The Race Politics Makes: Parties, Polarization, and Whites' Racial Attitudes

By

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To Pennie and Jeff, for sparking my sense of wonder and to everyone else who nurtured it along the way.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Across various metrics, racial inequality continues to be an important feature of American life. Black Americans tend to have very different social and economic experiences than their white counterparts. A recent Pew report puts these facts in stark relief (Pew Research Center, 2016). In 2014, poverty and unemployment rates among blacks were at least double that for whites. White households took in an average of 66% more income than black households. And white households held 13 times the wealth of blacks, with a substantial portion of this coming from large racial differences in homeownership rates.

These Black-White racial differences persist in other domains. Black Americans experience the justice system differently with an imprisonment rate 5 times that of Whites (Sentencing Project, 2017). Black men in particular have a high probability of incarceration, with those born in 2001 facing a 1 in 3 chance of imprisonment at some point in their lives. And politics is not immune. Although it is the most racially diverse Congress ever, racial and ethnic minorities are still underrepresented in the current 116th Congress, with this a particularly acute problem in the Senate (Bialik, 2019). Moreover, Black Americans may increasingly face difficulties simply casting ballots. Many states are instituting voter identification laws and other changes that make voting costlier and may disproportionately affect groups including racial and ethnic minorities (Berman, 2015).

These differences call for explanations. Does this variation stem from race-based factors like discrimination, or does it come from factors unrelated to race? Some may, for instance, explain racial income gaps by pointing to differences in educational attainment. It's not about factors related to someone's membership in a racial or ethnic group but something else. Alternatively, people may build on these differences by pointing out that race-based discrimination in hiring may matter. Black and White applicants for the same job who share the same background characteristics

do not have an equal shot. From this perspective race shapes lived experiences; race matters in an ostensibly colorblind society. These understandings matter because they then shape people's policy preferences. If various outcomes are unrelated to race, then addressing racial inequality as *racial* inequality will not occur (Iyengar, 1991).

Importantly, though, a sense that race is "real," i.e., socially meaningful, may manifest more for marginalized racial groups. Whites' privileged position in the United States allows them to avoid confronting race and how it shapes their norms, perspectives, and experiences (Waters, 1990; Haney López, 2006; Omi and Winant, 2015). Moreover, by experiencing racial victimization infrequently, if at all, Whites never confront the "petty indignities and intentional slights of racism," leading some scholars to argue that "to be white is to not think about [race]" even as it is central to how whites carry out their lives (Haney López, 2006, 111-112; see also Flagg, 1993). Being White does not potentially create problems for shopping, job hunting, or even walking down the street. Moreover, American social life is built such that whiteness seems natural, rendering non-whites the representatives of racial difference. For Whites, often when their race, specifically ethnicity, becomes salient, it's by providing a symbolic sense of community (Waters, 1990). This contrasts sharply with groups like Black Americans for whom social and political realities make race a more readily accessible perspective (Dawson, 1994).[1]

Whites' "race-blindness" matters because people's daily experiences shape how they understand the social world (Lippmann, 1922; Gamson, 1992). Whiteness operates as a set of lenses through which whites interpret the world, which makes it difficult for many to understand the the different lived realities of non-whites (Haney López, 2006). Events unfold for reasons unrelated to race. Part of what it means to be white comes from thinking that race does not define one's daily life. But this happens even as whites use the "racial" characteristics of other groups to make sense of the social and political world (Walsh, 2004; Haney López, 2006).[2]

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[1]Data from the 2016 American National Election Pilot Study are illustrative. It asked respondents "How important is being [RACE] to your identity?" Whereas 54% of black respondents said their race was "extremely important" to them, only 20% of whites said the same. In fact, nearly 40% of whites said that their race was "a little" or "not at all" important to their identity.

[2]The 2016 ANES Pilot Study also asked a variety of questions related to white privilege. Nearly 53% of whites said that being white did not provide any "unearned privileges in today's society," with a similar percentage saying

But people also often rely on others to help them make sense of events they do not experience firsthand (Lippmann, 1922; Gamson, 1992). These others include a person's social network peers or elites in politics or the media. Because Whites' social networks are usually racially homogenous (Cox, Navarro-Rivera and Jones, 2016), and Whites typically participate in predominately white civic organizations (Walsh, 2004), elites are likely more influential here. Elite influence is possible because the public trusts them as a source of information (Zaller, 1992). This influence is particularly likely for political elites because increasing elite polarization has resulted in a more party-centric political environment where individuals' party affiliations play an increasingly important role in shaping attitudes (Hetherington, 2001; Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2015).

I argue that politics is particularly important because it is intimately connected with race, and has been since the country's founding. Racial considerations contributed to the Constitution's shape, and subsequently structured party systems (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Schickler, 2016; Tesler, 2016) and directly influenced policymaking (Haney López, 2006; Katznelson, 2006). The politicization of race brought about by these institutions facilitates the links that exist between the mass public's racial attitudes and their policy preferences (e.g., Gilens, 1999; Tesler, 2016) and party attachments (e.g., Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016), links that in turn maintain race as an important institutional feature.

Through focusing on politics I provide an account of political race-making. By this I mean the ways in which politics shapes understandings of race, both in terms of racialized categories and the centrality of these concerns in interpreting lived experiences (see also Prewitt, 2013; Omi and Winant, 2015). Specifically, I aim to understand whether and how politics can shape Whites' awareness that racial inequality and racial identity/difference are social facts (Omi and Winant, 2015, 260). This awareness of race abuts a pervasive colorblind, even resentful, perspective contending that because the Civil Rights movement was successful, any explanation of racial difference emphasizing race and discrimination over non-racial factors like market forces or character is incorrect and even possibly racist (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; see also Kinder and Sanders, 1996;

that white people have few advantages that minorities do not have.

Haney López, 2006; King and Smith, 2014; Omi and Winant, 2015).[3] Politics' increased social salience, and the tight connections between politics and race, suggest elites have the capacity to produce some form of race-consciousness or to reinforce the colorblind and resentful lenses that many, particularly Whites, tend to adopt. As Civil Rights leaders once did, political actors could challenge this new conventional wisdom about race, changing attitudes and beliefs in the process (cf. Bonilla-Silva, 2014, Ch. 11).

I employ a multi-method approach to understand whether and how politics can shape how Whites understand race. In the first chapter I investigate whether mass attitudes may have elite origins by investigating how racially liberal and conservative elites talk about race. I analyze transcripts from two partisan news shows: *The Rachel Maddow Show* and *The O'Reilly Factor*. Pairing a case study with text-as-data methods, I provide insight into themes constituting racially liberal and conservative elite discourse. Racial liberals like Maddow emphasize that race matters– racial bias and discrimination still shape nonwhites' life chances. In contrast, racial conservatives like O'Reilly contend that race does not shape life chances and serves only as an attention-seeking device. Identifying these divides helps shed light on the origins and dynamics of mass racial attitudes.

The second empirical chapter offers a first test for elite influence on perceptions about race by considering agenda setting on race. Traditional agenda setting accounts show that the more the media cover an issue the more important it seems to the public. But these analyses focus on media coverage featuring a unidirectional frame, a limitation for topics like race where elites can present markedly different perspectives. I demonstrate that these different perspectives affect elites' agenda setting capacity in observational and experimental analyses. I use the content analysis described in chapter 1 to create a measure for how much attention Maddow and O'Reilly give to race and relate this with the public's most important problem evaluations. I find that while Maddow's coverage produces expected agenda setting effects, O'Reilly's does not. I support these

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[3]I emphasize psychological processes here rather than materialist conceptions of racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Omi and Winant, 2015). I do not deny that structures and material well-being matter. Rather, I argue that cognitive and affective processes are central for understanding how people make sense of the social world created by these institutional arrangements (see generally Neville et al., 2000).

conclusions through two experiments where I demonstrate that story frames, not just audience predispositions or show content differences, influence agenda setting effects. Talking about race can motivate public concern with it, but only when presented in particular perspectives.

I extend the investigation into attitudinal effects in the third empirical chapter. Here I examine the connection between politics and racial group evaluations. Specifically, I focus on the relationship between whites' party loyalties and their racial attitudes. The conventional wisdom in political science is that racial attitudes are an important foundation for partisanship (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016). Yet, I argue that polarized and competitive political contexts can make partisanship a more central attitude, increasing its causal influence relative to other predispositions, including racial attitudes. I apply cross-lagged regression models to panel data from the 1990s and 2000s and demonstrate that whites do indeed align their racial attitudes with their party loyalties, and partisanship's increased centrality in recent years makes these ties more influential. White Republicans and Democrats hold increasingly polarized views of Black Americans. Although I offer no direct test for events or other specific political stimuli, these analyses demonstrate that politics can make race by shaping how Whites understand racial categories.

The final empirical chapter begins to assess why partisans update their attitudes in polarized political contexts by examining whether individual differences condition the dynamic relationship between Whites' partisanship and their racial attitudes. Specifically, I focus on political engagement–captured by education, political interest, and political awareness–as a moderating force. I find that in party-centric political contexts White partisans of all stripes adopt new racial attitudes, but the politically engaged change the most, and especially Democrats. Relatedly, and in contrast to work arguing it promotes tolerance, education produces similar dynamics. College-educated White partisans display more attitude polarization in these periods than those without college degrees. Party encourages racial attitude change, and the politically engaged are the vanguard.

These patterns have important implications for the future of American politics. Partisan polarization appears unlikely to disappear in the near future and issues related to race are likely to

persist in importance. Partisanship is likely to continue to shape Whites' beliefs about race and racial groups for the foreseeable future. By way of conclusion, I note descriptive patterns suggesting continued party influence. I also highlight areas for future work.

Chapter 2

The Content of their Coverage: How Partisan Media Discuss Race

Scholars often identify the Civil Rights Movement as helping inaugurate an era of legal racial equality (e.g., Klinkner and Smith, 2002). But despite formal advances protecting the franchise and guarding against overtly discriminatory behavior, stark inequalities persist. Blacks and Latinos are twice as likely as whites to be poor, whites are more likely to be employed, and white households hold 10-13 times the wealth of Latino and black households (Pew Research Center, 2016).

To address such disparities scholars and political observers often propose that political elites need to lead the United States in a conversation on race. Political and social developments following the Civil Rights Movement motivated elites to turn away from race-conscious policy discussions in favor of race-neutral governing (King and Smith, 2014). That whites' racial attitudes profoundly shape their political opinions, including support for race-targeted policies, appears only to reinforce these decisions (Hutchings and Valentino, 2004). Echoing Myrdal (1962), the pro-conversation position appears to hold that elites can encourage whites to overcome this aversion to race-conscious policies by giving voice to the realities minority communities face.

This view has theoretical support. Although scholars persuasively argue whites' racial views are early-learned and persistent (Sears and Brown, 2013), evidence suggests these beliefs may respond to the social and political context (Schuman et al., 1997). Critically, elite behavior helps define these contexts. Some mass attitude scholars, for instance, have claimed that elite cues helped replace Jim Crow racism with culturally or symbolically racist beliefs (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Further, social psychologists find that people provide views about racial groups that fit with perspectives they hear (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1994; Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Apfelbaum et al., 2010). Taken together, mass racial attitudes may look the way they do because individuals' tendency to divide the world into kinds (Hirschfeld, 1996) intersects with information from elites on how these kinds should be understood. This thinking extends conventional models of elite-driven

public opinion formation (e.g., Zaller, 1992) to argue that elites may influence core predispositions, the very things these models propose as guiding the reception and incorporation of other considerations.

But despite these insights, scholars have devoted surprisingly little systematic attention to elite rhetoric on race (cf. Gillion, 2016).[1] This is a substantial oversight when striving to understand the nature and origins of mass racial attitudes. First, if elites do matter then scholars must assume the elite information environment on race has a specific flavor. Scholars holding that mass racial attitudes have persisted in a consistent guise for decades (e.g., Tesler, 2016) must assume either a stable stream of information from elites or that these attitudes develop and persist without elite influence. Second, it forces scholars to assume a unified signal that may not exist. An expansion of media options creates a fragmented news ecosystem potentially producing distinct information environments (Prior, 2007). This is particularly important in light of partisan media outlets that provide specific perspectives on the day's news and the relationship between people's political views and preferred news sources (Pew Research Center, 2014).

Third, not investigating how elites talk about race blinds scholars to possible explanations for mass attitude patterns. Elites could influence predispositions by shaping which ones people use to understand race and potentially race-related events. Tesler (2016) demonstrates that racially liberal and conservative attitudes increasingly explain whites' political views. This chronic accessibility suggests these attitudes have strengthened, a potential byproduct of elites consistently adopting views reinforcing racially liberal or conservative attitudes (Howe and Krosnick, 2017). Moreover, social psychologists have provided rich evidence that how racial progress and diversity are presented can lead whites to change their racial attitudes (Knowles et al., 2009; Craig and Richeson, 2014; Wilkins and Kaiser, 2014), providing another avenue for elite influence. But no evidence to date can speak to how frequently elites adopt such perspectives, which limits understanding whether and to what degree racial attitudes may change in ways extant work suggests.

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[1]Prior investigations speaking to elite racial cues either focus on limited domains like campaign appeals (e.g., Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Mendelberg, 2001) and party platforms (e.g., Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Schickler, 2016), or on specific issues like welfare (e.g., Gilens, 1999), crime (Gilliam, Iyengar and Simon, 1996), and immigration (e.g., Pérez, 2016).

Finally, studying elite rhetoric can speak to disagreements among public opinion scholars regarding the nature of certain racial attitudes. Some claim that symbolic racism or racial resentment (Kinder and Sanders, 1996) conflates principled conservatism with racial animus (Sniderman and Piazza, 1993; Huddy and Feldman, 2009). Although presented in part as measurement critiques, this position has an important theoretical implication: racial animus and principles are separable concerns when it comes to racial politics; value orientations convey no information about race when related to political judgments. But elite rhetoric can racialize non-racial views (Gilens, 1999; Winter, 2008; Tesler, 2016), creating the fusion of principles and group evaluations constituting racial resentment (Kam and Burge, 2018). Studying elite rhetoric on race can offer insights into the nature and political relevance of distinct mass attitudes.

To engage with the broad literature on mass racial attitudes I analyze elite rhetoric as it relates to racial conservatism and liberalism. Racial conservatism manifests as a commitment to race-neutral governing and a belief that individual characteristics, not structural barriers, explain group-based disparities. Racial liberalism emphasizes structural barriers to advancement and racial diversity's benefits. I develop these themes further in the following section.

I analyze partisan television to identify discrete racially liberal and conservative themes elites use. MSNBC and Fox News are an ideal place to identify how racially liberal and conservative elites talk about race because these outlets devote themselves to providing consistently liberal and conservative perspectives of the day's news (Levendusky, 2013). Viewers receive clear and consistent information that, intentioned or not, can establish whether and how race should matter socially and politically. Further, while prior work suggests these outlets should only cover issues promoting ideological or partisan ends (Levendusky, 2013), when required to cover nationally important events they should frame these issues to provide congenial perspectives. Fox will ignore race or adopt a racially conservative perspective that aligns with its audience's expectations. MSNBC, in contrast, should give race more attention and highlight discrimination when doing so. These coverage differences inherent in partisan television allow me to identify some of the racially conservative and liberal considerations elites provide, views that may contribute to racially liberal and

conservative mass attitudes.[2]

I use transcripts from flagship primetime programming on Fox and MSNBC, The O'Reilly Factor and The Rachel Maddow Show, to identify themes racially conservative and liberal elites provide. Far from ignoring race, each show consistently covers it. Further, O'Reilly's attention to race surpasses Maddow's, a surprising outcome given what existing work suggests these outlets should cover (Levendusky, 2013). But more important, the differences in how each show covers race shed light racially liberal and conservative elite views and suggest connections with mass beliefs. Maddow endorses race's relevance by emphasizing its social reality and its centrality to understanding issues communities of color face. O'Reilly, in contrast, holds that race is irrelevant and those claiming it matters simply want attention. Importantly, these analyses are *not* about demonstrating that Maddow and O'Reilly talk differently about race; rather, I use these differences to shed light on the *types* of racially liberal and conservative rhetoric the mass public may hear to understand if elite views may have attitudinal implications. Although I offer no direct tests for this last point, I conclude by drawing on extant work to highlight mass attitude patterns consistent with the possibility that elite rhetoric may shape predispositions.

2.1 Stylized Accounts of Racially Liberal and Conservative Rhetoric

Research on mass racial attitudes suggests these views can be characterized broadly as racial conservatism and racial liberalism. Given my interest in understanding whether elites may shape these views, I conceptualize elite rhetoric along similar lines. These positions incorporate beliefs about race's social and political relevance–explanations for how it does or does not matter. I use these themes to establish a framework for interpreting my later results, but I do not see them as definitive. I instead proceed inductively to identify specific content and perspective differences that racially conservative and liberal elites provide.

Racial conservatism includes colorblind or race-neutral views alongside a racially resentful perspective. It builds from conservative intellectuals articulating positions for decades distancing

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[2]These outlets can also address the myriad contexts where elites may talk about race noted in Footnote 1.

themselves from considering race in the policymaking process (Lowndes, 2008; King and Smith, 2014). It incorporates liberal ideals like equal opportunity, choice, and individualism, and minimizes discrimination, as explanations for potentially race-related matters (Knowles et al., 2009; Bonilla-Silva, 2014). Racial conservatism also includes a view that given the Civil Rights Movement's successes, society reflects meritocratic ideals. Consequently, preferential treatment of any kind is unwarranted, especially if special attention is group-based. It instead holds that the best, most qualified people end up with the good things in life. Thus, if processes violate meritocratic norms, as in instances of affirmative action, racial conservatism sees this as constituting reverse discrimination. By deeming skin color irrelevant, racial conservatives are unlikely to ascribe importance to race when addressing social problems.

Racial conservatism also incorporates explanations for minorities' social and economic status. For instance, it holds that blacks do poorly because they created a culture that promotes unhealthy values and bad habits (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Tarman and Sears, 2005; Kam and Burge, 2018). It denies that discrimination and prejudice threaten nonwhites' life chances and instead sees hard work as sufficient to overcome any disadvantages. By relying on individual rather than structural status explanations, racial conservatism includes resenting any perceived demands from minority groups for special attention and improvements to their station (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Tarman and Sears, 2005).

Racial liberalism, in contrast, more directly engages with group-based inequalities and the different lived experiences of people of color. It challenges the idea that race no longer shapes individuals' life chances, evidenced by liberal activists championing policies to help nonwhites (King and Smith, 2014). Whereas racial conservatism opposes black Americans and other nonwhites receiving special attention, the racially liberal view embraces this position. It acknowledges prejudice and discrimination, both past and present instantiations, and views individual effort alone as insufficient for group advancement (Kam and Burge, 2018). By taking a structural perspective, racial liberalism echoes in part former Supreme Court justice Harry Blackmun's position in *Regents of the University of California v. Bakke* that "In order to get beyond racism, we must first

take account of race." Group-based inequalities persist and thus require attention and, potentially group-based, solutions.

Racial liberalism further emphasizes the unique experiences of people of color by affirming all groups' unique backgrounds and experiences as well as the contributions they make to society (Citrin and Sears, 2014). Emphasizing equal group worth encourages seeing racial affairs as *racial* rather than as race-blind because ignoring race may homogenize potentially disparate group experiences. By drawing positive attention to otherwise marginalized communities, racial liberalism endorses race's political and social relevance.

To identify specific frames of racial liberalism and conservatism I focus on partisan elites because each party should employ different kinds of rhetoric. Since the conventional wisdom suggests talking about race calls attention to problems identified as racial (Gillion, 2016), Democrats should devote more attention than Republicans (Levendusky, 2013) and this rhetoric can shed light on racially liberal themes. In contrast, Republicans should talk less about race (Levendusky, 2013, but see Gillion, 2016) and their rhetoric will offer insight into racially conservative views. Again, I do not seek to show that partisan elites speak differently about race; I focus on them because I expect that they should. My aim instead is to use these differences to identify this rhetoric's specific content. By identifying the content, this investigation can help shed light on mass attitudes when paired with insights from elite-driven public opinion models (Zaller, 1992) and investigations into sources of racial attitude change (e.g., Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Knowles et al., 2009; Apfelbaum et al., 2010; Craig and Richeson, 2014; Wilkins and Kaiser, 2014).

2.2 Measuring Racially Conservative and Liberal Rhetoric

I build on existing conceptualizations to define racial rhetoric as references to a racial group, racialized policy or experience, prominent minority individuals, or some other racial association (Mendelberg, 2001; Gillion, 2016). This attempts to capture explicit and implicit racial references regardless of content and degree of emphasis within a conversation.[3]

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[3]Emphasizing rhetoric is unfortunately limited, however, because I cannot account for images linking implicit rhetoric and racial groups (Mendelberg, 2001).

I focus on race in relation to racial minority groups. Whereas studies of race often center on the black-white divide, a diversifying country necessitates expanding conceptualizations to account for growing immigrant communities from Asia and Latin America. A broader view of race matters for understanding whether partisan elites affect mass attitudes even as black Americans remain at the bottom of the racial hierarchy (Bobo, 2011). This view is especially important because whites often view these groups in a similar light (Kinder and Kam, 2009); information on one group may shape views on all.[4]

To identify racially conservative and liberal elite rhetoric I use transcripts from flagship weekday evening shows on Fox News and MSNBC: The O'Reilly Factor and The Rachel Maddow Show.[5] Because Maddow premiered after O'Reilly, I focus on the period between September 8, 2008, and December 31, 2016, when the shows aired simultaneously.[6] Each show consistently commanded a large number of viewers on the respective network. Before its cancellation in 2017, The Factor was typically the highest-rated cable news show. Although I do not argue that these shows are necessarily representative of elite discourse more broadly, I argue their coverage differences can provide insight into some racially conservative and liberal themes elites offer (for a similar approach, see Levendusky, 2013). Although limited temporally, the 2008-2016 period allows for comparing shows in the same news environment to understand whether and how these elites cover race.

Partisan television is advantageous because of the likely consistency of cues on race and its audience size. First, Fox and MSNBC have taken deliberate steps to provide conservative and liberal interpretations of the news (Levendusky, 2013). These outlets can thus shed light on the nature of racially conservative and liberal elite discourse. Second, partisan television appears to have a broader reach than other partisan media. More people consume it than partisan newsmagazines

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[4]Focusing on nonwhites may still be limited because it does not consider whiteness. But accounts of whiteness's origins suggest these concerns are not dire. As Haney López (Haney López, 2006) notes, whiteness developed by establishing who is not white rather than affirmatively defining who counts as white (21). Consequently, focusing on rhetoric referencing nonwhites can speak to how people understand race in its myriad guises, including whiteness.

[5]While other shows could be included or used instead, O'Reilly and Maddow offer the longest time coverage and most watched programming for each outlet, making them opportune subjects.

[6]These transcripts come from the DowJones FACTIVA database.

like The Nation or The National Review or blogs like Daily Kos or Breitbart (Pew Research Center, 2014), and spillover effects may expose non-viewers to its programming (Levendusky, 2013; Druckman, Levendusky and McLain, 2018). Partisan television's relatively broad reach, and potential to disproportionately affect viewers' attitudes (Levendusky, 2013), help make it an excellent place to identify racially conservative and liberal themes.

I use a multi-method approach to connect partisan racial discourse with racial liberalism and conservatism. I begin with a case study of the shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. By using a nationally important event I address expectations that partisan media only cover news that benefits their side (Levendusky, 2013). But because outlets cannot ignore an event like Ferguson, I can contrast how O'Reilly and Maddow cover the same story and offer initial evidence regarding the nature of racially liberal and conservative frames.

I then systematically address each show's attention to race through two text-as-data methods. I first use an algorithm to categorize transcripts as mentioning race or not. This procedure recovers the set of documents about race that I use to compare each show's level of attention to race and that serve as the data with which I address the racially conservative and liberal perspectives each outlet provides. I follow prior work and segment transcripts by speaker-turn and then divide these comments into sections resembling paragraphs (Gillion, 2016). This attempts to capture speakers' approximately complete thoughts, providing a richer characterization of racial discourse. I then apply the classifier to this set of speaker-turn documents.

This method seeks to replicate human coding procedures but over a larger set of documents. I first hand-coded a 200 document sample for each month between September 2008 and December 2016 and used these to train the algorithm to classify the remaining documents. My conceptualization of race as it relates to the experiences of racial and ethnic minorities, informed by extant work (e.g., Mendelberg, 2001; Gillion, 2016), motivated my coding decisions. I coded documents as about race if they 1) mentioned a racial group (e.g., Latinos), 2) discussed a racialized or race-targeted policy (e.g., welfare, stop-and-frisk), 3) referenced a prominent minority figure, either

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political or not (e.g., Al Sharpton, Oprah),[7] 4) discussed immigration, 5) invoked the Civil Rights Movement and related legislation, or 6) referred to race-based experiences (e.g., discrimination, segregation). After running the algorithm, I reviewed the text excerpts it classified as mentioning race to correct for false positives.[8]

The second approach addresses racial conservatism and liberalism by capturing thematic and content differences by show. This method sorts texts according to the substance, or "topics," they address. Specifically, I apply a structural topic model to the documents the first algorithm classified as discussing race (Roberts et al., 2014; Lucas et al., 2015). This technique recovers common terms between documents that reflect different content featured in racial discourse, differences that offer information on racially liberal and conservative views. Importantly, and in contrast to related methods, this approach allows for using covariates to uncover relationships between documents. I include an indicator for whether the document came from Maddow or O'Reilly and a flexible time trend. Again, I seek to characterize racially conservative and liberal perspectives and content by uncovering how The Factor differs from Maddow, rather than the discrete topics employed.[9]

2.3 Divided Racially Liberal and Conservative Views on Policing in Ferguson

I begin my investigation with the August 9, 2014, killing of Michael Brown, a black teenager, by Darren Wilson, a white police officer, in Ferguson, Missouri. With the event receiving national attention, Maddow and O'Reilly must pay attention to it instead of ignoring something potentially incongruent with party priorities (Levendusky, 2013)).

Maddow introduced the story by comparing the pending FBI investigation to the Rodney King beating in 1991. In doing so she drew attention to federal efforts at addressing police brutality in the years since King, asking, "More than 20 years later, how much have things really changed since

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[7]I exclude Barack Obama from mentions of prominent racial figures to guard against conflating discussion of race with references to the sitting president. Any results including Obama thus pair him with race defined some other way. This makes the picture I present restrictive because I do not directly capture how commentators discuss the sitting president, references my coding scheme may otherwise miss.

[8]This procedure is still limited because it cannot capture conversations across pundits and discussions on the same show if statements do not incorporate words identified as discriminating racial from non-racial text. I thus offer a restrictive characterization of partisan racial discourse.

[9]The appendix includes additional details on the text processing and model estimation.

the 1990s? And what has the federal government done to try to address this problem in a systemic way?" By linking Ferguson with a well-known incident of police brutality Maddow suggests to her viewers that they should see Ferguson as another instance of institutional discrimination and bias. Maddow and her guests also emphasized systemic issues in law enforcement. One guest, for example, noted that the ensuing federal investigation was important because:

> [I]t sends a message to the whole country as well as all the police departments that there has to be a change. If not, then it just gets pushed under the rug and the next thing you know, there's another incident. And they're isolated as opposed to having a general stance, pattern and practice that could be changed by police policies nationwide.

Maddow similarly highlighted St. Louis police seeking to "specifically arrest black people. That [police officers] should specifically target black people for arrest in specific shopping areas in southern St. Louis County." She also discussed data from Missouri on racial disparities in traffic stops, emphasizing the disproportionate attention police gave to blacks in cities like Ferguson. Maddow perhaps most clearly described racial inequities by noting representation gaps between Ferguson's police force and the local community.

> The community where 18-year-old Michael Brown was shot and killed by a police officer this weekend has a population that is 2/3 black. Of its 53 police officers, three of them are black. Two black women and one black man, out of 53 officers.

These comments and data references reveal a pattern of attention emphasizing the systemic nature of police behavior, contextualizing the Ferguson shooting and ensuing protests. Further, by using racial profiling and its potentially deadly consequences to demonstrate that racial discrimination still shapes nonwhites' lived experiences, Maddow's coverage could promote, or reinforce, racially liberal views among her audience (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Apfelbaum et al., 2010).

O'Reilly's coverage stands in stark contrast. Instead of comparing Ferguson to other instances of police brutality like Maddow did, O'Reilly introduced the shooting by focusing on

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the protests, specifically looting and violence targeting police officers. Doing so placed attention on the protests' consequences instead of their impetus. O'Reilly, for instance, editorialized one protestor's comment "He ain't got no gun in hands. Why you kill him," with "That man, apparently, justifying the looting," placing the focus not on the circumstances of Michael Brown's death but rather on the ensuing events. Similarly, he questioned whether the protestors were actually from Ferguson, and thus in his view holding some legitimate grievance, or if they were outsiders taking advantage of the situation. According to O'Reilly, Al Sharpton, for example, had come to Missouri "demanding this and that, agitating the situation," even "stoking the racial fire" as another commentator put it. By presenting a picture of possible material or symbolic gain instead of legitimate outrage, O'Reilly's comments suggest a deep distrust, even resentment, of the protestors' motives, rhetoric potentially contributing to racially conservative mass attitudes (Knowles et al., 2009). While O'Reilly did note that Brown's death was a "terrible situation," his coverage was well-removed from Maddow's racially liberal themes connecting the shooting to similar events or directly addressing potential causes.

Commentators on The Factor also worried about making Ferguson into a "spectacle" like other "racially-charged cases," namely the Trayvon Martin shooting. On a subsequent episode, commentator Howard Kurtz repeated O'Reilly's remarks questioning Al Sharpton's potential attention-seeking desire. Guest host Laura Ingraham agreed, noting Ferguson seemed like "one big satellite dish. I mean it's bring the satellite dishes in and you think the situation is going to get calmer?" Ferguson wasn't about highlighting racial bias, but about using race to get media attention. In fact, in another episode O'Reilly calls police shootings an "infinitesimal situation" relative to the total number of yearly arrests, and therefore not an important problem.

> It doesn't happen and those people who run in to Ferguson or any other city and say the police are hunting down young black men are lying and they're grossly insulting law enforcement across the country because this stat shows it all, this tells it all.

For O'Reilly, police disproportionately killing black Americans is sensible "in proportion to the crimes committed [by the group]." Instead, the real problem was "black-on-black crime." The

picture of the event Factor viewers saw emphasized its rarity, with violence in the black community and grandstanding for national media attention bigger stories. The Factor paid little attention to community concerns with racial profiling and the shooting's connection to these fears. Instead, signals emphasize group pathologies, delegitimize calls to see race's connection to social and political affairs, and ignore potential discrimination, information potentially bolstering racially conservative attitudes (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Knowles et al., 2009; Apfelbaum et al., 2010).

> The community where 18-year-old Michael Brown was shot and killed by a police officer this weekend has a population that is 2/3 black. Of its 53 police officers, three of them are black. Two black women and one black man, out of 53 officers.

Ferguson provides initial evidence into what differentiates racially liberal and conservative elite rhetoric and that this speech may also contribute to racially liberal or conservative mass attitudes. Racially liberal commentators like Maddow highlight the unequal experiences communities of color have with law enforcement, potentially promoting these same attitudes among her audience. O'Reilly's argument that emphasizing race is self-serving, with disparate police experiences coming from not cooperating, speaks to the nature of racially conservative elite rhetoric and offers an explanation for racially conservative mass beliefs. Race either shapes people's lived experiences or is used to get undeserved attention.

These insights could, however, be anomalous and case specific. That Maddow and O'Reilly talk about race here does not indicate how much attention they devote to race overall. Further, the insights into racial liberalism and conservatism the case offers could be unique as well. Event characteristics may motivate the perspectives I highlight. To address these limitations I turn to the text-as-data approaches.[10]

2.4 Racially Liberal and Conservative Partisan Elites Consistently Talk About Race

I focus first on the frequency of racial discussion. Differentiating racially liberal and conservative elite rhetoric matters little if they do not talk about it. To do so, I rely on a classification

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[10]The supplementary information includes a case study of Henry Louis Gates's arrest offering similar insights.

algorithm to replicate human coding procedures over a larger document set. This recovers the set of show transcript excerpts related to race.

Figure 2.1 plots the distribution of episodes from each show according to the attention given to race, defined as the proportion of texts (i.e., speaker-turn paragraphs) from an episode the algorithm classified as about race.[11] The top panel presents the distribution for Maddow while the bottom panel provides the distribution for The Factor.

Figure 2.1 shows that while decidedly not dominant, partisan media outlets do discuss race. Further, while the typical episode may contain no discussion, Factor viewers on average hear slightly more discussion about race than does Maddow's audience. Mean attention for a Factor episode is 2.9%, and for Maddow it is 2.6% (medians are 1.5% and 1% respectively). Racial discussion on Maddow is also marginally more variable ($SD_{Maddow} = 3.9$, $SD_{O'Reilly} = 3.8$). Finally, Figure 1 shows that slightly more Factor episodes devote higher levels of attention to race, a pattern supported statistically (two-sample KS test D = 0.16, $p < 0.01$). Although these differences do not seem substantively large, they contrast with evidence that conservative- aligned outlets ignore issues that are not winning topics for their coalition (Levendusky, 2013). Not only does O'Reilly discuss race, according to this measure he gives it more attention than Maddow.[12] But this may come in part from what is covered when these shows discuss race, with substance dividing in ways that advantage each party. Such divides can help identify racially liberal and conservative themes and speak to the potential for elites to influence mass racial attitudes.

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[11]This is a noisy attention measure given the methodological issues highlighted in Footnote 8.

[12]Gillion (Gillion, 2016) finds little partisan difference between members of Congress in how much they talk about race, results suggesting my finding is not a function of looking at partisan media or the specific attention operationalization.

Figure 2.1: Distribution of episode attention to race by show.

2.5   Racially Liberal and Conservative Themes in Partisan Media

I rely on the structural topic modeling results to contrast how Maddow and O'Reilly cover race. Again, this method sorts the transcript excerpts classified as mentioning race in some way into similar thematic areas, or topics. After considering several models I focus on one identifying 35 topics. I do not claim that this perfectly captures content variation; rather, a combination of statistical information and substantive interpretability suggest it can help shed light on racially liberal and conservative views by identifying differences between Maddow and O'Reilly (Roberts et al., 2014; Lucas et al., 2015).

Figure 2.2 directly addresses my expectation that contrasting Maddow and O'Reilly can speak to racially liberal and conservative coverage differences. It plots the difference in the proportion of texts classified in a topic based on them coming from Maddow or O'Reilly. Positive numbers indicate that Maddow favors the topic. Negative values indicate O'Reilly features it more. If Maddow and O'Reilly devote equal attention, the points center on 0.

Figure 2.2 shows how racially conservative and liberal coverage varies.[13] These differences

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[13]Topic labels come from reading the 60 documents identified as most strongly loading on each topic with 30 each

Topic Attention Difference Between O'Reilly and Maddow

Figure 2.2: Estimated difference in topic attention by Maddow and O'Reilly with precision estimates. Numbers in parentheses denote overall prevalence rank among all topics.

may relate to mass racial attitudes and also suggest that partisanship, by shaping information-seeking, may affect what people hear about race. O'Reilly covers whether race is a problem more than Maddow. He also emphasizes illegal immigration, what behaviors may be racially motivated, city/community problems, population characteristics, and prominent black Americans like Jesse

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from Maddow and O'Reilly. The "misc." topic includes primarily guest introductions but also a mix of short-term events like the 2009 ACORN controversy.

Jackson, Louis Farrakhan, and Rev. Jeremiah Wright. In contrast, Maddow features immigration reform, civil and voting rights issues, Tea Party racism, and discrimination. Despite rather similar levels of attention to race, how O'Reilly and Maddow cover it differs and in ways that shed light on the racially conservative and liberal divide.

The variation in Figure 2.2 indicates that racially conservative and liberal elite rhetoric addresses what race is and how it may matter. O'Reilly's fairly consistent attention to illegal immigration may spur whites to hold increasingly negative racial attitudes (Craig and Richeson, 2014). Similarly, how he discusses if race is a problem could reinforce racially conservative beliefs that minority group culture prevents nonwhites from getting ahead, rather than pointing to race itself as an obstacle (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Bonilla-Silva, 2014), a possibility I address further below. Similarly, topics like whether to invoke race to explain social phenomena and political correctness suggest racially conservative concerns about race's social and political relevance and if people use race to get attention. Maddow, in contrast, attends more to issues where nonwhites face continued discrimination like civil and voting rights, to racial biases among Republican politicians and supporters, and to areas presenting minority groups in at least a neutral light with immigration reform. This suggests that race matters given its presence in policymaking and nonwhites' different lived experiences, characterizing racially liberal themes and suggesting that attitudes may diverge according to whether one watches Maddow or O'Reilly (see Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Apfelbaum et al., 2010).

Figure 2.3 provides further insight into how racially conservative and liberal elite views vary by visualizing the correlation between topics as a network based on the likelihood topics co-occur in a text (Lucas et al., 2015). I scale the nodes and ties according to topic prevalence and correlation strength respectively, and create separate networks for O'Reilly and Maddow.

Not only does topic emphasis vary, Figure 2.3 suggests that the relationship between topics also differs. For instance, when O'Reilly and his guests discuss whether race is a problem, they are also likely to talk about whether race should be invoked or whether race motivated the events at hand. Labeling something as about race, further, is closely connected to discussion of racial

Figure 2.3: Correlation between topics by show. Edges weighted by correlation magnitude and nodes sized to indicate topic frequency. Only positive correlations greater than 0.10 are drawn.

tension. These patterns suggest themes related to the merits of using race to understand current affairs help characterize racial conservatism. This also appears to be a frequent conversation point on O'Reilly given the relative node size.

Although the right panel reveals similar relationships among these topics for Maddow, these connections are weaker and other clusters are more prominent. Here, the connection between minority children and illegal immigration suggests that how Maddow discusses illegal immigration may differ from O'Reilly. Maddow and her guests also often discuss GOP politicians alongside Barack Obama or evaluations of black behavior, and the relationships are stronger here than for O'Reilly. These patterns may reflect Maddow drawing attention to Republican elites using negative racial rhetoric to describe Obama and black Americans (Haney López, 2014), a point I return to below.

While the patterns in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 offer some insight into how racially conservative and liberal coverage varies, the Michael Brown case study indicated that they can differ in important ways when covering the same topic. To address this, and better identify racially conservative and

Race as a Problem

O'Reilly	Maddow
But let me say this, the problems that African–Americans face are no different than the problems that America faces. It's just that they are deeper. It's just that they're more significant, whether it's unemployment; whether it's a desire for our children to achieve educational outcomes; whether it's a desire to live in safe and wholesome communities. Those aspirations are the same. Our problems are similar. They just have to be deeper.	So, I think just based on that and then when you look at the systemic problems we have in this country and systemic racism and oppression. When you look at North Carolina itself being number 50, in the country in terms of the vulnerability for black people, we understand there is a problem here beyond the fact that we're being killed. There is a problem in terms of the educational system, the pipeline problem we have here, prison industrial complex issues we have here, there's a whole host of problems that need to be resolved.
However, we have a very different problem today. The problem today is a social problem. It's not so much a racial problem. You can take any group and you put them in an environment where there is no father figure to teach them, you know, personal responsibility and how to relate to authority. You put them in an environment where people advocate resolving issues with violence. And an environment where drugs and alcohol are easily accessible and an environment where education is not put on the top shelf, it's the thing that you want to accomplish. And then you send them out into society.	We end up with a wealth problem like this because of choices made by our own government. Initially, many black people in America cannot own property because they were property. Even after becoming citizens, many were shut out of the post–World War II policies that created an American middle class.
And that's why an observation you made in your talking points is really, really important. You said you're going to keep an eye on this for your viewers. You need to do that, because these people who always bring race into things without any evidence and throw racism around need to be shamed to the extent that they're capable of being shamed. And they need to be called out as unserious people and just as we put a bright spotlight in our history, which was a good thing on real racists who said nasty things, and said, "Look at these people," we need to put a bright light on the people who recklessly throw around charges of racism, because they're also doing harm to this country.	The people who are be planning this new telling of history say that that's not going to be white washed. They're going to tell all sides of the story. They're going to tell the story of the people who fought for civil rights, but also the much more uncomfortable story of the people who fought against it, including the state itself.

Figure 2.4: Example topic documents: Race as a Problem

liberal themes, I focus on three topics as example cases: race as a problem, population characteristics, and Tea Party racism. In Figures 2.4-2.6 I present three example documents from each show classified into each topic.

Figure 2.4 shows how the race as a problem topic merits this label and also speaks to racially conservative and liberal themes. These documents offer information regarding how each show references problems related to communities of color, but The Factor does so by defining them as problems all Americans face while Maddow points to legacies of discrimination maintaining race's relevance. On The Factor, real problems are not racial but social; violence, drugs, and personal responsibility are obstacles for minority communities, not race itself. Moreover, claims of racism are often specious and "unserious." Race itself has no political or social relevance. This contrasts sharply with Maddow, where discussion directly addresses systemic racism, policy legacies holding blacks back from economic success, and the civil rights struggle. Black Americans face issues in the educational system and criminal justice system, and have not had similar opportunities to

Population Characteristics

O'Reilly	Maddow
Out of wedlock births, 17 percent for Asians, 29 percent for whites, a whopping 72 percent for blacks. It's no question poverty is driven by lack of education, poor supervision of children and fractured families.	And the specifics are even worse. Child poverty rose from under 21 percent to 22 percent. Poverty among Hispanic Americans went from more than 25 percent to more than 26 percent. Poverty among African–Americans went from just under 26 percent to over 27 percent.
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics from 2012 to 2013, latest available, African–Americans are responsible for 22.4 percent of all violent crimes in the U.S.A., despite being just 13 percent of the population. Whites responsible for 43 percent of violent crimes with Caucasians making up 62 percent of the population. But here's the kicker. When you look at police shooting victims, whites comprise 50 percent of those shots, Blacks just 26 percent.	Crack was primarily afflicting urban neighborhoods and cocaine was viewed as the party drug of well–off whites. African–Americans made up 80 percent of those put in jail for crack offenses despite being 30 percent of crack users.
According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the unemployment rate for black Americans is 11.4 percent. It's just over five percent for whites, 4.5 percent for Asians. So, do we have Asian privilege in America? Because the truth is, that Asian American households earn far more money than anyone else. The median income for Asians, close to $69,000 a year; it's 57,000 for whites' $33,000 for black –– so the question becomes why? And the answer is found in stable homes and in emphasis on education; 88 percent of Asian Americans graduate from high school compared to 86 for whites and just 69 percent for blacks. That means 31 percent of African– Americans have little chance to succeed in the free marketplace because they are uneducated. They are high school dropouts.	Thirty–one is the percentage that the Pew Research Center estimates of the population, the voting population, that will be non–white. That's huge, because in 2012, the non–white population was 29 percent. It had been growing at 2 percent every four years, it's grown an extra percentage point. The vast majority of the 10.7, the second number 11, of the 10.7 million new eligible voters, 7.5 million of them are black, Hispanic, or Asian–American.

Figure 2.5: Example topic documents: Population Characteristics

build wealth. These examples reveal that in this context, The Factor's racially conservative view denies race's relevance and resents claims that racism matters. Maddow's racially liberal perspective calls attention to discrimination's legacies and obstacles nonwhites still face due to their race.

Figure 2.5 offers similar insights. The population characteristics topic includes racial group characteristics including rates of poverty, incarceration, and drug use, as well as minority groups' electoral significance. These examples again address racially conservative and liberal differences and how these analyses can inform work on mass attitudes. As the first and third O'Reilly texts show, The Factor attributes poverty to group cultural failings, a central part of racially conservative attitudes (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Kam and Burge, 2018). O'Reilly often cites education and family socialization as necessary for success. Relatedly, the second text suggests Factor viewers hear that black Americans disproportionately commit crimes, a point reflecting the Michael Brown case study and potentially reinforcing impressions of black criminality (Gilliam, Iyengar and Simon, 1996).

In contrast, Maddow's racially liberal perspective emphasizes discrimination. While discussing child poverty rates, Maddow also mentions that aggregate numbers hide the worse experiences of Hispanic and African American communities. The second example highlights disparities in drug sentencing based on powdered or crack cocaine use and the overrepresentation of black Americans among those imprisoned for using the latter. These patterns suggest that those hearing racially liberal views hear more about racial group population features as they relate to other groups like whites, with a particular focus on nonwhites' unique experiences and continued disadvantaged.

How O'Reilly and Maddow discuss racism within the Tea Party speaks to how racial conservatives and liberals understand racism more generally. O'Reilly typically sees claims about Tea Party racism as baseless. As the first two texts in Figure 2.6 show, he and his guests argue that the left tries to "brand Tea Party people as racist" because they dislike what it stands for, ignoring what constitutes "real racism" in America.[14] Since the Tea Party is not racist, such claims create a "boy who cried wolf" situation. The third text suggests these arguments are in part responses to media figures like actress and comedian Janeane Garofalo, potentially as a way to establish a belief that elites were arrayed against the Tea Party. Racial conservatism sees charges of racism as illegitimate and instead part of an effort to discredit a movement built on authentic, principled grievances. With race irrelevant, people saying otherwise deserve condemnation.

Maddow, in contrast, promotes claims of Tea Party racism. The first two documents focus on the movement's attempts to deal with racism. Even though some Tea Party elements sought to address race, many others made racist remarks or did not condemn those who did. Citing the NAACP's efforts to address Tea Party racism, as the second text shows, may enhance Maddow's critiques by incorporating similar comments from a well-known civil rights organization. Further, as the third text indicates, Maddow also covered Republican politicians making racist remarks. Here, Carl Paladino, a one-time Tea Party-backed GOP candidate for a New York congressional

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[14]When The Factor affirmatively addresses racism it usually invokes Jim Crow-style discrimination and biological racism. But this is rare. References to "real racism" provide no definitions, suggesting the speaker and audience possess a common knowledge about what actually constitutes racism. Alternatively, The Factor may define "real racism" via negation by indicating what racism is not.

Tea Party Racism

O'Reilly

O'REILLY: Obviously, the left despises that kind of rhetoric. And now, they are charges that Sarah Palin incites violence, sows discord. It's clear that some on the American left fear the Tea Party movement and that, there is a media strategy to brand Tea Party people as racist. Right in the Miami Herald over the weekend, Miami Leonard Pitts says, this about the Tea Party quote, "Their stated fears, socialism, communism, liberalism, are just proxies for the one fear, most of them no longer dare speak. It insults intelligence to deny that race is in the mix." unquote. So, you can see what's emerging.

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CROWLEY: Ellis, here's the danger of what the NAACP did this week. There is real racism in America. But what the NAACP went out there and did by attacking the Tea Party with nonexistent charges of nonexistent racism, rather, they are going down this road a boy who cried wolf, so that when real racism does come up, people are less inclined to take it seriously.

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JANEAN GARAFALO: This is about hating a black man in the White House. This is racism straight up. That is a nothing but a bunch of tea banging rednecks.

Maddow

MADDOW: Thanks a lot. Richard Engel, NBC chief foreign correspondent, of course. All right. One wing of the Tea Party Movement is organizing a conference on race to avert claims that there is any racism at all in the Tea Party Movement. On the other hand, the leader of another wing of Tea Party Movement has written a mock letter to Abraham Lincoln on behalf of slaves, asking Lincoln to repeal emancipation. It is hilarious like only a white Tea Party guy impersonating black slaves can be. A Tea Party divided amongst itself is not standing. The ongoing struggle to take that movement seriously continues in just a moment.

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Last week the NAACP passed a resolution asking the tea party movement to repudiate overtly racist groups that have associated themselves with the tea party movement as well as the occasionally racist signs and stuff that have happened at tea party events.

- -

MADDOW: You know, humans with their racist, pornographic e–mail genes. Mr. Paladino's plans for the plight of our inner city youth, as he says that he is committed to them –– his plans are to teach them basic things, including personal hygiene. Mr. Paladino has proposed converting prison dorms into Welfare centers. Quote, "Instead of handing out Welfare checks, we'll teach people how to earn their check. We'll teach them personal hygiene, the personal things they don't get when they come from dysfunctional homes." Quote, "You have to teach them basic things, taking care of themselves, physical fitness. In their dysfunctional environment, they never learned these things."

Figure 2.6: Example topic documents: Tea Party Racism

seat, characterized inner city youth as welfare-reliant and irresponsible. From these discussions, Maddow's viewers may increasingly pair racism with the Republican Party, or at least elements within it. MSNBC viewers may see racism as intertwined with Republican Party politics while Fox's audience sees it as the excuses of people lacking credible ways to critique someone's politics.[15]

Taken together these examples offer evidence for some ingredients potentially constituting mass racial attitudes. Racially conservative and liberal elite rhetoric varies both in what receives attention and how content is presented. O'Reilly's racial conservatism identifies problems related to race as ones of family breakdown instead of racism and discrimination. Racial liberalism as epitomized by Maddow emphasizes race's social reality and disparities communities of color face. I conclude by offering six stylized frames in Table 2.1, three from each show, that encapsulate divides in racially conservative and liberal elite views and suggest what mass attitudes may look

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[15]Maddow's approach reflects partisan news's proclivity to use individual events and stories to reveal flaws in the opposing party (Levendusky, 2013). Here, the Tea Party demonstrates that the Republican Party is out of step on race in part by condoning racist remarks.

Table 2.1: Stylized Frames of Racial Discourse

Theme	Maddow	O'Reilly
Strategic uses of racism	Republican elites use race to scare whites	Charges of racism are self-interested
Talking about Race	Talking about race matters	A double standard exists for talking about race, especially when people should not see race
Race-related issues	Communities of color have unique (and disparate) experiences	Minorities get special favors and attention, ignoring the real problems in their communities

like for people hearing these perspectives.

Strategic uses of racism constitute one dimension. A racially liberal perspective includes seeing racism as in part a tool Republican elites use to scare white voters into supporting Republican candidates. GOP politicians pursue "George Wallace-type stuff" by employing racist conspiracy theories and imagery of "nonwhite people being scary" as dog whistles. Racial conservatism sees racism not as a campaign tactic, but as allegations by the media or minorities advancing their own interests. The "temptation of racial politics" is about a "color beef" promoted by "racial hucksters" employing racism charges to delegitimize reasonable opposition or simply get attention. Like McCarthyite allegations of Communism, racism claims are "boy who cried wolf stuff" that harm people.

A second area concerns the legitimacy of talking about race. Discussing race is affirming for racial liberals like Maddow. Black lives matter as black lives, and not at the expense of other groups. Someone's race is central to understanding who they are and their often disparate experiences. The Factor's racial conservatism suggests it is better to ignore race. Evaluating outcomes through racial lenses is wrong because race is rarely related to social and political affairs. People should ignore race because "skin color is the least important human characteristic." In fact, a double standard exists because people use race to criticize whites and deflect from nonwhites' failings.

The final difference addresses race-related issues. Here, Maddow's racial liberalism emphasizes "systemic problems" and "historic wrongs." Acknowledging that discrimination is not as overt as it once was, this position emphasizes racial disparities in myriad social and economic outcomes, and how these relate to legacies of white supremacy and anti-black violence. For racial

conservatives like O'Reilly, minority communities receive special attention from the government and media when facing the slightest issue. Black communities do not face systemic oppression from the government and other institutions; black family fragility is the important policy problem. In this view, social problems explain racial group disparities, not race itself. Furthermore, such disparities may actually suggest underlying group differences in industriousness and lawfulness.

2.6   Conclusion

By contrasting how Rachel Maddow and Bill O'Reilly cover race I provide insight into how racially liberal and conservative elites' speech differs. Racial liberals celebrate racial diversity and argue nonwhites still face prejudice and discrimination. Racial conservatives attempt to delegitimize claims of racism and propose that discussing race is self-serving.

Identifying these differences matters because elites can influence mass predispositions, and race may be no exception. People adopt elite views to make sense of events they do not experience themselves (Lippmann, 1922), with this tendency potentially helping to explain why "Democrats and Republicans had increasingly separate realities about race in the Age of Obama" (Tesler, 2016, 195; emphasis in original). Tesler (2016) shows that while partisanship did not divide public reactions to events like the OJ Simpson or Rodney King verdicts, partisans' responses to events like the Ferguson, Missouri, protests and George Zimmerman's acquittal of murdering Trayvon Martin diverged markedly. My results suggest that rather than simply a byproduct of the growing correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes (Tesler, 2016), these patterns may also reflect elites shaping which predispositions people use to interpret social phenomena. By consistently applying the racially liberal or conservative perspectives I identify, elites may lead people to more regularly use these perspectives to interpret potentially race-related events (Howe and Krosnick, 2017), or to even change these attitudes (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Apfelbaum et al., 2010; Craig and Richeson, 2014; Wilkins and Kaiser, 2014).

Divide elite rhetoric may have additional consequences, particularly in the present political context. Elites may actually motivate people to update these presumably fundamental predisposi-

tions (Sears and Brown, 2013), not simply weight them differently. I investigate this in Chapter 3 by focusing on the growing partisan divide in whites' racial attitudes. I demonstrate that it increasingly comes from attitude change rather than party switching. This is a consequential outcome given racial attitudes' presumed long-term stability (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). Although no analyses directly relate the rhetoric I present here with these attitude trends, the changes are consistent with mass partisans responding to the elite information environment by updating their attitudes (see also Chapter 4).

These patterns also speak to the nature of distinct racial attitudes. Some argue racial resentment conflates racial animus and race-neutral principles (Sniderman and Piazza, 1993; Huddy and Feldman, 2009), implying these are separable concerns when it comes to understanding racial policy opinions. But recent work supports the view that race and principles jointly matter (Kam and Burge, 2018). My evidence may help explain these connections. Repeated exposure to racially conservative rhetoric like O'Reilly's that denies discrimination and explains racial affairs through individualism and other principles can connect race and values in viewers' long-term memory (Lodge and Taber, 2013), thereby racializing ostensibly race-neutral considerations (see also Gilens, 1999; Winter, 2008; Tesler, 2016). This associative learning process also suggests people could express racial views through principles alone, letting them ignore, or be unaware of, how race shapes their thinking (Knowles et al., 2009; Bonilla-Silva, 2014). Identifying racially conservative and liberal themes in elite rhetoric can thus shed some light on the nature and origins of mass predispositions.

The patterns I find also do not appear unique to the specific context or commentators (see Haney López, 2014; Dixon, 2017). Pundits applied similar frames when covering the August 2017 white nationalist rally and counterprotest in Charlottesville, Virginia. Although O'Reilly had since left Fox News, host Jesse Watters offered a view denying racism's relevance: "What we saw in Charlottesville were fringe fanatics who do not represent this country. America is not a racist nation. It's time we stop acting like it is." Rachel Maddow emphasized racism's importance, arguing, "[T]his persistent fascistic violent racist element in American culture and politics is a real

thing that we have lived through before as a country. And it waxes and wanes but it has never really gone away."

These divergent elite views may have facilitated sharp partisan divides in attitudes about Charlottesville. Democrats and Republicans split 62%-35% on whether the "political positions of white nationalists who attended the rally in Charlottesville" were mostly wrong (Edwards-Levy, 2017). Likewise, while more Democrats than Republicans said the violence in Charlottesville was part of a broader problem in American society (79%-61%), a full 25% of Republicans saw the violence as an isolated incident. That these divides reflect how elites covered Charlottesville, as well as the differences in racially liberal and conservative rhetoric I identify, implies some degree of elite influence (Zaller, 1992).

Future work could evaluate how apolitical and non-partisan sources present race. Sports commentators and athletes provide an interesting extension. Recently, NFL players including Colin Kaepernick and Eric Reid drew national attention by kneeling during the national anthem to protest police violence and other racial inequities. The NBA has perhaps been even more outspoken, with players and coaches including Lebron James, Stephen Curry, Steve Kerr, and Gregg Popovich speaking out against racism and discrimination. Future work could explore how these figures discuss race to see if rhetoric resembles the racially liberal and conservative views outlined above.

Studying how elites discuss race matters in light of work on prejudice reduction. While Myrdal (1962) may have believed that ignorance, willful and actual, about black Americans' social and economic circumstances helped shape whites' views on race, and thus publicity through media attention and other efforts would have salutary effects, reality seems more complicated. Motivation appears to play an important role in what makes a prejudice reduction technique effective (Paluck and Green, 2009). I show some of the information elites may provide, and subsequent work can establish what makes it persuasive. Uncovering what encourages people to update their beliefs about racial and ethnic minorities can help identify when people adopt elite views.

Chapter 3

The Limits of Agenda Setting? Framing Race's Importance

"What if we were to write race together on every Starbucks cup, and that facilitated a conversation between you and our customers?...If a customer asks you what this is, try to engage in a discussion." – Howard Schultz, Starbucks CEO, March 2015[1]

After protests broke out following a grand jury declining to indict Ferguson, Missouri, police officer Darren Wilson, for killing Michael Brown, Starbucks CEO Howard Schultz wanted to do something (Carr, 2015). This something became Starbucks's Race Together campaign, an effort highlighted in the epigraph that sought to "stimulate conversation, compassion and positive action regarding race in America" (Starbucks, 2015). Schultz is not alone in seeing racial dialogue as a way to bridge divides in the U.S. As president, Bill Clinton sought to start a national dialogue on race as a way to "learn together, talk together" (Clinton, 1997), something former First Lady Michelle Obama echoed when saying that "honest conversations" are "the only way we will heal the wounds of the past and move forward to a better future" (McCalmont, 2014). Indeed, the conventional wisdom appears to be that discussing race raises its salience as a way to address issues related to inequities that fall along racial lines (Gillion, 2016).

Fortunately for its advocates, work on media effects supports the pro-dialogue position. Decades of research handsomely supports the view that talking about issues increases public attention to, and concern with, them (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Beckett, 1994; Miller and Krosnick, 2000; Soroka, 2002, 2006; Miller, 2007). These insights suggest that talking about race, particularly for elites, should make it and related issues salient concerns, establishing ways to address past wounds and present injustices (see also Gillion, 2016).

But I argue here that merely emphasizing talking about race is not enough to encourage public attention. Proponents of racial dialogue seem to have in mind a specific type of conversation,

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[1]Remarks from letter to employees, quoted in (Carr, 2015).

one that acknowledges race's social reality (Gillion, 2016). But an alternative racial dialogue may occur, one deemphasizing race's role in social and political affairs (King and Smith, 2014). This conversation instead emphasizes other factors as explaining disparities across races. The nature of the racial dialogue likely has implications for mass beliefs about race's importance in the United States.

Further, talking about race may not be sufficient to stimulate public concern because individuals' attitudes may constrain elite influence. This seems particularly likely for a subject like race where the conventional wisdom holds that individuals' racial attitudes–beliefs about about groups understood to be racial–form early in life and persist through adulthood (Sears and Brown, 2013). Likewise, issue positions connected with social groups exhibit greater temporal stability than those lacking group implications (Converse, 1964), and may be more resistant to elite influence (Nelson, Sanbonmatsu and McClerking, 2007; Nicholson, 2011). With race a central component of the current party system (Kinder and Chudy, 2016; Tesler, 2016), and group evaluations providing "the very basis of reasons" for many individuals' political thinking (Achen and Bartels, 2016, 213), elites may face significant constraints stimulating concern for it in the mass public. Talking about race may only lead a subset of the mass public to believe it important while potentially generating a backlash among others (Gillion, 2016). Despite elite attention, the public's concern with race as a whole changes little because people react differently when hearing the same conversation.

To demonstrate that public concern with race is not a necessary outcome of elite attention to it, I focus on racial discourse in partisan media. Partisan media offer a most likely place to identify a conversation on race occurring but where the substance is varied. Indeed, as I showed in Chapter 1, partisan television outlets talk about race but cover different subjects and offer different perspectives on how race should be understood. This variation may affect whether the public expresses concern with race as an issue, an outcome suggested by perceptions of whether racism "is a big problem in our society today" polarizing by party in recent years (Neal, 2017).

Through two studies I consider elites' agenda setting capacity on race. The first provides a brush-clearing exercise, tracking attention to race on two partisan pundits' shows and public

concern with race as an important problem between 2008 and 2016. The attention measure comes from a content analysis of The Rachel Maddow Show and The O'Reilly Factor, exemplars of partisan media punditry. For public concern I use Gallup's most important problem data series. I then relate these two series and find that while Maddow's attention to race motivates public concern whereas O'Reilly's does not. In study 2 I use a survey experiment to demonstrate that the frame applied to an issue can motivate this concern, not simply differences in what the media choose to cover with respect to the issue (Miller, 2007). Elite attention to race is necessary, but not sufficient, to generate concern with race as a social problem.

3.1 Elite Racial Rhetoric and Public Perceptions

Classic agenda setting accounts propose that the more the media cover an issue, the more the public sees this issue as a pressing national problem (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Beckett, 1994; Miller and Krosnick, 2000; Soroka, 2002, 2006; Miller, 2007). More stories about the environment, unemployment, or crime make these problems seem more important to the mass public. But left largely unaddressed is how these dynamics function when what outlets cover within an issue varies and, more importantly, how these issues are covered.

Variation across media outlets in whether and how they cover an issue matters because this affects what consumers come to believe about the issue. Traditional agenda setting work typically considers a univalent issue (e.g., the economy is bad, inflation is increasing). It does not offer evidence for how attention to an issue matters when coupled with additional information that the issue is important (e.g., characteristic liberal coverage of race) or unimportant (e.g., typical conservative coverage of race).[2] This additional information frames race for viewers by defining what the issue is (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987) and what explanation(s) merit consideration (see also Chong and Druckman, 2007). To the degree media outlets cover race differently, viewers may reach dif-

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[2]Scholars have incorporated variation in topic frames to explain media (Boydstun, 2013) or social group (Gillion, 2016) attention to issues. Others have considered how coverage characteristics like positive or negative issue content affect importance judgments (Soroka, 2006; Miller, 2007). These results imply that issue characteristics affect now only what gets covered but also how this coverage relates to opinions. I extend this work to address evaluations of whether an issue should be seen as a problem.

ferent conclusions about the sources of, and solutions to, social and political problems (Iyengar, 1991). If coverage patterns persist over time within and across outlets, then viewers' perspectives of current affairs will vary according to the news they consume.

News organizations' decisions about what to cover and how to cover it likely follow in part from judgments regarding what is and is not newsworthy. Institutional norms, for instance, can guide whether and how an organization covers an issue (Gilens, 1999; Boydstun, 2013). Further, the outlet's belief about who the issue affects, its perceived relevance to consumers, and attention from other elites all guide coverage decisions. These decisions can lead to outlets paying attention to some issues more than others or, when covering the same issue, applying different frames, patterns than can persist over time (Boydstun, 2013).

Partisan media offer a most likely place to find this variation in the content and kind of issue coverage. Fox News and MSNBC are exemplars of conservative and liberal punditry. This motivation to provide an ideological interpretation of the day's events can lead them to cover race and related issues differently (Haney López, 2014; King and Smith, 2014; Dixon, 2017). First, attention to issues related to race may vary within and across outlets in accordance with the priorities of the party with which the outlet aligns (Levendusky, 2013). MSNBC may avoid covering crime or welfare because these issues disadvantage Democrats. Fox may avoid race altogether because its commentators see it as a losing issue for them and the Republican Party. They gain nothing from paying attention to issues affecting groups that overwhelmingly identify as Democrats (Kinder and Chudy, 2016). If anything, attention to racial inequality as the racial dialogue position desires would anger an increasingly racially conservative white base (Tesler, 2016). Differential attention to an issue prevents audiences from receiving the information necessary for them to identify race as an important problem.

But content is only half the story. What is potentially more consequential is variation in *how* race is discussed (Haney López, 2014; King and Smith, 2014; Dixon, 2017). Framing decisions allow partisan media to cover issues on the national agenda in ways that maintain partisan advantages in these domains (Levendusky, 2013). As I showed in chapter 1, when covering race,

commentators on The O'Reilly Factor deny its relevance to ongoing social and political processes. This racially conservative perspective includes describing protests surrounding black deaths at the hands of police as concerning black criminality and a desire for national attention rather than suggesting race has any social relevance. In contrast, racial liberals like Rachel Maddow linked these deaths to historical patterns of discrimination and ongoing struggles against racism and inequity. When they cover the same events, partisan media personalities can offer perspectives consistent with their partisan and ideological proclivities.

3.2   Partisan Media as Agenda Setters

I focus on partisan media to study how differences in elite racial rhetoric shape the public's proclivity to see race as an important national problem. Unlike broadcast news, media outlets like FOX News and MSNBC have greater freedom to editorialize, particularly through their primetime programming. They therefore provide clear partisan messaging on matters including race (Levendusky, 2013; Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016; Dixon, 2017), and reach a larger audience than similar sources (Pew Research Center, 2014).

Partisan media also provide an ideal place to explore elite influence because they likely have an outsized impact on viewers' attitudes. Partisanship's growing influence on individual decision-making (Mason, 2015; Iyengar and Westwood, 2014; Azari and Hetherington, 2016) has created party-specific media diets (Iyengar and Hahn, 2009; Henderson and Theodoridis, 2017) by affecting which elites people believe to be credible and trustworthy messengers (Pew Research Center, 2014).MSNBC's viewers tend to be Democrats and liberals while FOX News's audience is overwhelmingly Republican and conservative (Levendusky, 2013; Grossmann and Hopkins, 2016). This makes partisan news outlets particularly influential because the mass public perceives them to be promulgators of the party line (Levendusky, 2013; Suhay, 2015) and viewers are unlikely to encounter information that substantially challenges existing attitudes (Zaller, 1992; Lodge and Taber, 2013). If people decide to watch MSNBC then they will be exposed to a very different understanding about what race is and how it matters than if they opted to tune in to Fox News.

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Despite its likely larger reach than other types of partisan media, partisan television is potentially limited because these outlets' viewers are a unique group. Overall, a relatively small portion of Americans consume partisan news, with some evidence suggesting 10-15% watch this programming consistently (Prior, 2013).[3] Even so, this group is more engaged and attentive than others (Levendusky, 2013). Partisan media consumers are those most likely to pay attention to what party elites say and are therefore more likely to update their attitudes to fit with the partisan cues they come across (Zaller, 1992; Layman and Carsey, 2002; Stroud, 2011; Lenz, 2012). As Levendusky (2013) emphasizes, partisan media merits attention because its influence falls on the portion of Americans most politically aware and active, those whose voices most likely influence the political process. This is particularly important for an area like race where addressing related problems requires changing the status quo. Differences among engaged individuals in their impressions that race merits attention will shape what politicians understand to be pressing problems.

Despite its potentially limited direct influence, additional evidence suggests partisan media's reach may extend beyond the immediate audience. By being among the group of individuals actively interested in gathering information about politics, partisan news consumers are also likely opinion leaders within their social networks, facilitating information diffusion to others who do not consume this news (Huckfeldt, 2001; Stroud, 2011). Consequently, by providing this partisan-tinged information to their peers, viewers can motivate those who do not, or only rarely, consume partisan news to update their attitudes as if these individuals had also watched partisan programming (Druckman, Levendusky and McLain, 2018). Furthermore, partisan media may agenda set for other media outlets (Levendusky, 2013). Broadcast outlets and print media may pick up stories partisan outlets cover, expanding these organizations' reach. As I showed in the preceding chapter, partisan news media offer a way to capture clear partisan elite racial cues, and then relate these to

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[3]Data from Pew's 2012 Biennial Media Survey offer insights into each show's audience. They indicate that 76% and 74% of respective show viewers are non-Hispanic whites. Over 75% of each show's regular viewers trust a few media sources more than the news media generally, and sizable portions say they prefer news sources that share their "political point of view" (20% for Maddow, 43% for The Factor). Twenty-seven percent of all respondents said they sometimes or regularly watched the O'Reilly Factor. Twenty-three percent said the same for The Rachel Maddow Show. The numbers reported focus on the 8% and 5% respectively who report regularly watching each show. Although this is likely an overestimate (on measurement issues, see Prior, 2013), the characteristics of self-reported viewers are instructive.

mass attitudes.

I test three hypotheses related to the media's agenda setting capacity when it comes to race. The first, the *traditional account*, states that media attention, regardless of frame or content, increases public concern with the issue (cf. McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Beckett, 1994; Miller and Krosnick, 2000; Soroka, 2002, 2006; Miller, 2007). The second, the *multi-valent account*, proposes that how the issue is covered matters. In this context, I expect public concern with race to increase as attention to race emphasizing discrimination, racism, and race's social reality increases. In contrast, I expect no relationship between attention devoted to race that denies its ability to explain social phenomena and public concern with race. Finally, the *null account* proposes that race is simply a different type of issue. Because individuals' racial attitudes are strong and persistent (Sears and Brown, 2013), and personal and group experiences work alongside media influence to shape attitudes (Gamson, 1992; Walsh, 2004), the media have little influence over when people see race as an important problem (cf. Soroka, 2002). People use their racial attitudes to understand social and political phenomena and then decide whether race is important. No mediating role for elites needed.

3.3   Data and Methods

I rely on observational and experimental analyses to test my hypotheses. The observational analyses focus on levels of attention to race on O'Reilly and Maddow and the public's concern with race as an issue. The attention measure is the same as the prior chapter's. To recap, this captures how much The O'Reilly Factor and Rachel Maddow Show discuss race on each episode. This measure is defined by the proportion of a show's transcript for a given day that an automated algorithm classified as including some reference to race.

Public concern comes from Gallup's most important problem series. Every month Gallup invites survey respondents to report what issues they feel are pressing national problems in an open-ended format. Respondents can provide up to three issues which Gallup then codes. I use these data to measure concern with race in two ways. First, I create a *race only* indicator for

whether or not any response was coded as mentioning "race relations or racism" in any of the three coded responses. Second, I combine these responses with any mention of racialized policies like crime, welfare, or immigration and illegal aliens to create a *race plus* measure. Because racial discourse takes on many guises, this second operationalization captures the possibility that this rhetoric increases concern about closely related issues.[4]

I use these observational data two ways. First, I offer a descriptive comparison between the media attention and public concern series. I then test agenda setting test by relating public opinion responses to how much attention O'Reilly and Maddow devote to race in the weeks preceding a respondent's interview date.

The second test for my hypotheses relies on an experimental design. In study 2 I randomly assign individuals to read one of three news articles describing civil asset forfeiture. Each respondent reads that the policy involves law enforcement's ability to seize money and property in a person's possession if they suspect that it relates to a crime. But in two conditions respondents read that this policy is connected to race. One of these presents civil asset forfeiture as racially discriminatory while the other contends the policy has nothing to do with race. These frames reflect perspectives offered on Maddow and O'Reilly respectively that I identified in the last chapter. Comparing responses to items assessing problem importance across treatments then offers a way to address directly whether issue framing affects agenda setting by holding content constant.

3.4 Study 1: Partisan Racial Discourse Correlates with Judgments of Race's Importance

I begin by demonstrating descriptively that partisan outlet attention to race varies over time and in ways that suggest it could matter for the public's perception that race is an important national problem. To do so I rely on data from a content analysis conducted as part of other work.

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[4]In an average month, over 2% of Gallup's respondents offer a *race only* response (SD: 3.2%; range: 0.1–18%), while over 9% provide a *race plus* response (SD: 5.9%; range: 3–30%). These numbers drop when looking at just non-Hispanic whites. Over 1% of Anglo respondents report a *race only* response in a typical month (SD: 2.3%; range: 0–15%), while over 7% provide a *race plus* response (SD: 4.89%; range: 2–27%). To compare, a similar proportion of whites voice concern with the environment every month. The economy and unemployment, in contrast, receive much more attention with on average 27% and 17% of whites naming each as the most important problem every month. All descriptives employ survey weights.

Figure 3.1: Partisan Media Attention to Race

Specifically, in Figure 3.1 I plot the proportion of attention to race each show devotes on every day between September 2008 and December 2016. Moreover, I relate this attention to a selection of events which may have stimulated discussion about race. These include the arrest of Harvard Professor Henry Louise Gates, President Obama's remarks following George Zimmerman's acquittal of murdering Trayvon Martin, and the shooting death of Michael Brown.

The patterns in Figure 3.1 suggest that pundit attention to race reflects, in part, important events. Both Maddow and The Factor covered race more after Henry Louis Gates's arrest and the shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Attention similarly increases following police officers killing Philando Castile and Terence Crutcher. But attention varies across shows and over time, too. During summer 2013 when George Zimmerman was acquitted of murdering Trayvon Martin and President Obama remarked that if he had a son he would look like Trayvon, Maddow devoted more attention to race than O'Reilly. Similarly, 2011 was a relatively quiet year for both

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
Figure 3.2: Public Concern with Race as an Important Problem

shows when it came to discussing race. Overall, the two series correlate at 0.31, suggesting that while related, potentially consequential variation exists in how much attention each show devotes to race.

The public's concern with race as an issue appears to also respond to some of these events. Figure 3.2 provides information on the public's concern with race as an issue. The top panel plots the percentage of all Gallup respondents whose most important problem responses fall in the *race only* or *race plus* categories. I again include the preceding events to visually relate prominent and potentially race-related social and political events to public attitudes.

The trends suggest that these events may motivate concern. The Michael Brown shooting and eventual grand jury verdict appear to precede perceptions of race's national importance. Others like Freddie Gray's death and the ensuing protests in Baltimore, as well as the Philando Castile

shooting outside Saint Paul, Minnesota, seem to fall on general trends in increasing concern with race. What's more, the *race only* and *race plus* series in large part move together. While the former is certainly a component of the second measure and thus this parallelism makes sense, the degree to which they move together suggests that concern with race relations and racism is related to the salience of racialized issues.[5]

Similar patterns manifest when breaking down importance evaluations by partisanship among Whites, although the patterns are more muted for Republicans.[6] Whites in both parties appear to respond to the grand jury verdict in the Michael Brown case and events surrounding Freddie Gray's death. Democrats, however, react more to the Trayvon Martin and Michael Brown shootings, as well as President Obama's remarks following George Zimmerman's acquittal of murdering Martin. In general, as might be expected given the close alignment between individual racial attitudes and party (Tesler, 2016), White Democrats voice much more concern with race as captured by the *race only* measure, particularly during Barack Obama's second term in office. But Republicans express much more concern, and consistently so, when expanding the array of outcomes beyond racism and race relations to include things like welfare, crime, and immigration. It is also important to note that this expanded outcome measure appears driven by different components for White Democrats and White Republicans. For White Democrats, perceptions of racism's importance play a key role. For White Republicans, the additional racialized issues feature prominently. While only descriptive, this divergence suggests that because what elites talk about when they talk about race varies by party, mass attitude patterns look increasingly different.

To test my hypotheses I now relate these two series by regressing the *race only* and *race plus* outcomes on a set of individual and contextual covariates. My key explanatory variable, news coverage, enters as a contextual variable. I assign to each respondent the average amount of attention each show devotes to race in the two weeks preceding her interview date. The theoretical

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[5]Indeed, removing the race relations and racism responses from the *race plus* series and relating this racialized issues subset with the *race only* series yields a correlation of 0.53. Concern with race appears a general pattern among the American public as a whole. These relationships dampen among Whites, but don't differ much from there by party. The correlation between each series for white Democrats is 0.35 and for White Republicans is 0.39. Although related, the series are more different for Whites than non-Whites ($r_{nonwhite} = 0.52$, $r_{white} = 0.42$).

[6]I focus on Whites because they make up more than 3/4 of the partisan news audience.

motivation behind the two-week window comes from the information diffusion necessary for modifying attitudes beyond immediate show viewers (Levendusky, 2013; Druckman, Levendusky and McLain, 2018).[7] Moreover, including coverage variables for both shows in the same model accounts for potential interdependencies in coverage. As the discussion in the last chapter suggests, Maddow may respond to O'Reilly's coverage of race, or vice versa.

I also include individual-level covariates that may shape most important problem evaluations. These include partisanship, operationalized as indicator variables folding leaning partisans into the relevant partisan category, age set on a 0-1 scale, sex, an indicator for whether the respondent graduated from college, and an indicator for whether the respondent lives in the South defined as the states of the former Confederacy (Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2018). I also include survey fixed effects to account for any systematic differences over time in the survey context that may change respondents' concern with race overall. My inferences therefore relate variation in attention to race by show to problem importance responses within a survey fielding.[8] Finally, I focus on non-Hispanic Whites. They make up roughly 3/4 of each show's regular audience and provide a most likely place to find media effects because race is less salient for this group than for non-Whites.[9]

I model the binary *race only* or *race plus* categories using a probit link.[10] Consequently, I present the results as figures and reserve the complete model results for the appendix. Each panel in Figure 3.3 converts the model results into predicted probabilities, holding all variables at their sample means or modes for Whites.[11] The solid line in the left panel shows that when Maddow

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[7]The substantive results hold for windows as short as 10 days and extend to even a 21 day period. One potential explanation for the decline in significance as proximity to interview date increases follows from a decline in variation in show attention to race.

[8]This modeling approach reflects similar designs used to assess agenda setting effects (Gillion, 2016).

[9]Running the same analyses on only non-whites shows slightly different results from those I describe subsequently. On both outcomes O'Reilly's coverage still has a null effect. Maddow's coverage differs. On the *race only* outcome, non-Whites do not vary in their concern in ways that relate to media attention to race. On the *race plus* outcome a negative effect actually manifests ($p < 0.01$). This suggests that the racialized outcomes included in this measure may function differently for non-whites. Finally, running the same models on the full sample but interacting all of the explanatory variables with an indicator for whether the respondent is White reveals a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between it and Maddow's coverage (*race only* $p < 0.05$; *race plus* $p < 0.01$), supporting my contention that Whites are more responsive to these racial cues. I report these results in the appendix.

[10]Analyses using a linear probability model or rare events logit offer similar insights.

[11]This is a White man without a college education who lives outside the south and is 56 years old. I present results for this person identifying as a Democrat here, and as a Republican in the appendix. The substantive patterns remain, but for intercept shifts.

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Race Only Outcome

Race Plus Outcome

Figure 3.3: Probability of endorsing race as the most important problem by show attention to race. Predicted probabilities generated from probit models for a white Democrat with covariates held at sample means or modes. The hashmarks provide the distribution of levels of racial discussion, shaded by show.

discusses race more on her show, whites become more likely to report that race is an important national problem. A min-max change in coverage increases this probability by 0.038, from 0.007 to 0.045, over a 530% increase ($p < 0.05$). However, as the hashmarks show, this is a rare event given the distribution of the data. Looking instead at a change from one standard deviation below the mean for Maddow show coverage to one standard deviation above it produces a change of over 0.01, nearly a 150% increase from 0.008 to 0.019.[12]

This is not the case for O'Reilly. As the dashed line indicates, the more O'Reilly discusses race,

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[12]Alternatively, calculating the marginal change in conditional expectation using the observed value approach proposed by Hanmer and Kalkan (2012) provides an estimate of 0.095 with a 95% bootstrapped confidence interval of [0.026, 0.167] for Maddow's coverage and -0.050 [-0.129, 0.029] for O'Reilly's coverage. This is over 23 times the difference between a White Democrat and a White Republican (-0.004, [-0.005, -0.003]). For the *race plus* outcome these are: Maddow 0.185 [-0.012, 0.384], O'Reilly -0.121 [-0.391, 0.143], and Republican-Democrat 0.015 [0.013, 0.018].

the less likely whites are to see race as a problem. However, this effect is imprecisely estimated ($p = 0.17$, two-tailed). Even so, the potential negative relationship between greater attention paid to race and most important problem evaluations is interesting and I address it further in the subsequent studies.

These results also hold when looking at the *race plus* measure. The right panel of Figure 3.3 provides the same change in probability for this new outcome. The coverage effect is smaller, but still meaningful for Maddow. A min-max change in attention to race increases the probability an individual offers a response coded as one of the race-related outcomes by nearly 0.033, a 68% increase from 0.048 to 0.081 ($p < 0.05$). Reducing the change in attention to average attention, plus or minus one standard deviation, produces a 0.013 point shift from 0.050 to 0.063, a 27% increase. As before, the relationship between problem evaluations and O'Reilly discussing race is negative but much less precisely estimated ($p > 0.1$).

When Maddow discusses race more white respondents are more likely to report that race is an important national problem on two separate measures of concern. The *multi-valent account* therefore receives support while the *traditional* and *null* accounts do not.[13] Admittedly the effects are small in absolute magnitude. As I detail in footnote 4, relatively few Whites report race as an important problem in any given month. The most in the time period is 15% in July 2016, potentially reflecting the shooting deaths of police officers in Dallas and Baton Rouge and discussion about whether the Black Lives Matter movement motivated these attacks. Even so, the relative influence is substantial. Maddow discussing race can more than double the probability Whites report that race is an important national problem, although this influence is smaller on the broader *race plus* outcome. Whites' attitudes appear to respond to partisan racial rhetoric in ways that reflect its content. That these effects vary by partisan outlet may help explain why large partisan attitudinal gaps exist in evaluating race relations and race-based events (see Tesler, 2016; Neal, 2017). Maddow's audience expresses more concern while, if anything, O'Reilly's does less.

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[13]I also conducted placebo tests with different issues to inspect whether the identified relationship was spurious. Neither show's amount of racial discourse affects Whites' views on the importance of the environment, unemployment, or abortion. These issues should be well-removed from any effects from racial discussion. The estimated null effects suggest this is the case.

The preceding analyses demonstrate that the relationship between partisan media coverage of race and the public's concern with the issue is not directly related to issue attention; rather, outlet appears to matter. But these results may exist for two reasons. First, what the media cover in relation to an issue may shape whether people find it to be an important national problem (Miller, 2007). Alternatively, how the media present the content related to an issue matters (see generally Iyengar, 1991). It could be how each outlet covers race that shapes these differences, not so much differences in which topics they cover.

3.5   Study 2: Framing Affects Agenda Setting in an Experiment

I turn to an experimental design to address the observational equivalence issue in Study 1. I fielded this as part of a multi-investigator study on a sample of 1,2000 U.S. adults through the YouGov survey platform in July 2018. For consistency with the Study 1 analyses, I focus on the 825 non-Hispanic White respondents included in the surveys.

Participants read a pair of news articles ostensibly from the USA Today (for a similar design, see Miller, 2007).[14] Participants first read a story on mortgage interest rates and then read another story about law enforcement civil asset forfeiture practices.[15] The intervention relates to how this second story was framed.[16] Participants were assigned, on a random basis, to a *control* article talking about the practice of civil asset forfeiture, a *race-important* article calling attention to racial biases in the application of civil asset forfeiture and encouraging its repeal because it is discriminatory, and a *race-denial* condition mentioning the same racial biases but downplaying their importance.[17]

I measure problem importance evaluations in two ways, with the order of item type counter-

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[14]Each article was an edited version of an actual USA Today story.

[15]Civil asset forfeiture is an advantageous issue to study the impact framing has on perceptions of problem importance. The issue has received media coverage but has not commanded the attention that other aspects of the criminal justice system with potential racially disparate implementation have. Further, the nature of civil asset forfeiture coverage readily intersects with the types of coverage variation present in the media attention measure used in Study 1. This coverage variation provides the foundation for the framing variation I use in the design.

[16]The frames reflect racially liberal and conservative frames I identify in the preceding chapter. Articles are included in the appendix.

[17]After each article participants answered two questions evaluating the article on different dimensions to maintain a cover story for the section, and then they completed items capturing most important problem judgments.

balanced across participants. The first item is the standard Gallup question used in Study 1. I offer respondents the chance to provide up to three open-ended responses. As with the observational analysis I then create *race only* and *race plus* measures. The first codes responses that specifically mention race, racism, and race relations while the second incorporates the same set of racialized issues as before except for immigration given the treatment's focus.

The second item set, a series of close-ended issue importance items, addresses concerns with the Gallup most important problem item. Some contend it conflates perceptions of issue importance, or salience, and issue problematization, or a desire to change the status quo (Wlezien, 2005). Important problems may not be politically relevant and politically relevant issues may not be problems. I therefore include a set of 5 items asking respondents "Of the problems in the country today, how big of a problem is...[Racism/Race relations]?" with responses recorded on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from "a very big problem" to "not a problem at all." These issues include racism/race relations, housing affordability, the economy, the environment, and health care. Comparing across treatments, I expect respondents in the *race-important* condition will rate race as a more important problem than those in the *race-denial* condition. The remaining issues provide insight into whether and how the treatments shift concern about other issues. It could be the case that those in the *race-denial* condition rate these issues as more important than those in the *race-important* condition in a type of hydraulic effect. Alternatively, exposure to information about discrimination and appeals for modifying public policy may generate additional concern about other policies. Those in the *race-important* condition may place greater importance on these policies than those in the *race-denial* group.

I begin with the open-ended item. The left and right panels in Figure 3.4 present the proportion of responses coded as *race only* or *race plus*, respectively, as bold horizontal lines, doing so for each treatment group and the control. The vertical lines indicate 83% confidence intervals. The results reinforce the results from Study 1 and point to the influence issue frames have on problem importance judgments. The *race-important* group was more likely to offer a *race only* response compared to both the *control* and *race-denial* groups. Nearly 17% of those assigned to the *race-*

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
Figure 3.4: Issue mention proportions by condition. Horizontal lines present group means. Vertical lines denote 83% confidence intervals where non-overlap indicates significant differences between coefficient magnitudes at the 95% level (Bolsen and Thornton, 2014). Points display the raw responses and are jittered slightly to reduce overplotting.

important condition provided such a response compared to about 12% each for the *control* and *race-denial* conditions ($p < .15$ and $p < .09$, respectively).[18] While small in absolute magnitude, the difference in effects relates to over a 40% increase in the number of responses classified in this category. This is a particularly impressive outcome given the requirement that respondents relate a text-based treatment about a policy to a belief that race relations or racism are an important national problem in an open-ended format.

The right panel in Figure 3.4 sheds further light on the results. After expanding the set of classifiable responses to include racialized policies or other race-related mentions the *race-denial* condition becomes unique. While 20 and 21% of White respondents in the *control* and *race-important* conditions provide a *race plus* response, only 17% of those in the *race-denial* condition do so. While differences across conditions are not reliable, they are consistent with the observational analyses.[19]

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[18]Supplementary analyses using randomization inference yield similar *p*-values (Keele, McConnaughy and White, 2012).

[19]The *p*-value on the difference between the *race-important* and *race-denial* conditions is 0.24. Similar *p*-values

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The difference between the *race only* and *race plus* operationalizations is suggestive of the nature of the treatment effect. Given ongoing debates about race and related issues in summer 2018, an additional piece of information about discrimination in the criminal justice system does little so shift views about the importance of race-related policies.[20] The treatment then may specifically call attention to how race structures social outcomes, leading to the increased proportion of *race only* responses in the *race-important* condition. This outcome appears important for understanding the mix of considerations people bring to bear when identifying important social problem, even if it is only suggestive. While some 37% of the *race plus* responses in the *control* condition are from additional race-related issues, this decreases to 31% in the *race-denial* condition and 20% in the *race-important* condition. Exposure to information about whether or not race is related to social affairs appears to affect how Whites understand its role.

Figure 3.5 extends these analyses to the closed-ended items. The top left panel shows that those in the *race-important* condition rate race as more important than the other two conditions, but the difference is reliable only relative to the *control* ($p < .05$). Compared to the *control*, those in the *race-important* condition average a 0.72 on this 0-1 measure, a nearly 0.07 point difference (Cohen's $d = 0.21$). With respect to the *race-denial* group, the average importance rating is 0.026 points larger, but unreliably so ($p = .33$). These differences relate to increases of 10 and 4%, respectively. Additionally, 45% of the *race-important* group reported that race is a "very big problem," compared to 39% in the *control* and *race-denial* groups.[21]

It is worth highlighting the similarity in effects between the *race-denial* and *race-important* conditions. On the open-ended item, these two treatments resulted in polarizing attitude effects with the former decreasing concern and the latter increasing it. Here, they both increase concern with race as define as racism and race/relations. This suggests that part of the function for the

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obtain in analyses using randomization inference.

[20]As an example, the *race-important* condition contained only 1 additional response classified as mentioning crime or policing than either other condition.

[21]These distributional differences appear to affect the hypothesis testing. *P*-values from randomization inference tests offer evidence that not only are average ratings lower in the *control* group ($p < .02$), but they also provide more reliable, albeit still suggestive, evidence that the *race-denial* condition's importance rating is lower than the *race-important* group ($p < .09$).

Figure 3.5: Issue importance ratings by condition. Outcomes scaled 0-1. Horizontal lines present group means. Vertical lines denote 83% confidence intervals where non-overlap indicates significant differences between coefficient magnitudes at the 95% level (Bolsen and Thornton, 2014). Points display the raw responses and are jittered slightly to reduce overplotting.

race-denial condition may be a deliberate downweighting of considerations about race relative to other potentially important problems. The consequence for the closed-ended item is then viewing race as important but only because people are paying too much attention to it.

The remaining panels all also reveal some influence from the *race-important* condition. Relative to the *control* group, those in the *race-important* rate housing (difference = 0.046, p = .051), health care (0.017, p = .42), the economy (0.040, p = .18), and the environment (0.027, p = .30) as more important.[22] Similar differences manifest comparing the *race-important* and *race-denial* conditions.[23] These results offer little evidence that exposure to rhetoric about the importance of

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[22]Randomization inference analyses offer similar insights into where differences are reliable (housing, p = .052; health care, p = .43; economy, p = .32; environment, p = .20).

[23]These are: housing (difference = 0.032, p = .18), health care (0.013, p = .53), the economy (0.034, p = .27), and the environment (0.010, p = .71). But as with ratings of race's importance, distributional differences appear to affect to what extent these margins reliably differ from 0. Evidence from randomization inference analyses suggest these

one issue necessarily reduces concern with other issues when people are asked to individually rate them. Instead, the pattern of results potentially suggests that applying a frame indicative of liberal positions may foster concern with other issues given the integration of these issues in contemporary mass belief systems (Converse, 1964). A shift in perceived important for one issue may increase importance judgments for others through a process akin to spreading activation (Collins and Loftus, 1975). Indeed, averaging together the issue importance ratings for the non-race issue suggests this may be the case. The average on this combined measure in the *race-important* condition is 0.72, 0.033 points greater than the *control* ($p = .08$) and 0.025 points larger than the *race-denial* condition ($p = .19$).[24]

The results in Figure 3.5 also reveal that the *race-denial* condition does little to influence importance judgments on issues further removed from race. Not only are ratings consistently lower than the *race-important* condition, importance judgments in this group are on average only modestly larger than the *control*. The largest differences emerge on housing (difference = 0.015, $p = .54$) and the economy (0.017, $p = .50$), while on health care (0.004, $p = .86$) and the environment (0.007, $p = .83$), importance judgments differ little. In contrast to the *race-important* condition, the *race-denial* condition then does not appear to have any potential global influence on evaluations of issue importance for the issues considered here. The difference in average ratings relative to the *control* is only 0.008 ($p = .65$).

The results from Study 2 corroborate and extend the insights from Study 1. Not only may content affect agenda setting, but framing does so as well. Relative to a control condition where information about race was absent, participants in a condition where a policy was framed as racially discriminatory were more likely to note that race was an important problem. This holds both on open-ended and closed-ended items. Further, those reading that the policy was not racially discriminatory and that the policy's opponents were using race as a distraction were less likely to offer race as a response on an open-ended item compared to a control, but more likely to do so on

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differences are more reliable (housing, $p = .027$; health care, $p = .26$; economy, $p = .49$; environment, $p = .10$).

[24]Cohen's *d*s of 0.15, and 0.11, respectively. Randomization inference tests yield a similar *p*-value for the difference relative to the *control* (.079) but also suggest the difference relative to the *race-denial* condition is potentially more reliable (.042).

a closed-ended item. The results also offer interesting suggestive evidence regarding potentially broader impacts for framing on issue importance. While those in the *race-important* condition on average rated the non-race issues as more important than the *control*, no such increase appears in the *race-denial* condition. Future work could investigate the potential for such spillover effects and their consequences (cf. Hopkins and Mummolo, 2017).

3.6 Conclusion

A conventional wisdom holds that talking about race serves as a way to correct past injustices and present wrongs by calling attention attention to disparities related to race. But the evidence I present suggests that simply talking about race is not enough. In line with expectations from classic agenda setting accounts, concern with race does increase as attention to race increases (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Beckett, 1994; Miller and Krosnick, 2000; Soroka, 2002, 2006; Miller, 2007), but only when that conversation centers race as an important explanation for social inequities. Although the evidence I present is mixed on this outcome, attention to race that deemphasizes its influence may actually reduce public concern with it. Simply talking about race is not enough; perspective also matters.

My results indicate that agenda setting accounts should consider framing variation as an important conditioning force. Even so, one might argue that Study 1's results simply reflect individuals' predispositions shaping their judgments of race's national importance. Those likely to watch, or hear about, potentially race-related news from Rachel Maddow may already be open to seeing race as an important problem. Relatedly, O'Reilly's audience and their peers are perhaps more likely to ignore race anyway. That mass partisans are increasingly divided in their racial attitudes suggests this is potentially the case (Tesler, 2016). Consequently, it's unsurprising that Maddow's coverage matters in the observational analysis while O'Reilly's does not. Those receiving this information are predisposed to respond to cues on race in the same way, regardless of the frame.

Another concern may be that Maddow and O'Reilly are uniquely able to influence beliefs on race because people see them as trusted information sources. The partisan preferences that mo-

tivate people to seek out attitudinally consistent information similarly set partisan elites apart as people who can effectively frame issues (Druckman, 2001). Although motivated by partisanship, that these predispositions correlate with racial attitudes suggests individuals expect elites to offer some specific perspectives on race. Maddow can frame race as about discrimination, thereby shaping attitudes, in part because this is a consistent position. Without trustworthy sources, individuals' racial attitudes suppress these framing attempts, limiting elite influence.

Although not directly addressing this by varying source cues, the results from Study 2 suggest that highly trusted sources may be sufficient, but not necessary, for framing to influence agenda setting. The articles were ostensibly from the USA Today. That a story from a neutral arbiter framed in different ways can shift attitudes suggests source cues, while important, may not be required to alter how people perceive issues related to core predispositions. Although I motivated my analyses by foregrounding the trust partisans place in party elites, the experimental results suggest that elite influence may not simply follow from their credibility; rather, what they say may matter more.

As a final point, elite racial discourse may have longer-term implications for mass attitudes beyond agenda setting. Agenda setting concerns perceptions of national issues, but individuals can internalize elite discourse on race such that they see race as not only nationally important but also personally important. The mass public adopts the frames (de)emphasizing race's importance and uses these to understand other phenomena (Lippmann, 1922). Elites can thus encourage the public to use a particular perspective to understand the world (Boninger, Krosnick and Berent, 1995). A dialog on race can create issue publics around race where they otherwise did not exist. But because these entities may grow in response to elite discourse, these issue publics may organize around preserving, or challenging, the racial status quo. For those seeking to address persist racial inequality, talking about race matters, but the content of these conversations matters even more.

Chapter 4

Racial Attitudes Through A Partisan Lens

Race is fundamental to American society and American politics. Racial considerations contributed to the Constitution's shape, subsequently structuring party systems (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Schickler, 2016; Tesler, 2016) and influencing policymaking (Katznelson, 2006). The politicization of race brought about by these institutions facilitates the links between the mass public's racial attitudes and their policy preferences (Gilens, 1999; Tesler, 2016) and party attachments (Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016) links that in turn maintain race as an important institutional feature. Intentioned or not, race helps shape who gets what, when, and how.

Undergirding all of this is an assumption that racial animus feeds political conflict. In this paper, I turn this conventional wisdom on its head, arguing that political conflict can shape racial attitudes–the views and beliefs people hold about groups understood to be racial.[1] Political scientists have failed to examine this possibility perhaps because racial attitudes are seen as persistent and influential predispositions that form during childhood, long before most Americans become political animals (Sears and Brown, 2013).[2] According to this line of reasoning, individuals use these early-formed attitudes to make sense of politics; racial attitudes lead to partisanship (Sears and Funk, 1999; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002; Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016).[3]

Yet, I contend that changes in the political environment suggest that consistently privileging racial attitudes as the causal force in their relationship with partisanship is unwise. Consider the question in terms of attitude centrality. Political contexts make some predispositions more central in belief systems than others (Highton and Kam, 2011) with greater centrality increasing a predisposition's causal influence on other attitudes (Converse, 1964). When scholars first proposed and

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[1]My argument extends findings that partisanship can shape positions on race-related issues (Carsey and Layman, 2006; Highton and Kam, 2011) to consider attitudes about racial groups.

[2]Recent reviews of prejudice and politics view early-socialized racial animus as an explanation (Hutchings and Valentino, 2004; Kinder, 2013).

[3]Tesler (Tesler, 2016) does suggest evaluations of Barack Obama changed racial attitudes, but does not provide a full account (215, n. 33).

found evidence that racial attitudes shape party loyalties during the 1960s-1980s, many Americans were adjusting their partisanship to account for changes in the party system caused by an issue that was more important to them than their partisan ties (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Sears and Funk, 1999; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). But the current party system gives people little incentive to change their party loyalties and more cause to adopt party-consistent attitudes (Highton and Kam, 2011). It makes little sense to consistently use racial attitudes to predict a relatively more stable predisposition as scholars do when describing the growing correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes as a story about sorting rather than attitude change (Tesler, 2016).

That partisanship might affect racial attitudes is theoretically plausible for two reasons. First, partisanship is perhaps the most important attitude in Americans' political belief systems, and it is only more so today. By defining conflict more in terms of partisanship than other concerns, the current polarized and competitive political environment has made partisanship a much stronger political force now than it was in the first decades of survey research (Azari and Hetherington, 2016; Mason, 2018). In this more party-centric environment, scholars have found that partisanship has emerged as causally prior to many things once thought to be causally prior to partisanship, including issue positions (Lenz, 2012) core political values (Goren, 2005) and economic evaluations (Bartels, 2002). Add to this individuals' motivation to adopt party-consistent views in a polarized environment (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014) and the possibility of changes in causal dynamics is not only possible, but plausible.

Second, because the parties of the early 21st Century have not changed where they stand on race, party switching on racial attitudes is less likely. People are unlikely to receive information on race that changes which party they see as more supportive of racial minorities and fewer people have misaligned partisanship and racial attitudes, each making sorting less likely. Instead, when people receive information on race they are likely to change their attitudes. More central party attachments can shape the kinds of information partisans receive on race and how they interpret it. Party elites, for instance, discuss race in markedly different ways when it becomes salient (Haney López, 2014; King and Smith, 2014) offering one potential source of party-driven attitude

change (Zaller, 1992).

I demonstrate that partisanship is indeed a causal force in its relationship with racial attitudes, and this follows from changes in the political context that make party the central organizing force of political conflict. Using panel data, I compare two periods characterized by different degrees of party conflict, the early 1990s and late 2000s. I find that whites' racial attitudes encourage party switching in both periods, but this better characterizes the less party-centric 1990s than the more party-centric 2000s. In contrast, Barack Obama's administration coincided with many more whites aligning their racial attitudes with their partisanship than switching parties, a pattern persisting even in 2016. The results paint a normatively mixed picture by showing that politics, through partisanship, can perpetuate negative racial attitudes or encourage whites to adopt more favorable views.

4.1 Partisanship, Race, and Racial Attitude Updating

The connection between race and partisanship in the modern era has grown stronger over at least the last half century (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Schickler, 2016). Before 1964, intra-party conflicts largely kept civil rights off the national political agenda, with Southern Democrats in particular the keystone to maintaining institutionalized racism. This changed when Democrats championed the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts and Republicans courted disaffected whites with their Southern Strategy. In subsequent years, Democrats reinforced their commitment to pro-black policies, while Republicans distanced themselves from racial liberalism (Carmines and Stimson, 1989, Ch. 2). In part because the growing partisan divide on race gives elites incentives to use racialized campaign messages (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Mendelberg, 2001) the mass public has received clear signals about whom the parties support on race since at least the mid-1960s.

Changes in the mass public's party loyalties followed this information about where the parties stand, and explanations for these changes contribute to the prevailing characterization of the relationship as one where racial attitudes shape individuals' partisanship. For Sears and Funk

(Sears and Funk, 1999), racial attitudes played a "unique role" in shaping "partisan political preferences during the civil rights era and its aftermath" (17).[4] Similarly, Green and colleagues (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002) contend that the enfranchisement of African Americans changed each party's "social imagery," motivating whites to switch parties. Tesler (Tesler, 2016) echoes this claim when arguing that Barack Obama's presidency motivated racial liberals and conservatives to become Democrats and Republicans.

The conventional wisdom on whites' racial attitudes also argues race leads to party. The existing literature contends racial attitudes form early in life and persist through most of adulthood as a way to understand the world (Henry and Sears, 2009; Sears and Brown, 2013; Goldman and Hopkins, Forthcoming). Evidence indicates children understand racial categories before kindergarten and then come to see them as fixed attributes as they grow up (Hirschfeld, 1996). People's early social environments, including family and school experiences, contribute morals and values that provide these categories with meaning (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Goldman and Hopkins, Forthcoming).

The evidence for early-acquired racial attitudes encourages scholars to treat them as causally prior to political outcomes including partisanship (Sears and Funk, 1999; Hutchings and Valentino, 2004; Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016) implicitly reinforcing the conventional view that these attitudes are unlikely outcomes of political processes. The position holds that when people encounter information on race they will align some political position with their racial attitudes rather than change the latter. However, I propose that the contexts people find themselves in can motivate racial attitude change. People can reevaluate racial groups by incorporating additional information, like that provided by political elites when they draw attention to the positive and negative characteristics that define racial categories (Haney López, 2014; King and Smith, 2014).

Changes in which racial attitudes count as socially acceptable offer some initial guidance. For decades, white Americans believed that whites and blacks were innately different. This biological racism persisted among elites at least until World War II when it lost favor among social scientists

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[4]See also (Valentino and Sears, 2005).

(Kinder and Sanders, 1996, Ch. 5). Change in elites' beliefs precipitated a change in the mass public such that biological racism is decidedly uncommon these days (but see Tesler, 2016). As Kinder and Sanders (1996) detail, how elites talk about race affects how individuals express their attitudes. I extend this thinking to argue that elites, and the information environment more generally, can not only affect how people express distinct racial attitudes, but also which attitudes they hold.

4.2   Why Partisanship Should Matter for Racial Attitudes

To see how partisanship could shape racial attitudes, consider the relationship between the two in terms of attitude centrality. Changes in the political context make party now arguably more central than ever before. Increasing elite polarization and more competitive elections over the last several decades have reduced the number of cross-pressured voters open to changing their partisan allegiances and increased the congruence between partisanship and other predispositions and identities (Mason, 2018). Partisan attachments are so ingrained they even shape responses to reaction time tasks (Theodoridis, 2017). It's perhaps unsurprising then that analyses of historical data suggest that party today is more influential than any time since the introduction of the secret ballot (Azari and Hetherington, 2016). Even more suggestive of its growing influence, partisanship appears to increasingly shape preferences in settings outside of politics (Iyengar and Westwood, 2014). A political context defined more by party loyalties than issue positions or other concerns encourages the mass public to use partisanship more often to understand social and political phenomena, strengthening these loyalties and potentially making them more influential relative to other predispositions (Converse, 1964; Krosnick, 1988).

Partisanship's influence can be seen through several potential mechanisms. It shapes who people pay attention to for information and how they process the information they receive. Preferring relatively costless information searches, partisans tend to rely on co-partisan information sources because they value credible and trustworthy messengers (Zaller, 1992). Alongside potential differences in information exposure, partisanship's function as a "perceptual screen" encourages biased

information processing (Campbell et al., 1960; Bartels, 2002; Gaines et al., 2007), and motivates people to hold consistent attitudes (Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014). People interpret social and political affairs in ways that fit with their partisanship, modifying their attitudes accordingly. When contexts elevate partisanship over other lines of conflict, these partisan biases in information seeking and processing become more likely, increasing partisanship's potential influence on other attitudes (Krosnick, 1988; Mason, 2018; Henderson and Theodoridis, 2017).

Party-biased reactions to the information environment should most affect whites. Racially segregated geographic and social spaces limit whites' interactions with non-coethnics (Logan and Stults, 2011; Cox, Navarro-Rivera and Jones, 2016). Whites' information about nonwhites may primarily, or solely, come from political elites and other sources (Entman and Rojecki, 2000).

Social psychology offers insights into how whites' attitudes may respond to information on race. Signs of racial progress can motivate some whites to bolster the existing racial hierarchy and hold more negative racial attitudes (Norton and Sommers, 2011; Wilkins and Kaiser, 2014). Cues about whether race merits attention can have similar attitudinal consequences. Those emphasizing a colorblind perspective, one proposing that people should ignore race in decisionmaking, can lead some whites to avoid acknowledging their own racial biases (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004) and become less likely to see racism as an explanation for social outcomes (Apfelbaum et al., 2010). Whites thus increasingly deemphasize race's social reality and deny racial inequality, hallmarks of negative racial attitudes (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Tarman and Sears, 2005). But these effects reverse if people hear rhetoric about racial diversity's benefits or continued discrimination (Richeson and Nussbaum, 2004; Apfelbaum et al., 2010).

The information environment could therefore influence attitudes directly or indirectly. First, it may directly shape attitudes by providing information related to race. Second, it may shape the perspectives people use to interpret potentially race-related affairs, shaping how information from other sources is processed and thus changing views indirectly (Krosnick, 1988). Partisanship matters to the degree it affects each potential channel of influence. That evidence indicates Republican elites typically provide information potentially bolstering negative attitudes and Demo-

cratic elites frequently offer perspectives promoting positive views (Haney López, 2014; King and Smith, 2014), suggests information environments on race that potentially differ by party, making party-driven attitude change possible in party-centric contexts (Zaller, 1992).

To summarize, I examine two explanations for the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes. The first–the racial attitude influence hypothesis–follows the conventional wisdom that whites' racial attitudes produce changes in partisanship. Whites' racial attitudes in part foster concerns about who the parties support, leading them to change parties or how strongly they identify with their current one. The second–the partisanship influence hypothesis–argues that party shapes racial attitudes. Partisanship changes attitudes by affecting where people get information and how they process what they acquire. These two hypotheses are not mutually exclusive and can jointly describe the link between partisanship and racial attitudes in a given political context. What varies across contexts is the potential source(s) of change.

To show how context can shape dynamics, I test these hypotheses in two periods, one in which party was less central and one in which it was more: the Clinton era of the early 1990s and the Obama era of the late 2000s. In the first, party does less to define political conflict so whites should be more likely to adopt new party loyalties. I therefore expect to find more support for the racial attitude influence hypothesis[5] Whites cross-pressured by their partisan ties and racial attitudes resolve this conflict by sorting into the "correct" political party. In the second era, party does more to organize political conflict and there are fewer whites with misaligned partisanship and racial attitudes to switch parties. I thus expect to find more support for the partisanship influence hypothesis here.

Importantly, my argument for this latter period is not about reactions to President Obama and his administration or responses to a diversifying country; it is about the party-centric context in which these occur. For instance, imagine Obama running and governing in the 1980s when partisanship is in greater flux. His presence would likely not coincide with much, if any, attitude change. Instead, by reinforcing the connection between the Democratic Party and black America

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[5]Green and colleagues (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002) note partisan attachments in the 1990s were less stable even than prior decades.

it encourages party switching. Indeed, analyses exploring Jesse Jackson's 1984 campaign for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination reflect this possibility. His candidacy coincided with a white electorate shifting its allegiances to the Republican Party, changes motivated in part by racial attitudes (Sears, Citrin and Kosterman, 1987). The latter era matters because it is defined by strong partisan conflict. This allows for partisanship to change racial attitudes by shaping what information people receive on race and how they interpret it.[6]

4.3   Data and Methods

I test the relationship between whites' partisanship and racial attitudes using panel data from the American National Elections Studies, the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP), and the Democracy Fund.[7] In Appendix section 6.3 I show descriptively that the relationship between the two may be changing using the 1986-2016 ANES cross-sections.

I measure racial attitudes multiple ways. Racial resentment serves as my primary measure (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Tarman and Sears, 2005) and I complement this with group affect. Racial resentment captures structural versus individual explanations for black Americans' social and economic status (Tarman and Sears, 2005; Kam and Burge, 2018). It provides a reliable, validated construct consistently used in studies examining the relationship between whites' racial attitudes and partisanship (Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016). By also including affect I speak to prejudice's multi-dimensional nature (Kinder, 2013) and address any concerns with the racial resentment construct (Sniderman and Carmines, 1997; Huddy and Feldman, 2009). Finally, I offer evidence in Appendix section 6.3 that stereotype measures show similar dynamics.

I operationalize *racial resentment* with four items in the Kinder and Sanders (Kinder and

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[6]Some argue that Obama may also matter by shaping the relationship between racial attitudes and party (Tesler, 2016). Specifically, people's evaluations of Obama mediate these interconnections. But other mediators may matter or other factors may produce these results. I do not claim evaluations don't matter, but that they may do so because of, or alongside, other factors. In Appendix section 6.3 I develop this point further, including related analyses.

[7]I use the 1992-1994 wave of the 1992-1994-1996 ANES panel, the 2008, 2012, and 2016 CCAP election panels, and the 2012-2016 Democracy Fund VOTER Survey. The 1992-1994 ANES panel conducted face-to-face interviews, while the CCAP and VOTER surveys were completed online. Although survey modes differ, this should not affect my analyses because I look at individual-level change. CCAP and VOTER survey participants came from YouGov's non-random respondent pool with completed surveys then weighted back to population benchmarks. Analyses using more panels spanning different parts of the party-centric era are reported in Appendix section 6.3.

Sanders, 1996) battery.[8] I sum the items and scale them 0-1, with higher values indicating greater racial resentment. For *group affect* I create a differential affect measure by subtracting how negatively whites feel about whites from how negatively they feel about blacks. I set this to run 0-1, with higher values indicating respondents feel more negatively about blacks than whites.[9] This procedure accounts for interpersonal differences in how people respond to such items (Brady, 1985). I operationalize *partisanship* using the branched ANES party identification question, present in all data collections. I also set it to run 0-1, ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican.[10] I complement this operationalization in additional analyses reported in Appendix section 6.3 that use differenced feeling thermometers to measure partisanship with results showing similar attitude change patterns.

Consistent with the existing literature I focus on non-Hispanic whites (Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016). Furthermore, when using the 1992-1994 ANES data I restrict the analyses to those consistently interviewed by a white or non-white interviewer across waves (e.g., white in 1992 and white in 1994). This holds constant potential variation in responses to the racial resentment items the interview context creates (Kinder and Sanders, 1996).

I use cross-lagged regression models to evaluate dynamics (Finkel, 1995). These assess the effect of lagged racial attitudes (*racial attitudes$_{t-1}$*) on current partisanship (*PID$_t$*) and the effect of lagged partisanship (*PID$_{t-1}$*) on current racial attitudes (*racial attitudes$_t$*), after accounting for a lagged dependent variable. Equations 1 and 2 show this mathematically.

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[8]Answers are recorded on 5-point strongly agree–strongly disagree scales. The 2016 CCAP differs from the others because it included only three of the four items. Using only the three items common across surveys does not change the substantive results. Full question wording and descriptive statistics appear in Appendix section 6.3.

[9]This measure is available in the 1992-1994 ANES, 2012-2016 VOTER survey, and 2016 CCAP. The first two data collections feature 101-point feeling thermometers while the third has 5-point favorability scales.

[10]Using a very reliable measure for partisanship may privilege it in analyses using less reliable racial attitude measures. But racial resentment has similar characteristics, with error-corrected stabilities similar to partisanship (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). Yet, using a single partisanship item may disadvantage it. To address this I report further analyses in the appendix. In Appendix section 6.3 I report results from structural equation models. In Appendix section 6.3 I measure partisanship with party feeling thermometers. The substantive results persist.

$$racial\ attitudes_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 PID_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 racial\ attitudes_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_i \qquad (4.1)$$

$$PID_{i,t} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 PID_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 racial\ attitudes_{i,t-1} + \upsilon_i \qquad (4.2)$$

This method allows for assessing whether change in a variable over time can be attributed to the other variable in the relationship.[11] Here, β_1 and α_2 reflect the degree to which lagged partisanship and racial attitudes predict current values of the other construct after accounting for individuals' initial scores and associated weights (β_2 and α_1, which provide estimates for each predisposition's temporal stability). If $\beta_1 > 0$, then the partisanship influence hypothesis receives support: whites' partisanship motivates racial attitude change. Similarly, if $\alpha_2 > 0$, then the racial attitude influence hypothesis receives support: whites' racial attitudes inspire changes in partisanship. Finally, while my argument concerns each predisposition's potential causal impact, with these two comparisons my focus throughout, the models can also offer suggestive evidence regarding which predisposition drives dynamics. If $\beta_1 > \alpha_2$, then this suggests partisanship and attitude change matter more. But if $\beta_1 < \alpha_2$, then this suggests racial attitudes and sorting matter more. I estimate the models using seemingly unrelated regressions to facilitate these final comparisons, and report consistent results from additional estimation and analysis strategies in the appendix.[12]

As *prima facie* evidence that whites' partisanship could produce racial attitude change, consider the two-wave correlations for partisanship and racial resentment in each dataset. In all cases partisanship's correlation is heartier, and this increases over time. The correlation for racial resentment is 0.67 in the 1992-1994 ANES, 0.80 in the 2008 CCAP, 0.83 and 0.85 in the March and August waves of the 2012 CCAP, 0.80 in the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey, and 0.87 in the 2016

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[11]Scholars have used this same approach to examine partisanship's relationship with core political values (Goren, 2005) and issue orientations (Carsey and Layman, 2006; Highton and Kam, 2011).

[12]Appendix section 6.3 addresses distributional differences between partisanship and racial attitudes by standardizing the variables in equations 1 and 2 to place them on the same metric. Appendix section 6.3 offers consistent results from cross-lagged structural equation models that address measurement error concerns while also offering a standardized metric for comparisons. Results in Appendix section 6.3 suggest the patterns I find are not limited to modeling assumptions and manifest when simply considering the distribution of cases demonstrating stability and change in each predisposition over time.

CCAP. For partisanship, these are 0.81, 0.93, 0.94, 0.94, 0.90, and 0.95. Partisanship's greater stability, despite measuring it with a single item, suggests it is a likelier cause (Converse, 1964; Krosnick, 1988). Again, I refine this to argue its influence is most likely when partisanship defines political conflict over other concerns. Eras where party does less to organize political conflict should be less likely to see attitude change.

4.4 Racial Attitudes Dominate in a Political Context Defined Less by Party

What does the relationship between whites' partisanship and racial attitudes look like when party is less central to political conflict? The 1992-1994 ANES panel offers some evidence. Recall, I expect to be more likely to find support for the racial attitude influence hypothesis ($\alpha_2 > 0$) than the partisanship influence hypothesis ($\beta_1 > 0$). Further, racial attitudes should be more substantively influential than partisanship. Partisanship does less to organize political conflict and its influence on political thinking should therefore be weaker or nonexistent.

Table 4.1 contains the results from applying cross-lagged models to these data, separated by racial attitude operationalization. The first column tests the partisanship influence hypothesis and the second column considers the racial attitude influence hypothesis. First, the results in column 1 suggest partisanship's importance in this relationship, even during an era that could be seen as conventional politics. Strong partisans, 26% of the sample, separate by an average of 0.041 points on the racial resentment scale in these two years, equivalent to about two-thirds of a category on an item. But these results are imprecisely estimated ($p = 0.054$). Racial resentment's estimated stability is also noteworthy. The results suggest less stability than might be expected for a predisposition that is always placed near the beginning of the causal chain ($\hat{\beta}_2 = 0.600$). Partisanship's positive, albeit modest and imprecisely estimated, influence offers initial suggestive evidence for the partisanship influence hypothesis.

The results in column 2 support the racial attitude influence hypothesis. As expected, racial resentment has a significant influence on later party loyalties ($p < 0.05$). The difference in partisanship for the 7% of the sample scoring at racial resentment's poles increases by 0.127 points,

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Table 4.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Attitudes (1992-1994)

	Racial Resentment			Affect Difference		
	Racial Attitudes$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$	Racial Attitudes$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.041	0.853*	−0.086	−0.001	0.868*	−0.059
	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.046)	(0.013)	(0.025)	(0.082)
Racial Attitudes$_{t-1}$	0.600*	0.127*		0.586*	0.058	
	(0.031)	(0.041)		(0.065)	(0.082)	
Constant	0.243*	0.011		0.229*	0.051*	
	(0.022)	(0.025)		(0.033)	(0.047)	
Observations	592	592		577	577	
R^2	0.424	0.656		0.294	0.648	
Residual Std. Error	0.158	0.205		0.088	0.208	

Note: *p<0.05. Seemingly unrelated regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Columns 3 and 6 provide the estimated difference in cross-lagged effects between each predisposition.

about three-fourths of a category on the 7-point measure. Combined, the construct stabilities and cross-lagged effects presented in columns 1 and 2 explain about 33% of the relationship between each predisposition in 1994. The remaining variation comes from other unidentified factors and causal processes (see Finkel, 1995).[13]

The seemingly unrelated regression estimation strategy also offers one way to test whether racial attitudes or partisanship are more substantively important. Comparing the effects of min-max changes for each predisposition offers insight into its theoretical possible effect, despite different operationalizations (Achen, 1982). Column 3 in Table 4.1 provides the difference in coefficient estimates for partisanship$_{t-1}$ in column 1 (β_1 in equation 1) and racial resentment$_{t-1}$ in column 2 (α_2 in equation 2), and this difference's precision. As expected given the less party-centric context, partisanship is less influential than racial resentment ($\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2 = -0.086$, $p = 0.03$, one-tailed). Racial attitudes thus appear to contribute more substantively to the relationship's dynamics. Even so, these comparisons of theoretical influence are affected by each predisposition's variance because the changes relate to vastly different percentages of the sample. Although racial resentment's theoretical impact far surpasses that for partisanship, this potential influence is overstated because

[13]The 33% comes from the proportion of the correlation between partisanship and racial resentment in 1994 unaccounted for by the correlation between the models' residuals. To address potentially unaccounted for factors, I report analyses in Appendix section 6.3 including economic orientations, culture war attitudes, and anti-immigration attitudes. The substantive conclusions change little.

relatively few people occupy the scale endpoints. Another test for substantive influence consists of standardizing all variables to place them on the same metric, thereby directly relating variation in the predictor to variation in the outcome (Achen, 1982). Analyses reported in Appendix section 6.3 using standardized variables point to racial attitudes as more substantively influential in this regard.

The remaining columns in Table 4.1 extend these analyses to group affect.[14] The results in columns 4 and 5 suggest that there is no apparent relationship between differential group affect and partisanship in the 1990s. In neither case does the lagged measure produce significant changes in the other variable. If anything the results suggest sorting on racial attitudes.[15]

These analyses provide information on two counts. First, they show that at least one dimension of racial attitudes continued to shape party loyalties into the 1990s. Second, they offer suggestive evidence that partisanship may shape racial attitudes, although this only fits with the racial resentment operationalization.

4.5   A More Polarized Context Makes Party More Influential

I use the 2008 and 2012 CCAP surveys and the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey to assess dynamics in the more party-centric era. I expect to find consistent support for the partisanship influence hypothesis ($\beta_1 > 0$). Secondarily, and in contrast to the preceding analyses, I also expect partisanship to be more substantively influential than racial attitudes given the change in context.

I begin with the 2008 CCAP, using the March and October waves. I report the results in Table 4.2's columns 1-3. The first column supports the partisanship influence hypothesis. White strong partisans, over 40% of the sample, separate by an average of 0.102 points in racial resentment ($p < 0.05$), about one and a half categories on a scale item. The racial attitude influence hypothesis also receives support. The difference in partisanship between the least and most racially resentful (about 16% of whites) increases by an average of 0.048 points, over one-fourth a category

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[14]Descriptives: mean$_{92}$= 0.55, sd$_{92}$= 0.10; mean$_{94}$= 0.55, sd$_{94}$= 0.10.

[15]The affect measure and partisanship are in fact uncorrelated in these data. Nor does this relationship vary when looking at the individual racial group thermometer ratings.

Table 4.2: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment in the 2008 and 2012 Elections

	CCAP 2008			CCAP 2012: March			CCAP 2012: August		
	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.102*	0.917*	0.054*	0.075*	0.927*	0.009	0.130*	0.935*	0.097*
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.029)	(0.021)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.018)	(0.041)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.739*	0.048*		0.812*	0.066*		0.792*	0.032	
	(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.028)	(0.027)		(0.047)	(0.025)	
Constant	0.120*	0.012*		0.096*	−0.003		0.081*	0.012	
	(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.017)	(0.014)		(0.025)	(0.019)	
Observations	8,866	8,866		726	726		751	751	
R^2	0.660	0.865		0.680	0.885		0.663	0.864	
Residual Std. Error	0.152	0.138		0.150	0.117		0.149	0.123	

Note: *p<0.05. Seemingly unrelated regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Columns 3, 6, and 9 provide the estimated difference in cross-lagged effects between each predisposition.

on the 7-point item.

Partisanship also appears more substantively influential.[16] Column 3 presents the difference in coefficient estimates with partisanship about twice as influential as racial attitudes ($\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.054$, $p < 0.05$). Moreover, the effect of moving across partisanship's range implicates a much larger proportion of people than that related to racial attitudes' estimated theoretical influence. The results not only support my claim that contexts can make partisanship a causal force on racial attitudes, the evidence also suggests attitude change does more to explain the growing correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes.[17]

Table 4.2's remaining columns consider dynamics in 2012. They also provide an additional test for whether contextual changes increase party's relative importance. Each week during the campaign a representative sample of the nearly 45,000 respondents completing the December 2011 CCAP baseline survey were reinterviewed. I focus on the two waves reassessing racial resentment, one in March and the other in August. Because intensifying electoral competition activates partisanship over other considerations (Erikson and Wlezien, 2012). I expect it to be more substantively influential than racial attitudes in August than March.

The results again support the partisanship influence hypothesis. Column 4 shows that between December and March, the roughly 35% of the white sample identifying as strong partisans sep-

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[16]Additional analyses in Appendix section 6.3 also indicate that partisanship's increased magnitude relative to the 1990s is significant.

[17]The model accounts for about 85% of the relationship between the two predispositions in October.

arates by an average of 0.074 points on racial resentment ($p < 0.05$). Partisanship matters even more for the August group. As the results in column 7 indicate, strong partisans divide by 0.130 points on racial resentment, over two categories on a scale item ($p < 0.05$).[18]

The results inconsistently support the racial attitude influence hypothesis. Column 5 indicates that the 14% of whites in the March reinterview group placing at racially resentment's extremes separate by an average of 0.066 points on the partisanship item ($p < 0.05$), two-fifths of a category on the 7-point measure. This effect halves for the August reinterview group. The gap in partisan attachments grows by only 0.032 points, an insignificant difference ($p > 0.10$).

Further, partisanship again appears to be more substantively influential. Its influence on racial attitudes is greater in both waves. But with the difference in estimates only significant for the August reinterview group, the change in relative influence aligns with accounts that elections raise partisanship's salience; context matters for the relationship's dynamics. In addition, in both waves partisanship's influence concerns a group 2.5 times that implicated by a maximal change in racial resentment. Racial resentment's substantive effect is thus if anything overstated and the difference in magnitudes a restrictive characterization. Analyses in Appendix section 6.3 using standardized measures complement this. As with the 2008 analyses, partisanship not only shapes racial attitudes in periods where party does more to organize political conflict, but attitude change, not sorting, appears to drive dynamics more.

But these results only address election year patterns. Although helpful for unpacking attitude change dynamics, particularly for those made salient (Valentino and Sears, 1998) a campaign context does not shed light on whether the partisanship influence hypothesis holds over longer periods of time in a party-centric political context. The results in Table 4.3 from the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey help address this. And analyses reported in Appendix section 6.3 using data from the 2006-2010 General Social Survey and 2010-2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study reveal that the dynamics I identify are not merely a function of surveys conducted during presidential

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[18]A one-tailed test derived from the directional nature of my expectations given prior work indicates that the difference in partisanship's estimated effect across waves is suggestive but imprecisely estimated ($\hat{\beta}_{1,March} = \hat{\beta}_{1,August}$: $p < 0.10$, one-tailed). Nor does racial resentment's influence reliably differ between these two periods ($\hat{\alpha}_{2,March} = \hat{\alpha}_{2,August}$: $p = 0.53$, two-tailed).

Table 4.3: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Attitudes (2012-2016 VOTER Survey)

	Racial Resentment			Affect Difference		
	Racial Attitudes$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$	Racial Attitudes$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.147*	0.792*	0.006	0.068*	0.831*	−0.042
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.033)	(0.009)	(0.018)	(0.049)
Racial Attitudes$_{t-1}$	0.837*	0.142*		0.563*	0.110*	
	(0.024)	(0.027)		(0.036)	(0.049)	
Constant	0.001	0.036*		0.186*	0.044	
	(0.014)	(0.018)		(0.021)	(0.030)	
Observations	6,014	6,014		5,722	5,722	
R^2	0.614	0.682		0.317	0.687	
Residual Std. Error	0.190	0.202		0.113	0.201	

Note: *p<0.05. Seemingly unrelated regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Columns 3 and 6 provide the estimated difference in cross-lagged effects between each predisposition.

elections. Midterm election year surveys fielded in a more party-centric era reveal similar patterns.

The evidence again supports the partisanship influence hypothesis. Strong partisans (40% of whites) separate by an average of 0.147 points in racial resentment ($p < 0.05$). This is equivalent to three and a half categories on a single scale item.

Racial attitudes also contribute to the relationship's dynamics. Those scoring at racial resentment's poles divide by an average of 0.142 points on partisanship, or one response category ($p < 0.05$).

Considering substantive importance, the test comparing the difference in estimated effects offers inconclusive evidence for whether attitude change or sorting drive dynamics. Column 3 reveals an estimated difference of near 0. But again, this is a comparison of theoretical differences across each measure's range. Racial resentment's effect is likely overstated because relatively few whites (13%) populate the scale endpoints, a possibility reinforced by results from standardizing each measure that suggest partisanship matters more. While the evidence indicates that partisanship's influence extends beyond campaign contexts in a more party-centric political era, it is mixed as to whether partisanship is more substantively important between 2012 and 2016.[19]

The VOTER Survey also allows me to assess partisanship's influence using the group affect

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[19]The model accounts for about two-thirds of the correlation between whites' partisan ties and racial attitudes in 2016.

dimension of racial animus.[20] The results in column 4 indicate that partisanship's influence persists. Partisanship shapes how much more negatively whites feel about blacks relative to whites ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.067$, $p < 0.05$). Affect also motivates sorting, with those who rate blacks more negatively than whites identifying as more Republican ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.130$, $p < 0.05$). These results do not support, however, the result that partisanship matters more when comparing theoretically possible changes ($\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2 = -0.042$, $p > 0.1$). But again, the estimated effect for racial attitudes on partisanship is overstated because respondents are not distributed similarly across the measure. Results reported in Appendix section 6.3 standardizing the variables to adjust for this suggest partisanship has more substantive influence. As with racial resentment, attitude change is thus at least as likely as sorting to explain the growing correlation between racial attitudes and party loyalties, and potentially more so given the estimated attitude change effect implicates many more respondents.

These results provide substantial evidence for my argument that partisanship can shape racial attitudes. A political context raising party's salience makes it an influential causal force. Such contextual changes also appear to shape the relative influence that partisanship has in its relationship with racial attitudes, a point also suggested by leveraging the design of the 2012 CCAP panel. More party-centric contexts make attitude change rather than sorting the primary explanation for the growing correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes. The intensely partisan era in which President Obama governs sees whites adopting racial views consistent with their party loyalties and this holds for multiple dimensions of racial animus.[21]

4.6 2016: Sustained Party Influence

I argue that the preceding evidence for consistent party-driven attitude change comes from partisanship's increased centrality, brought about by a more party-centric political context. Even so, the results could be unique to President Obama. I now turn to test whether these effects persist in a party-centric context where Obama is not a focal political actor.

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[20]Descriptives: $\text{mean}_{12} = 0.56$, $\text{sd}_{12} = 0.11$; $\text{mean}_{16} = 0.53$, $\text{sd}_{16} = 0.13$.

[21]In all cases partisanship matters more in analyses standardizing all variables, and shapes racial attitudes after incorporating additional core attitudes. Analyses reported in Appendices D and F respectively.

Table 4.4: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Attitudes (2016 CCAP)

	Racial Resentment			Affect Difference		
	Racial Attitudes$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$	Racial Attitudes$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	$\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.089*	0.918*	0.055*	0.074*	0.924*	0.009
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.019)
Racial Attitudes$_{t-1}$	0.792*	0.034*		0.556*	0.065*	
	(0.011)	(0.010)		(0.022)	(0.017)	
Constant	0.069*	0.026*		0.193*	0.007*	
	(0.006)	(0.006)		(0.011)	(0.009)	
Observations	8,116	8,116		8,120	8,120	
R^2	0.725	0.851		0.378	0.851	
Residual Std. Error	0.151	0.128		0.135	0.128	

Note: *p<0.05. Seemingly unrelated regression results with robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Columns 3 and 6 provide the estimated difference in cross-lagged effects between each predisposition.

I do so using the 2016 presidential election. The election featured, in Donald Trump, a politician more open than most to denigrating racial and ethnic minorities. Trump's actions, and the media coverage they received, provide considerations on race separate from Obama that whites could respond to by changing their attitudes or partisanship. But Trump's ascendance also revealed a fracturing Republican Party. And Democrats displayed similar divides, with Bernie Sanders challenging Hillary Clinton by appealing to economic dissatisfaction. Race could matter, with whites' partisan lenses guiding responses, or race may matter less than other topics and not provide signals sufficient to motivate attitude change.

For this test I rely on data from the 2016 CCAP's June pre-election and November-December post-election interviews. The results, included in Table 4.4, again support both hypotheses. The first column indicates that strong partisans, nearly 42% of whites, separate by an average of 0.089 points in racial resentment, a difference of one scale item category on this 3 item version ($p < 0.05$).

That is not to say that whites did not also adopt new partisan allegiances. Column 2 suggests that racial attitudes encouraged changes in partisanship. The 20% of the white sample located at racial resentment's poles moves apart by 0.034 points on partisanship, or about one-fifth an item category ($p < 0.05$).

The results also suggest that partisanship has greater substantive influence. Column 3 shows that the difference between partisanship and racial resentment is positive and significant ($\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2 =$

0.055, $p < 0.05$). This occurs despite racial resentment's effect being somewhat overstated because it still implicates fewer people than the same shift for partisanship.[22]

The partisanship and racial attitude influence hypotheses also receive support when considering group affect. Here, respondents rated blacks and whites on 5-point favorability scales rather than feeling thermometers like the prior affect analyses.[23] Table 4.4's remaining results show that partisanship changes affect ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.074$, $p < 0.05$), and that affect motivates changing party loyalties ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.065$, $p < 0.05$). These estimates offer no clear insight into substantive influence ($\hat{\beta}_1 - \hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.009$, $p > 0.10$). But as with the VOTER Survey results, racial attitudes' influence is likely overstated because few whites score at the measure's extremes.

Party-driven racial attitude change occurs even when Barack Obama is not a focal political actor. Polarized contexts open the door for partisanship to change racial attitudes. Further, the evidence again suggests that the growing correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes comes more from attitude change than sorting.

4.7 Partisan Lenses for All? Awareness Moderates Dynamics

The preceding results demonstrate that partisanship can shape whites' racial attitudes. Even so, I estimate an average effect throughout. Scholarship investigating the dynamics between issue orientations and partisanship suggest individual-level characteristics may condition such dynamics (Carsey and Layman, 2006). To speak to these complexities, and to offer evidence for my argument that partisans are likely responding to features in the information environment, I briefly consider whether political awareness conditions the dynamics. Awareness captures individual differences in the likelihood people encounter information and can incorporate what they hear into existing attitudes (Zaller, 1992). If partisans are responding to the information environment as I claim, then the most politically aware should exhibit the most change. In periods of low party conflict, the most aware should provide the clearest evidence of sorting on racial attitudes. In more party-

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[22]Party still matters after including additional core predispositions. Similarly, standardizing all variables supports the evidence for its greater influence. Analyses reported Appendices F and D, respectively.

[23]Descriptives: mean$_{June}$= 0.55, sd$_{June}$= 0.17; mean$_{Nov-Dec}$= 0.53, sd$_{Nov-Dec}$= 0.18.

Table 4.5: Political Awareness's Moderating Effect on the Relationship between Racial Resentment and Partisanship

| | 1992-1994 ANES | | | | 2012-2016 VOTER Survey | | | |
| | Low Awareness | | High Awareness | | Low Awareness | | High Awareness | |
	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.021	0.774*	0.057*	0.879*	0.123*	0.785*	0.167*	0.807*
	(0.038)	(0.050)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.579*	0.032	0.595*	0.165*	0.757*	0.122*	0.861*	0.128*
	(0.061)	(0.080)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Constant	0.288*	0.084	0.227*	−0.014	0.087*	0.064*	−0.046*	0.022*
	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Observations	196	196	396	396	2,732	2,732	2,782	2,782
R^2	0.320	0.553	0.471	0.706	0.475	0.617	0.745	0.767
Residual Std. Error	0.171	0.226	0.151	0.193	0.200	0.224	0.147	0.151

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

centric periods, the most politically aware should show the greatest amount of attitude change.

I focus on the 1992-1994 ANES and the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey. I use the same specification as before, but run these models separately for high and low awareness individuals who I define, respectively, as scoring at and above, or below, political awareness's median in each data set.[24] Table 4.5 presents the results. The first two columns offer no evidence for a dynamic relationship between racial resentment and partisanship for low awareness whites in the 1990s. They neither update their racial attitudes nor sort on these beliefs. The next column pair, however, reveals different patterns, and evidence in line with my expectations. The politically aware appear to update their racial attitudes ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.057$, $p < 0.05$) and also adopt new party loyalties ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.165$, $p < 0.05$), with racial attitudes offering more substantive influence.[25] When party does less to organize political conflict, those likely to receive information and have the ability to respond to it appear more willing to switch parties than update their views of black Americans. That the politically aware change more supports my claim that individuals are likely responding to the information environment.

The results from the VOTER Survey reveal that, as expected, changes in the political con-

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[24]I operationalize awareness by summing together correct responses to political fact items and scale this 0-1, with higher values denoting greater levels of political awareness (Zaller, 1992). Median$_{ANES\ 1992}$ = 0.50. Median$_{VOTER\ 2012}$ = 0.90.

[25]Even so, the difference in effects between the low and high awareness groups is imprecisely estimated in both instances ($\hat{\beta}_1$: $p = 0.40$ and $\hat{\alpha}_2$: $p = 0.12$, two-tailed). But using a truncated sophistication measure appears to drive this. A model moderating by the full awareness measure rather than the low-high dichotomy reveals a significant difference across awareness's range on sorting but not attitude change.

text alter these dynamics. Between 2012 and 2016, the least politically aware both change their racial attitudes ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.123$, $p < 0.05$) and adopt new party loyalties ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.122$, $p < 0.05$). This suggests that changes in political context can foster party-driven attitude change even for the least politically attuned. But the results also indicate that the more politically aware are more responsive, suggesting the patterns I identify come from whites responding to the information environment. High awareness whites' partisanship changes their racial attitudes ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.167$, $p < 0.05$), a substantively large difference that is also greater than that for low awareness whites.[26] Further, while the results suggest sorting on racial attitudes ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.128$, $p < 0.05$), this is substantively less important than partisanship. Only 7% of the most aware white sample place at racial resentment's poles whereas strong partisans make up 46% of the sample. While the evidence suggests the most aware are more likely to change their racial attitudes, both groups appear similarly likely to adopt new party loyalties.[27]

These results support my argument that the information environment facilitates dynamics. With the politically aware the most engaged and attentive, they should be the most responsive to information they get on race, and the present patterns support this view.

4.8   Supplementary Analyses

Additional analyses reported in the appendix bolster my conclusions. As noted throughout, analyses using standardized variables offer further evidence speaking to whether attitude change or sorting best characterize the relationship's dynamics in more or less party centric eras. Partisanship still changes racial attitudes after including other presumptively core predispositions. I also find consistent effects in other panels. Results from the 2006-2010 General Social Survey and 2010-2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study show that presidential election-year surveys do not uniquely make partisanship a cause, and the 2008-2012 CCAP panel offers additional supporting evidence. I find similar patters using cross-lagged structural equation models to address measure

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[26]Partisanship's larger effect is significant ($p < 0.05$). This difference persists when moderating by the full awareness measure rather than focusing on the low-high binary.

[27]In Appendix section 6.3 I show that the group affect measure offers broadly consistent results.

reliabilities and tame measurement error. I also replicate the ANES and VOTER Survey analyses using differenced feeling thermometers to measure partisanship, an operationalization offering complementary results. Finally, descriptive trends and a different analytical approach complement these insights.

4.9   Conclusion

I demonstrate that the relationship between partisanship and racial animus is not unidirectional as prior scholarship at least implicitly believes (Hutchings and Valentino, 2004; Kinder, 2013). Rather, partisanship's centrality in whites' belief systems grounds my claim that it can serve as a causal force, with changes in the political context moving party to the center of political conflict making this a likely outcome. I show that partisanship influences two dimensions of prejudice (Kinder, 2013) and offer evidence that it shapes stereotyping in Appendix section 6.3. Finally, while partisans of all stripes update their racial attitudes in party-centric political contexts, the politically aware change the most. This aligns with my claim that partisans are responding to the information environment.

My results recast our understanding of the relationship between two predispositions presumed to be fundamental to individuals. Racial attitudes arguably form early in life and persist in much the same form through adulthood (Henry and Sears, 2009; Goldman and Hopkins, Forthcoming). Similarly, although partisan allegiances form somewhat later, evidence suggests they typically shift most following substantial changes in the party system (Campbell et al., 1960; Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002). Racial attitudes' early development and persistence encourages placing them causally prior to other outcomes, including partisanship, but this conceptualization blinds scholars to potential changes in causal dynamics created in part by changes in the political context. That partisanship and racial attitudes appear to have similar cognitive characteristics (Sears, 1993) perhaps makes it less surprising that whites' partisan ties can motivate them to update their beliefs about black Americans in response to new information given received wisdom that similar processes motivate party switching (Green, Palmquist and Schickler, 2002).

My results also shed light on the growing racialization of partisan ties. Scholars usually present this pattern in two ways: the growing division in party loyalties between whites and nonwhites and the sorting of racially resentful and sympathetic whites into the "correct" party (Tesler, 2016). My results reveal a third path for increased racialization: partisanship itself. When partisan loyalties drive political conflict more than other concerns whites appear open to updating their racial attitudes in ways consistent with their partisan loyalties.

That whites will change their racial attitudes potentially introduces perverse incentives for political campaign strategy. For decades politicians have faced the "electoral temptations of race" for generating support through racial campaign appeals (Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Mendelberg, 2001). Republican candidates may increasingly find success using this messaging because their core supporters' increasingly negative racial attitudes give these tactics greater purchase. Moreover, my results suggest such appeals could lead to additional party-driven attitude change, therefore introducing a vicious cycle. It seems unlikely that these attitude change dynamics are a short-term phenomenon.

Recent work suggests that negative racial appeals could have even more deleterious outcomes because the set of racial appeals available to politicians may be increasing. Whereas prior work demonstrated that social norms shape how politicians talk about race(Mendelberg, 2001) new evidence suggests these prohibitions may be changing (Valentino, Neuner and Vandenbroek, 2018). Whites do not appear to shun explicit racial cues like they used to. If party elites who employ negative racial appeals are not punished, then these appeals may become increasingly common. Such an outcome could produce pernicious consequences because the current party-centric era makes party elites particularly influential sources of social norms. Elites using negative racial appeals, particularly explicitly hostile ones, can validate this same behavior in the mass public (Crandall, Miller and White II, 2018). A breakdown in norms can lead the racial tensions built into the party system to surface, and with normatively troubling consequences.

Conversely, my results also indicate that politics, through partisanship, may reduce prejudice. That white Democrats' attitudes are becoming more positive suggests that political processes need

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not exclusively amplify racial animus. Motivation appears to be a key component of effective prejudice reduction techniques(Paluck and Green, 2009) and my results point to partisanship potentially providing some of the encouragement whites need to reevaluate racial categories. Further, that the politically aware are most open to attitude change suggests some combination of information exposure and willingness and/or ability to update existing attitudes. Future work could consider the discrete factor(s) at work for Democrats to identify prejudice reduction paths.

With this in mind it is also worth noting the similarity in estimated attitude change effects in the party-centric era analyses. They offer a couple possible implications for attitude change future work could consider. Whites may require consistent information exposure to sustain changes in core attitudes. Similarly, attitudes may shift in response to one piece of information, and change again given new considerations. Finally, it could be that one party's attitudes change in one period more than the other's. Democrats and Republicans all respond to the information environment, but to different degrees given the types of information available. Appendix section 6.3, for instance, shows descriptively that Republicans' attitudes started trending more negatively before Democrats' views moved more positively. These three possibilities are not mutually exclusive and could all shed light on the similarity in effects across the different analyses in the more party-centric context.

These lessons reorient the perspective that race is fundamental to politics by demonstrating that politics are also fundamental to race. Politics shape how whites view black Americans. Despite the Founders' desires, proper institutional arrangements appear insufficient for stifling group-based antagonisms (Hamilton, Madison and Jay, 1788/2006). In fact, the processes these structures establish can stoke, or quell, racial animus.

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Chapter 5

Partisan Lenses For All or For Some?

Partisanship drives current political conflict. With issues, values, and other social cleavages increasingly aligned with party, partisan concerns appear to rule all (Layman and Carsey, 2002; Levendusky, 2009; Mason, 2018). These changes in the political context increasingly encourage people to view the world through their partisan attachments (Bartels, 2000; Hetherington, 2001). Partisanship is now a more central predisposition, increasing its causal force on attitudes that themselves have been seen as causally prior to partisan preferences in less party polarized contexts (Bartels, 2002; Goren, 2005; Lenz, 2012).

As I demonstrate in the previous chapter, this change in the political context has resulted in partisanship even shaping Whites' racial attitudes–the views and beliefs people hold about groups understood to be racial in the United States. In this argument, changes in the political context making partisanship a more central predisposition have made it more central than even racial animus. According to this reasoning, party-driven attitude change comes in part from partisanship shaping where people seek out information on social and political affairs (Zaller, 1992) and how they process what they encounter (Gaines et al., 2007; Lodge and Taber, 2013; Bolsen, Druckman and Cook, 2014). With partisan elites providing consistent, and divergent, information on race (Haney López, 2014; King and Smith, 2014), partisans have ingredients available to update their views of racial groups.

This argument relies in part on Whites recognizing, and responding to, patterns in the information environment. Changes in context may increase partisanship's influence, but it can only be influential if Whites encounter, and understand, information on race. Indeed, individual-differences in political engagement and its relationship to information seeking and related processes appear to matter for understanding the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes. For instance, Tesler (Tesler, 2016) demonstrates that as recently as 2008 the correlation between partisanship

and racial attitudes was much stronger for college-educated Whites than those without college degrees. But a process of "low-information racialization" changed this substantially during Barack Obama's first term. The argument goes that less educated individuals became more aware of party differences on race, with the connection between their party loyalties and racial attitudes strengthening in the process (Tesler, 2016).

The argument that less politically engaged individuals responded most in this period seems reasonable insofar as this position emphasizes the role played by prominent features of the elite information environment. A Black Democrat as president unambiguously shows less politically engaged individuals that the Democratic Party supports minority communities, even if he talks less about race than those holding the office before him (Gillion, 2016). This presumably eliminates differential responsiveness across levels of engagement because such information requires little effort to seek out or interpret. But other patterns in the information environment suggest that the process is potentially more complicated. Accounting for variation in political engagement helps identify which Whites exhibit the most change in their racial attitudes or party loyalties (cf. Carsey and Layman, 2006).

That individual differences in engagement may condition the dynamics between partisanship and racial attitudes follows from recent work investigating the elite information environment on race. Information streams divide by party (Haney López, 2014; King and Smith, 2014), but individual differences encourage selection into environments where this information is encountered and affect how it is interpreted. It matters little if Republican elites consistently deny race's social reality, endorse stereotypical portrayals of racial minorities (Haney López, 2014; Dixon, 2017), and promote a governing vision where politics does not take race into consideration (King and Smith, 2014) if people do not encounter these cues or understand their attitudinal implications. Similarly, liberal commentators highlighting that communities of color face persistent discrimination and racism requires hearing this information and also understanding how it fits with existing beliefs. Individual differences in the motivation to seek out information, and the ability to understand that information's attitudinal implications, likely condition any influence the elite information environ-

ment has.

Political engagement can therefore offer insight into the dynamic relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes in party-centric political contexts. I consider three related, but distinct, dimensions of political engagement to unpack attitude change dynamics. One dimension, education, in part captures individuals' cognitive skills and exposes them to norms of racial egalitarianism which may shape responses to information on race. The second, political interest, captures the motivation to seek out information that attitude change likely requires. The third, political awareness, captures both the likelihood of encountering new information as well as the facility to incorporate it into existing opinions. Results in Chapter 4 point to awareness moderating dynamics, but I consider it alongside other measures of political engagement here as an attempt to identify *how* political engagement matters.

I demonstrate that each measure of political engagement conditions the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes. But only on the degree to which Whites modify their racial attitudes. The extent to which they adopt new partisan ties exhibits no such variation. Using panel data spanning Barack Obama's administration, I find that while partisans of all stripes update their racial attitudes, the politically engaged change the most, and particularly politically engaged Democrats. The results support claims that attitude change follows from responses to the information environment. Further, the consistency in effects across engagement operationalizations suggests that neither encountering information nor the motivation to incorporate it into existing attitudes are necessary for attitude change to occur. The relative importance of each may depend on the nature of the information provided and its frequency.

5.1 Political Engagement and Attitude Change

I focus on multiple components related to political engagement to shed light on the dynamic relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes in party-centric political contexts. These are education, political interest, and political awareness. While certainly related, they vary enough such that divergences between them in patterns of attitude change can suggest potential causal

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paths related to components of political engagement: information, motivation, and ability (Luskin, 1990; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). For instance, while some claim that education in part underpins political awareness and interest (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996), other evidence supports a view that college education's effect on awareness is not direct but rather through it accounting for other factors in place before people graduate from high school (Highton, 2009). Relatedly, education, while associated with the cognitive skills political awareness includes, does not completely capture the motivation or interest required to attend consistently to political affairs. Political interest captures motivation directly and may help explain political awareness (Luskin, 1990; Highton, 2009).

5.1.1 Education, Norms, and Attitude Change

Education plays a central role in social scientific explanations for racial attitude dynamics. Education has long been argued to encourage more tolerant attitudes (Allport, 1979; McClosky and Zaller, 1984; Bobo and Licari, 1989; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1993; Sniderman and Piazza, 1993; Schuman et al., 1997; Pettigrew, 2000). Although why education matters appears mixed, Delli Carpini and Keeter (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996) propose that its influence comes in part from "providing specific instruction regarding the norms and procedures of a liberal democracy" (221). Further, by also capturing cognitive sophistication it incorporates individuals' ability to connect commitment to these social and political norms with other attitudes and behaviors (Bobo and Licari, 1989; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1993). This motivates some to claim that "a critical determinant of whether people acknowledge that blacks are entitled to the same rights as others is education" because "education not only combats racial prejudice but also inhibits racial discrimination" (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1993, 13).

Despite this evidence, education may not offer a panacea. It may actually provide Whites with new ways to express negative racial attitudes. Rather than liberalizing, education instead equips recipients to promote dominant group interests (Jackman and Muha, 1984; Jackman, 1994). Education allows Whites to continue expressing their prior racial attitudes but doing so in new ways.

It may, for instance, motivate them to view their success through the lens of individualism, a view obfuscating the impact structural factors may have in contributing to their success. Through this, the educated become "the state-of-the-art apologists for their group's social position" (Jackman and Muha, 1984, 752).

This argument aligns with the necessity of norm internalization as the link between norm exposure and attitude change. Critically, norms like racial egalitarianism matter only to the degree individuals ascribe to them importance (Crandall, Eshleman and O'Brien, 2002). Education may introduce people to social norms, but they matter most when individuals strive to follow them. For instance, people update other attitudes or behaviors to fit with the implications from adhering to a norm rather than simply seeing norms as social prohibitions to acknowledge when contexts demand (e.g., offering a socially acceptable survey response). Indeed, Federico offers such an explanation for evidence that the relationship between racial attitudes and policy opinions is stronger for college-educated Whites (Federico, 2004, see also Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo, 1996). Moreover, even if Whites understand norms of racial egalitarianism and tolerance, elites like political leaders can alter how these norms are perceived, changing the standards of normatively acceptable attitudes and behaviors (Tankard and Paluck, 2016; Crandall, Miller and White II, 2018). Education may militate against intolerance, but additional links appear necessary for producing this effect. College-educated Whites may still come to hold more intolerant attitudes over time.

5.1.2 Political Interest and Information Exposure

Alongside education, I consider political interest. Interest differs from education by capturing the motivation to pay attention to politics (Luskin, 1990). Greater levels of political interest may thus relate to the likelihood that people seek out information. Consequently, political interest can therefore help untangle whether exposure to information matters centrally, or if it is is also the ability to update one's attitudes that conditions patterns of attitude change.

Political interest may also have indirect implications for attitude change. Interest in current affairs makes the politically aware likely opinion leaders in their social networks (Lazarsfeld, Berel-

son and Gaudet, 1948; Huckfeldt, 2001). This similarly increases the likelihood that the most aware develop new views because they discuss what they've learned with their peers (Levendusky, Druckman and McLain, 2016). That Whites report talking about race less than other topics suggests political interest may condition the dynamics between racial attitudes and partisanship by making the most interested the most likely to encounter and discuss the information on race they hear from political elites or gather from the more general information environment (Pew Research Center, 2016). Politically interested Republicans would exhibit the greatest increase in negative racial attitudes, while more attuned Democrats display the greatest increase in positive views.

5.1.3 Political Awareness, Information Seeking, and Attitude Updates

Political awareness (or sophistication) serves as the final manifestation of engagement and combines the cognitive skills education in part captures, as well as the motivation to seek out new information related to political interest. Political awareness thus captures individual differences in the likelihood that people encounter information allowing for changes in racial attitudes and also have the ability to understand what they encounter (Zaller, 1992; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996). Political awareness divides individuals according to their "intellectual or cognitive engagement with public affairs" and the likelihood of "absorbing political communications" (Zaller, 1992, 22). If elite rhetoric, and the information environment more generally, matter as I claim, then the most politically aware should exhibit the greatest attitude change because they are the most likely to encounter information on race and also possess the other considerations necessary for incorporating this new information into their existing attitudes. Education and interest alone may not condition effects, suggesting cognitive skills and information exposure alone are insufficient for attitude change. If this occurs, and a moderating effect appears for political awareness, then attitude change likely follows both being exposed to new information as well has having the capacity to integrate this information into existing attitudes.

5.2   Data and Methods

I rely on data from several sources to assess whether and how political sophistication conditions the dynamic relationship between whites' partisanship and racial attitudes. The 2008-2012 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) and the 2012-2016 Democracy Fund VOTER Survey panel data sets serve as my primary sources given included survey items.[1] I supplement these with three panel data sets from the General Social Survey spanning 2006-2014. These cover, respectively, 2006-08-10, 2008-10-12, and 2010-12-14.

I use multiple measures of racial attitudes to capture prejudice's many varieties (Kinder, 2013). Racial resentment serves as my primary measure of interest (see Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Sears and Henry, 2005; Tarman and Sears, 2005; Kam and Burge, 2018). Rather than expressing hostility toward blacks in terms of biological inferiority and whether they have an innate capacity for success, whites' attitudes are grounded in evaluations of whether blacks will try hard enough to succeed (Kinder and Sanders, 1996, Ch. 5). Higher levels of racial resentment correspond with thinking (1) racial discrimination no longer provides a serious obstacle to blacks' prospects for a good life so (2) blacks' continuing disadvantages largely come from their unwillingness to work hard enough, and thus (3) their increased advantage through programs like affirmative action is unwarranted (Tarman and Sears, 2005). This approach relies on a validated measure of racial animus (Tarman and Sears, 2005; DeSante, 2013; Banks, 2014; Kam and Burge, 2018) and provides a consistent comparison with prior work (e.g., Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016). Even so, some contend it conflates principled conservatism with racial animus (Sniderman and Carmines, 1997; Huddy and Feldman, 2009). To address this concern, and to shed light on potential variation in causal dynamics by dimension of prejudice, I also consider measures of group favorability and stereotyping.

I operationalize *racial resentment* with four items in the Kinder and Sanders (Kinder and Sanders, 1996) racial resentment battery introduced in the prior chapter. I sum together the items

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[1]Survey participants come from YouGov's non-random respondent pool with completed surveys then weighted back to population benchmarks. Interviews for the CCAP were conducted in March 2008 and June-July 2012. The VOTER Survey interviews were completed in December 2011 and November-December 2016.

Table 5.1: Correlations between Engagement Measures

	College Degree	Political Interest	Political Awareness
College Degree	—	0.16	0.27
Political Interest	0.17	—	0.54
Political Awareness	0.24	0.47	—

Note: Correlations for the 2008-2012 CCAP are contained in the lower triangle. The upper triangle contains the correlations from the VOTER Survey.

and rescale this measure to run 0-1, with higher values indicating greater racial resentment. I operationalize *partisanship* using the ANES branched party identification question, present in all data collections. Like racial resentment, I scale it to run 0-1, with 0 denoting strong Democrats and 1 indicating strong Republicans.

I measure education, political interest, and political awareness as follows. Education enters as an indicator for whether or not someone possesses a college degree.[2] I capture political interest using an item where respondents reported how interested they are in politics, with responses including "not that much," "somewhat," and "very much." To measure political awareness I sum together correct responses to factual political knowledge items (Zaller, 1992; Price and Zaller, 1993).[3] Supporting the view that these are related but distinct constructs, Table 5.1 provides the correlations between the three moderators in the CCAP (lower triangle) and VOTER survey (upper triangle). Finally, consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Valentino and Sears, 2005; Tesler, 2016) I focus on non-Hispanic Whites.

To evaluate the dynamic relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes I use a cross-lagged regression approach (Finkel, 1995). This framework relates lagged racial attitudes (*racial attitudes$_{t-1}$*) to present partisanship (*PID$_t$*) and lagged partisanship (*PID$_{t-1}$*) to current racial attitudes (*racial attitudes$_t$*), after accounting for a lagged dependent variable as well. But I modify this by interacting each lagged predisposition by the moderator of interest (MOD$_{t-1}$). Equations 1 and 2 below show this

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[2]Nearly 33% of White CCAP respondents meet this qualification. For the VOTER Survey this is 40% of participants.

[3]There are 11 such items in the 2008-2012 CCAP and 10 in the VOTER survey. I scale this index 0-1, with higher values denoting greater political awareness (2008-2012 CCAP: $M = 0.76, SD = 0.26, \alpha = 0.81$. 2012-2016 VOTER Survey: $M = 0.57, SD = 0.28, \alpha = 0.85$). Although items vary across surveys, all focus on current knowledge like identifying political figures and which party controls the House.

mathematically.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\textit{racial attitudes}_{i,t} = \ & \beta_0 + \beta_1 PID_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{racial attitudes}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 MOD_{i,t-1} \\
& + \ \beta_4 PID_{i,t-1} * MOD_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 \textit{racial attitudes}_{i,t-1} * MOD_{i,t-1} \\
& + \ \varepsilon \quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad (5.1) \\
PID_{i,t} = \ & \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 PID_{i,t-1} + \alpha_2 \textit{racial attitudes}_{i,t-1} + \alpha_3 MOD_{i,t-1} \\
& + \ \alpha_4 PID_{i,t-1} * MOD_{i,t-1} + \alpha_5 \textit{racial attitudes}_{i,t-1} * MOD_{i,t-1} \\
& + \ \upsilon \quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad (5.2)
\end{aligned}
$$

I can assess causal dynamics by relating how much change in a variable over time can be attributed to the other variable in the relationship. Parameter pairs β_1 and β_4 and α_2 and α_5 reveal the cross-lagged effects. They denote how much lagged partisanship (β_1) and lagged racial attitudes (α_2) predict current values of the other construct and whether this varies by individual characteristics (β_4 and α_5). The remaining parameters provide information on each predisposition's temporal stability (β_2 and α_1) and whether these stabilities similarly vary with individual characteristics (β_5 and α_4). If β_4 and α_5 are reliably different from zero, then this reveals for whom partisanship or racial attitudes has a stronger causal influence. If a college education engenders tolerance, it should promote resistance to attitude change among Republicans and encourage change for Democrats, with evidence for this proposition coming from a negative coefficient on β_4; non-college educated partisans polarize more. The partisan gap in racial attitudes decreases as education increases. If political interest facilitates encountering new information, then the combined effect of β_1 and β_4 should be positive. Similarly, if political awareness facilitates receiving and incorporating new considerations into existing attitudes, then the combined effect of β_1 and β_4 should be also positive. Party-driven attitude change occurs most among the most aware.

5.3 Education Bolsters Attitude Change

I begin with an assessment of whether education conditions the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship. Again, education's influence come through several mechanisms. First, it may in part capture individuals' cognitive skills and thus the ability to integrate new information into existing attitudes. It may also matter by exposing Whites to norms about racial equality that constrain adopting more negative racial attitudes. At the same time, norms require internalization before they shape attitudes, and education may itself allow Whites to rearticulate racial attitudes in ways that perpetuate negative views.

Table 5.2 demonstrates that a college education does condition the dynamic relationship between partisanship and racial resentment. The first column reveals that partisans of all stripes update their racial attitudes but those with more education exhibit greater levels of polarization. The difference between strong partisans without college degrees grows by nearly 0.11 points ($p < 0.05$), nearly 2 response categories on an item. As the left panel of Figure 5.1 demonstrates, this partisan gap increases to nearly 0.16 among college-educated partisans, although the over 0.04 point difference is imprecisely estimated ($p < 0.07$). This evidence does not support an argument that education is a moderating force promoting tolerance.

Nor does racial resentment's cross-lagged effect vary by education level. Whites are equally likely to sort on their racial attitudes. Similarly, college-educated respondents' partisan ties exhibit no greater stability than non-college educated individuals' partisan loyalties during Obama's first term. Education differentiates Whites in the degree to which they update their racial attitudes but not in the extent to which they modify their partisan attachments.

These causal patterns persist during Obama's second term in office. What changes, however, is the size of the subsequent partisan gap in racial resentment. Non-college educated partisans diverge by about 0.14 points ($p < 0.05$). But more impressively, college-educated partisans diverge by 0.20 points ($p < 0.05$), over three response categories on an item, although as the right panel in Figure 5.1 reveals, this 0.06 point increase is precisely estimate. This is equivalent to going from strongly agreeing that Blacks simply need to try harder to get ahead in December 2011

Table 5.2: Education's Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	2008-2012 CCAP		2012-2016 VOTER Survey	
	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.109*	0.814*	0.138*	0.801*
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.009)
—*College Degree$_{t-1}$	0.046	0.005	0.062*	−0.025
	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.020)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.711*	0.084*	0.831*	0.140*
	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.014)
—*College Degree$_{t-1}$	0.034	0.034	−0.052*	−0.008
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.025)	(0.027)
College Degree$_{t-1}$	−0.087*	−0.043*	−0.035*	0.003
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Constant	0.161*	0.051*	0.019*	0.037*
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Observations	2,204	2,204	6,003	6,003
R^2	0.648	0.770	0.617	0.682
Residual Std. Error	0.164	0.177	0.178	0.191

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

to disagreeing with this statement in December 2016. This reinforces the view that rather than serving as a militating force, education appears in fact to be an accelerate for attitude polarization.

Turning to column 4, the results reflect the effects from Obama's first term in office. Racial resentment leads to altered party loyalties regardless of education level. Those without college degrees scoring at racial resentment's poles separate by 0.140 points on the partisanship measure, nearly a full category on the 7-point item ($p < 0.05$), and those with college degrees look no different ($\hat{\alpha}_5 = -0.008, p > 0.1$). Education consistently conditions one side of the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes.

These results show that far from guarding against external forces encouraging more negative racial attitudes, a college education appears to help identify which Whites are most responsive to the political environment. And this is particularly the case in the VOTER Survey data. While attitude change occurred regardless of degree status, college-educated partisans became the most

Figure 5.1: Partisan gap in racial resentment$_t$ by college degree. Results based on models in Table 5.2. Bars provide the proportion of respondents with and without a college degree in each model.

polarized in each period.

These results also shed light on the low information racialization of partisanship account Tesler (Tesler, 2016) offers. He demonstrates that the correlation between partisanship and racial resentment increases substantially for non-college educated Whites between 2008 and 2012, lagging behind changes among college-educated Whites. He argues that these patterns accord with Obama's presidency finally clarifying for this group that the Democratic Party champions racial and ethnic minorities, and this encourages these previously unaware individuals to adopt new party loyalties. The results here however suggest that this story does not seem one of low information individuals uniquely aligning their partisan ties with their racial attitudes. Rather, the phenomenon appears to be one of non-college educated Whites being *as likely* to switch parties as their college-educated counterparts.[4] Instead, what's unique in this competitive political context is that Whites with col-

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[4]Applying the moderated cross-lagged modeling approach to data from the 1992-1994 ANES demonstrates that racial attitudes drive sorting in this less polarized era only among the college-educated. A decade and a half later the political context has changed such that even less educated individuals can effectively align their partisan ties with their racial attitudes. College-educated respondents are also the only group of the pair where evidence suggests partisanship leads to racial attitude updates in the 1990s ($\hat{\beta}_1 + \hat{\beta}_4 = 0.086$; 95% CI [0.01, 0.16]). But the difference across education

lege degrees exhibit larger changes in their racial attitudes.

An as-yet-untested implication from a college education, however, is that it may also constrain *how* Whites change their attitudes. Education may expose Whites to structural explanations for inequality that they had not encountered before (Wodtke, 2018). Or it could motivate Whites to emphasize individual over structural explanations for social outcomes as a way to justify their privileged position (Jackman and Muha, 1984; Jackman, 1994). Finally, Gomez and Wilson (Gomez and Wilson, 2006) argue that individual differences in cognitive sophistication produce different attributional styles such that more educated individuals may be more likely to adopt a structuralist over individualist perspective. These arguments suggest that attitude change may be isolated to specific subcomponents of racial resentment according to one's educational background.

To address this I divide the racial resentment measure into its structuralist and individualist sub-components.[5] Although this procedure does not allow for as precisely measuring these sub-dimensions, it can still point to where on the construct attitude change is occurring. If attributional styles affect where attitude change occurs, then temporal attitudinal differences by education level should be greater on the discrimination items than the individualism items. Going further, these analyses can offer some suggestive insight into what types of information partisans may be updating on. If one subdimension of racial resentment witnesses more change than the other, then this suggests that the types of information partisans are updating on connect more with this component.

I present the results from this investigation in Table 5.3. The first four columns use the 2008-2012 CCAP while the second four use the VOTER Survey. I focus first on the individualist dimension in the CCAP data. The estimates in the first column indicate that partisanship is related to attitude change among non-College educated Whites ($\beta_1 = 0.139$; $p < 0.05$), a difference increasing by 0.10 points for the college-educated. But attitude change is not isolated. The estimates in the third column indicate that these results also extend to the structuralist dimension. The partisan gap in attitudes increases by 0.122 points for those without college degrees ($p < 0.05$), and this

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level is insignificant ($p > 0.1$). I report these results in the appendix.

[5]The two individualism items are *special favors* and *try hard*. The two structural items are *deserve less* and *past discrimination*.

Table 5.3: College Education's Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Subdimensions of Racial Resentment

| | 2008-2012 CCAP | | | | 2012-2016 VOTER Survey | | | |
| | Individualist | | Structuralist | | Individualist | | Structuralist | |
	RR_t	Partisanship$_t$	RR_t	Partisanship$_t$	RR_t	Partisanship$_t$	RR_t	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.139*	0.814*	0.122*	0.823*	0.118*	0.803*	0.214*	0.813*
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.009)
—*College Degree$_{t-1}$	0.100*	0.018	0.063*	0.007	0.125*	−0.013	0.009	−0.028
	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)
RR Subdimension$_{t-1}$	0.591*	0.087*	0.650*	0.045*	0.765*	0.120*	0.677*	0.103*
	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)
—*College Degree$_{t-1}$	0.031	0.001	−0.029	0.051	−0.065*	−0.026	0.027	0.015
	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.024)
College Degree$_{t-1}$	−0.136*	−0.029	−0.058*	−0.059*	−0.070*	0.006	−0.072*	−0.015
	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.015)
Constant	0.241*	0.051*	0.188*	0.075*	0.084*	0.050*	0.080*	0.056*
	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Observations	2,204	2,204	2,204	2,204	6,003	6,003	6,003	6,003
R^2	0.559	0.771	0.545	0.769	0.560	0.681	0.486	0.680
Residual Std. Error	0.197	0.177	0.199	0.177	0.204	0.191	0.224	0.191

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

difference increases by over 0.06 points for those with college degrees ($p < 0.05$). The left panel in Figure 5.2 provides these results visually.

It could also be the case that, in addition to differences by education in where attitude change occurs, that education also differentiates Whites in the stability of their racial attitudes. Lacking the exposure to structuralist explanations for inequality that education may provide (Wodtke, 2018), this dimension should exhibit more stability among the college educated. The estimates in Table 5.3 offer no support for this. In neither data collection does either dimension of racial resentment exhibit differential stability by education level.

Turning to patterns of partisan change, the estimates in columns 2 and 4 offer no evidence for a differences by education level. Both individualist ($\alpha_2 = 0.087$; $p < 0.05$) and structuralist $\alpha_2 = 0.045$; $p < 0.05$) components motivate changes in partisan attachments among those without college degrees. And these differences do not change appreciably for the college-educated. The impact of structuralist explanations does increase if Whites have a college degree, but this 0.051 point difference is imprecise ($p > 0.10$).

Table 5.3's remaining columns offer estimates from the same models using the VOTER survey

Figure 5.2: Partisan gap in racial resentment_t by college degree and subdimension of racial resentment. Results based on models in Table 5.3. Bars provide the proportion of respondents with and without a college degree in each model.

data. The results reinforce those in the CCAP data. Columns 5 and 7 demonstrate that White partisans without college degrees polarize in their racial attitudes on both the individualist ($\beta_1 = 0.118$; $p < 0.05$) and structuralist dimensions ($\beta_1 = 0.214$; $p < 0.05$). But as Figure 5.2 demonstrates, while the partisan attitude gap is larger among the college educated on the individualist dimension ($\beta_4 = 0.125$; $p < 0.05$), no difference exists by degree status on the structuralist dimension.

Turning to sorting, the estimates in columns 6 and 8 offer no evidence the effect of racial resentment on changing party attachments difference based on degree status. For non-College educated Whites, variation along both subdimensions of racial resentment is related to divergent partisanship come 2016 ($\alpha_2 = 0.120$ and $\alpha_2 = 0.103$, respectively. $p < 0.05$). Their degree-holding counterparts are little different.

These results offer additional evidence that education offers insight into which Whites are most likely to update their racial attitudes. But it does not differentiate between individuals in their likelihood of adopting different party attachments. Further, as the patterns in Figure 5.2 make clear,

college educated White partisans diverge in their subsequent racial attitudes to the same degree on each dimension of racial resentment, doing so across time periods. This outcome is at odds with a view that a college education should increase the degree to which individualism features as an explanation for social disparities among dominant group individuals (Jackman and Muha, 1984; Jackman, 1994). This is not to say the argument offers no insight; rather, the explanation may only hold for some Whites, a possibility I consider later.

The patterns among non-college educated Whites run counter to arguments that education necessarily fosters structuralist explanations for outcomes. Partisanship does not disproportionately affect the individualist subdimension among non-college educated Whites. Indeed, it is even more noteworthy that the partisan divide on the structuralist dimension is greater than the differences on the individualist one in the VOTER Survey, and compared to both gaps in the CCAP survey. This change between Barack Obama's first and second terms may come from changes in the type of information available. Greater attention to structuralist explanations may be seen in attention to police violence and discussion of legacies of discrimination among Democrats, with this information having attitudinal implications. Some scholars argue a college education may introduce Whites to structuralist explanations for inequality which even if not liberalizing attitudes in that moment are present to structure information received later (Wodtke, 2018). The change in results across periods may thus reflect in some part an equalization across education groups in the types of information on race that Whites have available to incorporate into their attitudes.

5.4   Political Interest Also Encourages Attitude Change

I now turn to investigating self-reported political interest. While education in part captures cognitive sophistication and exposure to norms of racial equality, political interest accounts for the willingness to seek out information. If simple information exposure conditions the dynamics between partisanship and racial resentment, then more politically interested partisans should exhibit the greatest degree of attitude change.

Given the discrete nature of the interest item, I enter it into the cross-lagged models as sepa-

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rate indicators for respondents reporting moderate ("somewhat interested") and high ("very much interested") interest.[6] I report the estimates from the cross-lagged models in Table 5.4. Focusing first on attitude change, among the least interested partisanship does not shape racial resentment ($\beta_1 = 0.002$). But things change as reported political interest increases. As the left panel in Figure 5.3 demonstrates visually, while the partisan gap in attitudes is different from 0 among those with moderate levels of political interest (0.069, $p < 0.05$), this difference is not meaningfully greater than those reporting low levels of interest in politics. Only the most politically interested group, over 60% of the sample, see a uniquely large difference in party-driven attitude change in this period. This group divides by over 0.17 points, nearly 3 categories on one of the scale items.

Considering patterns of partisan change, the estimates in column 2 offer no evidence for differences by level of political interest. While the relationship between racial resentment and subsequent party attachments is imprecisely estimated among those reporting low levels of political interest ($\alpha_2 = 0.111$; $p < 0.08$), the marginal effect of racial resentment for the moderate (0.091) and high groups (0.106) is distinguishable from 0 but not from one another.

The estimates in columns 3 and 4 offer a slightly different account of political interest's conditioning effect during Barack Obama's second term. Here, partisanship is related to changes in racial resentment among the least politically interested ($\beta_1 = 0.119$), and this is similar in magnitude to moderately interested partisans. But as the right panel in Figure 5.3 demonstrates, partisanship disproportionately changes attitudes for Whites reporting high political interest. The 0.19 point difference between strong partisans here corresponds to a change of more than 3 categories on one of the scale items.

When it comes to changes in partisanship in this period, however, patterns switch. Interestingly, in contrast to the 2008-2012 period Whites low in political interest do not sort on their racial attitudes. But those at moderate and high levels of interest do. Moving from the minimum to the maximum on racial resentment yields a change in subsequent party attachments of 0.20 and

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[6]Doing so accounts for potential non-linearities in the interaction effects as well as sharp distributional differences between categories that may affect common support (Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu, Forthcoming).

Table 5.4: Political Interest's Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	2008-2012 CCAP		2012-2016 VOTER Survey	
	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.002	0.851*	0.119*	0.828*
	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.025)	(0.027)
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$	0.067	−0.037	−0.009	−0.024
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.030)
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$	0.172*	−0.036	0.071*	−0.035
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.676*	0.111	0.723*	0.005
	(0.058)	(0.063)	(0.041)	(0.043)
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$	0.074	−0.020	0.137*	0.192*
	(0.064)	(0.070)	(0.045)	(0.047)
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$	0.036	−0.005	0.083	0.121*
	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.043)	(0.045)
Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$	−0.099*	0.003	−0.089*	−0.150*
	(0.050)	(0.055)	(0.034)	(0.036)
High Interest$_{t-1}$	−0.172*	−0.018	−0.120*	−0.110*
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.034)
Constant	0.266*	0.042	0.106*	0.145*
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.031)	(0.032)
Observations	2,204	2,204	5,970	5,970
R^2	0.655	0.771	0.620	0.695
Residual Std. Error	0.163	0.177	0.178	0.186

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Low political interest is the omitted category.

0.13, respectively, magnitudes that are indistinguishable from one another. While White partisans of all stripes change their racial attitudes between December 2011 and December 2016, only the least politically interested do not update their partisanship. While these results contrast with those considering variation by education, such a moderation effect appears rather inconsequential substantively because so few Whites in the VOTER Survey report low levels of political interest. Only 6% do, compared with 29% and 65% for moderate and high levels, respectively.

Changes between data collections in the relationship between partisanship and attitude change among those reporting low political interest are also noteworthy. These differences imply some change in the information environment. That the low and moderate groups display similar amounts

Figure 5.3: Partisan gap in racial resentment$_t$ by political interest. Results based on models in Table 5.4. Bars provide the distribution of political interest in each model.

of attitude change between 2012 and 2016 is particularly impressive. Information streams on race may have changed during Barack Obama's second term in office if those largely uninterested in politics display attitude change in similar measure as moderately interested individuals.

In conjunction with the education analyses, the results here point to information exposure as an important component of attitude change. Education offers insight into whether and how Whites may incorporate new information into their existing attitudes. The present results demonstrate that those motivated to seek out new information are most likely change their attitudes.

5.5 Awareness Drives Attitude Polarization

I conclude with an assessment of political awareness's conditioning role. It in part combines education's cognitive skills with political interest's motivation to seek out new information. I follow traditional approaches and operationalize political awareness by summing correct responses to a series of knowledge items included in each survey. I report these results in Table 5.5.[7]

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[7]Additional diagnostics recommended by Hainmueller, Mummolo and Xu (Forthcoming) establish that common support exists across levels of awareness and that the linear interaction effect assumption holds.

Table 5.5: Political Awareness's Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	2008-2012 CCAP		2012-2016 VOTER Survey	
	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.050*	0.826*	0.087*	0.761*
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.021)	(0.023)
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$	0.137*	−0.015	0.075*	0.057
	(0.038)	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.032)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.667*	0.071	0.564*	0.120*
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.034)
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$	0.079	0.041	0.323*	−0.006
	(0.053)	(0.057)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Political Awareness$_{t-1}$	−0.209*	−0.070	−0.342*	−0.098*
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.030)
Constant	0.257*	0.077*	0.279*	0.116*
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.025)
Observations	2,204	2,204	5,514	5,514
R^2	0.654	0.771	0.634	0.684
Residual Std. Error	0.163	0.176	0.174	0.190

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

The results contained in Table 5.5's first column complement those from the preceding sections, demonstrating that political awareness does indeed modify partisanship's influence on racial resentment during Barack Obama's first term in office. Partisans across awareness's range become more divided in their views of Black Americans. But this is also a pattern most representative of the most politically attuned. Strong partisans incorrectly answering all 11 of the knowledge items (some 3% of the sample) became on average 0.05 points more divided in their racial attitudes ($p < 0.05$). But those correctly answering all of these items (13%) became on average 0.14 points more polarized in their evaluations of Black Americans ($p < 0.05$). These differences relate to between 1 and 3 categories on one of the racial resentment items. Figure 5.4's left panel presents these results visually, demonstrating that partisanship is more influential among the most politically aware.

Awareness also only moderates one direction of the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship. The results presented in column 2 offer no evidence that individuals at different levels

of political awareness were more or less likely to sort on their racial attitudes during Obama's first term. Nor is there much evidence to suggest political awareness increases partisanship's stability. Individuals during Obama's first term adopt new partisan loyalties, but this is a pattern consistent for most everyone.[8] This suggests that during Obama's first term Whites could more easily map racial attitudes to partisanship than they can incorporate cues on race in light of their partisan loyalties, that more aware individuals are more likely to encounter the information required to motivate attitude change, or both.

Turning to Obama's second term, the third and fourth columns in Table 5.5 offer little evidence for a change in dynamics. Attitude change again occurs across all levels of awareness, but much more among the more aware. Moreover, the partisan attitude gap between the least and most aware individuals is similar to the 2008-2012 results, patterns reinforced by the right panel in Figure 5.4. Among the least aware (1% of the sample), partisans diverge by about 0.09 points in racial resentment ($p < 0.05$), a slight 0.04 point increase over the first term. The partisan divide increases to 0.16 points for the most politically aware (33% of the sample, $p < 0.05$). This period also sees awareness produce more stable racial attitudes. For the most aware individuals, partisanship is a stronger causal force even as racial resentment exhibits much greater stability. Finally, the results in column 4 demonstrate that racial resentment similarly motivates sorting, but this occurs to the same degree by level of awareness. The results also suggest that partisanship is somewhat more stable among the most aware ($p = 0.071$). Awareness appears to make partisanship a more durable attachment.

These results support the argument that political awareness conditions the dynamic relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes. The politically aware exhibit the greatest amount of attitude change, and this holds for both Barack Obama's first and second terms in office. The rise of the Black Lives Matter movement and increased attention to racial discrimination during Obama's second term appear to have not changed the dynamics. A general context of party-centered polit-

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[8]Only the effect for the racial attitudes of the least aware individuals does not differ from 0 at conventional levels ($p = 0.051$)

Figure 5.4: Partisan gap in racial resentment$_t$ by political awareness. Results based on models in Table 5.5. Bars provide the distribution of political awareness in each model.

ical conflict that sees ongoing racial discourse appears an apt characterization of the period. The results also provide additional support for my argument that attitude change comes from patterns in the elite information environment. The greatest attitude polarization occurs among those most likely to experience, and incorporate new information on race. Awareness also conditions partisanship's effect on racial attitudes, but does not differentially affect racial resentment's effect on partisanship. This suggests that the ingredients needed to map racial beliefs to partisanship are shared equally across awareness levels. What varies by political awareness is the willingness and ability to incorporate new information on race into existing attitudes.

But an alternative explanation for these differences is that the greater facility for change among politically aware partisans comes from differences in how they respond to the racial resentment items. As noted in the education analyses, some argue that differences in cognitive sophistication , which political awareness in part captures, introduce different attributions for social phenomena (Gomez and Wilson, 2006).

To address this I again divide racial resentment into its individualist and structuralist compo-

Table 5.6: Political Awareness's Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Subdimensions of Racial Resentment

| | 2008-2012 CCAP | | | | 2012-2016 VOTER Survey | | | |
| | Individualist | | Structuralist | | Individualist | | Structuralist | |
	RR_t	$Partisanship_t$	RR_t	$Partisanship_t$	RR_t	$Partisanship_t$	RR_t	$Partisanship_t$
$Partisanship_{t-1}$	0.069*	0.817*	0.049	0.835*	0.032	0.767*	0.112*	0.755*
	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.023)
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$	0.173*	0.008	0.170*	−0.019	0.165*	0.053	0.111*	0.082*
	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.036)	(0.031)
RR Subdimension$_{t-1}$	0.465*	0.097*	0.629*	0.005	0.474*	0.045	0.480*	0.116*
	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.029)
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$	0.230*	−0.018	0.006	0.100	0.328*	0.065	0.305*	−0.035
	(0.055)	(0.050)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.045)	(0.039)
Political Awareness$_{t-1}$	−0.349*	−0.043	−0.181*	−0.115*	−0.422*	−0.142*	−0.342*	−0.098*
	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.027)
Constant	0.404*	0.065*	0.277*	0.120*	0.396*	0.165*	0.309*	0.126*
	(0.026)	(0.023)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.022)
Observations	2,204	2,204	2,204	2,204	5,514	5,514	5,514	5,514
R^2	0.568	0.772	0.551	0.770	0.576	0.683	0.505	0.683
Residual Std. Error	0.195	0.176	0.198	0.177	0.200	0.190	0.220	0.190

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

nents, presenting the results from this exercise Table 5.6. I focus first on the attitude change results using the individualist subdimension in the CCAP data. The first column offers evidence that even among the least aware, partisans divide in individualist explanations ($p < 0.05$). This 0.07 point gap increase by 0.17 points among the most politically attentive. Further, similar patterns manifest on the structuralist dimension. Partisanship still changes racial attitudes among the least politically aware, although this difference is imprecisely estimated ($p = 0.064$). But as with the individualist dimension, the gap between the least and most attentive partisans increases by 0.17 points. Figure 5.5 provides this comparison visually. The left panel shows that the partisan gap in racial resentment does not vary between subdimensions across levels of political awareness.

Turning to the relationship between racial resentment's subdimensions and changes in partisanship, the results presented in columns 2 and 4 offer no evidence that political awareness condition's racial resentment's effect. Among the least politically aware, the individualist dimension is related to a divide in subsequent party attachments of nearly 0.10 points ($p < .05$). And this gap only modestly declines across political awareness's range ($\hat{\alpha}_5 = -0.018$; $p > .10$). At the same time, individualist attributions appear to do more to explain party switching than structuralist. Among the least politically aware, variation in structuralist explanations are unrelated to subsequent party

Figure 5.5: Partisan gap in racial resentment$_t$ by political awareness and subdimension of racial resentment. Results based on models in Table 5.6 and include 95% confidence intervals. Bars provide the distribution of political awareness in each model.

attachments ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.005$; $p > .10$). The gap increases, however, as political awareness increases, although this difference is imprecisely estimate ($\hat{\alpha}_5 = 0.100$; $p = 0.057$).

The remaining columns in Table 5.6 offer results largely consistent with the CCAP. Considering first changes in racial resentment, columns 5 and 7 reveal that party-driven attitude change occurs on both subdimensions, and for most Whites. As Figure 5.5 shows, increases in political awareness are related to larger party divides on both the individualist and structuralist dimensions. But in contrast to the CCAP data, the difference between the least and most politically aware is greater on the individualist rather than structuralist dimensions, evidence inconsistent with attributional differences differentially shaping attitude change. Perhaps most impressively from this perspective, the least politically aware exhibit more change on the structuralist dimension ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.032$; $p > 0.10$) instead of the individualist dimension ($\hat{\beta}_1 = 0.112$; $p < 0.05$).

Columns 6 and 8 reinforce the uniqueness of the structuralist dimension in this period while

also offering no evidence for variation in sorting by political awareness. For the least aware, individualist explanations lead to a 0.045 point change in party attachments between 2012 and 2016 among the least aware, but this difference is imprecisely estimate ($p > 0.10$). Nor is does this difference vary between them and the most aware ($\hat{\alpha}_5 = 0.065$; $p > 0.10$). This changes for the structuralist dimension. Here, a min-max change on this dimension relates to over an 0.11 point difference in partisanship ($p < 0.05$). While this effect declines across the range of political awareness, the difference is slight and insignificant ($\hat{\alpha}_5 = -0.035$; $p > 0.10$).

Taken together, the results offer no evidence that attitude change comes more from shifts in individualist or structuralist explanations. If attributional differences shape responses to the racial resentment items, then these same differences in cognitive style would suggest divergent attitude change patterns between more and less politically attentive Whites. That partisanship's effect does not clearly vary across dimensions is evidence at odds with this claim. If anything, that partisanship does more to change attitudes on the structuralist dimension among the less politically aware in the VOTER data is further evidence against the claim that attributional differences introduced by cognitive style should shape responses to the racial resentment items.

The one difference in effects between the CCAP and VOTER Survey suggests a potential change in the information partisans are updating on. While each period sees partisanship change racial resentment's subdimensions to the same degree for high awareness individuals, among the least aware partisanship has a greater affect on structuralist rather individualist attributions in the VOTER Survey. This is informative if low awareness individuals are thought to lack the motivation to update arguably more complex attributions (Gomez and Wilson, 2006). Further, the shift between periods suggests that 2012-2016 may have included more information related to the structuralist dimension, providing the least aware with considerations they otherwise had not encountered.

5.6   Political Engagement's Conditioning Effect Varies by Party

Politically engaged partisans, no matter the operationalization, exhibit the greatest amount of racial attitude change in the party-centric context of Barack Obama's administration. But the analyses assume that engagement conditions the relationship between party affiliation and racial attitudes similarly for Democrats and Republicans. Indeed the estimates from the cross-lagged models simply look at how variation in partisanship ranging from strong Democrats to strong Republicans relates to subsequent racial attitudes. It could be the case that engagement has differential effects by party. Further, this possibility can help unpack what work engagement is doing given the consistency in results between measures.

I focus here only on patterns of racial attitude change rather than partisan switching. I modify slightly the preceding estimation strategy. Instead of entering partisanship as a single measure, I incorporate indicators for Republicans and pure Independents, coding independent leaners with their respective parties. I then interact these indicators with the prior political engagement measures. The comparisons then allow for considering variation in the effect of each engagement dimension on changes in racial resentment, with the estimates using White Democrats as the benchmark.

I present the results visually, reserving the model estimates for the Appendix. I use the model estimates to predict levels of racial resentment by party while varying political engagement. This takes a sample average individual in racial resentment at $t - 1$ and predicts their attitudes at t. I focus here on partisan identifiers, ignoring pure Independents. The panels in Figure 5.6 show how political engagement does comparatively little to condition Republicans' racial attitudes (dashed lines), but substantially influences Democrats' (solid lines). In one instance political engagement appears to meaningfully differentiate Republicans' in their later levels of racial resentment. The predicted values in the bottom right panel suggest that variation in political awareness is related to changes in Republicans' levels of racial resentment between 2012 and 2016, such that more aware partisans are actually less resentful than their least aware peers. It is also noteworthy that college educated Republicans resemble their non-college educated co-partisans, suggesting that any liberalizing effects a college education may provide are contingent and potentially overridden

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
Figure 5.6: Predicted level of racial resentment$_t$. Results based on models in Table A.20.

by partisan concerns.[9]

But throughout, the most engaged Democrats demonstrate the greatest amount of change. The relative similarity among Republicans, but variation among Democrats, further supports the view that partisans are responding to the information environment. For instance, the stability in Republicans' attitudes suggests that the information stream they encounter is consistent with their existing attitudes (Zaller, 1992). Modest increases come from this information reinforcing existing attitudes. Republicans' realities on race between 20008 and 2016 appear largely consistent with what they experienced before this period.

Differences by party suggest that Democrats have encountered information on race that goes against their existing attitudes, and they have the motivation update their attitudes. This information, moreover, is likely different from prior information. The patterns of change are consistent

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[9]The model estimates in Table A.20 do not suggest that these results are driven by more engaged Republicans' attitudes changing more and bringing them in line with their less engaged co-partisans, or vice versa. In some instances engaged Republicans exhibit less change than the less engaged while in other cases they exhibit more change or look no different. These patterns are inconsistent by engagement measure and between time period.

with Zaller's (1992) argument that one-side information flows on unfamiliar issues are more likely to see more engaged individuals change their attitudes (165). Applied to the present context, this could be modified slightly to consist of unfamiliar or unexpected information on a known issue delivered by co-partisans.

Finally, separating racial resentment into its structuralist and individualist components does not offer any evidence for degree of change varying consistently across dimension for Democrats or Republicans. Additional results reported in the Appendix offer evidence that engagement does more to differentiate attitude change among Democrats, but the degree of change is similar on each subdimension. Further, as with the results in Figure 5.6 engaged Republicans resemble their less engaged co-partisans with little variation by subdimension. These results suggest that even within party there's little difference in how Whites are updating their attitudes. Changes in racial resentment appear global in nature.

5.7   Political Engagement and the Dynamics of Group Affect and Stereotyping

The preceding analyses consistently show that political engagement in its various guises moderates the relationship between partisanship and racial resentment. But prejudice takes myriad forms, with distinct origins and political connections (Kinder, 2013). To address this I extend the preceding analyses to consider stereotyping and affect. Together these dimensions capture category evaluations, specific and broad. By containing category information that exaggerates group differences and homogenizes outgroups in an unflattering light, stereotypes capture cognitive aspects of prejudice. Affect, in contrast, consists of summary judgments of categories that can influence evaluations oftentimes quickly and outside of conscious awareness. While racial resentment certainly contains an affective component (e.g., Sears and Henry, 2003; Banks, 2014; Kam and Burge, 2018), affective responses develop separately and may respond to political dynamics differently. Given these characteristics, measures of political engagement may do less to differentiate which partisans update their attitudes most on affect, but reveal more variation on stereotype change.

To understand affect, I use data from the VOTER Survey. Respondents rated Blacks and Whites

separately on 101-point feeling thermometers. I take evaluations of Whites and subtract from them evaluations of Blacks, creating a relative affect measure which addresses how people respond to such rating items (Brady, 1985). I scale this measure from 0-1, where higher values denote holding more positive feelings about Whites than Blacks (or, by construction, how much more negatively people feel about Blacks than Whites). Because I consistently found moderation effects on changes in racial attitudes rather than changes in partisanship, I present results for changes in affect and reserve analyses on changes in partisanship for the Appendix.

The estimates presented in Table 5.7's 3 columns correspond to moderation by education, political interest, and political awareness, respectively.

The results echo those found using rational resentment. Each dimension of political engagement has a similar conditioning effect on changes in affect as on changes in racial resentment, patterns also evident visually in Figure 5.7. While the degree of change varies across measures of racial animus–consider the more limited y-axis range for Figure 5.7 than for Figure 5.4 for instance–the most politically engaged partisans polarize the most.

I next turn to racial stereotypes. The GSS panels include items where respondents were invited to rate separately the degree to which Blacks and Whites were intelligent or unintelligent and lazy or hardworking. I recode each item such that higher scores denote endorsing the negative stereotype. Similar to the affect rating, I then subtract respondents' ratings of Whites from their ratings of Blacks to create a relative negative stereotyping measure for each trait. I then average these relative ratings together into a measure ranging from 0-1, where higher values indicate holding more negative stereotypes of Blacks than Whites. These analyses are unfortunately limited compared to the preceding, however, because the GSS does not contain measures approximating political awareness or political interest. Even so, the degree to which these dimensions similarly conditioned effects on racial resentment and affect suggest that patterns found using education may generalize.

The results from these analyses are in Table 5.8. They point to little conditioning effect for education on changes in stereotype endorsement. What education does capture, although inconsis-

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Table 5.7: Moderating Effect of Political Engagement Dimensions on the relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Group Affect

	Education	Political Interest	Political Awareness
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.059*	0.048*	0.023
	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.013)
—*College Education$_{t-1}$	0.035*		
	(0.010)		
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$		−0.006	
		(0.017)	
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$		0.036*	
		(0.016)	
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$			0.064*
			(0.017)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.544*	0.412*	0.352*
	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.032)
—*College Education$_{t-1}$	0.034		
	(0.030)		
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$		0.242*	
		(0.040)	
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$		0.156*	
		(0.038)	
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$			0.292*
			(0.044)
College Education$_{t-1}$	−0.058*		
	(0.017)		
Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$		−0.130*	
		(0.026)	
High Interest$_{t-1}$		−0.121*	
		(0.024)	
Political Awareness$_{t-1}$			−0.247*
			(0.027)
Constant	0.206*	0.287*	0.364*
	(0.008)	(0.022)	(0.020)
Observations	5,712	5,691	5,262
R^2	0.324	0.342	0.330
Residual Std. Error	0.105	0.104	0.106

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Low political interest is the omitted category in column 2.

Figure 5.7: Partisan gap in group affect$_t$ by political engagement dimension. Results based on models in Table 5.7. Bars provide the distribution of the moderator in each model.

tently so across data collections, is variation in the stability of stereotype endorsement. Columns 1 and 2 suggest more stability for Whites with college degrees, although in only the first period is this difference by education level reliable ($p < 0.05$).

Figure 5.8 clarifies the effect of partisanship on stereotyping by whether or not Whites hold a college degree. The panels reinforce the insight that variation in education level does not shape the extent to which partisanship affects stereotype endorsement. What the plots do point to, however, is whether partisanship's influence is reliably different from 0. In only two of six instances is this the case, and inconsistently so. Partisanship contributes to changes in stereotype endorsement among non-college educated partisans between 2006 and 2010 and for degree-holding partisans between 2010 and 2014.

The investigation into stereotypes offers some evidence on the limits of party-driven attitude change. Partisanship does shape stereotyping, but its influence is inconsistent both across time periods and by education level. Even so, the results are at odds with the possibility that stereo-types, as a more cognitive realization of prejudice, should only change among the more engaged.

Table 5.8: Education's Moderating Effect on the Relationship between Partisanship and Changes in Stereotype Endorsement

	2006-2010	2008-2012	2010-2014
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.024*	0.001	0.013
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
—*College Degree$_{t-1}$	−0.020	0.014	0.022
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.019)
Negative Stereotypes$_{t-1}$	0.229*	0.420*	0.306*
	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.043)
—*College Degree$_{t-1}$	0.338*	0.166	−0.037
	(0.103)	(0.131)	(0.107)
College Degree$_{t-1}$	−0.181*	−0.099	0.002
	(0.055)	(0.070)	(0.055)
Constant	0.404*	0.315*	0.371*
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.024)
Observations	505	540	530
R^2	0.139	0.172	0.125
Residual Std. Error	0.069	0.073	0.067

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses.
Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

The present case is particularly informative because education accounts in part for differences in cognitive skills. The limited impact, and inconsistent moderating effect, suggests that the ability to update one's attitudes is not the key force underpinning party-driven attitude change.

Figure 5.8: Partisan gap in racial stereotypes$_t$ by education. Results based on models in Table 5.8. Bars provide the proportion of respondents with and without a college degree in each model.

5.8   Conclusion

The results from these analyses enrich our understanding of the dynamic relationship between Whites' partisanship and their racial attitudes. That the most politically engaged partisans exhibit the greatest amount of attitude change supports the argument that the information environment plays an important role in encouraging attitude change. While all Whites display racial attitude change over time, the politically engaged display the greatest polarization in this party centric political context. And this is especially the case for engaged Democrats. This fits with evidence on the relationship between partisanship and other attitudes where those more attuned to politics are those for whom attitude change is most likely (Carsey and Layman, 2006). But it also furthers these understandings by revealing similar patterns for even presumptively fundamental beliefs like racial attitudes. Further, that even the least politically engaged partisans exhibit changes in racial attitudes is an important result given arguments that only the politically engaged are likely to change their attitudes to align with their favored political party (Carsey and Layman, 2006). All the more impressive is that the patterns of change I find occur on attitudes that are thought to

be much more stable than issue positions. Mass opinion on issues is often quite susceptible to the information environment (Zaller, 1992), with racial prejudice actually thought to guide the reception and incorporation of new considerations because these orientations are early-learned and persistent (Sears and Brown, 2013).

It is also noteworthy that across levels of engagement the most engaged exhibit the greatest amount of attitude change. This evidence is at odds with models of attitude change where the moderately engaged should exhibit the greatest amount of change (Zaller, 1992). The least aware are less likely to encounter new information and have the facility to incorporate it into their existing beliefs. The most aware, in contrast, are most likely to encounter new information and have the capacity to update existing attitudes, but they also have a much greater store of existing considerations to draw from to bolster existing attitudes. While the approach differs, that degree of change is monotonic best fits with a one-sided information flow (e.g., liberals receive liberal messages) on an unfamiliar issue in Zaller's (1992) attitude change typology. Differences in information streams are reinforced by the divergence in engagement's effects by party. That politically engaged Democrats appear to be the most responsive, and politically engaged Republicans more consistently change their attitudes to a degree similar to their least engaged peers, suggests such a pattern.

That education has effects similar to political awareness and interest offers important qualifications to claims that education promotes tolerant beliefs (Allport, 1979; McClosky and Zaller, 1984; Bobo and Licari, 1989; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock, 1993; Sniderman and Piazza, 1993; Schuman et al., 1997; Pettigrew, 2000). Key here, it seems, are arguments that norm internalization matters for education to promote tolerance (Crandall, Eshleman and O'Brien, 2002; Federico, 2004). College-educated Republicans, while less racially resentful than their non-college educated copartisans, still change their views of Black Americans in ways consistent with their party loyalties. Similarly, college-educated Democrats display more attitude change at least between 2012 and 2016 than their non-college educated copartisans. Both are presumably aware of norms regarding racial tolerance, but these patterns suggest Democrats are more motivated to change their attitudes to be consistent with norms of racial tolerance than Republicans. Such an outcome sug-

gests that a beliefs about what norms of racial equality are and how they relate to appropriate attitudes may themselves divide by party. It could even be the case that understandings of what behaviors and beliefs constitute prejudice also divide by party (see generally Crandall, Miller and White II, 2018). Comparing Democrats' and Republicans' beliefs about what racial intolerance is, and also their personal commitment to upholding norms of racial tolerance, appears an important point for future research to consider.

My results have implications beyond simply clarifying the dynamics between racial attitudes and partisanship. They also suggest the types of views that politicians hear. Data from the 2016 ANES show that this is indeed an important outcome. While average levels of racial resentment for White Democrats and Republicans completing face-to-face interviews are 0.41 and 0.70, respectively, this 0.29 point gap increases to 0.38 points when comparing partisans completing one or more political activities that year.[10] This gap grows largely due to politically active White Democrats, with an average racial resentment score of 0.34. Active Republicans, in contrast, place at a 0.72. Further, focusing only donations as the costliest political act, this gap in attitudes widens further. While the Republican average remains at 0.72, Democrats now score at a 0.23. Although this comparison concerns only 92 respondents (57 Democrats and 35 Republicans), this a particularly consequential difference given the potential relationship between contributions and legislator access (Kalla and Broockman, 2015).

Seventy-five years ago Gunnar Myrdal 1962 contended that the intransigence of Whites' racial attitudes stemmed in part from ignorance, willful or involuntary. According to Myrdal, northern Whites, epitomizing those largely unintentionally ignorant about the status of Black Americans, would be "shocked and shaken in their conscience when they learn the facts" (48). He thus proposed an educational, consciousness raising effort to improve Whites' attitudes and allow for improvements to Blacks' station. While not the "nationwide educational offensive against racial intolerance" Myrdal (1962) envisioned (49), my results, particularly among Democrats, suggest

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[10]This includes persuading someone else to vote for or against a candidate, attending a rally or some other political event, wearing a campaign button or posting a sign/bumper sticker, donating to a political party or candidate, or doing any other work for a candidate.

information may indeed matter. Myrdal identified schools and churches as potential prejudice-reducing institutions because they connect with people's ideas about how the world ought to be which can overcome attitudes structuring everyday life (80). Political parties, given the correct political context, may function in much the same way. Not all Whites are necessarily open to this information, but that Democrats of all stripes changed their attitudes suggests parties, by providing a vision of how society should be organized, can serve as a vehicle promoting a racially egalitarian vision that mass partisans even from an advantaged group will adopt. It is up to elites to offer this vision.

Chapter 6

Partisanship and Racial Attitudes into the Future

Partisanship and race are driving forces in American politics (Campbell et al., 1960; Hutchings and Valentino, 2004). In the preceding chapters I have shown that not only is the connection between the two tightening as other scholars note (Tesler, 2016), but among White Americans partisanship is shaping beliefs about race in America. Changes in the political context have provided partisan elites and related actors with the ability to shape how Whites understand the role race plays in structuring social and political affairs. I show that partisan elites provide ingredients that can make up mass attitudes, and public opinion tracks this information.

In this conclusion I address an immediate question as well as future possibilities. The immediate concern is that the dynamics I address are driven exclusively by President Obama. All of the analyses pointing toward partisanship mattering occur when Obama is president. It could be the case that the patterns I find halt given the transition to the Trump administration. At the same time, partisan polarization has not diminished. Nor has race receded from its status as a salient social and political concern. While it is possible that the end of the Obama administration coincided with a new equilibrium in the relationship between partisanship and attitudes about race, I show below that descriptive trends suggest the attitude change patterns I identify are likely continuing under Trump.

I then entertain open questions. I offer avenues for future research that engage with explanations for why partisanship is changing attitudes, including the possibility that these trends are simply expressive responding rather than true attitude change. I then offer preliminary results extending the analyses from chapter 4 in two ways that reveal a more general story about the influence partisanship has on attitudes about other groups in society.

6.1 Patterns Continue

An important open question from the preceding chapters is whether patterns of attitude change will persist. The argument and evidence I present suggests that patterns of attitude change can continue so long as the political context motivates partisans to adopt party-consistent views. After nearly a full term for President Donald Trump, party's influence does not seem to be abating. Nor does race seem to be transitioning to a peripheral concern politically. Early candidates seeking the Democratic Party's 2020 presidential nomination have signaled a readiness to campaign on race conscious platforms (Herndon, 2019). President Trump, in contrast, appears to be positioning himself for a repeat performance of 2016 by stoking fears of criminal immigrants (Brownstein, 2019).

While no publicly available panel data exist to carry the analyses forward, two sets of cross-sectional data strongly suggest the causal dynamics I identified continue. The first series comes from the Pew Research Center. Since 2005, Pew has asked respondents to select one of two options for Black Americans' social and economic status. The pair strongly reflects racial resentment with one option stating "racial discrimination is the main reason why many black people can't get ahead these days" and the other "Blacks who can't get ahead in this country are mostly responsible for their own condition."[1]

Figure 6.1 plots the percentage of non-Hispanic White partisans selecting discrimination (left panel) or personal responsibility (right panel). The trends highlight a consistent thread through the analyses in the preceding chapters: Democrats are unique in this period (black line). Between 2005 and 2012, the percentage of Democrats selecting the discrimination option fluctuated between 25 and 41%. But after 2012 the proportion of partisans selecting this response consistently increases. From 46% in March 2014, this rises to 52% in October 2015 and reaches 70% in June 2017. While most Democrats selected the responsibility option during President Obama's first term, the gap between choices dropped to less than 5 points by 2012. But starting in October 2015 the proportion of Democrats selecting the discrimination response outweighs the proportion choosing

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[1] The question preamble is: "Which statement comes closer to your views, even if neither is exactly right?"

Figure 6.1: White explanations for Blacks' social and economic status by party. Pew Research Center Surveys.

the responsibility option in every survey.

These patterns help unpack the descriptive picture presented in chapter 4's appendix by suggesting most of the change in racial resentment among Democrats occurred toward the end of the 2012-2016 period. They also suggest a likely continuation of attitude change. While it is unclear where between 2015 and 2017 most of the change in attitudes occurred, these patterns support my argument that this is a general story about attitude change rather than one isolated to a context featuring a Black man as president.

It is noteworthy that these substantial changes manifest on a binary item. In contrast to the items comprising the racial resentment measure which allow for strength of agreement with different statements that to varying degrees capture structural or individual attributions, these trends come from White Democrats deciding that racial discrimination rather than personal responsibility best explain Black Americans' position in the United States.

The item's structure is likely behind the greater consistency is White Republicans' attitudes in this period. Although increases in the proportion of partisans selecting the personal responsibility

Figure 6.2: Racial resentment's distribution among Whites by party. Bars indicate proportion of party identifiers with given level of racial resentment. Four-item index scaled 0-1, with higher values denoting more racial resentment. Web surveys from the American National Election Studies.

option do occur, for instance between January 2012 and March 2017, the series start and end points each rest at 75% choosing this option.

Additional data complement these insights. These data come from the 2018 American National Election Study pilot Study.[2] Conducted online by the YouGov survey firm, the survey included the four standard racial resentment items. Given the online setting, I compare them to the web portion of the 2016 ANES.

Figure 6.2 sheds light on changes in the distribution of racial resentment by party between 2016 and 2018. Democrats exhibit a substantial shift to the left where the modal respondent places at the scale minimum in 2018.[3] While over 9% of Democrats placed here in 2016, this increases to

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[2]The interview period was December 6-19, 2018. The ANES describes the study as follows: "The survey was conducted using non-probability sampling. This method produces a sample that looks similar to a probability sample on the matched characteristics, but may still differ in unknown ways on unmatched characteristics."

[3]As noted in chapter 4's appendix, this change, where the modal respondent locates at the minimum, occurred between 2012 and 2016 in the face-to-face interviews. The discrepancy between survey mode does not have a ready explanation.

over 16% two years later. Complementing this change among Democrats, Republicans exhibit a sharp rightward shift. While the modal respondent scored at the scale's maximum, the proportion of the party scoring here increases over 6 percentage points, from 14% to 20%.

These distributional changes are reflected in consequential shifts in group means as well. White Democrats in 2016 on average scored at a 0.43. This decreases by 0.09 points to 0.34 in 2018. Republicans, in contrast, moved from a 0.71 in 2016 to a 0.76.[4] To tie everything together, the correlation between the 7-point party identification measure and racial resentment increased from 0.51 to 0.64.[5] The joint movement of means and distributions reinforces the trends I identify in this dissertation and continue to implicate racial attitude change more than partisan sorting as best explaining the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes in the present political context.

6.1.1 Implications

These trends have important implications for political practioners and social scientists. For practioners, that White Democrats appear unique in this period has potential consequences for the party's primary. Candidates campaigning on race-conscious policies may have greater freedom to do so than in prior years. The party coalition used to be more divided on race, but changes in Whites' attitudes appear to have reduced the degree to which they are divide them from their co-partisans of color in beliefs about race (Horowitz, Brown and Cox, 2019). Race may do less to divide Democrats, and may even serve to unite them, especially when juxtaposed with positions the Republican Party takes.

For social scientists, polarizing racial attitudes have consequences for how we understand the role racial attitudes play in structuring political opinion. As I note elsewhere (Engelhardt, Forth-

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[4]These shifts in racial resentment are also reflected on feeling thermometers. In 2016, White Republicans and Democrats both felt more positively about Whites than Blacks, but this difference was much larger for Republicans. The favorability gap for Republicans was 10 points (74 vs. 64) while for Democrats it was just 1 point (72 vs. 71). In 2018, Republicans still rated Whites 12 points more favorably than Blacks (81 vs. 69). Democrats, however, rated Blacks more positively than Whites by 8 points (69 vs. 77).

[5]In comparison, the correlation between partisanship and the 7-point ANES ideological self-identification or placement measure is 0.76 in 2016 and 0.78 in 2018. To item wording varies somewhat between surveys and does not include a "haven't thought much about this" option in 2018. Consequently I exclude such responses from the 2016 coding.

coming), claims that Whites' racial attitudes were uniquely important in shaping their vote preferences in the 2016 presidential election, and that this came from Donald Trump's campaign activating these attitudes, are assertions without clear evidentiary support. The increased alignment between racial attitudes and party creates observational equivalence issues in regression models, inferential problems well-known to scholars of issue voting (Lenz, 2012). While proper research designs can help overcome this problem, the increased correlation between racial attitudes and partisanship means that Whites' racial attitudes may be chronically related to vote preference, no campaign activation required. Democrats' racially liberal attitudes motivate them to support the Democratic candidate and reject the Republican candidate, and vice versa for Republicans' racially conservative beliefs (see also Tesler and Sears, 2010).

6.2   Future Work

The current investigation offers several potentially interesting avenues for future work. First, while I find evidence for Whites' views about race aligning with their partisan ties, this says nothing about whether this related to changes in attitudes themselves or partisan cheerleading (Bullock et al., 2015). From this perspective, attitudes themselves have not changed; rather, social desirability concerns or similar pressures are conditioning how partisans respond to survey items. While possible, the analyses using structural equation models to estimate relationships in chapter 4 fix racial resentment's meaning across waves, removing the possibility that changes in the nature of survey responses explain the relationships I find. Future work could test this more systematically, perhaps using the racial resentment battery and assessing item performance over time and between theoretically relevant groups to test whether social desirability or other expressive responding concerns play any role in the changes I identify.

Relatedly, the encouraging outcome that White Democrats' attitudes about Blacks are improving becomes especially important if these beliefs translate into behaviors. If Democrats also take action to promote policies, movements, or candidates seeking to improve Blacks' station then this trend in liberalizing attitudes carries even more import. Future work could investigate whether

White Democrats are increasingly likely to support and donate to candidates advocating addressing racial inequality, with the 2020 Democratic primary providing a particularly advantageous time to evaluate this. Analyses could also consider whether increased racial liberalism relates to greater participation in Black Lives Matter marches and less discrimination in lab experiments like the ultimatum game.

Given these insights, it is also important to understand further *why* partisanship is related to attitude change. That political engagement moderates dynamics suggests that information matters, but this likely does so alongside the motivation to updates existing beliefs. Future work can investigate the kinds of information that matters, how this interacts with source characteristics, and whether and how individual differences condition the interpretation and incorporation of this information. While these questions may be best answered through experimental designs, additional observational analyses could consider whether age, social context, or strength of partisan commitment condition responses. By considering multiple possibilities, evidence can triangulate types of interventions and targets that may work to foster more positive attitudes about marginalized groups.

Finally, additional investigations can extend the dynamic partisanship-racial attitude relationship. The first considers Whites' attitudes about non-Black minorities while the second looks at whether partisanship shapes non-Whites' attitudes about Black Americans. Given available survey data, I offer initial investigations below.

6.2.1 Whites' Attitudes About Non-Black Minorities

While the Black-White divide motivated most of my analyses, I note in several spots that the color line in the United States has shifted. Influxes of immigrants from Asia and Latin America, and the potency of outgroup attitudes in structuring White opinion (Kinder and Kam, 2009), necessitate considering whether attitude change generalizes to other racialized minority groups.

One way to consider the breadth of possible effects is to consider whether partisan variation in Whites' attitudes about Blacks manifests in orientations toward minorities generally. Specifically,

I consider variation by party in levels of group empathy. Group empathy theory proposes that socialization experiences, related in part to demographics (e.g., discrimination, intergroup contact), instill in people a concern for the struggles of outgroups (Sirin, Valentino and Villalobos, 2016*a*, 429-30). Group empathy is "a process where members of one group begin to internalize and vicariously experience the perspectives and emotions of members of another group even when they do not share intimate family or friendship bonds" (Sirin, Valentino and Villalobos, 2016*b*, 895). As such, items measuring it include "How often would you say you try to better understand people of other racial or ethnic groups by imagining how things look from their perspective" and "Before criticizing somebody from another racial or ethnic group, how often do you try to imagine how you would feel if you were in their place." Fortunately, the 2018 ANES pilot study included these two items as well as two other from the group empathy measure introduced by Sirin and colleagues (Sirin, Valentino and Villalobos, 2016*a,b*).[6] Responses are recorded on 5-point scales, from "extremely often" to "not often at all." I score each item such that higher values denote the more empathetic response and average them together into a 0-1 scale.[7] Although I do not have panel data to assess patterns of change driven by party, that group empathy theory forms through socialization and learning processes (Sirin, Valentino and Villalobos, 2016*a,b*) suggests any partisan variation may come in part from attitude change.

This measure offers evidence that partisanship may shape global orientations toward minority

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[6]Two items were randomly assigned to respondents in what appears to be a question wording test. One item shows significant response variation between question format ($p < 0.01$) while the other does not. To preserve cases I combine question wording formats into single items but note how responses differ on the item with wording variation. All received: "How often would you say you try to better understand people of other racial or ethnic groups by imagining how things look from their perspective?"
"Before criticizing somebody from another racial or ethnic group, how often do you try to imagine how you would feel if you were in their place?"
Half received: "How often would you say that you have tender, concerned feelings for people from another racial or ethnic group who are less fortunate than you?"
"When you see someone being taken advantage of due to their race or ethnicity, how often do you feel protective towards them?"
Half received: "How often would you say that you feel concerned about people from another racial or ethnic group who are less fortunate than you?"
"When you see someone being treated poorly due to their race or ethnicity, how often do you feel protective towards them?"
[7]The items demonstrate high internal reliability ($\alpha = 0.89$), and this does not vary much by party (Democrats: $\alpha = 0.89$, Republicans: $\alpha = 0.84$).

groups. While White Republicans score at a 0.51, Democrats report more group empathy, scoring on average 17 points higher on the measure at 0.68.[8] To put this in context, Blacks average a 0.58 and Latinos place at a 0.54. Interestingly, group empathy theory's proponents contend non-Whites should score higher on group empathy because of different group-based experiences with marginalization (Sirin, Valentino and Villalobos, 2016*a*,*b*), but this is not the case in these data (Whites as a whole average 0.58).[9] That White Democrats express greater levels of group empathy suggests that indirect experiences may contribute to these attitudes as well.[10]

To offer additional evidence for a generalized account of party-driven attitude change toward other social groups, I return to the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey and 2016 CCAP. These panels contain favorability items for various groups. I consider 3: Latinos, Asians, and Muslims. Latinos and Asians allow me to generalize the findings to two other racial groups. Muslims extend these patterns to a marginalized group that has been racialized over the last two decades (Lajevardi and Oskooii, 2018; Lajevardi and Abrajano, 2019). As with the analyses in chapters 4 and 5 I create a differenced affect measure for the Latino and Asian favorability items, subtracting these evaluations from Whites' evaluations of Whites. For Muslims, I take the difference between evaluations of Christians and evaluations of Muslims. I score this measure such that higher values denote relatively more positive attitudes about Christians than Muslims.[11]

Table 6.1 provides the estimates from cross-lagged regression models looking at group evaluations measured in the VOTER Survey. The estimates reveal a dynamic relationship between group evaluations and partisanship on all counts. Between December 2011 and November/December 2016, Republicans' and Democrats' preferences for Latinos and Asians, relative to Whites, po-

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[8]Partisanship and group empathy correlate at -0.34.

[9]It is also not the case that Whites' attitudes are more variable. The standard deviations of White Democrats' and Republicans' scores are 0.22 and 0.23, respectively. Blacks and Latinos display greater heterogeneity, with standard deviations of 0.25 and 0.26, respectively. Two-sample KS tests offer evidence that distributions vary both between partisan groups and also between Whites and non-Whites.

[10]Interestingly, racial resentment and group empathy correlate at -0.48, with a heartier correlation among Democrats (-0.49) than Republicans (-0.26). This suggests that different orientations toward race and marginalized groups are increasingly unified among Democrats, while Republicans' attitudes are more readily distinguished from each other.

[11]The results are consistent using just the Latino and Asian favorability items rather than the difference measure. Interestingly, disaggregating the composite measure for Muslims offers suggestive evidence that partisanship does more to shape attitudes about Muslims than Christians in both data collections. Further, attitudes about Christians are more influential on changes in party loyalties in the VOTER Survey but are equal in influence in the CCAP data.

Table 6.1: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Other Group Evaluations, VOTER Survey

	Whites - Latinos		Whites - Asians		Christians - Muslims	
	Group Negativity$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Group Negativity$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Group Negativity$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.066*	0.830*	0.072*	0.832*	0.141*	0.778*
	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Group Negativity$_{t-1}$	0.600*	0.110*	0.527*	0.219*	0.737*	0.252*
	(0.012)	(0.021)	(0.013)	(0.023)	(0.012)	(0.016)
Constant	0.162*	0.044*	0.194*	−0.013	0.074*	−0.030*
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Observations	5,522	5,522	5,522	5,522	5,338	5,338
R^2	0.349	0.682	0.271	0.685	0.567	0.706
Residual Std. Error	0.105	0.188	0.102	0.187	0.139	0.180

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

larizes. So, too, do their feelings about Muslims. Out-group evaluations appear relatively more influential than partisanship in the relationship.

These results, moreover, are not unique to this data collection. The estimates in Table 6.2 reveal similar dynamics during 2016. The relationship between racial group evaluations and partisanship is dynamic, with each about as influential. But here partisanship does more to shape relative feelings about Muslims than the reverse.

Partisanship not only shapes how Whites view Black Americans, it also influences their attitudes about Asians, Latinos, and Muslims. Further, differences across groups in partisanship's relative influence shed some light on what facilitates the dynamic relationship. That attitudes about Latinos and Asians are likely to motivate party switching to at least the same degree as partisanship is to change these attitudes suggests the parties' positions vis-à-vis these groups are being clarified for White Americans. This appears to also be the case for Muslims, although primarily in the VOTER Survey data. A change in relative influence suggests that partisans are incorporating new information into attitudes about the group rather than using this information to identify the party best aligned with their group attitudes. These results reinforce the view that information from party elites and others may be particularly influential because of comparatively low levels of interaction between Whites and various outgroups.

Table 6.2: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Other Group Evaluations, 2016 CCAP

| | Whites - Latinos | | Whites - Asians | | Christians - Muslims | |
	Group Negativity$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Group Negativity$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Group Negativity$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.066*	0.927*	0.057*	0.928*	0.102*	0.907*
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)
Group Negativity$_{t-1}$	0.558*	0.042*	0.442*	0.056*	0.673*	0.067*
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Constant	0.195*	0.018*	0.248*	0.012*	0.130*	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Observations	8,119	8,119	8,119	8,119	8,120	8,120
R^2	0.355	0.851	0.237	0.851	0.599	0.852
Residual Std. Error	0.129	0.118	0.120	0.118	0.142	0.117

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

6.2.2 Non-Whites' Attitudes About Blacks

Extending the test of partisanship shaping outgroup evaluations to non-Whites provides an interesting extension of the argument. Partisanship for non-Whites is often not as potent an influence due to different socialization processes and motivations for party loyalty (Hajnal and Lee, 2011). It is possible, therefore, that party does not affect other groups' attitudes. Alternatively, the nature of the present political context may be such that regardless of why someone identifies as a Democrat of a Republican, the very presence of this attachment allows for partisanship to matter.

To test whether partisanship's influence travels, I use data from the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey and the 2016 CCAP. These collections are large enough to provide reasonable inferences about attitude dynamics among minority groups.[12] I use racial resentment as the attitudinal outcome. Although conceptualized as an attitude for White Americans, the measure captures the same attitude among Black Americans (Kam and Burge, 2018). Consequently, I assume that its characterization as structural versus individual attributions for Black Americans' social and economic status travels to Latinos and Asians as well. I use the same analysis strategy as in chapter 4 and I pool together Latino and Asian respondents.

Table 6.3 presents the results from these analyses. The estimates reveal a relationship between partisanship on changes in racial resentment in both data collections. The estimated relationships,

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[12]The VOTER Survey contains responses from 120 Asians and 404 Latinos. These totals for the 2016 CCAP are 211 and 796, respectively. In both data collections the provided information on race includes Latino alongside other group categories rather than as a separate items asked after group identification.

Table 6.3: Relationship between Partisanship and Racial Resentment, Latinos and Asians

| | 2012-2016 VOTER Survey | | 2016 CCAP | |
	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.148*	0.843*	0.085*	0.762*
	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.021)	(0.025)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.807*	0.145*	0.723*	0.053
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.030)
Constant	−0.002	−0.024	0.110*	0.037*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.017)
Observations	495	495	735	735
R^2	0.626	0.729	0.592	0.608
Residual Std. Error	0.262	0.264	0.249	0.295

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

moreover, are indistinguishable from the estimates for White partisans in chapter 4. Partisanship's influence therefore appears to travel, and quite well.

The results also point to a relationship between racial resentment and partisan change for Latinos and Asians. This relationship is clearest in the VOTER Survey, and less reliable in the 2016 CCAP ($p < 0.10$). Further, like the estimated relationship for partisanship, the results here are quite similar to the results found among Whites.

These result indicate that partisanship's influence on attitudes about Black Americans is not isolated to Whites. These dynamics extend to Asian and Latino respondents as well. A potentially consequential limitation, though, is that these results likely overestimate relationships for these groups because group members participating in these surveys are likely much more socialized into the political process in the United States than their coethnics. Even so, these results are important given the variation in the nature of partisan attachments for racial and ethnic minorities (Hajnal and Lee, 2011).

As a final test, I extend these analyses to consider Black attitudes about Blacks. Because the target is their ingroup, Blacks' partisan loyalties may have no relationship with their subsequent racial attitudes. Party is not required to update explanations for their ingroup's social and economic

Table 6.4: Relationship between Partisanship and Racial Resentment, Blacks

| | 2012-2016 VOTER Survey | | 2016 CCAP | |
	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.104*	0.655*	0.065*	0.842*
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.022)	(0.019)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.841*	−0.066*	0.784*	0.020
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.023)	(0.019)
Constant	−0.009	0.061*	0.062*	0.030*
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Observations	627	627	868	868
R^2	0.542	0.448	0.593	0.703
Residual Std. Error	0.191	0.200	0.188	0.158

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

status. Even so, partisanship may still matter for this group.

The results reported in Table 6.4 offer evidence that partisanship is influential even among Black Americans. In both the VOTER Survey and 2016 CCAP partisanship is related to changes in racial attitudes ($p < 0.05$). Not only that, partisanship's estimated effects do not reliably differ between Blacks and Whites. While the estimated effect in the VOTER survey is about 0.04 points smaller than the estimate for Whites reported in Table 4.3, this difference is imprecise ($p < 0.06$, one-tailed). In the 2016 CCAP, partisanship's effect among Blacks is 0.02 points smaller but this is again imprecisely estimated ($p > 0.10$, one-tailed).

The estimates also suggest some role for racial attitudes for Blacks. In the VOTER survey, Blacks placing more emphasis on individual over structural explanations for their group's social and economic status were actually more likely to identify as Democrats ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = -0.066$, $p < 0.05$). It could be the case that racial resentment as a construct maps differently to the party system for Blacks than it does for Whites (see generally Pérez and Hetherington, 2014; Hetherington and Weiler, 2018). This is an interesting empirical question encouraged by evidence demonstrating the construct's cross-racial comparability (Kam and Burge, 2018).

All told, partisanship not only appears to affect how Whites view other groups. It also provides

a potent force shaping how non-Whites view Black Americans. And impressively, it also relates to Blacks' views of their own group. In the present political context, party provides a general, and influential, organizing force for people's attitudes about other social groups.

6.3 The Race-Party Link and the Nature of Democracy

These results present a normatively mixed picture about the relationship between democracy and intergroup relations. On the one hand, political processes appear capable of encouraging people to adopt more positive views about marginalized groups in society. Such an outcome can provide important benefits by producing more positive intergroup interactions. It can also potentially offer a foundation of support for policies targeted at addressing any group-based inequalities these marginalized groups experience. This is plausible because group-centric thinking helps people navigate politics without requiring sophisticated belief systems (Converse, 1964; Brady and Sniderman, 1985; Achen and Bartels, 2016), where people's views of policy beneficiaries underpin policy preferences (Nelson and Kinder, 1996; Gilens, 1999).

On the other hand, the results point to how political processes can perpetuate disadvantage. Typically, social scientists focus on the effects that institutions and public policies have on creating and perpetuating structural divides between groups (Katznelson, 2006; Rothstein, 2017). But the evidence I offer suggests an alternative path through which politics may maintain inequality: its contribution to intergroup attitudes. In the same way that changes in intergroup attitudes may open the door for more favorable attitudes towards policies potentially benefitting that group, so too does information reinforcing negative attitudes. A lack of concern for marginalized groups can perpetuate low support for policies intended to address their station.

Knowing that many Americans' partisanship is not only built upon attitudes about race but can also mold these views helps us understand how the political system will respond to, and shape, an increasingly diverse country. And these results can shed light both on past periods in US history and in other political contexts. Against the backdrop of American history the party-centric nature of today's politics seems more normal than abnormal (Azari and Hetherington, 2016), pat-

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terns reinforced by the deep connections between individuals' social and political selves (Mason, 2018). An electorate diversifying in an era of renewed party centrism suggests that partisan-driven racial attitude change could continue into the future as race remains socially and political salient. The current party system appears much more likely to reinforce, and possibly heighten, social antagonisms than foster any sort of reconciliation or incorporation motives.

Political parties are not simply neutral preference aggregators within democratic polities. People's willingness to categorize the world into into "us" and "them" allows the fight for political power to result in political conflict stoking, or quelling, social animosities (cf. Posner, 2005). Debates about which groups constitute the polis in a democracy, and therefore merit representation and potential state assistance, seem likely to be at the forefront of concern in an era of increased attention to international migration. Refugees from conflicts in the Middle East traveling to Europe or migrants fleeing violence in Central America and journeying to the United States make the politics of difference central to understanding political conflict cross-nationally for the foreseeable future. A core tension in many countries, then, will be between elites interested in leveraging these shifts for political gain by appealing to concerns about demographic change and whether their opponents push back on such campaigning. Knowing that elites have the capacity to alter mass attitudes about other social groups makes these political dynamics all the more consequential.

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Appendix

Appendix to Chapter 2

Text Analysis Procedure

I used a multi-step procedure to classify the documents according to whether or not they mentioned race. First, and as mentioned in the text, I took a random sample of 200 documents per month and coded each by hand according to whether or not they discussed race. Again, this included mentions of race in any context that explicitly refer to a racial group, racialized policy or experience, or prominent racial figure (Gillion, 2016). I then partitioned this over 21,000 document set into a training set and test set by randomly dividing it in half. I preprocessed the documents by removing stopwords, numbers, and punctuation. I did not stem words because eliminating contextually-relevant information in the unstemmed words reduced classifier accuracy. After testing a series of classifiers on the training set, including Naive Bayes and maximum entropy, I settled on a support vector machine to classify these documents because it was the most accurate in terms of recall and precision on the test set (Hsu, Chang and Lin, 2003).

I then did two things to improve classification accuracy. First, following prior work (Gillion, 2016) I used a keyword search for words that are undoubtedly race-related (e.g., African American, Latino, racism, racial) to add additional information into the training data to improve classifier accuracy. Second, I weighted words based on mutual information (MI). MI captures how much information a word's presence or absence contributes to making a classification decision (Manning, Raghavan and Schütze, 2009). I selected the specific MI cutoff by iterating over different MI levels and selecting the MI cutoff by evaluating each model's *F-score*, a weighted average of model recall and precision, or the frequency of type II and type I errors (Manning, Raghavan and Schütze, 2009). I used an MI cutoff of 0.0033, with the model in the test set providing an overall *F-score* of 0.91 out of 1, and a race-specific one of 0.88. Finally, I addressed overfitting the SVM through cross-validation with total accuracy of 92.8%.

After training the classifier I applied it to the uncoded documents. After collecting the coded

documents I then read through each document classified as discussing race to correct any Type I errors. Following this, 2.6% of documents were coded as implicating race in some way.This is similar to the 4% of the hand coded set that related to race.

Using these coded documents I then applied the structural topic modeling discussed in the text. I preprocessed the documents the same way, again not stemming words. I then specified different numbers of topics ranging from 20 to 50 in units of 5 and ran 10 different models for each topic specification. Each model allowed topic prevalence to vary by show and over time. For each topic specification I evaluated the 10 models based on exclusivity and semantic coherence as statistical criteria for each model's ability to identify unique topics that cohere well together (Roberts et al., 2014), and then inspected them to assess substance. After selecting a candidate model for each topic specification, I then compared these models across topic specifications, finally settling on the 35 topic model discussed in the text. While I make no claims that this is the definitive number of topics, the results appear meaningful based on the statistical and substantive comparisons, and from reading the documents while correcting Type I errors.[13]

Additional Examples of Topic Text

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[13]The model's semantic coherence is -146.90, and exclusivity is 9.93.

Civil and Voting Rights

O'Reilly	Maddow
O'REILLY: Reverend Burns. Reverend Coates and other clerics, black clerics see it as a civil rights issue. You obviously do not. And you know you were in the forefront of the Civil Rights Movement. But you don't see gay marriage as a civil rights issue, do you.	RAND PAUL (R), KENTUCKY SENATORIAL CANDIDATE: I like the Civil Rights Act in the sense that it ended discrimination in all public domains, and I'm all in favor of that.
And you made an interesting point about Rosa Parks. Rosa Parks and other good people back in the Civil Rights days boycotted, boycotted because human rights were being violated. Human rights, it wasn't an opinion. People were being forced physically to be in the back of the bus or not to go into a hotel. There is a big difference. We are talking speech here. Now, how would you reply to the counselor?	And the reality is that here in Alabama, in Selma, Alabama, the 1990s, Section 5 was required to block five discriminatory voting measures in the 1990s alone. Alabama is the epitome of a state that should be covered by Section 5. And Shelby County, Alabama, in particular, which is the place where which the challenge originates, as Justice Sotomayor at oral argument suggested is the personification of a jurisdiction that is rightfully covered by the Voting Rights Act.
REV. JESSE JACKSON, CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVIST: This is a civil war struggle, are you with the union? Are you with the states rightists? They had a debate in Iowa two weeks ago. And all of them are for the 10th Amendment. That's the slave amendment. They want to undermine the 13, 14, 15th Amendment. This is very serious.	MADDOW: That was this weekend in Selma, Alabama, during the 50th commemoration of the march across the Edmund Pettus Bridge and the police violence against those marchers that led to the Voting Rights Act in 1965.

Figure A.1: Example topic documents: Civil and Voting Rights

Illegal Immigration

O'Reilly	Maddow
On the home front the San Francisco Chronicle reporting that the feds are investigating the city of San Francisco for violating U.S. immigration law, finally. The allegations are that San Francisco authorities protected illegal alien drug dealers from Honduras.	Meet Sheriff Clarence Dupnik of Pima County, Arizona. Sheriff Dupnik says Arizona may have passed this new law telling police officers to stop people for just looking like illegal immigrants. They may have passed that law, but he says it's not enforceable.
INGRAHAM: One of my favorite parts of this ruling is when she discusses what the government argued about this burdensome, the process of having to cross check an individual's ID with the federal alien register. And they argue that it would tax the system, it would tax federal resources, and divert focus of the federal government. My question to you, John, is what about the taxing of the system of illegal aliens, by illegal aliens? How about that focus on the resources that are being drained from the American public?	MADDOW: And, of course, as Arizona Governor Jan Brewer explaining her decision to sign into law the "Papers, please" bill which compels law enforcement officers in Arizona to stop anyone who looks like they might be an illegal immigrant to demand that that person show proof that they are not, in fact, here illegally. In Arizona, you are presumed illegal unless you can prove otherwise –– papers, please. Arizona needs this law, in Governor Brewer's estimation, because the federal government is not doing a good enough job dealing with immigration. The Arizona governor is not alone in that assessment. There's actually a fairly wide consensus on both sides of the political aisle that what happened in Arizona only happened because the feds haven't acted to fix the immigration system and the problem of illegal immigration. (BEGIN VIDEO CLIPS)
O'REILLY: "Impact" segment tonight, while the Justice Department is suing the state of Arizona over its new anti–illegal alien law, it has for years ignored sanctuary cities like San Francisco and Houston that have refused to enforce federal immigration law. That is, if local authorities there in those cities apprehend illegal aliens, they do not tell homeland security, as they are required to do. So why aren't those cities being sued?	MADDOW: Romney there praising Arizona as a model, praising two things in Arizona: the E–verify system where employers have to check on the legal status of their employees and papers please, which is what the Obama Justice Department has sued Arizona to stop, in which Romney said he would not sue to stop it. I think Arizona is a model for the nation.

Figure A.2: Example topic documents: Illegal Immigration

Discrimination

O'Reilly

Now, that's dumb. Because, look, Rather didn't do anything wrong here. He just tried to be folksy. He wasn't trying to be racist. Anybody who says he was is an idiot. All Rather had to do was say that: "I'm trying to be folksy. It really doesn't work. I'm sorry. I'm trying to be folksy." But then he gets into journalism and news and all of this.

- -

Is it fair? Look, it's reprehensible that any of these (inaudible), anybody uses the N–Word would've heard –– Oprah Winfrey would've heard Bill Cosby and others say "These robbers (ph) are just as bad as these racist who use the N–Word." There's no place for the N–Word. But from a PR standpoint, for Paula Deen, the bigger thing, it's very much in politics. It's always said that it's not the crime, it's the cover–up that gets you in trouble.

- -

But second of all, I think the problem is, you know, Ms. O'Donnell would recoil at the idea that she is playing upon stereotypes here. But that's in fact what she's doing. She's putting the words in someone else's mouth, but she's the one who went there. And I would suggest to liberal journalists that when they hear a Republican talk about the president and his love for basketball, which is well–documented, and it's not some sort of thing that Newt made up, that the first thing their mind goes to is a common stereotype about black people, then they might be the ones with the racial hang ups. Now––

Maddow

GOV. PAUL LEPAGE (R), MAINE: Mr. Gattine, this is Governor Paul Richard LePage. I would like to talk to you about your comments about my being a racist, you (EXPLETIVE DELETED) sucker. I want to talk to you –– I want you to prove that I'm racist. I've spent my life helping black people and you little son of a bitch socialist (EXPLETIVE DELETED) sucker. You –– I need you to –– just friggin. I want you to record this and make it public because I'm after you. Thank you.

- -

PAUL: There's a hilarious episode on "Seinfeld", any "Seinfeld" fans? Where Jerry –– Jerry admits he loves Asian women, but he frets and he worries. He says, is it racist to like a certain race?

- -

PAUL: You had to ask me the "but." I don't like the idea of telling private business owners. I abhor racism. I think it's a bad business decision to ever exclude anybody from your restaurant. But at the same time, I do believe in private ownership. But I think there should be absolutely no discrimination in anything that gets any public funding, and that's mostly what the Civil Rights Act was about, to my mind. (END VIDEO CLIP)

Figure A.3: Example topic documents: Discrimination

Racism

O'Reilly

GOLDBERG: I mean, I think everybody realizes that calling people racist is a waste of time, nobody buys it anymore. If you are a racist because you are against Obamacare and the stimulus and the worldwide apology tour, if that makes you a racist, what do you call the skin heads who are really racist? Well, it just –– it's passe. Nobody is accepting it.

Folks, this is insane. So it's a cultural badge of honor to demean and degrade based on skin color if you are a person of color? Or are those who are going out of their way to excuse Ms. Jeantel's comments just suffering from an overdose of white guilt? In other words, we have to excuse her poor manners, her disrespectful language and cocky ignorance because she is black? It's all part of the culture William Raspberry called it once the ghettocracy. Left–wing elites fall over themselves to avoid criticizing behavior among black use that they would never tolerate from most upper crust white kids like the use of the "n" word or the "f" word or the "c" word. Oh when that happens just chill out.

- -

You practically had your tongue down his throat. And how about those black columnists who play the race card and generalize about Tea Party people being racist? Why don't you go after them by name and do it with the same passion and gusto that you use when you are going after fox people. How about Bill Maher? Bill Maher generalizes about people who go to church being a bunch of dopes. Is there some rule that says a comic can't go after another comic? Here is my final word, Jon, you can do whatever you want. But if you don't do that, guess what? You are not nearly as edgy as you think you are. You are just a safe, Jay Leno with a much smaller audience, but you get to say the f bomb, which gives your incredibly unsophisticated audience.

Maddow

HILLARY CLINTON (D), PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE: This is not conservatism as we have known it. This is not Republicanism as we have known it. These are racist ideas, race–baiting ideas, anti–Muslim, anti–immigrant, anti–women –– all key tenets making up the emerging racist ideology known as the alt– right.

- -

Here is that tattoo, the specific one reference there. And this is that specific guy. See, it's a Celtic cross inside a circle. And if you look in the white foreground, there's a big 14 on it –– 14 stands for the racist skinhead kind of pledge of allegiance, I guess, because it has 14 words. The 14 words are: "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children." Fourteen words supposedly written in prison by the leader of a group called The Order, which was the conspiratorial violent Nazi group that murdered the liberal radio host Allen Bird (ph) in Denver in 1984.

- -

The use of stereotypical war whoop chants and tomahawk chops are offensive and downright racist. The individuals involved in this unfortunate incident are high–ranking staffers in both the Senate office and the Brown campaign. A campaign that would allow and condone such offensive and racist behavior must be called to task for their actions.

Figure A.4: Example topic documents: Racism

Deaths of Black Americans

O'Reilly	Maddow
O'REILLY: Bitterness rising over the shooting death of 17–year–old Trayvon Martin. Are the authorities handling the case properly? And what about all the craziness that has descended on Florida?	The current national outrage over police use of force began in earnest late last summer with the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Michael Brown, 18 years old and unarmed when he died on the street in Ferguson in August 2014, last August. After Michael Brown's death, Ferguson saw weeks of protests, some of them very intense.
Finally two updates. The police officer in Tulsa, Betty Shelby who shot dead an unarmed black man, Terrence Crutcher has now been indicted on manslaughter charges. And in Charlotte, police have arrested 21–year–old Rayquan Borum, a protester for killing another protester 26–year–old Justin Carr. The accused killer has spent time prison and has two pending weapons charges against him.	Another man, Eric Garner of Staten Island, New York, he died after police put him in a chokehold while arresting him for selling loose cigarettes on the sidewalk in Staten Island. Eric Garner actually died a few weeks before Michael Brown was shot in Ferguson. But the protests in Ferguson seemed to amplify the response to Eric Garner's death and thousands of people marched on Staten Island last summer to protest what happened to Garner.
The autopsy shows that the young man was shot six times, had marijuana in his bloodstream. The tape shows that shortly before the confrontation with the police officer, the young man stole stuff from a convenient store and not assaulted but pushed a clerk who is half his size. Mr. Brown was close to 300 pounds and 6'4".	Unlike Michael Brown, police say that the man who was killed today, that he –– police say he was armed. They say he was armed with a knife. He allegedly brandished that knife at officers and that's why these two police officers say they shot him.

Figure A.5: Example topic documents: Deaths of Black Americans

City/Community Problems

O'Reilly	Maddow
The two guys charged with killing your daughter were gangsters who were looking to kill other gangsters. And this has been going on for years in Chicago in certain neighborhoods. Not on the Gulf Coast all right. Not in the suburbs of Chicago. It's going on in your neighborhood, it's going on in poor black neighborhoods. So I say that you flood the zone with police just as they have here in New York City. And then the police use the Stop–and–Frisk tactic to discourage criminals, to discourage them from bringing guns on to the street. Now you've seen the tremendous drop in murder here in New York City not very different from Chicago, by the way.	What's being discussed online today and what's starting seemingly be a source of anger is that the curfew only really applies to mostly black neighborhoods and that in wealthier parts of the city, parts of the city that haven't seen big protest activity, that the curfew isn't being enforced in those places and they can live as usual.
As Harlem here in New York City proves, his opportunity comes to people and places that respect the marketplace. Burning things down is anarchy. Investors and entrepreneurs avoid anarchy. And it's not African–American leadership that must act. It's black Americans themselves through peer pressure.	MADDOW: When I looked at that report today from the New Orleans chapter of the Urban League , I felt like the main thrust that I didn't fully understand I think before seeing it put in those terms, the main thesis was that a lot of what explains some of the racial –– a lot of what explains the racial disparity in the recovery, particularly some things about like political representation and whether or not people are governing themselves and people are being governed according to a sort of fair demographic sense, a lot of that is because the poorest neighborhoods and the blackest neighborhoods are neighborhoods that people were less able to come back to, less able to move back into New Orleans back into than other neighborhoods that tended to be whiter.
MACDONALD: This is something that is driven by violent crime. And I love Mr. Rangel's complaint that the government is ignoring inner city problems. They are going nuts about New York City policing because it has managed to bring homicide down in black neighborhoods by 80 percent by stop and frisk. And this is the government finally responding to black crime and saving lives.	What I notice now is they're condemning the youth for what has happened but they were the ones on the front line, they were the ones upset, they were ones that brung all this attention to all the problems that plague Baltimore youth, Baltimore citizens. And the majority of them are black. That's truth of the matter.

Figure A.6: Example topic documents: City/Community Problems

An Additional Case Study: A Beer Summit Follows "Police Acting Stupidly"

As an additional case study I offer the arrest of Harvard Professor Henry Louis Gates on July 16, 2009, the outcome of which led to the White House Beer Summit featuring Gates, President Obama, and arresting officer James Crowley.

The White House Beer Summit followed comments President Obama made during a White House press conference on healthcare reform that drew attention to how Officer Crowley handled his interaction with Professor Gates. "I don't know – not having been there and not seeing all the facts – what role race played in that, but I think it's fair to say, number one, any of us would be pretty angry; number two that the Cambridge police acted stupidly in arresting somebody when there was already proof that they were in their own home"

The O'Reilly Factor picked up the story following these remarks. Guest host Monica Crowley wondered whether President Obama should "have given say a more value-neutral statement" and if he "sees things through the prism of race or perhaps his liberal ideology." Instead of sticking with his promise to "try and bring to America a post-racial era," Crowley proposed that "[Obama] waited [*sic*] unnecessarily and irresponsibly knee deep into racial politics." Her comments, reflecting a racially conservative view, suggest that President Obama was making too much about race. He did not put forward a reasoned reaction to racial profiling by the police, as argued by one of The Factor's guests, but rather drew too heavily on his being a black man. Moreover, his comments did not befit the office of the President of the United States.

Across four episodes, The Factor paired guests who justified the arrest with those viewing the arrest as irresponsible, even reflecting racial bias. Factor hosts and guests justifying the arrest argued that Gates should not have acted "belligerently." As one guest advised, "You need to shut up when you're addressing a guy with a gun and a badge. And you need to be respectful, like we all are, or should be when we deal with somebody who's an officer of the law." This, despite his counterpart pointing out that "many African Americans have known the situation where police officers feel like they have to win," with officers feeling compelled to arrest blacks for even small infractions.

Most discussion, however, emphasized the racially conservative point that race was not a salient factor in the arrest itself. It was Professor Gates's behavior that mattered. He "had a chip on his shoulder" and "at a heartbeat turned this into a racial incident" according to O'Reilly, disagreeing with guest Geraldo Rivera's proposition that race is a constantly important factor in interactions between non-whites and the police. The view The Factor offered was that Gates's being a black man was irrelevant to how the event unfolded. President Obama, moreover, made a serious mistake by calling attention to possible racial dynamics present in the event and needed a *mea culpa*.

Rachel Maddow and her guests provided a markedly different perspective reflecting racially liberal themes. On two separate episodes, Maddow and guest Melissa Harris-Lacewell used the incident to talk about race's role in contemporary American politics. The first related to how the Republican National Committee was using President Obama's comments to fundraise. Both Maddow and Harris-Lacewell speculated that the GOP was more interested in stoking "racial indignation among [its] base" than in discussing "ideas and policy." On a separate occasion, Harris-Lacewell noted that "we had a little bit of a cheering section going on among progressive African American scholars when we heard Barack Obama speak so forthrightly about what sounded like his clear understanding of the anxious relationship between African Americans and the police." From this perspective the incident had clear racial implications. Professor Gates's arrest opened up a path to talk about criminal justice issues and offered a teachable moment for police forces to understand how African Americans are taught to interact with the police.

Even when covering the same story, Maddow and O'Reilly incorporate race in different ways. Although The Factor did more to present competing depictions of the arrest than did Maddow, an unmistakable takeaway from watching the former is that race was not an important event feature. In line with a racially conservative perspective, claims to racial profiling or proposals that blacks have meaningfully different interactions with police officers take a back seat to exhortations that simply being respectful and following orders will solve any issues citizens may have with law enforcement. In contrast, Maddow's viewers were shown yet another obstacle facing the black community, reinforcing racially liberal themes. Moreover, not only were President Obama's

comments on the incident warranted, in contrast to reactions presented on O'Reilly comments on Maddow suggested they did not go far enough. Obama had missed an opportunity to speak directly to the black community's concerns about issues in the criminal justice system.

Appendix to Chapter 3

Most Important Problem Results and Alternative Specifications

Table A.1: Relationship between Media Racial Discussion and Race as Most Important Problem

	Race Only	Race Plus
Maddow Coverage	8.150*	2.827*
	(2.771)	(1.337)
O'Reilly Coverage	−4.257	−1.848
	(3.063)	(1.777)
Independent	−0.217*	0.114*
	(0.053)	(0.027)
Republican	−0.348*	0.230*
	(0.031)	(0.016)
Age	−0.006*	0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.0004)
Female	0.132*	0.022
	(0.029)	(0.015)
College	0.064*	−0.125*
	(0.030)	(0.016)
Southerner	0.008	0.001
	(0.032)	(0.016)
Constant	−2.730*	−1.648*
	(0.408)	(0.093)
Observations	79,317	79,317
Log Likelihood	-3,874.608	-17,402.300
Akaike Inf. Crit.	7,961.216	35,016.600

Note: *$p<0.05$. Probit regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Gallup data for non-Hispanic Whites. Models include survey fixed effects.

Table A.2: Relationship between Media Racial Discussion and Placebo Most Important Problem Evaluations

	Environment	Unemployment	Abortion
Maddow Coverage	−2.125	0.325	−2.598
	(2.500)	(1.036)	(3.370)
O'Reilly Coverage	−1.616	0.269	−3.988
	(3.674)	(1.574)	(5.409)
Independent	−0.517*	−0.095*	−0.111
	(0.055)	(0.021)	(0.088)
Republican	−0.888*	−0.125*	0.245*
	(0.036)	(0.012)	(0.041)
Age	−0.005*	0.006*	−0.004*
	(0.001)	(0.0003)	(0.001)
Female	−0.0002	0.053*	0.254*
	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.039)
College	0.367*	−0.238*	0.025
	(0.027)	(0.013)	(0.039)
Southerner	−0.154*	−0.029*	−0.124*
	(0.033)	(0.013)	(0.043)
Constant	−1.500*	−1.947*	−2.070*
	(0.138)	(0.108)	(0.156)
Observations	79,317	79,317	79,317
Log Likelihood	-4,578.968	-30,243.070	-2,215.246
Akaike Inf. Crit.	9,369.936	60,698.140	4,642.492

Note: *p<0.05. Probit regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Gallup data for non-Hispanic Whites. Models include survey fixed effects.

Table A.3: Relationship between Media Racial Discussion and Race as Most Important Problem, Racial Differences

	Race Only	Race Plus	Race Only	Race Plus
Maddow Coverage	0.969	−5.169*	0.969	−5.169*
	(2.418)	(1.740)	(2.418)	(1.740)
O'Reilly Coverage	−3.980	−0.005	−3.980	−0.005
	(3.228)	(2.309)	(3.228)	(2.309)
Independent	0.013	0.108*	0.013	0.108*
	(0.041)	(0.029)	(0.041)	(0.029)
Republican	−0.476*	−0.019	−0.476*	−0.019
	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.043)	(0.023)
Age	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.002*	−0.002*
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	0.006	0.126*	0.006	0.126*
	(0.029)	(0.019)	(0.029)	(0.019)
College	0.043	−0.210*	0.043	−0.210*
	(0.033)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.024)
Southerner	0.067*	0.020	0.067*	0.020
	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.020)
White			−0.101	−0.040
			(0.621)	(0.191)
White*Maddow Coverage			7.181	7.996*
			(3.677)	(2.195)
White*O'Reilly Coverage			−0.277	−1.844
			(4.450)	(2.914)
White*Independent			−0.230*	0.006
			(0.067)	(0.040)
White*Republican			0.128*	0.249*
			(0.053)	(0.028)
White*Age			−0.004*	0.004*
			(0.001)	(0.001)
White*Female			0.126*	−0.105*
			(0.041)	(0.024)
White*College			0.021	0.085*
			(0.045)	(0.029)
White*Southerner			−0.059	−0.019
			(0.043)	(0.025)
Constant	−2.629*	−1.608*	−2.629*	−1.608*
	(0.468)	(0.167)	(0.468)	(0.167)
Observations	21,780	21,780	101,097	101,097
Log Likelihood	-4,494.416	-10,957.800	-8,369.024	-28,360.100
Akaike Inf. Crit.	9,200.832	22,127.610	17,162.050	57,144.210

Note: *p<0.05. Probit regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Gallup data for non-Hispanic Whites. Models include survey fixed effects.

Race Only Outcome | **Race Plus Outcome**

Figure A.7: Probability of endorsing race as the most important problem by show attention to race. Predicted probabilities generated from probit models for a white Republican with remaining covariates held at sample means or modes The hashmarks provide the distribution of levels of racial discussion, shaded by show.

Experimental Treatments

All participants first read a non-political story about interest rates, presented below. They were then randomly assigned to the *control*, *race-important*, or *race-denial* treatments.

USA Today: Mortgage rates drop to lowest since election, but borrowers barely budge

The lowest mortgage interest rates since last November did little to encourage people to refinance their home loans or take out a new loan to buy a home.

Total mortgage application volume rose just 0.1%, seasonally adjusted, last week from the previous week, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA). Volume was nearly 22% lower than a year ago.

A sharp drop in rates usually prompts homeowners to refinance, but those applications rose just

2% for the week and are still down 40% from the same week one year ago, when rates were lower. So many people have already refinanced at rock-bottom rates that the pool of potential applicants is shrinking.

The average contract interest rate for 30-year fixed-rate mortgages with conforming loan balances of $424,100 or less decreased to 4.12 percent, from 4.14 percent, with points remaining unchanged at 0.38, including the origination fee, for 80 percent loan-to-value ratio loans.

"Last week, mortgage rates dropped to their lowest level since the week of the November 2016 election," said Mike Fratantoni, chief economist for the MBA.

Lower rates did nothing to spur home buyers because the drop was not nearly enough to offset fast-rising home prices and a short supply of homes for sale. Mortgage applications to purchase a home fell 2 percent for the week but remain nearly 10% higher than a year ago.

One sign that buyers are struggling increasingly with high home prices is the jump in adjustable rate mortgage applications, which offer a lower interest rate. ARM volume now stands 13% higher than a year ago. In addition, FHA loan applications to purchase a home are only up 4% from a year ago. FHA loans are a favorite among young, first-time buyers with less money to put down on a home.

Control Condition

USA Today: Bill Aims to Reform Policing Practices

Civil asset forfeiture law faces radical reform if a bill in the state legislature passes.

These private property seizures gained traction in the 1980s when law enforcement agencies used them to go after the fruits and tools of organized drug traffickers. Laws allowed agencies to seize all kinds of property, from commercial real estate to boats and jewelry, that they believed was used in crimes or obtained with crime proceeds.

But well-publicized abuses of the process led to a long-running reform movement among activists on both the federal and state levels.

Asset forfeiture turns the common concept of due process on its head: Police can seize property even when its owner is not even charged, much less convicted of, a crime police suspect is related

to the property. Then the burden falls on the owner to prove their belongings are not criminally tainted.

The bill would alter some fundamental aspects of current property seizure practice. For one, forfeitures would have to be tied to a criminal conviction, and even then, the forfeiture would have to be proportional to the offense, meaning, for example, a semi-truck couldn't be taken because the driver had sold a personal amount of marijuana to another driver inside the cab.

Race-important Condition

USA Today: Bill Aims to Reform Racially Discriminatory Policing Practices

Civil asset forfeiture law, an effective crime-fighting tool to some, an instance of racial discrimination for others, faces radical reform if a bill in the state legislature passes.

These private property seizures gained traction in the 1980s when law enforcement agencies used them to go after the fruits and tools of organized drug traffickers. Laws allowed agencies to seize all kinds of property, from commercial real estate to boats and jewelry, that they believed was used in crimes or obtained with crime proceeds.

But well-publicized abuses of the process led to a long-running reform movement among activists on both the federal and state levels.

Asset forfeiture turns the common concept of due process on its head: Police can seize property even when its owner is not even charged, much less convicted of, a crime police suspect is related to the property. Then the burden falls on the owner to prove their belongings are not criminally tainted.

Many point to racial disparities in the policy's application. Although information is limited, in 400 federal court cases where people who challenged seizures and received some money back, the majority were black, Hispanic or another minority.

"Civil asset forfeiture perpetuates racial discrimination in the criminal justice system. Reforming this practice makes sure skin color does not shape one's access to the due process rights the Constitution provides," said Jake Miller, the head of the state ACLU chapter, an organization supporting the reform effort.

"This policy is just one example of how the criminal justice system is stacked against minorities. This bill is the first step toward addressing these pervasive racial biases."

The bill would alter some fundamental aspects of current property seizure practice. For one, forfeitures would have to be tied to a criminal conviction, and even then, the forfeiture would have to be proportional to the offense, meaning, for example, a semi-truck couldn't be taken because the driver had sold a personal amount of marijuana to another driver inside the cab.

Race-denial Condition

USA Today: Bill Aims to Reform "Racially Discriminatory" Policing Practices

Civil asset forfeiture law, an effective crime-fighting tool to some, an instance of racial discrimination for others, faces radical reform if a bill in the state legislature passes.

These private property seizures gained traction in the 1980s when law enforcement agencies used them to go after the fruits and tools of organized drug traffickers. Laws allowed agencies to seize all kinds of property, from commercial real estate to boats and jewelry, that they believed was used in crimes or obtained with crime proceeds.

But well-publicized abuses of the process led to a long-running reform movement among activists on both the federal and state levels.

Asset forfeiture turns the common concept of due process on its head: Police can seize property even when its owner is not even charged, much less convicted of, a crime police suspect is related to the property. Then the burden falls on the owner to prove their belongings are not criminally tainted.

Many point to racial disparities in the policy's application. Although information is limited, in 400 federal court cases where people who challenged seizures and received some money back, the majority were black, Hispanic or another minority.

"Civil asset forfeiture does not involve racial discrimination. Skin color does not shape one's access to the due process rights the Constitution provides, and reforming this practice does not change that," said Jake Miller, the head of the state Association of Chiefs of Police, an organization opposing the reform effort.

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"Opponents of this policy are trying to make this about race when it's not. They're using race as a distraction to get support for a bill that removes an effective policing practice."

The bill would alter some fundamental aspects of current property seizure practice. For one, forfeitures would have to be tied to a criminal conviction, and even then, the forfeiture would have to be proportional to the offense, meaning, for example, a semi-truck couldn't be taken because the driver had sold a personal amount of marijuana to another driver inside the cab.

Appendix to Chapter 4

Question Wording and Descriptive Statistics

Past discrimination: "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class."

Deserve less: "Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve."

Try hard: "It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites." (Reverse Coded)

Special favors (Not asked in 2016 CCAP): "Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors." (Reverse Coded)

Special favors (2008 CCAP version): "Many other minority groups have overcome prejudice and worked their way up. African Americans should do the same without any special favors." (Reverse Coded)

Responses in 4 of the 5 surveys are recorded on 5-point Likert-type scales anchored by strongly agree and strongly disagree. The VOTER Survey differed, with responses recorded on 4-point agree-disagree scales that also included a "don't know" response. "Don't knows" were recoded as midpoints on the scale to approximate the 5 category scale. Descriptive statistics for each scale in each data collection used in the main text analyses, grouped by party, are presented in Table A.4.

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Table A.4: Descriptives for Racial Resentment Measures

		ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012			VOTER Survey 2012-2016		CCAP 2016	
		1992	1994	March	October	December 2011	March	August	2012	2016	June	Nov-Dec
Mean	Democrats	0.56	0.57	0.54	0.53	0.54	0.55	0.52	0.49	0.40	0.38	0.36
	Republicans	0.65	0.68	0.79	0.79	0.78	0.82	0.80	0.79	0.80	0.74	0.73
SD	Democrats	0.25	0.23	0.27	0.26	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.26	0.30	0.30	0.29
	Republicans	0.20	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.19	0.22	0.21
Cronbach's α	Democrats	0.75	0.74	0.84	0.84	0.86	0.86	0.86	0.87	0.90	0.86	0.85
	Republicans	0.65	0.56	0.73	0.74	0.76	0.70	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.71	0.69

Note: Statistics come from non-Hispanic white respondents completing both waves.

Descriptive Analyses: A Polarizing Political Context Coincides with Polarizing Racial Attitudes

Here I show descriptively that the connection between whites' racial attitudes and partisanship has strengthened considerably over the past three decades. Importantly, however, the pattern of changes in these variables indicates that partisanship should be considered as a potential causal force. First, using data from the face-to-face interviews in the 1986-2016 ANES surveys I present means for racial resentment broken down by party in Figure A.8. Between 1986 and 1990, little difference existed between Democrats and Republicans.[14] But starting in 1992 the partisan gap grows in almost every passing year. It increases to 0.07 points in 1992, hits 0.15 points in 2004, and reaches a current peak of 0.28 points in 2016. Before 2016 most of this change came from Republicans becoming increasingly racially resentful. Republicans averaged a 0.61 on the scale in 1986, and 0.70 come 2016. Between 1986 and 2012, Democrats averaged between a 0.54 and 0.57, but dropped an astonishing 0.14 points between 2012 and 2016 to 0.41.[15] Between 1986 and 2016, the correlation between the ANES's 7-point partisanship measure and racial resentment strengthened from a paltry 0.06 to a robust 0.49.[16]

Not only are the means moving apart, but the distributions are changing as well. This is a critically important point. It is not that racially resentful erstwhile Democrats and racially sympathetic erstwhile Republicans have sorted themselves out of the "wrong" party, therefore increasing

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[14]I include leaners with strong and weak partisans.

[15]Since 2008, similar partisan gaps have grown on affect and interracial dating measures (Sides, Tesler and Vavreck, 2018).

[16]This relationship implicates both Southern and non-Southern whites. For Southerners the correlation changes from -0.05 to 0.38. For non-Southerners it increases from 0.11 to 0.51.

Figure A.8: Whites' average racial resentment levels by party affiliation and the correlation between the two. Four-item index scaled 0-1, with higher values denoting more racial resentment. Face-to-face interviews from the American National Election Studies.

the correlation between partisanship and racial attitudes. Instead, partisans are moving toward the scale's extremes over time. Figure A.9 breaks down the distribution of Democrats' and Republicans' racial resentment scores, comparing when the items first appear in the American National Election Study with more recent readings. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, little substantive difference existed between partisans.[17]

Things change in the 2000s as Republicans increasingly move rightward. In 2004, the most resentful three categories contain 25% of Republicans, up from 16% in 1988. This increases to 28% in 2016 with 14% scoring at the measure's maximum, making it the modal category.

White Democrats' attitudes were much more stable until Barack Obama's second term in office. The substantial drop in the group's average level of racial resentment coincided with a large distributional shift. The least resentful three categories contained 8% of Democrats in 2012, but 24% come 2016. Moreover, the modal white Democrat now places at the scale's minimum (12%),

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[17]Racial resentment's distribution does not, for instance, clearly differ by party in 1988 ($\chi^2_{16} = 25.499$, p $= 0.06$).

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
Figure A.9: Racial resentment's distribution among whites by party in select years. Bars indicate proportion of party identifiers with given level of racial resentment. Four-item index scaled 0-1, with higher values denoting more racial resentment. Face-to-face interviews from the American National Election Studies.

while only 2% did in 2012. Not only are partisans' evaluations of blacks increasingly distinct, but their racial attitudes are becoming more extreme.

These changes do not accord with a story where racial attitudes are consistently more central, and thus a more likely causal force, than partisanship. In this same time period, partisanship's distribution changes little. Between 1988 and 2016, the number of whites identifying as any type of Democrat decreases by 1.5 percentage points and the percentage of white Republican identifiers increased by 5 points. Similarly, partisans are not becoming markedly more extreme. Neither party sees more than a 4 percentage point increase in strong partisans in this 28-year window. It makes little sense to consider a less stable construct (racial resentment) as consistently causally prior to a

more stable one (partisanship).

Comparing Relative Magnitudes over Time

The main text references an omnibus model stacking the data sets together to assess whether the impact of partisanship on racial attitudes is significantly greater in the Obama era than the Clinton Era. These results are reported in Table A.5. The substantive picture is the same as the results reported in the text. What this analysis offers is insight into whether changes in the effects of partisanship and racial resentment change across data collections. As one indication, the second row compares the effect of partisanship measured in the 2008 CCAP relative to partisanship in the 1992-1994 ANES. The 6 point increase in magnitude is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). Similarly, moving to the eighth row and second column, the near 8 point decrease in racial resentment's influence between data collections is not significant ($p > 0.05$).

Table A.5: Relationship between Partisanship and Racial Attitudes

	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.041	0.853*
	(0.021)	(0.025)
Partisanship$_{t-1}$*CCAP 2008	0.061*	0.064*
	(0.022)	(0.025)
Partisanship$_{t-1}$*CCAP 2012: March	0.034	0.069*
	(0.036)	(0.033)
Partisanship$_{t-1}$*CCAP 2012: August	0.088*	0.082*
	(0.036)	(0.031)
Partisanship$_{t-1}$*VOTER Survey 2012-2016	0.106*	−0.061
	(0.027)	(0.032)
Partisanship$_{t-1}$*CCAP 2016	0.045*	0.067*
	(0.023)	(0.026)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.600*	0.127*
	(0.031)	(0.041)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$*CCAP 2008	0.139*	−0.079
	(0.033)	(0.041)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$*CCAP 2012: March	0.211*	−0.061
	(0.042)	(0.049)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$*CCAP 2012: August	0.192*	−0.095*
	(0.056)	(0.048)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$*VOTER Survey 2012-2016	0.237*	0.014
	(0.040)	(0.049)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$*CCAP 2016	0.194*	−0.090*
	(0.033)	(0.041)
CCAP 2008	−0.123*	0.001
	(0.022)	(0.026)
CCAP 2012: March	−0.147*	−0.014
	(0.028)	(0.029)
CCAP 2012: August	−0.162*	0.001
	(0.033)	(0.032)
VOTER Survey 2012-2016	−0.242*	0.025
	(0.026)	(0.031)
CCAP 2016	−0.175*	0.012
	(0.022)	(0.026)
Constant	0.243*	0.011
	(0.022)	(0.025)
Observations	25,065	25,065
R^2	0.672	0.815
Residual Std. Error	0.153	0.146

Note: *p<0.05

OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Models use population weights.
Variables scaled 0-1. The 1992-1994 ANES is the baseline data set.

The main text analyses offer two perspectives on the relative influence for each predisposition. The first focuses on estimating the difference in theoretical maximum influence indicated by a min-max change in a predisposition by using a seemingly unrelated regression strategy. But evidence from such comparisons is limited in part due to differences in the variance of the related constructs. The second addresses the sizes of the sample these differences relate as to whether these effects are understated. Even so, some may argue these comparisons do not effectively shed light on each predisposition's relative importance. A third way to address relative influence comes from using standardized coefficients. While methodologists disagree about their utility (cf. King, 1986; Luskin, 1991), standardizing variables to account for each's distribution can shed light on how much variation in the outcome variable is related to variation in the explanatory variable (Luskin, 1991; Gelman and Hill, 2007).

Table A.6 reports the results for the main text models that operationalize racial attitudes with racial resentment after standardizing all variables and estimating the models using OLS. This procedure de-means each variable and then divides it by its standard deviation. In support of my hypothesis that partisanship should be more substantively meaningful in its relationship with racial attitudes in political contexts privileging it over other concerns, the results from all models except those from 1992-1994 ANES reveal a larger relative influence for partisanship than racial attitudes.[18] This is additional evidence that attitude change rather than sorting best explains the dynamics between racial attitudes and partisanship in party-centric political contexts.

Table A.7 extends these analyses to the differential affect measure. Again, this takes the difference between whites' feelings about blacks and their feelings about whites such that higher values denote more negative evaluations of blacks than whites. The results here again point to attitude change rather than sorting as best characterizing the more party-centric political context covered by the VOTER Survey and 2016 CCAP. Partisanship is about 5 times as influential as racial attitudes

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[18]In all cases but the 1992-1994 ANES and the March wave of the 2012 CCAP, partisanship's effect is reliably different than racial resentment's ($p < .05$).

Table A.6: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment, Standardized Variables

	ANES 1992–1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012–2016 VOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.064	0.807*	0.145*	0.914*	0.097*	0.910*	0.166*	0.917*	0.170*	0.781*	0.107*	0.914*
	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.038)	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.008)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.635*	0.081*	0.739*	0.033*	0.766*	0.048*	0.733*	0.023	0.702*	0.101*	0.802*	0.028*
	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.020)	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.008)
Constant	0.003	0.003	−0.003	0.004	−0.033	−0.006	0.041	0.001	0.008	0.062*	0.000	0.004
	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.010)	(0.007)
Observations	592	592	8,866	8,866	726	726	751	751	6,012	6,012	8,116	8,116
R^2	0.424	0.656	0.660	0.865	0.680	0.885	0.663	0.864	0.614	0.682	0.725	0.851
Residual Std. Error	0.753	0.589	0.566	0.358	0.550	0.329	0.543	0.343	0.575	0.522	0.451	0.316

*p<0.05

Note:
OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All variables standardized. Analyses use population weights.

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Table A.7: Relationship between Partisanship and Affect Differential, Standardized Variables

	ANES 1992-1994		VOTER Survey 2012-2016		CCAP 2016	
	Affect Difference$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Affect Difference$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Affect Difference$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	−0.004	0.822*	0.189*	0.821*	0.156*	0.919*
	(0.042)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.008)
Affect Difference$_{t-1}$	0.559*	0.016	0.494*	0.034*	0.554*	0.030*
	(0.062)	(0.023)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.008)
Constant	0.017	0.001	0.022	0.063*	0.025	0.004
	(0.041)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.007)
Observations	577	577	5,720	5,720	8,120	8,120
R^2	0.294	0.648	0.317	0.687	0.378	0.851
Residual Std. Error	0.874	0.599	0.821	0.443	0.708	0.316

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

as measured by differential group affect.

Addressing Measurement Error with Structural Equation Models

In the main text I note that measurement error may potentially affect my conclusions in part by influencing measure stabilities. Here, I replicate the main text analyses using structural equation models as a way to tame measurement error. To facilitate interpretation, I separately report the measurement model results, attitude stabilities, and cross-lagged effects. Finally, to make the comparison as direct as possible I focus only on the respondents included in the main text analysis. Rather than using full information maximum likelihood or some other estimation technique that allows for missingness in my model, I restrict the data to the same respondent set. I then estimate all models via maximum likelihood using the `lavaan` R package (version 0.5) (Rosseel, 2012).

I estimate the same model for all panels. For the measurement component, I freely estimate the factor loadings for each racial resentment item, but constrain the loadings for each item to be equal at $t-1$ and t. This fixes the meaning of racial resentment over time. To identify these latent variables I therefore set each's metric to unit variance. I also correlate the item error variances over time (e.g., past discrimination at $t-1$ and past discrimination at t) and between items sharing the same response formate (e.g., try hard and special favors are reverse coded). Because it is a single item, partisanship's metric is identified by fixing the single item loading to 1. Finally, the covariances between partisanship and racial resentment are also fixed over time. Table A.8 presents the measurement model components of the SEM results for each data set used in the main text analyses, including the factor loadings and fit indices. The fit results are adequate, although not ideal (Brown, 2015).

Tables A.9 and A.10 contain the results from the structural relationships in the cross lagged SEMs. The stability estimates in Table A.9 affirm that each predisposition is highly stable, and also indicate that partisanship is more persistent. But this is not to say they do not change. The results in Table A.10 again support my argument that the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes is dynamic, and that partisanship becomes more influential in contexts privileging it above other predispositions. In only one case (December-March in the 2012 CCAP) do the substantive conclusions differ from the main text results. Here there is no evidence supporting the

Table A.8: SEM Measurement Model Results

	ANES 1992-1994	CCAP 2008	CCAP 2012: March	CCAP 2012: August	2012-2016 VOTER Survey	CCAP 2016
Special Favors	0.763	0.695	0.707	0.698	0.810	—
	(0.037)	(0.008)	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.009)	—
Deserve Less	0.386	0.673	0.597	0.618	0.719	0.724
	(0.036)	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Try Hard	0.728	0.716	0.722	0.703	0.801	0.933
	(0.039)	(0.009)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.009)	(0.010)
Past Discrimination	0.416	0.764	0.749	0.711	0.817	0.844
	(0.042)	(0.009)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.010)	(0.009)
Partisanship	1	1	1	1	1	1
	(—)	(—)	(—)	(—)	(—)	(—)
χ^2	172.628	4193.889	460.871	412.831	1932.661	5887.985
DF	30	28	28	28	28	15
CFI	0.932	0.933	0.923	0.933	0.960	0.900
TLI	0.898	0.893	0.877	0.893	0.936	0.812
SRMR	0.106	0.183	0.200	0.189	0.158	0.235
RMSEA [90% CI]	0.09 [0.077, 0.103]	0.13 [0.126, 0.133]	0.146 [0.134, 0.158]	0.135 [0.124, 0.147]	0.106 [0.102, 0.11]	0.22 [0.215, 0.224]
N	592	8866	726	751	6014	8116

Entries denote parameter estimates with standard errors in parentheses. Estimated via maximum likelihood. Factor variances for racial resentment and partisanship item loading fixed to 1 to identify the model. Loadings constrained to equality over time.

racial attitude influence hypothesis, with the effect imprecisely estimated ($p = .104$).

Table A.9: Stability Coefficients for Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012-2016 VOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
Partisanship	0.845	*0.794*	0.928	*0.908*	0.941	*0.923*	0.947	*0.914*	0.852	*0.808*	0.941	*0.915*
	(0.026)	*(0.016)*	(0.005)	*(0.002)*	(0.015)	*(0.007)*	(0.016)	*(0.007)*	(0.008)	*(0.005)*	(0.005)	*(0.003)*
Racial Resentment	0.790	*0.619*	0.879	*0.639*	0.977	*0.684*	0.997	*0.684*	0.986	*0.671*	0.906	*0.656*
	(0.053)	*(0.026)*	(0.014)	*(0.007)*	(0.051)	*(0.021)*	(0.047)	*(0.020)*	(0.017)	*(0.008)*	(0.014)	*(0.006)*

Note: *$p<0.05$
Entries are estimates from cross-lagged structural equation models estimated via maximum likelihood with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates from completely standardized solution included in italics. Measurement results reported in Table A.8.

Table A.10: Cross-Lagged Effects of Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012-2016 VOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.068	*0.017*	0.617*	*0.158**	0.582*	*0.135**	0.674*	*0.152**	0.672*	*0.152**	0.470*	*0.117**
$\longrightarrow$ Racial Resentment$_t$	(0.143)	*(0.037)*	(0.040)	*(0.010)*	(0.154)	*(0.036)*	(0.148)	*(0.034)*	(0.051)	*(0.012)*	(0.041)	*(0.010)*
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.023*	*0.068**	0.004*	*0.010**	0.008	*0.025*	0.005	*0.014*	0.023*	*0.065**	0.005*	*0.015**
$\longrightarrow$ Partisanship$_t$	(0.009)	*(0.027)*	(0.002)	*(0.005)*	(0.005)	*(0.016)*	(0.005)	*(0.016)*	(0.003)	*(0.008)*	(0.002)	*(0.005)*

Note: *$p<0.05$
Entries are estimates from cross-lagged structural equation models estimated via maximum likelihood with standard errors in parentheses. Estimates from completely standardized solution included in italics. Measurement models reported in Table A.8.

Furthermore, I can address relative magnitudes through a completely standardized solution. These results, italicized entries in Tables A.9 and A.10, demonstrate that partisanship's temporal influence consistently surpasses racial attitudes' in this later period. Interpreted as the standard deviation change in the outcome produced by a standard deviation change in the predictor, partisanship is 2.5 to 15 times as influential as racial attitudes in the relationship. The conclusions drawn

from the main text models receive additional support even after addressing potential differences in measure reliability introduced by measurement error.

Analyses Incorporating Additional Core Attitudes

To address the possibility that attitudes correlated with partisanship but omitted from my model explain my findings, I include other core predispositions into the main text models. These include culture war (Goren and Chapp, 2017) and economic orientations, as well as immigration attitudes (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015). Unfortunately not all data sets contain measures for these orientations captured in the same wave as partisanship and racial resentment, which would cloud temporal comparisons if entered into the models. Nor are operationalizations consistent across data sets, but as best as possible my coding follows existing work (Abrajano and Hajnal, 2015; Goren and Chapp, 2017).[19] Despite these limits my results speak to whether it's partisanship and racial

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[19]The operationalizations for each measure are as follows. In the 1992-1994 ANES I operationalization culture war attitudes using the same four items as (Goren and Chapp, 2017). One item relates to abortion: "There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view? You can just tell me the number of the opinion you choose." With responses: (1) By law, abortion should never be permitted. (2) The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest or when the woman's life is in danger. (3) The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been clearly established. (4) By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice. Two items asking whether they "favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination" and "think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United States Armed Forces or don't you think so", with responses recorded on four-point (strongly) agree/disagree scales. Finally, I included a feeling thermometer for "Gay men and lesbians; that is, homosexuals." I code each to capture conservative positions and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.46, sd = 0.28, α = 0.75). For immigration opinion, I combine 5 items. The first asks "Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little, decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?" The next three record responses on four point scales from extremely to not at all likely. These ask how likely is it that "the growing number of Hispanics will improve our culture with new ideas and customs," "cause higher taxes due to more demands for public services," and "take jobs away from people already here". Finally, I include a feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants. I key each to capture conservative positions and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.62, sd = 0.18, α = 0.65).

In the 2008 CCAP, I measure anti-immigration attitude with an item asking respondents if "Illegal immigrants should be arrested and deported as quickly as possible, regardless of their circumstances" or "Illegal immigrants now living in the U.S. should be allowed to become citizens if they pay a fine and meet other requirements." I key this to indicate anti-immigrant opinion. I capture culture war attitudes with two items, one concerning abortion's legality (responses: Abortion should always be legal = 0; abortion should be legal with some restrictions; abortion should only be legal in special circumstances.; abortion should be illegal. It should never be allowed = 1) and the other asking whether one supports civil unions for gay couples (responses strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1). I code each to capture opposition and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.46, sd = 0.34, α = 0.71).

In the 2012 CCAP, I measure anti-immigration attitude with 3 items asking respondents if "illegal immigrants make a contribution to American society or are a drain," if "it should be easier or harder for foreigners to immigrate to the

attitudes themselves, or related factors, that explain my results.

The conclusions drawn from the main text models persist even after accounting for these other presumptively fundamental predispositions. Table A.11 demonstrates that partisanship still has a substantively and statistically significant impact on racial attitudes in a party-centric era. In no case does partisanship no longer explain attitude change in the Obama era or 2016 election models. When conclusions do change they come from the effect racial attitudes have on party switching. The March reinterviews for the 2012 CCAP and the 2016 CCAP analyses each suggested that racial attitudes motivated sorting. Incorporating additional core attitudes introduces additional imprecision into the estimates, dropping the results from conventional levels of statistical significance. That all the explanatory variables are highly correlated suggests multicollinearity could explain the imprecision, but even then the substantive impact appears negligible for at least the 2016 election patterns.

US legally than it is currently" and if they "favor or oppose providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens?" I key each to capture opposition and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.47, sd = 0.31, α = 0.73). Culture war attitudes are operationalized with 3 items, one on abortion's legality (responses legal in all cases, legal/illegal in some cases, illegal in all cases), one asking whether someone favors or opposes gay marriage (responses favor or oppose), and a feeling thermometer asking about ones feelings towards gays. I code each to capture negative attitudes or opposition and combine them into a 0-1 scale (mean = 0.44, sd = 0.31, α = 0.75). Finally, I measure economic orientations with an item asking if "there is too much or too little regulation of business by the government?" with responses recorded as too much (coded = 1), about right (0.5), or too little (0).

I use the same operationalization scheme as the 2012 CCAP for the VOTER survey, each again scaled 0-1 denoting more conservative attitudes (anti-immigration attitude: mean = 0.58, sd = 0.32, α = 0.72; culture war attitudes: mean = 0.53, sd = 0.31, α = 0.76).

Finally, for the 2016 CCAP I operationalize culture war attitudes with 3 item. One for whether people "have a favorable or an unfavorable opinion of" gays and lesbians (responses: very favorable = 0, very unfavorable = 1), and two asking whether they favor or oppose "repealing a woman's right to have an abortion" (responses: strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1), and "allowing gays and lesbians to marry legally" (responses: strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1). I then combine these items into a 0-1 scale where higher scores correspond with conservative positions (mean = 0.37, sd = 0.34, α = 0.81). I use a similar set for anti-immigration attitudes. One item includes favorability evaluations of illegal immigrants (responses: very favorable = 0, very unfavorable = 1), and two asking whether they favor or oppose "building a wall along the Mexican border" (responses: strongly oppose = 0, strongly favor = 1) and "providing a legal way for illegal immigrants already in the United States to become U.S. citizens" (responses: strongly favor = 0, strongly oppose = 1). Likewise, I combine these items into a 0-1 scale with higher scores denoting anti-immigrant attitudes (mean = 0.56, sd = 0.35, α = 0.83).

Table A.11: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment, with additional attitudes

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2008		CCAP 2012: March		CCAP 2012: August		2012-2016 VOTER Survey		CCAP 2016	
	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.030	0.812*	0.071*	0.902*	0.066*	0.884*	0.041*	0.892*	0.063*	0.734*	0.051*	0.895*
	(0.022)	(0.028)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.558*	0.087*	0.689*	0.036*	0.707*	0.027	0.744*	-0.008	0.690*	0.065*	0.710*	-0.008
	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Anti-Immigration Attitudes$_{t-1}$	0.067	-0.022	0.051*	0.004	0.134*	0.039*	0.082*	0.054*	0.140*	0.065*	0.127*	0.053*
	(0.041)	(0.053)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.022)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Culture War Attitudes$_{t-1}$	0.088*	0.163*	0.052*	0.035*	0.005	0.055*	0.052*	0.052*	0.093*	0.118*	0.018*	0.029*
	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Economic Orientations$_{t-1}$					0.039*	0.042*	0.065*	0.020	0.063*	0.019*		
					(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.017)	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.008)		
Constant	0.190*	-0.003	0.114*	0.009*	0.062*	-0.029*	0.033*	-0.008	-0.023*	0.009*	0.051*	0.020*
	(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	521	521	8,717	8,717	652	652	669	669	5,588	5,588	7,079	7,079
R^2	0.455	0.674	0.673	0.866	0.710	0.893	0.737	0.867	0.648	0.705	0.741	0.854
Residual Std. Error	0.157	0.203	0.145	0.133	0.142	0.113	0.129	0.119	0.171	0.183	0.134	0.116

*p<0.05

Note:
OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Analyses employ population weights. Variables scaled 0-1.

What's interesting, too, is the relationships between these additional attitudes and racial resentment. In all cases one or more of these orientations explains racial attitude change, but to my knowledge no extant work suggests why these relationships should exist. Most likely, as with partisanship, these attitudes motivate selection into certain information environments where, upon encountering information on race, individuals then update their attitudes to maintain belief system coherence. The interrelationships between these attitudes are interesting and other work should consider investigating them in greater detail in future work. But the point remains: my account that the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship is dynamic, with partisanship shaping racial attitudes, holds.

Analyses with Additional Party-Centric Era Panels

I also conducted additional analyses relating racial resentment and partisanship in other data collections to demonstrate that the effect I find for partisanship on racial attitudes does not come from the data collections used in the main text analyses or the specific time periods employed. Here, I focus on the 2006 and 2010 waves of the 2006-2008-2010 General Social Survey (GSS) panel, the 2008-2012 CCAP panel, and the 2010 and 2014 waves of the 2010-2012-2014 Cooperative Congressional Election Study panel.[20] These data shed light on different parts of President Obama's tenure in office, including reactions to his seeking the Democratic Party's nomination (GSS) and reactions to his first term (CCAP). Similarly, the GSS and CCES shed light on whether presidential election years uniquely privilege partisanship in the relationship, or if lower salience midterm elections still see similar patterns.

Importantly, these panels vary in their operationalization of racial resentment. Only the CCAP contains the full four-item set. The CCES contains just two items (special favors and past discrimination) and the GSS contains a single item (special favors) to which I add other items based on prior work (cf. Kinder and Chudy, 2016; Tesler, 2016).[21] All analyses again focus on non-Hispanic

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[20]I also considered other panels including the 2000-2004, 2004-2006, and 2008-2009-2010 ANES and the 2006-2012 Portraits of American Life Study. They unfortunately do not contain sufficient sample sizes, suitable items, or measured racial attitudes at different times temporally than partisanship which affects any analyses.

[21]These additional items are: "On the average, African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than White

Table A.12: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment in additional data collections

	GSS 2006-2010		CCAP 2008-2012		CCES 2010-2014	
	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.130*	0.761*	0.119*	0.815*	0.107*	0.858*
	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.521*	0.057	0.748*	0.105*	0.820*	0.100*
	(0.049)	(0.051)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.016)
Constant	0.235*	0.084*	0.118*	0.031*	0.050*	−0.005
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Observations	331	331	2,204	2,204	7,815	7,815
R^2	0.410	0.597	0.642	0.770	0.665	0.826
Residual Std. Error	0.176	0.208	0.165	0.177	0.169	0.139

Note:*p<0.05. OLS regression results. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

whites. Further, because the GSS conducted face-to-face interviews, the analyses using these focus only on those respondents interviewed by a consistently white or non-white interviewer in 2006 and 2010.[22]

Table A.12 shows that the results from these analyses reflect the results presented in the main text. In each model lagged partisanship has a substantive and statistically significant impact on racial attitudes ($p < 0.05$). Lagged racial resentment similarly shapes subsequent partisanship in two of three analyses.[23] Moreover, while these lagged effects not statistically distinguishable, par-

people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to discrimination?" and "On the average, African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than White people. Do you think these differences are because most African Americans just don't have the motivation or will power to pull themselves out of poverty?" Responses to each were recorded as Yes/No, with disagreeing to the first and agreeing with the second coded as racially resentful responses. The last item takes the difference between respondents' ratings of whites and blacks on a 7-point scale asking them to rate each group as hardworking or lazy. This operationalization makes an adequate scale: α 2006 = 0.62 and 2010 = 0.63.

[22]The CCAP and CCES again relied on YouGov's online panel.

[23]Interestingly, I fail to find a significant bivariate relationship between racial resentment and partisanship between 2006 and 2010 in the GSS. Tesler (Tesler, 2016) reports results finding a significant influence, including a larger coefficient estimate, in a model incorporating additional covariates. The most likely reason I find different results comes from my attempt to hold constant variation in the interview context to address potential variation in racial attitude responses from interviewer effects (Kinder and Sanders, 1996). This, combined with focusing solely on respondents without missing partisanship and racial resentment in both waves, drops my effective sample to 331 compared with Tesler's (Tesler, 2016) reported 581 observations. The results disparity appears to come from missingness related to the racial background of respondents' third wave interviewers. Eliminating the restriction that respondents be interviewed by a consistently white or non-white interviewer does nothing to affect the reported results among those for whom these data are recorded. Ignoring interviewer race and only looking at complete cases for 2006 and 2010 partisanship and racial resentment again supports my argument that party matters, but also recovers a sorting effect similar to (Tesler, 2016).

tisanship appears the most substantively meaningful. These estimates reflect variation along the range of the measure so if cases are unevenly distributed then the estimates may overestimate the measure's influence. That similar amounts of whites place at the ends of the partisanship measure makes these differences more substantively consequential in light of racial resentment's skewed distribution. Few people place at racial resentment's minimum in any data collection making the coefficient estimates speak to an unlikely comparison given the data (for a similar argument on relative effect sizes, see Goren and Chapp, 2017). For example, the CCAP and CCES results indicate that 46-47% of white respondents, those identifying as strong partisans, separate by an average of 11-12 percentage points in racial resentment. In sharp contrast, while a similar difference manifests between those scoring at racial resentment's poles, this group makes up 22% of CCAP respondents and 35% in the CCES. With between a third to over twice again as many people potentially implicated in aligning their racial attitudes with their partisanship, the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes appears to be better characterized by people attitude change than party switching. These conclusions are further supported by results from models using standardized variables. Similarly, including immigration, and culture war attitude does not affect the conclusions suggested by the results in Table A.12's third through sixth columns.[24]

Investigating Obama's Role

Some existing work suggests President Obama was central to the connection between racial attitudes and partisan change. Specifically, those with more negative (positive) racial attitudes are more likely to evaluate Obama negatively (positively) and change their partisanship or racial attitudes accordingly (e.g., Tesler, 2013, 2016). It could therefore be the case that the effects I find in the main text and supplemental analyses are solely attributable to Obama and by missing this connection my argument about partisanship's influence is incomplete. Even the 2016 CCAP analyses may feature the imprint of a two-term black president.

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[24]Unfortunately the GSS's ballot assignment halves my effective sample size when including culture war attitudes, with the case loss substantially decreasing the estimates' precision. But the results are still in the expected direction in each.

However, while Obama may be potentially influential as a signal of racial progress that suggests racial discrimination is over and thus motivates respondents to double down on denying discrimination, or as a positive exemplar who highlights the obstacles black Americans face, it seems unlikely that he alone explains the patterns observed. First, from a theoretical perspective these arguments suggest that his election and administration created a shock to which people reacted. This implies that attitude change or sorting should occur largely in the early Obama years as people become used to these new political realities. But if Obama alone mattered, the patterns I find during his second term or the 2016 election make less sense. That partisanship's estimated effect remains fairly consistent across models spanning different periods of Obama's time in office suggests a more general pattern. It seems a richer theoretical account emphasizes the broader information environment, and how partisanship influences interpretations of it, rather than privileging distinct stimuli. This is certainly not to say that Obama did not matter for shaping individuals' political thinking; that evidence is substantial (Tesler, 2016). Rather, I modify this slightly to note that he was one piece of a larger, party-centric context that featured many potentially race-related stimuli to which people could respond, a feature particularly characteristic of his second term. Acknowledging this provides for a richer picture of the connection between politics and race.[25]

Second, identifying exhaustive causal mediators requires considering other factors correlated with evaluations of Obama that could explain their connection to the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes that encourages changing one or the other. This is not to say that considering possible attitudinal mechanisms connecting partisanship and racial attitudes is not important. It is by providing insight into why these relationships exist. Rather, analyses can suggest possible paths for influence and then incorporate how sensitive these paths are to unaccounted for factors that violate assumptions required to claim the proposed mediator exhausts possible mechanisms (see Imai et al., 2011; Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2016). Obama evaluations may matter,

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[25]Indeed, the descriptive patterns presented in the main text indicate that the largest polarization in racial attitudes came during President Obama's second term. If Obama alone mattered for this shift it seems like this change should have happened during his first term in office. But this latter period saw the rise of the Black Lives Matter movement and increased attention to police brutality and the persistence of racial discrimination, as well as Donald Trump's presidential campaign. These movements, and the media attention they generated, offered information to which partisans could, and seemingly did, respond.

but they matter alongside other potentially unmeasured factors.

To demonstrate, the panels in Figure A.10 provide the estimates and confidence intervals for a mediation analysis following the Baron-Kenny regression procedure (Baron and Kenny, 1986) using the 2008-2012 CCAP and the 2012-2016 VOTER Survey.[26] The total effect result corresponds with the regression results reported above and in the main text (e.g., partisanship$_{t-1}$ on racial attitudes$_t$). The average direct effect (ADE) results denote the estimated cross-lagged effect for partisanship or racial attitudes after incorporating evaluations of Barack Obama.[27] Finally, the average causal mediation effect (ACME) signifies the portion of the relationship between partisanship or racial attitudes and the other outcome mediated by Obama evaluations.

Comparing the total effects with the ACME offers evidence for the mediating influence of Obama evaluations. Figure A.10 shows that whites' feelings about Obama help explain the relationship between partisanship and racial attitudes. But they are not the whole story. Lagged partisanship and racial attitudes still have statistically and substantively significant direct influences on the respective outcome, evidence indicating that other mechanisms are at work.

These results, however, are only part of the account. The panels in Figure A.11 contain results from sensitivity analyses for the preceding outcomes. They speak to how much the ACME changes given levels of confounding by unobservables. The approach relates the proportion of variation in the mediator (Obama evaluations) and the outcome (racial attitudes or partisanship) explained by the confounder to the estimated ACME (Imai et al., 2011). Specifically, I hypothesize unobserved confounding to affect the mediator and outcome in opposite ways (e.g., more positive Obama evaluations produce less resentful attitudes).

At first glance these results suggest robustly estimated mediation effects for Obama evaluations. The bounds for unexplained variance (e.g., variation suggesting possible confounding as

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[26]Mediation and sensitivity analysis results calculated using the `mediation` R package (version 4.4.5) (Tingley et al., 2014) which follows Imai et al. (2011). Other approaches yield similar outcomes (Acharya, Blackwell and Sen, 2016).

[27]This item asks how favorable one feels toward Barack Obama, with responses recorded on 4-point scales ranging from very favorable to very unfavorable. I scale this to run 0-1 with higher values denoting more positive evaluations. Each are asked at $t-1$.

Partisanship on Racial Attitudes   **Racial Attitudes on Partisanship**

Figure A.10: Point estimates and 95% bootstrapped confidence intervals for the average total effect, average causal mediation effect (ACME), and average direct effect (ADE).

indicated by the limits of the contour lines) are relatively low, a trait Imai and colleagues (Imai et al., 2011) note "indicates a more robust estimate of the ACME because there is less room for an unobserved confounder to bias the result" (777). Yet closer inspection reveals greater sensitivity. Relatively low levels of confounding actually switch the sign for the ACME. The top two panels, for example, indicate that if one or more unobserved variables explain over 10% of Obama evaluations and over 5% of racial attitudes or partisanship, then the ACMEs reported in Figure A.10 are incorrect. More generally, even small amounts of original variance explained by confounders results in ACME estimates of 0 (from 0.2% to 0.5% depending on the model). How people evaluate Barack Obama may facilitate the relationship between racial attitudes and partisanship, but theoretical expectations and these results suggest there's much more to the story. Exploring possible mechanisms is certainly worth other work considering.

Figure A.11: Sensitivity analyses for mediation results presented in Figure A.10.

Alternative Operationalizations of Racial Attitudes

I report here additional analyses using alternative measures for racial attitudes in other data collections covering similar time windows.[28] The first addresses racial group stereotypes. The

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[28]Unfortunately the NAES lacks any measure approximating racial resentment to which I can compare effects across racial attitude measures using the same respondents.

2006-08-10 General Social Survey (GSS) panel survey includes four items asking respondents if they thought whites and blacks "tend to be hard-working or if they tend to be lazy" and "tend to be unintelligent or tend to be intelligent," with responses recorded on 7-point scales. Similarly, the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES)'s online panel asked respondents if whites and blacks "in general" are hardworking or lazy, trustworthy or untrustworthy, and intelligent or unintelligent, with responses recorded on 0-100 scales.[29] As with the group favorability items I take the difference between whites' ratings of blacks and their ratings of whites to create 0-1 measures of endorsing anti-black stereotypes. I focus on the 2006-2010 waves for the GSS and waves 3 and 5 for the NAES (summer and winter 2008 respectively).[30] Again, all observations come from non-Hispanic whites and given the GSS's face-to-face interviews I focus only on those interviewed by a white or non-white interviewer in both 2006 and 2010.[31]

The first four columns in Table A.13 contain the results using stereotypes. They provide inconsistent evidence for a dynamic relationship between partisanship and group characterizations. Rather, the results offer more consistent evidence for the partisanship influence hypothesis. First, the GSS analyses demonstrate that partisanship does have a meaningful cross-lagged effect. Between 2006 and 2010 whites' partisan ties motivate them to modify how much they negatively stereotype black Americans relative to white Americans ($\beta_1 = 0.025, p < 0.05$). At the same time, there's no evidence that stereotypes motivated sorting in this period. Second, the NAES results similarly support partisanship as a causal force ($\beta_1 = 0.034, p < 0.05$). But here, evidence also supports those holding negative stereotypes of black Americans in summer 2008 diverging in their partisanship ($\alpha_2 = 0.406\, p < 0.05$). While racial attitudes appear more influential here, this difference is quite overstated because it applies to the full range of the stereotype measure, a range anchored by under 1% of respondents. Racial attitudes implicates many fewer respondents than the 34% of whites identifying as strong partisans. Furthermore, results from models using stan-

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[29]The NAES sample came from Knowledge Networks's Knowledge Panel with participants recruited by random-digit telephone dialing. If households lacked internet access they were provided it to participate in the panel.

[30]GSS_{06}: mean = 0.55, sd= 0.08. GSS_{10}: mean = 0.54, sd= 0.08. $NAES_{wave3}$: mean = 0.53, sd = 0.09. $NAES_{wave5}$: mean = 0.53, sd = 0.08.

[31]After model diagnostics suggested misspecification (King and Roberts, 2017), I transformed the NAES stereotype measure using a Box-Cox transformation to normalize each variable.

Table A.13: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Attitudes

	GSS 2006-2010		2008 NAES (July-December)		GSS 2006-2010	
	Anti-Black Stereotypes$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Anti-Black Stereotypes$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Same-Race Marriage Preference$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.025*	0.776*	0.006*	0.898*	0.026	0.762*
	(0.012)	(0.034)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.034)
Anti-Black Stereotypes$_{t-1}$	0.309*	0.078	0.284*	0.406*		
	(0.050)	(0.141)	(0.013)	(0.082)		
Same-Race Marriage Preference$_{t-1}$					0.584*	0.143*
					(0.038)	(0.059)
Constant	0.357*	0.067	0.648*	−0.288*	0.232*	0.026
	(0.027)	(0.077)	(0.011)	(0.069)	(0.027)	(0.042)
Observations	364	364	2,938	2,938	378	378
R^2	0.113	0.598	0.164	0.787	0.395	0.591
Residual Std. Error	0.073	0.206	0.022	0.146	0.137	0.208

Note:*p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

dardized variables suggest that partisanship is twice as influential.

Finally, the fifth and sixth columns in Table A.13 address beliefs about interracial marriage. This item is frequently used to capture old fashion racism, a preference for social distance based on race (Tesler, 2013).[32] The results indicate that no dynamic relationship appears to exist between partisanship and in-marriage preference. Opposing interracial marriage is related to party switching ($p < 0.05$), but partisanship has no relationship to in-marriage preferences.

Considered alongside the analyses from the main text, these results suggest that partisanship's influence on racial attitudes is not isolated to racial resentment or general group evaluations. It also shapes stereotypes. It does not, however, affect same-race marriage preferences. This mix of relationships appears to reflect patterns in the elite information environment where messages frequently relate to the themes of racial resentment (Haney López, 2014), occasionally implicate racial stereotypes (Dixon, 2017), and do not appear to speak to old fashioned racist beliefs. That partisanship shapes multiple dimensions of racial animus (Kinder, 2013) speaks to its influence in a party-centric political context.

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[32]Specifically, this takes two items asking "How about having a close relative or family member marry a black/white person? Would you be very in favor of it happening, somewhat in favor, neither in favor nor opposed to it happening, somewhat opposed, or very opposed to it happening?" It's coded such that 1 = strongly opposing someone marrying a black person and strongly favoring marrying a white person, and 0 = no in-marriage preference.

Table A.14: Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment. Alternative Partisanship Operationalization.

	ANES 1992-1994		CCAP 2016	
	Racial Resentment$_t$	Relative Republican Favorability$_t$	Racial Resentment$_t$	Relative Republican Favorability$_t$
Relative Republican Favorability$_{t-1}$	0.112*	0.713*	0.110*	0.810*
	(0.037)	(0.030)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.596*	0.108*	0.777*	0.107*
	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Constant	0.210*	0.116*	0.065*	0.052*
	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Observations	574	574	8,116	8,116
R^2	0.436	0.534	0.727	0.732
Residual Std. Error	0.158	0.127	0.138	0.148

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses employ population weights.

Alternative Operationalization of Partisanship

In two data sets I generate substitute measures of partisanship employing differenced feeling thermometers. This new measure offers additional variation, potentially overcoming limitations from using the traditional 7-point branched ANES measure. Higher values on the outcome denote greater relative favorability for Republicans over Democrats, mirroring in part an attachment to the Republican Party. The results in Table A.14 below demonstrates that this alternative measure of partisanship still shapes racial attitudes.

Table A.15: Political Awareness's Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Affect Differential

| | 1992-1994 ANES | | | | 2012-2016 VOTER Survey | | | |
| | Low Awareness | | High Awareness | | Low Awareness | | High Awareness | |
	Affect Difference$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Affect Difference$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Affect Difference$_t$	Partisanship$_t$	Affect Difference$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	−0.017	0.774*	0.018	0.909*	0.056*	0.800*	0.085*	0.878*
	(0.022)	(0.051)	(0.012)	(0.031)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Affect Difference$_{t-1}$	0.739*	0.035	0.469*	0.060	0.515*	0.159*	0.618*	−0.032
	(0.070)	(0.158)	(0.043)	(0.108)	(0.018)	(0.034)	(0.019)	(0.030)
Constant	0.176*	0.087	0.270*	0.039	0.230*	0.045*	0.132*	0.078*
	(0.041)	(0.094)	(0.024)	(0.060)	(0.011)	(0.021)	(0.011)	(0.016)
Observations	194	194	383	383	2,573	2,573	2,689	2,689
R^2	0.377	0.551	0.249	0.693	0.266	0.625	0.368	0.775
Residual Std. Error	0.100	0.226	0.079	0.199	0.115	0.219	0.096	0.148

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights.

Examining Political Awareness's Moderating Effect Using Group Affect

The results in Table A.15 replicate the main text analysis exploring political awareness's conditioning role but using the affect operationalization for racial attitudes. The results offer similar insights. As with the main results using this operationalization, little dynamic relationship exists between partisanship and racial attitudes in the 1990s, and this holds for both the most and least aware (again defined here as those scoring at or above, or below, the median of political awareness in each data set).

The remaining columns reinforce the main text conclusions that changes in the political context can make partisanship a causal force and that this appears to come from people responding to the information environment. The results again show that partisanship motivates attitude change, but the politically aware change the most. The main text results extend to an additional dimension of racial animus. Where things do change is in racial attitudes' effect on party switching. Here, the least politically aware were the most likely to adopt new party loyalties to fit with their racial attitudes. The more negatively they felt about blacks relative to whites, the more they identified as Republicans ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = 0.159$, $p < 0.05$). The results do not offer any evidence that the most aware switched parties between 2012 and 2016 ($\hat{\alpha}_2 = -0.032$, $p > 0.1$). This divergence across dimensions suggests that group affect may be more readily mapped on to the political system for the less politically aware.

Replicating the Main Analyses with an Alternative Analytic Strategy

An additional procedure for evaluating causal patterns comes from (Miller, 1999). This method classifies individuals based on whether they are located consistently on predisposition measures across survey waves, or whether one or both predispositions of interest change over time. From there, causal patterns can be identified by looking at the percentage of individuals who change one predisposition to align with its partner in a proposed relationship. The distribution of cases among these categories helps shed light on plausible patterns of causation, and suggests the dominant causal direction in a given time period. Here, I look at the percentage of individuals who remain at the same level of partisanship and change their racial attitudes in a congruent direction (e.g., more racially sympathetic for Democrats) and the percentage of individuals at the same level of racial resentment (reduced here to a 6-category scale to address potential measurement error issues) who change their party attachments in a congruent direction (e.g., more Republican for racially resentful individuals).[33] When added together these cases provide the total percentage of respondents available for identifying a causal relationship, and they can be used to explore the more influential part of a predisposition (e.g., more Republicans change their racial attitudes than Democrats).

The results from this exercise, reported in Table A.16, reinforce the conclusions from the cross-lagged analyses that partisanship exerts a causal force on racial attitudes, and that this influence is relatively greater in recent years when compared to the 1990s. First, in the 1992-1994 ANES data, some 28% of cases allow for determining whether partisanship or racial resentment is a causal force. Within this set, half of these causal cases support partisanship, while the other half support racial attitudes. Further, Republicans become more racially resentful at a rate slightly greater than Democrats become more racially sympathetic (rate = 1.19:1). Racially resentful individuals, those scoring above the scale's midpoint, are also twice as likely to become more attached to the Republican Party than racially sympathetic individuals decrease their attachments to the same (1.96:1).[34]

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[33]Changing the number of categories does shape the picture presented, but do not change the substantive results. Analyses using fewer categories make racial attitudes seem more stable, but still present a substantively similar picture as those presented here. More categories do much more to privilege partisanship in the relationship. By focusing on fewer categories I present a more stringent test of my hypotheses, and still observe the proposed relationship.

[34]Changes in party attachments can include reducing one's attachment to the same party (e.g., strong to weak

Table A.16: Distribution of Cases featuring Partisanship or Racial Attitudes as a Plausible Cause

Causal Forces		1992-1994 ANES	2008 CCAP	2012 CCAP: March	2012 CCAP: August	2012-2016 VOTER Survey	2016 CCAP
Partisanship Updating Racial Attitudes	Democrats	6%	10%	9%	10%	10%	7%
	Republicans	8%	8%	9%	10%	10%	10%
	Total	14%	19%	19%	20%	20%	17%
Racial Attitudes Updating Partisanship	Racially Resentful	9%	4%	3%	3%	6%	3%
	Racially Sympathetic	5%	2%	1%	2%	2%	2%
	Total	14%	5%	4%	5%	8%	5%
	Causal total	28%	24%	23%	25%	28%	22%

This procedure therefore helps shed light on where most of the causal action is occurring in the 1990s by revealing that more change occurs among Republicans and the racially resentful.

Turning to the 2008 election and the CCAP data, much the same pattern holds. Between March and October, some 24% of cases can identify causal patterns. In contrast to the 1990s, though, party loyalties matter much more than racial attitudes. Over three times as many whites bring their racial attitudes into alignment with their partisan ties than vice versa (3.5:1). Of these cases where causal leverage can be attributed to partisanship, Democrats are moderately more likely than Republicans to change their racial attitudes (1.2:1). Racially resentful whites are also twice as likely to express greater identification with the Republican Party than their racially sympathetic counterparts do with the Democratic Party (2.18:1). Like the 1992-1994 ANES results, those with more negative racial attitudes provide more of the causal force. But in contrast to these results, partisanship causes a greater share of predisposition change than do racial attitudes, and among these cases Democrats appear more influential.

These patterns are remarkably similar when moving to the 2012 CCAP. For the March reinterviews, 23% of cases allow for plausibly identifying racial attitudes or partisanship as a cause and partisanship matters much more. This increases to 25% for the August group. For both sets of respondents, about four times as many whites update their racial attitudes as alter their partisan allegiances. Moreover, Republicans and Democrats are equally likely to change their attitudes. When considering those updating their partisan ties, the racially resentful are more likely to weaken their attachments to, or abandon, the Democratic Party than the racially sympathetic are to change

Republican) or switching to another category entirely (e.g., pure independent to lean Republican).

their loyalties to the Republican Party. But this is more common among the March reinterview group than the August pool.

These trends persist when looking at changes between 2012 and 2016. Some 28% of cases can be used to identify causal patterns, and 72% of these speak to partisanship's influence. Some 20% of respondents align their racial attitudes with their party loyalties, and these patterns do not differ by party. Only 8% of cases support racial attitudes having any influence. But of these, the racially resentful over twice as likely as the racially sympathetic to modify their party loyalties to fit with their racial attitudes.

Finally, the 2016 CCAP data extend these patterns. Some 22% of cases allow for identifying causal patterns, and over three-fourths of these implicate partisanship. Within this group, somewhat more white Republicans change their racial attitudes than Democrats (1.55:1). Similarly, the racially resentful are slightly more likely to change their party loyalties than are the racially sympathetic (1.30:1). These results again fit with the prior evidence suggesting Republicans and the racially resentful provide most of the causal force.

Using a different analytical strategy I again demonstrate that partisanship can change racial attitudes, and that this is more likely in a party-centric political context. What's more, this procedure also sheds light on who is most likely to update their racial attitudes or their partisanship. No partisan group seems especially prone to updating their attitudes. But racially resentful individuals are somewhat more likely to align their party loyalties appropriately than racially sympathetic individuals are to update theirs.

Appendix to Chapter 5

Education's Moderating Effect in a Less Party Centric Era

The results in Table A.17 consider education's conditioning effect in a period less polarized by party. As noted in the main text, there are no conditioned relationship effects from partisanship on racial attitudes. Indeed there's weak support for partisanship even having an average effect

on attitude change. But as the results in the second column indicate, this period saw changes in partisan ties produced by racial attitudes. Moreover, these differences are driven by racially resentful individuals with college degrees.

Table A.17: Conditioned Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment between 1992 and 1994

	Racial Resentment$_t$	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	0.036	0.837*
	(0.025)	(0.033)
—*College Degree$_{t-1}$	0.051	0.022
	(0.045)	(0.060)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.520*	0.020
	(0.040)	(0.053)
—*College Degree$_{t-1}$	0.105	0.243*
	(0.063)	(0.083)
College Degree$_{t-1}$	−0.141*	−0.151*
	(0.041)	(0.054)
Constant	0.310*	0.084*
	(0.028)	(0.037)
Observations	571	571
R^2	0.442	0.663
Residual Std. Error	0.156	0.205

Note: *$p<0.05$. OLS regression results. Standard errors in parentheses. Data from the 1992-1994 ANES panel study with population weights.

Testing Education's Moderating Effect with an Alternative Approach

Table A.18 provides results using an alternative analytical strategy described in (Miller, 1999). This method classifies individuals based on whether they are located consistently on predisposition measures across survey waves, or whether one or both predispositions of interest change over time. From there, causal patterns can be identified by looking at the percentage of individuals who change one predisposition to align with its partner in a proposed relationship. The distribution of cases among these categories helps shed light on plausible patterns of causation, and suggests the dominant causal direction in a given time period. Here, I look at the percentage of individuals who

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remain at the same level of partisanship and change their racial attitudes in a congruent direction (e.g., more racially sympathetic for Democrats) and the percentage of individuals at the same level of racial resentment (reduced here to a 6-category scale to address potential measurement error issues) who change their party attachments in a congruent direction (e.g., more Republican for racially resentful individuals). When added together these cases provide the total percentage of respondents available for identifying a causal relationship, and they can be used to explore the more influential part of a predisposition (e.g., more Republicans change their racial attitudes than Democrats).

Table A.18: Distribution of Cases featuring Partisanship or Racial Attitudes as a Plausible Cause

| | | 2008-2012 CCAP | | 2012-2016 VOTER Survey | |
Causal Forces		No College	College	No College	College
Partisanship Updating	Democrats	7%	7	10	13
Racial Attitudes	Republicans	11	9	12	9
	Total	18	17	21	22
Racial Attitudes	Racially Resentful	8	4	6	3
Updating Partisanship	Racially Sympathetic	2	2	1	2
	Total	9	6	6	5
	Causal total	27	23	28	28

Racial Resentment Subdimension Analysis by Political Interest

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Table A.19: Political Interest's Moderating Effect on the relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment

| | 2008-2012 CCAP | | | | 2012-2016 VOTER Survey | | | |
| | Individualist | | Structuralist | | Individualist | | Structuralist | |
	RR_t	Partisanship$_t$	RR_t	Partisanship$_t$	RR_t	Partisanship$_t$	RR_t	Partisanship$_t$
Partisanship$_{t-1}$	−0.009	0.852*	0.016	0.854*	0.071*	0.826*	0.172*	0.829*
	(0.046)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.027)	(0.032)	(0.027)
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$	0.098	−0.039	0.077	−0.031	0.042	−0.012	−0.023	−0.021
	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.036)	(0.030)
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$	0.238*	−0.028	0.173*	−0.031	0.122*	−0.030	0.085*	−0.020
	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.029)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.442*	0.152*	0.692*	−0.002	0.677*	0.044	0.605*	−0.034
	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.035)
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$	0.170*	−0.057	−0.040	0.049	0.113*	0.090*	0.063	0.211*
	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.068)	(0.061)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.040)
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$	0.182*	−0.067	−0.062	0.087	0.061	0.067	0.099*	0.131*
	(0.061)	(0.055)	(0.065)	(0.058)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.038)
Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$	−0.179*	0.031	−0.032	−0.052	−0.104*	−0.085*	−0.025	−0.165*
	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.056)	(0.050)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.031)
High Interest$_{t-1}$	−0.313*	0.021	−0.108*	−0.090	−0.138*	−0.073*	−0.139*	−0.128*
	(0.050)	(0.045)	(0.053)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.035)	(0.029)
Constant	0.442*	0.013	0.243*	0.122*	0.174*	0.119*	0.148*	0.171*
	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Observations	2,204	2,204	2,204	2,204	5,970	5,970	5,970	5,970
R^2	0.567	0.771	0.551	0.769	0.565	0.693	0.492	0.694
Residual Std. Error	0.195	0.177	0.198	0.177	0.203	0.187	0.222	0.186

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Low political interest is the omitted category.


Figure A.12: Partisan gap in racial resentment$_t$ by political interest and subdimension of racial resentment. Results based on models in Table A.19. Bars provide the distribution of political interest in each model.

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Engagement Moderation Analysis by Party

Table A.20: Moderating Effect of Political Engagement Dimensions on the Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment

	CCAP 2008-2012	VOTER Survey 2012-2016	CCAP 2008-2012	VOTER Survey 2012-2016	CCAP 2008-2012	VOTER Survey 2012-2016
Republican_{t-1}	0.094*	0.114*	0.012	0.088*	0.020	0.061*
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.028)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)
—*College Education$_{t-1}$	0.038	0.052*				
	(0.021)	(0.014)				
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			0.045	0.015		
			(0.031)	(0.021)		
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$			0.148*	0.070*		
			(0.030)	(0.020)		
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					0.163*	0.082*
					(0.031)	(0.023)
Pure Independent$_{t-1}$	0.076*	0.067*	−0.010	0.061*	−0.002	0.023
	(0.015)	(0.008)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.017)
—*College Education$_{t-1}$	0.042	0.066*				
	(0.030)	(0.018)				
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			0.047	−0.007		
			(0.038)	(0.021)		
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$			0.153*	0.050*		
			(0.037)	(0.022)		
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					0.166*	0.055*
					(0.044)	(0.026)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.703*	0.821*	0.679*	0.726*	0.682*	0.573*
	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.058)	(0.041)	(0.034)	(0.031)
—*College Education$_{t-1}$	0.028	−0.058*				
	(0.035)	(0.025)				
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			0.066	0.118*		
			(0.065)	(0.045)		
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$			0.014	0.063		
			(0.062)	(0.043)		
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					0.029	0.291*
					(0.053)	(0.041)
College Education$_{t-1}$	−0.082*	−0.032*				
	(0.020)	(0.014)				
Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			−0.087	−0.082*		
			(0.048)	(0.034)		
High Interest$_{t-1}$			−0.153*	−0.106*		
			(0.046)	(0.032)		
Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					−0.192*	−0.330*
					(0.034)	(0.027)
Constant	0.172*	0.035*	0.262*	0.113*	0.262*	0.287*
	(0.013)	(0.009)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.022)
Observations	2,204	6,095	2,204	6,062	2,204	5,597
R^2	0.652	0.622	0.662	0.625	0.660	0.639
Residual Std. Error	0.163	0.177	0.161	0.176	0.161	0.172

Note: *$p<0.05$. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Democrats are the omitted category.

Figure A.13: Predicted level of racial resentment$_t$ by subdimension. Results based on models in Tables A.21 and Tables A.22.

Variation by Racial Resentment Subdimension

To further unpack party differences by engagement, I consider variation by subdimension of racial resentment and the conditioning effects of education and political awareness. The panels in Figure A.13 again demonstrate asymmetric conditioning effects by party. But the degree of variation varies somewhat by dimension. No matter the time period or dimension, more engaged Democrats exhibit greater degrees of attitude change. Even so, variation is somewhat more muted on the structuralist dimension in the VOTER Survey data than in the CCAP data, again suggesting a change in the nature of information to which partisans are responding.

Table A.21: Moderating Effect of Political Engagement Dimensions on the Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment's Structuralist Dimension

	CCAP 2008-2012	VOTER Survey 2012-2016	CCAP 2008-2012	VOTER Survey 2012-2016	CCAP 2008-2012	VOTER Survey 2012-2016
Republican$_{t-1}$	0.106*	0.174*	0.037	0.130*	0.020	0.075*
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)
—*College Education$_{t-1}$	0.054*	0.019				
	(0.024)	(0.017)				
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			0.041	0.009		
			(0.038)	(0.026)		
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$			0.132*	0.085*		
			(0.037)	(0.025)		
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					0.190*	0.122*
					(0.036)	(0.028)
Pure Independent$_{t-1}$	0.079*	0.099*	0.017	0.128*	−0.011	0.029
	(0.018)	(0.010)	(0.039)	(0.023)	(0.030)	(0.022)
—*College Education$_{t-1}$	0.040	0.059*				
	(0.037)	(0.022)				
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			0.015	−0.083*		
			(0.047)	(0.027)		
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$			0.118*	0.026		
			(0.045)	(0.027)		
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					0.187*	0.085*
					(0.053)	(0.033)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.642*	0.667*	0.686*	0.627*	0.642*	0.494*
	(0.020)	(0.014)	(0.063)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.033)
—*College Education$_{t-1}$	−0.035	0.015				
	(0.037)	(0.028)				
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			−0.040	0.030		
			(0.069)	(0.047)		
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$			−0.070	0.053		
			(0.066)	(0.045)		
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					−0.039	0.260*
					(0.059)	(0.046)
College Education$_{t-1}$	−0.050*	−0.074*				
	(0.023)	(0.017)				
Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			−0.015	0.008		
			(0.053)	(0.037)		
High Interest$_{t-1}$			−0.086	−0.097*		
			(0.051)	(0.035)		
Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					−0.165*	−0.324*
					(0.039)	(0.031)
Constant	0.200*	0.103*	0.238*	0.134*	0.284*	0.320*
	(0.015)	(0.010)	(0.049)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Observations	2,204	6,003	2,204	5,970	2,204	5,514
R^2	0.549	0.493	0.556	0.500	0.558	0.511
Residual Std. Error	0.198	0.223	0.197	0.220	0.196	

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Democrats are the omitted category.

Table A.22: Moderating Effect of Political Engagement Dimensions on the Relationship between Whites' Partisanship and Racial Resentment's Individualist Dimension

	CCAP 2008-2012	VOTER Survey 2012-2016	CCAP 2008-2012	VOTER Survey 2012-2016	CCAP 2008-2012	VOTER Survey 2012-2016
Republican$_{t-1}$	0.119*	0.101*	−0.007	0.054*	0.038	0.028
	(0.011)	(0.008)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.019)
—*College Education$_{t-1}$	0.080*	0.089*				
	(0.024)	(0.016)				
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			0.079*	0.047*		
			(0.037)	(0.024)		
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$			0.215*	0.107*		
			(0.036)	(0.023)		
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					0.186*	0.139*
					(0.036)	(0.026)
Pure Independent$_{t-1}$	0.090*	0.063*	−0.021	−0.009	0.024	0.001
	(0.018)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.029)	(0.020)
—*College Education$_{t-1}$	0.092*	0.077*				
	(0.036)	(0.020)				
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			0.083	0.097*		
			(0.045)	(0.024)		
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$			0.201*	0.120*		
			(0.044)	(0.025)		
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					0.162*	0.092*
					(0.052)	(0.030)
Racial Resentment$_{t-1}$	0.583*	0.756*	0.446*	0.683*	0.475*	0.482*
	(0.019)	(0.013)	(0.057)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.032)
—*College Education$_{t-1}$	0.024	−0.067*				
	(0.036)	(0.026)				
—*Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			0.161*	0.092*		
			(0.064)	(0.044)		
—*High Interest$_{t-1}$			0.158*	0.041		
			(0.061)	(0.042)		
—*Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					0.192*	0.301*
					(0.056)	(0.042)
College Education$_{t-1}$	−0.126*	−0.055*				
	(0.021)	(0.015)				
Moderate Interest$_{t-1}$			−0.169*	−0.112*		
			(0.049)	(0.034)		
High Interest$_{t-1}$			−0.295*	−0.135*		
			(0.047)	(0.032)		
Political Awareness$_{t-1}$					−0.332*	−0.401*
					(0.036)	(0.029)
Constant	0.254*	0.095*	0.443*	0.190*	0.411*	0.398*
	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.045)	(0.031)	(0.025)	(0.024)
Observations	2,204	6,003	2,204	5,970	2,204	5,514
R^2	0.564	0.562	0.576	0.570	0.574	0.579
Residual Std. Error	0.195	0.204	0.193	0.202	0.193	0.199

Note: *p<0.05. OLS regression results with standard errors in parentheses. Variables scaled 0-1. Analyses use population weights. Democrats are the omitted category.