A CITY ON A HILL: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AND MORAL ANALYSIS OF NEOLIBERAL URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN THE U.S. WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGION, SPACE, AND PLACE

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INTRODUCTION

CITIES, NEOLIBERALISM, AND REDEVELOPMENT

This dissertation is an empirical study and moral analysis of neoliberal urban redevelopment in the U.S. Metropolitan cities across the nation in places such as Washington, D.C., Detroit, Nashville, Philadelphia, Seattle, Chicago and many others are experiencing urban redevelopment on a massive level. Over the last few decades, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to analyzing the political-economic forces that drive change and shape urban space in the context of globalization[1] and the breakdown of inter-scalar barriers to the circulation of capital.[2] In this context, social and economic relations, understood on various geographical scales—i.e., "local," "regional," "national," and "global"—are being reconstituted such that there is now decreased significance of the national economy in relationship to the economic growth and development of local municipalities. Urban geographer Neil Smith refers to this reality as a new form of globalism whereby, "Globalization brings about a dramatic change in the kinds of social

[1] The term "globalization" has a wide range of definitions and usage in both academic and popular discourse. To avoid ambiguity, in this chapter, I draw on Manfred B. Steger's conception of globalization. For Steger, globalization is properly understood in relationship to what he calls *globality,* which signifies "a *social condition* characterized by the existence of global economic, political, cultural, and environmental interconnections and flows that make many of the currently existing borders and boundaries irrelevant." Globalization, therefore, refers to "a set of *social* [I also include economic] *processes* that are thought to transform our present social conditions into one of globality." See Manfred B. Steger, *Globalization: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), my brackets; italics in the original.

[2] Here I draw from David Harvey's conception of capital as, "…not a thing but a process in which money is perpetually sent in search of more money." According to Harvey, the dominant form of capital circulation from the mid-18th century onward is production (industrial) capital. I refer to the circulation of capital in these terms. For more see David Harvey, *The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism* (London: Profile Books, 2010), 40. For a representative sample of works that explore the political economic forces that drive urban change, see David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (Athens; London: University of Georgia Press, 2009); Neil Smith, *Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of Space*, 3rd edition (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2008); Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, eds., *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe* (Malden, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2002); Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class--Revisited: Revised and Expanded* (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 2012).

and economic relations and activities occurring in these containers [geographic scales], and an increased porosity of the national containers, such that turbulence in the wider global sea increasingly buffets cities directly."[3] For Smith, in the context of a new globalism, a new urbanism has emerged effectively recasting the importance of the relationship between global and local contexts. Consequently, a special nexus now exists between global and local urban change.

The expansion of the global financial system during the 1970s and the domination of foreign investment by capital moving into and between capital markets[4] set the ground for the transformation of cities that were in pursuit of capital investment and economic growth. As global financial markets evolve and expand so too must cities if they desire to compete and thrive. As urban geographer and political economist, David Harvey illuminates in his seminal essay, "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism" (1989), since the 1970s, U.S. cities have increasingly adopted an entrepreneurial form of urban governance as an effective means of inciting economic growth and development. Beginning in the 1980s, cities determined that they "had to be much more innovative and entrepreneurial, willing to explore all kinds of avenues through which to alleviate their distressed conditions and thereby secure a better future for their populations."[5] As Harvey notes, cities recognized during the 1980s that entrepreneurial strategies were necessary to reverse the effects of deindustrialization and urban and economic decline within their spaces. Consequently, a "new urban entrepreneurialism," emphasizing economic competitiveness, became the core component in urban policy formations and urban growth strategies within the U.S.[6] This dissertation centers on the ideology that frames entrepreneurial strategies of economic growth and

[3] Neil Smith, "New Globalism, New Urbanism" in Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, eds., *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe* (Malden, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2002), 84, my brackets.
[4] Ibid., 83.
[5] David Harvey, "From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism," *Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography* 71, no. 1 (1989): 4.
[6] Ibid.

manages the way capitalism shapes urban spaces through redevelopment initiatives. That ideology is neoliberalism.

What is Neoliberalism?

Neoliberalism refers to a very specific set of ideas borne out of seventeenth and eighteenth-century classical liberalism: namely a commitment to individualism, a self-regulating market, and a non-interventionist state.[7] According to political economist Jason Hackworth (2007), classical liberals were unified on several important counts even though they varied in their politics, method, and purpose.[8] First they asserted that the degree to which individuals are allowed to pursue their self-interests is the highest virtue of society. Because individuals are the best qualified to determine their needs and wants, society must be structured in a way that facilitates the realization of those desires. Second, an unfettered, self-regulating market is conceived as the most efficient and effective means for achieving individual autonomy.[9] Classical liberalism maintains that society flourishes the most when free individuals are permitted to pursue their private wants and needs through the market. Furthermore, it maintains that the market economy, left uninterrupted, will function properly and will self-correct all problems that arise in the system, thus preventing the possibility of market failure.[10] This economic philosophy emphasizes the separability of the economic and political spheres, gives primacy to the former, and necessitates strict adherence to a

[7] I owe a great intellectual debt to James A. Caporaso, Jason Hackworth, David Harvey, Costas Lapavistas, David P. Levine, Ravi K. Roy and Manfred B. Steger whose scholarship shaped my knowledge of political-economic theory.
[8] Jason R. Hackworth, *The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 3.
[9] Ibid, 4.
[10] Market failure refers to a scenario where the market fails to provide the conditions necessary whereby economic actors can effectively maximize their private want satisfaction. On this point, Caporaso and Levine state, "The idea of a general [market] failure has a meaning significantly different from that of an individual failure. It means that the aggregate of goods that people need are available and yet cannot be bought and sold because the market mechanism that circulates money into the hands of those who need the goods has broken down." James A. Caporaso and David P. Levine, *Theories of Political Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 40.

noninterventionist state in order to achieve the classical liberal vision of society.[11] The aforementioned ideas that constitute classical liberalism defined conventional economic wisdom from the eighteenth century until the Great Depression of the 1900s. Jolted by the turmoil caused by the longevity of Great Depression, economic thinkers reevaluated the feasibility and effects on the economy of classical liberal macroeconomic thinking. Chief among them was John Maynard Keynes who was one of the most influential economists of the twentieth century.

Keynes rejected the idea of a self-regulating market and argued that market failure could be a systemic problem, the result of a failure of market mechanisms built within the system itself, thus threatening its stability. The problem of market instability remained of primary concern for Keynes. Capitalist economies, he argued, incorporate processes that make their reproduction unstable and uncertain.[12] He believed that the capitalist economy has an inherent tendency toward crisis and that the state had a special role to play. For him, the state's objective is to secure the macroeconomic conditions necessary in order to prevent any potential perverse effects of an individual's pursuit of private interest.[13] Thus, the state takes on a managerial role of the economy to ensure the production of the most efficient system possible. According to Keynes, the state should increase public spending during economic recessions in order to spur growth and subsequently reduce spending during economic booms in order to minimize inflation. Moreover, state intervention is necessary to correct the devastating effects of the failures of a market economy left to its own devices. He also advocated for limited state ownership of important national enterprises like transportation and energy. These positions are antithetical to the macroeconomic thinking of classical liberalism. As it is today known, Keynesianism became the dominant

[11] Caporaso and Levine, *Theories of Political Economy*, 34.
[12] Ibid., 101.
[13] Ibid., 119.

paradigm in macroeconomic policy in the 1940s. Under a Keynesian economic order, various international economic institutions were created and helped shape a global economy. On this point, global studies scholars Manfred B. Steger and Ravi K. Roy state are worth quoting at length:

> The International Monetary Fund was created to administer the international monetary system. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, later known as the World Bank, was initially designed to provide loans for Europe's postwar reconstruction. During the 1950s, however, its purpose expanded to fund various industrial projects in developing countries around the world. Finally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was established in 1947 as a global trade organization charged with fashioning and enforcing multilateral trade agreements.[14]

These international economic institutions played a managerial role in the global economy. As Steger and Roy assert, the application of Keynesian ideas inspired what is referred to as "the golden age of controlled capitalism,"[15] that lasted from the 1940s until the recession of the 1970s, which led to the rise in inflation and unemployment.

As a consequence of the recession, economic thinkers sought a return to the ideas of classical liberalism. Chief among them was Austrian economist, Frederick von Hayek who was the leading voice in the proselytization of classical liberalism in the twentieth century.[16] Along with a small group of similarly-minded economists, historians, and philosophers who constituted the Mont Pelerin Society, Hayek argued that classical liberalist principles are the virtues upon which the market economy must function. The revival of classical liberalism, known as neoliberalism, assumes classical economic principles in modern form propelling the belief in open, competitive, and unregulated markets that are liberated from all forms of state interference,

[14] Manfred B. Steger and Ravi K. Roy, *Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 6.
[15] Ibid., 7.
[16] David Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 19.

resulting in the optimal mechanisms for economic growth and development.[17] In his book, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* (2006), Harvey defines neoliberalism as "a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade."[18] This definition reflects the principles of classical liberalism and underscores the fact that the liberation of individual entrepreneurial freedoms and the proliferation of free markets, free trade and strong private property rights occur within an institutional framework. This institutional framework involves political-economic practices that are largely instituted in and through cities. Urban geographers Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell (2002) identify these political-economic practices by what they call "rollback" and "rollout" neoliberalism.[19]

Although the revival of classical liberalism in the twentieth century began as a small intellectual movement during the 1950s and 1960s, led by Hayek and others in the Mont Pelerin Society, it very soon penetrated the boundaries of a strictly philosophical project and gained political salience in the decades that followed. As Harvey asserts, neoliberalism's rise in the West, especially in the U.S., is most notably associated with the ascent of U.S. President Ronald Reagan.[20] The policy reforms that he enacted while in power transformed neoliberalism into an institutionalized political-economic state project via what Peck and Tickell call "neoliberal conviction politics."[21] This transformation essentially reconfigured contemporary political practices through the medium of institutionalized state power for the purposes of extending classic

[17] Brenner and Theodore, "Cities and the Geographies of 'Actually Existing Neoliberalism,'" in *Spaces of Neoliberalism, 2*.
[18] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 2.
[19] Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space" in *Spaces of Neoliberalism*, 37.
[20] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 1.
[21] Peck and Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space" in *Spaces of Neoliberalism,* 41.

market logics to free up the ability to accumulate capital. Peck and Tickell refer to the economic and political developments during this time as "rollback" processes of neoliberalism.

When Reagan ascended to national political power in 1981, he immediately began enacting an economic policy agenda (today known as Reaganomics), which spurred the first wave of neoliberal reforms in the U.S. Essentially a campaign against the golden age of controlled capitalism, Reaganomics embodied classical liberal principles and sought to "rollback" or actively discredit and systematically dismantle Keynesian-style "big government" and its associated welfare-state programs. At the core of Reagan's neoliberal policy agenda was the notion that big government is inefficient and that government predation leads to poor economic performance. Further undergirding this belief was Reagan's allegiance to a supply-side economic philosophy, which assumed that long-term economic growth depends on "freeing up" the amount of capital available for private investment.[22] For Reagan, the extent of government power needed to be restricted in order to free up available capital to spur economic growth. He accomplished this through neoliberal political-economic policies.

Reagan instituted his supply-side-oriented program geared toward boosting a stagnate U.S. economy quickly, beginning with fiscal policy. By reducing marginal tax rates as a means of freeing up capital, Reagan sought to promote growth and generate sufficient revenue to stabilize a fragile economy. While on the surface, the neoliberal aspects operative in the Reagan tax cuts may not seem readily apparent, Steger and Roy contend that this type of fiscal policy represents "a full-blown assault on state-led redistribution of private wealth."[23] In an effort to simplify the tax code, Reagan championed the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986—the second of two tax cuts—which reduced the number of tax brackets, dramatically decreasing the rate for top income earners

[22] Steger and Roy, *Neoliberalism*, 24.
[23] Ibid., 27.

from fifty percent to twenty-eight percent while simultaneously increasing the bottom rate from eleven percent to fifteen percent. This piece of legislation drastically widened the income gap between the middle class and the wealthy and increased the financial burden of the working poor. Moreover, tax breaks on investments subsidized the movement of capital away from the unionized Northeast and Midwest and into the barely-regulated South that essentially had no union power.[24] Reagan's tax cuts and other supply-side fiscal policy initiatives and systematically reversed Keynesian-era market restraints that controlled the disparate levels of capital accumulation between classes.

While fiscal policy was a primary focus of Reaganomics, deregulation was also a critical component of President Reagan's political-economic agenda. Rooted in an ideological commitment to the neoliberal tenants of regulatory restraint and individual choice, Reagan believed that smaller, decentralized government was the most advantageous method to facilitate market efficiency and economic effectiveness.[25] Moreover, he advocated for the value of rigorous economic statistical tools to assess public policy. That conviction translated into executive political action when, at the beginning of his first term in office, Reagan signed *Executive Order 12291*, which required federal agencies to "utilize the methods of cost-benefit analysis in appraising government regulation proposals."[26] The result was the targeting of a substantial number of existing regulations for elimination. Likewise, the regulatory powers of federal agencies and departments like the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of Housing and Urban Development were also significantly weakened.

[24] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 26.
[25] Steger and Roy, *Neoliberalism*, 30.
[26] Ibid.

Reagan's deregulation program also extended beyond the scope of the federal government into key industry sectors, which included among others communications, airlines, transportation and banking. Arguably the most controversial of Reagan's neoliberal deregulatory reforms centered on the Savings and Loan Industry, which was by most assessments a relatively secure and prudent industry in part because of the high level of government regulations.[27] Reagan argued that the Savings and Loan industry was systematically denied the opportunity to compete aggressively with other commercial bank and security markets and thus enacted a set of deregulatory reforms that allowed them to seek new forms of financing in pursuit of higher profits. This move subsequently culminated in a range of corporate mergers, acquisitions, and buyouts.[28]

Harvey contends that the deregulation of government and public industry under the Reagan Administration opened up new zones of unfettered market freedoms for powerful corporate interests.[29] These policies are emblematic of the type of political practices incorporated within rollback neoliberalism. They effectively mobilize state power to back marketization and deregulation projects through a set of processes that proselytized classical liberalism virtues of free markets and individual autonomy. Furthermore, the set of rollback processes systematically dismantled Keynesian-state programs and the era of controlled capitalism. Combined with the major reforms enacted in the area of social policy which targeted federal programs geared toward the poor, e.g., Medicaid, Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and the like, Reaganomics essentially reduced the reach and authority of the federal government for the sole purpose of eliminating the "inefficiency" of big government, all in an attempt to enhance the nation's economic performance. Harvey rightly argues that such efforts began the shift toward greater

[27] Ibid., 31.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 26.

social inequality as a part of the neoliberal turn, and are thus characteristic of the restoration and reconstruction of economic power of class elites.[30]

The first "rollback" wave of neoliberalism and the use of institutionalized state power in the U.S. set the stage for the second "rollout" wave during the 1990s, which involved, as Peck and Tickell contend, "the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations."[31] Then-President Bill Clinton primarily championed this shift. His support for the neoliberal construction of institutional economic management hinged on his ideological allegiance to market globalism. For Clinton, the condition of the U.S. economy was interconnected and interdependent on the economies of other nation-states across the globe. During the 1990s, globalization emerged as a critical discourse concerning economic activity, and Clinton's ability to articulate a neoliberal political-economic agenda within the globalization discourse was a significant contributing factor to the success of the institutional reforms he achieved. This was further buttressed by the fact that global power elites, who subscribed to neoliberal ideology, had by Clinton's presidency infused globalization processes with neoliberal politics. During the Clinton era, neoliberal ideology assumed a more technocratic form through what is today known as the "Washington Consensus," which became the global framework for economic development during the 1990s.[32]

As a set of ten specific economic policy prescriptions developed in Washington, D.C. and exported around the world through organizations like through international economic institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Washington Consensus was viewed as the standard for proper economic management.[33] President Clinton, who

[30] Ibid.
[31] Peck and Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space," In *Spaces of Neoliberalism,* 36.
[32] Steger and Roy, *Neoliberalism*, 19.
[33] Ibid.

as a market globalist was grounded in the neoliberal thesis that free trade brings prosperity to everyone, believed that the economic vitality of the global economy was critical for sustained U.S. market expansion. As a result, his administration politically championed the imposition of "radical market-oriented structure adjustment programs"[34] on developing countries through multiple international economic institutions in order to boost global economic performance. In particular, the IMF, endowed with the authority to negotiate debt relief early in Reagan's first term as president, negotiated deals with over fifteen countries to forgive some $60 billion in debt with the hopes that the relief would ignite a global economic recovery, ultimately benefiting the U.S.[35]

This debt forgiveness came at a price. Countries had to agree to lift price controls in their economy, privatize state-owned companies and liberalize trade, among other maneuvers.[36] As Harvey notes, nation-states that imposed such neoliberal economic reforms also received massive loans from the IMF and other international economic institutions.[37] These institutional arrangements not only came to define the rules of world trade (the IMF and WTO both require the opening up of capital markets as conditions to membership thereby politically constructing new markets), as Peck and Tickell astutely argue, they construct "the 'rules' of interlocal competition by shaping the very metrics by which regional competitiveness, public policy, corporate performance, [and] social productivity are measured…"[38] The neoliberal rules of economic management, which effectively institutionalize the extension of market forces, are applied to local manifestations of neoliberalized space in regions and cities across the country. Championed by the Clinton Administration, the reproduction of neoliberalism in the form of political action and

[34] Ibid., 55.
[35] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism,* 75.
[36] Steger and Roy, *Neoliberalism,* 57.
[37] Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 75.
[38] Peck and Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space," in *Spaces of Neoliberalism, 40*.

institutionalized state power, which began with President Reagan in the U.S., is indicative of the ways in which market relationships and political practices become intertwined under neoliberal ideology.

The above provides an account of neoliberalism that includes the principles of individualism, a self-regulating market, and a non-interventionist state and gave particular attention to the political-economic practices that proliferate neoliberalism in capitalist societies. The aim was to be analytically specific about the use of the term in this dissertation because neoliberalism means different things to different people. This is a point made poignantly by religious social ethicist Keri Day in her book, *Religious Resistance to Neoliberalism* (2015). She states:

> To the neo-Marxist, neoliberalism has meant a free-market system that has privileged economic redistribution to the wealthy, a social policy system characterized by structural adjustment policies created by the IMF and World Bank that have disproportionately hurt poor women and their children in Two-Thirds World countries. For Foucaultian scholars, this term is understood as a *cultural* project, premised on the shift toward "governmentalities that merge market and state imperatives in order to produce self-regulating 'good subjects' who embody ideals of individual responsibility." For political theorists, neoliberalism has created a new model of statecraft in which privatization of goods and services, the destruction of the welfare state, and the increasing shift toward a prison industrial complex and militarism (national security) have shaped economic policy and cultural practices around the world.[39]

While neoliberalism has divergent meanings across disciplines, this dissertation uses the term to invoke the principles of classical liberalism borne out of the eighteen and nineteenth centuries. A second aim was to provide an account of neoliberalism that identifies the political-economic processes and practices that constitute neoliberal forms of urban governance. Peck and Tickell refer to these processes and practices as "neoliberalization."[40] In this dissertation, the

[39] Keri Day, *Religious Resistance to Neoliberalism: Womanist and Black Feminist Perspectives* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 7.
[40] Peck and Tickell, "Neoliberalizing Space," in *Spaces of Neoliberalism, 40*.

adoption of their understanding of "neoliberalization" is used to refer to the political-economic processes instituted within cities. As Peck and Tickell argue, cities are at the forefront of neoliberalization.[41] Under neoliberalism, cities function as important geographies for economic growth and profit. They are primary sites for boosting economic development in competition for the increased circulation and accumulation of capital.[42] The physical transformation of cities into arenas of market discipline and capital under neoliberal urban policy and through practices of neoliberalization constitutes neoliberal urban redevelopment.

Neoliberalism and Urban Redevelopment

Much of the literature that explores the intersection of neoliberalism and cities analyzes the ways that neoliberalism is utilized as a political-economic strategy for spatial restructuring that often leads to uneven geographical development.[43] Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore's anthology, *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe* (2002) is a representative text of this approach.[44] The text aims to both "examine the role of neoliberal political projects since the late 1970s in shaping the dynamics of urban change in North America and Western Europe," and "illuminate some of the boarder geographical contours, dynamics and trajectories of neoliberalism itself as a multiscalar geoeconomic and geopolitical project."[45] The contributions to this volume are largely theoretical and focus on state and corporate practices under neoliberal regimes. In contrast, another edited volume on neoliberalism by Helga Leitner et al.,

[41] Ibid.
[42] Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, "Preface: From the 'New Localism' to the Spaces of Neoliberalism" in *Spaces of Neoliberalism*, v.
[43] For an instructive analysis of uneven geographical development, see David Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development* (London ; New York, NY: Verso, 2006); Smith, *Uneven Development*.
[44] The essays in this volume also appear in the journal *Antipode,* Volume 34, issue 3.
[45] Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, "Preface: From the 'New Localism' to the Spaces of Neoliberalism' in *Spaces of Neoliberalism*, viii.

Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers (2007), considers the "contestations in and of neoliberal urbanization—particularly those emerging from within civil society (although contestations from within the state receive some attention)."[46] While some of the contributions to this volume are theoretical, others take up the task of revealing what urban contestation in neoliberal cities entails. Of the fifteen contributive essays to this informative volume, however, only one considers neoliberalism in relationship to the urban poor.

Jason Hackworth's book, *The Neoliberal City* (2007), is another notable text that explores neoliberalism in the context of the city. He examines the role of neoliberal political projects on urban change by grounding neoliberalism in the spatial particularity of the city as one form of settlement and examines the neoliberalization of public housing specifically through the federally sponsored HOPE VI program. Hackworth's focus on the city in relation to neoliberalism reflects his conviction that, "Cities are the sites of both the most acute articulation of neoliberalism and of its most acute opposition."[47] Although he goes to considerable lengths to detail the neoliberalization of public housing, Hackworth does not give much analysis of the impact of such neoliberal practices on human lives.

Beyond the field of urban studies, there is literature that considers neoliberalism within a broader social context. Hall et al.'s anthology, *After Neoliberalism?: The Kilburn Manifesto* (2015), challenges the very foundations of what the volume frames as the present neoliberal social order. They are particularly interested in the ways in which neoliberalism shapes public discourse. "Ideology plays a key role in disseminating, legitimizing and re-invigorating a regime of power, profit and privilege. Neoliberal ideas seem to have sedimented into the western imaginary and

[46] Helga Leitner, Jamie Peck, and Eric S. Sheppard, eds., *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers* (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), vii-viii.
[47] Hackworth, *The Neoliberal City, xii*.

become embedded in popular 'common sense.' They set the parameters—provide the 'taken-for-granteds'—of public discussion, media debate and popular calculation."[48] Moreover, in emphasizing the social dimension of neoliberalism, these scholars even consider moral aspects of neoliberalism as an ideology, if only tangentially. "Neoliberalism represents the market economy as virtually coterminous with society itself, as determining its entire system of values. We challenge this conception. We see the economy as only one element in a wider process of social reproduction; it is merely one of the means through which society takes shape. The economy should be seen as a means to the fulfillment of broader human ends, not as an end in itself."[49] Hall et al.'s volume is a notable contribution to the literature on neoliberalism that explicitly attends to dimensions of the concept that literature in urban studies bypasses.

In religious studies, Tuomas Martikainen and François Gautheir's anthology *Religion in the Neoliberal Age: Political Economy and Modes of Governance* (2013) seeks to fill a gap in the way religion interplays with the effects of neoliberalism. Their volume focuses on three main concepts 1) religious responses to neoliberalism, particularly considering how religious organizations respond to the neoliberal market economy, 2) the ways in which the political economy of neoliberalism affects opportunity structures for religious actors, and 3) how political governance shifts the boundaries of religious agency.[50] Their volume is a noteworthy contribution to the field of religious studies. Yet it does not effectively address the moral dimensions of neoliberalism's effects on human lives, particularly the urban poor.

[48] Stuart Hall, Doreen Massey, and Michael Rustin, eds., *After Neoliberalism?: The Kilburn Manifesto* (London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd, 2015), 18–19.
[49] Ibid., 119.
[50] Tuomas Martikainen and Francois Gauthier, eds., *Religion in the Neoliberal Age: Political Economy and Modes of Governance* (Farnham, Surrey. England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Pub Co, 2013).

Keri Day's, *Religious Resistance to Neoliberalism* (2015) provides a moral analysis of neoliberalism in some very helpful ways, and thus fills a gap in religious scholarship that examines neoliberalism exclusively. As far as I am aware, her text is the only monograph devoted to a religious analysis of neoliberalism. According to Day, "Over the last several decades, most theological and religious scholarship has focused on critiques of free-market economy rather than neoliberalism. These critiques of free-market economy have focused on both the absence of the state in regulating 'free markets' as well as social pathologies (competition, lack of care, etc.) that result from market individualism."[51] As a contribution to the literature, she interrogates the distortion and obstruction of human meaning and flourishing at the hands of neoliberal ideology and its associated political-economic practices. For Day, the effects of neoliberalism are as much a religious and theological question as they are material.[52] She asserts that neoliberal values and practices affect moral and religious imaginations through constraint by free-market rationalities. By drawing on black feminist and womanist religio-cultural perspectives, she seeks to generate new critiques of neoliberalism that contests its detrimental effects. Although Day offers a compelling contribution to the religious studies literature on neoliberalism, this dissertation is fundamentally concerned with the effects of neoliberalism, not only on spaces that constitute cities, but also on the moral implications of neoliberal urban redevelopment for the study of religion, space, and place, a topic not considered by Day.

The transformation of cities in pursuit of economic growth has significant implications for urban residents. As a scholar of religion and social ethicist interested in how issues of race, class, and gender shape U.S. cities in the twenty-first century, I am especially concerned with the harm that neoliberal urban redevelopment inflicts on the black urban poor. While neoliberal urban

[51] Day, *Religious Resistance to Neoliberalism*, 5.
[52] Ibid, 4.

redevelopment has pronouncedly negative consequences for the urban poor writ large, among this group, poor black urban residents are especially disadvantaged as neoliberal urban redevelopment schemes target inner city neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty. While scholars have studied neoliberalism and the intersection of cities and society, this dissertation provides a moral analysis of the effects of neoliberal urban redevelopment on the black urban poor. It argues that the end game of urban revitalization in poor black neighborhoods is real estate and profit, not the general welfare of the "least of these" in a rapidly changing urban environment.

Chapter Overviews

This dissertation draws from multiple academic disciplines including economics, urban studies, sociology, history, cultural studies, and religion to inform a moral analysis of neoliberal urban redevelopment in the U.S. centered on the lives of the black urban poor. Chapter one interrogates the racialization of urban concentrated poverty in American public discourse. It examines the effects that black migration had on American industrial cities during the twentieth century. As blacks moved into cities, public and private practices of racism constrained their resettlement options resulting in their spatial segregation. With the increase in poor black enclaves in segregated and economically divested urban spaces came a rise in social scientific research on the poverty problem. Chapter one explores the relationship between poverty research and racialization and argues that the national news media mediated the racialization of urban concentrated poverty through their coverage of the infamous Moynihan Report, which was based on social scientific research. This exploration is necessary to understand why poor black communities are frequently targeted in urban redevelopment initiatives.

Chapter two examinees the premises that justify urban redevelopment in poor black neighborhoods through mixed-income housing creation. From the late twentieth century to the

present, the deconcentration of poverty through the creation of mixed-income communities has been a leading strategy in urban redevelopment initiatives. Conventional wisdom states that mixed-income development mitigates the social problems associated with the urban poor, including joblessness, crime, and teen pregnancy while "revitalizing" their neighborhoods. "Urban revitalization" is the primary rhetorical moniker used to frame redevelopment initiatives. The second chapter explores the theoretical premises that buttress mixed-income development as a strategy to deconcentrate urban poverty. It assesses these claims against empirical evidence that reveals an inconsistency between such claims and reality, drawing from multiple studies of the federal HOPE VI program. It argues that based on available evidence, indicators suggest poor black urban residents are not the ideal type of urban dwellers that urban elites[53] have in mind in their vision of a vibrant urban metropolis. While race is never referenced in urban revitalization, the agenda to deconcentrated urban poverty through mixed-income development is very much a race-based project that is infused with class politics.

Chapter three considers the material consequences for poor blacks who live in neighborhoods targeted for urban revitalization, using Washington, D.C. as a case study. D.C. became the first majority black city in the U.S. in 1970. Affectionately known as "Chocolate City," over the last two decades the city has experienced extensive redevelopment, and at the same time has seen a drastic drop in its black population and the loss of its status as a predominantly black city. The redevelopment initiatives in D.C. have had a pronouncedly negative impact on black and poor communities. Chapter three specifically considers the redevelopment of Barry Farm, a historically black neighborhood located in Southeast D.C. Notwithstanding its very rich history,

[53] By "urban elites," I refer to individuals who have the power and influence to shape and implement policies that transform cities and their spaces. These include, but are not limited to, elected officials, government bureaucrats, urban planners and developers, business leaders, and the like.

research on the neighborhood is quite limited. This chapter attends to the history and problematizes the revitalization of the neighborhood through the New Communities Initiative, which is the city's mixed-income strategy for redevelopment. I argue that broken promises by city leaders to neighborhood residents and their subsequent displacement as a consequence of urban revitalization demonstrates that the planned redevelopment of the neighborhood is not really for them but rather for an elite creative (and predominantly white) class group.

Chapter four offers a moral analysis of urban revitalization that centers on four emergent themes from the first three chapters of the dissertation. They are: the role that racial representation plays in urban revitalization through stereotyping; the exacerbation of racial and socio-economic inequality in U.S. cities through urban revitalization; the cultural logic of creative destruction embedded in neoliberal urban redevelopment; and the broken promises to and the perennial displacement of poor black urban residents that renders them an exilic class group. The dissertation concludes with implications of the dissertation, particularly for the study of religion, space, and place.

CHAPTER I

THE RACIALIZATION OF CONCENTRATED URBAN POVERTY IN AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE

Introduction

This chapter interrogates the racialization of concentrated urban poverty in American public discourse and its implications for urban redevelopment. An interrogation of how urban poverty became primarily associated with poor black neighborhoods provides instructive insight on the reasons that such neighborhoods are common targets of urban redevelopment initiatives, often to the detriment to the current residents. In what follows, I first identify the historical context for the racialization of urban poverty. One cannot understand the significance of urban redevelopment in black urban neighborhoods without considering the effects of black migration into U.S. industrial cities. While I am interested in the effects of the waves of black migration into cities during and after the First and Second World Wars, I do not provide a historiography of black migration in the U.S.[54] My use of the historical material in this chapter is solely for the purpose of identifying how the waves of black migration reconstituted urban space and precipitated the racialization of urban concentrated poverty. In this historical reconstruction, I owe a great intellectual debt to Benjamin S. Kleinburg, David Ward, Eric Arnesen, Daniel M. Johnson, and Rex R. Campbell whose work I have found most useful.

[54]For a survey of the historiography of black migration in America, see Joe William Trotter, Jr., ed., *The Great Migration in Historical Perspective: New Dimensions of Race, Class, and Gender* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). For other book-length studies on black migration in the United States, see James M. Gregory, *The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of Black and White Southerners Transformed America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005); Nicholas Leman, *The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America* (New York: Knopf, 1991); Milton C. Sernett, *Bound for the Promised Land: African American Religion and the Great Migration* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).

Secondly, I consider the issue of urban decline and segregation of poor blacks in urban space that precipitated the emergence of concentrated (ghetto) urban poverty in these cities in the aftermath of black migration. The reconstitution of urban space vis-à-vis an influx of blacks into cities and the establishment of segregated urban space comprised of primarily poor blacks set the stage for the racialization of urban poverty in American public discourse. Thirdly, I account for the origins and development of poverty knowledge in the U.S. in order to show how opinion about the poor based on social-scientific poverty research was absorbed into the national public discourse on poverty and subsequently shaped urban policy approaches designed to address urban concentrated poverty as a social problem. Here I find historian Alice O'Connor instrumental. Her seminal contribution to poverty research provides a synthesis of the intellectual history of social scientific knowledge on poverty that brings together various theories across the disciplines of sociology, anthropology, behavioral psychology, and economics from the Progressive Era up through the end of the twentieth century, and identifies how poverty research shaped public policy.[55] In the fourth section, I give particular attention to the infamous Moynihan Report and consider how President Lyndon Johnson used it to champion his "war on poverty" policy agenda. My claim is that the national news media mediated the racialization of poverty through their coverage of the Report. I conclude by identifying the implications of the racialization of urban poverty for urban redevelopment initiatives in the U.S.

[55] This issue is examined further in chapter two in the context of mixed-income development as a strategy to address urban concentrated poverty.

Black Migration into America's Industrial Cities

The Emergence of the Industrial City

According to sociologist Benjamin Kleinberg, the rise of the industrial city began in the nineteenth century when only a few sizable cities existed in the U.S. In his assessment, "Prior to the 1840s the only sizable American cities were the port cities of the East Coast. Cities such as Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and Charleston ranked as the leading urban places at the country's national beginning in the late 1700s. These were actually small commercial cities under 30,000 in population, built up during the colonial era around seagoing ports to serve mercantile policies of the British Empire."[56] Developments in the transportation sector of the U.S. economy swiftly brought about urban industrial transformation.

Railroad network connected emerging industrial cities to each other and even more widely to areas rich in natural resources in the southern and midwestern parts of the country. These railway networks also facilitated the growth of urban populations making easier intercontinental migration of people. Joining basic factors of economic production, i.e., land and natural resources, labor, and the means of production, the nascent railroad network significantly accelerated the development of industrial capitalism in the U.S. and contributed to urban growth. Kleinberg surmises, "…the installation of the railroads made it possible for all the major factors of production to be brought within convenient mutual access to one another and for their products to be set circulating into ever widening markets in a rapidly developing urban-industrial system."[57]

Also critical in the social and economic factors conditioning urban industrial growth was the evolution of the steamship. Steam connected American and European ports that expanded

[56] Benjamin S. Kleinberg, *Urban America in Transformation: Perspectives on Urban Policy and Development* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc, 1995), 3.
[57] Ibid., 6.

overseas trade and investment and provided a means for European immigrants seeking employment opportunities to come to the U.S. The bulk of these immigrants came to the country in two waves, extensively from England, Ireland, and Germany. American historians refer to these periods as the "old migration" between 1830-1880 and the "new migration" between 1880-1930.[58] According to historian David Ward, by the late nineteenth century, European immigrants and their native-born children comprised the majority of urban populations in northern and midwestern industrial cities.[59] The increased presence of European immigrants in U.S. industrial cities not only propelled urban industrial capitalism by expanding the population and labor supply in industrial cities (only three cities existed in 1840 with populations of 100,000 or more, by 1860 that number had more than doubled),[60] it also brought a diversity of cultural backgrounds and practices. Industrial cities were regarded as economic machines and became centers for private and public investment in industry and services, while also serving as hubs of urban life. The industrial city represented an urban space characterized by diversity of cultures, occupations, and lifestyles. It was a "highly complex urban settlement,"[61] and by the second decade of the 1900s, the social, cultural, and economic processes that constituted the industrial city were well underway.[62] Beginning in the nineteen teens, many African Americans in the South were drawn to the North as it appeared to them as a promised land of socio-economic opportunity.[63]

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[58] Ibid. For a more in-depth account of the transformation of industrial cities in the context of European immigration during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see David Ward, *Cities and Immigrants: A Geography of Change in 19th Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press), 1971; John Bodnar, *The Transplanted: A History of Immigrants in Urban America* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press), 1987.
[59] David Ward, *Poverty, Ethnicity and the American City, 1840-1925: Changing Conceptions of the Slum and Ghetto* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1.
[60] Kleinberg, *Urban American in Transformation*, 5.
[61] Ibid., 8
[62] Ibid.,
[63] Eric Arnesen, *Black Protest and the Great Migration: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2003)*, 67.* Several studies explore the lives of blacks who migrated to northern cities. For examples, see Jervis Anderson, *This was Harlem: A Cultural Portrait, 1900-1950* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux), 1981; Darrel E. Bigham, *We Ask Only a Fair Trial: A History of the Black Community of Evansville, Indiana* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 1987; David Katzman, *Before the Ghetto: Black Detroit in the Nineteenth*

The Great Migrations of the Twentieth Century

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 set the conditions for the first large wave of migration of blacks to the North, a consequence of a cessation of European immigration into the U.S. triggered by war.[64] According to American historian Eric Arnesen, European immigration fell dramatically within the first year of conflict from 1.2 million in 1914 to 300,000 in 1915.[65] Combined with the military enlistment of millions of Americans, the supply of American workers plummeted at the very time that demand for labor increased. Faced with a growing economy and a severe labor shortage, American industrial employers turned to untapped sources of labor, which included southern blacks. Northern industries sent recruiters to the South to retrieve new labor. Many southern blacks, living in a racially hostile and violent South, jumped at the opportunity for work in the industrial North.[66]

The desire to flee white supremacy and racial apartheid in the South and pursue the prospects for social and economic mobility in the North, and buttressed by the labor shortage, facilitated the movement of large numbers of black people to northern industrial cities. Steward E. Tolnay and E.M. Beck summarize this state of affairs as the effects of "push" and "pull" factors where "…the net attractiveness of a potential destination outweighs the net attractiveness of the place of origin."[67] Under these conditions, they state, migration is expected. According to Johnson and Campbell, between 1915 and 1918, no less than 750,000 blacks migrated from the rural South

Century (Urbana: University of Illinois Press), 1973; and Kenneth L. Kusmer, *A Ghetto Takes Shape: Black Cleveland, 1870-1930*) Urbana: University of Illinois Press), 1976.

[64] Eric Arnesen, *Black Protest and the Great Migration,*7.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

[67] See Tolnay and Beck, "Rethinking the Role of Racial Violence in the Great Migration" in Alferdteen Harrison, ed., *Black Exodus: The Great Migration from the American South* (Jackson, MS: University Press of Mississippi, 1992).

to northern cities.[68] By 1920, thirteen southern states experienced significant losses in rural blacks.[69] Although declines in the black population in rural areas were most prominent in southern states, these declines were widespread. Twenty-six states across the country experienced significant declines in their rural areas.[70] Another 614,000 blacks migrated to urban areas during the 1920s, accounting for an increase in their population by some forty-six percent.[71] Cities with populations of more than 100,000 experienced the heaviest concentration of blacks, including New York, Chicago, Detroit, and Philadelphia.[72]

The movement of blacks into industrial cities during this first wave of black migration had significant consequences for urban spaces and life within them. Blacks were not immune to the effects of racism in the North. Whites greeted them with hostility and antagonism. Racial animosity sparked riots that were shaped by fear of mixed neighborhoods and resentment toward black invaders.[73] Industrial city neighborhoods were defined by race. The quality of living conditions in black neighborhoods tended to be much lower than those of whites. On this point, Arnesen reports:

> Black migrants, then, were not free to live anywhere they wanted: Their general poverty and racial restrictions forced them to live in geographically circumscribed areas. As their numbers increased, so too did the pressures on the housing stock. Migrants, journalists, and social services workers uniformly agreed that housing conditions were terrible. …The addition of thousands of migrants meant 'the utmost utilization of every place in the Negro sections capable of being transformed into habitation,' with attics, cellars, storerooms, churches, sheds, and warehouses turned into accommodations for new arrivals.[74]

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[68] Johnson and Campbell, *Black Migration in America*, 74. The exact range of black migrants during this period is disputable. Arnesen places this number at up to 500,000 blacks during this same period. I find Johnson and Campbell's use of census data and Department of Labor data (the challenges associated with data from that era not withstanding) a more convincing account.
[69] Ibid., 76.
[70] Ibid.
[71] Ibid., 78
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid., 84.
[74] Arnesen, *Black Protest and the Great Migration*, 15.

This essentially meant that black urban residents were most often relegated to underdeveloped, economically divested areas of cities where dilapidated buildings marked the urban landscape and frequently served as housing structures.

The demographics of urban space shifted dramatically as blacks settled into segregated neighborhoods. Despite challenges encountered as a result of racism and white supremacy, black migrants were able to establish networks and build vibrant communities, which had economic and political implications. Black migration into industrial cities solidified the role of black labor in the industrial economy. On this point, Arnesen states, "Depsite some migrants' loss of jobs to white workers and persistent conflict over housing, black migrants ultimately retained their foothold in the industrial economy and established a firm and permanent presence in the northern and midwestern states, particularly in domestic service, common labor, and unskilled and semiskilled factory production jobs."[75] The large influx of blacks into industrial cities formed conditions that were instrumental in the rise of a black working and middle class. Black political mobilization accompanied rising black populations in cities and, as Arnesen states, although a half century removed the first large wave of black migration to the North from the abolition of the system of Jim Crow, the changes to black urban life in industrial cities "set the stage for subsequent struggles and ultimate if not incomplete victories,"[76] for racial equality during the Civil Rights Movement. As a result of the first wave of black migrants into industrial cities in the North, developments within the black community established the foundation for black mobility and political organization in urban space that subsequent generations would advance.

World War II marked the beginning of the second large wave of black migration. The greater of the two waves in terms of numbers, it facilitated the movement of nearly five million

[75] Ibid., 35.
[76] Ibid., 36.

blacks from the South between 1941 and the late 1970s not only into the industrial North but throughout the Midwest and West Coast.[77] It also included black mobility within the South from villages and small towns to larger urban areas. The geographical expansiveness of black migration to other parts of the country and its political-economic effects on black migrants primarily defines the second large wave. Historian James Gregory describes the geographical shifts in the black population: "Within one generation, a people who had been mostly rural became mostly urban. A people mostly southern spread to all regions of the United States. A people mostly accustomed to poverty and equipped with farm skills now pushed their way into the core of the American economy. And other changes followed. A people who had lacked access to political rights and political influence now gained both."[78] By 1980, eighteen metropolitan areas outside of the South had black populations of more than 100,000 people while another eleven had populations above 50,000.[79] Black migration to urban areas within the South virtually eliminated black farm life, causing the rural South to become whiter as a result of the second wave of migration in the U.S.[80] Citing U.S. census data, Gregory acknowledges that African Americans became the majority in several cities, including Baltimore, Detroit, and New Orleans, and comprised at least forty percent of the urban population in many others.[81] These factors had a radical impact on and reorganized urban space. One of the prominent consequences of that reorganization was the emergence of the black ghetto in U.S. cities.

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[77] James N. Gregory, "The Second Great Migration: A Historical Overview" in Kenneth L. Kusmer and Joe W. Trotter, eds., *African American Urban History since World War II* (Chicago ; London: University Of Chicago Press, 2009), 19.
[78] Ibid., 20.
[79] Ibid., 23.
[80] Ibid., 23-24.
[81] Ibid., 30. Also see US Census Bureau Administration and Customer Services, "US Census Bureau Publications - Census of Population and Housing," accessed February 24, 2019, https://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/1980/1980censusofpopu8011u_bw.pdf.

The Ghetto and the Black Urban Poor

According to urban geographer David Ward, the term "ghetto" was initially applied in the U.S. to refer to the residential quarters of Eastern European Jews in cities toward the turn of the nineteenth century.[82] During this period, the poor were identified with inner city slums. Ward states, "In its initial American usage, the ghetto was regarded as a slum where the presence of newly arrived [European] immigrants exacerbated social problems related to adverse living conditions and residential segregation."[83] Over the course of time, it gradually acquired a broader definition to describe the residential segregation of any minority group in the slums of inner cities. By the mid to late 1900s, the term was overwhelmingly deployed to refer to high concentrations of poor urban blacks.[84]

What facilitated its evolution in American culture? Ward maintains that shifts in European immigration from the northwestern to the southern, central, and eastern parts of the continent complicated American anxieties about poverty and buttressed a desire for assimilation of the "new" European immigrant.[85] The push for this assimilation shifted Americans' conception of poverty and led to the extension of the term to include other minority groups. This is not to suggest it is inaccurate to refer to underdeveloped, poor black neighborhoods in industrial cities prior to the 1950s as black ghettos. As stated earlier, white supremacy and racial apartheid during the earliest periods of the first great wave of blacks into industrial cities constrained their settlement options, relegating many of them to slum areas. According to the earlier referenced definition, one could refer to those areas as black ghettos. Urban geographer David Wilson, for example, contends

[82] David Ward, *Poverty, Ethnicity and the American City, 1840-1925: Changing Conceptions of the Slum and Ghetto* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 2.
[83] Ibid., my brackets.
[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid., 10

that the emergence of black ghettos in cities in the 1920s and 1930s coincided with the first great wave of black migration.[86] As previously noted, however, this was not the dominant understanding of the ghetto at that time. Rather, suburbanization and urban decline during the 1940s and 1950s, combined with the continuous in-migration of blacks into the poorest, exacerbated racial segregation and established the conditions for the rise in concentrated urban poverty and the expansion of poor urban neighborhoods. This became a precursor to the inevitable racialization of high-poverty inner-city neighborhoods, or "the ghetto," in the public sphere.

As blacks (who were largely poor) poured into the central districts and inner-city neighborhoods of U.S. cities in search of jobs and economic opportunity, middle and upper-income residents (largely white) moved to their peripheral areas. By 1950, suburbanization had effectively severed investment capital in urban spaces.[87] Private, financial, and real estate interests followed the wave of out-migration by middle-class flight into suburban areas. During this postwar period, blue-collar manufacturers, which included the auto and steel industries that were the primary drivers of industrial city economies, also moved to the suburbs.[88] Large-scale manufacturing businesses, commercial and service industries, retail firms and other professional offices followed their predominantly white customers to the suburbs.

The shift in private and public resources and the transfer of jobs out of the city proper left many isolated, under and unemployed black residents behind to deal with the effects of economic

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[86] David Wilson, *Cities and Race: America's New Black Ghetto* (Routledge, 2007), 19.
[87] For examples of texts that examine the drivers of suburbanization during the twentieth century and the subsequent effects on U.S. cities, see Kenneth T. Jackson, *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), William Julius Wilson, *When Work Disappears : The World of the New Urban Poor* (New York: Vintage, 1997); Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993); Peter Mieszkowski and Edwin S. Mills, "The Causes of Metropolitan Suburbanization," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7, no. 3 (September 1993): 135–47, https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.7.3.135; Alan Greenspan and Adrian Wooldridge, *Capitalism in America: A History* (New York City: Penguin Press, 2018).
[88] Kleinberg, *Urban America in Transformation*, 124.

divestment and a decaying urban landscape. These shifts were accelerated via federal public policy that propelled suburbanization, contributed to urban decline, and reinforced racial segregation. Federal highway programs, mortgage loans, and the federal public housing program were fundamental factors that contributed to urban decline and the isolation of the black urban poor. The Interstate Highway Act of 1956 accelerated suburban growth through the development of an interstate network that connected (white) middle-class urban residents to the suburbs. On the significance of the 1956 Highway Act, Kleinberg writes,

> With the construction of the interstate network, middle-class central city residents looking for newer housing or a better neighborhood were no longer confined to what the city had to offer; they now had ready access to expanding new suburban developments. At the same time, a variety of business firms, manufacturing plants, and real estate developers all found open to them the broad expanses of suburbia. No longer tied to locations near existing streetcar routes or railroad lines, they were freed from the pattern of urban-centered location associated with prewar urban-industrial development.[89]

According to Kleinberg, the construction of an interstate network was a critical element in the acceleration of suburbanization in the U.S.

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and the Veterans Administration's (VA) post-WWII mortgage programs essentially subsidized the cost of middle-class white flight to the suburbs. These programs provided a pathway to homeownership by significantly reducing financial barriers for veterans and their families.[90] Black veterans, however, were denied the benefits of this form of government assistance. The FHA and VA legally restricted loans to white borrowers in efforts to protect all-white residential neighborhoods, particularly those in the suburbs. This was standard operating procedure until 1962 when President Kennedy signed an executive order banning the discriminatory practice.[91] Unfortunately, these were not the only

[89] Ibid., 129.
[90] Ibid., 125.
[91] Ibid., 126.

infractions committed by the FHA against communities of color. It engaged in income discrimination against low-income individuals in efforts to prevent them from obtaining government-backed loans, and also actively discouraged investment in minority communities through low eligibility ratings on properties that housed minorities.[92] These kind of public practices, that also include realtor steering and the improper use of zoning ordinances reinforced and exacerbated racial segregation and the concentration and isolation of black and poor people in urban space.[93]

Arguably the most significant factor for the concentration and isolation of the black urban poor in U.S. cities has been the federal public housing program. Although the program originated in 1937, its initial reach was limited. Less than twenty U.S. cities had public housing complexes in 1940.[94] It was not until 1949 that the program received an infusion of federal funds which led to the increased construction of public housing complexes in cities across the nation. On the extent of public housing creation, David Ward asserts: "Between 1949 and 1967, more than 600 public housing projects were launched in some 700 cities. Over half were to house more than 500 families. In planning schemes, central portions of downtowns characterized by urban blight and high concentrations of poverty were targeted for destruction and public housing construction. Many projects were designed to capture displacees from nearby urban renewal projects, others were envisioned as new neighborhoods for the poor. By 1970, over 450 public housing projects in U.S. cities had been built. Typically, projects were monstrous in scale (usually over 10 acres in size and housing thousands of people) and with a horrifyingly high concentration of people."[95] Although the federal government claimed the program was a means to abolish slum areas and spark urban

[92] Ibid.
[93] Wilson, *Cities and Race,* 20.
[94] Ibid., 25.
[95] Ibid.

revitalization, its ultimate accomplishment was the increased segregation and stigmatization of poor black residents. Public housing programs in cities in all fifty states cordoned off low- and no-income individuals and families residing in their complexes. In many cities, public housing functioned as the only available option for the urban poor.

Prior to the antidiscrimination laws of the late 1960s, many cities built public housing in slum areas before razing their existing dilapidated buildings in order to avoid the relocation of black tenants to other (nonblack) neighborhoods. For example, from the mid-1950s to mid-1960s the Chicago's public housing protocol effectively guaranteed that all new public housing developments would be located in "exclusively black or racially changing areas."[96] In other cities across the country, public housing programs during its early stages were, "… run according to the 'neighborhood-composition' rule, requiring that public housing residents must mirror the ethnic distribution of their surrounding neighborhood."[97] The net effect was the spatial concentration and isolation of the poorest residential neighborhoods that were overwhelmingly populated by blacks. These conditions set the stage for the racialization of concentrated urban poverty in the public sphere, for public housing became the dominant framing device for its spaces, which fundamentally invoked race. The emergence of poverty research as a means to address the social problem of poverty was an essential factor that contributed to the racialization of urban poverty in the American public sphere. I now turn my attention to the process of racialization beginning with the origins and development of poverty knowledge.

[96] Edward Goetz, *Clearing the Way: Deconcentrating the Poor in Urban America* (Washington, D.C: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2003), 34.
[97] Ibid.

Poverty Knowledge, Racialization, and Discourse in the Public Sphere

The Origins and Development of Poverty Knowledge

Concentrated urban poverty in the U.S. has been a consistent interest of the social scientific community from the late nineteenth century during the Progressive Era to the present. In her book, *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History* (2002), historian Alice O'Connor contends that American liberalism has long held that scientific knowledge holds the key to solving society's social problems.[98] This is most apparent in how it has attempted to address the problem of poverty. According to O'Connor, poverty research, which has historically focused on cities, is an American invention.[99] The two dominant approaches to the issue represent tensions embedded in "poverty knowledge" in the U.S. By poverty knowledge, O'Connor refers to "the body of knowledge that, very much as a legacy of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, has attained a kind of quasi-official status in defining 'the poverty problem' and assessing how social programs affect the poor. Besides being social scientific, this knowledge is based principally on quantitative, national-level data."[100] The first dominant approach to poverty knowledge O'Connor identifies accounts for poverty by emphasizing individual failures. The second underscores structural inequality as the cause of poverty.[101]

At the end of the nineteenth century, O'Connor maintains, poverty research was defined by a social economist paradigm. In this view, only individuals who are able to successfully compete in the marketplace survive and thrive, while those who cannot eventually perish. Poverty is construed as an inevitability of nature and any attempt to intervene in the free market system to

[98] Alice O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History*, Reprint edition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002), 3.
[99] Ibid., 3.
[100] Ibid., 4 .
[101] Ibid., 6.

address the problem would introduce chaos and instability into society. Later a rigorously empirical (quantitative) and objective (analytical) approach to poverty knowledge displaced the social economist paradigm during the Progressive Era and dominated the landscape of research. Pioneers of the succeeding framework embraced a pronouncedly structural, moral, and social analysis to account for the existence of poverty in the capitalist economy. Institutional reforms were their fundamental objective. Social scientists emphasized poverty's structural causes, e.g., social and economic conditions, as opposed to the individualist explanations prevalent in the economic naturalist school of thought.[102]

The Social Survey Movement epitomized the succeeding framework for poverty knowledge and incited the evolution of social scientific research during the early decades of the twentieth century.[103] According to O'Connor, the institution of the social survey method in poverty research represented a significant development in poverty knowledge because it established "…a framework within which poverty could be investigated as a problem of political or social economy—of low wages, un-, and 'under'-employment, long hours, hazardous work conditions—and of the policies and practices governing the distribution of income and wealth."[104] This framework enabled social scientific investigators to assess the effects of race, class, and gender inequality through the scrutiny of discriminatory policies and practices that shaped labor markets.

In this way, the social survey method merged research with a reformist agenda embodied in the structural socio-economic framework of poverty knowledge for Progressive Era investigators. Social survey research regularly interrogated labor relations as opposed to analyses

[102] Ibid., 26.
[103] For more on the Social Survey Movement and its significance to sociological research methods, see Michael Gordon, "The Social Survey Movement and Sociology in the United States," *Social Problems* 21, no. 2 (1973): 284–98.
[104] O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*, 27.

of poverty in general. It became a standard approach in social scientific investigation of poverty in community research and action. Charles Booth's seventeen-volume study, *Life and Labour of the People in London* (1889) and W.E.B. Du Bois's *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899), illustrate the Social Survey Movement and Progressive Era social scientists' critique of the political economy in capitalist societies.

The Chicago School of Sociology, which emerged during the 1920s, then shifted the framework of poverty knowledge by emphasizing social ecology over political economy.[105] Social investigators moved from examination of race, class, and gender inequality in a structural analysis of poverty to social disorganization to account for its existence.[106] Developed by University of Chicago sociologist W.I. Thomas and his research assistant Florian Znaniecki in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (1918)—a seminal five-volume study of Polish immigrant families in Chicago—social disorganization theory refers to "a decrease of the influence of existing social rules of behavior upon individual members of the group. This decrease may present innumerable degrees, ranging from a single break of some particular rule by one individual up to a general decay of all the institutions of the group."[107] Here, an individual is emancipated from the social control of a group, which could result in increased individual autonomy and the creation of new forms of family and community, or alternatively, lead to demoralization represented by sexual deviance, the breakdown in family and community relationships, and violence. In particular, social disorganization theory accounts for concentrated urban poverty by framing it as part of the

[105] For an insightful account of the development of the Chicago School of Sociology, see Martin Bulmer, *The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research*, (Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1986).
[106] O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*, 45.
[107] William Isaac Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America* (edited and abridged version), ed. Eli Zaretsky (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 191. This can be understood in contrast to "social organization" which can refer to "the ability of a community structure to realize the common values of its residents and maintain effective social controls." Robert J. Sampson and W. Byron Groves, "Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory" *Journal of American Sociology* 94, no. 4 (1989): 774–802.

symptomology of the disorganization that accompanies communities in transition from rural to urban areas and from one cultural environment to another. Thus, as an alternative to the critique of the wage structure of the economy, the social ecology argument frames poverty as a consequence of temporary cultural breakdown.

Thomas' theory of social disorganization was extremely influential to the development of the social science disciplines that shaped poverty knowledge in the U.S. On its impact, Eli Zaretsky states:

> It essentially created the fields of urban sociology and the sociology of deviance; it defined the concepts of attitude and value for a generation of social psychologists; it remains the most enduring description of peasant society for both historians and anthropologists; it gave social work its leading non-Freudian psychological concepts; it is an early classic of comparative history (Poland and America), and it pioneered in the effort to trace the subjective experience of immigrants and other minority groups, printing private letters, a book-length autobiography, and life history documents, which until then had never been considered in America for their potential contribution to knowledge.[108]

Not only did social disorganization theory significantly impact poverty knowledge across social scientific disciplines, but the ecological model for social development, of which Thomas and Znaniecki were early pioneers, defined the Chicago School of Sociology.

Two additional consequences of the development of the Chicago School's ecological framework for poverty research merit acknowledgment. The first concerns the stark shift in the aims of poverty research from an explicitly reformist agenda exemplified by the Social Survey Movement to a pronouncedly academic exercise. "Working from a more secure institutional base and in the more conservative political climate of the 1920s, Chicago sociologists took social scientific community research in a direction not contemplated in progressive social inquiry. In their hands, poverty knowledge became an academic rather than so exclusively a reform-minded

[108] Ibid., 2–3.

endeavor, a contribution to theory-building, and a 'scientific basis' for a more limited (though it would not remain that way) kind of community action," writes O'Connor.[109] In this way, the shift fortified the preexisting barriers that isolated the poverty debate within the social scientific community from the general public.

The second concerns the push to naturalize urban poverty, moving away from the institutional and structural critiques posed by earlier social investigators in the social and political-economic framework of poverty knowledge. "As a program of research, social ecology neutralized the conceptual terrain mapped out in the social surveys; as a program for action, it redirected the aims of intervention, away from wages and work and living conditions, and toward the more circumscribed objectives of community 'reorganization' and assimilation into the existing social mainstream."[110] The poverty problem, then, became an issue of group dynamics as opposed to structural issues in a capitalist political economy. The naturalization of urban poverty is particularly significant as it led to another turn in poverty research that focused on the role of culture.

The emphasis on culture as both a cause and consequence of poverty seemingly was embraced by poverty researchers across various theoretical orientations. For progressive reformists, the focus on culture was not so much a departure from the structural, political-economic approach, as it was a different way to emphasize its themes of class polarization and the problems of liberal individualism.[111] The focus on culture, specifically the existence of a "lower-class culture," an "underclass,"[112] or a "culture of poverty" among the poor, was a dimension of the type

[109] O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*, 53.
[110] Ibid.
[111] Ibid., 55.
[112] The term "underclass" is highly contested. It was most prominently deployed by sociologist William Julius Wilson. In his seminal text, *The Truly Disadvantaged,* Wilson used it to describe an underprivileged group of poor urban residents who had been "left behind" amidst the structural changes within cities and their residential neighborhoods. Wilson acknowledged that the term garnered little consensus among the social scientific community

of structural inequalities that progressive reformers in the Social Survey Movement sought to redress.[113] However, for others, emphasizing culture provided a pathway to return to an individualist orientation for the examination of poverty through the consideration of the relationship between personal responsibility, behavior, and the poverty problem.

Of the various theoretical accounts of poverty's existence, the "culture-of-poverty" thesis was arguably the most dominant theory of the twentieth century. During the 1960s, anthropologist Oscar Lewis emphatically advanced this theory through his writing. According to Lewis, "The culture of poverty is both an adaptation and reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class-stratified, highly individuated, capitalistic society. It represents an effort to cope with feelings of hopelessness and despair that develop from the realization of the improbability of achieving success in terms of the values and goals of the larger society."[114] For Lewis, the culture of poverty emerges amidst the confluence of a number of conditions in societies with capitalist economies, including persistently high un-, and 'under'-employment for unskilled workers, low wages, and "the existence in the dominant class of a set of values that stresses the accumulation of wealth and property, the possibility of upward mobility, and thrift and that explains low economic status as the result of personal inadequacy or inferiority."[115] On Lewis' view, the culture of poverty refers to the way of life that develops among poor populations under the various conditions that facilitate its emergence. It is a self-perpetuating reality, passed from one generation to the next.

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with regard to its meaning. He eventually abandoned the use of the term due to the negative connotation it acquired, largely in part to its deployment by the news media to talk about poor black communities in particular. I use it here simply to invoke the language that was commonly deployed in the poverty debates of the 20th century. For an informative historical survey of the term see Michael B. Katz, ed., *The "Underclass" Debate* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1992).

[113] O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge,* 57.

[114] Oscar Lewis "The Culture of Poverty" in Daniel P. Moynihan, ed., *On Understanding Poverty: Perspectives from the Social Sciences* (New York: Basic Books, 1969), 188.

[115] Ibid.

While he explicitly tethered the culture of poverty to structural conditions in society, by articulating its self-perpetuating nature, Lewis provided the framework to disassociate economic and structural inequality analyses from the poverty problem by emphasizing the values, emotional and mental state, and agency of the poor. In so doing, his culture of poverty thesis can be construed as a return to an individualist orientation to poverty knowledge in that it opened a gateway to focus on the deficiencies of groups of individuals, i.e., the poor, through the identification of cultural deprivation and the existence of a social pathology as the dominant cause of concentrated urban poverty. This ultimately led to the racialization of urban poverty in poverty knowledge among the social scientific community by focusing on black urban residents who were the primary subjects of urban poverty research. Race became intricately entwined with poverty knowledge within the social scientific community.

According to O'Connor, several factors contributed to this development: 1) the large numbers of African-American migrants who moved into cities during the years of the waves of black migration; 2) the proliferation of black social scientists conducting research on poverty using the latest sociological and anthropological theories in poverty knowledge; and 3) the transformation in scientific racial ideology, which provided a theoretical framework and justification for racial assimilation and egalitarianism.[116] The culture of poverty thesis fused with the racial politics of the 1960s[117] during President Lyndon Johnson's administration with the release of a report by sociologist Daniel Patrick Moynihan on the family structure of the black urban poor. Consequently, the politicization of poverty knowledge in the public sphere via the Moynihan Report mediated the racialization of concentrated urban poverty in public discourse,

[116] O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*, 74–75.
[117] Katz, "The Urban 'Underclass' as a Metaphor of Social Transformation," in Katz, ed., *The "Underclass" Debate,* 13.

and this racialization was propelled by a ferocious rhetorical assault on black women, underscoring the gendered aspect of the racialization of poverty.

The Moynihan Report, Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, and the News Media

In 1965, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who at the time was the Assistant Secretary of Labor for Policy Planning and Research in the Johnson Administration, began work on a report intended to provoke federal government action in hopes to advance the achievements of the black freedom movement to the next stage. Moynihan was adamant that American society needed to exert "special effort" to ensure that the equality of opportunities in the U.S. established by the landmark civil rights legislation produced "roughly equal results" for black Americans.[118] Through the Report, Moynihan defined the problem of black poverty by identifying what he believed was the fundamental challenge that stifled progress for the black urban poor in the aftermath of the landmark accomplishment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While he acknowledged both structural and what he viewed as familial problems that threatened upward mobility for poor blacks, the latter undeniably overshadowed the former in its reception. For him, the breakdown of family structure in poor black communities was the dominant reason why poor blacks were unable to advance in society at the same rate and level of achievement as whites. "At the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro family. It is the fundamental source of the weakness of the Negro community at the present time,"[119] writes Moynihan. He linked the role of the family with the development of individual character and ability and argued that the family is the basic social and socializing unit of American life.

[118] Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action" in Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967), 43.
[119] Ibid., 51.

According to Moynihan, white families achieved a higher level of stability and maintenance in contrast to poor black families, which were highly unstable and on the brink of complete structural collapse in American cities. The breakdown of poor black families centered on the absence of black men, which facilitated the emergence of a "matriarchal structure" in black family life that impeded upward economic and social mobility. "In essence, the Negro community has been forced into a matriarchal structure which, because it is so out of line with the rest of the American society, seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole, and imposes a crushing burden on the Negro male and, in consequence, on a great many Negro women as well."[120] Using data from various federal agencies, Moynihan claimed that the matriarchal structure and the existence of a "tangle of pathology" which entraps blacks in the cycle of poverty was evidence of the disorganization of lower class blacks and the breakdown of black families. "…[A]t the center of the tangle of pathology is the weakness of the family structure. Once or twice removed, it will be found to be the principal source of most of the aberrant, inadequate, or antisocial behavior that did not establish, but now serves to perpetuate the cycle of poverty and deprivation."[121] Although Moynihan acknowledged slavery in the U.S. as the catalyzing event that destroyed black families and that post-WWII residential segregation further compounded their plight, he located the problem concerning the existence of concentrated urban poverty *within* the black community. Moynihan directed attention in the Report to the need to strengthen black families as the primary (albeit not sole) mechanism to effectively address it.

While it's important to acknowledge that the Moynihan Report was not intended as a scholarly contribution to poverty knowledge—its primary purpose was to internally spark government action—as O'Connor rightly asserts, the report relied on 30 years of social scientific

[120] Ibid., 75.
[121] Ibid., 76, my brackets.

poverty research.[122] As evident in the Report, Moynihan construes the black family as a component of black social structure. By emphasizing the disorganization of lower-class black families, Moynihan's analysis reflects Chicago School theory of social disorganization. He cites E. Franklin Frazier, one of the most prominent Chicago School sociologists, a half-dozen times, and in one instance recites an entire passage from Frazier's *The Negro Family in the United States* (1939) at length. In this way, the Moynihan Report is a tacit endorsement of Frazier's claims about black families.[123] Research on the black family, in fact, was a hallmark of the "Golden Age" of the black sociological tradition. Moreover, Moynihan's use of the language of a 'tangle of pathology' reflects Oscar Lewis' culture of poverty thesis. Moynihan acknowledged that his report did not offer anything distinctive in its findings, but simply reflected the consensus among current and previous generations of social scientists on poverty knowledge.[124]

Despite the stated intention of the Moynihan Report, it had a pronounced impact on the way poverty was construed in the general public. This was primarily due to the attention it received in the news media after President Lyndon Johnson's June 4, 1964 address—coauthored by Moynihan—at Howard University. Johnson used the Report as source material to construct an argument for his "war on poverty" policy agenda, which was an instrumental component to his vision of a Great Society. For Johnson, movement toward a Great Society necessitated the eradication of racial injustice and poverty, both of which involved the removal of the barriers to opportunity and a higher quality of life for all U.S. citizens.[125] He framed his war on poverty as a

[122] O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*, 203.
[123] For more on Frazier's claims about black family life, see Edward Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1939).
[124] Ibid., 204.
[125] John A. Andrew III, *Lyndon Johnson and the Great Society* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1999), 12.

necessary step in the path toward black progress, using the Howard University address to bring national attention to the plight of the black urban poor in the U.S.

Johnson's speech followed similar conceptual moves as the Report. He acknowledged the legacy of slavery and segregation in the development of the turmoil in the black community but placed the weight of responsibility on the backs of poor blacks and invoked Oscar Lewis' culture of poverty thesis in the process. "The Negro, like these others, will have to *rely mostly on his own efforts*. But he just cannot do it alone. For they did not have the heritage of centuries to overcome. They did not have a *cultural tradition* which had been twisted and battered by endless years of hatred and hopelessness."[126] Johnson underscored the "special nature" of black poverty, arguing that while many of its causes were the same as whites, the nature of poverty between the two was distinctly different. He grounded his claims in Moynihan's thesis of the breakdown of black family structure. Referencing data from the Report, he emphasized the problem of single-parent households in the black community, and declared that, "So, unless we work to strengthen the family, to create conditions under which most parents will stay together—all the rest: schools and playgrounds, public assistance and private concern, will never be enough to cut completely the circle of despair and deprivation."[127] Here, his use of "circle of despair and deprivation" functioned as a synonym for Moynihan's tangle of pathology. By politicizing the Moynihan Report as a means to champion his Great Society and its associated programs, Johnson politicized the poverty research that framed it and brought the poverty debate, which had been primarily confined to the social-scientific community, into the public sphere. This led to the racialization of concentrated

[126] Lyndon Johnson, "The Howard University Address" in Rainwater and Yancey, *The Moynihan Report,* 129, my italics.
[127] Ibid., 130.

urban poverty in the public, mediated by the news coverage the Report received in the aftermath of Johnson's address.

His speech drew attention to the existence of the Moynihan Report and its ideas, although the Johnson administration never made an official announcement of its release. Press coverage about the Report's most provocative claims, based on his speech, sparked public dialogue about black poverty and cultural deprivation in the black community. For example, during the 1960s, one of Washington's most influential journalists, Mary McGrory of the now defunct *Washington Star*, wrote an article based on Johnson's speech where she stated in part, "President Johnson suggested that the time had come for them to come to grips with their own worst problem, 'the breakdown of Negro family life.'"[128] In the article, McGrory cited then-current and former members of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) who were concerned about efforts for self-improvement within the black community. In a subsequent article, McGrory argued that the President had "urged black Americans to forgive and forget and to look frankly at their own failures."[129] So began the public narrative about blacks and urban poverty.

Press coverage by national news organizations bolstered the racialization of concentrated urban poverty once the Report surfaced in the public domain several days before the outbreak of the August 1965 Watts riots in Los Angeles. *The New York Times* released an editorial on black family structure that stated in part, "Whatever the index of social pathology… it is apparent that the Negro family in the urban areas of this country is rapidly decaying."[130] It further claimed that black family structure in urban areas was unable to withstand the pressures of the Great Migration.

[128] Ibid.,135.
[129] Ibid., 136.
[130] Ibid., 138.

In the wake of the Watts riots, journalists linked the findings of the Moynihan Report with black unrest. *The Wall Street Journal* (*WSJ*), for example, used the findings of the Report as an explanation for the Watts Riots. "Family Life Breakdown in Negro Slums Sows Seeds of Race Violence—Husbandless Homes Spawn Young Hoodlums, Impede Reforms, Sociologists Say," read one headline.[131] Other *WSJ* articles emphasized the social pathology of the poor living in ghettos. *The Washington Post* reported on the "crumbling family life" of urban blacks, while other news organizations inferred idleness of the black community in comparison to other groups who faced similar challenges. "Moynihan believes that the public erroneously compares the Negro minority to the Jewish minority. When discriminatory bars were lowered, Jews were ready to move. But the implicit message of the Moynihan Report is that ending discrimination is not nearly enough for the Negro. But what is enough?"[132] The news media effectively reified the notion of cultural deficiency, social pathology, and the instability of poor urban black urban residents in the general public, ideas buttressed by the social scientific knowledge of poverty available at the time.[133]

News media were the principal sources through which the general public initially came to understand concentrated urban poverty and engage the issue in public discourse. It not only framed public perceptions of the black urban poor in general and the neighborhoods where they resided, but specifically denigrated poor black women, who as a consequence of the Report became the face and conceptual mascot of concentrated urban poverty. Black feminist and womanist scholars alike have understandably criticized the Report based on its social effects for black women. For

[131] Ibid., 139–40.
[132] Ibid., 142.
[133] Not all press coverage of the Moynihan Report negatively portrayed poor black urban communities. The *St. Louis Review,* for example, dedicated a series to the Report, with an editor's note that stated, "Since excerpts have been used in periodicals hostile to the Negro cause, *The St. Louis Review* has undertaken this series and will publish long excerpts to balance the picture." (153) Yet these more positive interpretations were overshadowed by the pejorative responses to the report.

example, black feminist scholar Patricia Hill Collins argues that the Moynihan Report uses gender relations in black communities as a measure of black cultural disadvantage.[134] She maintains that the image of the matriarch emphasized in the Report supports racial oppression. Here is Collins at length:

> …the Moynihan Report (1965) contends that slavery destroyed Black families by creating reversed roles for men and women. Black family structures are seen as being deviant because they challenge the patriarchal assumptions underpinning the traditional family ideal. Moreover, the absence of Black patriarchy is used as evidence for Black cultural inferiority. Under scientific racism, Blacks have been construed as inferior, and their inferiority has been attributed either to biological causes or cultural differences. Thus, locating the source of cultural difference in flawed gender relations provides a powerful foundation for U.S. racism. Black women's failure to conform to the cult of true womanhood can then be identified as one fundamental source of Black cultural deficiency.[135]

For Collins, advancing the notion of black cultural disadvantage vis-à-vis the black matriarchal image embodied in the Report "counter[ed] efforts by African-Americans who identified political and social policies as one important source of Black economic disadvantage."[136] Collins argues that the image of matriarch is one of a number of socially constructed controlling images of black womanhood devised by the dominant culture to subordinate black women.

Similarly, womanist theologian Kelly Brown Douglas maintains that the Moynihan Report cemented the image of the black matriarch in white culture.[137] According to Douglas, the black matriarch stigmatized in the Report especially represents an attack on black sexuality. She writes,

> Essentially, Moynihan identified family 'disorganization' as the major source of weakness for the Black community. In so doing, he clearly named the Black woman as the culprit. She was considered the root cause for the 'tangle of pathology' that ensnared the Black family. She, Moynihan argued, was the center of a 'black matriarchy' that was the core of the problem, imposing 'a crushing burden on the

[134] Patricia Hill Collins, *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 1999), 77.
[135] Ibid.
[136] Ibid, my brackets.
[137] Kelly Brown Douglas, *Sexuality and the Black Church: A Womanist Perspective* (Maryknoll, N.Y: Orbis Books, 1999), 51.

> Negro male.' It is important to note at this point the significance of the Black family to the White cultural attack upon Black sexuality. If the family is the source of communicating values and ways of behaving to a people, then to suggest a 'deviant' family is to imply the handing down of deviant values and standards. To stigmatize the family is to stigmatize the entire race of people.[138]

For Douglas, the Moynihan Report perpetuated the perception of the deviant black family vis-à-vis an attack on black sexuality that blamed black women for the problems of black men and the black family writ large. Moreover, Douglas claims that Report implied that black women were responsible for the failure of their children to succeed and that the crisis of black social life is one of black masculinity.[139] Critiques such as the ones offered by Collins and Douglas underscore the influence of gender in the public reception of the Moynihan Report and indicate the role that gender played in the racialization of urban poverty.

The public assault deployed by Ronald Reagan during the 1980s against the black urban poor further shaped urban poverty discourse in the public and demonstrates the enduring effects of the Moynihan Report. Both as a candidate and as the U.S. President, Reagan unleashed a public offensive against the black urban poor in his efforts to reduce the size of government and government spending. These attacks particularly singled out poor black women whom he demonized as being hedonistic, lazy, and irresponsible. The "Welfare Queen"—a concept Reagan introduced in public discourse during his 1976 presidential campaign—became the embodiment of these characterizations. Reagan described the Welfare Queen as a woman who "used 80 names, 30 addresses, [and] 15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security, [and] veteran's benefits for four nonexistent deceased veteran husbands, as well as welfare."[140] Although Reagan

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[138] Ibid.
[139] Ibid., 52.
[140] "The Real Story of Linda Taylor, America's Original Welfare Queen," Slate Magazine, December 19, 2017, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2013/12/linda_taylor_welfare_queen_ronald_reagan_made_her_a_notorious_american_villain.html, my brackets.

did not name the woman or identify her racial ethnic background, his mention of the city where she was from (Chicago—home to one of the largest and infamous black ghettos in the country) was likely a racial dog-whistle. Regardless, his description of the Welfare Queen fit the perception of many whites about poor black urban residents. Reagan's Welfare Queen rhetoric only deepened negative perceptions of poor blacks and particularly maligned poor black women. On this point, David Wilson writes, "The offering of the ghastly and defiant Welfare Queen headed this litany of resonate icons. All of Reagan's negative notions about black poverty were skillfully collapsed into this one body as a luminous container of values, attitudes, looks, and demeanor. Deftly dressed, color-coded, and behavioralized, she had disdain for mainstream norms, had endless kids and welfare boyfriends, and reveled in hustle and plunder."[141]

There should be no doubt that Reagan's claims were undergirded by the findings of the Moynihan Report. In his radio address to the nation on welfare reform, Reagan invoked the conceptual ideas that constituted the Report's central arguments. His words merit lengthy quotation.

> Today I'd like to speak to you about a gathering crisis in our society: It's a family crisis. …I'm talking about the crisis of family breakdowns, especially among the welfare poor, both black and white. In inner cities today, families, as we've always thought of them, are not even being formed. Since 1960 the percentage of babies born out of wedlock has more than doubled. And too often their mothers are only teenagers. They're children—many of them 15, 16, and 17 years old with all the responsibilities of grownups thrust upon them. The fathers of these children are often nowhere to be found. In some instances, you have to go back three generations before you can find an intact family. It seems even the memory of families is in danger of becoming extinct. And what of the babies born out of wedlock, these children born to children. … The family is the most basic support system there is.[142]

[141] Wilson, *Cities and Race*, 32.
[142] Ronald Reagan: "Radio Address to the Nation on Welfare Reform," February 15, 1986. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=36875. Accessed December 9, 2017.

Although Reagan included whites along with blacks in his "welfare poor" reference, by invoking the place setting of the problem—the inner city—which by the 1980s had long since become an urban space racialized as black, it is not difficult to decipher of whom Reagan was implicitly referring. His language and rhetoric in the radio address mirrored the Report. Both emphasized the central role of the family in the social fabric. Both drew attention to the increase in the black "illegitimacy" rate among the urban poor. Both problematized the absence of men and the subsequent rise of families headed by women, and both invoked the culture of poverty thesis. The Moynihan Report was the source for the politicization of poverty knowledge via Johnson's use in his Howard University address. It also was the medium for the racialization of poverty in public discourse, mediated by the press coverage by the national news media.

Conclusion

I began this chapter with an account of the rise of the industrial city in the U.S. This was necessary to identify the appeal that industrial cities had for black migrants in search of economic opportunity and upward social mobility. By tracing the massive waves of migration into industrial cities, I illuminated the significant impact that they had on urban spaces. The surge in black populations in cities and subsequent white, middle-class flight led to significant urban decline and the emergence of concentrated urban poverty and the black ghetto. The culmination of the aforementioned events precipitated the emergence and development of poverty knowledge in the U.S. which made possible the racialization of concentrated urban poverty in the public sphere vis-à-vis news media reports of the Moynihan Report. The fact that the dominant theories to understand and explain urban poverty were readily applied to black life is demonstrative of the natural attitudes that have historically shaped black experiences in the U.S. To be clear, I am not claiming that poverty knowledge theorists developed their ideas with the intent of black

subjugation in mind. W.I. Thomas' theory of social disorganization, based on his ethnographic study of Polish immigrants in America, provides effective counter evidence of such a claim. Yet it is difficult to deny the seismic effects that shifts in the development of poverty knowledge had on *how* concentrated urban poverty was studied and particularly *who* became the objects of study. In this regard, Thomas' theory of social disorganization becomes an insightful example as it "marked a turning point in social investigation in methodological as well as conceptual terms."[143] By shifting poverty discourse from structural analyses of poverty which emphasized its causes to an ecological model that emphasized group dynamics and the naturalization of poverty among deviant subgroups, poverty knowledge pivoted its broader emphasis to assimilation. The urban poor were stigmatized based on their inability to assimilate into mainstream American society and exemplify "American values." These values were characterized by middle-class, white Anglo Saxon Protestantism throughout the twentieth century (and arguably up to the present). The emphasis on cultural breakdown, specifically a culture of poverty and the existence of a social pathology among the black urban poor, became another means by which to differentiate whites from blacks within American culture.

The weaponization of the Moynihan Report against blacks by the news media and American political leadership (notably President Ronald Reagan) to propagate and sustain racial stratification in American culture—despite the intention and attention to the structural causes of poverty by its author—has had a profound impact on how people in the U.S. understand the problems associated with urban poverty in cities and shapes the policies that cities design and implement to address it. Despite Moynihan's stated goals, his report had the *effect* of reifying people's pre-existent racial biases about black life. It is what, in large part, made Reagan's

[143] O'Connor, *Poverty Knowledge*, 46.

argument about the black urban poor, specifically poor black women credible. The national news media had already sedimented many of these ideas in the general public's understanding of the black urban poor.

Neoliberal urban redevelopment initiatives that seek to revitalize high-poverty neighborhoods have a disparate impact on poor black communities. These initiatives target public housing complexes for demolition in order to privatize property and reconstruct their spaces, most often in the form of "mixed-income" developments which are conducive to capital accumulation. Capital flow into fixed assets like property, i.e., real estate, is referred to as fixed capital and form a secondary circuit of capital.[144] Real estate property within the urban built environment functions as an important source for capital accumulation. This is why privatization is a popular political-economic strategy for economic development in cities. Privatization is a fundamental marker of neoliberal projects.[145] Neoliberal ideology, "dismisses most forms of public ownership as socially and privately unproductive. When ownership resides with the government, the logic goes, the property is fiscally barren, and there is no profit motive or institutional check on the dissipation of potential value by manager-bureaucrats."[146]

The drive toward the privatization of property in U.S. cities is a drive toward whiteness. In American culture, property and the concept of ownership are racialized. As Cheryl Harris convincingly argues in her seminal essay "Whiteness as Property," white identity is fused with

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[144] David Harvey, "The Urban Process under Capitalism: A Framework for Analysis," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 2, no. 1–3 (March 12, 1978): 106–7. Drawing from Marx, Harvey identifies three circuits of capital. The primary circuit of capital involves the manufacturing process where money combined with the means of production and labor power produces a commodity that is sold by its owner in the market. The tertiary circuit of capital entails a) investment in science and technology and b) social expenditures related to the process of the reproduction of labor.

[145] David Harvey, *Spaces of Global Capitalism: A Theory of Uneven Geographical Development* (London ; New York, NY: Verso, 2006), 44.

[146] Rachel Webber, "Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban Redevelopment" in Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, eds., Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe (Malden, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2002), 188.

notions of private property and ownership thus making these concepts synonymous.[147] Contrastingly, blackness signifies a state of propertylessness, and the idea of public property (particularly residential) and public assistance is racialized as black. Public housing and welfare are two examples where this reality is readily discernable. In the public sphere, public housing is emblematic of the black ghetto, and public assistance, such as welfare, is also conceptually understood through racial lenses as a program designed for and principally utilized by poor black urban residents.

Neoliberal urban redevelopment strategies frame urban space characterized by its public housing as an anathema that inhibits the generation of profit. The language of contamination, blight, disease and the like are strategically deployed in order to frame city space as principal sites for redevelopment. Moreover, the residents who inhabit these areas of city space are particularly targeted. Bench Ansfield emphasizes this point: "Most frequently, dominant debates around concentrated poverty assume as self-evident the despicable nature of these geographies and the *inhuman* ("ghetto-specific") behaviors that are naturalized to them."[148] Ansfield calls attention to how narratives of contamination function "as an auto-instituting trope for knowing and regulating" blighted urban spaces.[149] According to him, the dominant mode of subjective understanding frames these spaces and those who inhabit them as both contaminated and contaminant. Although the aim neoliberal redevelopment is to privatize real estate, such initiatives are justified in black high-poverty neighborhoods through the language of revitalization that has a positive impact on the

[147] Cheryl I. Harris, "Whiteness as Property" in Kimberle Crenshaw et al., eds., *Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings That Formed the Movement* (New York: The New Press, 1996), 278.
[148] Bench Ansfield, "Still Submerged: The Uninhabitability of Urban Redevelopment," in Katherine McKittrick, ed., *Sylvia Wynter: On Being Human as Praxis* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2015).
[149] Ibid., 125.

lives of the black urban poor. Chapter two explores mixed-income development as a strategy by improve the lives of the urban poor through the deconcentration of urban poverty.

CHAPTER II

MIXED-INCOME DEVELOPMENT, POVERTY DECONCENTRATION, AND THE NEOLIBERALIZATION OF PUBLIC HOUSING

Introduction

In May of 1963, critically acclaimed novelist James Baldwin met with Kenneth Clark for an interview following Baldwin's meeting with then-U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy.[150] The meeting between Baldwin and Kennedy, which included a select small group of other prominent black figures, was proposed by the latter as an attempt to improve race relations in the U.S. during a heightened period of racial conflict.[151] Only a couple weeks prior, a race-related bombing in the city of Birmingham, Alabama prompted riots and protests by urban blacks against southern racism and white supremacy. By the 1963, Birmingham, which was the most segregated large city in the South, had become a hotbed for racial violence.[152] Between 1957 and 1963, eight race-related bombings occurred in the city.[153]

In the interview with Baldwin, Clark raised the issue of racial conflict in the U.S., referencing the Birmingham unrest. "Well, we are confronted with the racial confrontation in America today. I think the pictures of dogs in the hands of human beings attacking other human beings…this [in] Birmingham, clearly not restricted to Birmingham as you so eloquently pointed

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[150] Collectif James Baldwin, *James Baldwin Interviewé par Kenneth Clark (24 Mai 1963)*, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ua2Rb7vVsMY.
[151] Layhmond Robinson, "Robert Kennedy Consults Negroes Here About North: James Baldwin, Lorraine Hansberry and Lena Horne Are Among Those Who Warn Him of 'Explosive Situation' Robert Kennedy Sees Negroes About Racial Situation in North," *New York Times*, May 25, 1963, http://search.proquest.com/news/docview/116424569/abstract/A9324800B0E34818PQ/1. Also present at the meeting were other notable names such as Lena Horne, Lorraine Hansberry, Harry Belafonte, David Baldwin (James Baldwin's brother), Edwin C. Berry, Rip Torn, Jerome Smith, Clarence Jones, and Kenneth Clark.
[152] Irving Bernstein, *Promises Kept: John F. Kennedy's New Frontier* (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1991, 86.
[153] Ibid., 85.

out. What do you think can be done to change, to use your term, the moral fiber of America?"[154] Responding to Clark, Baldwin argued for the need to demand a moral commitment from the John F. Kennedy Administration to address issues of racism in the U.S. Referencing his earlier meeting with Robert Kennedy, Baldwin recalled Kennedy's ignorance of Baldwin's resentment of federal government efforts to liberate people in other nations while it had failed to do so for its own citizens of color: "It was a great shock to me. I want to say this on the air. The attorney general did not know… that I would have trouble losing my nephew to go to Cuba, for example, to liberate the Cubans, in defense of a government which now says it has done, is doing everything it can do, which cannot liberate me."[155] Underscoring his point about racial discrimination, he recalled a conversation with a teenager from San Francisco who felt alienated from the U.S. Here is Baldwin at length:

> A boy last week, he was sixteen in San Francisco told me on television—thank God we got him to talk. Maybe somebody will start to listen. He said "I've got no country. I've got no flag." And he's only sixteen years old. And I couldn't say you do. I don't have any evidence to prove that he does. They were tearing down his house because San Francisco is engaging as most northern cities now are engaged in something called urban renewal, which means moving the Negroes out. It means Negro removal. That is what it means and the federal government is an accomplice to this fact.[156]

Attempting to explain the boy's animosity, Baldwin acknowledged the problem of urban redevelopment and its consequences for urban blacks as an example of the type of practices of racial discrimination that have a disparate impact on African-American communities. Baldwin argued that the federal urban renewal program, which Congress approved as a means to raze slum areas in cities, was essentially a means to displace poor urban black residents. He unapologetically

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[154] Collecetif James Baldwin, James Baldwin Interviewé Par Kenneth Clark *(24 Mai 1963),* my brackets.
[155] Ibid.
[156] Ibid. The terms "urban renewal" and "urban revitalization" are synonymous. I use the latter throughout this dissertation. I use urban renewal only with reference to the federal program and Baldwin's insightful commentary.

declared that urban renewal—a term that was substituted for urban redevelopment in the Housing Act of 1954 as an indication of the federal government's more comprehensive approach to urban restructuring[157]—was synonymous with black removal from urban space. The federal government, according to Baldwin, was complicit in the destruction of black communities. More than four decades after Baldwin's poignant observation, his assessment remains an instructive historical reference for the perpetual and disproportionate disadvantage poor urban black residents continue to experience as a consequence of urban revitalization. In the twenty-first century, urban revitalization—instituted under neoliberal ideology and subsidized by the federal government—continues to displace poor urban blacks.

This chapter examines the premises that justify mixed-income development as a vehicle to improve the lives of the black urban poor through the deconcentration of urban poverty, and measures this claim against available evidence. From the late twentieth century to the present, urban revitalization has been implemented under a poverty deconcentration paradigm. The notion that the deconcentration of poverty solves a great number of urban social problems associated with the urban poor, including joblessness, crime, and poverty itself, is widely accepted among policy experts and advocacy groups.[158] One of the primary mechanisms favored by urban elites to deconcentrate poverty is the restructuring of black ghettos (characterized by public housing and emblematic of concentrated urban poverty) through mixed-income development. Numerous studies, however, reveal an inconsistency between reality and the premises that buttress an argument for mixed-income development.[159] I will argue that the implementation of the mixed-

[157] Rachel Weber, "Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban Redevelopment" in Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, eds., *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe* (Malden, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2002), 181.
[158] Jeff Crump, "Deconcentration by Demolition: Public Housing, Poverty, and Urban Policy," *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 20, no. 5 (October 2002): 581–96.
[159] For representative samples, see Diane K. Levy and Mark Woolley, "Relocation Is Not Enough: Employment Barriers Among HOPE VI Families" (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, June 4, 2016),

income development strategy is more about the seizure of real estate for the private market to attract higher-income households and drive economic growth in cities than the professed outcomes of poor public housing residents. This objective is achieved through the neoliberalization of public housing embodied in the federal Housing Opportunity for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) program and personifies what Dana-Ain Davis calls "muted racializing," which I will discuss later.

First, I define mixed-income development and identify the premises that justify its use as a means to improve the lives of the poor through the deconcentration of urban poverty. An overview of the theoretical underpinnings of the mixed-income development provides useful insight into why urban elites justify the transformation of public housing as a tactic for urban revitalization. Next I consider mixed-income development theory in the context of racialized poverty discourse. I aver that its theoretical justifications as an anti-poverty strategy are tethered to racial ideas in U.S. culture and society. I then examine the HOPE VI program, which has served as the primary vehicle through which public housing property has been redeveloped from the early 1990s through the first decade of the twenty-first century. Over the course of the life of the program, scholars have conducted studies on the outcomes of HOPE VI projects. I use this research to make assessments about the nature of the transformation of public housing in the context of urban revitalization and conclude with final thoughts about the racialized nature of neoliberal urban redevelopment in U.S. cities.

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https://www.urban.org/research/publication/relocation-not-enough; Edward G. Goetz, "Better Neighborhoods, Better Outcomes? Explaining Relocation Outcomes in HOPE VI," *Cityscape* 12, no. 1 (2010): 5–31; Roderick W. Jones and Derek J. Paulsen, "HOPE VI Resident Displacement: Using HOPE VI Program Goals to Evaluate Neighborhood Outcomes," *Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development and Research* 13, no. 3 (2011): 85–102; Susan J. Popkin et al., "The Gautreaux Legacy: What Might Mixed-Income and Dispersal Strategies Mean for the Poorest Public Housing Tenants?," *Housing Policy Debate* 11, no. 4 (January 1, 2000): 911–42, https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2000.9521392.

The Theoretical Rationale for Mixed-Income Development

Defining Mixed-Income Development

Mixed-income development (also known as mixed-income housing) is a term that is widely used with varied meaning among urban policy experts, advocacy groups, and academics. For this reason, clarity on the term is paramount, particularly given the debate over its signification. I find the work of Mark L. Joseph, Robert J. Chaskin, and Henry S. Webber in addition to Alastair Smith critical for this purpose. For Joseph et al.,

> Mixed-income is a term that covers a broad spectrum of levels of economic integration. At one end of the spectrum are private-sector, market-rate developments that include a small percentage of affordable housing, often to qualify for municipal subsidies. At the other end of the spectrum are developments built exclusively for moderate- and low-income families. The public housing 'transformation' currently underway in Chicago, the largest mixed-income development effort in the country, defines mixed income generally as including one-third public housing units, one-third affordable housing units (below 120 percent of area median income), and one-third market rate units.[160]

The specific mix of incomes in a mixed-income development varies based on a variety of factors including target population served, location, scale, management, and tenure type, among others. The free market in large part determines the type of income mix that is possible.[161]

In a report published by the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University (2002), Alastair Smith contends that mixed-income developments generally fall on a scale that classifies the type of property to which the "mixed-income" moniker can be assigned. He identifies five

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[160] Mark Joseph, Robert J. Chaskin, and Henry S. Webber, "The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development," *Urban Affairs Review* 42, no. 3 (January 2007): 371. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development generally defines affordable housing as "housing for which the occupant(s) is/are paying no more than 30 percent of his or her income for gross housing costs, including utilities." "Glossary of HUD Terms | HUD USER," accessed June 14, 2018, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/glossary/glossary_a.html. This definition is, of course, precarious given that what is "affordable" varies across income level. Thus, housing that may be affordable for someone making $60,000 a year may be unfordable for an individual who only makes the federal minimum wage. This is an ongoing debate in the affordable housing advocacy community.

[161] Alastair Smith, "Mixed-Income Housing Developments: Promise and Reality" (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2002), 15.

categories of mixed-income properties that entail 1) *moderate-income inclusion* comprised predominantly of market-rate units with some for moderate-income households, 2) *low-income inclusion* comprised predominantly of market-rate units with some for low-income households, 3) *broad income range developments* that provide units that span a spectrum from market-rate to those for extremely low-income households, 4) *market-rate inclusion* comprised of predominantly low-income developments but include some market-rate units, and 5) *affordable mix* developments that serve moderate-, low-, and extremely low-income households.[162]

For purposes of this study, "mixed-income development" generally refers to any variation of these configurations of real estate, which categorizes types of residential property (as opposed to commercial). However, the distinction between "mixed-income development" and "mixed-use development," which is also a common term in the lexicon of urban planning and development, is important. The latter refers to properties that are jointly used for both residential and commercial use. Mixed-use developments include mixed-income housing units, but the distinction here is that mixed-income development is strictly residential while mixed-use properties will also include space for local businesses.

Having defined mixed-income development, I turn my attention to the dominant rationale for its use as a vehicle to deconcentrate poverty and as a strategy for urban revitalization. Here again, I find Joseph et al. instructive. They synthesize many of the previous studies that buttress arguments for mixed-income housing as a strategy to address concentrated urban poverty. Their argument is that mixed-income development is justified on the basis of two primary arguments: 1) that it is an effective strategy for reducing the concentration of urban poverty while addressing the

[162] Ibid., 1–2. It should be noted that "market rate" refers to "housing units without limits on the incomes of the residents." (Ibid.)

social problems associated with it, and 2) that it is an effective general strategy for urban redevelopment.[163] I begin with the first argument and then move to the second.

Theorizing the Effects of Mixed-Income Development on the Urban Poor

In *The Truly Disadvantaged* (1987), sociologist William Julius Wilson emphasizes the effects of the flight of middle- and working-class blacks and the subsequent restructuring of the economy on the black urban poor. According to Wilson, these factors, in combination with racially discriminatory practices, left behind an isolated and spatially concentrated group of black poor residents who were disconnected from employment opportunities and who subsequently developed a "ghetto culture" which perpetuates poverty, characterized by high rates of joblessness, welfare dependency, social disorganization, violence, crime, etc.[164] Wilson's hypothesis reignited the "culture of poverty" debate of the 1960s, which many social scientists criticized for emphasizing personal responsibility above the structural causes of poverty. His research underscored two of the three arguments that predominate the literature on the causes of concentrated high-poverty neighborhoods, namely, middle-class flight, especially by blacks, from mixed-income communities and poor job prospects of inner-city workers.[165] Wilson's analysis spurred a vast number of empirical studies that interrogated his claims, ultimately leading to the development of a body of research on the "concentrated/neighborhood effects" of urban poverty.[166]

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[163] Joseph et al., "The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development," 372.
[164] William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*, Reprint edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
[165] Lincoln Quillian, "Migration Patterns and the Growth of High-Poverty Neighborhoods, 1970-1990," *American Journal of Sociology* 105, no. 1 (1999): 2-3. The third argument claims poverty is the result of racial segregation.
[166] For representative samples, see Robert J. Sampson and W. Byron Groves, "Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory," *Journal of American Sociology* 94, no. 4 (1989): 774–802; Jonathan Crane, "The Epidemic Theory of Ghettos and Neighborhood Effects on Dropping Out and Teenage Childbearing," *American Journal of Sociology* 96, no. 5 (1991): 1226–59; Garry L. Rolison, "Black, Single Female-Headed Family Formation in Large U.S. Cities," *The Sociological Quarterly* 33, no. 3 (1992): 473–81; Saul D. Hoffman, E. Michael Foster, and Frank F. Furstenberg, "Reevaluating the Costs of Teenage Childbearing," *Demography* 30, no. 1 (1993): 1–13, https://doi.org/10.2307/2061859; James R. Elliott, "Social Isolation and Labor Market Insulation: Network

Urban elites justify the transformation of public housing through mixed-income development on the grounds that it improves the quality of life for the urban poor by effectively reduces incidences of high criminal activity, welfare dependency, joblessness, and other social problems associated with ghetto poor neighborhoods. Specifically, Joseph et al. identify four premises in support of mixed-income development as a means of improving the lives of the urban poor: 1) that it expands the social networks of the urban poor, thereby connecting them to resources, information, and ultimately employment, 2) the presence of higher-income residents provides a form of social control that leads to higher levels of accountability and safer neighborhoods, 3) the presence of higher-income residents provides effective role models for the urban poor, which leads to the adoption of alternative lifestyles, and 4) higher-income residents generate new market demand that attracts economic resources and services for underserved communities.[167] I consider each below.

Joseph et al. hold that claims for mixed-income development on the grounds that they expand the social networks of the urban poor are persuasive. They claim:

> One of the more compelling explanations for persistent urban poverty is that with the exodus of higher-income families to other parts of the metropolitan area, inner-city residents have lost regular contact with individuals who can provide access to information about jobs, other resources, and other forms of social support. Thus, one argument for mixed-income development is that by attracting higher-income residents to the inner city, mixed-income development can facilitate the establishment of effective social networks that produce social capital."[168]

This justification implies that there is an increased probability for the expansion of social networks of the urban poor as a consequence of their social interaction with higher-income people that will

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and Neighborhood Effects on Less-Educated Urban Workers," *The Sociological Quarterly* 40, no. 2 (1999): 199–216; Thomas P. Vartanian, "Adolescent Neighborhood Effects on Labor Market and Economic Outcomes," *Social Service Review* 73, no. 2 (1999): 142–67, https://doi.org/10.1086/514412.

[167] Joseph et al., "The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development," 373.

[168] Ibid., 379. Social capital broadley refers to the "productive asset that resides in relationships among actors and takes meeaning through its purposive use." Ibid, 380.

result in increased opportunities for employment and upward social mobility when mixed-income housing is designed to promote spatial integration through common spaces of interaction. This theory is grounded in social-scientific research that provides evidence that a) opportunity, proximity to others, and space has an influence on network formation, b) personal relationships provide people with access to resources beyond their own socioeconomic status level, and c) social networks among low-income individuals tend to be more localized than those among higher-income individuals.

With regard to the research on opportunity, proximity, and space, psychologists Raymond Fleming, Jerome Baum, and Jerome E. Singer (1985) demonstrates that social interaction is enhanced by three variables, which include the opportunity for contact, the proximity to others, and the presence of appropriate space in which to interact.[169] Their study finds that common areas have a profound impact on social integration by affecting the frequency and quality of contacts between individuals. Building upon Fleming et al., sociologist Carl Keane (1991) examines the socioenvironmental determinants of community formation in a study on the social interaction between men and women. Keane finds that the urban environment influences Fleming et al.'s three variables of social interaction among women and men by providing opportunity for and constraints on whom people interact with and the location of that interaction. [170]

On the issue of personal relationship and access to resources, sociologists Nan Lin, John C. Vaughn, and Walter M. Ensel (1981) examines the effects of social resources, i.e., wealth, status, power and social ties, on the process of obtaining employment. Lin et al. aver that "access to resources through social networks provides the essential transition from family background and

[169] Raymond Fleming, Jerome Baum, and Jerome E. Singer, "Social Support and the Physical Environment" in Sheldon Cohen and S. Leonard Syme, eds., *Social Support and Health* (Orlando, FL: Academic Press), 1985.
[170] Carl Keane, "Socioenvironmental Determinants of Community Formation," *Environment and Behavior* 23, no. 1 (1991): 27–96.

educational statuses to socioeconomic status achievement."[171] More specifically, they demonstrate that variations in level of attained employment are affected by the socioeconomic characteristics of personal contacts. Similarly, economist James Montgomery (1992) identifies a positive correlation between network composition and labor market success.[172] He demonstrates that workers' wages (and expected future earnings) rise as the proportion of weak ties—here referencing relationships between acquaintances—in workers' networks increases.

Finally, regarding social networks among low-income individuals, sociologists Karen E. Campbell and Barbara A. Lee (1992) examines how personal networks vary along lines of markers of status and identity that include gender, age, family cycle, and socio-economic status.[173] Their research finds that individuals with a higher socio-economic status reported having larger networks than those of a lower socio-economic status, who tend to have smaller neighbor networks. They conclude that "…the limited opportunities of the economically disadvantaged beyond the neighborhood mean that they rely more heavily on neighbors for friendship and support…"[174] Thus, social networks among low-income individuals tend to be more localized than those among high-income individuals. The aforementioned studies buttress the argument in favor of mixed-income development on the grounds that it effectively expands the social networks of the urban poor, leading to improved life conditions and increased work opportunities.[175]

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[171] Nan Lin, John C. Vaughn, and Walter M. Ensel, "Social Resources and Occupational Status Attainment," *Social Forces* 59, no. 4 (June 1981): 1163–81, https://doi.org/10.2307/2577987.
[172] James D. Montgomery, "Job Search and Network Composition: Implications of the Strength-Of-Weak-Ties Hypothesis," *American Sociological Review* 57, no. 5 (1992): 586–96, https://doi.org/10.2307/2095914.
[173] Karen E. Campbell and Barrett A. Lee, "Sources of Personal Neighbor Networks: Social Integration, Need, or Time?," *Social Forces* 70, no. 4 (June 1992): 1077–1100, https://doi.org/10.2307/2580202.
[174] Ibid., 1093.
[175] For additional research on the impact of social networks on life outcomes, see Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M Cook, "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks," *Annual Review of Sociology* 27, no. 1 (2001): 415–44, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.415; Rachel Garshick Kleit, "The Role of Neighborhood Social Networks in Scattered-site Public Housing Residents' Search for Jobs," *Housing Policy Debate* 12, no. 3 (January 1, 2001): 541–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2001.9521418.

A second premise for mixed-income development as a strategy for improving the lives of the urban poor through mixed-income development is that it provides an effective form of social control by substantially raising the level of social organization in the surrounding community.[176] This argument emphasizes the central role of "network closure," a term that refers to the increased likelihood of facilitating informal social control when all members of the group know each other.[177] Here interrelationships must be strong enough to be able to provide accountability among group members to adhere to the common values shared within the community. Proponents of the social control argument contend that the migration of higher-income families out of poor inner-city neighborhoods caused the net loss of individuals who are more likely to enforce safety and order within a community.

Social organization research buttresses this argument due to evidence that suggests social control is more likely among high socioeconomic communities. For example, sociologists Robert J. Sampson and W. Byron Groves (1989) examine the relationship between variables of social disorganization and crime and delinquency rates in urban communities. They test an influential theory developed in *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas* (1942) by sociologists Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, who argue that low economic status, ethnic heterogeneity, and residential mobility leads to the disruption of community social organization, which in turn leads to crime and delinquency in urban space.[178] Sampson and Groves were the first to directly test this theory of social disorganization by exploring its community-level implications.[179] Analyzing data from the first British Crime Survey—a nationwide survey of more than 200 local communities in

[176] Joseph et al., "The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development," 386.
[177] Ibid.
[178] See Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay, *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942).
[179] Robert J. Sampson and W. Byron Groves, "Community Structure and Crime: Testing Social-Disorganization Theory," *Journal of American Sociology* 94, no. 4 (1989): 774–802.

England and Wales—they construct a model to test the relationship between the aforementioned variables of social disorganization and community crime and delinquency. They find "…lower-class communities with fewer resources are apparently unable to control or supervise youths' congregating to the extent that upper-class communities can."[180] The focus on youths, i.e., teenagers, is reflective of Shaw and McKay's disorganization model that emphasizes "…the ability of a community to supervise and control teenage peer groups (e.g., gangs)."[181] The implication here is that the exertion of social control is more likely in the presence of people with a high socioeconomic status.

Research on collective efficacy and social control in poor communities also buttresses the argument for mixed-income development.[182] A study by Robert J. Sampson (1997) examines how collective efficacy, which he defines as "social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good,"[183] is correlated to reduced rates of violence in urban neighborhoods. Sampson claims that social and organizational characteristics of urban neighborhoods account for variations in crime rates.[184] Analyzing crime statistics and survey data compiled from responses from more than 8,700 residents across more than 340 neighborhoods in Chicago, Sampson finds that "…the combined measure of informal social control and cohesion and trust [remain] a robust predictor of lower ratees of violence."[185] Moreover, he maintains, "High

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[180] Ibid., 788.
[181] Ibid., 788, italics removed from the original. As Sampson and Groves note, previous research demonstrates that delinquency is primarily a group phenomenon. For representative samples, see Shaw and McKay, *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas*, 1942; Frederic Thrasher, *The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago,* rev. ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1963; James F. Short and Fred Strodtbeck, *Group Process and Gang Delinquency* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1965. Moreover, Thrasher (1963) and David Bordua find that gangs develop from unsupervised play groups, hence a focus on teenage groups. See also Bordua, "Delinquent Subcultures: Sociological Interpretations of Gang Delinquency," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 338 (1961): 119-36.
[182] Joseph et al., 387.
[183] Robert J. Sampson, "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy," *Science* 277, no. 5328 (August 15, 1997): 918-924.
[184] Ibid., 918.
[185] Ibid., 924, my brackets.

SES, homeownership, and age were associated with elevated levels of collective efficacy, whereas high mobility was negatively associated with collective efficacy."[186] The implication of these findings for mixed-income development in high-poverty neighborhoods is that mixing low- and high-income people together increases the collective efficacy within poor communities, thereby increasing the likelihood of the exertion of social control in high-poverty neighborhoods that would consequently lower rates of violence.

The use of mixed-income development as a means to mitigate the problematic behaviors of the urban poor is a third premise for mixed-income development as an effective strategy for improving their lives. The culture of poverty thesis informs proponents' understanding of behaviors predominately associated with residents of high poverty neighborhoods. Mixed-income development is proffered as an effective policy response to correct this problem. Urban elites argue that mixed-income housing decreases the various behavioral and social problems that stigmatize black ghettos, primarily via observational learning and role modeling. Exposing poor families to "more stable" socioeconomic backgrounds is thought to encourage poor families to adopt more positive and socially acceptable behavior, which includes the attainment of steady employment, conformity to social norms, decrease in welfare dependency, and reduction of criminal activity, among others.

Social learning theory provides the conceptual framework for the central claims of mixed-income development as a strategy to address the behavioral problems of the urban poor. As developed by psychologist Albert Bandura (1977), social learning theory asserts that "…most human behavior is learned observationally through modeling: from observing others one forms an idea of how new behaviors are performed, and on later occasions this coded information serves to

[186] Ibid., 921.

guide action."[187] Human behavior, according to Bandura, is the result of a four-component process that involves perception, retention, reproduction, and motivation (or affirmation) of modeled behavior. In the context of mixed-income development, social learning theory implies that through observation and adoption of the positive, productive behaviors of higher-income individuals, the urban poor may begin to successfully assimilate into mainstream society.

Studies that examine the effects of adult socialization on youth and the positive correlation between social outcomes of low-income individuals who move to more affluent neighborhoods lend support for this implication. Based on his study of the black urban poor in Chicago, William Julius Wilson (1987) argues that young adults who live in high poverty neighborhoods where few working adults reside are likely to underestimate the return on education.[188] Research by James Rosenbaum (1991) on the Gautreaux Program in Chicago, which facilitated the relocation of poor black families to more affluent, white suburbs and other urban areas, finds increased levels of work among low-income individuals. Rosenbaum also finds children were more likely to be in school, in college-track programs, in better-paying jobs, and jobs with benefits, among other outcomes.[189] As a body of literature, such studies buttress arguments by proponents of mixed-income development on the basis that observational learning will elicit more productive behaviors for the urban poor.[190]

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[187] Albert Bandura, *Social Learning Theory* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977).
[188] Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged*.
[189] James E. Rosenbaum, "Black Pioneers—Do Their Moves to the Suburbs Increase Economic Opportunity for Mothers and Children?," *Housing Policy Debate* 2, no. 4 (January 1, 1991): 1179–1213, https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.1991.9521086.
[190] For additional research on the effects of observational learning and role modeling, see Keri R. Brewer and Daniel L. Wann, "Observational Learning Effectiveness as a Function of Model Characteristics: Investigating the Importance of Social Power," *Social Behavior and Personality; Palmerston North* 26, no. 1 (1998): 1, http://dx.doi.org.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/10.2224/sbp.1998.26.1.1; Ronald L. Akers et al., "Social Learning and Deviant Behavior: A Specific Test of a General Theory," *American Sociological Review* 44, no. 4 (1979): 636–55, https://doi.org/10.2307/2094592; William Michelson, *Man and His Urban Environment: A Sociological Approach, with Revisions* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), 1976.

The political economy of place constitutes a fourth premise for the argument that mixed-income development improves the lives of the urban poor. This refers to the positive effects of higher-income residents in neighborhoods characterized by high concentrations of poverty. Proponents argue that they draw in economic investment, political influence, and civic engagement that are otherwise ostensibly absent.[191] "By attracting higher-income residents into a community, mixed-income developments are expected to increase the proportion of local residents with the willingness and ability to advocate for high quality goods and services. In addition, the greater spending power of the higher-income residents should make the community more attractive for retail and commercial development services such as banking."[192] The return of higher-income residents theoretically spurs the transformation of divested neighborhoods into healthy, vibrant communities, which ultimately has a positive impact on the quality of life for low-income people. This fourth justification, as Joseph et al. note, is theoretically distinct from the preceding three because it emphasizes "the relationship between residents of the community and external actors, rather than interactions among residents."[193]

These four premises—that it expands the social networks of the urban poor thereby increasing their opportunities for employment, provides a form of social control, facilitates role modeling that curtails undesirable behavior, and attracts economic investment and political influence into once divested urban communities—provide the theory that buttresses and drives its use as a vehicle to deconcentrate poverty through the transformation of public housing on the grounds that doing so improves the lives of the urban poor. I now briefly turn my attention to a

[191] Joseph et al., "The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development," 392.
[192] Ibid., 393.
[193] Ibid.

secondary argument for mixed-income identified by Joseph et al., namely that it reverses urban blight in high-poverty neighborhoods.

On Racial Stigma and Theorizing the Effects of Mixed-Income Development on Urban Blight

Urban elites also justify mixed-income development on the basis that it is an effective strategy for urban revitalization of the physical landscape, particularly for razing dilapidated and distressed property that contributes to urban blight of city space. The term urban blight initially emerged in the context of urban redevelopment in the postwar period of the mid-twentieth century as a means to make way for new construction and investment in real estate.[194] The exact meaning of urban blight during its early use was ambiguous. It was used to depict not only the quality of neighborhoods, but also the inhabitants of the space as well. On this point, urban studies scholar Rachel Weber merits lengthy quotation:

> The language of urban destruction evolved from the vice-obsessed teens and twenties into its own technical language in roughly the middle third of the century. Historic accounts of urban policy during this period point to blight as the primary justification for creative destruction. In the local renewal ordinances and state statues of this period, the definition of blight is vague: it is framed as both a cause of physical deterioration and a state of being in which the built environment is deteriorated or physically impaired beyond normal use. The discourse of blight appropriated metaphors from plant pathology (blight is a disease that causes vegetation to discolor, wilt, and eventually die) and medicine (blighted areas were often referred to as 'cancers' or 'ulcers'). The scientific basis for blight drew attention to the physical bodies inhabiting the city, as well as the unhygienic sanitary conditions those bodies 'created.'[195]

Criteria for blight were eventually developed to include the age of buildings, density, population gain or loss, structural deterioration, and the like, and was perceived as a legitimate precondition for demolition and rebuilding of new housing, "because it produced hardships for residents and

[194] Rachel Weber, "Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban Redevelopment" in Brenner and Theodore, *Spaces of Neoliberalism, 178*.
[195] Ibid., 179.

bred crime and disease."[196] The language of urban blight continues today in the lexicon of urban redevelopment discourse, and consequently mixed-income development is at the forefront of urban revitalization in the U.S.

It is important to emphasize the racialized aspect of the discourse about mixed-income development. Its theoretical justifications as an anti-poverty strategy are tethered to racially biased ideas, given how the stigmatizing effects of the racialization of concentrated urban poverty have shaped public perception of the space and inhabitants of high-poverty (ghetto) neighborhoods (see chapter one). Mixed-income development theory is bolstered by a taken-for-granted acceptance of "concentrated/neighborhood effects" of urban poverty arguments that are foregrounded in the culture of poverty thesis. Through the use of language in U.S. culture, the idea of the existence of cultural pathology fused with perceptions of black urban poverty through its racial representation in public discourse. Particularly, Reagan's infamous "Welfare Queen" (discussed in chapter two) is the most explicit racial representation of the cultural poverty thesis and the social problems associated with concentrated urban poverty.

Such representation contributes to the stigmatization of black ghetto neighborhoods through stereotyping of its residents, to which mixed-income development has functioned as a *muted* racial response. Here, mixed-income development as a muted racial response is derived from urban anthropologist Dana-Ain Davis' (2007) concept of what she calls "muted racializing." By this she means, "a practice of indexing, or coding: that is, using words or phrases that are not explicitly, but are implicitly racially disparaging."[197] For Davis, the representational force of the Welfare Queen functions as a stark example. According to Davis, the image of the Welfare Queen

[196] Ibid., 180.
[197] Dana-Ain Davis, "Narrating the Mute: Racializing and Racism in a Neoliberal Moment," *Souls* 9, no. 4 (December 6, 2007): 352.

"exemplifies how deprecation is blended with racial coding."[198] It is thus an *over*representation of the black urban poor, specifically black women, which "sustains the view that Black women are defective and is so loaded with racial meaning that even when altered, still brackets a Black racial subject."[199]

Racial stigma is embedded within the very lexicon of urban redevelopment discourse, which is shaped by poverty knowledge. "Urban blight" functions as a substitute term for black. "Blighted urban neighborhoods" essentially refer to communities with a high concentration of poor black residents. In this way blight can be understood as the contamination of urban space—the consequence of housing segregation, white flight to the suburbs, and the rise of black residents in inner-city neighborhoods. Moreover, the use of dog-whistle rhetoric to talk about the urban poor racially stigmatizes them. The very use of terms like "public housing," "Welfare Queen," "cultural pathology" and the like are most frequently used pejoratively to refer to a particular racial/ethnic group—black folk. Mixed-income development functions as a muted racial response to a social problem that is widely perceived through racial lens without explicitly mentioning race at all. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva might refer to what I have described above as an example of color-blind racism. By this he refers to a "new" form of racism where contemporary racial inequality is reproduced "through practices that are subtle, institutional, and apparently nonracial." [200] This occurs in cities across the nation with the financial assistance of the federal government, which facilitated the displacement of entire communities of poor, black urban residents, most effectively through the HOPE VI program.

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[198] Ibid.
[199] Ibid.
[200] Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, *Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America*, 4th edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 3.

Displaced by HOPE: The Reality of Mixed-Income Development

The Origins and Objectives of HOPE VI

In 1989, Congress established the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing with the signing of the Department of Housing and Urban Development Reform Act. The creation of the Commission was a response to the deplorable conditions of inner cities and public housing during the 1980s and the public perception that federal policies had contributed to those conditions.[201] Congress charged the Commission to a) identify the most severely distressed public housing projects in the U.S., b) assess potential strategies that would effectively ameliorate conditions associated with them, and c) develop a plan for the eliminations of such conditions by the year 2000.[202] Over a period of eighteen months, the Commission and its staff visited public housing projects in over 25 cities, conducted interviews with boards of directors and staffs of public housing agencies, spoke extensively with public housing residents, and held public hearings. The Commission released its report in August of 1992, which indicated that 86,000 units of the public housing stock were "severely distressed." This assessment was based on measurements, which included the most common conditions associated with severe distress: 1) "residents living in despair and generally needing high levels of social and support service," 2) "physical deteriorated buildings," and 3) "economically and social distressed surrounding communities."[203] It maintained that developments with a combination of the aforementioned

[201] Bruce Katz, "The Origins of HOPE VI" in Henry G. Cisneros and Lora Engdahl, eds., *From Despair to Hope: Hope VI and the New Promise of Public Housing in America's Cities* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), 20.
[202] Harry J. Wexler, "HOPE VI: Market Means/Public Ends—The Goals, Strategies, and Midterm Lessons of HUD's Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program," *Journal of Affordable Housing & Community Development Law* 10, no. 3 (2001): 197–98.
[203] National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, "Final Report of The National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing" (Washington, D.C, 1992), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DOC_9836.PDF, accessed July 14, 2018.

conditions made them difficult to manage because of high criminal activity, obsolete building mechanical systems, high vacancy rates, and the need for greater resident security.[204]

The Commission developed a national action plan that called for "coordinated actions by the President, Congress, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), public housing agencies (PHAs), State and local governments, public housing residents and others,"[205] and recommended a multi-faceted approach that focused, among other things, on resident initiatives and support services, management and operations of public housing developments, and capital improvement programs and physical conditions. In response to the Commission's recommendations, HUD created the Urban Revitalization Demonstration Program (URD) in October of 1992, which became the HOPE VI program. Although it originally targeted the most severely distressed public housing for renovation or replacement as its sole objective, there was early recognition of the shortcomings of this initial, limited scope. On this point, Henry Cisneros, the first HUD Secretary under the Clinton Administration who was charged with the initial implementation of the HOPE VI program states it thusly, "We knew that it was not enough to eliminate the most distressed public housing buildings—we needed to dramatically reorient the workings of public housing as a system."[206] Among the various reforms the program endured was a shift in approach toward utilizing HOPE VI as a vehicle to deconcentrate urban poverty. For Cisneros, HOPE VI was more than a housing or urban redevelopment program. It was an opportunity to rethink how housing and redevelopment initiatives were implemented in cities, prospects that had potentially widespread effects on urban life. The deconcentration paradigm, as

[204] Ibid.
[205] Ibid.
[206] Henry Cisneros, "A New Moment for People and Cities," in Cisneros and Engdahl, *From Despair to Hope: Hope VI and the New Promise of Public Housing in America's Cities*, 6–7.

was discussed above, was an instrumental component in HOPE VI implementation as a means toward a much broader vision of reconstructing the urban landscape.[207]

HUD leadership embraced a model of urban design and planning known as New Urbanism. Not long into his tenure as HUD Secretary, Cisneros and the HOPE VI team invited New Urbanism planners to advise them on how to incorporate New Urbanism design principles into the renovation of public housing. Those design principles included a commitment to: 1) *Diversity*, which means "mixing a variety of housing types to support a range of households of different incomes, integrating housing with local shops and safe public spaces, and providing social services." This is primarily achieved via mixed-income and mixed-use development; 2) *Human scale*, which emphasizes features such as "street- and pedestrian-oriented buildings; rich architectural detail, and clear definition of public and private space" with an emphasis on the safety and walkability of neighborhoods; 3) *Restoration*, which "entails preserving and in many cases reconstructing the positive social and physical infrastructure of the neighborhood;" and 4) *continuity*, "in the street network, architectural treatments, open space systems, and shared public spaces [that reconnect] the 'projects' with nearby neighborhoods and the city."[208]

Under the leadership of Cisneros, HUD released a policy brief in September of 1994 that reviewed much of the research on concentrated poverty in U.S. cities as a pertinent social problem. It identified the deconcentration of poverty as an agency priority and identified three primary strategies—place-based initiatives, personal mobility programs, and residential mobility—that were widely viewed as best practices toward achievement of poverty deconcentration.[209] HUD

[207] Peter Calthorpe, "HOPE VI and New Urbanism" in Cisneros and Engdahl, 52-53.
[208] Ibid, my brackets.
[209] U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Residential Mobility Programs; Urban Policy Brief No. 1" (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, September 1994), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/urbaff/upb1.html, accessed July 16, 2018.

incorporated these strategies into the implementation of the HOPE VI program and just three years after its initial rollout, the deconcentration agenda officially appeared in statutory regulations, including its Notices of Funding Availability (NOFAs) and in appropriation bills. The poverty deconcentration thrust of HOPE VI was subsequently expanded through the Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act of 1998 (QHWRA).[210] For Cisneros, HUD staff, and other advocates, HOPE VI was deemed a means to better the lives of public housing residents, so much so that the strategy of using the HOPE VI program as vehicle to abate the problems of the concentrated/neighborhood effects of urban poverty became conventional wisdom.

HOPE VI did achieve some notable accomplishments. For example, according to the HUD's 2016 HOPE VI report, which analyzes performance data that emphasizes housing unit demolition and construction and supportive services to public housing residents reported by HOPE VI grantees, of the more than 97,000 new housing units produced under the HOPE VI program, 56.8 percent of them (or just over 53,500 units) were newly constructed public housing units. Of those, approximately 90 percent (roughly 49,950) are rental units while approximately 10 percent are public housing homeownership units.[211] Moreover, roughly 30 percent of the total units produced are designated as affordable housing. Advocates of HOPE VI and the mixed-income development strategy will likely use these numbers to applaud the success of the program. These proponents may brag that it successfully leveraged significant levels of private funds to produce public housing development, as indicated in HUD's report. While this is true, it is also true that the HOPE VI program substantially reduced the total stock of public housing in the U.S. by more

[210] Alexander Polikoff, "HOPE VI and the Deconcentration of Poverty" in Cisneros and Engdahl, *From Despair to Hope: Hope VI and the New Promise of Public Housing in America's Cities*, 66.
[211] Taryn Gress, Cho Seungjong, and Mark Joseph, "Hope VI Data Compilation and Analysis" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, September 2016), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/HOPE-VI-Data-Compilation-and-Analysis.html, 29.

than 43,000 units.[212] Moreover, the success of leveraging private dollars to produce new public housing units through urban revitalization does not directly correlate to improved health and life outcomes of the public housing residents who returned. Notwithstanding the total numbers of new public housing units produces, these data lend no support to the premises offered by mixed-income development proponents on the grounds of the argument that it improves the lives of the urban poor. While proponents can use such data to champion their cause, there is limited evidence that supports the aforementioned premises that undergird mixed-income development. This fact undermines the argument that justifies mixed-income development, and HOPE VI in particular, on the grounds that it significantly improves the lives of the urban poor. I now turn to the empirical evidence that outlines HOPE VI outcomes.

The Empirical Evidence on HOPE VI Outcomes

Numerous studies have interrogated the outcomes of the HOPE VI program. I draw from the Urban Institute's HOPE VI Panel Study (2002)[213] and the HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study (2002)[214] as well as reviews of other independent research, to indicate the inconsistency of the theoretical claims of mixed-income development with available evidence. Below I return to each of the four theoretical rationales used to justify mixed-income development as a vehicle to deconcentrate poverty.

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[212] Ibid.

[213] Susan J Popkin et al., "HOPE VI Panel Study: Baseline Report" (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, September 2002) https://www.urban.org/research/publication/hope-vi-panel-study-baseline-report.

[214] Larry Buron et al., "The HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study" (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, November 2002), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/hope-vi-resident-tracking-study.The Panel Study analyzed data from five cities, which included Atlantic City, NJ, Chicago, Durham, Richmond, and Washington, D.C., while the Resident Tracking Study analyzed data from eight different cities, including Denver, Newark, Springfield, IL, San Francisco, Louisville, Tucson, Patterson, NJ, and Albany, NY. Both are national studies that examine the outcomes for residents of distressed public housing displaced by HOPE VI.

As previously stated, mixed-income housing is justified on the grounds that it expands the social networks and social capital of low-income residents, thereby improving their access to information that will increase their chances of acquiring gainful employment. Yet available evidence on the successful outcomes of mixed-income housing in relation to its promises does not support these claims. In his review of the literature on HOPE VI outcomes, political scientist Edward Goetz (2010) contends that displaced households achieve no gains in employment, earnings, or overall income as a result of living in mixed-income housing. He points to finding from studies of the Gautreaux program implemented in Chicago, the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program implemented in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, and Baltimore, and other HOPE VI studies, all of which found that mixed-income housing produced no significant improvement in employment.[215]

The conclusions of those studies are further buttressed by the HOPE VI Panel Study. With regard to employment, the study found that less than half of respondents who lived in mixed-income housing were employed. Nearly 80 percent of respondents reported an annual household income of $15,000 or less, while 66 percent reported an income of $10,000 or less.[216] Moreover, limited evidence supports the claim that mixed-income housing expands the social networks of low-income residents. The HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study found that very few household respondents—less than ¼— reported regular or even casual contact with their neighbors beyond occasional small talk in hallways.[217] A study by Maryann Mason (1997) suggests that the lack of significant social interaction may be due to the fact that "…many residents place a high value on their privacy and purposely place boundaries on their interactions and spend time away from the

[215] Goetz, "Better Neighborhoods, Better Outcomes?," 9.
[216] Susan J. Popkin et al., "HOPE VI Panel Study: Baseline Report" (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, September 2002), 125.
[217] Buron et al., "The HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study," 91.

development in order to avoid intrusion into their lives by fellow residents."[218] Fraser et al. (2013) note that the responsibilities of work, school, and raising children also tend to preclude social interaction with neighbors in mixed-income housing.[219] There is also evidence to suggest that the theory of social capital may work in the reverse as a consequence of displacement, which disrupts the support networks of low-income households.[220] A study by Susan Clampet-Lundquist (2004) found that none of the relocated HOPE VI households learned of employment opportunities through their new neighbors.[221] This is in direct contrast to several interviewees from the same study who reported finding employment through network connections from their previous public housing site. Such research leads Goetz to conclude that, "No evidence suggests that the [HOPE VI] program is producing benefits such as increased economic self-sufficiency and access to enhanced social capital."[222]

Research also reveals inconsistencies between theoretical claims and reality with regard to social control and role modeling. Concerning the former, studies appear to refute arguments that levels of social control are substantially higher in mixed-income housing. The HOPE VI Residential Tracking Study indicates no statistically significant difference in the level of perception of social control between HOPE VI public housing residents and those in general public housing.[223] Alastair Smith emphasizes the role of property managers in exercising social control

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[218] Ibid.
[219] James Fraser, James DeFilippis, and Joshua Bazuin, "HOPE VI: Calling for Modesty in Its Claims" in Gary Bridge, Tim Butler, and Loretta Lees, eds., *Mixed Communities: Gentrification by Stealth?* (Bristol: Policy Press, 2013), 226.
[220] Goetz, "Better Neighborhoods, Better Outcomes?," 9.
[221] Susan Clampet-Lundquist, "Moving Over or Moving Up? Short-Term Gains and Losses for Relocated HOPE VI Families," *Cityscape* 7, no. 1 (2004): 57–80.
[222] Ibid., 12, my brackets.
[223] Larry Buron et al., "The HOPE VI Resident Tracking Study" (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute, 2002), 90, https://www.urban.org/research/publication/hope-vi-resident-tracking-study, accessed July 23, 2018. There was one exception noted. The study did find a statistically significant difference with regard to neighbor involvement for children caught spray painting graffiti on local buildings. Joseph et al. also make this poignant observation in their review of the literature.

on residents, which undercuts arguments that increased social control is achievable as a result of the presence of higher-income residents alone: "The ability to manage negative social behaviors appears to have far more to do with the practices of the management than the income mix of the tenants. As noted in the case of Marcos Andrade of the Mathew Henson homes in Phoenix, while standards of the tenants are important, an active management office committed to a high-quality living environment can achieve many of the same goals."[224] With the passing of QHWRA in 1998, strict screening became a mandate of the HOPE VI program.

The increased level of strict screening and behavioral standards, as Smith notes, is also a likely factor in the mitigation of unwanted social behavior at HOPE VI developments. Screening standards often require residents to pass credit and criminal background checks and provide evidence of a good history with former landlords as prerequisites for residency. Thus, the elimination of potentially problematic residents through strict screening is likely a more significant factor in the reduction of unwanted behavior in mixed-income housing than social control exerted by higher-income residents. Strict screening standards also problematize claims that mixed-income development leads to the adoption of more socially acceptable and constructive behavior of low-income families as it (theoretically) eliminates all potentially problematic residents who do not share the values that shape community life at mixed-income developments as articulated and enforced by property managers. It would seem likely that low-income residents who pass the strict screening process would by necessity reflect the values and laudatory behavior that are prerequisites for residency. Even if that were not the case, substantial social interaction across income levels is an essential component for role modeling to occur. As previously noted, however, the desire for privacy limits the interaction of residents across income levels, thereby reducing the

[224] Smith, "Mixed-Income Housing Developments: Promise and Reality," 22.

opportunities to model behavior of higher-income residents. While there is literature on the impact of living in mixed-income neighborhoods, specifically on the benefit to low-income children and adolescents from the presence of higher-income households in outcomes such as education, health, and sexual activity, there is no evidence about the extent to which role modeling is or is not occurring or its effects.[225]

Finally, there is also a lack of evidence about the extent to which higher-income households draw investment and resources into mixed-income communities to the benefit of low-income residents. Although the political economy of place argument has theoretical appeal, Joseph et al. maintain, "There is essentially no research in mixed-income developments on the role of higher-income residents in leveraging external resources or to what end they are leveraged."[226] There is, however, some data to suggest that low-income residents are disadvantaged by the presence of higher-income households. Several studies have indicated the uneven spatial distribution of municipal services between higher- and low-income communities. In particular, a study by Robert L. Lineberry (1977) found that low-income residents "were disadvantaged by their inability to effectively exercise exit or voice in response to unacceptable service availability and quality."[227] The primary challenge here is that the needs of and services for higher-income households differ substantially from those of low-income households. Urban elites may also favor higher-income households because of their social capital and access to political-economic power and other resources. Although theoretically compelling, the political economy of place argument used to justify mixed-income development does not cohere with available evidence.

[225] Joseph et al., "The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development," 392.
[226] Ibid., 394-395.
[227] Ibid.

It's About the Real Estate: The Neoliberalization of Public Housing and the Creative Class

The tension between the professed outcomes of mixed-income housing, and HOPE VI in particular, has exposed the poverty deconcentration agenda to criticism. Joseph et al., for example, suggest the need to "lower expectations for the impact of mixed-income housing on low-income residents."[228] Similarly, Fraser et al. suggest "a call for modesty regarding the impacts of the actual 'mixed-income' component of [HOPE VI] revitalization and poverty amelioration initiatives."[229] These admonishments emphasize a problem of inconsistency between HOPE VI claims and reality, and press for better alignment between the two.

My assessment of the literature leads in a different direction. I am more concerned with the inference of intent of urban elites ultimately responsible for the development of city space. I argue that the mixed-income development agenda, particularly as implemented through the HOPE VI program, is more about the seizure of real estate for the private market to attract higher-income households and spur economic growth in cities than the professed outcomes of poor public housing residents.[230] It is conventional wisdom that the increase of higher-income households is one of the most important elements for economic growth. Urban studies scholars have maintained that the policy goals of mixed-income development are fundamentally concerned with the transformation of urban space and the circulation of capital.[231] As I stated in the previous chapter, capital flow into fixed assets like real estate property is referred to as "fixed capital" and forms a secondary circuit of capital that is an important component in the urban process under capitalism.[232]

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[228] Ibid., 399.
[229] James Fraser et al., "HOPE VI: Calling for Modesty in Its Claims," 227, my brackets.
[230] Others have made similar arguments. For example, see Sheila Crowley, "HOPE VI: What Went Wrong" in Cisneros and Engdahl.
[231] Ibid., 209. For an explanation of how I use the term "capital," refer to chapter one, note two.
[232] David Harvey, "The Urban Process under Capitalism: A Framework for Analysis," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 2, no. 1–3 (March 12, 1978): 106.

David Harvey is useful for further considering this line of thought. Citing Karl Marx, Harvey avers that fixed capital "requires special analysis because of certain peculiarities which attach to its mode of production and realization. These peculiarities arise because fixed capital items can be produced in the normal course of capitalist commodity production but they are used as aids to the production process rather than as direct raw material inputs. They are also used over a relatively long time period."[233] In other words, fixed capital items, e.g., real estate property, are both commodities created through capitalist production, but also—once produced—can function as a circuit of capital for accumulation purposes. This is unlike raw materials, which are valuable at the initial stage of production. Consequently, fixed capital items can be used indefinitely in the capitalist production process.

Harvey makes two additional points that merit acknowledgement. The first is a distinction between fixed capital "enclosed within the production process and fixed capital which functions as a physical framework for production." [234] He refers to the latter as "the built environment for production." This framing device signifies how the physical landscape of urban space can be used to generate and circulate capital. The second concerns the circumstances under which capital can flow successfully through the secondary circuit. He states, "A general condition of the flow of capital into the secondary circuit is, therefore, the existence of a functioning capital market and, perhaps, a state willing to finance and guarantee long-term, large-scale projects with respect to the creation of the built environment."[235] Both of these points, in addition to the one above, bear on my interpretation of mixed-income development and HOPE VI as a tactic by urban elites to spur economic growth in cities.

[233] Ibid.
[234] Ibid.
[235] Ibid., 107.

Returning to the issue of tension between HOPE VI claims and reality, Fraser et al. opine that the inconsistency between the two may reveal "…the possibility that the call for mixed-income housing may actually be a state-led effort to colonize former public housing residents to prepare neighborhoods for market reinvestment."[236] Placing the colonization aspect of their argument aside, Fraser et al. are right to acknowledge the fundamental market-based schema of the HOPE VI program. The mixed-income development agenda is fundamentally about the seizure of real estate property from public ownership to transform public housing and make real estate property suitable for the flow of capital through the secondary circuit. Mixed-income housing is both a production commodity and, once development is complete, operates as a source and conduit for the indefinite circulation and accumulation of capital. It is a prime example of what Harvey calls the built environment of production.

Furthermore, mixed-income housing meets Harvey's condition for the flow of capital into the secondary circuit. The transfer of public housing property into the private real estate market was financed by the federal government through the HOPE VI program for nearly twenty years (from 1993-2011) and subsidized many large-scale redevelopment projects in cities across the nation. The largest of these projects is located in Chicago where the Chicago Housing Authority implemented a 15-year plan to revitalize or redevelop 25,000 units of public housing—at least a third of which became mixed-income housing defined by private homes, condominiums, and apartments at market rate.[237]

The retrieval of real estate property from public ownership is a signifier of neoliberal urban policy in practice. Jason Hackworth contends that there are two primary reasons that explain why

[236] James Curtis Fraser et al., "HOPE VI, Colonization, and the Production of Difference," *Urban Affairs Review* 49, no. 4 (November 23, 2012): 527.
[237] Lora Engdahl, "An Overview of HOPE VI Revitalization Grant Projects," in Cisneros and Engdahl, *From Despair to Hope: Hope VI and the New Promise of Public Housing in America's Cities, 85*.

the transformation of U.S. public housing provides a useful example for how neoliberalism is instituted in cities. I quote him at length.

> First, because it has never enjoyed a broad constituency, public housing has been historically more malleable in the face of ideological shifts than other parts of the welfare state in the United States. The impact of various ideological movements—including but not limited to neoliberalism—tends to be more exaggerated, and thus more readily observable, in this sector than on others with more political support. Second, U.S. public housing is institutionally multiscalar by design. It was constructed and maintained as a system wherein general edicts by the federal government (mainly its housing arm, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, or HUD) could be filtered down to local public housing authorities (PHAs), which then had significant autonomy. The institutional architecture of the system is thus ideal for learning about the ways that generalized ideologies (such as neoliberalism) manifest themselves as an actual existing (and locally contingent) set of policies, practices, and experiences.[238]

The neoliberalization of public housing did not begin with HOPE VI. Certain aspects existed long before the creation of the program. The moratorium on the creation of new public housing by Nixon in the 1970s epitomizes the rollback stage of neoliberalism that specifically targets Keynesian-era welfare state policies for reduction and elimination. Similarly, certain aspects of the rollout stage of neoliberalism also preceded HOPE VI. According to Hackworth, rollout measures in the context of public housing fundamentally promote the idea of "self-sufficiency," "entrepreneurialism," and "private governance."[239] The institution of Section 8 vouchers, which became the preferred model for public housing during the 1970s, typifies the rollout measures of neoliberalism that existed prior to HOPE VI.

What HOPE VI did accomplish, quite successfully, is the merger of rollback and rollout measures into one program, thus making it the embodiment of the neoliberalization of public housing.[240] As previously mentioned, HOPE VI reduced the total stock of public housing in the

[238] Jason R. Hackworth, *The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 41–42.
[239] Ibid., 48.
[240] Ibid., 50.

U.S. It also effectively privatized the management responsibilities for many of the mixed-income developments with public housing units.[241] Moreover, the restructure of the HOPE VI program in 1998 via QHWRA that instituted work requirements and emphasized home ownership, represents as Hackworth notes, "a more transparent rollout of neoliberal policy in practice."[242] These measures emphasize the need for economic self-sufficiency, entrepreneurialism, and personal responsibility among public housing residents.

Yet the neoliberalization of public housing embodied in the HOPE VI program (and continued by its successor, Choice Neighborhoods) is fundamentally about the seizure and transformation of real estate property as a secondary circuit of capital in order to drive economic growth in city space.[243] This necessitates the attraction of higher-income earners who facilitate the flow of capital, among other ways, via real estate through rents, mortgages, property taxes and the like. In the scheme of neoliberal urban redevelopment, urban elites seek to attract a particular type of higher-income earner—what Richard Florida calls the "Creative Class"—to buttress the redevelopment of city space. In his text, *The Rise of the Creative Class* (2002), Florida argues that the Creative Class determines the fortunes and economic growth of cites. He defines the Creative Class by the occupations they have and divides them into two specific groups. Here is Florida in extensive quotation:

> What I call the *Super-Creative Core* of the Creative Class includes scientists and engineers, university professors, poets and novelists, artists, entertainers, actors, designers, and architects, as well as the thought leadership of modern society: nonfiction writers, editors, cultural figures, think-tank researchers, analysts, and other opinion makers. I define the highest order of creative work as producing new

[241] Gress, Seungjong, and Joseph, "Hope VI Data Compilation and Analysis," 11.
[242] Hackworth, *The Neoliberal City*, 51.
[243] In 2010, the HOPE VI program was replaced and expanded by the "Choice Neighborhoods" program under the Obama Administration. Like HOPE VI, Choice Neighborhoods provides financing for the redevelopment of public housing and the surrounding neighborhood. In 2011, HUD committed 122 million dollars for the first five sites under the program. For an examination of the early implementation of the Choice Neighborhoods program, see Rolf Pendall and Leah Hendey, "A Brief Look at the Early Implementation of Choice Neighborhoods," Urban Institute, June 4, 2016, https://www.urban.org/research/publication/brief-look-early-implementation-choice-neighborhoods.

> forms or designs that are readily transferable and widely useful—such as designing a consumer product that can be manufactured and sold; coming up with a theorem or strategy that can be applied in many cases; or composing music that can be performed again and again. Whether they are software programmers or engineers, architects, or filmmakers, the people at the core of the Creative Class engage in this kind of work regularly; it's what they are paid to do. [. . .] Beyond this core group, the Creative Class also includes 'creative professionals' who work in a wide range of knowledge-intensive industries, such as high-tech, financial services, the legal and health care professions, and business management. These people engage in creative problem solving, drawing on complex bodies of knowledge to solve problems. Doing so typically requires a high degree of formal education and thus a high level of human capital.[244]

Florida avows that "advanced nations" have shifted to knowledge-based, information-driven economies where the key driver is creativity, which he understands as "the faculty that enables us to derive useful new forms from knowledge."[245] Florida's argument for the centrality of the Creative Class to economic growth is both shaped and informed by robust scholarship on the human capital theory of regional development. Summarized succinctly, human capital theory contends that the key to regional growth lies in endowments of highly-educated and productive people.[246] According to Florida, there is a clear connection between economic success of nations and their human capital (as measured by education). Thus, he contends that human capital theory establishes that creative people, i.e., the Creative Class, are the driving force behind economic growth, particularly in cities.

Although Florida suffered no shortage of critics,[247] his theory of economic growth in cities was met with widespread acclaim. On this point, Jamie Peck frames it thusly, "From Singapore to

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[244] Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class--Revisited: Revised and Expanded* (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 2012), 38–39, italics in original. I revisit the concept of the creative class is in chapters three and four.
[245] Ibid., 30.
[246] Richard Florida, "Cities and the Creative Class," *City & Community* 2, no. 1 (March 2003): 6.
[247] For examples of such criticism, see Jamie Peck, "Struggling with the Creative Class," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research,* 29, no.4 (2005): 740-770; Deborah Leslie and John Paul Catungal, "Social Justice and the Creative City: Class, Gender and Racial Inequalities," *Geography Compass* 6, no. 3 (2012): 111–22, and Brenda Parker, "Beyond the Class Act: Gender and Race in the 'Creative City' Discourse," in Judith N. DeSena, ed., *Gender in an Urban World*, Research in Urban Sociology; v. 9 (Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing, 2008)."

London, Dublin to Auckland, Memphis to Amsterdam; indeed, all the way to Providence, RI and Green Bay, WI, cities have paid handsomely to hear about the new credo of creativity, to learn how to attract and nurture creative workers, and to evaluate the latest 'hipsterization strategies' of established creative capitals like Austin, TX or wannabes like Tampa Bay, Fl: 'civic leaders are seizing on the argument that they need to compete not with the plain old tax breaks and redevelopment schemes, but on the playing fields of what Florida calls 'the three T's [of] Technology, Talent, and Tolerance.'"[248] The transformation of U.S. public housing into mixed-income developments via HOPE VI and its successor represents a fundamental component of the creative strategies of urban elites in their agenda to attract creative-type urban dwellers to revitalized urban neighborhoods. Moreover, as Peck asserts, these creative strategies in urban policy cohere with the broader neoliberal redevelopment agenda "…framed around interurban competition, gentrification, middle-class consumption and place-marketing…"[249]

Conclusion

In this chapter, I explored the theoretical premises that buttress mixed-income development as a vehicle to deconcentrate urban poverty. I assessed these claims against empirical evidence, which reveals inconsistency between mixed-income housing claims and reality. For more than two decades, urban elites justified mixed-income development, as implemented through the HOPE VI program, on the grounds that it improves the lives of the urban poor via the deconcentration of urban poverty. While in some instances the lives of former public housing residents may have improved, the legacy of mixed-income housing may be defined more by its devastating consequences to poor black urban residents and their communities. The net loss of more than

[248] Jamie Peck, "Struggling with the Creative Class," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 4 (December 2005): 740. I consider the creative class concept further in chapter three.
[249] Ibid., 740-741.

43,000 public housing units is a substantial decrease of the total public housing stock and significantly contributes to the shortage of affordable housing in U.S. cities for low-income households. It is an especially devastating blow to the most vulnerable poor and black urban residents in the U.S. who struggle to secure housing in the midst of a perennial shortage of affordable housing.

Permanent displacement may be the most damning aspect of the mixed-income housing strategy. HUD's HOPE VI Data Compilation and Analysis Report indicates an ominously low re-occupancy rate for former public housing residents. Of the more than 96,000 units of public housing renovated under HOPE VI, only about 21 percent, or nearly 20,000 units, are occupied by the original tenants of the development. Similarly, of the roughly 55,000 units that were produced as replacement units of public housing, only about 36 percent, or nearly 20,000 units, are occupied by residents of the original development. On average, only about 28 percent of originally displaced public housing residents—the vast majority of them black—returned to the new units. Another 12 percent were not permitted to return—eliminated through strict screening—or died (causes unknown) before the completion of redevelopment sites.[250]

These social facts raise the following question: Who is the redevelopment of city space via mixed-income housing really for? Based on available evidence, indicators suggest that poor black urban residents are not the ideal type of urban dwellers that urban elites have in mind in their vision of a vibrant urban metropolis. It is important to underscore that the transformation of public housing into mixed-income developments signifies the implementation of urban entrepreneurial strategies by elites to spur economic growth in U.S. cities. It is also critical to remember that neoliberalism frames these entrepreneurial strategies.

[250] U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, "HOPE VI Data Compilation and Analysis," 12.

Neoliberal urban redevelopment signifies an appeal to whiteness because the transformation of public housing via the implementation of neoliberal urban policies represents a *muted* racial response that seeks to revitalize blighted black urban neighborhoods and attract a vibrant urban citizenry—the Creative Class—that is imagined and defined by whiteness. While race is never referenced in urban revitalization initiatives, the agenda to deconcentrated urban poverty through mixed-income development is very much a race-based project that is infused with class politics. It seeks to reconstitute urban space and its inhabitants toward an imagined (white) urban community.

This may account for why more than fifty years after Baldwin's poignant observation, urban revitalization continues to result in the displacement of black folks from the places they identify as home. But it also demonstrates, as one writer once articulated, that there is nothing new under the sun. Still, in the contemporary moment, neoliberal urban redevelopment, particularly via HOPE VI, has been a fundamental component in the transformation and gentrification of black city space. Chapter three considers this argument more explicitly through the examination of Washington, D.C. as a case study. In just two decades, the nation's capital has undergone extensive urban redevelopment, which has produced significant change in the racial and class constitution of the city. Chapter three examines this transformation in great detail.

CHAPTER III

FROM CHOCOLATE CITY TO VANILLA VILLIAGE: URBAN REVITALIZATION IN THE NATION'S CAPITAL

> Your friends get forced out, and you never hear from them again. They get relocated to one place, then that place gets gentrified and they have to move to another place, and after a while they are just gone. – Barry Farm Resident[251]
>
> We cannot accept this! We want you to know, as residents, we want to stay here in Barry Farm! – Barry Farm Resident[252]

Introduction

In April of 2018, a group of three native, black Washingtonians, along with a community group named C.A.R.E. (Current Area Residents East of the River) representing lower-income black urban residents in Washington, D.C. (hereafter referred to as D.C.), filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court.[253] The suit, which names a long list of defendants, including various agencies across the D.C. government, the current mayor, Muriel Bowser, as well as former mayors Adrian Fenty and Vincent Gray, alleges discrimination by the city against lower-income, black residents, many of who have been displaced from public housing as a result of urban revitalization in the city. According to the lawsuit, for more than a decade, D.C. has implemented revitalization initiatives with the aim of attracting the creative class.[254] As a consequence, primarily poor, black communities, including those who reside in the city's distressed public housing, have been

[251] Courtland Milloy, "At Barry Farm, Standing Firm as Homes Are Razed," *The Washington Post*, last updated August 22, 2018, http://search.proquest.com/news/docview/2091003239/citation/CC602B797D214384PQ/1.
[252] Paul Duggan, "D.C. Public Housing Residents Are Angry They Will Now Be Forced to Move for Redevelopment," *The Washington Post*, last updated July 8, 2017, http://login.proxy.library.vanderbilt.edu/login?url=https://proquest.com/docview/1917107624?accountid=14816.
[253] Jenna Wang, "Residents Sue Washington D.C. For Racist Gentrification Practices," Forbes, accessed November 23, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennawang/2018/06/28/residents-sue-washington-d-c-over-1-billion-for-racist-gentrification-practices/.
[254] Refer to chapter two for a substantive discussion of the Creative Class.

displaced. Between, 2000 and 2010, the suit contends, nearly 40,000 black residents were "forced out of the city" even as D.C. gained a net increase of 50,000 white residents over the same period.[255]

On the issue of perennial displacement of vulnerable black residents in D.C. due to urban revitalization, the law suit reads:

> Historically, urban renewal projects have involved widespread community destruction and large scale African-American exoduses across the District. This, from the time of the early freedmen who were removed from the 'shanties and shacks' they built seeking solace in the Capital immediately after the Civil War. All the way up to these former slaves [*sic*] subsequent placement at Barry Farm freedman's colony. Through and all the way up to the Barry Farm freedman's colony's razing and removal. To the razing and removal of Reno City in Tenleytown. And the Alley homes and dwellings razing and removal, to the Southwest Neighborhood's razing and removal, and the HOPE VI projects and Arthur Capper Carrollsburg public housing razing and removal. Up to today's current New Communities programming, still not ensuring African American communities can stay intact through 'revitalization.'[256]

The suit acknowledges a long history of disruption of black communities in the nation's capital vis-à-vis urban revitalization. It makes clear that black displacement is a perennial consequence of redevelopment in D.C. Yet it also indicates a particularly distinct—and neoliberal—moment in the history of urban revitalization through its reference to the HOPE VI projects and the New Communities Initiative.

The epigraphs that capture the theme of this chapter not only reflect the fears and sense of loss by vulnerable residents adversely affected by urban revitalization vis-à-vis mixed-income housing development, but also their determination to remain in their communities and the will to fight in order to do so. In the preceding chapter, I argued that the displacement of poor, urban

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[255] *Paulette Matthews, Greta Fuller, C.A.R.E., et al. v. D.C. Zoning Commission, D.C. Housing Authority, D.C. Office of Planning, Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development, D.C. Department of Housing and Community Development, et al.* 1:18-cv872, (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia), https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.195501/gov.uscourts.dcd.195501.1.0.pdf.

[256] Ibid. The term "urban renewal" here is synonymous with urban revitalization.

blacks is the enduring legacy of the mixed-income housing agenda contrary to the arguments made by proponents. In this chapter, I display the material consequences for those who live in spaces targeted for urban revitalization and disclose the values that drive such initiatives in D.C. I examine here a case study of the historic Barry Farm neighborhood[257] located in Ward 8 in the far southeast quadrant of the city.[258] My intention is to move from an abstract argument to an observable, concrete example of the adverse effect—namely displacement—of neoliberal urban redevelopment on black lives.

Some raise cautions about utilizing D.C. as a case study to explore displacement as a consequence of urban revitalization. Urban planner Howard J. Sumka, for example, argues that D.C. is an extreme case of displacement as a consequence of revitalization, in part, because "…Washington's revitalization movement has been spearheaded by young professional households. In no other city in the country is such a large portion of the work force engaged in white-collar employment."[259] Others emphasize D.C.'s special relationship with the federal government. In their article, "Neighborhood Revitalization and Racial Change: The Case for Washington, D.C.," (1985), urban studies scholars Barrett A. Lee, Daphne Spain, and Debra J. Umberson summarize the aforementioned concern thusly: "Because of its special status as the seat of government, there is a strong temptation to regard Washington as idiosyncratic. The implication of this view is that revitalization-generated changes observed in the Washington area should not

[257] I use the term "neighborhood" to refer to a "physically bounded area characterized by some degree of relative homogeneity and/or social cohesion." For more on the concept of neighborhood, see Michael J. White, *American Neighborhoods and Residential Differentiation* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation for the National Committee for Research on the 1980 Census, 1987).
[258] D.C. is divided into four quadrants: Northwest (NW), Northeast (NE), Southwest (SW), and Southeast (SE). These four quadrants are sub-divided into eight council wards, which are political areas used to elect members to the D.C. city council. Occasionally ward boundaries are redrawn based on available data from the U.S. decennial census. For more information see the Neighborhood Info DC website. "2012 Council Wards," NeighborhoodinfoDC, accessed December 9, 2018, https://www.neighborhoodinfodc.org/wards/wards.html.
[259] Howard J. Sumka, "Neighborhood Revitalization and Displacement: A Review of the Evidence" in Loretta Lees, Tom Slater, and Elvin Wyly, eds., *The Gentrification Reader* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010), 330.

be expected to occur anywhere else, or, when they do, to occur in less extreme form."[260] Although acknowledging the plausibility of this idiosyncratic position, Lee et al.'s offer a persuasive counter argument. "If it is also a forerunner or prototype in neighborhood revitalization, our inability to detect the hypothesized effects in other cities may simply mean that revitalization is beginning later in those places and they have not yet caught up."[261] For Lee et al., D.C.'s status as a pioneer in urban revitalization plausibly accounts for the inability to trace the effects of urban change in other cities, not because those effects do not occur in other cities, but rather due to the fact that D.C. is significantly ahead of the urban change game. They also argue that D.C.'s uniqueness as a city tends to be exaggerated, while the extent to which the dynamics that make D.C. a revitalization "hotbed" appear in other U.S. cities is underestimated.[262] Although Lee et al. stop short of declaring D.C. as a model city for the study of urban revitalization, they recognize the value of a case study of the nation's capital for understanding urban redevelopment dynamics.

Similarly, I contend that D.C. is a suitable city to study neoliberal urban redevelopment for three reasons. First, although D.C. has a unique relationship with the federal government that is unlike other cities, the economic impact of that relationship on the city has diminished, as urban sociologist Derek Hyra notes, making it more reflective of other U.S. cities. He states,

> In the 1980s and 1990s, the federal government began outsourcing many of its functions. Just as multinational firms outsourced their legal, human resources, and marketing departments, the federal government, too has farmed out its previously internal functions to private companies. The outsourcing of these functions changed the nature of the D.C. economy. By the 1990s, D.C. more closely resembled other U.S. cities, because its economy, while still dependent on the federal government, had diversified with private service-sector employment opportunities."[263]

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[260] Barrett A. Lee, Daphne Spain, and Debra J. Umberson, "Neighborhood Revitalization and Racial Change: The Case of Washington, D.C.," *Demography* 22, no. 4 (1985): 597.
[261] Ibid., 598.
[262] Ibid.
[263] Derek S. Hyra, *Race, Class, and Politics in the Cappuccino City* (Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 16. I want to note here that the economic diversification of which Hyra speaks coincides with the rollout stage of neoliberalism, which fundamentally involves the privatization of industry, which I discussed in the introduction.

As Hyra makes clear, D.C.'s economic diversification over the last three decades caused it to more closely resemble many other large U.S. cities. Thus, the dynamics that shape urban revitalization in D.C. are likely observable in other urban areas.

Second, although D.C.'s resemblance to other U.S. cities warrants analysis, its racial distinctiveness also merits attention. Urban sociologist Jonathan Jackson argues that D.C. is an ideal study for analysis of urban revitalization in the context of its shifting racial and class makeup given its history of racial conflict. "The high concentration of racial minorities sets Washington, D.C. apart from most other cities; the riots of 1968 left many neighborhoods in shambles for years, making their revitalization even more dramatic and contentious," Jackson maintains.[264] Recent demographic shifts in D.C. raise serious questions about the forces that drive such changes and the groups of people most likely to benefit from them. Attending to such changes may provide insight for researchers studying urban revitalization.

Third, D.C. has been a prime site for neoliberal urban redevelopment experiments since at least the mid- to late 1990s, particularly in residential neighborhoods. Many of its urban redevelopment projects were funded by the federal HOPE VI program. In fact, in a tie with Baltimore and Atlanta, D.C. received the second largest number of HOPE VI revitalization grants behind Chicago, totaling more than $180 million dollars within twelve years split between seven projects spread across six neighborhoods.[265] The HOPE VI program had such an impact on urban revitalization that the city created its own version. Named the New Communities Initiative and

[264] Jonathan Jackson, "The Consequences of Gentrification for Racial Change in Washington, DC," *Housing Policy Debate* 25, no. 2 (April 3, 2015): 357, https://doi.org/10.1080/10511482.2014.921221.
[265] "Revitalization Grants - HOPE VI - Public and Indian Housing - HUD | HUD.Gov / U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)," accessed November 25, 2018, https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/hope6/grants/revitalization. The total dollar amount was calculated by the addition of the amount per revitalization grant awarded to the city.

funded by local dollars, the initiative is modeled after HOPE VI and targets public housing in D.C. for privatization with the aim of redeveloping those properties into mixed-income neighborhoods. Thus, D.C. becomes an important site for studying of the effects of neoliberal urban redevelopment on vulnerable black communities.

In what follows, I explore the rise of "Chocolate City" and the subsequent decline in urban infrastructure in D.C. I will not provide a detailed history of the nation's capital.[266] Rather, I provide an account of factors that led to a majority black population, urban decline, and residential segregation. I then provide a brief historical overview of Barry Farm. Notwithstanding its very rich history, research on the neighborhood is limited. I attend to that history and contextualize it within twenty-first century urban revitalization in D.C. I analyze and assess the city's New Communities Initiative and the Barry Farm Redevelopment Plan adopted by the D.C. Council in 2006. Both identify the vision, guiding principles, and urban redesign for the proposed redevelopment of the Barry Farm neighborhood. In the final section, I highlight the broken promises to Barry Farm residents and their subsequent displacement. I situate this displacement within a broader context of demographic shifts that have occurred in the city over the last decade and a half. I conclude by considering the question concerning the group(s) of people who stand to benefit most from urban revitalization in Barry Farm.

Toward a Black Majority, Urban Decline, and Segregation in the Nation's Capital

D.C. became a majority black city during the mid-twentieth century. Like all cities prior to the 1900s, D.C. was predominantly white. At the time of its establishment in 1802, the city had a population of less than ten thousand with blacks comprising approximately 30 percent, the vast

[266] For an in-depth history of Washington, D.C. see Tom Lewis' very thorough account: Tom Lewis, *Washington: A History of Our National City* (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

majority of whom were enslaved.[267] Although the black population grew steadily throughout the nineteenth century, it substantially increased in the twentieth. During the years of the first grate wave of black migration between 1910-1920, D.C. had an average annual growth rate of 16.4 percent in its black population.[268] At the onset of the second wave of migration in 1940, D.C. had the second largest black net in-migration in the U.S., just a few thousand fewer than New York City.[269] Still, blacks only comprised approximately 28 percent of the total population of 663,000 in that year. It was not until after World War II that racial demographics shifted drastically like many other cities in the U.S. In 1950, the year that the U.S. Census recorded the highest population in D.C. at over 800,000 people, blacks made up 35 percent of the population. But by 1960, that number increased to 54 percent, nearly 412,000 people[270] with more than half of them born in other states.[271] During this period, D.C. became the first predominantly black major city in the U.S. concurrently with a 33 percent drop in the white population.[272] In response to the racial change, D.C. became affectionately known as "Chocolate City."

As whites abandoned the city, D.C. became poorer and experienced urban decline. The deterioration of the city's economic viability was amplified by civil unrest during the late 1960s. The 3-5-day riot in 1968 (there is disagreement about the length of its duration), which immediately followed the April assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., had devastating consequences for the urban landscape. Roughly 1,200 building were burned to the ground. More

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[267] Ibid., 69.
[268] Daniel M. Johnson and Rex R. Campbell, *Black Migration in America: A Social Demographic History* (Durham, N.C: Duke University Press, 1981), 77.
[269] Ibid., 96.
[270] "Table 9. District of Columbia - Race and Hispanic Origin for Selected Large Cities and Other Places: Earliest Census to 1990," U.S. Census Bureau, accessed December 2, 2018, https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0076/DCtab.pdf.
[271] Johnson and Campbell, *Black Migration in America*, 130.
[272] Harry S. Jaffe and Tom Sherwood, *Dream City: Race, Power, and the Decline of Washington, D.C.* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), xxi.

than 900 businesses were damaged or destroyed,[273] the vast majority of which were owned by whites.[274] Entire neighborhoods were decimated with damages of at least $24 million in total.[275] White and middle-class flight accelerated after the riots and was joined by the exodus of many black middle-class families. By 1970, the white population comprised only 28 percent of the city's total compared to more than 70 percent of blacks, who were predominantly poor.[276] In the aftermath of the riot of 1968, signs of urban and economic decline in D.C. were ostensible throughout the city, but especially in segregated black neighborhoods marked by a high concentration of poverty.

Black migrants who moved to D.C. during the great migrations were not immune to the effects of racial discrimination. D.C., after all, was a southern city, formed by the partitioning of land from two southern slave states. As blacks moved in, they were prohibited from living in many areas. Private practices by whites who refused to sell or rent houses to blacks[277] and public practices like restrictive covenants, redlining, and other discriminatory tactics (discussed in chapter one) constrained black settlement. The places where blacks did settle were often overcrowded, characterized by underinvestment in the urban landscape, and deteriorated rapidly.[278] Parts of D.C. east of the Anacostia river (the southern quadrants) were prime settlement sites for blacks. These sections, particularly Wards 7 and 8, were among the poorest and most neglected in the city. While

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[273] Danielle Rindler, "The Four Days in 1968 That Reshaped D.C.: Chaotic Riots Left 13 Dead and More than 900 Businesses Damaged.," The Washington Post (Online); Washington, D.C., March 27, 2018, http://search.proquest.com/news/docview/2018934060/citation/86C62B9A913C4265PQ/1.

[274] Steven J. Diner and Anita Henderson, *A History of the District of Columbia: Unit VII: The Center of a Metropolis, Washington Since 1954* (Washington, D.C.: Associates for Renewal in Education, Inc., 1980), 57.

[275] Ibid. Some estimates place the figure at upwards of $27 million.

[276] These statistics were calculated based on a chart that was provided to be the D.C. Office of Planning that compiled U.S. Census data on the District population by race and Hispanic origin from 1800 to 2017. I am particularly in debt to Ms. Coleen Jordan, the Demographic Specialist at the State Data Center within the Office of Planning who sent me this information.

[277] Diner and Anita, *A History of the District of Columbia*, 12.

[278] Kathryn Zickuhr, "Discriminatory Housing Practices in the District: A Brief History," D.C. Policy Center, October 24, 2018, https://www.dcpolicycenter.org/publications/discriminatory-housing-practices-in-the-district-a-brief-history/.

urban blight branded much of D.C. following the 1960s, neighborhoods "east of the river" bore the brunt of the consequences of economic decline and divestment. Urban revitalization intended to reverse the effects of economic decline and urban decay frequently came to the detriment of many black neighborhoods. One place devastated by a history of urban revitalization is Barry Farm. Unfortunately, in our contemporary moment, it appears that it is experiencing a reoccurrence of the destructive forces of years past.

A Brief History of Barry Farm

Barry Farm is located in what is known as the Anacostia Historic District.[279] In common usage, Anacostia is the umbrella named used to refer to all of the neighborhoods located east of the Anacostia river in far southeast D.C.[280] Originally named Barry's Farm, the neighborhood was established in 1867 through the purchase of 375 acres of land from the descendants of James D. Barry, a white slave owner after whom it is named. The land was purchased by the Bureau of Refugees, Freedman, and Abandoned Lands (commonly known as the Freedman's Bureau) under the direction of abolitionist General Oliver Otis Howard. Although the idea to purchase the land was spurred by racial conflict, General Howard acquired the property in order to provide an opportunity for upward mobility for newly freed blacks. He believed that homeownership (and by default landownership) was a necessary step toward self-sufficiency, and determined that the land would be used for such purposes.

[279] DC Preservation (DC Historic Preservation Office), "Anacostia Historic District" (Washington, D.C.: D.C. Historic Preservation Office, March 2007, https://planning.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/op/publication/attachments/Anacostia_Historic_Brochure_0.pdf.
[280] Howard Gillette, Jr., "Old Anacostia: Washington's First Suburb" in Kathryn Schneider Smith, ed., *Washington at Home: An Illustrated History of Neighborhoods in the Nation's Capital* (Northridge, CA: Windsor Publications, 1988), 97.

In their book, *Chocolate City: A History of Race and Democracy in the Nation's Capital* (2017), historians Chris Meyers Asch and George Derek Musgrove contend that the establishment of Barry Farm was a notable moment for racial uplift for blacks in D.C., especially regarding black home ownership. They write:

> Perhaps the most successful home ownership program was the Barry's Farm community in Southeast Washington. Barry's Farm had its roots in white land-owners' attempts to evict black squatters on their lots in the Meridian Hill area of North West. General Howard met with black families in the area to discuss the issue, and several of them told him what they wanted: land. Howard proposed creating a black colony on the eastern side of the Anacostia River, just south of the small white community of Uniontown, an area that remained almost entirely rural at war's end.[281]

Black families were able to purchase one-acre lots at prices between $125 and $300 from the Freedman's Bureau and enough lumber from which to build their houses.[282] Although the fact that many whites at the time opposed the idea of black landownership, going so far as to attack blacks who were traveling from work to their homes in Barry Farm, within two years approximately 500 black families had moved into the neighborhood.[283] Many of those families found gainful employment. Carpenters, painters, brick layers, grocers, teachers, blacksmiths, shoemakers, and government clerks, among others, were all professions represented in the early Barry Farm neighborhood.[284] Barry Farm residents became politically active, even dominating the politics of Anacostia during the 1870s. Some even rose to political leadership. Residents in Barry Farm forged a strong community that enabled them to weather many storms. About the resilience of the early Barry Farm community, historian Louise Daniel Hutchinson writes, "In spite of the faltering

[281] Chris Myers Asch and George Derek Musgrove, *Chocolate City: A History of Race and Democracy in the Nation's Capital* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 138.
[282] Louise Daniel Hutchinson, *The Anacostia Story, 1608-1930* (Washington: Published for the Anacostia Neighborhood Museum of the Smithsonian Institution by the Smithsonian Institution Press, 1977), 82.
[283] Ibid., 83.
[284] DC Preservation (DC Historic Preservation Office), "Anacostia Historic District."

labor market and the national depression of 1873 and 1893, Barry's Farm residents fared better than many people. During times of economic reversal and uncertainties they had the security of their land, their homes, and the support of one another."[285] Barry Farm was so successful as a black enclave, being the first black home ownership community in D.C., it garnered the reputation as a place of opportunity, one that "came to be known as a model for the self-help philosophy of the [then] nascent Republican party.[286]

With the Great Depression and World War II, Barry Farm was devastated. The Depression had an adverse effect on the economic viability during the early 1930s, causing a rise in unemployment, job furloughs, and business closures.[287] During World War II, the construction of a freeway through Barry Farm split it in half further destabilizing it. The National Capital Park and Planning Commission intended for the freeway to improve transportation between D.C. and Maryland for defense industry workers.[288] The construction of the Suitland Parkway (as it is named) destroyed houses, businesses that survived the Depression, and other assets in Barry Farm. As the war raged on, the demand for housing in D.C. intensified. In response, a Federal Housing Administration rental program repossessed land from black home owners through the invocation of eminent domain and paved the way for the construction of a number of apartment complexes in the Anacostia Historic District.[289]

Revisions to local zoning laws reserved up to 75 percent of the residential land for rental apartment housing. "By the end of the 1960s," Asch and Musgrove state, "85 percent of housing units in Far Southeast were multifamily apartments and three-fourths of the city's public housing

[285] Hutchinson, *The Anacostia Story, 1608-1930*, 90.
[286] Gillette, Jr. "Old Anacostia" in Smith, *Washington at Home, 99,* my brackets.
[287] Kilolo Kijakazi et al., "The Color of Wealth in the Nation's Capital," Urban Institute, October 31, 2016, 20, https://www.urban.org/research/publication/color-wealth-nations-capital.
[288] Kijakazi et al., 21.
[289] Gillette, Jr. "Old Anacostia" in Smith, *Washington at Home*, 101.

residents lived there."[290] Large sections of Barry Farm that were once sites of black home ownership were demolished to make room for public housing. As urban revitalization advanced in other parts of the city, displaced black communities resettled in the Anacostia Historic District. Many of these displacees relocated to public housing.[291] The riot of 1968 further disrupted Barry Farm as the commercial avenues of the Anacostia Historic District were devastated, leaving an indelible mark on southeast D.C.[292] By the 1970s, Barry Farm's reputation had completely changed.

Today it is characterized as a high poverty, high crime black neighborhood with distressed public housing marking the urban landscape. In 2013, historian and journalist John Muller declared that Barry Farm "is almost exclusively associated with the faded 26-acre Barry Farm Dwellings, a 432-unit (nearly a third vacant) [public housing] property of the D.C. Housing Authority."[293] This perception remains unchanged. For many, public housing in Barry Farm epitomizes economic divestment, government neglect, and above all, concentrated urban poverty in black urban space. However, within the last decade and a half, there has been a redevelopment boom in D.C. That boom has had significant consequences for many of the places east of the river as developers target under-utilized real estate in order to flip it for profit. Barry Farm is one such community and the city's New Communities Initiative, inclusive of the Barry Farm Redevelopment Plan, are the primary mechanisms by which the city has attempted to reclaim that space and bring new life to the neighborhood.

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[290] Asch and Musgrove, *Chocolate City*, 331.
[291] DC Preservation (DC Historic Preservation Office), "Anacostia Historic District."
[292] Sandra Fitzpatrick and Maria R. Goodwin, *The Guide to Black Washington: Places and Events of Historical and Cultural Significance in the Nation's Capital*, Rev. Illustrated ed. (New York: Hippocrene Books, 2001), 49.
[293] John Muller, "Barry Farm Street Names Reflect Post-Civil War History," January 31, 2013, https://ggwash.org/view/30068/barry-farm-street-names-reflect-post-civil-war-history, my brackets. Another public housing complex, "Wade Apartments" is also located in Barry Farm. In total, 444 public housing units exist in the neighborhood.

The New Communities Initiative and the Barry Farm Redevelopment Plan

The New Communities Initiative (hereafter the Initiative) began in 2005 as a D.C. funded program designed to "revitalize severely distressed public housing and redevelop communities plagued with concentrated poverty, high crime, and economic segregation."[294] The Initiative was championed by then D.C. major Anthony A. Williams in response to budget cuts to the federal HOPE VI program enacted by the George W. Bush Administration. Modeled after HOPE VI, it was created in consultation with government officials, residents, city agencies, and other stakeholders to spur urban revitalization in four D.C. neighborhoods, each with its own redevelopment plan. At the Initiative's inception, the vision was to create "vibrant mixed-income neighborhoods that address both the physical architecture and human capital needs, where residents have quality of affordable housing options, economic opportunities, and access to appropriate human services."[295]

The four guiding principles shaping the Initiative's design at its inception were: 1) Ensure one for one replacement of razed housing in order to safeguard that there is "no net loss of affordable housing units in [redeveloped] neighborhood[s];" 2) Honor the right of residents to remain during redevelopment or return shortly after completion, 3) Develop mixed-income housing as the strategy to address concentrated poverty; and 4) Execute a build-first philosophy, "which calls for the redevelopment of new housing to begin prior to the demolition of existing distressed housing to minimize displacement."[296] These four principles were adopted in light of the criticism of HOPE VI that underscored a net loss in affordable housing in U.S. cities and a

[294] "About the New Communities Initiative," New Communities Initiative, http://dcnewcommunities.org/about-nci/. The Initiative is jointly managed by the D.C. Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic Development and the D.C. Housing Authority.
[295] Ibid.
[296] Ibid, my brackets.

high level of displacement of public housing residents. The one for one replacement principle, which was not a general requirement of HOPE VI, addresses the former, while the second and fourth principles address the latter. Each of the neighborhood redevelopment plans that constitute the Initiative has three primary components that focus on a) the human capital of New Communities residents, b) physical redevelopment, and c) a finance strategy.

Barry Farm was selected as the Initiative's third site "because of its visible location in Anacostia and the need to bring the promise and opportunities provided with this Initiative east of the Anacostia River. A community with a high concentration of crime and poverty, the Neighborhood is in pressing need of the services and opportunities presented by the New Communities Initiative."[297] The vision of the Barry Farm Redevelopment Plan (hereafter "the Plan") reflects that of the Initiative and shares its four guiding principles; but it stipulates that redevelopment should proceed "while also honoring [Barry Farm's] history".[298] On the one hand, the human capital component prioritizes adult education and employment, meaningful child and youth programing, improved community health, and safety and security. On the other, the area redevelopment component, to which urban planners gave the most attention, identifies existing conditions (as of 2006), offers a market analysis of Barry Farm and the immediate surrounding area, and describes the proposed urban redesign.

Worth noting is the call for 1,110 new units of mixed-income housing in Barry Farm—approximately a third of which would be replacement public housing units—integrated in with new retail businesses.[299] Also notable is the Barry Farm urban redesign, the goal of which is to

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[297] "Barry Farm Redevelopment Plan," New Communities Initiative, https://dmped.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/dmped/publication/attachments/Barry%20Farm%20Park%20Chester%20Wade%20Road%20Community%20Revitalization%20P.pdf, 7.
[298] Ibid., 25.
[299] The combination of mixed-income housing with retail business is generally referred to as mixed-use development. For more, see chapter two.

"eliminate the isolation of Barry Farm and integrate it with the broader Anacostia community."[300] This is undoubtedly a reference to the effects of the construction of the Suitland Parkway. The Plan claims that the proposed urban redesign "expands the existing neighborhood's connection to the surrounding community and bolsters the site's ability to maintain a comfortable environment."[301] Notably absent in the Plan, however, is a plausible strategy for how the city intends to execute its build-first philosophy while ensuring a one-for-one replacement of public housing units, which are hallmark aspects of the New Communities Initiative. This unfortunate observation is a primary reason why to date, D.C. has produced no new public housing units in Barry Farm. In fact, as journalist Aaron Weiner argues in a 2014 article for *The Washington City Paper,* "…the New Communities program has failed to produce new communities."[302] Since its launch, the Initiative was beset with obstacles and setbacks that have largely thwarted its success.

Former mayor Anthony Williams, who chiefly advocated for the endeavor, was widely mistrusted by low-income black residents who believed he became "too friendly to developers seeking young, white wealthy faces to populate their luxury condominiums," during his time in office.[303] Distrust of the city mayor, which was a significant obstacle for increasing political support for urban revitalization, continued into Adrian Fenty's administration, despite his expressed support for the Initiative during his mayoral campaign. Consequently, residents opposed the proposed redevelopment projects. On this point, urban sociologist Brian McCabe states, "This resistance . . . emerged as critics express[ed] fear that the New Communities Initiative will replace

[300] Barry Farm Redevelopment Plan," New Communities Initiative, 22.
[301] Ibid., 31.
[302] Aaron Wiener, "Report: D.C. Should Redevelop Public Housing Without Replacing Units First," Washington City Paper, September 9, 2014, www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/housing-complex/blog/13124286/report-d-c-should-redevelop-public-housing-without-replacing-units-first.
[303] Mark Anderson, "How D.C.'s Plan to Save Low-Income Housing Went Wrong," Washington City Paper, October 29, 2014, www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/city-desk/blog/13069268/how-d-c-s-plan-to-save-low-income-housing-went-wrong.

low-income residents with higher income ones. As recent research on the HOPE VI program confirms, public housing redevelopment often serves as a catalyst of neighborhood change by closing public housing, creating market-rate units and displacing long-term renters."[304] The Initiative also encountered a monumental setback with the housing market crash of 2008. Because it was largely funded by the city's Housing Production Trust Fund, which relies on profits from market-rate units to subsidize affordable housing units, the 2008 housing market crash "weakened the housing market for market-rate housing and especially for market-rate housing east of the Anacostia River."[305] Planned financing for the Initiative was therefore eliminated and left the Initiative without a reliable funding source for redevelopment.

The Initiative was practically abandoned and plans for redevelopment in Barry Farm stalled until March of 2014 when the D.C. Housing Authority (DCHA)—in partnership with two private and nonprofit developers—updated the Barry Farm Redevelopment Plan through the submission of a zoning application to the D.C. Zoning Commission. In it, DCHA acknowledged the extreme delay in the redevelopment of Barry Farm, but reiterated its commitment to the project. "The replacement of the existing Barry Farm and Wade Road residences has been contemplated, studied, and planned for a number of years and this proposal would be the implementation of these many plans. The redevelopment would benefit many of the existing residents and the Anacostia neighborhood, and would further economic development in revitalizing Anacostia and the District as whole."[306]

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[304] Brian McCabe, "DC's New Communities Initiative, Explained," Greater Greater Washington, February 14, 2017, https://ggwash.org/view/62381/dcs-new-communities-initiative-explained, my brackets.
[305] Ibid.
[306] District of Columbia Office of Planning, *Memorandum: ZC 14-02: Setdown Report – Barry Farm First stage PUD and Related Map Amendment*, March 21, 2014, http://dcnewcommunities.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Zoning_Barry-Farm-Setdown-Report.pdf. "Wade Road residences" is a reference to the name of the other public housing property in Barry Farm.

The 2014 revision to the Barry Farm Redevelopment Plan increased the total planned mixed-income housing units from the originally proposed 1,110 to between 1,300 and 1,900, "consisting of apartments, condominiums, duplexes, rowhouses, and flats for families of varying income levels and varying sizes."[307] Furthermore, it underscores the Initiative's guiding principle of one-for-one replacement of demolished public housing units with a caveat that states not all replacement units must be *on site* of the redeveloped property. Finally, the revision also underscores the build-first principle, echoing the city's commitment to maintaining the social networks of residents during redevelopment. "To Build-First is one of the core parameters of the New Communities Initiative which would provide for units off-site and in the neighborhood of the affected property *to avoid displacement or being relocated from a resident's base community.*"[308] In December of 2014, the D.C. Zoning Commission approved DCHA's zoning application. The revised redevelopment plan became effective in May of the following year. In response, the Barry Farm Tenants and Allies Association, formed in 2012 and comprised of Barry Farm residents and allies, filed a lawsuit in 2016 against the Zoning Commission, arguing, in part, that it "failed to consider the loss of current amenities that residents enjoy as an adverse impact; and . . . erred in concluding that the [Barry Farm residents'] relocation process would avoid hardship or dislocation of current residents…"[309]

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[307] Ibid. The Commission approved a final number of 1,400 units. Estimates place the total cost of the redevelopment project at $400 million. Additionally, the revision to the Plan requires the rezoning of Barry Farm to include moderate height residential housing as well as shopping and business permission to allow mixed-used development. This is why the revision was included to an application to the Zoning Commission.

[308] Ibid, my italics.

[309] *Barry Farm Tenants and Allies Association v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission and A&R Development Corporation, et al.* Petition for Review of a Decision of the District of Columbia Zoning Commission (ZC-14-02). No. 15-aa-1000, (District of Columbia Court of Appeals) *al.* 1:18-cv872, (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia), https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/15-AA-1000.pdf, my brackets. This is a different lawsuit from the one referenced at the onset of this chapter. Both cases, however, are represented by the same attorney, Aristotle Theresa, Esq.

It is important to note that the city's renewed interest in the redevelopment of Barry Farm came in the midst of a shift in focus in economic development. Only four year prior, the D.C. Office of Planning in conjunction with the Washington, D.C. Economic Partnership released a report that revealed D.C.'s new strategy for economic development. Entitled "Creative Capital: The Creative D.C. Action Agenda," it provides a blueprint for the public, private, and nonprofit sectors on how to best spur economic growth by stimulating the city's creative economy. The conceptual framework of the action agenda relies heavily on Richard Florida's theory of the creative class, discussed in detail in chapter two. City leaders even invited Florida to an economic development summit to speak with business leaders, city agencies, and other stakeholders in efforts to identity viable paths forward in the new economy post the 2008 recession.

According to the action agenda, "The city's 'creative sector'—a phrase referring to enterprises in and for which creative content drives both economic and cultural value, including businesses, individuals, and organizations engaged in every stage of the creative process—act as a local economic driver creating a significant number of jobs, income, and revenues for the city and its residents."[310] The report acknowledges that talent "increasingly drives the creative economy" and that D.C. has increasingly become "a city of choice for many in creative fields."[311] Especially notable is its focus on the "revitalization" of underserved neighborhoods, arguing that arts and culture play a vital role in urban revitalization. "In fact," the agenda reads, "many cities have aggressively sought to attract artists as a catalyst to revitalizing urban neighborhoods."[312] D.C. is one such city.

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[310] District of Colombia Office of Planning and Washington, D.C. Economic Partnership, *Creative Capital: The Creative D.C. Action Agenda*, May 2010, https://planning.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/op/publication/attachments/creative_capital_rpt_04302010.pdf, 7.
[311] Ibid., 8.
[312] Ibid., 28.

The Anacostia Historic District is one choice area in D.C. among a short list of examples of creative places. "Anacostia in southeast Washington is one of the city's premier historic districts, the only neighborhood east of the Anacostia River on the National Register of Historic Places. The neighborhood is also evolving into a creative cluster, with new galleries and artist housing."[313] The focus on arts and culture and its ability to catalyze urban revitalization may potentially explain why today the Barry Farm Recreational Center, a building that opened in 2015, is the *only* new structure built by the city in Barry Farm. The new center, however, neither significantly benefits Barry Farm residents nor resolves the housing problem. About the recreation center, one Barry Farm resident declares in an interview with local news media, "They could've taken the money for the rec and used it to help us but they're going to make it look good for when they get rid of us. It ain't for us."[314] This individual is alluding to the intended beneficiaries of revitalization in the Barry Farm neighborhood. His statement reflects the sentiments among poor black communities in D.C. that revitalization is designed to attract wealthy, white residents to their neighborhoods by enticing them with amenities like recreation centers, dog parks, retail shopping, etc. He insinuates that the city is revitalizing Barry Farm in preparation for the new residents who are to come. Financial resources that the city council designated for the construction of a recreation center could have instead been spent on targeted initiatives such as appliance upgrades, mold remediation, rodent extermination, and other services that would have an immediate impact on the quality of life for Barry Farm residents. The new recreation center does nothing to resolve these urgent problems, prompting residents to accuse city leaders of deception, and this accusation is buttressed by the fact that city leaders broker their promises to Barry Farm residents.

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[313] Ibid., 10.
[314] Jeffrey Anderson, "Out To Pasture," *The District Dig*, February 10, 2016, http://www.districtdig.com/2016/02/10/out-to-pasture/.

In 2017, DCHA received approval to begin demolition of the public housing in Barry Farm, but by then the city had already reneged on the core commitments adopted to guide redevelopment under the New Communities Initiative. DCHA announced in September of the prior year that the build-first approach (that became rhetorically known as "redevelop in place") was cost-prohibitive for Barry Farm. At that time, a spokeswoman for DCHA stated, "Due to the scale of the redevelopment, including demolition and rebuilding of not only the buildings, but also the infrastructure, redeveloping in place is not feasible."[315] Consequently, the agency said, Barry Farm residents would be relocated.

The city also arguably broke its promise of one-for-one replacement units at the new property. 444 total public housing units currently exist in Barry Farm.[316] The revised redevelopment plan only calls for 344 replacement units. The remaining 100, according to DCHA, would be spread throughout other developments across the city.[317] While DCHA argues that the city is honoring the one-for-one replacement principle—the revised plan does state that not all replacement units *must* to be on site of the redeveloped property—the net loss of 100 units in Barry Farm is an unequivocal violation of city leaders' promise to residents that it would implement redevelopment in such a way that would prevent resident displacement and relocation from their base community. To add insult to injury, the one-for-one replacement principle does not extend to the mix of various unit sizes, a problem that residents raised repeatedly with city leaders. At issue

[315] Ibid.
[316] Barry Farm Dwellings, the largest public housing complex in the neighborhood has 432 public housing units. The other public housing property in the neighborhood, Wade Road Apartments, consists of 12 units.
[317] Christina Sturdivant, "Barry Farm Residents File Lawsuit Against D.C. Housing Authority," DCist, August 29, 2017, https://dcist.com/story/17/08/29/barry-farm-residents-file-lawsuit-a/. In August of 2017, Barry Farm residents filed yet another lawsuit against the Housing Authority. This suit alleges that DCHA, through its contract with a private developer, effectively displaces Barry Farm residents through the reduction of family-size units at the redeveloped property.

is the net loss of housing units available for large families. The proposed redevelopment would have net fewer 2 to 6-bedroom units.[318] As a result, analysts project that the redeveloped property would displace more than 150 families. Residents allege that the decrease in family units reflects city leaders' desire to "reduce the number of low-income tenants with children to make the redeveloped complex more attractive to market-rate renters and buyers."[319]

A 2014 independent review of the New Communities Initiative guided the city's decision to walk back its promises to Barry Farm residents. The review raised challenges with both the build-first and one-for-one replacement principles. "The Build First Principle . . . is not cost or time effective, particularly when combined with the desire to ensure units serving a range of incomes. Build First is costly because it means having to plan, finance, and build not just replacement units, but affordable units as well. The complexity of this method prolongs the development timeframe and diverts subsidy from directly supporting redevelopment. . ."[320] To address this challenge, reviewers recommended building on-site and off-site housing simultaneously, which necessitates the removal of resident from the development site during construction. On one-for-one replacement, the review reads, "The principle has been interpreted by some stakeholders to mean that the existing mix (number of bedrooms per unit, primarily) will be replicated in new developments. There is also an assumption that every replacement unit will [be] built within the footprint of the existing neighborhood which limits the possibilities for new

[318] Ibid.
[319] Paul Duggan, "The New Barry Farms Won't Have Enough Room for Families, Lawsuit Charges: Advocates for Tenants at the Public Housing Complex Say the City's Renovation Plans Will Exclude 150 Families," The Washington Post (Online); Washington, D.C., August 29, 2017, http://search.proquest.com/news/docview/1933402360/citation/4729B51D1E314ACDPQ/1.
[320] Quadel Consulting and Training LLC, "Policy Advisor's Recommendations on the District of Columbia Initiative," August 2014, http://dcnewcommunities.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Policy-Advisors-Recommendations-on-the-NCI-Program.pdf, 3. The review raises challenges with every principle that frames the New Communities Initiative. It recognized that despite the Initiative's rhetoric of a "right to return/stay" for residents, there, in fact, is no guarantee that every resident will return. It further contends that the desire for market-rate inclusion in Barry Farm was not feasible.

development as site control is a significant challenge."[321] In response, reviewers recommended that the city clarify that the one-for one-replacement principle does not refer to unit mix, but rather total units produced.

Over the objections of many residents, DCHA began moving residents out of Barry Farm during the summer of 2017 in advance of planned demolition. At its peak occupancy, public housing in Barry Farm served hundreds of families. By the summer of 2017, however, only half the units were occupied because DCHA declined to fill vacated units in anticipation of pending redevelopment. At that time, a spokesman for DCHA stated that, "All families affected by relocation will be offered a comparable home in the District during the relocation phase of the redevelopment. Those who are interested in returning to the property after Barry Farm is redeveloped will be offered an opportunity to return to the new development."[322] Some residents left voluntarily with hopes of eventual return. Most responded to DCHA's claim with skepticism. In the spirit of that skepticism, one twenty-year old veteran of Barry Farm states, "The people, they have to go through all these hoops to get back in. Everything has to check out, before they're even approved to get into the new housing."[323] This resident expresses sentiments reflective of many residents looking to return after a property has been redeveloped. As discussed in chapter two, strict screening standards historically present a very real obstacle to the return of public housing residents to a redeveloped property. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that an offer for an opportunity of return is by no means a *guarantee* of return after construction is complete.

[321] Ibid., 6, my brackets.
[322] Sasha-Ann Simons, "D.C. Government Is Trying to Intimidate Us Into Leaving, Barry Farm Residents Say," WAMU, July 28, 2017, https://wamu.org/story/17/07/28/d-c-government-trying-intimidate-us-leaving-barry-farm-residents-say/.
[323] Ibid.

In April of 2018, the D.C. Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the lawsuit filed by the Barry Farm Tenants and Allies Association against the D.C. Zoning Commission. The Court of Appeals agreed with plaintiffs that there would be a net loss of 100 units in Barry Farm under the revised redevelopment plan. The Court also raised the problem of displacement, which it found was inconsistent with the New Communities Initiative. The Court found:

> In this context, 'dislocation' refers to the removal of current residents from the Barry Farm site. The relocation plan envisions moving Barry Farm residents to a new site during construction; it presents no discussion of whether it would be possible to 'avoid dislocation' and allow Barry Farm residents to remain on site as part of a phased construction plan. . . .Although the Commission makes reference to the [New Communities Initiative], the Commission fails to explain how the PUD [Planned Unit Development] is actually consistent with its policies.[324]

The Court ruled that the Zoning Commission, ". . .failed to consider a potential adverse impact of the PUD on the Barry Farm Community. . . [and]. . . did not address all material contested issues, necessitating a remand," when it approved DCHA's application.[325] The ruling nullified the Zoning Commission's approval of the revised redevelopment plan for Barry Farm and sent it back, ordering it to address all issues flagged by the Court. One month later, DCHA withdrew its application, effectively bringing redevelopment plans for Barry Farm to an indefinite halt once again.

Notwithstanding the court's ruling, DCHA moved forward with demolition, and has continued to remove residents from Barry Farm against their wishes, offering them two options: 1) move to another public housing property in the city, or 2) accept a federally-funded housing

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[324] *Barry Farm Tenants and Allies Association v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission and A&R Development Corporation, et al.* Petition for Review of a Decision of the District of Columbia Zoning Commission (ZC-14-02). No. 15-aa-1000, (District of Columbia Court of Appeals) *al.* 1:18-cv872, (U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia), https://www.dccourts.gov/sites/default/files/2018-04/15-AA-1000.pdf, my brackets.
[325] Ibid.

voucher to acquire housing in the private market on their own.[326] Local news media reported that approximately 80 residents remained in Barry Farm at the end of July of 2018. Between July and December, DCHA relocated most of those residents elsewhere. As of December 31, 2018, only 17 "head-of-households" remain and, according to DCHA, they will be relocated in January of 2019. An email from the Director of Campaign Programs within DCHA dated January 2, 2019 states, "We are pleased to say that all [remaining] residents have made their housing selection and are working with the relocation team to complete their relocation process."[327] Notwithstanding the various obstacles and opposition, the city has doubled down on its redevelopment agenda with no identifiable path forward, all at the expense of the very people for whom it claims urban revitalization is designed to benefit. Many Barry Farm residents, however, have made clear their position. Reflecting the sentiments of many in the neighborhood, one resident declares emphatically, "We don't want mixed-income communities with majority market-rate people. That's when discrimination and other issues come in."[328] The discriminatory aspect of mixed-income housing is an issue that urban studies scholars have raised before. For example, noting the power differential between low- and high-income earners in mixed-use housing, Mark Joseph, Robert J. Chaskin, and Henry S. Webber state:

> …[T]here are risks for the lower-income residents due to the higher participation of more affluent residents. Although basic community values and interests (safe streets, good schools, efficient city services) are likely to be shared across income

[326] Morgan Baskin, "A Public Meeting Over the Future of Barry Farm Highlighted Years-Long Concerns," Washington City Paper, July 19, 2018, www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/housing-complex/article/21014025/a-public-meeting-over-the-future-of-barry-farm-highlighted-yearslong-community-concerns.

[327] Michelle Greene, "Barry Farm Information Request," email, 2019, my brackets. On December 27th 2018, I called the Office of Capital Programs within the Housing Authority to inquire about the remainder of individuals and families left in Barry Farms as no public information is currently available. The director, Michelle Greene, informed me that the Barry Farm property had only has a small number of residents remaining, but she did not have the numbers readily available. Those residents, she said, requested a delay in relocation until after the holidays. The same day I submitted a Freedom of Information Request to the office asking, among other questions, what percentage of the 444 units in Barry Farm remained occupied. She responded on January 2, 2019.

[328] Andrew Giambrone, "D.C. Resets Barry Farm Redevelopment after Unfavorable Court Decision," Curbed DC, August 4, 2018, https://dc.curbed.com/2018/8/4/17648968/dc-barry-farm-redevelopment-court-decision-public-housing-new-communities-initiative.

> groups, the particular needs and priorities of low- versus higher-income residents may differ substantially, and the unequal distribution of power and resources among residents (and among local organizations acting on their behalf) may exacerbate such differences and lead to differential benefits that favor those with more influence. Thus, the benefits that may accrue to mixed-income communities by virtue of the presence or activism of higher-income residents cannot be presumed to redound equally to the well-being of all.[329]

Given this reality, Barry Farm residents are understandably concerned about the adverse impact to their quality of life as a consequence of an increased presence of high-income earners in their neighborhood.

Barry Farm residents have even more cause for concern given a rapidly changing urban landscape and an economic growth trajectory that has largely left them behind. Between 2000 and 2010, the black population in D.C. decreased by nine percentage points from 60 percent to 51 percent.[330] The white population increased concurrently by eight points to 38 percent. The following year, the black population fell under 51 percent and ended D.C.'s status as a majority black city. In 2018, that number stood at 47 percent while the white population increased to 45 percent.[331] In effect, the former Chocolate City has become a vanilla village. An analysis by the Urban Institute of the changing racial demographics in the city finds that D.C. is one of only a few cities where urban growth is being driven by whites.[332] It is undeniable that nation's capital is becoming increasingly white and wealthy, a reality that even the D.C. Chamber of Commerce bluntly acknowledges in its 2018 State of the Business Report: "As the City is getting whiter and

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[329] Mark Joseph, Robert J. Chaskin, and Henry S. Webber, "The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development," *Urban Affairs Review* 42, no. 3 (January 2007): 394.
[330] Joy Phillips, "District of Columbia Black Population Demographic Characteristics," Office of Planning, February 27, 2012, https://planning.dc.gov/node/595632.
[331] "U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: District of Columbia," accessed December 28, 2018, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/dc.
[332] Peter Tatian and Serena Lei, "Washington, DC: Our Changing City," Washington, DC: Our Changing City, accessed December 5, 2018, http://apps.urban.org/features/OurChangingCity/demographics/#index.

richer, displacement is becoming a larger source of tension." [333] According to the Chamber, between 2009 and 2016, D.C. lost 4,300 families with incomes under $35,000. In contrast, more than 10,000 families with incomes above $200,000 arrived during the same period, "accounting for almost all growth since 2009."[334]

In 2017, the area median income (AMI) for D.C. rose to approximately $82,000, continuing a ten-year upward trend. However, as the D.C. Fiscal Policy Institute makes clear, the increase in AMI disproportionately benefits whites. ". . .[W]hile the median income for white households has increased significantly over the last decade, the median income for black households hasn't budged. Black median household income in D.C.—now around $42,000—is less than a third of the white median household income of $134,000. The lack of progress for Black household income in a growing economy is a sign that the District is not doing enough to remove barriers to economic opportunity for residents…"[335] The Chamber of Commerce's report particularly underscores the income disparity between the haves and the have-nots who live in the southern quadrants of the city.

> In many neighborhood east of the river, poverty remains the norm: at least one in five families live in poverty in these neighborhoods. Household incomes here hover around $30,000—less than half the median household income of the City and less than a quarter of the median household income in neighborhoods west of Rock Creek Park [historically white areas]. Expanding employment opportunities in D.C. have not benefited every resident. The unemployment rate in Wards 7 and 8 stood at 9.9 percent and 12.8 percent respectively. These are three to four times the unemployment rates in Wards 1, 2, and 3.[336]

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[333] D.C. Chamber of Commerce, "2018 State of the Business report: Towards a More Inclusive Economy," https://www.dcchamber.org/dc-commerce/reports-publications/.
[334] Ibid.
[335] Ed Lazere, "DC's Growing Prosperity Is Not Reaching Black Residents, Census Data Show," *DC Fiscal Policy Institute*, September 26, 2018, https://www.dcfpi.org/all/dcs-growing-prosperity-is-not-reaching-black-residents-census-data-show/.
[336] D.C. Chamber of Commerce, "2018 State of the Business report: Towards a More Inclusive Economy," my brackets.

Add to the income disparity skyrocketing rent that makes the vast majority of housing in D.C. completely unaffordable for low-income residents plus the decrease of rent-assisted housing, and the fears of the black urban poor that urban redevelopment will permanently destroy their communities and networks become a plausible—perhaps even likely—reality. The history of urban revitalization in the former Chocolate City may suggest this will indeed be the case. The displacement of the black urban poor, particularly from neighborhoods like Barry Farm, could very well be a catalyst to a much more extensive forced migration out of the nation's capital altogether.

Conclusion

This chapter began with discussion of a lawsuit filed against the city on behalf of vulnerable black D.C. residents threatened by urban revitalization. The lawsuit is an effort to combat the city's alleged discriminatory policies in urban planning that have contributed to the displacement of these individuals and families from their communities. In June of 2018, D.C. filed a motion to dismiss the suit, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that they failed to plausibly allege the city intentionally aimed to discriminate against the black urban poor through its development policies. The U.S. District Court remanded the city's motion of dismissal to a magistrate judge for report and recommendation in December. As of this writing, the case is still pending. Regardless of the verdict, however, the lawsuit is a brazen critique of D.C.'s redevelopment initiatives and fundamentally raises the question: for whom is urban revitalization in the city designed?

Aristotle Theresa, the civil rights attorney who represents Barry Farm residents in the aforementioned case, provides an unequivocal answer. "None of [my] clients fit within the group of people that [city leaders want] to attract to the city. None of them would qualify as 'creative

class' members, and none of them are millennials."[337] Given that Theresa's clientele are poor, black urban residents, his remarks serve as a race- and class-based critique. He is not the first to criticize Richard Florida's creative class theory and the consequences of its implementation in U.S. cities. Various scholars have previously made similar arguments.[338] However, recent research on the racial demographics of the creative class by Florida himself especially sharpens race-based critiques. He finds that blacks in the U.S. are profoundly underrepresented in the creative class. Here Florida is worth lengthy quotation.

> Blacks hold just 8.5 percent of creative-class jobs, despite making up 12 percent of the population. Whites, in contrast (specifically, non-Hispanic whites), hold almost three-quarters of creative class jobs (73.8 percent) while making up less than two-thirds of the population (64 percent). Just 18 percent of black workers hold creative-class jobs, compared to 41 percent of white workers. The share of white workers in creative-class jobs exceeds 40 percent in thirty-seven of the fifty-one metros with more than 1 million people, whereas the share of black workers in creative-class jobs exceeds 40 percent in just one large metro. Black workers make up a larger share of the creative-class jobs in larger, denser metros with more college graduates, more high-tech firms, and greater diversity (in terms of immigrants and the gay and lesbian populations), but they lag in such jobs in areas where they make up a large share of the population overall.[339]

What the data make clear is that the creative class is disproportionately constituted by whites, which promotes a dominant association of the creative class with white people.[340]

The disparate impact on poor, black urban residents that urban revitalization initiatives designed to attract a disproportionately white creative class is the very problem that Theresa seeks

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[337] Carey L. Biron, "Washington D.C. Sued for Putting 'creative Class' above Minority Communities," *Christian Science Monitor*, June 28, 2018, https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Society/2018/0628/Washington-D.C.-sued-for-putting-creative-class-above-minority-communities, my brackets.

[338] For representative samples, see Deborah Leslie and John Paul Catungal, "Social Justice and the Creative City: Class, Gender and Racial Inequalities," *Geography Compass* 6, no. 3 (2012): 111–22, and Brenda Parker, "Beyond the Class Act: Gender and Race in the 'Creative City' Discourse," in Judith N. DeSena, ed., *Gender in an Urban World*, Research in Urban Sociology; v. 9 (Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing, 2008)."

[339] Richard Florida, *The New Urban Crisis: How Our Cities Are Increasing Inequality, Deepening Segregation, and Failing the Middle Class and What We Can Do About It* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 115.

[340] For a particularly insightful gendered and racial analysis of the creative class, see Parker, "Beyond the Class Act: Gender and Race in the 'Creative City' Discourse" in DeSena, ed., *Gender in an Urban World.*

to remedy through litigation. "We had to go to court to get [gentrification and displacement] acknowledged as something that should be considered, despite it being in statues."[341] Theresa is referring to the D.C. Human Rights Act, which makes discrimination illegal on the basis of twenty protected categories that include race, income, and age, among others.[342] The fact that Barry Farm residents filed at least three separate lawsuits in an effort to block planned redevelopment in their neighborhood should be cause for pause and reflection by city leaders. Yet the city's determination to move forward with urban revitalization in spite of legal obstruction belies the underlying values that guide D.C.'s urban and economic development policies.

This case study on the history, dynamics, and trajectory of urban redevelopment in Barry Farm underscore the various aspects that shape "revitalization" in the neighborhood. Neighborhoods are riddled with symbolism,[343] and are—as urban sociologist Robert E. Park contends—the smallest units in the social and political organization of cities.[344] They are important units of analysis that disclose tacit values that shape and reshape urban spaces. Analysis of the aspects of the redevelopment of Barry Farm sanctions an inference of intended beneficiaries of urban revitalization. The desire to drive economic growth in the city and accumulate capital guides D.C.'s entrepreneurial posture and shapes its urban revitalization policies that overwhelmingly favor and attract "creatives" who are disproportionately white and have higher incomes. It apparently also takes precedent over other values that shape urban life, namely the creation of an inclusive city "where every member of the community feels welcome wherever they are in the

[341] Wang, "Residents Sue Washington D.C. For Racist Gentrification Practices," https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennawang/2018/06/28/residents-sue-washington-d-c-over-1-billion-for-racist-gentrification-practices/#3bd56daa3e8f, brackets in the original.
[342] D.C. Office of Human Rights, "Protected Traits in the D.C. Human Rights Act," https://ohr.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ohr/page_content/attachments/ProtectedTraitsDC_Sept2017.pdf.
[343] White, *American Neighborhoods and Residential Differentiation,* 2.
[344] Robert E. Park, "The City: Suggestions for the Investigation of Human Behavior in the Urban Environment," in Robert E. Park and Ernest Burgess, *The City* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 7.

city, and where everyone has a fair and equitable opportunity to live a healthy, successful and fulfilling life," as articulated in its Comprehensive Plan.[345] The manner in which D.C. has implemented urban revitalization in Barry Farm suggests that the city is more devoted to forging a "new identity" of "a Washington that stands as a center for creativity and arts with few rivals in the U.S. or worldwide,"[346] than it is to effectively bettering the lives of the black urban poor.

Because D.C. understands itself as "city of neighborhoods, each with its own distinctive history and cultural and creative assets,"[347] the redevelopment of city neighborhoods—perhaps most especially its most neglected areas—is a critical component in its economic growth agenda. The arguably cavalier disregard for the disparate impact of urban revitalization on poor black neighborhoods like Barry Farm signals that black urban poor fall beyond the pale of the imagined metropolitan community envisioned by urban elites. The planned revitalization of the Barry Farm neighborhood is not likely to benefit them in any significant way. It is not *really* for Barry Farm residents. But it does appear to be a necessary first-step for the attraction of creative class individuals who, once settled, would further drive economic growth and development in the neighborhood. Although the problems facing the black urban poor in the nation's capital is the focus of this chapter, these problems are replicated in many cities across the U.S. In the next chapter, I provide a moral analysis urban redevelopment organized around four themes: 1) the role of that racial representation plays in urban revitalization through stereotyping, 2) the exacerbation of racial and socio-economic inequality in U.S. cities via urban revitalization, 3) the cultural logic

[345] "A Vision for Growing an Inclusive City," D.C. Office of Planning, accessed December 24, 2018, https://planning.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/op/Vision%20for%20Inclusive%20CIty%202004.pdf. The D.C. Comprehensive Plan is a 20-year framework that guides D.C.'s growth as an urban center and under which all other city plans and agendas, i.e., The New Communities Initiative and the Barry Farm Redevelopment Plan, the Creative Action agenda, etc. The plan was developed in 2006 and revised in 2011. For more, see "The Comprehensive Plan," D.C. Office of Planning, accessed December 24, 2018, https://planning.dc.gov/page/comprehensive-plan.
[346] "The Creative DC Action Agenda" D.C. Office of Planning, accessed December 24, 2018, https://planning.dc.gov/page/creative-dc-action-agenda.
[347] Ibid.

of creative destruction embedded in neoliberal urban redevelopment, and 4) the broken promises to and the perennial displacement of poor black urban residents that renders them an exilic class group.

CHAPTER IV

URBAN REVITALIZATION AS A SOCAL PROBLEM: A MORAL ANALYSIS

"This will be the day when we shall bring into full realization the dream of American democracy—a dream yet unfulfilled. A dream of equality of opportunity, of privilege and property widely distributed; a dream of a land where [people] will not take necessities from the many to give luxuries to the few; a dream of a land where [people] do not argue that the color of [one's] skin determines the content of [one's] character; a dream of a place where all our gifts and resources are held not for ourselves alone but as instruments of service for the rest of humanity; the dream of a country where every [person] will respect the dignity and worth of all human personality—that is the dream" – Martin Luther King, Jr.[348]

"Whoever is kind to the poor lends to the Lord, and will be repaid in full." – Proverbs 19:17 (NRSV)

"And the king will answer them, 'Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me." – Matthew 24:40 (NRSV)

Introduction

This chapter offers a moral analysis of urban revitalization. Having established the historical context for neoliberal urban redevelopment and analyzed the rationale that justifies mixed-income housing as a strategy to revitalize poor black urban neighborhoods—using Barry Farm as a case study—I argue here that urban revitalization of poor black neighborhoods should be understood as an important social problem. This assessment is grounded in four dominant themes that emerge from the previous three chapters that constitute this study. They are 1) the role that racial representation plays in urban revitalization through stereotyping; 2) the exacerbation of racial and socio-economic inequality in U.S. cities via urban revitalization; 3) the cultural logic of creative destruction embedded in neoliberal urban redevelopment; and 4) the broken promises to

[348] Martin Luther King, Jr., *"All Labor Has Dignity,"* ed. Michael K. Honey (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2011), 43, my brackets.

and the perennial displacement of poor black urban residents that renders them an exilic class group.

These four themes function as the primary issue frames—the central organizing ideas—through which to substantively understand the revitalization of poor black neighborhoods under neoliberalism. Here I find the scholarship on issue frames helpful. Political scientists Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sanders (1996) argue that issue framing helps people understand issues of public interest.[349] They posit that frames provide central, organizing ideas that provide meaning to events by weaving connections within the issues themselves. For Kinder and Sanders, issue frames serve as interpretive structures that are embedded within political discourse. They contend that such frames are necessary to advance social and political ideologies and agendas.[350] Similarly, sociologists Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow (2000) argue that frames enable people to render meaningful events by using frames that organize experience, guide action, and simplify and condense complicated and detached ideas in a way that mobilizes potential constituents and demobilize antagonists.[351] They evaluate the concept in burgeoning sociological literature to better understand the relationship between the operation of social movements and the framing process in order to enhance our knowledge of the ways in which social movements operate. Ultimately, they seek to provide clarification of the links between issue framing and its processes and to other theoretical formulations relevant to social movements and how issue frames are useful for recruitment, ally building, and the like.[352]

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[349] Donald R. Kinder and Lynn M. Sander, *Divided By Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 164.
[350] Ibid., 165.
[351] Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26, no. 1 (2000): 614, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611.
[352] Ibid., 611.

Of particular importance for them is the function of "collective action frames," a term referring to "the production of mobilizing and counter-mobilizing ideas and meanings."[353] Collective action frames in this sense are the results of an intentional process of meaning construction that is geared toward assisting groups, e.g., constituents, activists, potential movement participants and the like, to better interpret an issue so that they may orient their action toward a particular goal. According to Benford and Snow, collective action frames perform three core tasks: diagnosis of the problem, prognosis of the solution, and motivation to get persons involved. Most common to diagnostic framing evident in the literature on social movements, they argue, is the use of "injustice frames" whereby movements identify victims and emphasizes their victimization in order to advocate for some type of social or political change. Prognosis framing, they aver, articulates a proposed solution that if enacted should solve the identifiable problem. It enables movement actors to come to consensus with regard to the best action to take in relation to a diagnosed problem. Finally, motivational framing does as its name suggests; it motivates groups to take collective action in order to achieve the proposed solution and alleviate the diagnosed problem. In motivational framing, the central goal is to compel individuals to channel their moral agency in order to achieve a desired result. While each task is important for eliciting action from potential movement actors, in this chapter I emphasize the first of these tasks: diagnosis of the problem. In what follows, I consider the four aforementioned issue frames of urban revitalization in successive order and assess the moral salience of each. I conclude with some thoughts about the implications of a moral analysis of urban revitalization for policy makers, activists, and other community stakeholders.

[353]Ibid., 613.

Frame #1: Racial Representation through Stereotyping

According to cultural theorist Stuart Hall (2013), stereotyping is a signifying practice that is essential to the representation of difference within a particular culture.[354] By culture, Hall refers to a distinct set of practices among a group that enable those within it to establish shared meaning. He states, "Primarily, culture is concerned with the production and the exchange of meanings—the 'giving and taking of meaning'—between the members of a society or group. To say that two people belong to the same culture is to say that they interpret the world in roughly the same ways and can express themselves, their thoughts, and feelings about the world, in ways which will be understood by each other."[355] For Hall, culture depends on similar—but not necessarily uniform—interpretations of the world in which they live. Critical to an understanding of stereotyping is the relationship between representation, meaning, and language.

Hall maintains that the concept of representation serves a special role in the study of culture as it is intertwined with language and meaning production.[356] Representation is a central practice that produces culture through the medium of language. "'Representation means using language to say something meaningful about, or to represent, the world meaningfully, to other people.' You may well ask, 'Is that all?' Well, yes and no. Representation *is* an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture. It *does* involve the use of language, of signs, and images which stand for or represent things."[357] According to Hall, shared meaning is only produced through common access to language, which functions as a repository of meaning and value.

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[354] Stuart Hall, "The Spectacle of the 'Other' in Stuart Hall, Jessica Evans, and Sean Nixon, eds., *Representation*, 2nd edition (Los Angeles ; London ; New Delhi ; Singapore ; Washington DC: SAGE, 2013), 247.
[355] Hall "Introduction" in Hall et al., eds., *Representation*, xviii-xix.
[356] Stuart Hall "The Work of Representation" in Stuart Hall, Jessica Evans, and Sean Nixon, eds., *Representation*, 2nd edition (Los Angeles ; London ; New Delhi ; Singapore ; Washington DC: SAGE, 2013), 1.
[357] Ibid., 1, italics in original.

Because language operates as a representational system, it facilitates the construction of culture through shared understandings that enable people to commonly interpret things. "In language, we use signs and symbols—whether they are sounds, written words, electronically produced images, musical notes, even objects—to stand for or represent to other people our concepts, ideas, and feelings. Language is one of the 'media' through which thoughts, ideas and feelings are presented in a culture. Representation through language is therefore central to the processes by which meaning is produced."[358] The following example of representation through language is illustrative. Consider any familiar object in a room. When looking at the object, the viewer immediately recognizes what the object is. But what does "recognize" mean and how does one "know" what that object is? Hall argues that the viewer recognizes the object because her thought processes decode visual perception of the object formed in her mind. If the viewer were to look away from the object, she would still be able to mentally perceive it. When the viewer verbalizes the object, e.g., "That is a table.", it travels from the mental representation of the viewer to another who hears the verbalized object. According to Hall, in this instance, the word "stands for or represents the concept, and can be used to reference or designate either a 'real' object in the world or indeed even some imaginary object, like angels dancing on the head of a pin, which no one has ever actually seen."[359] The object is represented to another through language and the other is able to perceive and understand what is being communicated to her based on the common access to language and a mutual understanding of what the object is.

According to Hall, stereotyping is a specific representational practice that uses language to emphasize difference.[360] By taking characteristics that are widely associated with a group,

[358] Ibid., vxii.
[359] Ibid., 3.
[360] Hall, "The Spectacle of the 'Other'" in Hall et al, *Representation*, 215.

stereotyping reduces the totality of a subject in question through language to its salient traits and exaggerates and simplifies those traits into principal identifiable markers. This practice essentially marks difference by accentuating otherness, what Hall refers to as "the spectacle of the other."[361] For Hall, stereotyping inevitably leads to exclusion based on difference by isolating that which is considered abnormal and unacceptable from the normal and the acceptable. Here is Hall at length:

> Stereotyping, in other words, is part of the maintenance of social and symbolic order. It sets up a symbolic frontier between the 'normal' and the 'deviant', the 'normal' and the 'pathological', the 'acceptable' and the 'unacceptable', what 'belongs' and what does not or is 'Other', between 'insiders' and 'outsiders', Us and Them. It facilitates the 'binding' or bonding together of all of Us who are 'normal' into one 'imagined community'; and it sends into symbolic exile all of Them—'the Others'—who are in some way different—'beyond the pale'.[362]

I find Hall instructive for the consideration of the role of stereotyping in urban revitalization initiatives that target poor black neighborhoods. In U.S. culture and the American public imaginary, the idea and image of the Welfare Queen represents the character and defining attributes of the black urban poor—the kind of person for which urban revitalization provides an effective social fix.

As acknowledged in chapter one, Ronald Reagan introduced the concept of the Welfare Queen to the American public during his 1976 presidential campaign. The Welfare Queen emerged as the iconic image that represents the poor black urban resident: a social safety-net pariah who drains government resources to fund a lifestyle of laziness, duplicity, and criminality. She was, according to Reagan, a woman who "used 80 names, 30 addresses [and] 15 telephone numbers to collect food stamps, Social Security, [and] veteran's benefits for four nonexistent deceased veteran

[361] Ibid., 215.
[362] Ibid., 248.

husbands, as well as welfare."[363] Through his use of language, Reagan signified the meaning of black poverty in the U.S. through his vivid description of the Welfare Queen and effectively established a symbolic frontier that exaggerated the difference between the black urban poor (particularly poor black women) who, in American culture, were viewed as a deviant, unacceptable minority group, and the mainstream of society—namely white working and middle class. In so doing, Reagan effectively reduced the totality of poor black communities—their narratives, unique experiences, and struggles—to the behavior of an imagined individual who became the representation for an entire group. In this way, the idea of deviant behavior among the black urban poor constituted the public conception of the entire group vis-à-vis the cultural image of the Welfare Queen. This perception of the black urban poor, which continues to this day as the dominant trope used to portray poor black urban communities, was enabled and perpetuated by a rhetorical assault on the black family vis-à-vis black women by the news media and undergirded by social scientific research.

The stereotype of the Welfare Queen illustrates what Hall articulates as a "racialized regime of representation."[364] By this phrase, Hall underscores the relationship between power, representation, and difference. "We often think of power in terms of direct physical coercion or constraint. However, we have also spoken, for example, of power *in representation*; power to mark, assign and classify; of *symbolic* power; of *ritualized* expulsion. Power, it seems, has to be understood here not only in terms of economic exploitation and physical coercion, but also in broader cultural or symbolic terms, including power to represent someone or something in a certain

[363] "The Real Story of Linda Taylor, America's Original Welfare Queen," Slate Magazine, December 19, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/history/2013/12/linda_taylor_welfare_queen_ronald_reagan_made_her_a_notorious_american_villain.html, my brackets.
[364] Hall, "The Spectacle of the 'Other'" in Hall et al, *Representation*, 237.

way—within a certain 'regime of representation.'"[365] For Hall, the regime of representation includes the exercise of symbolic power through representational practices, of which stereotyping is a key element. The cultural production of the Welfare Queen, which intersects issues of race, class, and gender, illustrates the power of an American society to over represent an entire group, i.e., the black urban poor, based on an image produced as a consequence of racial stigmatization. The Welfare Queen belongs to a cadre of images of black people, including the Mammy (the prototypical house servant), the Coon (the watermelon-eating slapstick entertainer), and the Bad Buck (violent renegade) among others, that have been used throughout history to mark, denigrate, and exclude the black "other" within American culture.

Racial representation through stereotyping of the black urban poor plays a significant role in urban revitalization of high-poverty neighborhoods. Urban revitalization through mixed-income development enters in to "fix" the people over represented by the Welfare Queen image who live in high-poverty neighborhoods. All four of the premises examined in chapter two that buttress the argument for mixed-income development as a strategy for urban revitalization—that it expands the social networks of the urban poor, thereby connecting them to resources, information, and ultimately employment, that the presence of higher-income residents provides a form of social control that leads to higher levels of accountability and safer neighborhoods, that the presence of higher-income residents provides effective role models for the urban poor, which leads to the adoption of alternative lifestyles, and that higher-income residents generate new market demand, which attracts economic resources and services for underserved communities—acutely focuses on the lives of the urban poor who have been judged as beyond the pale of American culture. This judgment is enshrined in the very report that led to the racialization of urban poverty in the

[365] Ibid., 249, italics in the original.

American public. In Moynihan's assessment, the family structure of the black urban poor is "…so out of line with the rest of the American Society [that it] seriously retards the progress of the group as a whole…"[366]

An emphasis on the lives of the black urban poor as a solution to the problems associate with high-poverty neighborhoods does not consider the structural causes of urban concentrated poverty, which I maintain must be attended to in any urban revitalization strategy. As indicated in chapter three, each neighborhood under the New Communities Initiative has a human capital component in addition to a physical redevelopment and finance strategy. The Barry Farm redevelopment plan's prioritizes adult education and employment, meaningful child and youth programing, improved health outcomes for residents, and safety and security as its human capital component. These priorities, like the premises that undergird mixed-income housing as a strategy for revitalization, focus on human outcomes to the exclusion of the structural factors that cause and perpetuate concentrated urban poverty.

This belief is based on the idea that fixing the people in these neighborhoods solves the poverty problem, and this assumption is based in a conceptual frame that stigmatizes the very people who are far too frequently the collateral damage of urban redevelopment schemes. Because urban revitalization is significantly predicated on the personal outcomes of the black urban poor, structural issues that cause and perpetuate urban poverty, like discriminatory federal housing policy, local racially discriminatory practices like red lining, zoning, and economic divestment in historically black and poor neighborhoods, remain unaddressed. Thus, a significant challenge to urban revitalization is its myopic vision as to what constitutes an effective solution to a problem

[366] Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action" in Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1967), 75, my brackets.

that emphasizes personal behavior at the expense of attention given to the role of institutional and social structures.

Frame #2: Urban Revitalization and Racial and Socio-Economic Inequality

In his book *The Rise of the Creative Class* (2002 [2012]), Richard Florida opens with a thought experiment that I find useful for the discussion in this section. Take a person from the year 1900 and place him in the 1950s. Then take someone from the 1950s and place her in the twenty-first century. Between the two, which time-traveler would experience the greater change? Florida states that an initial assessment might suggest that the first would be more disoriented. He would be in awe of urbanization and the advancement in technology and medicine that revolutionized and improved the lives of Americans between 1900 and 1950. Those changes, Florida states, would likely be profoundly unsettling for him. In contrast, the second time-traveler placed in the twenty-first century would have little trouble adapting to the present day. She would find herself in a world that at first glance would appear to be very similar to the one she left. She would perhaps view the technological changes between her time of origin and the present day as incremental rather than revolutionary. Florida maintains, however, that the second time-traveler would experience the greatest disorientation. He writes,

> But the longer they stayed in [the new time period], the more each time-traveler would become aware of subtler dimensions of change. Once the glare of technology had dimmed, each would begin to notice their respective society's changed norms and values, the different ways in which everyday people live and work. And here the tables would be turned. In terms of adjusting to the social structures and the rhythms and patterns of daily life, our second time-traveler would be much more disoriented.[367]

[367] Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class--Revisited: Revised and Expanded* (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 2012), 3, my brackets.

Florida contends that the first time-traveler would discover the worlds of the early 1900s and the 1950s similar, while the second time-traveler would be more troubled about the social and cultural changes that occurred in America between the 1950s and the present. "Although the first time-traveler had to adjust to some drastic technological changes, it is the second who experiences the deeper, more pervasive transformation. It is the second who has been thrust into a time when lifestyles and worldviews are most assuredly changing—a time when the old order has broken down, when flux and uncertainty themselves seem to be part of the everyday norm."[368] The inference is that the second time-traveler would likely find herself at a disadvantage as she would be anachronistically out of sync with her new environment.

The above thought experiment serves as a useful analogy for the status of many blacks—particularly the poor and working class—in relation to a twenty-first century economy. In chapter three I underscored a racial disparity among the creative class. As a brief recap, blacks are significantly underrepresented, only holding 8.5 percent of creative class careers despite constituting 12 percent of the total population. In contrast, whites constitute nearly 75 percent of creative class jobs while only comprising 64 percent of the population.[369] The position of blacks in the twenty-first century economy is starkly different than their place in the Fordist economy of the 1900s that brought innovation to the capitalist system in the U.S.[370] On this point, historian Thomas Holt states,

> The Fordist political economy brought fundamental shifts in the very framework of race relations on a geographic scale. The new mass-production, mass consumption regime's voracious appetite for labor produced mass black migrations at unprecedented levels in the early twentieth century… It followed as a consequence

[368] Ibid., 5.
[369] Richard Florida, *The New Urban Crisis: How Our Cities Are Increasing Inequality, Deepening Segregation, and Failing the Middle Class and What We Can Do About It* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 115.
[370] Named after manufacturing tycoon Henry Ford, Fordism was an economic system that centered on the mass production of goods and services. For an detailed and insightful analysis of Fordism, see David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford [England]; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell, 1989).

> that in each location one finds some counterpart of the story we are so familiar with in the United States: the breakdown of paternalistic modes of racial interaction that characterized both slavery and sharecropping; *a greater integration of blacks into the national economy*, and of black culture into national cultures; and most important, the tendency for the state to take a greater direct role in the regulation of race relations.[371]

Holt maintains that by working with and through prominent African-American institutions like the Urban League and black churches, Henry Ford was instrumental in recruiting African Americans into industrial skill-based and largely service-sector jobs that fueled the Fordist economy for much of the 1900s. The significance of this development is that during the twentieth century, blacks became a significant part of the core industries that powered economic growth and development.[372]

Toward the end of the twentieth century, which coincided with a restructure of the economy toward technology and knowledge, many blacks fell behind. In his book *The Political Economy of Hope and Fear* (1999), economist Marcellus Andrews lays the blame for this racial lag at the feet of an American culture defined by a history of racism and discrimination. In particular, Andrews argues that the prevalence of black poverty is a consequence of the combination of American racism and capitalism. He writes:

> [B]lack people are poor now because they were so badly discriminated against by historic American racism that they were unprepared for, and unable to take advantage of the American economy that has utterly transformed our lives over the past three decades. Black people were completely unprepared for, and unable to take advantage of, the shift in the structure of the American economy toward a knowledge- and technology-driven system that offers huge rewards to brains over brawn, because they remain an industrial labor force in a post-industrial country.[373]

For Andrews, U.S. social and economic policy shaped by racism and discrimination had a corrosive effect on the economic well-being of blacks, particularly poor blacks, which frustrated

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[371] Thomas Holt, *The Problem of Race in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 70–71, my italics.
[372] Ibid., 72
[373] Marcellus William Andrews, *The Political Economy of Hope and Fear: Capitalism and the Black Condition in America* (New York: NYU Press, 1999), 3.

their incorporation into a knowledge- and technology-driven U.S. economy. Here is where the time travel though experiment functions as a useful analogy. The inability of poor and working-class blacks to catch up to the transformations in the national economy essentially rendered them relics of a bygone era, an old economic order that has broken down and passed away. This status, Andrews argues, contributes to their socio-economic disadvantage, which is largely blamed on their maladjustment to the knowledge- and technology-based economy of the twenty-first century.

It is important to acknowledge here that Florida contends that the knowledge and technology driven economy is fueled by creativity. He states, "Many say that we now live in an information economy or a knowledge economy. But what's more fundamentally true is that for the first time, our economy is powered by creativity. …In today's economy, creativity is pervasive and ongoing: it drives incremental improvements in products and processes that keep them viable just as much as it does their original innovation."[374] Florida defines this new economy (what he refers to as the creative economy) in terms of *occupations*.[375] This is why the creative class—identified by the kind of work its members do for a living—is its fundamental driver.

Herein lies the second challenge with the institution of urban revitalization in U.S. cities. In chapter two, I stated that through neoliberal urban redevelopment initiatives, urban elites seek to attract the creative class in order to buttress the revitalization of urban space. According to what is now conventional wisdom, creative class individuals determine the fortune of cities because human creativity is the key factor for economic growth and development within urban space. The danger of urban revitalization is that it exacerbates both racial and socio-economic inequality.[376]

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[374] Richard Florida, *The Rise of the Creative Class*, 6.
[375] Ibid., 30.
[376] According to Florida, in order to incite economic growth and urban revitalization, cities must focus on the "quality of place,"—what he refers to as territorial assets (what and who is in a place, including the vibrancy of its street life)—in order to attract the creative class. Ibid., 280.

In the context of the creative class thesis, this problem is one that scholars within the field of urban studies have raised.

For example, in their article in *Geoforum* (2009), urban geographers John Paul Catungal and Deborah Leslie address the failure of urban planners to recognize that racially minoritized communities in creative cities (who are often poor and marginalized) are not often the beneficiaries of creative class strategies. They assert, "Because of the class-differentiated benefits of the creative city, poorer racialized communities in the city are generally not the recipients of the windfalls of the creative city (the highly mobile, professional class and creative firms are the winners.) In fact, often the neighborhoods in which they live are gentrified due to urban transformations resulting from creative city planning, displacing them through changes in the property market or through private securitization of arts and culture districts."[377] For Catungal and Leslie, the creative class agenda acknowledges racial difference in the context of urban life only in a circumscribed way. Race and ethnicity largely remain unpopular discussion topics among urban planners. By assailing race and ethnicity as categories of classification to be considered in creative class strategies, urban revitalization exacerbates racial inequality by ignoring racial disparities within the creative class itself. The appeal to the whims and desires of the creative class is an appeal to a predominately white (and male) elite class.

Feminist urban studies scholar Brenda Parker (2008) provides a discourse analysis on the creative class strategy of economic development that takes seriously the role of race *and* gender. She maintains that these units of analysis have received little attention in the creative class debate and pushes us to consider the limitations of creative city discourse by exploring how race and

[377] John Paul Catungal and Deborah Leslie, "Contesting the Creative City: Race, Nation, Multiculturalism," *Geoforum*, Themed Issue: Land, Labor, Livestock and (Neo)Liberalism: Understanding the Geographies of Pastoralism and Ranching, 40, no. 5 (September 1, 2009): 701, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.05.005.

gender are important aspects of creative city strategies, but remain uninterrogated. Her argument is that "…the Creative Class discourse forwards a seemingly soft contemporary version of hegemonic masculinity. Sometimes subtly and often opaquely, the discourse reflects and reproduces a number of gendered ideologies and practices. In doing so, it helps 'fix' and 'naturalize' a raced and gendered order in which privileged men have the most unambiguous access to and power in the creative city."[378] Drawing primarily from Florida's discursive creation of the creative class epitomized in his body of scholarship, Parker calls attention to racial and gender inequality within the creative class by debunking a myth she claims Florida perpetuates: all human beings are creative. In her assessment, Florida's claim about the inherent creativity in all of humanity is betrayed by his own writing because he "persistently positions certain people as more creative than others, and invoke[s] the rhetoric of 'creative scarcity.'"[379]

Quoting Florida's *Cities and the Creative Class* (2005), she writes "The nexus of competitive advantage shifts to those regions that can generate, retain, and attract the best talent. This is particularly true because creative workers are extremely mobile and the distribution of talent is highly skewed … Those that have the talent win, those that do not lose."[380] Referencing Florida's words above, Parker's avers that although creative class discourse propagates the idea that all human beings are creative, it privileges particular forms of creativity and positions certain subjects as scarce and valuable. Creative class discourse praises a particular type of hyper capitalist, individualistic worker who is competitive, unattached, career driven, and whose

[378] Brenda Parker, "Beyond the Class Act: Gender and Race in the 'Creative City' Discourse" in Judith N. DeSena, *Gender in an Urban World*, Research in Urban Sociology ; v. 9 (Bingley, UK: Emerald Publishing, 2008), 202. By "gendered," Parker refers to "an active process by which certain subjects, activities, and processes are devalued or [re]valued insubordinate relationship to hegemonic masculinity." Ibid., n1.
[379] Ibid., 207, my brackets.
[380] Richard Florida, *Cities and the Creative Class*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 50 quoted in Parker; Ibid, 207-208.

networks and privileges are "particularly exclusive and masculinized."[381] According to Parker, that hyper capitalist creative subject is "…a normative, northern, elite, white male [who] is most unambiguously at the heart of Florida's idealized Creative Class."[382] Analyzing the racial and gender demographics of Florida's "super creative core" in fields such as architecture, engineering, information technology, and the physical and social sciences (among others), Parker underscores the extremely low percentage of women in general, and minority women in particular within these fields. For example, only 13 percent of women constitute creative class careers in architecture and engineering. That number drops to just 3 percent for minority women.[383] In careers in computer science and mathematics, women constitute only 27 percent of the workforce while minority women make up 8 percent.[384] In the life, physical, and social sciences, minority women only constitute 9 percent of creative careers in these fields as compared to 40 percent for women broadly.[385] Given the fact that women and racial minorities, as Parker acknowledges, face high barriers of entry into creative class careers, these statistics, though deeply troubling, are not surprising. These data illustrate quite clearly the racial and gender inequality that exists within the creative class.

Urban geographer Jamie Peck has also raised problem of inequality in creative class strategies. In his frequently cited essay in the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (2005), Peck underscores that the creative city strategies perpetuate inequality by confining the noncreative (working and service) class to only a passive role in economic growth and development within cities. Here Peck at length.

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[381] Ibid, 208.
[382] Ibid., my brackets.
[383] Ibid., 221.
[384] Ibid.
[385] Ibid.

> Earnest attempts to graft social inclusion and antipoverty objectives onto the basic creative-cities script—which are clearly evident in the Canadian and British debates, pay insufficient attention to the script's predication on, and infusion with, the realpolitik of urban inequality. The less creative underclasses have only bit parts in this script. Their role is secondary and contingent, in economic terms, to the driving and determining acts of creativity. Their only salvation being to get more creative. And the libertarian politics that envelops the creativity thesis, is as far as it concerns itself with the underclasses at all—for the most part they are portrayed as servants of the creative class, or the stranded inhabitants of 'hopeless' cities—peddles only voluntaristic and usually moralizing solutions.[386]

As Peck notes above, creative class discourse marginalizes noncreative class individuals by pushing them to the periphery in urban economic development strategies. According to Peck, Florida has little regard for the uncreative service and working classes beyond the hope for the realization of their creative potential, which would facilitate their inclusion among the more elite creative class. In this way, creative class strategies designed to spur urban revitalization cater to an elite class of individuals that largely excludes people of color, most especially poor, black urban communities. Urban revitalization substitutes one class group for another. The uncreative class, epitomized most in the black urban poor, constitute an undesirable group that falls beyond the pale of American culture. Conversely, the highly desirable creative class epitomizes the virtues of an American capitalist culture, e.g., hard work, personal responsibility, and innovation, that are the bedrock of urban economic growth and development. Given that the creative class is constituted predominately by an economically privileged white individuals, urban revitalization exacerbates racial and socio-economic inequality by reproducing a racial and class divide. This is materially instituted through the destruction and reconstruction of urban spaces, most especially poor black neighborhoods. This leads me to the third issue frame for urban revitalization.

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[386] Jamie Peck, "Struggling with the Creative Class," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no. 4 (December 2005): 759, https://doi.org/10.1111/%28ISSN%291468-2427/issues.

Frame #3: The Cultural Logic of Creative Destruction Under Neoliberal Urban Redevelopment

The concept of creative destruction was first used by economist Joseph Schumpeter. In his book, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942), Schumpeter deploys the term to describe the evolutionary character of capitalism.[387] He maintains that capitalism by nature can never be stationary because its fundamental impulse comes from the perpetual creation of consumer goods, the development of new methods of production and transportation, new markets, and new forms of industrial organization that drive economic progress.[388] This impulse, which propels capitalism forward through the creation of new forms of capital, displaces the previously existing state of equilibrium in the economy in order to give rise to something revolutionary. Schumpeter refers to this process, which is inherent in a capitalist system, as creative destruction. He states:

> The opening of new markets, foreign or domestic, and the organization development from the craft shop and factory to such concerns as U.S. Steel illustrate the same process of industrial mutation—if I may use that biological term—that incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure from *within,* incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating the new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in.[389]

According to Schumpeter, the process of creative destruction enables the economy to be more productive as the old gives way to the new. Although originally deployed in the field of economics, the idea of creative destruction has penetrated other academic disciplines and discourses. Drawing from urban studies scholars David Harvey and Rachel Webber, I use it here to discuss the cultural logic embedded within neoliberal urban redevelopment.

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[387] Schumpeter first reference to the concept appears in his earlier work, *The Theory of Economic Development* (1934). However, he substantially discusses it in *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*.
[388] Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*, 3rd edition (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2008), 82.
[389] Ibid., 83.

In *The Condition of Postmodernity* (1989), Harvey uses the concept of creative destruction to examine the development of urban modernity. He states, "The image of 'creative destruction' is very important to understand modernity precisely because it derived from the practical dilemmas that faced the implementation of the modernist product. How could a new world be created, after all, without destroying much that had gone before? You simply cannot make an omelet without breaking eggs, as a whole line of modernist thinkers from Goethe to Mao have noted."[390] Harvey's metaphor of the omelet and the egg reflects the cultural logic of creative destruction under neoliberal urban redevelopment. In order for a new urban frontier to emerge, one marked by the unencumbered circulation of capital, the privatization of assets, and the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms, the old one, which constrained capitalist development in urban space under Keynesianism, must be destroyed.[391] Within the urban built environment, creative destruction largely targets Keynesian-style economic policies and welfare-state programs. Specifically, the retrenchment of public housing under neoliberal urban redevelopment schemes is an instrumental tactic in order to make city spaces more flexible to real estate capital.

Rachel Weber uses the term "obsolescence" to frame the creative destruction agenda under neoliberal urban redevelopment with regard to real estate. She states,

> Schumpeter's notion of "creative destruction" captures the way in which capital's restless search for profits requires constant renewal through galelike forces that simultaneously make way for the new and devalue the old. What is left behind by innovation is considered "obsolete." Obsolescence implies something out of date—a product, place, or concept displaced by modernization and progress. Appraisers divide property conditions into "functional" and "economic" obsolescence, categories that correspond roughly to value changes in location and improvements.[392]

[390] Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity*, 16.
[391] See the introduction of this dissertation for an explanation of Keynesianism.
[392] Rachel Weber, "Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban Redevelopment," *Antipode* 34, no. 3 (2002): 522, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8330.00253.

Citing Steven R. Bullock research on the low-investment-grade apartment appraisal process, Weber maintains that the indicators of functional obsolescence in housing entail a combination of factors including, but not limited to, excessive building size, outdated plumbing and electrical infrastructure, poor central utilities, and inadequate heating capacities.[393] These factors underscore the importance of functional modernization in building maintenance. Economic obsolescence involves factors external to the property that "reduce demand and negate its value."[394] It is important to underscore that the factors named above are applied in an assessment of severely distressed public housing. In fact, they characterize it. The final report of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (1992) found that, "In many instances, severely distressed developments were constructed with inappropriate materials and obsolete mechanical and electrical systems."[395] Such properties present a barrier to capital accumulation in urban space to which urban revitalization enters in as a spatial fix.[396] According to Weber, "When the value of [a] structure declines faster than the ground rents increase, however, it becomes 'short-turnover' and demolition—a potent spatial fix—prepares the land for gentrification and building upgrading."[397] Obsolescence, Weber maintains, functions as a neoliberal alibi for creative destruction in the process of capitalist development in urban space.

Creative destruction is central to the mixed-income housing strategy for urban revitalization under neoliberal urban redevelopment. The destruction involved in mixed-income housing creation is both literal and symbolic. One the one hand, mixed-income development

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[393] Ibid.
[394] Ibid.
[395] National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, "The Final Report: A Report to the Congress and the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development" (Washington, D.C.: United States Congress, August 1992), 79, https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/DOC_9836.PDF.
[396] For an analysis of the concept of the spatial fix, see Bob Jessop, "Spatial Fixes, Temporal Fixes, and Spatio-Temporal Fixes," in Noel Castree and Derek Gregory, eds., *David Harvey: A Critical Reader*, (Malden, MA ; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006).
[397] Weber, "Extracting Value from the City," 523, my brackets.

privileges the demolition of physical structures over their renovation. In order to revitalize high-poverty neighborhoods, the physical buildings that mark the urban landscape *must* be destroyed. In this way, the destruction of property is a prerequisite to the creation of a modern environment. This destruction, of course, has significant material consequences for the human lives that are impacted by redevelopment initiatives in their neighborhoods, as emphasized in the previous chapter. While creation can often precede destruction, urban revitalization of high-poverty neighborhoods effectively necessitates the reverse order. On the other hand, the destruction involved in mixed-income housing creation is also largely symbolic. It represents the displacement of an old world. One characterized by a people shaped by a cultural pathology that produces lifestyles of laziness, duplicity, and criminality amidst high levels of poverty. The new world created represents the polar opposite. In this regard, urban revitalization vis-à-vis mixed-income development under neoliberal urban policy requires the demise of one symbolic community in order to give birth to another.

Frame #4: Broken Promises, Displacement, and Urban Exile

In chapter three, I outlined the goals of D.C.'s New Communities Initiative that the city created to incite redevelopment in four economically marginalized and largely black neighborhoods. I return to that case in this final section as it reflects the fourth issue frame that is helpful for understanding what is at stake concerning urban revitalization. Through the Initiative, city leaders, i.e., multiple mayoral administrations and the city council, made a public commitment to D.C. residents that it would bring "vibrant mixed-income communities"[398] to their neighborhoods. The Initiative's four principles, which include 1) an assurance of one for one

[398] "About the New Communities Initiative," New Communities Initiative, accessed December 20, 2018, http://dcnewcommunities.org/about-nci/.

replacement of razed housing in order to mitigate a net loss of public housing units, 2) a pledge to honor the right of residents to remain during revitalization or return after project completion, 3) the alleviation of urban concentrated poverty, and 4) the creation of new public housing before the destruction of older units, constitute the central promises to D.C. residents. Nearly fifteen years after the program was created, it is tragically and empirically clear that city leaders have reneged on all four promises to D.C. residents. For the residents who live(d) in the historic Barry Farm neighborhood in particular, this betrayal has had a cascading effect on their lives, culminating in their displacement. In fact, displacement is the principle marker of urban revitalization in Barry Farm.

It is as one Barry Farm resident poignantly described, "Your friends get forced out, and you never hear from them again. They get relocated to one place, then that place gets gentrified and they have to move to another place, and after a while they are just gone."[399] These words sadly reveal the perennial nature of displacement of the black urban poor from their neighborhoods as a result of neoliberal urban redevelopment in U.S. cities. The black urban poor are too frequently the collateral damage of redevelopment schemes that effectively render them an exilic urban class group. While the rhetoric of urban revitalization represents a symbolic promised land predicated on redevelopment, the implementation of these strategies under neoliberal urban restructuring projects thrusts the black urban poor into a nomadic existence, moving from one place to the next until one day they disappear altogether. This fact should raise alarms for all those who care about human lives.

The story of the supposed revitalization of Barry Farm exposes the duplicitous nature of neoliberal urban redevelopment schemes. They promise to breathe new life into vulnerable and

[399] Courtland Milloy, "At Barry Farm, Standing Firm as Homes Are Razed," *The Washington Post*, last updated August 22, 2018, http://search.proquest.com/news/docview/2091003239/citation/CC602B797D214384PQ/1.

economically disenfranchised communities, emphasizing health and wellness outcomes that rarely materialize after the dust settles. The story of Barry Farm also raises challenges related to city government. It appears that city leaders are able to lie to constituents and egregiously disrupt their lives with impunity. It is worth restating that despite an unfavorable court ruling, D.C. moved forward with its plan to relocate all Barry Farm residents from their homes. In January of 2019, only 17 heads of households remained who were scheduled to be removed from the public housing property in the neighborhood by the end of the month. The city moved forward with its demolition plans with no apparent consequences. As tragic as this is, none should be surprised. This history of urban revitalization in D.C. illustrates that little regard is given for the concerns of poor and black communities absent the social, political, and economic power to compel city leaders to address the problems that have a disparate impact on their lives. Moreover, the history of urban revitalization in D.C. is a cautionary tale that identifies the danger for many in poor black communities of the risk of trusting a city government that has adopted an entrepreneurial posture to economic development where the lives of the poor are emphasized rhetorically in the language of redevelopment but in practice are far from the minds of those in power.

Conclusion: A Moral Analysis of Four Themes

In this chapter I identified four frames for understanding urban revitalization. In this conclusion I offer a moral analysis of those frames. This analysis is reflective of the epigraphs that open the chapter. I begin with the first frame and proceed in chronological order. The use of the Welfare Queen stereotype as an (over)representation of the black urban poor signifies the practice of race-based humiliation directed at black communities. The symbolic trope stands in the subject position for those in society who stand in need. In this regard, the invocation of the infamous trope inflicts moral harm on black poor communities and poor black women in particular because it

publicly denigrates their moral value and human dignity. This public denigration is malicious and epitomizes the scorn that an American capitalist culture has for the black urban poor. It renders poor black communities as disposable. This is the primary reason why cities like D.C. practically lie to poor urban blacks, renege on the promises made to them, and quite literally destroy their communities with impunity. City leaders are able to get away with such practices because poor black communities do not rise to a level of public concern that warrants public outrage. As the controlling image for the black urban poor, the Welfare Queen stereotype overdetermines the options available to them in terms of public assistance. The reach of social-safety net programs is limited in order to mitigate the inevitable exploitation of such programs by the black urban poor left to their own devices. The overrepresentation of poor blacks aids in a disassociation of their communities from the broader virtuous urban citizenry. In an American capitalist culture, one's moral worth and value is determined by his or her productivity and substantial contributions to society. Accordingly, this is the very reason why poor black communities are subjected to unwarranted public criticism and viewed as beyond the pale of and "out of line" with the mainstream of American culture.

This treatment of the black urban poor is antithetical to a religious moral vision of society that is predicated on the conviction that the moral worth and dignity of human beings is based, not on our economic productivity, but on the fact that we are made in the very image of God and therefore we are to treat one another with kindness and respect. The invocation of the Welfare Queen trope frustrates this religious moral vision as it epitomizes public scorn directed at a vulnerable community and sanctions race-based practices of discrimination and racial hatred. In fact, the production of the trope itself reproduces racist ideas of blacks that have characterized American culture since its inception. It is also contrary to scripture where, in both the Jewish and

Christian narratives, the poor are consistently exalted rather than humiliated. The continued practice of racial stereotyping in the U.S. serves only to further the practice of othering, which reinforces social hierarchies, fuels racial animosity toward a particularly vulnerable and marginalized group, and permits the destruction of their neighborhoods in the pursuit of profit.

The fact that urban revitalization exacerbates racial and socio-economic inequality demonstrates a second way that neoliberal urban redevelopment vis-à-vis revitalization inflicts harm on the black urban poor. Within a neoliberal capitalist culture, the moral good is the circulation of capital and the generation of profit in order to grow wealth. Imbedded within popular and political debates about the condition and future of a society is the neoliberal logic that idolizes capital accumulation and sacralizes its pursuit. One can detect strands of this ideology at the highest levels of our public discourse, for instance in the rhetoric espoused in the U.S. presidential campaigns where some candidates argued for the need to "restore a safer, stronger, and freer America," and "make America great again!" Perceptions of the nation's strength and greatness are tethered to individuals' freedom to pursue capital and generate wealth. Those with great wealth, equipped with the social and political power that money provides, are able to institutionalize their moral capitalist values. The institutionalization of these values is observable in the political-economic processes that shape cities. As illustrated in this dissertation, the neoliberal logics of individualism, free market capitalism, and privatization govern how cities structure their spaces. Of particular importance here is the way in which the institution of urban revitalization in poor black neighborhoods in D.C. privileges an elite, predominantly white class of urban dwellers above the city's most vulnerable residents, and in so doing widens the race and class divide.

This division is a contradiction to a religious moral vision of society where the moral good among human beings is social solidarity. Such a vision is embodied rhetorically in concepts like

the kingdom of God or the beloved community, poignantly articulated by Walter Rauschenbusch and Martin Luther King, Jr.[400] The mutual embrace of social solidarity, which defines the corporate life of humanity, unites Rauschenbusch and King's religious moral visions. For Rauschenbusch, the perfection of the collective life between individuals, reflected in the laws and customs of society, signifies such an ideal. Grounded in Jesus' social teachings, he pushed for the creation of a human moral community that acknowledged the sacrality of life and personality, humanity's interconnectedness and gave particular attention to the marginalized and dispossessed as a reflection of the kingdom of God. King strove for a similar vision in his pursuit of the beloved community, which signified a society wherein its members live together in harmony and honor the communal nature of reality and personhood. King, like Rauschenbusch, embraced the ethical principles of Jesus and pushed for the eradication of the barriers that obstruct communal life.

At the core, then, Rauschenbusch's kingdom of God and King's beloved community both frame social solidarity as a governing principle that should order the common life within society. Assessing the material consequences of urban revitalization in light of a religious moral vision that foregrounds social solidarity distills the moral harm that urban revitalization inflicts. The black urban poor are cast out in favor of an elite privileged class, tragically violating the principle of social solidarity. To be clear, the principle of social solidarity does not mandate that the urban poor and the urban elite have to be friends, hold hands, and sing kumbaya. Rather, it privileges an egalitarianism that, in the context of city building, mandates that city leaders institute urban redevelopment initiatives that mutually benefit all who constitute the human community.

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[400]See Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1991); Martin Luther King Jr, Vincent Harding, and Coretta Scott King, *Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2010). For an insightful analysis of Rauschenbusch's concept of the Kingdom of God and King's Beloved Community, see Harlan Beckley, *Passion for Justice: Retrieving the Legacies of Walter Rauschenbusch, John A. Ryan, and Reinhold Niebuhr* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1992); Rufus Burrow, Jr., *God and Human Dignity: The Personalism, Theology, and Ethics of Martin Luther King, Jr.* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006).

The cultural logic of creative destruction embedded in neoliberal urban redevelopment also has moral salience. Defenders of creative destruction describe it as a universal and natural law. Economist Joseph Schumpeter captures this reality in his description of the evolutionary character of capitalism. In the context of urban revitalization under neoliberal policy, creative destruction represents the only option for economic growth and redevelopment of the urban landscape. Although ardent capitalists like Alan Greenspan and Adrian Wooldridge acknowledge the dark side of creative destruction,[401] it is seen as the fundamental means by which economic progress occurs. There is no alternative. In this regard, the doctrine of creative destruction signifies a fundamental metaphysics that orders, constrains, and guides economic growth and development in U.S. cities without restraint or a moral guide. It is a malevolent principle of economic life that, when applied to urban growth strategies in cities, directs the destruction of public goods, like housing, while an elite privileged class stand by without so much as a metaphorical shoulder shrug. Moreover, it is important to underscore that metaphysics is reflective of those in power. The cultural logic of creative destruction reflects an elite capitalist class that has the power to determine how and for whom cities are designed. Those without power, like the black urban poor, must contend with the gross disadvantages of creative destruction. Here again, is another instance where the material consequences of urban revitalization conflict with a religious moral vision of society foregrounds social solidarity.

Finally, the fourth frame is at the central issue on which the dissertation centers. The broken promises to Barry Farm residents illustrate an egregious violation of the sacred trust placed in our elected officials. Trust is a central component for any democratic society. Governments are trusted to act on behalf and in the best interest of its citizens. Breaking promises to citizens fundamentally

[401] Alan Greenspan and Adrian Wooldridge, *Capitalism in America: A History* (New York City: Penguin Press, 2018), 21.

undermine the public trust placed in elected officials and of government by extension. When this occurs, democracy is threated. The story of Barry Farm signifies an act of betrayal by the D.C. government. Barry Farm residents were not simply led astray, they were lied to. The city promised that it would revitalize—breathe new life into—their long abandoned and disregarded neighborhood. When it became clear to city leaders that honoring their promises would come as a significant financial burden to the city and diminish returns on capital investments, they did not hesitate to adjust course in line their values and ultimate goal. The consequence has been the literal destruction of the community and the severing of ties of Barry Farm residents to a neighborhood. The betrayal by the D.C. government of Barry Farm residents reveals that the end game of urban revitalization in Barry Farm is about real estate and profit, rather than the general welfare of the "least of these" in an urban environment that is rapidly evolving.

The story of Barry Farm is fundamentally about the failure of elected officials to live up to the trust that citizens place in them. It is an example of the obstruction of American democracy—in the nation's capital no less. It further provides damning evidence that more than 50 years after the end of the Civil Rights Movement for racial and economic justice, our society is farther from King's dream of equality that many would acknowledge. The standard by which we evaluate the effectiveness of government must be predicated on how it treats the "least of these" in society and the extent to which it places the common good above private interests. Far too often those with the most power and economic privilege shape public policy in ways that reinforce their dominance and widens the disparity gap between the haves and the have-nots. Consequently, the special interests of an elite few in U.S. cities across the nation overshadow the common good for all and undermine American democracy when government can no longer be trusted to act on behalf of *all* citizens. A religious moral vision of a society that foregrounds social solidarity as a governing

principle underscores the critical role that trust plays in the proper functioning of government as trust is necessary for the establishment of solidarity. If government fails to act in the best interest and general welfare of the public toward the common good, thereby violating the trust of its citizens, then it is within the rights of a people to overthrow that government. The story of Barry Farm provides a stark reminder of the perils to the least of these under the leadership of an elite and economically privileged few.

In this chapter, I offered a moral analysis of urban revitalization that centered on four themes. These themes, which above constitute issue frames in the above moral analysis, are the central organizing ideas through which to understand urban revitalization as a social problem. By examining the role of stereotyping, the exacerbation of racial and socio-economic inequality, the cultural logic of creative destruction, and the broken promises to and displacement of the black urban poor, I sought to reveal the socially problematic nature of urban revitalization in poor black neighborhoods. These aspects of revitalization merit further attention by policy analysts, community activists, and other stakeholders interested the challenges associated with urban redevelopment for the most vulnerable communities in cities. Moreover, there is also an important role for scholars across disciplines whose research lies at the intersection of the political-economic practices of urbanization, cultural studies, and public policy. Here is an area that the contributions of scholars of religion could be particularly insightful. In the conclusion, I identify some of the implications of this study for scholars of religion.

CONCLUSION

SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FROM THIS STUDY

As stated in the introduction, this dissertation is an empirical study and moral analysis of neoliberal urban redevelopment in the U.S. Cities across the country are currently undergoing urban redevelopment on a massive scale in an effort to be competitive and incite economic growth within their spaces. The entrepreneurial strategies instituted within cities are shaped under neoliberal ideology. I stated that in this dissertation, the term "neoliberalism" is used in an economic sense to refer to a very specific set of ideas borne out of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century classical liberalism: a commitment to individualism, a self-regulating market, and a non-interventionist state. I detailed the historical emergence of neoliberalism in the U.S. and identified the political-economic practices that constitute neoliberalization and neoliberal urban redevelopment. Under neoliberalism, cities function as important geographies for economic growth and capitalist development. Neoliberal urban redevelopment initiatives particularly target black neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty in an effort to make those spaces more flexible to real estate capital. It does so through the revitalization of severely distressed public housing. The dissertation argued that the implementation of urban revitalization in poor black neighborhoods is an important social problem because it inflicts public harm on vulnerable and marginalized residents by privileging an elite (predominantly white) class of urban residents.

The study began with an examination of the racialization of concentrated urban poverty in American public discourse. I stated in chapter one that one cannot understand the significance of urban revitalization in black neighborhoods without considering the effects of black migration into industrial cities during the twentieth century. Chapter one provided the historical context of black

migration in the U.S. in order to identify how the multiple waves of black resettlement in cities reconstituted their spaces and precipitated the racialization of urban concentrated poverty. Blacks were not immune to the effects of racism in cities, which characterized much of life in the South for blacks. Their migration into urban spaces, first to the North and then in other places throughout the country, was met with resentment and hostility that shaped public and private practices of racial discrimination, e.g., redlining, realtor steering, etc., and constrained their housing options. As a consequence, black urban residents were most often relegated to underdeveloped and economically divested areas of cities. The chapter explored how racist practices led to the emergence of the black urban ghetto, a particular area of city space characterized by high concentrations poverty and marked by urban blight.

It considered how the rise of concentrated urban poverty garnered the attention of the social scientific community concerning what became known as the poverty problem, and detailed the emergence of "poverty knowledge," a term that refers to the body of social scientific research on poverty. Two approaches constitute the dominant paradigms that shaped poverty knowledge: emphasizing structural inequality as the cause of poverty versus an emphasis on individual failures. While poverty research during the early years of the twentieth century largely reflected the former, by the 1920s as a result of the impact of the Chicago School of Sociology and the culture of pathology thesis, poverty research turned toward the latter. The chapter examined the shifts in poverty research in order to demonstrate that the Moynihan Report epitomized the best of social scientific research available at the time, which underscored the second paradigm in poverty research.

Next it detailed how the politicization of the Moynihan Report by President Lyndon Johnson and the subsequent attention it garnered from the national news media mediated the

racialization of urban concentrated poverty in American public discourse. The national news media were the primary sources through which the general public came to understand the poverty problem and engage the issue in public discourse. The chapter concluded by arguing that the weaponization of the Moynihan Report against blacks by the news media and American political leadership, namely Ronald Reagan, had a profound impact on how American culture understands the problems associated with urban poverty in cities and shapes the policies that cities implement to address it. The revitalization of poor black neighborhoods through the transformation of public housing into mixed-income developments functions as the primary mechanism by which cities attempt to make poor black neighborhoods more flexible to the purpose of urban economic growth.

Chapter two examined the premises that justify mixed-income development as a vehicle to deconcentrate poverty. It stated that cities emphasize the improvements of the lives of the urban poor as justification for urban revitalization. Using Mark Joseph et al. and Alastair Smith, it first identified what constitutes mixed-income development. Generally conceived, mixed-income development refers to a wide spectrum of economic integration in residential housing from those comprised of primarily market-rate units with some for moderate-incomes to those that serve primarily low-income households with some market-rate units. Next, it discussed the theory that undergirds it as a strategy for poverty deconcentration. Specifically, Joseph et al. identify four premises of mixed-income development as a means for improving the lives of the poor. They include the expansion of their social networks and connection with resources that will lead to employment, the social control of the urban poor as a consequence of high-income households in mixed-income communities, the positive effects of role modeling of high-income households by the poor, and the generation of market demand and attraction of resources and services to underserved communities. It cited the scientific literature that undergirds each claim and assessed

the argument for mixed-income development against available evidence and identified as counter evidence studies on the national mixed-income development strategy embodied in the federal HOPE VI program.

The HOPE VI program was created in 1992 under the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as a means to addressing the problem of severely distressed public housing. This was an issue identified in the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing's final report to the U.S. Congress. Chapter two outlined the origins and objectives of HOPE VI and analyzed the empirical evidence of its outcomes in order to show that the premises that buttress mixed-income development in urban revitalization strategies are largely unsupported. Based on an assessment of the literature, I argued that the mixed-income agenda, largely implemented through the HOPE VI program, is more concerned with the seizure of real estate for the private market to attract higher-income households to city space and drive economic growth, than the professed outcomes of the urban poor. The neoliberalization of public housing vis-à-vis HOPE VI seeks to make black poor neighborhoods more flexible to real estate capital. The chapter argues that in light of the evidence, the displacement of poor urban blacks may be the enduring legacy of the mixed-income housing agenda. Finally, it considered the role of the creative class—an elite, economically (and predominantly white) privileged group of professionals—in urban economic growth strategies. It maintained that poor black urban residents are not the ideal type of urban dwellers imagined for a vibrant urban metropolis, and concluded with an assertion that the agenda to deconcentrated urban poverty through mixed-income development is very much a race-based project that is infused with class politics.

Chapter three considered the material consequences for the black urban poor who live in spaces identified for urban revitalization. Using Washington, D.C. as a case study, it began with

discussion of a lawsuit filed against the city by black urban residents in collaboration with a community group named C.A.R.E. (Current Area Residents East of the River), seeking to stop redevelopment of the historic Barry Farm neighborhood in Southeast D.C. The suit alleges a long history of disruption of black communities in D.C. as a consequence of revitalization. Using the lawsuit to foreground an assessment of redevelopment in Barry Farm, the chapter provides an overview of the rise of a black majority in D.C. and identifies how segregation and urban decline shaped the urban spaces, particularly in black neighborhoods, in the nation's capital. The chapter gave particular attention to the history of the Barry Farm neighborhood. It detailed the transition of Barry Farm from a once-thriving black enclave from the late 1860s until the late 1920s to a high-poverty neighborhood characterized by high levels of crime and urban blight, with distressed public housing. Next it considered the city's mixed-income strategy program: the New Communities Initiative. Modeled after HOPE VI, the Initiative was created to spur urban revitalization in Barry Farm along with three other blighted neighborhoods. The chapter analyzed the Barry Farm redevelopment plan and underscored the promises that city leaders made to the residents through the Initiative. They included a commitment of one-for-one replacement of razed housing, assurance that residents could remain in the neighborhood during redevelopment or return thereafter, alleviate concentrated poverty, and build new housing before the destruction of the old.

Chapter three also detailed the life of the Initiative and placed it within the city's broader economic growth strategy, influenced by Richard Florida's theory of the creative class. The final section described how city leaders broke their promises to Barry Farm residents and forcibly removed them from the neighborhood against their objections and despite an unfavorable court ruling that sided with residents that stipulated the city had to address their concerns before moving forward with redevelopment. Today Barry farm is likely completely vacant as the remaining

residents who still lived in public housing property at the beginning of the 2019 were slated to be relocated by the end of January. Chapter three situated the contestation of the redevelopment of the Barry Farm neighborhood in the midst of a changing urban landscape of D.C. that has facilitated a richer and whiter demographic, as acknowledged by the D.C. Chamber of Commerce. The chapter returned to the lawsuit filed by C.A.R.E in the conclusion and asserted that the suit represents a brazen critique of D.C.'s redevelopment initiatives. Urban revitalization in poor black neighborhoods is not ultimately designed for them, but rather for the coveted elite creative class.

Finally, chapter four provided a moral analysis of urban revitalization that considered four themes as framing devices for urban revitalization. They included: the role that racial representation plays in urban revitalization through stereotyping; the exacerbation of racial and socio-economic inequality in U.S. cities through urban revitalization; the cultural logic of creative destruction embedded in neoliberal urban redevelopment; and the broken promises to and the perennial displacement of poor black urban residents that renders them an exilic class group. It argued that the end game of urban revitalization in poor black neighborhoods is real estate and profit, not the general welfare of the "least of these" in a rapidly changing urban environment.

I began this dissertation interested in the ways in which religionists and public theologians can respond to the current state of affairs regarding cities, their redevelopment, and the impact of urban change on vulnerable black communities. In the process of doing the research, I discovered that the issue was too complex to take on as a whole. I realized that the most feasible approach was to focus on the structural aspects of urban revitalization and consider their moral salience in relationship to the black urban poor. When I turned to a moral analysis of urban revitalization, I did not find much that was significantly helpful for my reflection on the problem of urban revitalization in twenty-first century cities. This is not to say that religious discourses on cities is

nonexistent. It is quite the opposite. Harvey Cox's book *The Secular City* (1966), for example, considers urbanization in the context of religion. As the title of the book reveals, Cox's point of departure in considering the city is centers on the idea of secularization.

More recently, a robust body of scholarship on religion, space and place has emerged. For example, Kim Knotts's essay, "Religion, Space, and Place: The Spatial Turn in Research on Religion" (2010), published in the journal of *Religion and Society* provides a thorough overview of the body of literature at the intersection of spatial theory and religious studies and considers the impact of the late twentieth century spatial turn on the study of religion. She contends that before the mid 1990s, "there was comparatively little interest in researching religion, space, and place, and it was generally limited to certain topics such as sacred space and pilgrimage."[402] Inspired by the work of geographers responding to the scholarship of French spatial theorists such as Henri Lefebvre, Michel Foucault, and Michele de Certeau among others, as well as critical theorists such as Adrienne Rich, bell hooks, and Homi Bhabha, Knott argues that the spatial turn "has had a wide-ranging impact, especially when seen in association with simultaneous—and arguably linked—scholarly interests in embodiment, performativity, and material culture."[403] That impact infiltrated the field of religion where religious scholars have produced an increased body of scholarship that examines the religious dimensions of urban space and place.

Roger Stump is another example of research in the area of religion, space, and place. In his book, *The Geographies of Religion: Faith, Place and Space* (2008), Stump examines the issue of public space through the lens of the scale of community, which he argues is "the primary context

[402] Kim Knott, "Religion, Space, and Place: The Spatial Turn in Research on Religion," *Religion and Society* 1 (2010): 29–30.
[403] Ibid., 29.

within which religious groups relate their faith to the patterns of daily life."[404] With regard to religion and urban space, Stump is primarily concerned with what he calls "external forms of territoriality" or the ways in which hegemonic groups clash over the religious use of space, e.g., for prayer or bible study, or the presence of religion on public landscapes, e.g., displays of the Ten Commandments on county courthouses or city parks. Though these contributions to the field of religion at the intersection of (urban) space are valuable, I did not find much of it especially helpful for this dissertation, particularly given my interest in this subfield in religious studies.

There are several implications from this study. The first reveals the failure of past theological studies to address the current situation in U.S. cities in which race, class, gender, capital, and public policy are the primary units of analysis that shape the (re)constitution of U.S. cities in the twenty-first century. This study demonstrated the ways in which these factors are the clues for assessing the trajectory of urban economic growth and development. This study also demonstrates the value that an intersectional, multidisciplinary approach provides religious moral analysis. This dissertation drew on multiple academic disciplines including economics, urban studies, sociology, history, cultural studies, and religion to inform a moral analysis of neoliberal urban redevelopment in the U.S. centered on the lives of the black urban poor. It emphasizes the importance of an ongoing conversation between these fields around mutual interests, and the particular benefit for scholars interested in the study of religion, space, and place. Finally, this study reveals the double-edged sword of language by emphasizing how urban revitalization is rhetorically used to obscure harmful and deadly practices that literally destroy poor and vulnerable communities. My hope is that this study inspires new perspectives on religion, space and place in

[404] Roger W. Stump, *The Geography of Religion: Faith, Place, and Space* (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 268.

ways that are generative, edifying, and transformative for those that take seriously the welfare of the least of these in American culture.

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