely on the basis of abstract claims to certain rights. They had already witnessed how easily the sacred "right" of the charter could be ignored, once it began to run against the larger aims of empire. Accordingly, in the political debates that followed the rebellion, the colonial authors began to put forth an understanding of empire that made "English Rights" abroad sound imperial policy. The imperial officials would do the same thing with the opposite goal as both sides debated the nature of the empire and its most profitable organization. The pro-Andros and colonial authors would square off after the rebellion in a series of polemical political tracts. They would condemn and vilify each other, but they would do so in the context of empire. Both sides argued that their opponents represented the extremes of a faulty imperial organization. More than a natural right, representative government came to be understood as a key component of either colonial success or imperial failure.

In the wake of the rebellion, both sides launched aggressive printed attacks against each other. The charges of self-interest and oligarchy were omnipresent in the various tracts. The pro-Andros authors portrayed the colonial faction as upstarts, individuals lacking in personal virtue and in the other expected characteristics of the elite. As leaders of a community, they ignored their responsibilities on the local level by pursuing their own personal interests. On the imperial level, their lack of virtue surfaced again as they disregarded the greater good of the empire and refused to abide by and

²³ On the colonists' use of an argument based in natural rights, see Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty and Empire*, 29-80.

enforce the Navigation Acts. These were the types of men, the pro-Andros authors asserted, that were likely to rise to power in a decentralized empire. The colonial dissidents responded with their own charges of oligarchy. They constantly depicted imperial officials, such as Andros, as "strangers" to the community, who confirmed their outsider status by demonstrating little concern for the good of the local community. They were the exploiters, the colonial faction maintained, who would come to power in a centralized empire to the ruin of both the colony and the empire. As hyperbolic and personal as the attacks from both sides were, the imperial implications of these aspersions were always in view.

The pro-Andros tracts hammered away at the colonial leaders as a self-interested minority faction, who had secured their political power early in the colony's history. In a *Short Account of the Present State of New England*, the author detailed their rise to power, a process that was intertwined with the colony's religious pretensions. The first government under the charter had been dominated by religious leaders, whom the author referred to as the "*teachers*."²⁴ They translated their religious leadership into political power through their influence over elected officials. Any magistrate who was "so sturdy as to presume to act of himself without taking [the teachers'] advice and direction, [the magistrate] might be sure of it, his Magistracy ended with the Year." The author noted that the world rightly condemns the "Usurped Power of the *Popish* Clergy over the *Laity*," but the power of the "teachers" in Massachusetts "over the people" was even more extreme. The teachers imposed voting restrictions onto the people to "perpetuate the Government to themselves." To vote in the colony, an individual had to be a "freeman,"

²⁴ Anon., *A Short Account of the Present State of New England* (London?, 1690), 8.

which you could only qualify for by being in "full communion with their Churches," or in other words for the author, "in all points be[ing] of the Preacher's Opinion." Any colonist who resisted the "*Independent* persuasion," no matter how "fober in Life and Conversation," was denied the status of freeman and declared the "Enemy to the Church and State." The colony's leaders perpetuated their authority by limiting participation in government to only those who met their approval. This allowed only the obsequious and ambitious into the body politic of Massachusetts. Those granted freeman status were "hypocrites, who were ambitious of Honour and Preferment," and willing to appease the ministers, through "many costly Treats and Prefents" for the sake of their own selfish motives. With a sarcastic tone, the author described a common scene in the colony: "It was pleasant to behold poor *Coblers* and pitiful *Mechanics*, which had neither House nor Land, strutting and making no mean Figure at their *Elections*; and some of the richest Merchants and wealthiest People stand by as insignificant Cypers."²⁵ The author offered a startling reinterpretation of the godly community in Massachusetts. The New England leaders were petit tyrants, who through a tightly managed oligarchy, constructed a government and led a rebellion where "*Self-interest* was the first and principal motive."²⁶ Everything that had previously been explained by their religious dedication was in fact the selfish actions of an oligarchic power, intent on protecting their "arbitrary pleasure" through exclusion and intimidation and squeezing as much material wealth out of the population as possible.²⁷

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 8-9.

²⁶ John Palmer, *Present State of New England*, 43.

²⁷ C.D., *New England's Faction Discovered*, (London, 1690), in *Narratives of Insurrection, 1675-1690*, ed. Charles M. Andrews (New York: Scribner and Sons, 1915), 261.

There were few protections for anyone outside of this ruling faction. The pro-Andros writers provided numerous examples of persecution by the Puritans. In a *Short Account*, the author recounted the origins of Rhode Island to emphasize the many sufferings of the Quakers in the colony. "The people of Boston," he wrote, "who always had a perfect hatred against those who differed in Opinion from them," banished a group of "Quakers" from the colony with the hopes that the Quakers would either perish "with hunger, or else be destroyed by the Heathens."²⁸ Miraculously, the author claimed, they survived the early months of their banishment and established a new colony. Members of the Church of England had fared little better in the colony. Before the appointment of Andros, members of the church were "punished with Fines, Imprisonment, Stripes, Banishment, and Death, and all for matters of meer Conscience and Religion only." Andros had protected the Church of England during the Dominion years, but the rebellion restored a Puritan leadership even more intent on its destruction. Church members "were seized and barbarously Imprisoned" and the church building "receive the marks of [New England's] indignation and scorn, by having the Windows broke to pieces, and the Doors and Walls daubed with dung, and other filth, in the rudest and basest manner imaginable."²⁹ The Church of England minister was forced to abandon his congregation and leave the colony. Another author claimed that one preacher recommended "cutting the throats of all the Established Church" so that the colony would "never bee troubled with them again."³⁰ A religion "that did not comply with their Independency" had no protection in the colony. These attacks extended beyond the realm of religion. The New

²⁸ *Short Account*, 2.

²⁹ *New England's Faction Discovered*, 258.

³⁰ Anon., *A Particular Account of the Late Revolution (1690)*, in *Narratives of Insurrections*, 207.

England leaders, one author claimed, had no regard for "Religion, Liberty, and Property."³¹ The laws established by the Puritans were the only ones that mattered: "The Laws of *England* are of no credit among them, and when pleaded in their Courts are little regarded."³² No one in colony, no matter how rich or English, was safe within the boundaries of Puritan control.

The colonial leaders in Massachusetts were even willing to risk the destruction of the colony for self-gain. In a manuscript account of the rebellion in 1689, the author reported their treachery during a war with the Indians, while Andros served the colony honorably. Andros had led a colonial force north to meet the Indians, suffering every hardship of the average soldier and treating them as a "tender father" would "his family." His successful tactics included blockading rivers and routing habitations, and the Indians, threatened by starvation, would soon have had little choice but to surrender if Andros had not been prematurely called back to Boston. While Andros was busy fighting Indians, the author claimed, the former leaders of the colony sought advantage in his absence and littered the city with "false storys" about the Governor, who they depicted as the "great Enemy of the Country." Most disturbingly, some Bostoners even seized the opportunity for profit. Seeing the desperate situation of the Indians, they "supplied them with all such things as they wanted, whereby they put weapons in the Enemy's hand to destroy hundreds of the King's Subjects and lay the whole Country desolate." The author could not believe that these colonists, "who were so damnably treacherous and wicked," were

³¹ C.D., *New England's Faction Discovered*, 258.

³² *A Short Account*, 8.

now the same individuals "reputed [to be] great Patriots of the Country and Restorers of the English Liberties and Privileges."³³

The colonial leaders in Massachusetts sacrificed the greater good of the community for personal gain and would do the same in the matters of empire, especially in regards to the enforcement of the Navigation Acts. Supporters of Andros claimed that he had prosecuted violations of the Acts of Trade and that his "prohibition of these irregularities [had] made his Government intolerable." When the leaders under the charter government regained control of the colony, they immediately began to reestablish their former ways. Men who were imprisoned for debt were "set at liberty" and "Pirates and Murderers [were] freely discharged from jail." The "Acts of Trade," the author continued, "were publickly broken, and boats loaden with hogsheads of Tobacco went up the River at noon-day." Bostoners were again guilty of trading arms with the enemy. They sold "Ammunition and Provision" to the French and Indians," which in turn "killed many of their Majesty's Subjects and destroyed the best part of the Country." The new leaders of the government were the worst offenders: "some of the chief in Government [are] the very Men, which most notoriously break the Acts of Trade."³⁴ In Andros's own report, he contended that New Englanders now tolerated "an unlimited irregular trade" contrary to the Acts of Trade, which were "now as little regarded as in the time of their former Charter Government."³⁵ The leadership in Boston not only threatened the local community but also diminished the King's revenues. An imperial organization that

³³ *A Particular Account*, 198.

³⁴ *A Particular Account*, 208-211.

³⁵ *Andros's Report*, 235.

allowed these types of men to run a colony was at best inefficient and, at worst, self-destructive.

The supporters of the Dominion accused the colonial faction of resisting even the smallest obligations of empire and even at times seemed to pursue independence. John Palmer, in his tract, *Considerations humbly offered to Parliament*, laid out what he surely considered to be an obvious and reasonable expectation of a colony:

All his Majesties Plantations in *America*, have either Discovered, or Peopled under the Engouragement of Charters from the Crown of England, and several Great Powers and Priviledges have been Granted to . . . Corporations with restrictions, nevertheless . . . it was always understood that those Priviledges, and especially the Powers of Government should be exercised so by the particular . . . Corporations, as not to prejudice the Interest of *England*.³⁶

New England's leaders, however, disputed even this minimal subordination. One pro-Andros author accused the New Englanders of claiming to be a "free people" and of asserting that England had no "dominion over them."³⁷ Another contended that they wanted to reestablish their "old Arbitrary Commonwealth Government" in order to free "themselves from the Authority of England."³⁸ To the supporters of the Dominion, it was "most plain that the late Subverters of the Government had no manner of regard to Their Majesty's Interest or Service." The interests of the England would be obviously be "ruined and destroyed" by such leaders in the colony. The "whole country," they added, would be put at risk. The colonial leaders were doubly damaging to the future of the empire. They were destroying the colony and ignoring the Navigation Acts at the same

³⁶ Anon., *Considerations Humbly Offered to Parliament, shewing that those charters relating to the plantations were taken away* (London, 1689), 1.

³⁷ *A Particular Account*, 208.

³⁸ *New England's Faction Discovered*, 257.

time. They sought their "English Liberties" only so that they would be "free" to continue oppressing the population of Massachusetts.

A decentralized empire provided no corrective for this type of colonial mismanagement. In depicting the colonial leaders in such a negative light, the pro-Andros writers criticized an imperial vision that would be able to do little about it. The colonies needed direct oversight from England so that such unqualified leaders, like the ones in Massachusetts, would not rise to power. The colony could be saved, they claimed, only by "the KING's Superintendancy, whose Officers may have such Instructions, as shalt divert them from all prejudicial Trade, and encourage such as may redound, as well to theirs, as to the Advantage of *Old England*."³⁹ The imperial officers, on the instructions of the king, would provide the virtuous leadership so needed in the colony. This would benefit the local community as much as it would bolster imperial revenues. Enforcement of the Navigation Acts by an imperial officer was the action of an individual more concerned with the greater good of the empire than any opportunities for personal profit, a virtuous disposition that would also be extended to the local community. For the pro-Andros authors, local and imperial needs worked together, and accordingly, a decentralized imperial organization made little sense.

The colonial dissidents countered with an equally vitriolic attack on Andros and his supporters. Their attacks were a mirror image of the criticisms levied by Palmer and the other supporters of Andros. They portrayed the imperial officers as exploiters of the colonial communities.⁴⁰ Like the accusations directed at the colonial leaders, the

³⁹ *Considerations Humbly Offered*, 4.

⁴⁰ Blair Worden, "Republicanism, Regicide, and Republic: The English Experience," in *Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage*, ed. Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, 2002).

imperial officers were accused of lacking virtue and pursuing their own private gain at the expense of the common good. There was a grander scope to some the attacks on Andros, as he and his supporters could be tied to larger popish conspiracies, but the key target was a centralized imperial organization. As they had symbolized to their opponents the flaws of a decentralized empire, Andros and his faction would represent the type of disruptive leadership likely to arise within a more centralized empire.

Throughout the colonial tracts, the governor and his supporters were constantly referred to as "strangers" and accused of harboring only self-interested intentions towards the New England community. In the *Declaration of the Gentlemen*, the authors described the Dominion government as being in the hands of "such Men as were Strangers and Haters of the People."⁴¹ A later pamphlet, published in 1690, referred to the colony's former governors as "a Company of Strangers" and as a "few little men." In one tract, Increase Mather pointed out that the governor was "wholly a stranger to New England" and many of his "Councillors [were] Strangers, and the others of them such as were Andross's Creatures."⁴² In a separate tract, he referred to them as a "little gang . . . who went by the Name of the *Church of England*."⁴³ The implication was clear. Andros and his supporters had no connection to the community Massachusetts and therefore had little inclination to sacrifice their own personal interest for the larger good of the society. The appellation of stranger was often quickly followed with the charge of self-interest. Some

⁴¹ Nathaniel Byfield, *An Account of the Late Revolution in New-England* (London, 1689), in *Narratives of Insurrections*, 177.

⁴² Increase Mather, *A Brief Account concerning several of the Agents of New-England, their negotiation at the Court of England* (London, 1691) in *Narratives of Insurrections*, 289.

⁴³ Increase Mather, *A Vindication of New-England* (Boston, 1690), 11.

of the former council members, who had turned against Andros during the rebellion, published their own account of how the council had worked during the Dominion:

The Governour did so quickly neglect the great number of the Council, and chiefly adhere unto and Govern by the advice only of a few others, the principal of them Strangers to the Countrey, without Estates or Interest therein to oblige them, persons of know Prejudices against us, and that had plainly laid their chiefest Designs and Hopes to make unreasonable profit of this poor People.⁴⁴

A separate tract made the same claim in the same language, asserting that "a Company of Strangers, who had all manner of Civility and Protection, and are growing rich under the present Government."⁴⁵ To Increase Mather, the Dominion government had allowed "some strangers . . . to raise (to themselves) Estates amongst (the people of New England)."⁴⁶ The Puritan faction chose to attack the Andros faction by establishing their outsider status, which was difficult to dispute, and then attaching a self-interested agenda to that characteristic.

The colonial leaders accused Andros and his supporters of a whole range of governmental abuses in pursuit of their personal aggrandizement. The *Declaration* pointed to "intollerable Fees extorted from every one upon all Occasions, with any Rules but those of their own insatiable Avarice and Beggary."⁴⁷ The fees passed by Andros's government were "Extraordinary," "Oppressive," and "taken in all matters by indigent and exacting Officers."⁴⁸ One pamphlet, for instance, accused the Dominion government

⁴⁴ William Stoughton, Thomas Hinckley, Wait Winthrop, Barthol. Gedney, and Samuel Shrimpton, *A Narrative of the Proceedings of Sir Edmond Androsse and his Complices* (Boston, 1691), in *Narratives of Insurrections*, 241.

⁴⁵ Anon., *Further Queries upon the present state of the New-English affairs* (Boston, 1690), 3.

⁴⁶ Mather, *A Vindication of New-England*, 8.

⁴⁷ Byfield, *An Account of the Late Revolution*, in *Narratives of Insurrections*, 177.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 246.

of making "poor Widows and [the] Fatherless" pay fifty shillings for the probate of the will, whereas the former government had charged only five.⁴⁹ Another detailed a story of how governmental officials would visit "honest houses in the country" and request a "cup of drink." Upon receiving one, they would then toss a "3 pence" into the corner of the room and then swear under oath that they had bought a drink there, bringing a necessary fine upon the household.⁵⁰ The governor and his associates attacked landholdings in the colony as well, declaring that "all mens Titles in effect quite null and void." They particularly targeted the town common lands, which had led to the "impoverishing, if not utter ruining of whole Townships."⁵¹ They also packed juries when possible. They would fill juries with "meer Strangers of the Country, and no Freeholders" so that they could be "fure to effect their Pernitious Desfigns."⁵² The whole government had "become a meer *Engine* , a sort of *Machin* contriv'd only to enrich a crew of Abject Strangers, upon the Ruines of a miserable people."⁵³ The result of these various measures was that the wealth of the community was expropriated by Andros and his supporters. Andros's "far-fetched Instruments grew rich among [the people of Boston]." They were "fleecing" the people, making "unreasonable profit of this poor People, "growing rich under the prefent government," or "raising their own fortunes upon their Neighbors ruines."⁵⁴ The

⁴⁹ Anon., *A Narrative of the Miferies of New-England, by Reason of Arbitrary Government Erected there* (London, 1688), 4.

⁵⁰ Mather, *A Vindication of New-England*, 11.

⁵¹ Anon., *A Narrative of the Miferies of New-England* 4-5; Byfield, *An Account of the Late Revolution, in Narratives of Insurrections*, 245; and Anon., *An Appeal to the Men of New England with a short account of Mr. Randolph's Papers* (Boston, 1689), 6.

⁵² Anon., *A Narrative of the Miferies of New-England*, 4.

⁵³ A.B., *An Account of the late Revolutions in New England* (London, 1689), in *The Glorious Revolution in America: Documents of the Colonial Crisis of 1689*, eds., Michael G. Hall, Lawrence H. Leder, and Michael Kammen (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), 48.

⁵⁴ "Samuel Mather's Account," in *The Glorious Revolution in America: Documents*, 39; Stoughton, et. al., *A Narrative of the Proceedings*, 241; Anon., *Further Queries*, 3; Mather, *A Vindication*, 8.

Dominion government employed every aspect of their governing power to take as much advantage of the people as possible.

Sustaining a government so injurious to the community was a difficult task and necessitated maintaining an exclusive and oppressive governing style. Andros had established a small, exclusive coterie of advisers, where "only here and there a good Man was used." Repeatedly throughout the anti-Andros pamphlets, the dissidents accused the governor of ruling with the help of only a small group of four to five persons.⁵⁵ Some of his former councilors, who had since turned against Andros, reported that the process of passing laws and other bills under the Andros administration had been highly irregular. "Bills of the greatest concernment" were first considered in private and then only "unexpectedly brought into Council" to the great disadvantage of those who potentially opposed it. The result was "that in effect four or five persons . . . bear the Rule over, and gave Law" to the entire colony. The laws themselves were not publicized. A later pamphlet contended that the "People [were] at a great losf what the law is, and what not."⁵⁶ By these methods, the law in New England, one author claimed, had been made into a "tool to manage the defigns of Robbery."⁵⁷ Beyond disingenuous governmental tactics, Andros also employed straight-forward intimidation to protect his interests. His stern reaction to the Ipswich protest was offered as a leading example. The offending actors had been given a punishment disproportionate to the crime, having been "feverely handled, not only imprisoned for several weeks, but fined and bound to their good

⁵⁵ Anon., *A Narrative of the Miferies of New England*, 3; Increase Mather, *A Brief Relation of the State of New England from the beginning of that plantation to this present year, 1689 in a letter to a person of Quality* (London, 1689), 3; Anon., *An Appeal to the Men of New England*, 3.

⁵⁶ Anon., *A Narrative of the Miferies of New-England*, 3.

⁵⁷ Anon., *An Appeal to the Men of New England*, 5.

behavior." Other examples indicated the same streak of oppressive behavior. Another anti-Andros author claimed that a colonist had been imprisoned and fined for signing "a modest Paper," in which he had laid a simple claim to the rights of an Englishman.⁵⁸

At their most extreme, the colonial authors even accused Andros and his supporters of being papal conspirators against England and Protestantism. Andros attacked English Rights and erected a "*French-Government*" in New England, not just because he was selfish, but because of his involvement in a much more insidious plot.⁵⁹ Everything that had been happening in New England, by this interpretation, including the appointment of Andros, was part of a larger conspiracy. The forces of "*Slavery* as well as *Popery*" that William had recently vanquished in England had also been at work in the colony. The colonial authors argued that many of the policies that James had hoped to enact in England had first been attempted in New England. James had sent his "Creatures" out and empowered them to rule by illegal means. The "*commiffion*" that granted Andros governing power, they claimed, was "more Illegal and Arbitrary, than that granted . . . by any one that ever fwayed the *Englilh* Scepter."⁶⁰ The revocation of the Massachusetts charter had been part of the larger attack on English charters by James II, which one author termed "the most *confiderable* Branches of the late *Popish Plot*, for the subversion and utter extinction of the Protestant Religion."⁶¹ The crown's imperial actions during the 1680s had been early indications of a larger conspiracy to overthrow English institutions and religion. One author asserted that this "*French-Government*" was

⁵⁸ Anon., *Revolution in New England in Justified, and the People there Vindicated From the Aspersion cast upon them by Mr. John Palmer in his Pretended Answer to the Declaration* (Boston, 1691), 7-8.

⁵⁹ Anon., *An Appeal to the Men of New England*, 4.

⁶⁰ Anon., *The Revolution in New England Justified*, 1.

⁶¹ Anon., *An Appeal to the Men of New England*, 1.

a "Specimen of what was intended for the whole *English Nation*."⁶² The claim was repeated in an earlier tract, which claimed that this "*French Government*" was intended to come to England "as soon as the times would bear it."⁶³ A centralized empire had empowered individuals like Andros, whose power could not be checked or restrained by the local population. The fact that these imperial officials were involved, as the colonial authors claimed, in larger papist conspiracy demonstrated just how far colonial leadership could stray from the common good when completely detached from any local accountability. The results could be devastating for the empire.

In many ways, these rival accusations of oligarchy were thoroughly conventional. They utilized a humanist political language, decrying self-interest and claiming complete dedication to the common good, just as numerous political actors did across early modern England, but the imperial context added a new element to this discourse.⁶⁴ Both sides wanted the mechanisms that had brought their opponents to power to be understood as bad imperial policy. A poorly governed colony in New England hurt the English empire and ultimately Crown revenues. Both sides launched their attacks with the clear intention of winning the approval of the king. The pro-Andros authors argued that a decentralized government would bring the unqualified to power, who would then exploit and abuse the local population, ignore imperial responsibilities, and render the colony of the little advantage to England. The colonial authors, on the other hand, claimed that a centralized empire would bring an arbitrary power into the colony with no accountability to the local

⁶² *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶³ Anon., *A Narrative of the Miseries*, 3.

⁶⁴ On the prevalence of a humanistic political language in early modern England, see Phil Withington, *The Politics of Commonwealth: Citizens and Freemen in Early Modern England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

community. This would lead to the rule of "strangers" in the colony, who, if not already corrupt, would soon be corrupted by their expansive power. Tapping into the long history of republican rhetoric and thought that had existed in the colony, the colonial authors asserted that local populations in the colonies had an important political role to play in the colonies. The two sides understood the people in Massachusetts very differently. To justify their separate visions for empire and their own political power, both sides had to posit a vastly different depiction of the colonial population, which would become an enduring distinction in the imperial debates between the center and periphery. The debate between centralized and decentralized empire depended to a large degree on how each sided understood the colonial population, their labor, and their character.

From the viewpoint of the imperial officials, the colonial population was dangerously misinformed and out-of-control. The imperial officers largely ignored the contributions of the common colonists in their understandings of colonization and promised to make their lives better by doing the exact opposite of what the population seemed to want. The colonial authors, on the other hand, described the colonial population as virtuous, reasonable, and most importantly, in the context of empire, productive. Their labor had been and still was vital to colonization. The colonial elite, who had the most to lose under regimes like the Dominion of New England, argued for the legitimacy of their political authority through this popular understanding of the empire. The people's labor, they claimed, was contingent on the honoring of their "English Rights" in America. Representative government was necessary to sustain it;

autocratic government would greatly diminish it.⁶⁵ The logic of this justification for local autonomy and their role in the empire would establish an important pattern in the conflicts between center and periphery throughout the remainder of the colonial period. When pushed, the colonial elites would have to turn to the people and their importance to the larger empire. The political power of colonial elites and this conception of "the people" would rise or fall together.

The pro-Andros pamphlets presented a version of early colonial history almost completely devoid of the people. John Palmer understood the English colonies in terms of conquest and its laws: "'Tis a Fundamentall Point consented unto by all Christian Nations, that the First Discovery of a Countrey inhabited by Infidells, gives a right and Dominion of that Countrey to the Prince in whose service and Employment the Discoverers were sent." He then went through all the various European conquests of the New World, the Spaniards claimed the West Indies, the Portuguese Brazil, and the English the "Northern parts of *America*." The upshot of this fact was that the land belonged exclusively to the King and was "from the Grace and Favour of the Crowne alone that all these flow and are dispensed at the pleasure of him that sits on the Throne." For Palmer, colonial lands had an inherent value. The conquered territories were the spoils of war and had been given to certain individuals as such. Palmer's narrative of colonial beginnings had little space for the exploits of the individual and placed minimal emphasis on the transformation of the American landscape by the English colonists.

⁶⁵ With this claim, the colonial authors were putting to political use a connection between colonial productivity and representative government that had become dominant in the colonial literature by the 1680s. See, Chapter Three.

For colonial writers, the story of early colonization was much more dynamic. The element of change was the colonial population, who were very much present at the creation of an English America. The omnipresent conception of America as a "wilderness" was so important to the colonial position because it highlighted the fact that the colonies necessitated an act of creation to bring them into being. For one author, the first settlers were not given a great gift by the King but were "a poor Distressed People" that fled to "a Wilderneys, where cold, Hunger, Savages, and innumerable Evils and Dangers muft needs attend them." Many people, the author claimed, were sure that the "Sea, the Savages, cold, or the Country would eat them up."⁶⁶ Increase Mather made a similar claim, but instead of describing the early colonists as distressed, he referred to them as "Honourable perfons" and noted that some were "Famous for learning." This early group had "transplanted themselves from their defirable Native Country, into that Howling wilderneys of *America*. . . [and] in little time that Wilderneys was by their great Endeavors & Expense, improved into a habitable country."⁶⁷ The colonists had, another author claimed, "fubdued a Wilderneys, built [their] Houfes, and planted Orchards." The English settlements, as they existed late in the seventeenth century, had not been given by the King, but were better understood as the product of colonial labor. This had clear implications for property claims in the New World, but carried important imperial

⁶⁶ Anon., *The Humble Address of the Publicans of New-England To which King you please. With some remarks upon it* (London, 1691), 11.

⁶⁷ Mather, *A Vindication of New England*, 2. During this description of early colonization, Mather paradoxically points to the fact that upon their arrival, the colonists "purchased their poffeffions of the *Native Proprietors*".

implications as well.⁶⁸ The empire was expanding and developing in America through the actions of common settlers, not through the conquests or discoveries of English armies. The colonists had created the colony "with their own hands."⁶⁹ In their historical narrative of early colonization, the colonial writers posited an essential role to the colonists and their labor.

After emphasizing the importance of the people to early colonization, the colonial authors argued that the political rights promised by the charter had played a crucial role in eliciting this all-important participation. In a petition by John Gibson, an eighty-seven year old settler, included in the pamphlet *A Narrative of the Miseries of New England*, the aged colonist revisited the challenges of early colonization and the motivations for men like himself: "That your Majesty's good Subjects, with much hard labour and great disbursements, have subdued a Wilderneys, built our Houfes, and planted Orchards, being encouraged by our indubitable right to the Soil by the Royal Charter granted unto the Firt Planters."⁷⁰ John Gibson was not alone in his identifying a direct link between the charter and colonial participation. Increase Mather claimed that the "Report of this Charter, did encourage many very deserving people to Transplant themselves and their families to *New England*."⁷¹ Another author extended the point well beyond the borders of New England: "All his Majesties Plantations in *America*, have been either Discovered, or Peopled under the Encouragement of Charters from the Crown of *England*."⁷²

⁶⁸ This logic could translate easily into claim of possession. One author, for instance, after detailing that the colonists had "accepted vaft Charges in subduing a Wilderneys," claimed that they had so gained a "rightful poffeffion of, as ever any People in the World had or can have."

⁶⁹ Anon., *A Narrative of the Miseries of New England*, 4-6.

⁷⁰ Mather, *A Brief Relation*, 6.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁷² Anon., *Considerations Humbly Offered to the Parliament*, 1.

Another author extended the importance of the charters temporally, instead of geographically: "The first Planters in that *America* Defart . . . inlarge[d] the King's Dominions, in Confidence that not themselves only, but their *Posterity* should enjoy those Priviledges which by their Charters were assured to them." The promise of political rights in America had been necessary to attracting sufficient migration. It would be morally wrong to revoke these promises after the colonists had "performed their part, and been at vast Charges, whereby the Crown and the *English* Nation have been many wayes advantaged."⁷³ It would also put the colony at risk. The colonists could abandon the colony at any moment. One author threatened that if they became "*slaves*" in the colony and lost their chartered privileges to have an "interest in [the] making of *Laws*," then the "*smarting* part of them . . . [could] agree to break up the Plantation, and march home for England again."⁷⁴ For the colonial authors, the people had created the colonies, and there would have been no settlers without the charter. When John Palmer wrote that "New England had a *Charter* but no one will be so stupid to imagine that the King was *bound* to grant it," he revealed his perception of Massachusetts as an entity which existed before and apart from the charter. For the colonial authors, there was no colony before the charter.

The charter had promised rights crucial to encouraging migration, but had also helped to install a government well suited to encourage the further development of the colony. As Increase Mather outlined, the New England settlers had been, through the charter, "Empower'd to Elect" their own governmental leaders on an annual basis, just as

⁷³ Anon., *Reasons for the Confirmation of the Charters belonging to the several Corporations in New-England* (London, 1690), 1.

⁷⁴ Anon., *An appeal to the Men*, 3.

in any other corporate town in England. Their elected leaders had supreme lawmaking powers with the ability to pass laws "most proper and suitable for the Plantation." The resulting political arrangement, as Mather termed it, was a "good and easie Government," under which the Plantation "increased, and prospered wonderfully."⁷⁵ A later tract elaborated on what exactly constituted a "good and easy" government. The author claimed that with the charter the colony "had a Sweet, Easie, and Gentle Government." Its defining characteristic was that it was "*made and Constituted by, as well as for the People; A Government, that knew no Interest inconfittant with that of their Country and their Charge.*" The author had divided political groups into two categories: "republicans" and "publicans." Republicans, the author contended, were "*clearly for keeping what you have; but your Publicans are for taking it away.*"⁷⁶ The charter government had clearly been a "republican" regime, as the author defined the term. The people's selection of their leaders had ensured a virtuous leadership in the colony, defined by their pursuit of the good of the larger community. The success of the government that was empowered by the people was clear. Over the century, New England had been transformed from "*a Barren Wilderneys into a Fruitful Field*" and now constituted "*a famous & flourishing Teritory.*"⁷⁷

If a "sweet and easy" political regime had encouraged such great accomplishments, then an oppressive government, the colonial authors claimed, would work in the opposite direction and turn "*a fruitful Field into a barren Wilderneys.*" The author of the *Humble Address* described how imperial officials, such as Andros,

⁷⁵ Mather, *A Brief Relation*, 4.

⁷⁶ Anon., *The Humble Address*, 21, 3

⁷⁷ Anon., *An Appeal to the Men of New-England*, 3.

exercised power in the colonies: "A poor naked hungry Governour comes usually from the Court every three years, with a troop of miserable debauched Followers, *and for the most part guilty of one Crime or other*, whose Debaucheries, Ignorance, and Necessities, *provoke them to innumerable Practices of Fraud.*" In these governments, only membership in the small ruling group, which was very limited in number, had any sort of security in their property. "No Rich Man is safe," the author maintained, "unless he be Partners with the Governour." These governing regimes had deprived "Mankind at once of the only valuable thing in the World, *precious Liberty.*" The result was devastating for the colony's development. The people were victims to this "*Dabauchery and Malignity of the Government*" and the colony began to "decrease daily, both in Riches and People." It forced the people in the colonies to have only a short-term interest in remaining. Once individual colonists "begin to get any thing of an Estate, they are fain to forsake those places." The charter government, in contrast, had encouraged "young Men [to be] industrious" through the opportunity of "every one improving himself in his way, and preferred from Idleness and Debauchery." The author declared that it was "not so much the Air which people live in that corrupts their manners . . . but it's the Evil Government . . . by which men corrupt one another."⁷⁸ For the colonial authors, the colonies and their prosperity depended on the people, and their industrious disposition, so important to imperial successes up to this point, was a not a given. A change in government could quickly diminish it and turn back the colonial progress that had resulted from it.

The colonial critique of imperial officers like Andros and Edward Randolph was that by focusing so emphatically on the enforcement of the Navigation Acts, they missed

⁷⁸ Anon., *The Humble Address of the Publicans*, 18.

the bigger picture of colonial production and imperial profits. John Palmer, among others, accused the New Englanders of violating the Navigation Acts, so it was clear to him that increased enforcement, which he claimed had occurred under Andros, would result in a "considerable Advance of His Majesties Revenue."⁷⁹ The focus of Andros, Randolph, and other imperial officials on the better enforcement of the Navigation Acts and the arbitrary, external power within colonial society necessary to achieve this was, to the colonial writers, a shortsighted approach to increasing colonial revenues. In the common seventeenth century English analogy to the bee hive, the author of *The Humble Address* called Andros and his supporters "drones," whose policies were so "*inhumane and cruel as to destroy the very Bees that feed them.*" These types of men were particularly unsuited for the challenges of building and sustaining communities in the New World because their "rapacious nature of these [men] are infatiable, so that a few *Publicans* are capable to ruine a great People, and yet not make themselves; *for they have the right Talent to make a great city little, but never to make a little one great.*"⁸⁰ Improving the enforcement of the Navigation Acts was a logical means to increase revenues (the colonial authors all claimed that New Englanders did in fact comply with those regulations), but to do so through the imposition of an autocratic government undercut their larger goals. The negative effect of these imperial policies would be to discourage the very behavior by the people that had made New England so prosperous. The small gains that would come through improved enforcement would be outweighed by the much broader damage it would do to the community, which would eventually diminish imperial revenues on a far greater scale.

⁷⁹ Mather, *The Present State of New England*, 11.

⁸⁰ Anon., *The Humble Address of the Publicans*, 10-11.

This narrative of the people, their labor, and motivations led to a broader commentary on the character of the colonists who had thrived under the charter government and helped to establish such a prosperous colony. For the colonial authors, the colonists in New England were "generally Sober, Industrious, well-Disciplined, and apt for Martial Affairs" or were a "loyall, Quiet, and Virtuous people."⁸¹ The uprising that occurred on April 18, which Andros and his supporters had described as the actions of a mob, was presented by the colonial authors as a defining example of the restraint and virtue of the colonists. Even though Andros and his government were "objects of *Universal Hatred* and Indignation," the people as a "whole armed body . . . Marched . . . with so composed a *Sobriety*, that I question whether *America* has ever seen what might equal it." The colonial authors maintained that with few exceptions, there was no bloodshed or plunder but that "the people generally gave a Demonstration, That they designed nothing but the securing of some great Malefactors, for the Justice which a course of Law would exposed them to."⁸² The people in the colonies were not only productive, but fair-minded and reasonable as well.

The colonial authors needed this depiction of the people because it was the only way to justify local authority in the colony. If the people were bad, there was little reason to extend English liberties to America and grant the colonists the right to representative government. If they were good, however, and if their labor, so crucial to the empire, was dependent on certain liberties, then self-government in America made good imperial sense. The colonial authors put forth this imperial vision, with a productive and

⁸¹ Anon., *A Narrative of the Miseries*, 1.

⁸² A.B., *An Account of the late Revolutions in New England*, in *The Glorious Revolution in America: Documents*, 51.

industrious people at its center, and then attempted to corral and mobilize the power of their support and approbation. The colonial authors claimed that they acted with the full support of the people, acting only on their behalf. Under the charter government, they claimed, the power of colonial leaders had been by the "voice, and vote, and confent of the *whole people*" and only the restoration of the former charter would "fatiffy the generality of the inhabitants, as is manifest by the unanimous Declaration of the *Convention* there, published at *Bolfton*."⁸³ The leaders of the Council of Safety, who seized political control of the colony after the rebellion, only "accepted" that charge because the "Inhabitants . . . (as one man)" had demanded it. The importance of communal support even lent itself at times to numerical estimations of the people's support. One author argued that the "Temper of that People, do confidently affirm, That there is not one in an hundred amongft the Inhabitants in that territory, which does not defire that their Government by Charter might be continued to them."⁸⁴ Another author claimed that the Andros government was disliked by the "biggest part of the Plantation more than feven to one."⁸⁵

The pro-Andros authors were forced into an entirely different position as it involved the people. The virtue of the people in the colony, who had risen up in support of the colonial dissidents, needed to be brought into question. Their depiction of the colonial population was resoundingly negative and thoroughly conventional, referring to them as "deluded Countrey men," "an ignorant people," a "Vulgar and Ignorant People," or even a "perverfe people," who were prone to "Folly and Rashness" and easily

⁸³ Anon., *Further Queries*, 3; Anon., *Reasons for the Confirmation*, 2.

⁸⁴ Anon., *Reasons for the Confirmation*, 2.

⁸⁵ Anon., *Further Queries*, 3-4.

"amuse[d] & deceive[d]."⁸⁶ The colonial leaders, the pro-Andros authors argued, had proven to be demagogues, intent on exploiting the credulity and simplicity of the common people to further their own personal agendas. To gratify their "Malice, Ambition or Revenge," John Palmer asserted, the "*plotters & contrivers*" in colony "have made use of the deluded Country men, as the *Monkey did the Cat's foot to pluck the Chesnut out of the fire*."⁸⁷ In the preface of the second edition, he made the same point: "the meanest things" in Massachusetts had made a "deep Impression on the vulgar and Ignorant People."⁸⁸ The fact that the people would support the rebellious leaders confirmed for Palmer their baseness. He continued his attack on their abilities throughout his tract. He finds the substance of the *Declaration* so riddled with inaccuracies and lies that its real intention could only have been to "amuse & deceive ignorant people." Palmer rejected the right of subjects to rebel against political authority under any circumstances. Following a Hobbesian logic, he argued that once a civil society has been "Instituted for the Preservation of Peace," the individual grants that authority a "certain great Right over [theirs]." If "forcible resistance" was tolerated, then he hypothesized a terrible result of a "confused rabble" where "*All are speakers and none hearers*."⁸⁹

Now that the people had been brought into the public realm and able to exert their influence on colonial politics, the pro-Andros authors predicted the quick destruction of the colony. In *A Particular Account of the Late Revolution*, the author contends that the rebellious leaders awakened the "ignorant multitude" and brought forth a "detestable

⁸⁶ John Palmer, *The Present State of New-England Impartially Considered, in a letter to the clergy* (Boston, 1689) 1, 9, 12; Anon., Anon., *An Appeal to the Men of New-England*, 14; and Palmer, *An impartial account of the State of New-England* (London, 1690), preface.

⁸⁷ Palmer, *The Present State*, 1.

⁸⁸ Palmer, *An Impartial Account of the State of New-England*, A2.

⁸⁹ Palmer, *The Present State*, 23 (12).

Monster." The "Multitude," the author explained, was always "prone to do mischief," but had formerly been under control. Now the author compared the "rabble" in the colony to "a destroying hurricane." The masses were so bloodthirsty and difficult to predict that they even at times scared the dissident leaders. A group of men from the town of Lynn, led by Rev. Jeremiah Shepherd, appeared in the Boston "like soe many wild bears and the leader mad with passion, or rather drunk with Brandy, more savage than any of his followers." They demanded that Andros be turned over to them directly and threatened violence if the demand went unmet. This scared the Council of Safety, and these terrified colonial leaders, the author claimed, actually came to Andros for help, who responded that "if they had raised the Rabble, which they could not govern, it behooved them to look to it."⁹⁰ The people's support had to be attacked as much as the colony's leaders, and this resulted in a persistently critical depiction of the colonial population. The result was that the pro-Andros attacks of the dissident leaders in Massachusetts were withering, but so were their attacks on the broader colonial population.

These contrasting depictions of the people would become a lasting fault line between colonial and imperial voices. Whenever the colonial elite were challenged and their privileges or rights brought into question, colonial leaders would resort to popular conception of colonization to help justify their claims to political authority.⁹¹ In 1684, the colonial leaders had lost their power with the revocation of the charter, and they clearly wanted it back. The only way that would happen after 1686 would be through the extension of "English rights" throughout the empire, so that they again could be elected

⁹⁰ Anon., *A particular Account, in Narratives of Insurrections*, 196-197;199; 203-204.

⁹¹ For an argument locating this same process the Revolution of 1776, see Rozbicki, *Culture and Liberty*, 79-84.

to their positions of power by their neighbors. They had few claims to elite status on traditional terms and were vulnerable to attacks by Edward Randolph, among others, who claimed that he knew "*but one man* [in the colonial faction], *who was not himself a Servant, or a Servants Son*" and that the colonials were on average of "of mean Extraction . . . at their first Planting here."⁹² They had to justify representative government through the people, not themselves. The dangerous implications of this logic were clear to their opponents. An Andros supporter maintained that "The Vote and Confent fo Ten Thousand tho it may give greater force and violence; yet gives no more right or power in Law than the vote or confent of one private perfon."⁹³ The people could not be so empowered. The pro-Andros authors referred to the colonial leaders as "young conjurers, who had raised a devil they could not govern."⁹⁴ The puritan government had been more exclusive than any other government in English America in terms of suffrage restrictions up to 1686, but their arguments for political power in 1689 had forced them into a new position. They now put forth such an idealized conception they were frequently accused of rabble-rousing.

The new rhetoric of "the people" echoed the republican language of the colony's early leaders, but with one major difference. When Winthrop talked about the people, the community of individuals to which he referred existed only of the elect. Winthrop could talk about "the people" then as uniform entity because in a large part it was. The religious restrictions on who participated in the body politic made it much easier to embrace a positive depiction of the people and ultimately to embrace a republican

⁹² Anon., *An Appeal to the Men of New-England*, 12-13.

⁹³ [Nathaniel Byfield], *Seasonable Motives to our Duty and Allegiance* (Philadelphia, 1689), 2.

⁹⁴ Anon., *A particular Account, in Narratives of Insurrections*, 204.

political ideology. This had changed irreversibly with the Dominion government and the rebellion of 1689. The earlier suffrage restrictions were relaxed, giving the non-elect the right to vote and to participate in government. The Council of Safety put into place after the rebellion included several merchants who had not served in any political capacity under the charter regime. Even with those most optimistic about the return to their former privileges under a new charter, there was little hope of return to the earlier suffrage restrictions. When the New England leaders of 1689 referenced "the people," they were referring to a much larger and more diverse community.

Early colonization provided the experience by which the population in America could be conceptualized as a virtuous and unified entity. The stories of migration and the early dangers of colonization became evidence of the people's character. The emphasis on the importance of the colonists' labor that was so present in the both promotional literature and in the language of dissent in Maryland in 1676 had been elevated from an argument about imperial policy to a larger political statement about the character of the colonists.⁹⁵ The progress that all the colonies had demonstrated as the English settlers transformed a "wilderness" into a habitable region provided undeniable proof of their sacrifice, labor, and resolve. No longer a community of the elect, they were now portrayed as a community of colonists, which would lay a similar groundwork on which a republican ideology could emerge and thrive. Far from running away from the dangers of this rhetoric, later colonists would resort to the same narrative and the same depiction of the people when necessary. When the Board of Trade attacked colonial charters in the first decades of the eighteenth century, the most sophisticated response came from

⁹⁵ See Chapters Three and Four.

Jeremiah Dummer in 1721. In his pamphlet *A Defence of the New-England Charter*, he fell back on the same narrative of early colonization that emphasized the role of the colonists. "To increase the Nation's Commerce and enlarge her Dominions," he wrote, "muft be allow'd a Work of no little Merit, if we confider the Hardships to which the Adventurers were expofed; or the Expence in making their Settlements; or laftly, the great Advantages thence accruing to the Crown and Nation." The early colonists had faced the "many Dangers in their Voyages over the *Atlantick*," "an Inhofpitable Shore and wafte Wildernefs," an "extreme" climate, and were "inevitably engag'd in a War with the Natives."⁹⁶ In 1765, another New Englander, John Adams wrote *A Dissertation of the Canon and Feudal Law* in response to new imperial intrusions and pointed to the same sacrifices of the early colonists, who had left "their native country for a dreary, inhospitable wilderness." "Recollect their amazing fortitude," he wrote, "their bitter sufferings, -- the hunger the nakedness, the cold, which they patiently endured, -- the severe labors of clearing their grounds, building their houses, raising their provisions, amidst the dangers from wild beasts and savage men." The insertion of "the people" into the political discourse was not new to the English politics and had clear classical precedents, but colonial circumstances defined its trajectory in America.⁹⁷ No matter how elite and aristocratic the worldview of the colonial leaders, they would have to be proponents of the importance of "the people" to justify their authority effectively. Not only did colonial circumstances push them into this position, their understanding of the colonial past and imperial profits provided the means by which to defend and explain

⁹⁶ Jeremiah Dummer, *A Defence of the New-England Charters* (London, 1721), 7-8. For extended analysis of Dummer's tract, see Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire*, 83-112.

⁹⁷ On the creation of "the People" in English political discourse during both the Civil War years and the Glorious Revolution, see Morgan, *Inventing the People*, 11-121.

their position. As the Maryland dissidents had done before them, the colonial authors mobilized a history of America that ignored any evidence of English assistance and the important roles of wealthy colonial planners and leaders, and instead focused on the labor and bravery of the common settler. They promulgated and further developed this contested narrative, which would be repeated by colonists like Dummer and Adams, to serve their political agenda. And because of the structure of colonial politics, where every colonial leader across the various colonies was equally invested in supporting this narrative, it quickly rose to the level uncontested truth in the colonies.

The goal of the colonial faction in 1689 was to secure "English rights" in America, but the populist narrative of early colonization employed to substantiate that claim was potentially much more radical. In his recent study of the American Revolution, Michal Rozbicki has noted that colonial leaders embraced a "symbolic partnership with 'the people'" as a practical political strategy to enhance their claims to local authority, even if they risked the "greater politicization of the masses" at home.⁹⁸ This tactic and its risks were not new to the eighteenth century, however, and dated back to 1689. Colonial leaders throughout the eighteenth century developed and elaborated on this colonial political strategy, the ideological origins of which were already in place at the turn of the century. If colonial leaders wanted to maintain their authority in the face of imperial challenges, they would have to espouse a republican, and even at times a populist, political ideology. The structure of politics in the empire demanded it. In 1689, the contributions of "the people," both past and present, to the empire was the most important reason to grant to the colonists of Massachusetts the right to an elected

⁹⁸ Rozbicki, *Culture and Liberty*, 65-69.

assembly, which would reestablish the political power of the colonial elite. To maintain their authority then, colonial leaders had to describe the people in non-traditional terms and claim that they governed only by their approbation. In doing so, the New England authors created a coherent political conception of "the people" in America of lasting political importance. To procure their privileges within the empire, they had to risk destabilizing their authority at home. This was the enduring tradeoff of colonial protest and rebellion that would continue throughout the remainder of the colonial period.

CONCLUSION

THE POLITICS OF "PEOPLING" THE NEW WORLD

"We Sweat and Toil" has traced the development of a liberal political ideology in the colonial literature and tracked its emergence in the political discourse by the end of the century. This colonial vision, first promulgated in the midcentury promotional literature for the English colonies, outlined a new approach to colonial success, one that displaced the previous focus on virtue, emphasizing instead the importance of the industriousness of the individual. This ideology transformed how self-interest came to be understood in the colonies. Previously interpreted as the most dangerous threat to virtue and ultimately the success of the colonies, interest was now interpreted as providing a crucial spur to industrious behaviors. Once interest was reconceptualized in this way, representative government and its promised protection of private property took on a new economic justification. The Scottish enlightenment thinkers, the great proponents of a liberal political economy in the eighteenth century, would fully expand on the many ramifications of this type of societal organization. Sir James Steuart, for instance, identified a clear opposition to arbitrary rule in a liberal political economy and its demands for law, regularity, and individual initiative. A "modern oeconomy," he summarized, was the "most effective bridle ever invented against the folly of despotism." Steuart observed a great irony in this observation. The pursuit of wealth and trade, in his analysis, had originated with "princes" determined to augment their own power, but once "the fund of the prince's wealth" had become the possession of an "opulent, bold, and spirited people," those subordinates now had it within their power to "shake off" the

power of their leaders.¹ By the end of the seventeenth century, a liberal economic ideology had taken hold in the colonies and would constitute, as Steuart would theorize a century later, the most powerful argument for colonists' rights and liberties.

The radical economic ideology that would become so important to colonial politics by the end of the century first emerged in England during the 1650s and quickly supplanted the providential approach that had dominated promotion of the colonies up to that point. In the early promotion of the English colonies, God's approval had been considered crucial to their ultimate success. This godly approach to colonization reinforced much that was socially orthodox in early modern England, including the importance of an individual's willingness to suppress private interest for the common good. The proponents of the new economic ideology at mid-century were no less concerned with the common good, but argued for a new criterion for the health of a nation. Wealth was the new measure of state power and the wealth-producing individual, for these commentators, soon displaced the virtuous subject as the key component of powerful nations. Self-interest and its invaluable encouragement of labor now needed to be protected by the state. Colonial promoters found this reappraisal of self-interest particularly useful because it allowed for a more direct appeal to the ambitions of potential migrants in a way that had not been possible within the providential approach to colonization. The promotional writers who first embraced this ideology pursued many of the same ends as their predecessors had, but their means were now interest and industry. By the 1680s, this ideology was in full ascendancy in the promotional literature.

¹ Sir James Steuart, *An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Oeconomy: Being an Essay on the Science of Domestic Policy in Free Nations* (London, 1767), 248, 322. On Sir James Steuart's political and economic thought, see Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), 81-87.

Carolina, East Jersey, and Pennsylvania launched substantial promotional campaigns and, despite the wide variety of their religious and political backgrounds of the respective proprietary groups, they all embraced a colonial vision that prioritized the labor and promised the protection of property through representative government.

This understanding of colonization, as it had developed in the colonial literature, eventually surfaced in the colonial political discourse. The political contests in Maryland in 1676 and New England in 1689 provided two important examples. The colonists repeated the key principles of the economic ideology in their understanding of the colonial past and in its prospects for future success. As the engine of their labor and industriousness, now understood to be the crucial element of colonial development, the self-interest of the colonists had to be secured, they maintained, through the guarantee of representative government or the empire would quickly decline. Colonists in Maryland and New England used the importance of their labor, which they asserted was directly contingent on certain political rights, to challenge autocratic institutions and proposed a political economy for the colonies that connected their political liberties to the larger goals of empire. This coherent and plausible understanding of colonization, supported as it was so prominently in the colonial literature, worked against any form of centralized power in America. When dissident colonists in Maryland attacked Lord Baltimore's stewardship of the colony, for instance, they did so on the basis of their labor. When the New England colonists attacked James II's much broader attempt to reorganize the empire, they did so through a broader application of the same logic.

In focusing on the development of this economic ideology and its political ramifications, "We Sweat and Toil" does not dismiss the importance of the colonists'

claims to "English Rights" in America, but argues that the mimetic implications of the colonists' position has been overstated by colonial historians.² The idea that colonists pursued their political rights in America through a claim of identity to the native privileges of English subjects imposes a confrontational relationship between center and periphery that did not exist in the seventeenth century. Independence was not a feasible alternative for the colonists in the first century of settlement, as it would be in 1776. The colonists could lay claim to certain rights, but they could not threaten an imperial break because there was no feasible opportunity for the continued existence of their communities outside of the empire. The most salient threat put forth by the colonists in the seventeenth century was actually to abandon the empire by leaving their respective colonies or potentially North America altogether.³ Given the circumstances of the colonists' position in the seventeenth century, they are better understood as aspiring imperialists, desperate to align their own interests on the right side of imperial policy. The political contests of the late seventeenth century were predominantly a battle to understand and define empire, not resist it.

² See David Lovejoy, *The Glorious Revolution in America* (Hanover: Wesleyan University Press, 1972). On its continuing influence of his study on the colonial historiography, see Richard R. Johnson, "Empire," in *A Companion to Colonial America* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2003). For specific examples of its influence in recent studies of politics in early America, see Carla Pestana, *The English Atlantic in the Age of Revolution, 1640-1661* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004); James Horn, *Adapting to a New World: English Society in the Seventeenth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 334-380; Horn, "Tobacco Colonies: The Shaping of English Society in the Seventeenth Century Chesapeake," in *The Oxford History of the English Empire, Vol. 1* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 170-192; Natalie Zacek, "A Death in the Morning: The Murder of Daniel Parke," in *Cultures and Identities in colonial British America*, eds. Robert Olwell and Alan Tully (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2006), 223-243; and Zacek, *Settler Society in the English Leeward Islands, 1670-1776* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

³ These types of threats surfaced in both the Maryland rebellion of 1676 and the New England rebellion of 1689. See Chapters four and five. On the permeability of colonial borders and the frequency of inter-colonial and even wider transatlantic migrations, see, Alison Games, *Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

The language of "English Rights" on the part of the colonists has also led to the conclusion by historians that their political position within the empire was "fundamentally reactive," but this claim makes sense only if the form and framework of the political discourse in 1776 is applied retroactively to the political protestations of the seventeenth century.⁴ Approaching the colonial rebellions of 1689 from the perspective of the early history of colonization, however, offers a new interpretation of how the colonists pursued their political power in the New World. The fundamental challenge faced by colonial leaders and promoters throughout the seventeenth century was the successful "peopling" of the colonies. When the challenges of this process and the reluctance of so many to migrate are highlighted through an analysis of the promotional literature, a central feature of colonization becomes the expectation of settlers for self-advancement as a condition of migration. To be effective, the task of attracting migrants had to include the promise of something new or different, whether it was economic gain, political empowerment, or religious freedom. The political mobilization of the English colonists' self-interest through their importance to the project of "peopling" America would quickly impose adverse ideas and conditions on enslaved and indigenous people with long-lasting implications. The consequences for the English settlers, however, in their political disputes within the empire was that the leading colonists were often understood to be "new men," wholly void, in the eyes of their critics, of the markings of a legitimate elite. When colonists pursued political power within the empire, their credentials as leading members of a community and the privileges that that entailed were

⁴ Craig Yirush, *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early American Political Theory, 1675-1775* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 264. David Lovejoy acknowledges and defends the teleological nature of his thesis in the "Introduction" to *The Glorious Revolution*, xiii-xvi.

the frequent targets of their political opponents. Lord Baltimore, for instance, in his pursuit of autocratic power in Maryland, attacked the character of Maryland's settlers to justify his governing ambitions.⁵ John Palmer and Edward Randolph would launch similar attacks against the New England elite in 1689.⁶ The colonists needed an explanation for local political power that rendered their lack of social credentials to be inconsequential, which is exactly what the new economic ideology did by justifying political participation through labor and material production, instead of education, virtue, or heredity. In the political discourse at the close of the century, "English Rights" was synonymous with a claim to local political authority, but its justification was not an assertion of a common English identity. Far from a static claim to English liberties abroad, the colonists' argument unleashed a justification for political power that was proto-liberal in its attention to individual rights and potentially radical in its emphasis on labor. The language of "English Rights" has served to conceal the fact that the colonists were actually attempting to dissolve the conventional criteria for political leadership, opening up the political arena to a much larger portion of the population.

Before John Locke's publication of *Two Treatises on Government* and nearly one hundred years before Steuart's writings on political economy, dissident colonists were using a liberal understanding of society to justify their political rights. The fact that this ideology took root so quickly in the colonial literature was inextricably connected to the circumstances of empire. A primary purpose of the colonies from their earliest conception was to deliver concrete returns to the English exchequer. With this

⁵ See Cecil Calvert (Lord Baltimore), *The Lord Baltmores case concerning the province of Maryland* (London, 1653).

⁶ See John Palmer, *An impartial account of the State of New-England* (London, 1690).

originating rationale for their very existence, it was much easier to conceive of colonial society in economic terms than it was for other longstanding English communities, such as England's many urban corporations or even English society more broadly conceived. With the colonies always evaluated with an eye towards their production of wealth, they became fruitful grounds for an economic ideology to serve as a dynamic justification for new political rights.⁷ The economic subordination of the colonies in the seventeenth century opened up new avenues for political liberties, instead of, as would be the case in the eighteenth century, threatening those freedoms.

The economic ideology did not only displace the older language of virtue, but also allowed for a new conception of the ideal individual. Edmund Morgan and more recently Michael Rozbicki have both identified 1776 as the moment that "the people" were created in America and have put forth a top-down understanding of the origins of this conception and its political importance. For both historians, the revolutionary leaders created "the people" to bolster their claims to political authority with little real intention of empowering the wider population. The elite, however, having created "the people" in print also did so in actuality, as the populace, inspired by this rhetoric of their own importance, soon began to agitate for a larger role in government. "We Sweat and Toil" has argued for a much earlier and more complex history of this political conception in North American political thought, and the emergent economic ideology was crucial to its earliest iterations in print. In 1689, the claims of local leaders in New England that the

⁷ Elizabeth Mancke argues against understanding political rights in the colonies as a transmission or transplantation of English liberties abroad and argues instead that the colonies has broadly points to the possibility of the colonies as a place of the "active creation of liberties." This dissertation has presented an argument for one example of the empire could function in a such a capacity. See Mancke, "The Languages of Liberty in British North America," in Jack P. Greene, ed., *Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600-1900* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 25-49, quotation on 49.

colonists' labors had sustained the empire quickly transformed into a broader comment on the character of the English colonists. The colonies had thrived in a state of freedom, they argued. The liberty granted to the colonists had not led to depravity or idleness, but instead to an industrious population. When freed to pursue their own self-interest, they argued, the colonists had diligently labored and in the process demonstrated such characteristics as courage, perseverance, and rationality. The economic behaviors that were producing wealth for England were also crucial to redeeming the reputation of the colonists, offering a new set of characteristics by which to identify the ideal subject and giving rise to an idea of "the people" in America that differed dramatically from analogous definitions in England.

Morgan and Rozbicki have rightly pointed to the destabilizing potential of this populist rhetoric for colonial leaders, but it was much more than a case of philosophically insincere, political opportunism. The economic ideology that they relied on for their populist language, for instance, had been developed and promulgated, not by colonial elites aspiring for political power, but by promotional authors, many of them intent on not ceding away too much authority to the colonists. The promotional authors at mid-century had looked for a way to work with self-interest, instead of against it, because potential settlers from all ranks of society had demanded to benefit from their migration. The promotional authors needed an intellectual approach to colonization that was more accommodating to both social mobility and broader political participation. The language that they found most useful in appealing to potential migrants was the same language that the political leaders would use to define "the people." The promotional authors, who were on the front lines of dealing with the many challenges of "peopling" the New

World, defined and described colonial development in a way that made the language of "the people" a compelling and plausible political strategy.

The "peopling" project inherent in English colonization during the seventeenth century had a transformative potential for those who migrated. Much like the contributions of the ordinary soldier in the New Model army, the act of migration had the power to dignify those of even the most modest origins through their involvement in such a risky and impactful undertaking and carried with it the potential to raise the expectations of "the people" in America.⁸ The politicization of the colonial population did not occur in 1689, however, but first surfaced in print in the numerous promises extended in the promotional literature, including the widespread guarantee of elected assemblies alongside standard, English suffrage restrictions, even though land in America was more available to the wider percentage of the population. When the New England dissidents began to idealize "the people" in print, they did so with a new coherence and broader scope that marked an important moment in colonial political history, but they did not *create* an empowered populace through this rhetoric. The "peopling" of the New World had already done that. The colonial leaders in New England corralled the power of "the people," which was already evident to most colonial planners and promoters, and attempted to make that work to their advantage. When the imperial officers accused the New England leaders of being "young conjurors," who through their dangerously popular language, "had raised a devil they could not govern," they misunderstood the much more

⁸ On the New Model Army, Ian Gentles, *The New Model Army in England, Ireland, and Scotland, 1645-1653* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). On the intersection of the politicizing nature of the New Model Army and colonization, see Carla Pestana, "English Character and the Fiasco of the Western Design," *Early American Studies*, 3 (Spring, 2005), 1-31.

complex history of the New England leaders' political maneuverings.⁹ The empowerment of the people in North America had been made possible, not by the demagoguery of a displaced leadership intent on regaining power, but through the nature of English colonization itself. The politics of "peopling" the New World was a dangerous business for both imperial officers and colonial leaders, as both would have to straddle the importance of "the people" to the endeavor and their resulting political empowerment alongside traditional pretensions to elite governance. This tension was the defining characteristic of North American politics and its lasting legacy for future generations of English colonists in a new world.

⁹ Anon., *A particular Account*, in Charles McLean Andrews, ed., *Narratives of Insurrections* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915), 191-210.
Narratives of Insurrections, 204.

SELECTED BIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Published Primary Sources

Alexander, William. *An Encouragement to the Colonies*. London, 1624.

Anon. *A True Declaration*. London, 1610.

_____. *A True and Sincere Declaration*. London, 1610.

_____. *The articles, settlement, and offices of the Free Society of Traders in Pennsylvania agreed upon by divers merchants and others for the better improvement and government of trade in that province*. London, 1682.

_____. *An Abstract and abbreviation of some few of the many (later and former) testimonys from the inhabitants of New-Jersey and other eminent persons who have wrote particularly concerning that place*. London, 1681.

_____. *A Brief Account of the Province of Pennsylvania in America, lately granted under the Great Seal of England to William Penn, etc.* London, 1682.

_____. *A New and Most Exact Account Of the Fertiles and Famous Colony of Carolina*. Dublin, 1683.

_____. *Carolina, Described more fully then heretofore*. Dublin, 1684.

_____. *A brief description of the province of Carolina on the coasts of Floreda*. London, 1666.

_____. *Further Queries upon the present state of the New-English affairs*. Boston, 1690.

_____. *A Narrative of the Miseries of New-England, by Reason of Arbitrary Government Erected there*. London, 1688.

_____. *An Appeal to the Men of New England with a short account of Mr. Randolph's Papers*. Boston, 1689.

_____. *Revolution in New England in Justified, and the People there Vindicated From the Aspersion cast upon them by Mr. John Palmer in his Pretended Answer to the Declaration*. Boston, 1691.

_____. *The Humble Address of the Publicans of New-England To which King you please. With some remarks upon it*. London, 1691.

- _____. *Reasons for the Confirmation of the Charters belonging to the several Corporations in New-England*. London, 1690.
- _____. *A Short Account of the Present State of New England*. London, 1690.
- _____. *Considerations Humbly Offered to Parliament, shewing that those charters relating to the plantations were taken away*. London, 1689.
- Bonoeil, John. *Observations to be Followed, for the Making of fit roomes to keep Silke-wormes in: Also For the Best Manner of planting Mulbery trees to feed them*. London, 1620.
- Byfield, Nathaniel. *Seasonable Motives to our Duty and Allegiance*. Philadelphia, 1689.
- Brooke, Christopher. *A Poem of the late Massacre in Virginia*. London, 1622.
- Budd, Thomas. *Good Order established in Pennsilvania & New-Jersey*. Philadelphia, 1685.
- William Bullock. *Virginia Impartially Examined*. London, 1649.
- Calvert, Cecil. *The Lord Baltemores case concerning the province of Maryland*. London, 1653.
- Cotton, John. *Gods Promise to his Plantation*. London, 1630.
- Crashaw, William. *A sermon preached in London*. London, 1610.
- Cushman, Robert. *A Sermon Preached at Plimmoth in Nevv-England*. London, 1622.
- Donne, John. *A Sermon upon the VIII verse of the I chapter of the Acts of the Apostles preached . . . to the Virginia Company*. London, 1622.
- Ferguson, Robert. *The Present State of Carolina with Advice to the Settlers*. London, 1682.
- Ferrar, John. *A Perfect Description of Virginia*. London, 1649.
- Gatford, Lionel. *Publick Good without Private Interest*. London, 1657.
- Gray, Robert. *A Good Speed to Virginia*. London, 1609.
- Hammond, John. *Leah and Rachel, or, the Two Fruitfull Sisters Virginia and Mary-Land: Their Prefent Condition, Impartially stated and related*. London, 1655.

- Hartlib, Samuel. *A Rare and new discovery of a speedy and easie means found out by a young lady in England . . . for the feeding of silk worms in . . . Virginia*. London, 1655.
- Hayman, Robert. *Quodlibets lately come ouer from New Britaniola, old Newfound-land Epigrams and other small parcels, both morall and diuine*. London, 1628.
- Hughes, Lewes. *A letter, sent into England from the Summer Ilands*. London, 1615.
- James I. *A Counterblaste to Tobacco*. London, 1604.
- Johnson, Robert. *Nova Britannia*. London, 1609.
- _____. *The New Life of Virginea*. London, 1612.
- Levett, Christopher. *A Voyage into New England*. London, 1624.
- Loddington, William. *Plantation Work*. London, 1682.
- Mather, Increase. *A Brief Relation of the State of New England from the beginning of that plantation to this present year, 1689 in a letter to a person of Quality*. London, 1689.
- _____. *A Vindication of New-England*. Boston, 1690.
- John Palmer. *An impartial account of the State of New-England*. London, 1690.
- _____. *The Present State of New-England Impartially Considered, in a letter to the clergy*. Boston, 1689.
- William Penn. *A Brief account of the province of East-Jersey in America*. London, 1682.
- _____. *A letter from William Penn, poprietary and governour of Pennsylvania in America, to the Committee of the Free Society of Traders of that province residing in London*. London, 1683.
- _____. *Information and direction to such persons as are inclined to America, more especially those related to the province of Pensilvania*. London, 1686.
- _____. *Some Account of the Province of Pensilvania in America*. London, 1681.
- Scot, George. *A Brief Advertisement concerning East-New-Jersey, in America*. Edinburgh?, 1685.
- _____. *The Model of Government of the Proprietors of East-New-Jersey in America*. Edinburgh, 1685.
- Smith, John. *A Description of New England*. London, 1616.

Symonds, William. *A Sermon Preached at White-Chappel*. London, 1609.

Vaughan, William. *The Golden Fleece*. London, 1626.

Waterhouse, Edward. *A declaration of the state of the colony and affaires in Virginia With a relation of the barbarous massacre in the time of peace and league, treacherously executed by the native infidels vpon the English, the 22 of March last*. London, 1622.

Whitaker, Alexander. *Good Nevves from Virginia*. London, 1613.

White, John. *The Planters Plea*. London, 1630.

Williams, Edward. *Virginia's Discovery of Silk-wormes, with their benefit and the implanting of mulberry trees*. London, 1650.

_____. *Virgo trimphans, or, Virginia in generall, but the south part therof in particular including the fertile Carolana, and the no lesse excellent island of Roanoak, richly and experimentally valued*. London, 1650.

Wilson, Samuel. *An Account of the Province of Carolina in America together with An abstract of the Patent, and several other Neccessary and Ufeful Particulars, to such as have thoughts of Transporting themselves thither*. London, 1682.

Winslow, Edward. *Good Nevves from New England*. London, 1624.

_____. *A Relation or Journal of the Beginning and Proceedings of the English Plantation Settled at Plimoth in New England*. London, 1622.

Edited Volumes

Andrews, Charles McLean, ed. *Narratives of Insurrections*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1915.

Barbour, Philip L., ed. *The Complete Works of John Smith*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986.

Cell, Gillian T., ed. *Newfoundland Discovered: English Attempts at Colonisation, 1610-1630*. London: Hakluyt Society, 1982.

Greene, Jack P., ed. *Selling a New World: Two Colonial South Carolina Promotional Pamphlets*. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

Hall, Clayton Colman, ed. *Narratives of Early Maryland, 1633-1684*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910.

Hall, Michael G., Lawrence H. Leder, and Michael G Kammen, eds. *The Glorious Revolution in America: Documents on the Colonial Crisis of 1689*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964.

Papenfuse, Edward C. Jr. *Archives of Maryland Online*. Vol. 1: Proceedings of the General Assembly, January 1637/8-September 1664. Annapolis: Maryland State Archives, 2006.

_____. *Archives of Maryland Online*. Vol. 5: Proceedings of the Council of Maryland, 1667-1687/8. Annapolis: Maryland State Archives, 2006.

_____. *Archives of Maryland Online*. Vol. 15: Proceedings of the Council of Maryland, 1671-1681. Annapolis: Maryland State Archives, 2006.

Tyler, Lyon G., ed. *Narratives of Early Virginia*. New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1907.

Secondary Sources

Allen, David Grayson. *In English Ways: The Movement of Societies and the Transfer of English Local Law and Customs to Massachusetts Bay in the Seventeenth Century*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.

Ammerman, David L. and Thad W. Tate, eds. *The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century: Essays on Anglo-American Society*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979.

Andrews, Kenneth R. *Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480-1630*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Appleby, Joyce O. *Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth Century England*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

_____. *Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

Armitage, David and Michael J. Braddick, eds. *The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

Armstrong, Catherine. *Writing North America in the Seventeenth Century: English Representations in Print and Manuscript*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.

- Arneil, Barbara. *John Locke and America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Bailyn, Bernard. *Atlantic History: Concept and Contours*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
- _____. *The Barbarous Years: The Conflict of Civilizations, 1600-1675*. New York: Knopf, 2012.
- _____. *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1967.
- _____. *Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution*. New York: Knopf, 1986.
- Becker, Carl. *The Declaration of Independence: A Study of the History of Political Ideas*. New York: Knopf, 1942.
- Beier, A.L. *Masterless Men: The Vagrancy Problem in England, 1560-1640*. London: Methuen, 1985.
- Berry, Christopher J. *The Idea of Luxury: a Conceptual and Historical Investigation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Black, Barbara. "The Constitution of Empire: The Case for the Colonists." *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 124 (1976): 1157-1211.
- Robert M. Bliss. *Revolution and Empire: English Politics and the American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990.
- Warren B. Billings. *Sir William Berkeley and the Forging of Colonial Virginia*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2004.
- _____. Selby, and Tate. *Colonial Virginia: A History*. New York: KTO Press, 1986.
- Bradburn, Douglas. "The Eschatological Origins of the English Empire," in John C. Coombs and Bradburn, eds. *Early Modern Virginia: Reconsidering the Old Dominion*, eds. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011: 15-56.
- _____. "The Visible Fist: The Chesapeake Tobacco Trade in War and the Purpose of Empire, 1690-1715." *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 68 (July, 2011): 361-386.
- Braddick, M.J. *State Formation in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1700*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

- Breen, T.H. *Puritans and Adventurers: Change and Persistence in Early America*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.
- Bronner, Edwin P. *William Penn's Holy Experiment: The Founding of Pennsylvania, 1681-1701*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1962.
- Burgess, Glenn. *The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An Introduction to English Legal and Political Thought, 1603-1642*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992.
- Burnard, Trevor. *Creole Gentlemen: The Maryland Elite, 1691-1776*. New York: Routledge, 2002.
- Cain, Tom. "John Donne and the Ideology of Colonization." *English Literary Renaissance* 31 (September, 2001): 440-476.
- Canny, Nicholas, ed. *Europeans on the Move: Studies on European Migration, 1500-1800*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- _____. "Writing Atlantic History: Or Reconfiguring the History of Colonial British America." *Journal of American History* 86 (Dec., 1999): 1093-1114.
- Chartres, John and David Hey, eds. *English Rural Society, 1500-1800*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Craven, Wesley F. *Dissolution of the Virginia Company: The Failure of a Colonial Experiment*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1932.
- _____. *The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, 1607-1689*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1949.
- Cronon, William. *Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England*. New York: Hill and Wang, 1983.
- Daniels, Bruce C., ed. *Town and Country: Essays on the Structure of Local Government in the American Colonies*. Middletown, Connecticut : Wesleyan University Press, 1978.
- Drake, James D. *King Philip's War: Civil War in New England, 1675-1676*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1999.
- Dunn, John. "The Politics of John Locke in England and America in the Eighteenth Century," in John Yolton, ed. *John Locke: Problems and Perspectives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Dunn, Richard S. "Imperial Pressures on Massachusetts and Jamaica, 1675-1700" in Alison G. Olson and Richard M. Brown, eds. *Anglo-American Political Relations, 1675-1775*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970: 52-75.

_____. "The Glorious Revolution and America" in Nicholas Canny, ed. *The Oxford History of the British Empire*, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998: 445-66

Dworetz, Steven. *The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism and the American Revolution*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990.

Edwards, Jess. "'Between Plain Wilderness' and 'Goodly Corn Fields': Representing Land Use in Early Virginia," in Robert Appelbaum and John Wood Sweet, eds. *Envisioning an Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

Elliot, John. *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.

Fisher, David Hackett. *Albion's Seed: Four British Folkways in America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

Finkelstein, Andrea. *Harmony and Balance: An Intellectual History of Seventeenth Century English Economic Thought*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000.

Fitzmaurice, Andrew. "The Commercial Ideology of Colonization in Jacobean England: Robert Johnson, Giovanni Botero, and the Pursuit of Greatness." *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 64 (October, 2007): 791-820.

_____. *Humanism and America: An Intellectual History of English Colonisation, 1500-1625*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Fuller, Mary. *Voyages in Print: English Travel in America, 1576-1624*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Fumerton, Patricia. *Unsettled: the Culture of Mobility and the Working Poor in Early Modern England*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006.

Gallay, Alan. *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002.

Games, Alison. "Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities." *American Historical Review*, 111 (June, 2006): 741-757.

_____. *Migration and the Origins of the English Atlantic World*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.

_____. *The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in the Age of Expansion, 1560-1660*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Geitner, Mary K. *William Penn*. Harlow, England: Longman, 2000.

Gibson, Alan. *Understanding the Founding: The Crucial Questions*. Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2007.

Gibson, Charles. *The Black Legend: Anti-Spanish Attitudes in the Old World and the New*. New York: Knopf, 1971.

Gragg, Larry D. *Englishmen Transplanted: The English Colonization of Barbados, 1627-1660*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Greene, Jack P. and Philip D. Morgan, eds. *Atlantic History: A Critical Appraisal*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

_____. *Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Politics of the British Empire and the United States, 1607-1788*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1986.

_____. *Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988.

Guenther, Michael. "A Peculiar Silence: The Scottish Enlightenment, Political Economy, and the Early American Debates over Slavery." *Atlantic Studies* 8 (December, 2011): 447-483.

Haffenden, Phillip S. *New England and the English Nation, 1689 – 1713*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974.

Hall, Michael. *Edward Randolph and the American Colonies, 1676-1703*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960.

Harris, Tim. *London Crowds in the reign of Charles II: Propaganda and Politics from the Restoration until the Exclusion Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Hayes, Kevin J. "Defining the Ideal Colonist: Captain John Smith's Revisions from *A True Relation* to the *Proceedings* to the Third Book of the *Generall Historie*." *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 99 (April, 1991): 123-144.

Hill, Christopher. *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas during the English Revolution*. New York: Viking, 1972.

Hindle, Steve. *The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, c. 1550-1640*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

Hirschman, Albert O. *The Passion and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.

Horn, James. *A Land as God Made It: Jamestown and the Birth of America*. New York: Basic Books, 2005.

_____. *Adapting to a New World: English Society in the Seventeenth Century*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994.

_____. "Tobacco Colonies: The Shaping of English Society in the Seventeenth Century Chesapeake" in Nicholas Canny, ed. *The Oxford History of the English Empire*, Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998:170-192.

Nelson, William E., eds. *Law as Culture and Culture as Law: Essays in Honor of John Phillip Reid*. Madison, WI: Madison House, 2000.

Houston, Alan and Steve Pincus, eds. *A Nation Transformed: England and the Restoration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Illick, Joseph E. *Colonial Pennsylvania*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1976.

Innes, Stephen. *Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of Puritan New England*. New York: Norton and Company, 1995.

Johnson, Richard R. *Adjustment to Empire: The New England Colonies, 1675-1715*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1981.

_____. "The Revolution of 1688-89 in the American Colonies" in Jonathan Israel, ed. *The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991: 215-240.

Jordan, David W. *Foundations of Representative Government in Maryland, 1632-1715*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Kahn, Victoria A. *Wayward Contracts: the Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640-1674*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Krugler, Jon. *English and Catholic: The Lords Baltimore in the Seventeenth Century*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2004.

Kukla, Jon. "Order and Chaos in Early America: Political and Social Stability in Pre-Restoration Virginia." *American Historical Review* 90 (April, 1985): 275-298.

- Kulikoff, Allan. *Tobacco and Slaves: The Development of Southern Cultures in the Chesapeake, 1680-1800*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986.
- Lovejoy, David S. *The Glorious Revolution in America*. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.
- Kupperman, Karen. "Forward" in Robert Applebaum and John Sweet Wood. eds. *Envisioning an English Empire: Jamestown and the Making of the North Atlantic World*. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 2005: xi – xv.
- _____. *Indians and English: Facing Off in Early America*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000.
- _____. *Providence Island, 1630-1641*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Landsman, Ned C. *Scotland and its First American Colony, 1683-1765*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- Lefler, Hugh T. "Promotional Literature of the Southern Colonies." *The Journal of Southern History* 33 (February, 1967): 3-25.
- Lemay Joseph A. L. *The American Dream of Captain John Smith*. Charlottesville, VA.: University of Virginia Press, 1991.
- _____. *Men of Letters in Colonial Maryland*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1972.
- Lepore, Jill. *The Name of War: King Philip's War and the Origins of American Identity*. New York: Knopf, 1998.
- Lustig, Mary Lou. *The Imperial Executive in America: Sir Edmund Andros, 1637-1714*. Madison, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2002.
- Maltby, William S. *The Black Legend in England: The Development of Anti-Spanish Sentiment, 1558-1660*. Durham: Duke University Press, 1971.
- Mancall, Peter. *Hakluyt's Promise: an Elizabethan's Obsession with an English America*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2007.
- Manning, Brian. *Aristocrats, Plebeians, and Revolution in England, 1640-1660*. London: Pluto Press, 1996.
- Macpherson, C.B. *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.

McRae, Hal. *God Speed the Plough: the Representations of Agrarian England, 1500-1660*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Miller, Perry. "Religion and Society in the Early Literature: the Religious Impulse in the Founding of Virginia." *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 5 (October, 1948): 492-522 and 6 (January, 1949): 24-41.

Morgan, Edmund. *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1975.

_____. *Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America*. New York: Norton, 1988.

Nelson, Eric. "Un-Sainting James: Othello and the 'Spanish Spirits' of Shakespeare's Globe." *Representations* 62 (1998): 58-100.

Ohmori, Yuhtaro. *The Artillery of Mr. Locke: The Use of Locke's 'Second Treatise' in Pre-Revolutionary America, 1764-1776*. PhD Diss., Johns Hopkins University, 1988.

Overton, Mark. *Agricultural Revolution in England: The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy, 1500-1850*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Pangle, Thomas. *The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Parker, John. "Religion and the Virginia Colony, 1609-10," in K.R. Andrews, N.P. Canny, and P.E.H. Hair, eds. *The Westward Enterprise: English Activities in Ireland, the Atlantic, and America, 1480-1650*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1979.

Pestana, Carla. *The English Atlantic in the Age of Revolution, 1640-1661*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004.

Pincus, Steve. "Neither Machiavellian Moment nor Possessive Individualism: Commercial Society and the Defenders of the English Commonwealth," *The American Historical Review* 103 (June, 1998): 705-736.

Pocock, J.G.A. *The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957.

_____. *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.

_____. *Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Pope, Peter. *Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004.

Pulsipher, Jenny Hale. *Subjects unto the Same King: Indians, English, and the Contest of Authority in Colonial New England*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

Rahe, Paul. *Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992.

Rainbolt, John C. "A New Look at Stuart 'Tyranny': The Crown's Attack on the Virginia Assembly, 1676-1689." *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 75 (1967): 387-406.

Richter, Daniel K. *Before the Revolution: America's Ancient Pasts*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011.

_____. *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Rodgers, Daniel T. "Republicanism: The Career of a Concept." *Journal of American History* 79 (June, 1992): 11-38.

Roper, L.H. *Conceiving Carolina: Proprietors, Planters, and Plots, 1662-1729*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Rountree, Helen C. *Pocahontas, Powhatan, Opechancanough: Three Indian Lives Changed by Jamestown*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2005.

Rozbicki, Michal J. *Culture and Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011.

Rutman, Darrett B. and Anita H. Rutman. *A Place in Time: Middlesex County Virginia, 1650-1750*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984.

Sanchez, Joseph P. *The Spanish Black Legend/La Leyenda Negra Espanola: Origins of the Anti-Hispanic Stereotypes/Origenes de los estereotipos antihispanicos*. Albuquerque: National Park Service, 1990.

Sarson, Steve. *British America, 1500-1800*. London: Hodder Arnold, 2005.

Scanlan, Thomas. *Colonial Writing and the New World: Allegories of Desire*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

- Schwartz, Stuart B. *Tropical Babylons: Sugar and the Making of the Atlantic World, 1450-1680*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003.
- Sheehan, Bernard W. *Savagism and Civility: Indians and Englishmen in Colonial Virginia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980.
- Skinner, Quentin. *Liberty before Liberalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Sosin, J.M. *English America and the Restoration Monarchy of Charles II: Transatlantic Politics, Commerce, and Kinship*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980.
- _____. *English America and the Revolution of 1688: Royal Administration and the Structure of Provincial Government*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982.
- Steele, Ian K. *Warpaths: Invasions of North America*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Sutto, Antoinette P. "Built Upon Smoke: Politics and Political Culture in Maryland, 1630-1690." PhD diss., Princeton University, 2008.
- Taylor, Alan. *American Colonies*. New York: Viking Press, 2001.
- Thirsk, Joan. *Agricultural Change: Policy and Practice, 1500-1750*, vol. 3 of Thirsk, gen. ed. *Chapters from the Agrarian History of England and Wales, 1500-1750*, 5 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Walsh, Lorena S. *Motives of Honor, Pleasure, and Profit: Plantation Management in the Colonial Chesapeake, 1607-1763*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.
- Webb, Stephen Saunders. *1676: The End of American Independence*. New York: Knopf, 1994.
- Weir, Robert M. *Colonial South Carolina: A History*. New York: KTO Press, 1983.
- Winship, Michael. "Godly Republicanism and the Origins of the Massachusetts Polity," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 63 (2006): 427-462.
- Withington, Phil. *Society and Early Modern England: The Vernacular Origins of some Powerful Ideas*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010.
- _____. *The Politics of Commonwealth: Citizens and Freemen in Early Modern England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Wood, Gordon. *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969.

Wood, Peter H. *Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion*. New York: W.W. Norton Co., 1975.

Woodward, Walter W. "Captain John Smith and the Campaign for New England: A Study in Early Modern Identity and Promotion." *The New England Quarterly* 81 (March, 2008): 91-125.

Wright, Louis B. *Religion and Empire: The Alliance between Piety and Commerce in English Expansion, 1558-1626*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1942.

Wrightson, Keith. *Earthly Necessities: Economic Lives in Early Modern Britain*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.

Yelling, J.A. *Common Field and Enclosure in England, 1450-1850*. London: Macmillan, 1977.

Yirush, Craig. *Settlers, Liberty, and Empire: The Roots of Early American Political Theory, 1675-1775*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Zacek, Natalie. "A Death in the Morning: The Murder of Daniel Parke" in Robert Olwell and Alan Tully, eds. *Cultures and Identities in colonial British America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2006: 223-243.

_____. *Settler Society in the English Leeward Islands, 1670-1776*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Zuckert, Michael. *Natural Rights and the New Republicanism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.

