

DECENTRALIZATION AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE POLITICAL SURVIVAL OF LOCAL ELITES

By

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To María Rosa, with all of my love

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CHAPTER I

I. INTRODUCTION: DECENTRALIZATION AND DEMOCRACY: THE UNCERTAIN LINK

Why does decentralization contribute to the consolidation of some national and sub-national emerging participatory democracies while placing others at greater risk of democratic decay? The puzzle behind this question can be illustrated by two neighboring towns located within Argentina's borders, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, which took very different paths on their way to democratization. Both Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay inherited the legacy of Spanish colonial rule. Both share common borders. Both are located on the shores of the Uruguay River. Both have remarkably similar income levels, populations and area sizes. Both towns function under the Constitution of the Province of Entre Rios. Both have experienced significant decentralization reforms, following Argentina's transition to democracy in 1983. Yet, one transited to a relatively pluralistic, open democracy and the other remains today a single-family politically dominated town.

What produced this sharp difference in the impact of decentralization? More broadly, when does decentralization help to consolidate participatory democracies, when does it not and why? The case studies mentioned above are part of a larger inquiry about the effects of decentralization on Latin American participatory democracies that this project intends to respond. This dissertation rests on the key proposition that the success or failure of decentralization is based on the choices made by local political elites with respect to how to incorporate decentralization reforms into their political survival strategies, and the corresponding response made by citizens, who as principals find themselves newly empowered but also potentially more vulnerable to agency loss.

I view the choices made by both elites and masses regarding to their responses to decentralization reforms, and thus the likely impact of those reforms on participatory democracy, as a function of (a) the degree of citizen support for decentralization policies; (b) the degree of

political support for participatory democracy; (c) the size of local elite coalitions and the consequent disposition to either exclude or include potential emerging competitors in municipal decision-making (i.e. the degree of political democracy already in place at the time of the decentralization reforms); and (d) the design and implementation of local municipal regulations by local political elites and other actors.

Emerging from a thirty-year period of highly centralized, authoritarian regimes, and resting on a centuries-long tradition of state centralization, the decentralization movement that began in the 1970s in Latin America and took off in the 1980s was wrongly perceived as a panacea for all of Latin America's democratic failings. Advocates overstated the power of decentralization by stating that it would bring about strong, consolidated democracies by promoting social capital and citizen participation in politics. It was certainly reasonable to claim that, by bringing government closer to the people and empowering local government with meaningful governance tasks, citizens would have a greater stake in government, hold their officials accountable, and in the process, gain such democratic qualities as interpersonal trust and tolerance – à la Tocqueville, Rousseau, Putnam and company (Grindle 2007; Montero and Samuels 2004). Other proponents of the decentralization strategy viewed it as a way to strengthen the grassroots bases of political parties, increase government transparency, and improve governance across the many emergent democracies of Latin America (O'Neill 2005). In short, by the end of the 1990s, a description of a prior "New Federalism" movement in the United States during the late 1960s rang equally true for Latin America in the 1990s, "Decentralization is rapidly replacing God, Country and Motherhood in popular favor" (Furniss 1974: 958).

In the years that have followed the initial decentralization push by government officials and development specialists in the 1990s, one thing has become abundantly clear – the strategy has had dramatically different outcomes, not only across different countries, but within the same country as well. Surprisingly, we still have very little systematic work on understanding these variations in the outcomes of the decentralization strategy. The question has the qualities of a classic natural experiment – a similar set of policies implemented during the same time period in countries within one region of the world have produced vastly different outcomes with respect to

the democratic goals set forth by proponents. This question is even more amenable to a natural experiment design when considering the often times wildly different outcomes that have occurred as a result of the exact same policy implementation within a single country. This manuscript presents the results of a research project that takes advantage of the natural experimental design qualities of the decentralization trend in an effort to contribute to our still limited understanding of the mixed effects of decentralization reforms.

On the negative side, what are the potential pitfalls of decentralization with respect to democratic consolidation? Some authors warn that if decentralization is carried out in non-democratic settings, it may consolidate sub-national authoritarianism as a result of the increased ability that leaders in these authoritarian enclaves have to prevent the effective extension of political rights to the entire population (Fox 1994). Such authoritarian enclaves are more likely to consolidate power in territories where political parties are weak or absent, or simply fail to represent the interests of groups that oppose the incumbent. Democracy can also be undermined when fiscally empowered sub-national governments use their resources to implement clientelistic networks in order to guarantee their political survival, either by exchanging goods for votes or by providing “jobs for the boys” (Garcia-Guadilla and Perez 2002, Prud’homme 1995). Finally, when decentralization is carried out with the purpose of defusing ethnic conflicts, it may unintentionally strengthen local groups’ capacity to demand unlimited autonomy, exacerbating separatist sentiments between the populations (Treisman 2006).

Drawing upon this controversy, this dissertation develops and tests a theory of *political survival of local elites* to explore the question of why it is that state decentralization can contribute to the consolidation of democratic citizenship in some cases, while in others it can be at least partly responsible for the emergence and strengthening of anti-democratic values and behaviors. This theory argues that rational local leaders face incentives to implement decentralization such that its outcomes do not pose a risk large enough to challenge their chances to hold on local power. In the following chapters, this manuscript intends to show that decentralization can increase the capability of local politicians to implement institutional changes that promote widespread citizen participation and respect for opposition rights. But the very same strategy can

also empower local officials to strengthen authoritarian practices that benefit only a selected few to the detriment of the rest of the society. The influence of civic history, the daily life of municipal governments and the structure of intergovernmental relations are of course important explanatory factors as well. However, this dissertation contends that after these factors are taken into account, the way in which local elites implement the strategy remains the single, most powerful explanation for the diverse degrees of democracy at the local level. At large, local elites may either concentrate the power they receive as a result of decentralization, or they may share it with the citizenry, groups of citizens and other local political actors.

To test this theory, this study uses an unprecedented collection of mixed-method data sources obtained at both country and municipal levels through qualitative and quantitative techniques. At the national level, this dissertation carries out a comparative analysis of survey data obtained from the 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries included in the *AmericasBarometer* carried out by the *Latin American Public Opinion Project* (LAPOP) in 2008. These data allow identifying patterns of effects of decentralization on participatory democracy across the hemisphere. At the municipal level, this dissertation reports on a sub-national comparative analysis of survey data obtained by the *Programa de Auditoría Ciudadana* (PAC) in 46 Argentinean municipalities between 2003 and 2008. While the country level data are useful to identify general macro-consequences of decentralization, the municipal level data are helpful to take into account some of the unobserved country-specific variables. Together, LAPOP and PAC data sets provide responses from more than 55,000 individuals to questions related not only to decentralization, but also to democracy and citizenship.

The quantitative data above prove to be efficient for bringing to light some of the associations between state reform and core democratic values. However, the mechanisms behind these associations become clearer only with the employment of qualitative methods. For this purpose, this dissertation analyzes qualitative data obtained through focus groups and elite interviews. Focus groups data are effective for understanding what individuals think when they talk about the concepts of and relationships among decentralization, recentralization, democracy and authoritarianism. Elite interviews, on the other hand, are useful to uncover what makes

decentralization fail or succeed with regards to the objective of democratic consolidation. While PAC gathered focus group data in all 46 Argentinean municipalities, I collected views and opinions of 24 councilors, historians, lawyers and journalists in Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, through semi-structured elite interviews.

This dissertation is relevant for researchers and policy-makers alike. For those interested in theoretical aspects, this investigation intends to contribute to the reform of the state literature by establishing a clear association between decentralization and democratic consolidation. Although the focus of this study is Latin America and the Caribbean at the national level and sub-national Argentina at the municipal level, I believe that the theory presented here and the findings of this study are relevant to many other regions of the world where significant decentralization reforms are taking place. For those interested in how local institutions can be designed in order to enhance the benefits and avoid the pitfalls of decentralization, this research can offer them a profound evaluation of how individuals regard local democratic governance under a selection of normative municipal provisions. In sum, this dissertation provides new evidence for scholars, governments, and society in general, on how the degree of decentralization shapes the prospects of democratic consolidation.

Decentralization to the Rescue of Democracy?

During the “second reverse wave” from democracy in the 1960s, most Latin American countries heavily concentrated political power in the central offices of authoritarian regimes. Centralized decision-making was widely implemented by force rather than consensus, and human rights were systematically violated. Secret intelligence cross-border systems, such as *Operation Condor*, were established in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay to repress, torture and execute political opponents, including dissidents and leftists, students and teachers, union leaders and intellectuals, and purported guerillas. Conservative estimates show that centralized state terror may have rendered some 60,000 individuals killed and tens of thousands seized and tortured during military operations (McSherry 2002).

These atrocities contributed to unleash a large array of social, economic and political

pressures to bring about the breakdown of centralized authoritarian regimes. In the 1970s and 1980s, Latin America entered the “third wave” of democratization and several constitutions were drafted limiting the power of executive offices in order to guarantee civil liberties and political rights of citizens, and to prevent new episodes of human rights violations. One of such constitutional provisions was the transfer of decision-making from central to regional and local levels of government. This process, broadly categorized under the rubric of *decentralization*, was widely expected to help consolidating democracy (Diamond and Tsalik 1999).

By “bringing the government closer to the people” advocates argued, citizens could exert greater control over governmental decision-making. Decentralization was expected to increase electoral accountability, because citizens become better informed about local than about central governmental practices, especially in places far away from the national capital. Also, decentralization was deemed important for increasing citizen participation and cultivating civic virtue, which in turn would minimize the risks of democratic decay. And most importantly, decentralization could empower local officials to prevent abuses from central governments and protect citizen political freedoms and civil liberties.

For these reasons, decentralization started to be not only earnestly implemented by policy-makers in country after country, but also generously funded by international development agencies. Today, calculating precisely the total investment on decentralization is difficult –if not impossible- but since the last democratizing wave, estimates show that it has run into the billions (Treisman 2007). Decentralization programs are among the most widely spread and resource intensive of all democracy and governance programs funded by multilateral and bi-lateral donors, especially in countries transiting to democracy (Goldstone et al. 2008). In 1980, sub-national governments around the world collected on average 15% of revenues and spent 20% of expenditures. As a result of decentralization, those figures had risen to 19% and 25%, respectively, and had even doubled in some regions by the late 1990s (Falleti 2004).

Even though decentralization increased political, fiscal, and administrative powers at the sub-national level, its implementation also brought headaches and dilemmas. After decades of state centralization, intermediate and local governments had to cope with their new

responsibilities in terms of budget administration, economic development, and the provision of goods and services. Institutions for local decision-making that were weakened and even dismantled after years of authoritarian rule had to be reinstated in order to take on complex tasks (Gindle 2007). New organizations implemented to provide local services needed to be created, human capital needed to be strengthened and the rules of the “new game” had to be put into effect. Local public administration became more demanding as citizens learned that public officials could be appealed to, rewarded or blamed if they overpromised but under-delivered. These issues raised critical concerns not only for policy-makers seeking to negotiate the promotion of successful democratic regimes, but also for academics trying to understand the mechanisms under which state decentralization promotes citizen support for democratic consolidation.

The Scholarship on Decentralization and Democracy

The literature on state decentralization and democracy provides important insights for understanding the perils and promises of this reform. On the benefits, the literature can be traced as far back as Aristotle and other Greek philosophers who thought that, “living a life of excellence requires that one take active part in the process of government” (Treisman 2007:157). Rousseau and others later revived this argument during the Enlightenment, suggesting that freedom is best exercised by participating in the decision-making process of legislatures. But since direct involvement was increasingly limited in a nascent nation-state that counted with tens and even hundred of thousands of inhabitants, how could such direct participation be possible? Alexis de Tocqueville (1961 [1835]) described how power was broken down into fragments in the American township, so a maximum number of people could play a role in public affairs. The attachment of the New Englanders to their township, he thought, was a product of strong independency and capacity that they had, within their scope, to rule society.

De Tocqueville’s views of local public affairs were also backed by John Stuart Mill (in Treisman 2007, 1961 [1861]), who thought about decentralization as a way to extend opportunities for political participation. Mill stated that local government was a “school for political

capacity and general intelligence” (Tresiman 2007:158). With these views, decentralization moved quickly to be an important tool for direct participation in democracies of “the first wave” (Huntington 1991) and the scholarship about this state reform experienced an explosion. In the decades to follow, proponents of civic virtue and social capital viewed local arenas as perfect environments where citizens could engage in communitarian activities, learn to trust each other, and tolerate different opinions regarding the administration of public affairs (Almond and Verba 1963; Grindle 2007; Montero and Samuels 2004; Putnam 1994). Culturalists, regarded this collection of civic values that may result from state decentralization as the basis for the consolidation of durable democracies (Inglehart 1997; Seligson 2008).

As democracies struggle to become more efficient, culturalists argue, participatory local democracy empowers citizens to become more effective at rewarding or punishing local public officials. As a result, rational politicians have “political survival” incentives to be responsive to local needs and concerns (Grindle 2007). This mechanism is associated with the “accountability argument” that has flooded the decentralization literature. According to this argument, while it can be difficult to monitor politicians at the national level, “voters face lower costs when they seek to gather information about how local politicians are making use of governmental resources” (Connerley, Eaton and Smoke 2010:4). By bringing the government closer to the people, citizens should be better informed to reelect officials who perform well and to replace those who fail to perform as expected (Przeworski et al.1999; Falletti 2005).

The benefits of decentralization have also been studied from the institutional perspective. Disappointed with the outcomes of the “dual transition” during the 1980s and 1990s at the national level, reformers contemplated decentralization as way to deepen democracy by opening local spaces for public contestation (Hiskey 2010). Precisely because authoritarian enclaves survived transitions to democracy, decision-makers viewed decentralization as an instrument to transfer power from national to local spheres in order to prevent the potential renaissance of authoritarianism (Diamond and Tsalik 1999; Bland 2004; Norris 2008). To strengthen institutions of political representation, decentralization is also capable of reallocating power to areas where the incumbent and its party allies are more likely to win in future electoral contests (O’Neill 2005).

Thus decentralization has been seen as a strategy, not only for political parties with relatively long time horizons, but also for the emergence of political representation institutions of traditionally excluded minorities. Van Cott, for instance, shows three factors that are most likely to foster local-level political innovation in excluded communities: “a legal and political context that facilitates bottom-driven decentralization... effective mayoral leadership; and support from a cohesive, organic political party rooted in civil society” (2008:211).

Other important positive consequences of decentralization, in addition to democracy, have been studied in other disciplines of the social sciences. The social movement literature has been particularly interested in studying the spaces that decentralization opens up for the empowerment of non-governmental interests in decision-making. This work focuses on the effects that NGOs have on local governments, and on the deepening of democratization (Keese and Freire 2006; Yashar 1999). The economics literature also deems decentralization significant because it is capable of boosting local development by increasing effectiveness on the allocation of resources (Oates 1972; Escobar-Lemmon 2003). These authors claim that multi-tier governments make it possible to satisfy citizens’ demands for public goods and services more precisely and cost-effectively, due to their proximity to citizens. In a similar vein, students of public management suggest that in decentralized settings, those responsible for the provision of goods and services are local, thus citizens have greater motivation to complain and demand for improvements (Campbell 2003). Since management of public funds by government officials is easier to monitor at the local than the national level, some scholars argue that there is a negative association between fiscal decentralization in government expenditure and corruption (Fisman and Gatti 1999). Finally, others have studied the effects of decentralization on poverty alleviation, the environment, and the provision of health and education (Grindle 2007; Sepulveda and Martinez-Vasquez 2010; von Braun and Grote 2000).

Not surprisingly, these high expectations were likely to be disappointed when reforms were put into practice. As Grindle puts it, “practice rarely lives up to theory” (2007:8). Some started to see that decentralization could empower “bad” local governments as well as “good” local governments (Fox 1994). In other words, when carried out in non-democratic settings,

decentralization strengthened some of the authoritarian enclaves it was supposed to eliminate (Arze and Martinez 2004; Prud'homme 1995). In some instances, sub-national populist governments could use the machinery available to them to consolidate clientelistic practices that reinforced their privileged positions (Diamond 1999; Prud'homme 1995). This machinery was made available, on purpose or not, by the provision of central government subsidies, where sub-national governments had a weak tax link with local citizens and businesses (Gervasoni 2010). These arguments are part of a larger assessment of the impact of decentralization on corruption. Treisman (2000) and Gerring and Thacker (2004) find that federalist countries have higher rates of corruption than unitary countries. The logic behind Treisman's finding is that in decentralized political systems the potential corrupter needs to influence a smaller segment of the government than in centralized settings, and because in a fragmented system there are fewer centralized institutions to enforce honesty. This view of decentralization and corruption is particularly harmful for democracy, if local leaders are aware that they may exchange goods for votes more easily than national leaders (Garcia-Guadilla and Perez 2002).

Another group of scientists has studied the mixed impact of decentralization on democratic governance. Hiskey and Seligson (2003) find support for the contention that decentralization can increase the levels of democratic system approval, however, they do not discard the possibility that the emphasis on local government can also exert more negative effects on the political system, when local institutions fail to satisfy citizen expectations. For governments, the effects of decentralization can be mixed too. Eaton (2004) and Falletti (2010) find that decentralization can actually increase the power of central governments while decreasing the power of local governments, depending upon the sequence and timing of the decentralization reforms. This is why other studies have also placed into question the citizen empowerment and increased equity benefits that decentralization is supposed to bring about. When analyzing the effects of decentralization on ethnic conflicts, Treisman states that "local governments may socialize ethnic politicians into cooperation – or they may turn into schools of intolerance and ethnic hatred" (2007:14). Thus, decentralization can defuse ethnic conflicts by satisfying limited demands for autonomy, but it also may strengthen local elite's capacity to press for unlimited demands of

autonomy.

Additionally, decentralization could be responsible for generating fiscal imbalances. In some cases, local government debts had to become the responsibility of national governments in countries where municipalities were not able to repay their loans (Campbell 2005). In other cases, politically strong local governments undermined fiscal and macroeconomic discipline by pressuring the central government for unlimited aid (Treisman 2006; 2007). For these reasons, those responsible for fiscal and macroeconomic discipline had to put in place some mechanisms to tighten up national level oversight of intergovernmental transfers and expenditures (Grindle 2007). Economists who advocated for fiscal decentralization became soon disappointed because many local governments increased their demands on central governments for more revenue sharing instead of expanding the robustness for local taxation (Prud'homme 1995).

In the light of all these mixed results of a promising theory, scholars and decision-makers modified their expectations but did not abandon their hope for stronger democracy as a result of state decentralization. In fact, the transfers of political, administrative and fiscal powers from the center to the periphery continued during the first 10 years of the XXI century, and are likely to continue. Many more sub-national politicians are now elected than ever before. Sub-national expenditures as percentage of total government expenditures continue to rise. Municipalities all over the world are becoming responsible not only for street maintenance and garbage collection, but for a larger provision of health, education and clean environments. Political parties are paying much more attention to grass-roots organizations as local politicians see increased opportunities for political careers. And citizens too seem to have developed greater trust for institutions of the local government (Montalvo 2008; 2010). It is vitally important, therefore, to learn as much as possible about the mixed effects of decentralization on democracy. When does decentralization help to consolidate democracy, when does it not and why?

A Theory of Political Survival of Local Elites

Conceptual Definitions

In this dissertation, I define *state decentralization* as the dynamic transfer of power and decision-making from national to sub-national levels of government. Since the main focus of this research is the local (as opposed to regional, state or provincial) level of government, I am most interested in the transfers that usually occur in political, fiscal and administrative dimensions from the national and intermediate to the municipal levels government.¹ Political decentralization empowers individuals to directly elect municipal officers that are otherwise appointed by a higher level of government. Fiscal decentralization empowers municipal governments to generate their own revenues, usually through taxes and intergovernmental transfers. Finally, administrative decentralization empowers municipal governments to manage and implement public policy. Decentralization differs from devolution, where the national government transfers funds and responsibilities to appointed sub-national officers; delegation or privatization, where the national government sell off state functions; and from deconcentration, where the executive transfers decision-making powers to a series of secretaries and institutions at the national level.

A preliminary and straightforward linkage between decentralization and democracy can be found at the epistemological level. Etymologically, the word democracy comes from the Greek word *dēmokratía* that means *the power to the people*. This definition is remarkably similar to the common knowledge purpose of decentralization that is empowering citizens by *bringing the government closer to the people*. For this reason and in contrast to the Schumpeterian minimalist conception that favors competitive elections over other elements of democracy (Przeworski 1999), this dissertation emphasizes the concept of *participatory democracy* to refer more broadly to the effects of institutions in increasing individuals' control over the determination and development of democracy as a whole (Warren 1992). In this view, participatory democracies

¹ The chief objective of decentralization is "to bring the government closer to the people;" hence, in this dissertation I choose the level located closest to the citizenry in the majority of Latin American countries: the municipal government.

encourage individuals to have a greater stake at processes of decision-making; thus increasing the opportunities for democratic consolidation.

Theory and Hypotheses

This manuscript presents the synopsis of an ongoing research agenda intended to explain why decentralization contributes to the consolidation of participatory democracies in some places, while placing others at greater risk of decay. Drawing upon the works of Ames (1987) and Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003), the mixed consequences of decentralization are explained here through a theory of *political survival of local elites*. According to this theory, local leaders may seek to implement decentralization in such a way that its outcomes do not decrease their relative power at the local level. In order to best explain this theory, this study advances at least four major hypotheses. These hypotheses center on citizen support for decentralization, political support for participatory democracy, size of local political elite coalitions, and municipal regulations for democratic governance. Each provides a distinct but interrelated potential explanation of the factors that promote or discourage participatory democracies under different degrees of state decentralization.

Citizen Support for Decentralization. If one of the major purposes of decentralization is furnishing common citizens with a greater stake in decision-making, it may appear natural to ask them whether or not they agree with this policy in the first place. For it may be also natural to think that citizen participation levels will depend upon the degree of political legitimacy of decentralization. Ironically, the study of citizen support for this policy has been, to my knowledge, largely absent from the decentralization literature. Most of the work has focused on the study of decentralization as a result of neoliberal reforms, international factors, political system reforms, and institutional and socio-structural factors (Montero and Samuels 2004). In this dissertation, I intend to explain under which contextual and individual conditions citizens manifest support for state decentralization in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Drawing upon the seminal work of Claudio Véliz (1980) “The Centralist Tradition of Latin America,” it may be expected, on average, that citizens in the region tend to favor strong central governments. Véliz suggests that the factors that make Latin America “centralist” in character are the absence of the feudal experience from the region’s tradition, the absence of religious non-conformity and the resulting centralism of the dominant religion, the absence of any circumstance that can be taken as a counterpart of the European industrial Revolution, and the absence of the ideological, social, and political developments associated with the French Revolution. In other words, in the Latin American region principal citizens have traditionally struggled with centralist government agents in a lesser scale in comparison to their European counterparts. Véliz’s theory, however, falls short with respect to explaining the wide variation in support for decentralization across countries. In this dissertation, I argue that this variation is partly due to the different levels of human development among Latin American nations.

The work of Seymour Martin Lipset (1981) suggests that countries with high levels of health, education and general wealth nest individuals who show greater support for decentralization and power-sharing systems. In contrast, societies with lower education, economic insecurity and low human development are likely to breed individuals that support strong, centrally led systems that, in the words Lipset, “tend to produce... political authoritarianism.” (1981:114). In this view, citizens in the region who tend to support greater control over fiscal resources and larger provision of goods and services by the national government should reside in rather underdeveloped contexts. In contrast citizen support for decentralization should be greater in contexts where citizens have fulfilled their basic developmental needs. This contrast may be due to the fact that less well-off individuals regard the national government as an important provider of the basic elements needed for human development.

It is not my intention to state, however, that low human development always leads to a centralized form of government or that all centralized governments are relatively more authoritarian. In fact, the empirical evidence shows that countries with high levels of both human development and democracy, such as Costa Rica and Uruguay, are indeed relatively more

centralized than other countries in the region. In theory, wealthier individuals may also prefer the status quo to any state reform, in order to maintain their privileged positions. Nonetheless, in this dissertation I concur with and refine Lipset's statement that of "low education, low participation in political or voluntary organizations of any type, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns" (1981:476) both at the contextual and individual levels are some of the most of important factors contributing not only to authoritarian, but in my view, to centralist predispositions.

Political Support for Participatory Democracy. Local elite support for or opposition to citizen participation is at the heart of this dissertation. Here, I develop and test a theory of political survival of local elites. This theory contends that the transfer of political, fiscal and administrative powers from national and intermediate levels of government to municipal governments increase, in general terms, the ability and capacity of local government agents to exercise control and authority over citizen principals. In terms of relative power, full decentralization² may endow local political elites with more political, social and economic powers compared not only to higher levels of government, but also to the citizenry. Thus, in contexts of empowered municipal governments, local political elites may struggle more fiercely with political competitors in order to maintain and endure in their privileged positions.

As a result, local agents in relatively more decentralized territories have greater incentives to dissuade or discourage citizen participation in institutions that may pose a threat large enough to challenge their continued control over resources and decision-making. Institutions of political representation, such as political parties and movements, are arguably the citizen organizations that pose the largest threats, since in a democracy, which is the case of most if not all the Latin American countries studied here, these institutions seek to influence government policies usually by nominating their own candidates with the purpose of seating them in political office. The threat of replacement may originate in either antagonist political parties or

² Full decentralization is opposed to sequential decentralization because the former will more likely lead to an increase in power while the latter may actually *decrease* it.

from emerging local competitors within the incumbent's party. Hence, in this project I expect to find a negative association between the degree of state decentralization and citizen participation in institutions of political representation and other organizations that can credibly challenge the political survival of local elites. In short, I claim that agency loss dulls citizen empowerment in more decentralized settings

There are at least three alternatives that in my view, citizen principals can opt for as a consequence of the decrement in their relative power and autonomy after the implementation of decentralization policies. First, they could increase their demand-making on municipal offices for public and private goods and services. Second, if their voices are not heard and their complaints and needs are not met, they could try to engage in institutions of political representation to replace the incumbent government in the next electoral period. Third, if neither alternative fulfills their expectations, they could turn to mobilized modes of participation, such as public protests, demonstrations and riots (Seligson 1980).

This study recognizes that local elites, or groups of elites, are not the only ones responsible for formulating and implementing local policies. Other important actors generally involved in these processes are higher levels of government, international organizations, NGOs, private firms, and the like. However, political elites in decentralized settings have greater leverage over other actors to implement institutions that guarantee their political survival, for at least two reasons. First, decentralization can empower local elites with political, fiscal and administrative resources that put them in a relatively better bargaining position for the design and implementation of their preferred institutions. Second, decentralization transfers autonomy to settings that usually have less horizontal checks and balances than the national level, and therefore local power concentration deterrence heavily rests on vertical mechanisms only, such as sub-national elections. Thus concentration of power is more difficult to control, I argue, at the local than the national level. In this context, local elite behavior may be better explained from an office-maximizing rather than a pure vote-maximizing perspective

Size of Local Political Elite Coalitions. Even though the hypothesis above explains the general expectation about the role of local elites in encouraging or discouraging citizen participation at different decentralization degrees, it fails to explain why some territory dyads, or twin towns as I call them, have remarkably similar decentralization levels and dramatically different outcomes. This hypothesis suggests that, holding decentralization constant, levels of participatory democracy depend upon the size of local political elite coalitions. To further explain this claim, I adapt the *selectorate theory* put forward by Bueno de Mesquita and others in 2003, to sub-national levels of government. Leaders, all of whom face emerging challengers who wish to remove them from office, maintain their collation of supporters by providing them a mixture of public and private goods and services. When leaders depend on a “small” group or elite coalition to survive in office, they engender loyalty by providing them with access to ample personal, private goods and services they would not otherwise receive if they were not in the elite. Family-ruled towns are a good example of small elite coalitions. In this context, alternation in power is less frequent and citizen participation in dissension institutions is highly discouraged. In contrast, contexts where many supporters demand for rewards, the costs of private benefits required to keep their loyalty is just too high. Instead, those leaders who rely on a “large” elite coalition to remain in office emphasize the provision of goods and services that benefit everyone in the society. In this framework, democratic alternation of power is more frequent because coalition members can defect to a rival since they do not enjoy of private benefits. As a result, in large coalition contexts citizen face less restrictions to participate in institutions of political representation.

But how large or small local elite coalitions are formed? In this dissertation I argue that the characteristics of these coalitions depend on the historical dynamics of the groups that worked to bring about decentralization. The literature in this regard distinguishes between “local-up” dynamics, in which decentralization is forced on national decision-makers from pressures exerted by sub-national officials, and “national-down” patterns, in which national actors, operating in an strategic mode, decide to decentralize (Eaton 2004; Falleti 2010; Grindle 2007; O'Neill 2005; Tulchin and Selee 2004) In my study, I introduce a third element to explain identity

formation: the “citizen-up” dynamics. In this dynamic, I argue that large local coalitions were socially constructed in towns where civil society rather than sub-national politicians exerted the most significant pressures for the transfers of power to their municipal government. In contrast, towns where “local-up” processes were exerted by a local *caudillo* (or family of caudillos), institutions are designed in such a way that they tend to favor the concentration of power among a small local elite, instead of extending political rights and civil liberties among the citizenry. The “national-down” dynamic only reinforces the size of pre-established local political coalitions.

Municipal regulations for Democratic Governance. While the previous set of hypotheses put an emphasis on human development and local elites to explain citizen support for decentralization and participation in democratic institutions, this final hypothesis focuses on the effects of local municipal regulations, as designed and implemented by local political elites, to understand citizen views about local democratic governance. For this purpose, this research studies citizen evaluations and perceptions of municipal performance under Tulchin and Selee’s assertion “that the success or failure of the relationship between civil society and the state at sub-national levels will be central to the construction of democratic governance in Latin America in the coming decades” (2004:1). With this premise, I expect to find better citizen evaluations and perceptions of municipal performance where local lawmakers have implemented municipal regulations that allow for mechanisms of both direct democracy, such as referenda, public audiences and/or mandate recall; and accountability, such as mechanisms for municipal evaluation, complaint registries and/or access to public information.

Conversely, municipal regulations that mostly rely on elections for holding public officials accountable may be less efficient as a tool to improve democratic governance. If sub-national elections are constrained to fixed calendars, voters may need to wait until the following electoral period to witness changes on municipal performance. The timing of national and sub-national electoral contests, citizen rights to cut their ballots, rules permitting the arbitrary removal of sub-national elected officials by the national government, etc. are also factors that may weaken electoral accountability (Connerley, Eaton and Smoke 2010).

An Incomplete Theory of Elite Behavior. This dissertation begins with a simple, basic theory in the hope that further research will bring to light certain issues that are not covered here due to the lack of time and space. For instance, the study of intergovernmental relations, such as the interaction among the national, provincial or state, and local levels of government may prove to be essential to advance the understanding of strategic elite behavior. This behavior may also be constrained to whether local politicians struggle for political survival at the municipal level or intend to advance their political careers in a higher level of government. The theory put forward in this dissertation neither takes into account local elite political ideologies nor distinguishes between presidential and parliamentary institutional designs. This dissertation, nonetheless, is a step along the way –not an end- to explain how strategic decision-making at the local level can further or reverse the consolidation of participatory democracy, with the expectation that others also find it of sufficient interest to elaborate and build upon it.

Selection of Countries, Municipalities and Citizens

These four hypotheses develop an intellectual agenda designed to explain the mixed effects of decentralization on participatory democracy. In order to test these hypotheses, this dissertation employs two unprecedented public opinion data sets obtained through survey research in order to measure core democratic values and behaviors. Additionally, this study makes use of secondary data to capture the political, fiscal and administrative dimensions of decentralization, both at the national and local levels of analysis. These secondary data are complemented with a quantitative and qualitative assessment of local municipal regulations designed to the implementation and functioning of local institutions. Finally, this research makes extensive use of focus groups and elite interviews to explain the mechanisms behind the statistical correlations that arise from a multiple selection of Hierarchical Linear Models.

The *AmericasBarometer* is one of the two public opinion data sets that will be analyzed in this study. This data set is obtained every two years through survey research by the *Latin American Public Opinion Project* (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University, in nearly all countries in the

Americas. In my dissertation, I make use of the 2008 round of the *AmericasBarometer* to be able to compare citizens' perceptions of and experiences with various elements of democracy in 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries at different decentralization degrees. Map I-1 and Table I-1 show the countries selected for this study. These countries were carefully selected for two reasons. First, the region has undergone significant decentralization since 1980, triggered in most cases by the national democratic transitions that took place during the same decade (Daughters and Harper 2007). Second, most of the primary data is readily available in the *AmericasBarometer* database. These data were gathered by carrying out 37,035 face-to-face interviews in Latin America and the Caribbean.

In order to collect the data, LAPOP uses a common survey sampling technique with the purpose of facilitating comparisons across countries. Samples are designed using probability methods with household quotas. After stratification and clustering the average sample size is 1,500, with the exception of Bolivia (n = 3,000); Ecuador (n = 3,000); and Paraguay (n = 1,200).



Map I-1. Selected Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
 (Source: Mapsof.Net)

Table I-1: Key Indicators in Latin America and the Caribbean

Country	<i>n</i>	Land Area N (Sq. Km)	Population 2008 (1,000)	GNI per capita 2008 (PPP)	GINI Coef. 2008	Freedom House 2008 (inverted)	Year of Democratic Transition
Argentina	1,486	2,766,890	39,746	14,000	51.3	10	1983
Belize	1,552	22,966	294	5,940	<i>n.a.</i>	11	1981
Bolivia	3,003	1,098,580	10,028	4,140	60.1	8	1982
Brazil	1,497	8,511,965	195,138	10,080	57	10	1985
Chile	1,527	756,950	16,770	13,250	54.9	12	1990
Colombia	1,503	1,138,910	46,702	8,430	58.6	8	1958
Costa Rica	1,500	51,100	4,550	10,960	49.8	12	1949
Dominican Rep.	1,507	48,730	9,890	7,800	51.6	10	1966
Ecuador	3,000	283,560	13,801	7,780	53.6	8	1979
El Salvador	1,549	21,040	7,224	6,630	52.4	9	1984
Guatemala	1,538	108,890	13,677	4,690	55.1	7	1985
Guyana	2,514	214,970	736	3,030	44.6	9	1966
Haiti	1,536	27,750	9,762	<i>n.a.</i>	59.2	5	<i>n.a.</i>
Honduras	1,522	112,090	7,322	3,830	53.8	8	1982
Jamaica	1,499	10,991	2,728	7,370	45.5	9	1962
Mexico	1,560	1,972,550	107,677	14,340	46.1	9	1917
Nicaragua	1,540	129,494	5,677	2,620	43.1	8	1990
Panama	1,536	78,200	3,391	12,630	56.1	11	1989
Paraguay	1,166	406,750	6,230	4,660	58.4	8	1989
Peru	1,500	1,285,220	28,214	7,950	52	9	1980
Uruguay	1,500	176,220	3,342	12,550	44.9	12	1985
Venezuela	1,500	912,050	27,912	12,850	48.2	6	1958

Note: Freedom House Index inverted scale goes from 0 (low) to 12 (high).

Sources: The World Bank www.worldbank.org ; Freedom House www.freedomhouse.org ; LAPOP www.lapopsurveys.org ; Daughters, Robert, and Leslie Harper. "Fiscal and Political Decentralization Reforms." In *The State of State Reform in Latin America*, by Eduardo Lora, 213-61. Palo Alto and Washington: Stanford University Press, 2007.

The second public opinion database to be used in this study was created by harmonizing and merging 46 data sets obtained through survey research by the *Programa de Auditoria Ciudadana* (PAC) at the “Subsecretaría para la Reforma Institucional y Fortalecimiento de la Democracia” in Argentina. The Argentinean government designed this program with the purpose of improving citizens’ democratic life. Two years after the 2001 economic and political debacle in Argentina, the government decided to implement a program that could help rebuild the levels of trust in core democratic institutions that were lost during a long period of crisis. This program started by carrying out a continuous assessment of what they considered to be crucial elements for the reestablishment of a full, liberal democracy. These elements can be summarized in the following aspects: (a) civic culture, (b) citizen participation, (c) governance, and (d) accountability.

To assess these four elements, PAC carried out a series of public opinion surveys in 46 Argentinean municipalities between 2003 and 2008. Three waves were necessary to conclude the data gathering.³ Each wave consisted of face-to-face public opinion interviews of 18,583 non-institutionalized individuals, with a sample design that allows reaching conclusions at the municipal level. Respondents were selected by the probability method, and the sample design included area stratification and clustering. At the household, individuals were finally selected using sex and age quotas, taking only into consideration respondents of at least 18 years of age. The error margins oscillate between +/- 2.9 and +/- 4.8 depending upon the dispersion of the variable, with a confidence interval of 95 percent.

Towns and cities in this study were non-randomly selected by the initiative of either national or local public officials. The 46 municipalities chosen for this research are distributed across 16 Argentinean provinces, and comprise more than 10 percent of the total Argentinean population. Map I-2 shows the provinces of this study and Table I-2 summarize some of the characteristics of the localities that will be analyzed throughout this dissertation.

³ A fourth wave was being implemented in early 2009, however, the current administration decided to terminate the program for undetermined reasons.



Map I-2. Provinces that Group the 46 Municipalities Selected for this Study
 (Source: Geology.com)

Table I-2: Provinces and Selected Argentinean Municipalities

Province	Municipality	<i>n</i>	Municipal Population <i>N</i> 2001	Municipal Budget 2007 (Pesos/pc)
Buenos Aires	Pergamino	401	99,193	467.49
	Olavarria	400	103,961	913.90
	Junin	400	88,664	795.04
	Morón	400	309,380	614.01
	Bragado	410	40,259	2078.78
	Villa Gesell	408	24,282	1795.45
	Balcarce	419	42,039	832.56
	General Belgrano	417	15,381	657.68
	General Pueyrredón	400	564,056	1083.23
	Bahía Blanca	400	284,776	625.05
Catamarca	San Fernando	400	151,131	721.23
	San F. del Valle de Catamarca	400	141,260	725.09
Corrientes	Monte Caseros	400	24,671	720.84
	Curuzú Cuatiá	408	36,390	333.66
Chaco	Roque Saenz Peña	400	88,164	1792.11
Chubut	Comodoro Rivadavia	462	137,061	1544.84
	Gualeguaychú	400	76,220	716.93
Entre Ríos	Crespo	400	18,296	874.73
	Concepción del Uruguay	400	67,474	673.59
	Diamante	400	19,545	1688.41
	Villaguay	400	32,027	533.92
	Cerrito	400	4,653	530.57
	Concordia	400	141,971	524.76
Formosa	Libertador San Martín	400	5,273	1409.25
	Pirané	400	19,124	820.29
Jujuy	Palpala	400	48,199	726.16
La Pampa	General Pico	400	53,352	1680.22
	Lujan de Cuyo	400	104,470	765.77
Mendoza	Lavalle	400	32,129	399.24
	Godoy Cruz	400	182,977	495.43
	Las Heras	400	182,962	765.19
	Malargüe	400	23,020	3623.50
	Guaymallén	400	251,339	676.38
Neuquén	San Martín de los Andes	400	23,519	1936.51
	Villa La Angostura	400	7,526	3408.00
	Neuquén	459	203,190	2039.70
San Luis	Rawson	400	107,740	422.11
	Rivadavia	400	76,150	512.15
	Rafaela	400	83,563	968.16
Santa Fe	Rosario	400	909,397	830.80
	Firmat	400	18,294	588.31
	Las Rosas	400	12,793	1100.43
	El Trebol	400	10,506	999.39
Tucumán	Yerba Buena	399	50,783	866.43
Salta	Coronel Moldes	400	4,194	3912.48
Córdoba	Villa Gral Belgrano	400	5,888	1718.02

Sources: 2001 Census, municipal WebPages and Ministry of Interior www.mininterior.gov.ar

While these public opinion databases provide powerful resources to find some of the correlates of decentralization and participatory democracy, the use of quantitative methods is less powerful for discovering the causal mechanisms behind these correlations. For this reason I carried out 24 semi-structured interviews during the spring of 2010, with the purpose of developing a second, qualitative phase of this dissertation. These interviews included councilors, historians, jurists and journalists that were crucial in my efforts to explain some of the mechanisms that connect political elite behavior with local participatory democracy. They also allowed me to collect information about how decision-making is carried out and implemented, what are the deadlocks in the process, and what is the generalized perception of local political elites about opposition groups and emerging competitors.

Two Argentinean municipalities were selected for the semi-structured interviews: Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú. These two municipalities were carefully chosen using the Mill's Method of Difference for comparison. This method involves choosing municipalities that are similar in ways that are treated as parameters but dissimilar with regard to the dependent variable. This method also allowed me to locate alternative explanatory variables (Mill 1970). Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú are two middle size towns located in the Province of Entre Rios, that share not only borders but also similar histories, population sizes, and levels of economic development. In spite of their remarkably similar socio-economic and demographic characteristics, these towns have produced dramatically different political outcomes.

While Gualeguaychú enjoys high levels of citizen support for democracy, political participation, tolerance and interpersonal trust, a tradition of public apathy, little institutional and interpersonal trust and high levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works at the municipal level characterize Concepción del Uruguay. These facts suggest that even though these two towns share important characteristics, they have chosen different paths on their way to democratization. In this dissertation I bring to light some of the most plausible causes of these contrasting cases. Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú are shown in Map I-3.



Map I-3. The Contrast of Two Similar Cities: Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú
 (Source: Portal Oficial de Turismo de Concepción del Uruguay)

A Note on Hierarchical Linear Models

This dissertation is mostly concerned about how context affects individual attitudes, opinions and behaviors. My primary objective is to determine whether or not the likelihood of developing a democratic citizenry is influenced by the degree of political, fiscal and administrative decentralization in the nations and municipalities selected for this study. This type of “hierarchical” theoretical construct requires of statistical techniques that are also hierarchical in order to avoid potential problems. Two of the most common problems that arise from failing to do so are *ecological fallacy* and *atomistic fallacy*, where “relationships observed in groups are assumed to hold for individuals” in the former, and “inferences about groups are incorrectly drawn from individual-level information” in the latter (Luke 2004:5).

Statistically, disaggregating group-level information to the individual level to overcome the above pitfalls may also prove problematic. First, the un-modeled context information can end up in the individual error term, and because individuals nested within a context presumably have correlated errors, this may violate one of the basic assumptions of regression analysis. Second, by ignoring context, the model assumes that regression coefficients apply in the same way to all countries and municipalities. Finally, by including a fixed effect in the model to take into account the grouping of individuals (i.e. dummy variables) can lead to an over-specified model with low power and parsimony, in addition to ignoring the random variability associated with group-level characteristics (Luke 2004)

The use of hierarchical linear models in this research allows then incorporating the effects of national and municipal factors on individual outcomes, which in the absence of multilevel statistical techniques would be difficult to assess. Standard errors are, moreover, more appropriately estimated by adjusting for the dependence among individual responses within countries and municipalities. This adjustment also permits “incorporating into the statistical model a unique random effect” for each level of analysis (Raundebush and Bryk 2002). To give an example, in this dissertation I am interested in examining how voter turnout is influenced by

individual characteristics (e.g. age) as well as constitutional type of the individual's country of residence (e.g. federal vs. unitary).

This basic two-level arrangement can be modeled using the following system of equations:

Equation I.1

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Level 1: } Y_{ij} &= \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{ij} + r_{ij} \\ \text{Level 2: } \beta_{0j} &= \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}W_j + u_{0j} \\ \beta_{1j} &= \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}W_j + u_{1j} \end{aligned}$$

Where we assume that r_{ij} is randomly distributed with homogenous variance across countries, that is $r_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$. These equations above not only show all of the independent and outcome variables, but also depict the hierarchical structure of the model. The level-1 equation above is similar to a standard OLS model; however, the subscript j indicates that a different level-1 model is estimated for each of the j level-2 units (countries). In this example, each country can have a different average level of voter turnout (β_{0j}) and a different effect of years of age on voter turnout (β_{1j}). Hence, this model allows varying intercepts and slopes across countries; a variation known in statistical language as *means and slopes as outcomes* of level-2 independent variables (Luke 2004; Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

Level-2 components of Equation I.1 show how each of the level-1 parameters are functions of level-2 independent variables. Thus β_{0j} is the individual-level intercept in country j ; γ_{00} is the mean value of voter turnout when system type equals 0; γ_{01} is the voter turnout difference between federal and unitary systems; and u_{0j} is the unique effect of country j on voter turnout, holding W_j constant. The second portion of the equation in the level-2 model predicts the effects on the slope of X_{ij} . In this portion, β_{1j} is the individual-level slope in country j ; γ_{10} is the mean value of the individual-level slope controlling for W_j ; γ_{11} is the effect of constitution

type on the individual-level slope; and u_{1j} is the unique effect of country j on the years of age slope holding W_j constant.

This system of equations can be specified in the following *mixed-effect model*:

Equation 1.2

$$Y_{ij}[\underbrace{\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + \gamma_{01}W_j + \gamma_{11}W_jX_{ij}}_{\text{fixed}}] + [\underbrace{u_{0j} + u_{1j}X_{ij} + r_{ij}}_{\text{random}}]$$

This basic structure of the hierarchical linear model presented in Equation 1.2 is the one that will be used to analyze the multilevel correlations in the data sets for Latin American in general and Argentina in particular. Of course, some model variations may be possible according to the hypotheses to be tested and the model to be specified. For instance, *fully unconditional* models can be specified with no predictors at level 1 or 2, in order to identify the intra-class correlation coefficient. This coefficient is useful to determine the proportion in the variance of the outcome that is to be explained across level-2 units. Another hierarchical linear model can be fitted assuming that level-1 intercepts vary across level-2 units, but not the level-1 slopes. Other model types can be specified when the outcome variable is dichotomous or categorical. Regardless of the specification of the hierarchical structure of the model, this dissertation makes extensive use of HLM to corroborate what has been repeatedly said in the social science literature: “context matters.”

The Dissertation in Brief

To summarize, given the extant efforts and capital invested on decentralization, it is imperative to take a closer look at the mixed effects that these reforms can inflict on the young, and sometimes fragile Latin American democracies. For this purpose, this dissertation brings to light a portrait of citizen views, opinions and behaviors about some core elements of advanced democracies, such as democratic participation, legitimacy and governance at different degrees of state decentralization. Thanks to the wide variety of contexts, each Latin American and

Caribbean country can be regarded as a natural “treatment,” where citizens are exposed to a multiplicity of institutional arrangements in the national-local continuum. Citizens are then evaluated to determine the effects of context on their levels of democratic citizenship.

Each of the chapters that follow provides some lessons but also suggest that this area of research is still underdeveloped. Chapter II shows that if citizens had been given the option to choose from decentralization or recentralization in 2008, Latin Americans would have leaned towards a *recentralization* of fiscal and administrative powers between the national and local levels of government. This finding challenges, to some extent, both policy-makers and international organizations’ expectations of a wide support for state decentralization. Additionally, these citizen preferences are partly responsible for some of the diverse outcomes of decentralization that will be analyzed in greater detail in Chapters III, IV and V.

But what are the factors that impede a wider support for decentralization among the citizenry? A main finding is that individuals who reside in countries with higher levels of human development tend to be more supportive of decentralization policies. In contrast, those individuals residing in countries with lower average levels of economic wealth, health, and education tend to prefer a centralized management of public funds as well as a national instead of local provision of goods and services. In sum, Chapter II finds that the “centralist tradition of Latin America” holds true for countries where governments fail to provide the essential elements of social welfare.

The literature on political institutions has continuously attempted to make robust generalizations like the ones put forward in Chapter II. However, some scholars convincingly argue that generalizations like these are very difficult to formulate in the decentralization domain because it is so rich in context that cases must be evaluated individually. Others argue that part of the decentralization literature suffers from poor definitions and operationalizations of the concept and scarce cross-national statistical data sets. A more pessimistic group even suggests giving up research efforts altogether, due to the irrelevance of decentralization as a means to consolidate democracies (Treisman 2008).

In this dissertation, however, I make use of two large public opinion data sets to present in Chapters III and IV, some local, national and even hemispherical inferences about the effects of

decentralization on some elements of democracy. Chapter III looks at the correlations between state reforms and citizen participation in 22 countries in the Americas, whilst Chapter IV carries out a similar analysis in 46 Argentinean municipalities. These chapters find two contrasting outcomes: On the one hand, relatively higher degrees of state decentralization are associated with *lower* levels of citizen participation in political parties and movements. On the other hand, as territories become more decentralized, citizens tend to engage more often in public protests demonstrations and riots. In this regard, the empirical evidence presented here corroborates my theory of political survival of local elites; where empowered local elite agents discourage citizen participation in institutions of political representation, and citizen principals, as a result, engage in mobilized forms of participation. Two other findings suggest that in the 46 Argentinean municipalities selected for this study, higher decentralization degrees are related to lower voter turnout, but also to higher rates of demand-making on municipal offices.

If the findings above were true, how can we explain that two territories with remarkably similar degrees of state decentralization can still produce dramatically different outcomes? To find a plausible answer, Chapter V carries out a comparative historical analysis of Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú in Argentina. Arguably, no other dyad in this study could provide more leverage in order to control for all possible causal factors, and at the same time provide such extremely different outcomes with respect to democratic citizenship. Resting heavily on Collier and Collier's "critical juncture" (2002), Chapter V brings a key element to our understanding of decentralization: *the size of local political elite coalitions*. This chapter then determines how agency was delimited and how political actors made contingent choices upon the design and consolidation of current municipal governments in both cities. Chapter V makes an illuminating discovery.

Decentralization proves to be more successful with regards to goal of strengthening participatory democracy in towns where local civil society rather than local political elites or national leaders exert the most significant pressures for the transfers of power to their municipal government. In towns where "bottom-up" dynamics are exerted by a reduced group of political elites, institutions can be designed in such a way that sub-national power is concentrated in the

hands of a few instead of extending political rights and civil liberties among the citizenry. This finding corroborates my hypothesis that the structure of small local elite coalitions enables the establishment of institutions that restrict participatory democracy to political survival. In this sense, if small coalitions discover groups that could emerge as possible political competitors or are simply formed to oppose the incumbent's process of decision-making, elites will choose actions to avoid citizen participation or even eliminate such groups. On the contrary, the structure of relatively larger elite coalitions that results from "citizen-up" decentralization dynamics forges a wide, stronger participatory democracy. Thus, participation can mean a masquerade used by undemocratic leaders to exert fiscal pressures in some territories, but it can also mean a true path to sub-national democratic consolidation. But how can we discern between the success and failure of decentralization?

Part of the answer to this question is shown in Chapter VI. In this final chapter I use an unprecedented set of citizen assessments of Argentinean local governments to build three indicators of decentralization success. These indicators comprise the following citizen assessments: (a) Perception of Municipal Performance; (b) Perception of Municipal Administrative Efficacy; and (c) Perceptions about Municipal Freedom from Corruption. All four indicators relate to a greater concept of *Democratic Governance*. Results in this policy-oriented chapter show, once again, that municipal provisions that favor direct democracy and increase public accountability have mixed impacts on democratic governance. Some of the municipal regulations evaluated in this chapter are the public entities in charge of processing citizen complaints, specific mechanisms for the evaluation of municipal performance, rules that allow the accountability of public officials, registries of public official behavior, referendums, public audiences, mandate recalls, and the like.

CHAPTER II

II. CITIZEN SUPPORT FOR STATE DECENTRALIZATION

Decentralization brings the government closer to the people; however, do people want to be closer to the government? Decentralization advocates and skeptics have historically disagreed upon the impact that such reform has on society. What they do seem to agree with, however, is the fact that governments, policy-makers and international organizations have enthusiastically supported decentralization without regard of geography, political ideology or regime type. In post-Communist Eastern Europe, Latin America, post-Apartheid South Africa and even China, institutional reforms have modified in some way or another how power is allocated across different governmental levels. More provincial and municipal leaders are being popularly elected, more transfers of responsibilities for health care, education and the environment are being transferred, and more municipalities are collecting and spending fiscal resources than ever before. These changes have been particularly evident in the Latin American region, where international development agencies, such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the United States Agency for International Development have turned decentralization into the most widely spread and resource intensive of all democracy and governance programs (Falleti 2010; Goldstone et al. 2008; Treisman 2007).

Along with democracy, decentralization in Latin America has come to be seen not only by development agencies but also by policy-makers as a cure for a remarkable range of political and social ills. When the government is closer to the people, proponents argue, leaders should be able to satisfy with more precision territorially different citizen needs. Also, citizens should benefit from the increased competition between local governments to attract investors that results from decentralization. Even ethnic conflicts should be reduced because decentralization can be designed to satisfy limited demands for autonomy. But do people want to be closer to the government? In spite of the wide political support and the alleged benefits reported in the literature, few studies, if any, have been conducted to explore what citizens think about

decentralization. If this reform is intended to improve the relationship between the government and the citizenry, it may be crucial to understand not only the political support but also the citizen will to bring about decentralization. In other words, the degree of citizen support for decentralization may provide some of the answers to the question regarding the mixed effects of decentralization on democracy, which is the main topic of this dissertation.

In this context, do Latin American citizens prefer decentralization or recentralization? That is, should more obligations and more money be assigned to the municipality, or should the national government be allowed to assume more municipal obligations and services? Is citizen support for decentralization/recentralization symmetrical across Latin American countries? If not, what factors can explain this asymmetry? This chapter shows that despite governmental pressures and the efforts of international agencies to bring about decentralization, Latin American public opinion remains divided, and even a little inclined towards state *recentralization*. Some of the factors that explain these “light centralist preferences” are: (a) Country levels of human development; (b) Social capital and democratic governance (i.e. experiences with local governments); and (c) Socio-economic and demographic variables.

In the following section, I will argue that the most common causes of decentralization mentioned in the literature make little, if any reference to the study of citizen support for this state reform. I will discuss next that even though Latin American public opinion remains slightly in favor of recentralization, there is wide variation in citizen support for decentralization not only among individuals, but also across countries. The subsequent section hypothesizes about the factors that can explain these variations. After explaining my approach to instrumentation, I will explain the statistical procedures that will be used to assess my theory of light centralist preferences in Latin America and the Caribbean. Based on the works of Véliz (1980) and Lipset (1981), this theory argues that Latin American citizens tend to favor strong central governments, due to the historical construction of their societies that lack fundamental elements, such as feudal experiences, religious non-conformities, and the ideological, social and political developments associated with the industrial revolution, in comparison to their European counterparts. However, there should be an ample variation of citizen support for state decentralization across Latin

American countries that should be especially associated to levels of human development. Specifically, societies with relatively lower education levels, higher mortality rates, and economic insecurity should be more likely to breed individuals that support strong central governments, due to a self-recognition of the limited abilities that citizens have to fulfill the duties decentralization brings with it. In contrast, as the levels of health, wealth and education increase, citizens start to feel they are better equipped to exert closer control and oversight over public decision-making. Finally, the last section of this chapter concludes by showing the implications for theory and practice of the study of citizen preferences of state decentralization/recentralization.

Finding Support for State Decentralization

A large section of the decentralization literature has been dedicated to the study of the theoretical ideas of decentralization as the most adequate form of organization for the exercise of democracy. Most of these theories can be nested in three large dimensions: (a) The economic dimension; (b) The political dimension; and (c) The administrative dimension. Governments and international organizations alike have used these theories to base their decisions about decentralization or recentralization. However, a direct assessment of citizens' willingness to favor or oppose decentralization reforms remains, in my view, largely absent from the literature. The study of public opinion on decentralization is relevant because the development of "effective democracy" depends in important ways on the recognition of the citizen will by political elites. In this section, I will first review the often-cited scholarship on the causes of political support for decentralization, and then explain some of the potential causes behind the diverse degrees of Latin American citizen support for decentralization.

One of the political thinkers that pioneered the study of decentralization was Alexis de Tocqueville. This author envisioned the need for local governments by noting that even if individuals are equally capable to govern themselves, they submit to society not because of inferiority, but because they think and know it is useful, and such union cannot exist without a ruling power (de Tocqueville 1961 [1835]). The "almost natural" primary form of this ruling power would be the community, where people directly gather to decide what should be collectively

addressed, what should be contributed, and who should be responsible for carrying out the collective mandate. Communitarian society exists in all towns, independently from their customs and laws. Only at the community, thanks to direct democracy, people can exercise their self-government rights; but among all liberties that of the community is precisely the most exposed to power invasions, and to successfully defend it, it is necessary that communes have fully developed under broader national ideas and customs. For Tocqueville, the community was a sort of “laboratory for democracy.”

According to this observer, the daily needs of New Englanders were resolved at the community level. The county and the state had legislative powers but their decisions needed to be made through the (elected) community officers. Citizens elected representatives at higher levels of government only to solve those problems that basic organizations did not or could not resolve themselves. This logic was the basis for the federal organization of the United States (Finot 2001). Tocqueville also observes, however, that the United States represents a unique case of political organization only sustained in democracy. This could have been possible only because the founding fathers were originally wealthy, had advanced education levels, shared order and morality habits, and migrated with their women and children. These observations constitute the basis for modern scholarship on decentralization. Scholars nowadays base the study of decentralization on its fiscal or economic, and political and administrative dimensions. In the following lines, I will present the highlights of each dimension and discuss how they relate to the political support for such reforms of the state.

The Economic Dimension

Modern scholarship on the economic dimension of support for decentralization is explained through at least 4 theories: (a) Fiscal federalism; (b) Public choice; (c) The principal-agent model; and (d) Neo-institutionalism and social capital. Proponents of *fiscal federalism* argue that decentralization can be implemented to partly solve the allocation of public goods dilemma. Paul Samuelson (1954) was one of the first authors to note this dilemma. While the market system allows both recognizing with more precision individual preferences and satisfying

them with private goods, provision of public goods responds to aggregate instead of individual preferences, creating an efficiency problem. For this reason, in those territorial arrangements where the allocation of public goods fails to satisfy individual preferences, tax evasion should be higher. Years later, Charles Tiebout (1956) stated that this efficiency problem could be mitigated if a large number of public goods are locally provided; in this case, consumers could vote “with their feet,” that is, they could move to the community that best responded to their preferences (this idea was later elaborated upon by Hirschman in 1970). Based on these views, governments started to decentralize but they soon encountered problems. Demand for public goods did not necessarily coincide with the jurisdiction of each governmental level and it was unfeasible to change the size of the jurisdictions to solve this problem, since optimum sizes proved to be different for each type of service (Finot 2001). Nevertheless, decentralized processes were still more efficient than their centralized counterparts because local governments were still better endowed to recognize territorially differentiated demands.

With the purpose of lessening efficiency problems that markets alone cannot solve, Dennis Mueller (1979, 1984) developed a second economic dimension of support for decentralization in his *public choice theory*. According to this theory, the quest for individual satisfaction is not enough to reach an optimum where improving an individual's situation is impossible without worsening somebody else's situation (Pareto optimum). Indeed, trying to exclusively improve individual's welfare may conduce to steal rather than exchange, producing the worst scenario; that is, people producing and consuming less because they would have to invest large amounts of resources to take care of their properties.

Public goods, as a result, are basically cooperative solutions to the problem mentioned above (or at least the second best option), because they are more efficient when competitive solutions fail. In principle, these agreements are more efficient in small communities because in those cases, individuals can internalize the costs of complying and enforcing agreements, that otherwise have to be covered by the government through taxes (Coase 1960). As communities grow larger, there is an increasing need for representation and public administration to enforce agreements. However, neither politicians nor public officials are immune from the quest of

individual, private gains. For this reason, the provision of public goods and services is thought to be more efficient in small, decentralized settings, not only because specific individual needs can be more accurately satisfied, but also because political and administrative intermediation is less necessary. Thus the ideal solution would be one in which citizens directly decide what local public goods they will use knowing beforehand the costs of doing so.

A third way to explain the economic dimension of decentralization is through the *principal-agent* model. In this model, governments, as well as individuals, give certain degrees of freedom to bureaucracies to produce public services (Heymann 1988; Hiskey 2010). As Finot notes, the principal-agent model is appropriate to explain decentralized states, because local governments work both as the “heads of autonomies” and as “national government agents” (2001:31). In the former case, citizens (principals) “theoretically gain more leverage over those agents [local governments] most directly responsible for such critical areas as basic service provision “(Hiskey 2010:30). The latter would be a case where a national government defines a policy but encounters that it would be more convenient if its execution were decentralized. Even though local governments have more information about local realities, they also have their own priorities. Thus, if local leaders use national resources based on their priorities rather than national priorities, the principal-agent model could be at risk. To avoid this potential problem, national governments and citizens should elaborate detailed contracts and complex follow-up and evaluation systems that would not be necessary in the absence of such conflict of interests (Finot 2001).

Finally, the *neo-institutionalism and social capital* theory argues that even though the neoclassic approach is fundamentally right, the correct functioning of the economy is only possible through the establishment of the appropriate norms and mechanisms (North 1995). Such institutions may be either formal or informal, but the decisive component to their correct functioning is actors' behavior. A seminal contribution to the decentralization literature is the study of decentralization in Italy. Putnam's exploration of why after a symmetric change in the rules of the game in Italy (i.e. decentralization) some regions progressed more than others, found that in the most progressive regions there was a strong tradition of reciprocity and a culture of horizontal

cooperation (1994). In this way, Putnam's reasoning contributed to the concept of "social capital" that basically explains the capacity of a society to develop cooperative solutions to common problems. This characteristic may be a product of a large process of social constructivism, but John Durston (1999) shows that it might also be possible to create it even in places where social capital has been traditionally incipient. The problem, however, is that trying to create social capital in places with low civic traditions may exacerbate pre-existing conflicts, generating as a result negative outcomes to the socialization process (Armony 2004).

The four theories advanced in this section employed to explain the economic dimension of support for decentralization make little reference about the response that the alleged beneficiaries would give to an attempt of vertically relocating fiscal powers. In this chapter, I argue that the degree of citizen support for fiscal decentralization is contingent upon the capacity that principals believe to have to control the use of public monies by governmental authorities or other agents. In this view, individuals residing in countries with higher averages of education, wealth and health should feel better equipped to exert closer control over the tax structure of those countries. In contrast, relatively less developed principals should be more comfortable letting the "experts" in the nation's capital city take care of the national budget and the allocation of public monies. Moreover, principals in less developed contexts should be more concerned with the satisfaction of their individual basic needs instead worrying about the collective decision-making processes of public economic resources.

The Political and Administrative Dimensions

In general terms, the political and administrative dimensions of decentralization see support for decentralization as a function of (a) Electoralist Approach; (b) The Role of Demographic Forces; (c) Decentralization as a Result of Democratization; and (d) International Factors. The *electoralist approach* studies the incentives politicians have to decentralize, usually as a result of the structure of electoral institutions, the internal structure of political parties and politicians' strategic competitions to advance their careers (Montero and Samuels 2004). Such approaches suggest that the incentives political leaders have to either decentralize or recentralize

depend upon the chances they have to win in electoral contest, paying careful consideration to the importance of whether elections are national or sub-national, and the relative importance that elections have for career advancement. As Montero and Samuels argue “these approaches assume both that existing political hierarchies exert a path-dependent effect on politicians’ choices *and* politicians are strategic and forward-looking and may attempt to redesign existing institutions to serve an expected future political goal” (2004:21). In other words, politicians may support decentralization if it helps to fulfill their political objectives (i.e. vote-maximizing or office-maximizing behaviors).

The *role of demographic forces* explains that support for decentralization is related to the increasing urbanization levels that alter municipal leaders’ incentives to pressure for state reforms (Samuels 2004). In particular, high levels of urbanization increase the costs of providing local services from the central level of government. As a result, decentralization is seen as a tool to increase efficiency in the management and delivery of public goods and services. The demographic forces approach has also proven useful to explain the limits to decentralization. In poorer territorial settings, for instance, decentralizing revenue authority clearly cannot help governments to develop local economies. In contrast, wealthier sub-national units may pressure for an increasing fiscal autonomy because they want to be able to control more of the locally generated revenues. In this case, national legislators may face contradicting pressures to decentralize or not. For this reason, governments have to apply complex formulas for both revenues assignments and administrative distributions.

Part of the literature on support for decentralization has focused on *democratization* to explain such reform. The logic behind this association is that decentralization opens up local spaces for public contestation and electoral participation at the sub-national level (Beer 2004). Thus several scholars have suggested that decentralization aids democratic consolidation because citizen pressures increase the demand for more responsive governments (Nickson 1995; Souza 1997). However, Montero and Samuels (2004) convincingly argue that correlation is insufficient to establish *causation*, because several studies show that in some territories, democratization *preceded* decentralization. It is important to note, however, that democratization

is important to determine how policy authorities and resources are decentralized. For this reason, as scholars suggest, “we require more nuanced hypotheses to tease out the complex linkages between regime change and decentralization” (Montero and Samuels 2004:18). In sum, the works advanced to explain the linkage between decentralization and democratization require additional efforts to collect times series data or make qualitative comparative historical analysis in order to best determine causation.

Finally, the *international factors approach* discusses decentralization reforms as a result of market economy openness to foreign investments, the trans-nationalization of production, and the advocacy of international financial institutions for structural adjustment programs. However, the empirical evidence shows mixed supportive evidence for such claims. For instance, the privatization wave occurred during the late 1980s and early 1990s involved in some places sub-national governments, it did not accompany the pre-1990 episodes of decentralization, and even in some cases such as Argentina and Brazil, financial liberalization followed fiscal and administrative decentralization. Foreign direct investment (FDI) created opportunities for municipal governments to attract international capitals, however, not all countries have taken advantage of this opportunity in the same way and even in some cases, empirical evidence for the association of FDI and decentralization is scant. Lastly, in an assessment carried out by Falletti (1999), the author found little evidence backing the claim that international financial institutions recommended fiscal decentralization as part of the broader set of policies found in the “Washington Consensus” (see also Montero and Samuels 2004).

Just as the study of support for decentralization’s economic dimension, citizens’ willingness to either approve or reject the political and administrative dimensions has been understudied. A crucial hypothesis in this regard is that individuals living in relatively more developed contexts should be better endowed to closely monitor and shape the behavior of their agents. As a result, principals should be willing to support a move towards decentralization in contexts of greater development. Conversely, principals living in underdeveloped contexts should be able self-recognize their limited ability to play a more preponderant role in the political and administrative decision-making that decentralization reforms bring with them.

Citizen Support for State Decentralization in Latin America or Centralism *Déjà vu?*

As previously suggested, the aforementioned causes of decentralization make only implicit associations between decentralization and the citizen's will to support the strategy. This author has not found, however, any comprehensive regional or global study of citizen preferences in the allocation of fiscal and administrative responsibilities between the national and local levels of government. Since the congruence between what people feel and how governments behave is quintessential in a democracy, it may very well be the case that the current degree of decentralization in the Latin American region is at least partly related to citizen preferences for it. For if rational elected public officials in charge of decentralization policies pursue political survival, they should be connected, in one way or another, with the elector's opinions about who should manage public funds and who should be responsible for the provision of public goods and services. Drawing upon the theories put forward in the previous section, I present in the following lines five hypothesis that I think best collectively explain different degrees of citizen support for state decentralization in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Centralist Inheritance. This first hypothesis is based on the seminal work advanced by Claudio Véliz in "The Centralist Tradition of Latin America" (1980). In this work, Véliz essentially argues that Latin American societies will remain centralist for some time because they have not experienced northwestern Europe's social constructivist factors. These factors are: a) The absence of the feudal experience from the Latin American tradition; b) The absence of religious unconformity and therefore the presence of a dominant, centralist religion; c) The absence of the circumstances circumscribed to the Industrial Revolution; and d) The absence of the circumstances circumscribed in the French Revolution that so dramatically transformed the European society. In this sense, Véliz suggests that the proliferation of centralist, authoritarian regimes is not a product of aberration; rather, it is a "manifestation of a style of political behavior, a secular disposition of Latin American society that under different forms... will be with us for some time yet" (1980:3).

Therefore, if Véliz is right, there should be some empirical evidence to corroborate his assertions that Latin Americans favor centralism over decentralism. Although Véliz wrote his piece 30 years ago, his assertions may hold true today because “centralism has had a most powerful and specific impact on the behavior of Latin Americans” during the past five centuries (1980:6). In this dissertation, I thus expect to find, on average, greater support for the idea that the national government in lieu of the local government, should manage more public funds and administer more governmental responsibilities. However, a cautionary note must be introduced: Even though I expect to find, on average, a slight preference for recentralization, Véliz’s theory falls short to explain why there is so much variation on support for decentralization not only across countries but also among individual principals. The following four hypotheses are designed in such a way as to take into consideration that Latin American countries and individuals within countries may also differ with respect to their degree of support for state decentralization.

Human Development. The factor that I think best explains the expected wide variation of support for decentralization within and across Latin American countries is *human development*. Within countries, factors such as individual education, income, and the geographical location of residence should be associated with the degree of citizen support for decentralization. This expectation is based upon Seymour Martin Lipset’s seminal work *Political Man*, in which he notes that low education, low participation in political or voluntary organizations of any type, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns” (1981:476) are some of the most of important factors contributing to centralist, authoritarian governments. If Lipset’s claim were true, I would expect then to find that less well-off individuals regard strong central governments as important providers of the basic elements needed for human development.

In this view, less developed individuals in terms of health, wealth and education should feel ill equipped to carry out the duties and responsibilities that come associated with decentralization processes, and may prefer to leave these actions to the connoisseurs at the

national capital. Moreover, these individuals should be more concerned about satisfying their basic needs instead of thinking about how to exercise more control and how participate more actively in collective decision-making at the local level. In contrast, I anticipate that wealthier and more educated individuals prefer to have greater control over their contributions to society (usually fees and taxes), and hence show greater support for decentralization. In other words, once individuals think they have satisfied their basic needs, they may feel ready to participate more actively in decision-making and oversight activities that result from the empowerment of local governments.

This logic may also hold across countries. As Lipset and many others have argued “the average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries;” (1981:33) where power is shared instead of concentrated in authoritarian, central offices. As a result, citizen support for state decentralization or recentralization should vary according to the average country levels of health, wealth education. In this research, I expect to find that in countries with higher average levels of human development dwell individuals who show greater support for decentralization and power-sharing systems. In contrast, centralist opinions should be evident in countries with lower average levels of health, wealth and education.

Social Capital. Lipset's *Political Man* also notes that “low participation in political or voluntary organizations of any type” is associated with an increasing support for centralist, authoritarian leaders. Much of the literature on social capital has focused on its impact on democracy and democratic governance. The main argument is that individuals who participate in communitarian activities or voluntary associations learn to voice their needs and complaints, and at the same time increase their tolerance towards those who oppose the majority's will. Externally, these associations allow individuals to organize and express their interests and demands on government, while at the same time protect them from abuses of power by their political leaders. In short, participation and civic engagement develop the individual characteristics necessary to promote democratic self-government, since in these “schools for

democracy” citizen learn to run meetings, speak in public, organize projects, write letters and debate public issues (Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1994).

If social capital were positively related to the concept of self-government, I then anticipate that those individuals who participate more often in political or voluntary associations of any type show greater support for state decentralization. In this view, civically engaged citizens would rather be “closer” to public funds and administrative responsibilities as to be able to manage them by themselves. In contrast, I expect that people divorced from communities, occupations and associations show greater support for recentralization. Low levels of civic engagement may be due to intrinsic individual factors such as dissatisfaction with life, or extrinsic factors such as low levels of interpersonal trust. Whatever the most plausible reason is, or a combination of both, citizens in scenarios of disconnection with their communities should prefer that the national government manage more funds and responsibilities in comparison to the community or the local government.

Democratic Governance. One of the most cited benefits of democratic systems, is that they allow citizens to hold their leaders accountable. Democratic governments are accountable if citizens can discern whether politicians are acting on their best interests and sanction them appropriately, rewarding officials who perform well, usually through reelection, and replacing them if they fail to do so (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). In addition to electoral accountability, citizens may also reward not only elected officials but also bureaucrats by supporting their initiatives and allowing them to manage more public funds and administrative responsibilities. Accordingly, if citizens perceive inefficient governance at one level, they may prefer that public funds and administrative responsibilities be managed at a different level.

From this analysis, it could be expected that those individuals who are relatively more satisfied with the services provided by the local government show greater support for state decentralization. Conversely, those citizens who perceive that the national government is being more efficacious with respect to the management of public funds and administrative responsibilities should be more supportive of recentralization policies. Finally, as shown

somewhere else, political trust is another governance factor associated with the different levels of support for decentralization among individuals (see Montalvo 2008). Political trust is shaped by individuals' perceptions of and experiences with governmental institutions responsible for ensuring the quality of democratic governance. Thus, as political trust in the municipality increases, citizen support for state decentralization should increase as well. On the other hand, citizens should exhibit greater support for recentralization if they have higher levels of political trust for the national level of government.

Ethnic Divisions. According to consociational theory, the adoption of decentralized forms of government facilitates social stability in multinational states (Lijphart 1969; Lijphart 1977; Norris 2008). The mechanism behind this association shows that decentralized constitutions "which strengthen state's rights and regional autonomy represent some of the most important strategies, as these safeguard some guaranteed areas of self-government for geographically concentrated minorities" (Norris 2008:157). Lijphart suggests that if political boundaries of sub-national governments reflect social or ethnic boundaries, then multicultural societies can become homogenous within their boundaries, promoting political stability and making it easier to aggregate diverse preferences to the larger state.

If citizens of multinational countries are aware that decentralization can satisfy their demands for autonomy, they may be willing to show high levels of support for decentralization. In this context, it may be possible to find greater support for decentralization among indigenous and African Latin-American populations, in comparison to white, mestizo or other racial groups. An alternative hypothesis, however, may be that if the product of decentralization in multiethnic nations empowers an ethnic local group in detriment of other groups, then those groups that lose power relative to the beneficiaries of decentralization may be willing to show higher levels of support for state recentralization. In this view, for instance, indigenous or black populations in Latin America may prefer recentralization to decentralization, if white or mestizo groups are the dominant leaders at the municipal government and use their power to oppress other races.

In Search for Evidence of Citizen Support for Decentralization

The five hypotheses advanced above constitute the research program for this chapter. These factors associated with citizen support for decentralization in Latin America and the Caribbean are not exhaustive; rather, they are intended to shed some light about plausible explanations for the willingness that people have to embrace the strategy. In order to test the hypothesis presented in this chapter, I query the *AmericasBarometer* 2008 data set to operationalize measures that I think best capture the Latin American public opinion on decentralization. This data set contains responses of 37,035 individuals in 22 countries in the region.¹ In the next lines, I will describe the variables I use for each hypothesis and how these variables are operationalized.

Dependent Variables. There are four dependent variables in this study to analyze the average citizen support for decentralization in Latin America and the Caribbean: (a) Citizen support for administrative decentralization; (b) Citizen support for fiscal decentralization; (c) a Composite index of citizen support for decentralization; and (d) a Trichotomous measure of citizen support for decentralization. The first two variables were obtained using the instrument in Appendix A1, while the third and fourth variables are a construct of the other two. The wording to obtain the variable *Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization* is the following: “Taking into account the public services available in this country, who should assume more responsibilities?” The original 1 to 5 scale was recoded to a scale that ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 means “much more to the national government,” 25 means “something more to the national government,” 50 means “the same amount to the national government and the municipality,” 75 means “somewhat more to the municipality,” and 100 means “much more to the municipality.”

¹ These countries are: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. For more information see Chapter I and www.lapopsurveys.org

Similarly, the wording to obtain the variable *Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization* is as follows: “And taking into account the existing economic resources in the country: Who should administer more money?” This variable, as well as the *Composite Index*, uses the same scale as the one used in Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization. Finally, the *Trichotomous Measure* is coded as -100 for “support for recentralization,” 0 for “support for an even distribution,” and 100 for “support for decentralization.” This variable was created based on condensing the options “much more and something more to the national government” in one category, the “same amount to the national government and to the municipality” in a second category, and “much more and something more to the municipality” in a third category. Condensing these options will allow classifying individuals according to their preferences about decentralization, recentralization or even distribution. There are three features that are worth noting about these variables and scales. First, they only tap into the administrative and fiscal dimensions of decentralization, and leave aside the political dimension. With very few exceptions, mayors are nowadays being popularly elected across all Latin American countries, giving to political decentralization dimension the empirical characteristic of a *constant* instead of a variable.

The administrative and fiscal dimensions of decentralization, on the other hand, are under permanent negotiation between the nation/state and municipal levels of government. Second, the wording used for the questions makes clear reference to the “existing or available services and resources.” With this wording, respondents should understand that no more taxes, bureaucracies or institutions are being created; rather, they have to choose from decentralization and recentralization in a zero-sum game. Of course tax-bases and institutional structures can be studied from a non-zero sum game perspective; however, in this chapter I am interested in citizen support for the occurrence of power *transfers* between the national and local levels of government instead of the willingness to create more taxes or institutions. Finally, since support for decentralization is studied from a zero-sum perspective, respondents have three fundamental options that compose the *Trichotomous Measure*: (a) support decentralization; (b) support an equal distribution of resources and responsibilities; and (c) support recentralization.

Independent Variables. In accord with the theory of this chapter, the explanatory variables will center around: (a) Human development; (b) Social capital; (c) Democratic governance; and (d) Ethnicity. In terms of *Human Development* this chapter uses both country-level and individual-level measures. The country-level construct is a composite statistic created by the United Nations Development Programme that classifies countries according to their level of life expectancy, education, and per-capita GDP as an indicator of standard of living.² This index goes from 0 that means, “least developed” to 1 that means “most developed.” The individual-level human development variables are *education* that goes from 0 to 18 and *quintiles of wealth* that goes from 1 to 5. While the former measures the number of years of completed education, the latter measures the quintile of wealth in which an individual is located.³ A control variable used in this section is *Role of the State Index*. This composite statistic measures the idea that citizens have about the role of the state in the economy and goes from 0, which means “Strongly disagrees” that the state (government) should have a role in the economy to 100, which means “Strongly agrees.”

The variables to measure *Social Capital* are: *Municipal Meetings Attendance* that is coded as 0 if the respondent “Has not attended” and 1 if the respondent “Has attended;” *Demand-Making on Municipal Government* coded as 0 if respondent “Has not demanded” and 1 if the respondent “Has demanded;” and *Communitarian Participation* that goes from 0 if the respondent “Never participated” to 100 if the respondent “Participates at least once a week.” It is worth noting that the first two social capital variables are dichotomous, while the third variable is continuous. As it can be observed, these variables measure participation not only in the municipality, but also in organizations of the civil society. Next, the variables that measure *Democratic Governance* are: *Satisfaction with Local Democracy* that goes from 0 if the respondent thinks, “the services provided by the municipality are very poor” to 100 if the respondent thinks, “the services provided by the municipality are very good;” *Trust in the*

² For more information see: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/>

³ For more information about how the quintiles of wealth were created, see: Abby Córdova, *Nota metodológica: midiendo riqueza relativa utilizando indicadores sobre bienes del hogar* (Nashville: El Barómetro de las Américas, 19, 2009).

Municipal Government that goes from 0 if the respondent “Does not trust it at all” to 100 if the respondent “Trusts it a lot;” and *Efficacy of the National Government* which is an index that how efficacious is the government in the eyes of respondents, and goes from 0, representing the lowest level of efficacy to 100, representing the highest efficacy level.

Table II-1: Descriptive Statistics from LAPOP Americas Barometer 2008 and UNDP HDI 2007

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
VARIABLE NAME	CODE	N	MEAN	SD	MIN	MAX
<i>Dependent Variables</i>						
Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization	LGL2AR	33682	49.05	33.45	0	100
Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization	LGL2BR	33529	48.13	34.26	0	100
Composite Index of Citizen Support for Decentralization	DECINDEX	34399	48.62	29.96	0	100
Trichotomous Measure of Citizen Support for Decentralization	TRICH	34399	-2.10	84.86	-100	100
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>						
Education	EDS	36694	8.92	4.47	0	18
Age	Q2S	36939	38.91	15.8	16	101
Female	MUJER	37035	0.51	0.5	0	1
Quintiles of Wealth	QUINTALL	36817	2.93	1.41	1	5
Size of City/Town of Residence	TAMANOR	37035	2.71	1.58	1	5
<i>Ethnicity</i>						
White	WHITE	36018	0.25	0.43	0	1
Mestizo	MESTIZO	36018	0.46	0.5	0	1
Indigenous	INDIG	36018	0.07	0.26	0	1
Black	BLACK	36018	0.14	0.35	0	1
Other	OTHER	36018	0.07	0.26	0	1
<i>Support for Democracy</i>						
Churchillian Democracy	ING4R	34637	71.07	28.84	0	100
Preference for Authoritarian Leader	AUT1R	34851	0.15	0.36	0	1
<i>Social Capital</i>						
Municipal Meetings Attendance	NP1R	36597	0.11	0.31	0	1
Demand-Making on Municipal Government	NP2R	36645	0.13	0.33	0	1
Communitarian Participation	CP8R	36534	15.48	26.76	0	100
<i>Governance Indicators</i>						
Satisfaction with Local Services	SGL1R	34620	49.85	23.49	0	100
Trust in the Municipal Government	B32R	35746	49.98	30.29	0	100
Efficacy of National Government	EFICGOV	35886	43.68	26.81	0	100
<i>Role of the State in the Economy</i>						
Role of the State Index	ROLST	35917	72.3	22.37	0	100
COUNTRY-LEVEL						
VARIABLE NAME	CODE	N	MEAN	SD	MIN	MAX
Human Development Index 2007	HDI07	22	0.78	0.08	0.53	0.88

Finally, the *Ethnicity* variables are dummies for *Mestizo*, *Indigenous*, *Black* and *Other*, using *White* as base category. According to the literature review and the hypothesis advanced in this chapter, four other variables need to be taken into consideration when exploring citizen support for state decentralization. The first two variables are associated with the socio-demographic characteristics of the population: (a) Sex, (b) Size of the city/town of residence; while the other two are related to democratic values: (c) Support for democracy, and (d) Authoritarian preferences. *Female* is a dummy variable that taps into sex, and is coded as 1 if “Female” and 0 if “Male;” the *Size of the City/ Town of Residence* goes from 1 that means “Rural Area” to 5 that means “Metropolitan Area;” *Support for Democracy* taps into the “Churchillian” concept and goes from 0 that means that the respondent “Strongly disagrees” with the Churchillian concept of democracy, and 100 if the respondent “Strongly agrees;” and *Preference for Authoritarian Leaders* coded as 0 if the respondent thinks “We need a strong leader who does not have to be elected” or 1 if the respondent thinks “Electoral democracy is the best.” A summary of the descriptive statistics is depicted in Table II-1.

With these variables, this chapter fits several hierarchical linear models in order to test the associations among the dependent and explanatory variables described in the hypotheses of this study.⁴ The dependent variables “citizen support for administrative decentralization,” “citizen support for fiscal decentralization,” and the “composite index of support for decentralization” are modeled as continuous; while the trichotomous variable “support for decentralization” is modeled as multinomial, with *decentralization* as the base category. Hence, the *intra-class correlation coefficients* in this chapter are calculated by fitting three fully unconditional models, according to the specification of the dependent variables.⁵ After a series of analyses, and according to the theory of this chapter, the following models are selected:

⁴ All the statistical analyses in this chapter are carried out using STATA 10.1 and HLM 6.08.

⁵ The intra-class correlation for the trichotomous support for decentralization is not meaningful because the level-1 variance is heteroscedastic.

Equation II.1

Dependent variable: Citizen Support for Administrative Decentralization

Level-1 Model:

$$Y = B_0 + B_1*(ING4R) + B_2*(NP1R) + B_3*(NP2R) + B_4*(SGL1R) + B_5*(B32R) + B_6*(EFICGOV) + B_7*(MUJER) + B_8*(Q2S) + B_9*(EDS) + B_{10}*(CP8R) + B_{11}*(ROLST) + B_{12}*(TAMANOR) + B_{13}*(QUINTALL) + B_{14}*(MESTIZO) + B_{15}*(INDIG) + B_{16}*(BLACK) + B_{17}*(OTHER) + B_{18}*(AUT1R) + R$$

Level-2 Model:

$$B_0 = G_0 + G_1*(HDI07) + U_0$$

Equation II.2

Dependent variable: Citizen Support for Fiscal Decentralization

Level-1 Model

$$Y = B_0 + B_1*(ING4R) + B_2*(NP1R) + B_3*(NP2R) + B_4*(SGL1R) + B_5*(B32R) + B_6*(EFICGOV) + B_7*(MUJER) + B_8*(Q2S) + B_9*(EDS) + B_{10}*(CP8R) + B_{11}*(ROLST) + B_{12}*(TAMANOR) + B_{13}*(QUINTALL) + B_{14}*(MESTIZO) + B_{15}*(INDIG) + B_{16}*(BLACK) + B_{17}*(OTHER) + B_{18}*(AUT1R) + R$$

Level-2 Model

$$B_0 = G_0 + G_1*(HDI07) + U_0$$

Equation II.3

Dependent variable: Composite Index of Citizen Support for Decentralization⁶

Level-1 Model

$$Y = B_0 + B_1*(ING4R) + B_2*(NP1R) + B_3*(NP2R) + B_4*(SGL1R) + B_5*(B32R) + B_6*(EFICGOV) + B_7*(MUJER) + B_8*(Q2S) + B_9*(EDS) + B_{10}*(CP8R) + B_{11}*(ROLST) + B_{12}*(TAMANOR) + B_{13}*(QUINTALL) + B_{14}*(MESTIZO) + B_{15}*(INDIG) + B_{16}*(BLACK) + B_{17}*(OTHER) + B_{18}*(AUT1R) + R$$

Level-2 Model

$$B_0 = G_0 + G_1*(HDI07) + U_0$$

Equation II.4

Dependent variable: Trichotomous Measure (Base category: *support for decentralization*)

Level-1 Model

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Prob}[Y(-100) = 1|B] &= P(-100) \\ \text{Prob}[Y(0) = 1|B] &= P(0) \end{aligned}$$

⁶ The scale reliability coefficient for this construct is .7.

$$\text{Prob}[Y(100) = 1|B] = P(100) = 1 - P(-100) - P(0)$$

$$\begin{aligned} \log[P(-100)/P(100)] = & B0(-100) + B1(-100)*(ING4R) + B2(-100)*(NP1R) + B3(-100)*(NP2R) + B4(-100)*(SGL1R) + B5(-100)*(B32R) + B6(-100)*(EFICGOV) + \\ & B7(-100)*(MUJER) + B8(-100)*(Q2S) + B9(-100)*(EDS) + B10(-100)*(CP8R) + \\ & B11(-100)*(ROLST) + B12(-100)*(TAMANOR) + B13(-100)*(QUINTALL) + B14(-100)*(MESTIZO) + \\ & B15(-100)*(INDIG) + B16(-100)*(BLACK) + B17(-100)*(OTHER) + B18(-100)*(AUT1R) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \log[P(0)/P(100)] = & B0(0) + B1(0)*(ING4R) + B2(0)*(NP1R) + B3(0)*(NP2R) + \\ & B4(0)*(SGL1R) + B5(0)*(B32R) + B6(0)*(EFICGOV) + B7(0)*(MUJER) + \\ & B8(0)*(Q2S) + B9(0)*(EDS) + B10(0)*(CP8R) + B11(0)*(ROLST) + \\ & B12(0)*(TAMANOR) + B13(0)*(QUINTALL) + B14(0)*(MESTIZO) + \\ & B15(0)*(INDIG) + B16(0)*(BLACK) + B17(0)*(OTHER) + B18(0)*(AUT1R) \end{aligned}$$

Level-2 Model

$$\begin{aligned} B0(-100) &= G00(-100) + G01(-100)*(HDI07) + U0(-100) \\ B0(0) &= G00(0) + G01(0)*(HDI07) + U0(0) \end{aligned}$$

Variable coding is depicted in Table II-1.

Results

This section analyzes the degree to which citizens in Latin American and Caribbean express support for decentralization, recentralization, or an equal distribution of administrative and fiscal responsibilities between the national and municipal governments. The regional mean values for the four measures show that public support is almost perfectly divided; however, the data show a slight preference for *recentralization*. While the regional mean of citizen support for administrative decentralization is 49.05 points in the 0 – 100 scale, the mean for citizen support for fiscal decentralization is 48.13 points (48.90 and 48.36 respectively, if design effects are taken into account). These results are depicted in Figure II-1. Although the mean differences between administrative and fiscal support for decentralization are not statistically significant, their confidence intervals do not cross the 50-point value, suggesting a slight inclination to favor *recentralization* over decentralization.




Figure II-1: Citizen Support for Administrative and Fiscal Decentralization

The mean value for the composite index of citizen support for decentralization is 48.62 (48.47 if design effects are taken into account), corroborating the slight preference for recentralization. Finally, the trichotomous measure shows that 36.9 percent of citizens in Latin American and Caribbean prefer recentralization, 35 percent decentralization, and 28.1 percent an equal distribution of administrative and fiscal responsibilities between the national and the local levels of government. These results are depicted in Figure II-2. In spite of these findings, Figures II-1 and II-2 also show that there is variation across countries, not only in terms of their relative rankings, but also in their preferences for either decentralization or recentralization.⁷ For instance, while Bolivia, Costa Rica and Mexico are at the top of the scale of support for *administrative* decentralization with 61.0, 55.3 and 55.3 points respectively, Costa Rica, Paraguay and Bolivia

⁷ The intra-class correlation coefficient for the first three dependent variables is around four percent.

are at the top of the scale of support for *fiscal* decentralization, with 61.1, 57.4 and 56.2 respectively. At the other end, countries like Panama, Haiti and Honduras show the lowest support for administrative decentralization with 39.8, 35.2 and 32.4 points respectively; and Ecuador, Haiti and Honduras show the lowest support for fiscal decentralization with 40.3, 37.4 and 35.8 points respectively.




Figure II-2: Composite Index and Trichotomous Measure of Citizen Support for Decentralization

In the case of the composite index, Bolivia, Costa Rica and Mexico are at the top of the scale with 58.5, 58.1 and 55.1 points respectively, while the countries at the bottom of the scale are the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Honduras with 43.0, 36.3 and 34.1 points respectively. It is interesting to note that the wide variation of citizen support for decentralization appears to be independent from the degree of actual decentralization. The empirical evidence shows a federal country (Mexico), sharing the top of the scale of the composite index with a moderately

decentralized country (Bolivia) and a rather centralized country (Costa Rica). Also, the position of relatively high-decentralized countries in the middle of the scale (such as the Argentina and Brazil federations) suggests that support for decentralization may be determined by other contextual factors not related to the actual degree of decentralization.⁸ What are some of the possible factors related to citizen support for decentralization? The following lines show the results of the four hierarchical linear models specified in the previous section for this purpose.

Table II-2 summarizes the results from the first three means-as-outcomes hierarchical linear models fitted to explore the correlations of citizen support for state decentralization. Results from the multinomial model are depicted in Table II-3. The three models with continuous dependent variables in Table II-2 are: (a) Support for administrative decentralization; (b) Support for fiscal decentralization; and (c) Composite index of support for decentralization. This table shows coefficients, significance levels and standard errors in parentheses.

⁸ Chapter III shows the degree of decentralization per country in the region.

Table II-2: Results from the Means-As-Outcomes Models

	Model I		Model II		Model III	
	Support for Administrative Decentralization		Support for Fiscal Decentralization		Support for Decentralization Index	
Intercept	48.649***	(1.217)	48.366***	(1.380)	48.574***	(1.228)
Individual-Level						
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>						
Education	0.292***	(0.068)	0.172***	(0.065)	0.24***	(0.062)
Age	0.034	(0.022)	0.008	(0.018)	0.022	(0.018)
Female	-1.639***	(0.384)	-1.100**	(0.443)	-1.310***	(0.342)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.174	(0.200)	-0.437**	(0.215)	-0.321*	(0.189)
Size of City/Town of Residence	-0.21	(0.248)	-0.831***	(0.308)	-0.544**	(0.254)
<i>Race (Base category: White)</i>						
Mestizo	-0.445	(0.835)	-1.402*	(0.780)	-0.881	(0.786)
Indigenous	-1.243	(0.934)	-3.773**	(1.455)	-2.338**	(0.997)
Black	0.502	(1.160)	0.09	(1.403)	0.204	(1.236)
Other	0.884	(0.862)	1.049	(0.767)	1.063	(0.728)
<i>Support for Democracy</i>						
Churchillian Democracy	0.011	(0.013)	0.01	(0.012)	0.011	(0.012)
Preference for Authoritarian Leader	-2.49**	(1.173)	-0.771	(1.321)	-1.603	(1.207)
<i>Social Capital</i>						
Municipal Meetings Attendance	1.783**	(0.793)	1.314	(0.862)	1.547**	(0.598)
Demand-making on Municipal Government	2.067***	(0.559)	1.440**	(0.736)	1.663***	(0.545)
Communitarian Participation	0.021**	(0.010)	0.012	(0.008)	0.0166**	(0.008)
<i>Governance Indicators</i>						
Satisfaction with Local Services	-0.007	(0.016)	0.045***	(0.012)	0.02	(0.012)
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.056***	(0.011)	0.098***	(0.013)	0.076***	(0.011)
Efficacy of National Government	-0.054**	(0.021)	-0.151***	(0.032)	-0.102***	(0.025)
<i>Role of the State in the Economy</i>						
Role of the State Index	-0.029**	(0.014)	-0.031*	(0.019)	-0.030**	(0.014)
Country-Level						
Human Development Index (2007)	42.505***	(1.173)	34.968**	(14.553)	38.706**	(13.454)
Variance Components						
Random effect						
Support for Decentralization, u_{0j}	35.358***		44.826***		35.691***	
Reliability estimate	0.974		0.979		0.98	

Note: Individual and country-level variables grand-mean centered. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
* = $p < .10$; ** = $p < .05$; *** = $p < .01$ Number of Countries = 22 Number of Cases = 37,035
Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

At the individual level, there are four socioeconomic and demographic variables statistically associated with citizen support for state decentralization. First, the number of years of completed education is positively associated with the three measures of citizen support for decentralization, suggesting that as individuals increase their levels of education, they tend to be more supportive of transfers from the national to the local government. Substantively, the greatest possible effect of this variable is on support for *administrative* decentralization. By moving from complete illiteracy to 18 years of completed education, there is a 5.26-point increase in support for administrative decentralization, all else equal, and a 3.06-point increase and support for fiscal decentralization. The greatest possible effects for all significant associations are summarized in Appendix A2.

Second, women, in comparison to men, tend to show higher support for *recentralization*. This result is consistent across the three continuous measures of citizen support for decentralization. However, the size of the effect is not very large: *ceteris paribus* being a woman decreases in -1.64 the level of support for administrative decentralization and in -1.1 the level of support for fiscal decentralization as opposed to being a man. Third, the level of wealth is only significantly associated with support for *fiscal* decentralization, and weakly associated ($p < .10$) to the composite index. Contrary to the expectations set forward in the theory of this chapter, as the level of individual wealth increases, support for both fiscal decentralization and the composite index decreases. The substantive effects are not very large, however. A from quintile one to quintile five is associated with a -1.75-point decrease in support for fiscal decentralization and a -1.28-point decrease in the composite index of support for decentralization in the 0-100 scale. Finally, the size of the city of residence is also statistically relevant only for fiscal support and the composite index. As the size of the city of residence increases, support for decentralization decreases. Substantively, and individual who resides in the capital city shows 3.32 points lower support for fiscal decentralization in a 0-100 scale, than an individual who resides in a rural area, holding all other factors constant.

In terms of ethnic identification, those individuals who identify themselves as mestizos or indigenous, tend support greater fiscal recentralization than those who consider themselves as

white. The self-defined indigenous group shows the largest substantive effect, with a 3.77-point support for fiscal recentralization in comparison to white. In the case of the composite index, only the indigenous group shows a 2.34-point support for recentralization in comparison to whites. The other ethnic self-identification categories are not statistically significant at the .1 level. Another variable that is negatively correlated with support for decentralization is authoritarian preferences. Those who prefer an authoritarian leader show a 2.49-point support for recentralization in comparison with those who think that electoral democracy is always best.

All the social capital variables included in this chapter show a positive association with citizen support for administrative decentralization and the composite index; however, only demand-making on municipal governments has a statistical association with fiscal decentralization. The variables *interpersonal trust* and *tolerance* did not show a significant correlation with the decentralization measures.⁹ As a consequence, those individuals who have participated in municipal meetings or communitarian activities, and those who solicit the municipal government, tend to show greater support for administrative decentralization than those who do not participate. The size of the effects, however, is not very large: participating in municipal meetings, making solicitudes to the local government and participating in communitarian activities at least once a week increase support for administrative decentralization in 1.8, 2.1, and 2.1 points respectively, in the 0-100 scale.

Where relatively larger effects are found, is in the association between the governance indicators and citizen support for decentralization/recentralization. As the perception that the current national government is fighting poverty, protecting democratic principles, fighting corruption, protecting human rights, improving security and fighting unemployment (efficacy of national government) increases, citizen support for administrative and fiscal recentralization increases as well. The largest possible effect is found in fiscal recentralization, with a 15.1-point increased support from those who think that the national government is not at all efficacious to those who think that it is very efficacious. In contrast, support for fiscal decentralization is 9.8 points greater for those who trust municipal government a lot, in comparison to those who do not

⁹ These variables were excluded in order to obtain relatively more parsimonious models.

trust it at all. Statistically and substantive significance are also found, but in a lesser extent, in the relationship with efficacy of the national government and trust in the municipality. While in the former case the largest possible effect is 5.4 points in favor of administrative recentralization, the latter is 5.6 points in favor of decentralization. The role of the state is also negatively associated with all three dimensions of support for decentralization. As the belief that the government, instead of the private sector, should own the most important firms and factories and should be responsible for the provision of social welfare, job security and the reduction of income inequality (role of the states) increases, support for fiscal and administrative recentralization increase as well. The maximum substantive effect for this association, on average, is 3 points in the 0 - 100 scale. Finally, satisfaction with local services is only statistically related to support for fiscal decentralization. Those who think that the services provided by the municipality are very good show a 4.5-point higher support for fiscal decentralization than those who think that these services are very bad.

At the country level, the Human Development Index shows the largest effect on all three accounts of citizen support for state decentralization. The model explains that, on average, support for administrative, fiscal and the composite index of decentralization are 14.88, 12.24, and 13.55 points greater for citizens residing in Costa Rica or Chile in comparison with those living in Haiti. In other words, those individuals residing in countries with low levels of education, short life expectancies, and poor standards of living tend to show greater support for recentralization than decentralization. This finding corroborates the main argument of this chapter, which states that individuals residing in context of higher human development tend to feel better equipped to carry out the participation and oversight function that come along with decentralization programs. In contrast, those inhabitants of less developed countries prefer to leave civic engagement, participation and accountability activities to the “experts” at the national capital.

Table II-3: Results from the Hierarchical Model for the Multinomial Support for Decentralization

	Category (-100)		Category (0)	
	Support for Recentralization		Equal Distribution	
Base category: Support for Decentralization				
Intercept	0.084	(0.105)	-0.216*	(0.104)
Individual-Level				
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>				
Education	-0.017***	(0.004)	-0.007*	(0.004)
Age	-0.002	(0.001)	-0.002**	(0.001)
Female	0.115***	(0.029)	0.219***	(0.032)
Quintiles of Wealth	0.026**	(0.011)	0.014	(0.012)
Size of City/Town of Residence	0.048***	(0.010)	0.039***	(0.011)
<i>Race (Base category: White)</i>				
Mestizo	0.045	(0.041)	0.018	(0.043)
Indigenous	0.137*	(0.072)	0.035	(0.077)
Black	-0.023	(0.071)	0.004	(0.076)
Other	-0.075	(0.071)	-0.034	(0.075)
<i>Support for Democracy</i>				
Churchillian Democracy	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.001**	(0.001)
Preference for Authoritarian Leader	0.125***	(0.042)	-0.061	(0.047)
<i>Social Capital</i>				
Municipal Meetings Attendance	-0.113**	(0.049)	-0.086	(0.053)
Demand-making on Municipal Government	-0.001***	(0.044)	-0.199***	(0.048)
Communitarian Participation	-0.001**	(0.001)	0.000	(0.001)
<i>Governance Indicators</i>				
Satisfaction with Local Services	-0.001	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.001)
Trust in the Municipal Government	-0.01***	(0.001)	-0.003***	(0.000)
Efficacy of National Government	0.01***	(0.001)	0.003***	(0.001)
<i>Role of the State in the Economy</i>				
Role of the State Index	0.002***	(0.000)	-0.000	(0.001)
Country-Level				
Human Development Index (2007)	-2.81*	(1.383)	-0.845	(1.377)
Variance Components				
Random effect				
Support for Recentralization, u_{0j}	0.238***		0.233***	
Reliability estimate	0.979		0.975	

Note: Individual and country-level variables grand-mean centered. Standard errors in parenthesis.

* = $p < .10$; ** = $p < .05$; *** = $p < .01$

Number of Countries = 22

Number of Cases = 37,035

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

Table II-3 makes a comparative assessment of the factors affecting the likelihood that an individual supports either decentralization or recentralization, or just prefers an equal distribution of fiscal and administrative responsibilities between the national and the local levels of government. A hierarchical model for the multinomial (trichotomous) dependent variable is fitted for this purpose. In general terms, as an individual's years of completed education increases, and as individuals grow older, the log odds of support for recentralization decreases relative to support for decentralization. Similarly, the log odds of support for an equal distribution relative to support for decentralization get smaller as the individual levels of education increase. The complete set of predicted probabilities for significant coefficients are depicted in Appendix A3.¹⁰ Once again, this finding supports the hypothesis that better equipped individuals will more likely support decentralization as opposed to citizens who self-recognize their limitations, especially in terms of education. These and other findings will be interpreted further upon in the next section.

On the other hand, socio-economic characteristics associated with heightened odds of preferring recentralization to decentralization include larger sizes of city/town of residence, wealthier individuals, being female as well as Indigenous ethnicity (relative to whites). Residing in larger cities/town and being female also increases the log odds of supporting an equal distribution of fiscal and administrative responsibilities relative to decentralization. As the belief that democracy is the best political system increases, the log odds of favoring an equal distribution between the national and local governments decreases relative to decentralization. Conversely, those who prefer authoritarian leaders instead of electoral democracy have higher log odds to prefer recentralization to decentralization. This finding suggest that support for authoritarianism is closely related to support for recentralization, since individuals may think that in order to remain strong, authoritarian leaders should not share their power with local governments.

Social capital effects associated with lower odds of favoring recentralization relative to decentralization are participation in municipal meetings and communitarian activities, as well as making demands on the municipal government. Also, as demand-making on the local government increases, the log odds of supporting an equal distribution decrease relative to

¹⁰ The formula use to convert log odds to probability is: $\phi_{ij} = 1 / 1 + \exp(-\eta_{ij})$.

decentralization. Consistent with what have been previously shown, greater perceptions of governmental efficaciousness and a heightened perception of the role of the state in the economy increase the odds of favoring both recentralization and equal fiscal and administrative distributions relative to decentralization. In contrast, higher levels of trust in the municipal government decrease the odds of favoring recentralization and equal fiscal and administrative distribution. Finally, as the country levels of human development improve, the log odds of preferring recentralization relative to decentralization decrease.

Citizen Support for Decentralization: Discussing the Results and Moving Forward

This chapter has shown that in 2008, only 35 percent of the people living in the 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries selected for this study expressed direct support for state decentralization. The remaining 65 percent either favor recentralization or think that fiscal and administrative responsibilities should be equally distributed among the national and local levels of government. Thus, in this chapter I find support for the “light centralist preference” theory for Latin American and Caribbean countries put forward in the outset of the chapter. These findings uncover a silent challenge that policy-makers, international organizations, NGOs and the alleged beneficiaries themselves face if they are concerned about the political legitimacy of this state reform. Possibly, one of the main explanations for some of the unintended consequences of decentralization with regards to its objective of attaining participatory democracies lies behind this relatively moderate/low level of citizen support for decentralization. If one of the elements of a successful decentralization reform package is the role that citizens play in a particular sector (Hiskey 2010), then it may be natural to think that individuals’ attitudes and behaviors will depend on their position about the reform in the first place. The following chapters will make a comparative assessment of how these citizen opinions affect their political participation, and their opinions seem to be a function of their relative abilities to perform their more demanding roles as principals as a result of state decentralization.

Alternatively, citizens may be more inclined to approve decentralization after they see and experience its benefits first hand. From this reasoning, one could expect higher levels of

citizen support in more decentralized territories. However, the analyses carried out here did not yield any statistically significant evidence to support this claim. Other contextual considerations, such as democracy levels, country area and population sizes and density were not statistically relevant either. An illuminating finding is, nonetheless, that country and individual levels of human development constitute a powerful and robust explanation for the different degrees of citizen support for decentralization.

This finding, put in principal – agent terms, indicates that principals residing in countries with higher levels of health, wealth and education are better equipped to more closely monitor and shape the behavior of their agents. In other words, they are more willing to support decentralization reforms. In contrast, local principals living in relatively more underdeveloped territories appear to be comfortable letting the “experts” in the capital city take care of fiscal and administrative duties and responsibilities. This finding may be due to the fact that in less developed contexts, individual activities focus on the daily struggle to achieve the minimum levels of health, wealth and education necessary to meet some of the basic standards of living. Once citizens have satisfied these minimum standards, they can switch their attention to the satisfaction of the collective needs and demands, and for accomplishing this objective they could demand from central authorities more control and oversight over public resources. In short, the most important message of this discovery is that a key element behind citizen support for decentralization is the perceived abilities individuals have to fulfill the duties of decentralization. The empirical evidence shows that people living in Costa Rica or Chile express a degree of support for decentralization that is, on average, nearly 14 points higher than that reported by people living in Haiti, in a 0 to 100 scale. These findings are depicted in Figure II-3 and somehow corroborate what Lipset discovered some 30 years ago in 1981 in his seminal work *Political Man*.




Figure II-3: Composite Index and Trichotomous Measure of Citizen Support for Decentralization

The claim that “low education, low participation in political or voluntary organizations of any type, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity and authoritarian family patterns are some of the most important factors contributing to centralist, authoritarian governments” (Lipset 1981:476) finds support in this chapter in most of the elements, as mentioned before, but not all. Even though more educated individuals show higher support for decentralization, wealthier citizens show greater support for *recentralization*. The latter phenomenon could be due to the fact that individuals in higher quintiles of wealth may be able (and willing) to exert larger influence over national politics. Bankers, presidents and CEOs of large companies and corporations, and owners of the means of production in general may have a closer and direct relationship with congressmen and ministers at the national level and could even play a important role in decision-making over financial and monetary policies. On the other hand richer individuals may perceive decentralization as a tool to create more bureaucracy that can lead to an increase of taxes.

Other relevant variables associated with citizen support for decentralization and recentralization are ethnicity and gender. The results shown in the previous section indicate that indigenous populations tend to express higher support for *recentralization* relative to whites. Similarly, women are more willing to favor recentralization relative to men. These findings also support the theory put forward in this chapter, considering the stereotype that non-indigenous men are more likely to consider themselves capable to carrying out the duties and responsibilities that result from decentralization than indigenous groups and women. An alternative explanation for both findings may be related: in contexts where local governments in Latin America and the Caribbean are dominated by undemocratic white males, the decision-making process may exclude traditionally relegated groups, such as indigenous and women. These groups, as a result, should be against any administrative or fiscal transfer that can increase the relative power of dominant groups. Due to the scope of this study, however, I have not been able to make a characterization of the ethnicity and gender of local elites, hence, further research is needed in order to tests these presumptions.

Civic engagement and participation also proved to be pertinent for explaining citizen support for state decentralization. Those who regularly attend municipal meetings, make petitions to the municipality, and participate in communitarian activities are more willing to favor both administrative and fiscal decentralization relative to those who do not participate. Though statistically relevant, these social capital factors only provide moderate substantive significance since they contribute a maximum of two points in favor of decentralization in the 0 - 100 scale. From a policy standpoint, however, it is important to pay a careful attention to social capital since local political elites may bring into play these dynamics in order to exert pressures to the national government for actual decentralization. A more detailed analysis in this regard will be carried out in Chapter V when I discuss local political elite behavior.

Finally, the governance indicators studied in this chapter show the largest and most robust individual effects on support for decentralization. In particular, those who think that the current national government is fighting poverty, protecting democratic principles, fighting corruption, protecting human rights, improving security and fighting unemployment are much

more willing to favor recentralization than decentralization (15-point difference for fiscal and 6 point-difference for administrative decentralization). This finding suggests that it may be easier to find citizen support for decentralization in contexts where people perceive that the national government is being ineffective. Likewise, if citizens trust their municipality, they will be willing to favor decentralization instead of recentralization (10-point difference for fiscal, and 7-point difference for administrative decentralization). These results suggest a strong accountability mechanism, where citizens only endorse those policies that come from what they perceive to be an efficacious and trustworthy government.

This chapter has shown that even though there is a slight preference for recentralization in Latin America as a whole, there is wide variation in citizen support for decentralization both across and within countries. The main findings presented here indicate that principals favor decentralization in contexts of high levels of health, wealth and education. Also, the degree of citizen support for decentralization appears to be a reward or punishment based on perceptions of how well or bad national and municipal levels of government are carrying out politics. In contrast, a relatively lower self-evaluation of individual capabilities to respond to political, fiscal and administrative empowerments is associated with a higher probability of supporting recentralization. In contexts of lower education levels, citizens prefer to let the national government take care of public affairs. These findings suggest that similar decentralization policies can work differently according to the territorial contexts because principals' willingness to back the strategy is contingent upon the distinct factors explored in these pages. However, this chapter has not shown the possible consequences of decentralization at different degrees of implementation. The following chapter will show the effects of decentralization on participatory democracy.

CHAPTER III

III. EXPLORING THE LINK BETWEEN DECENTRALIZATION AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Much of the discussion of decentralization reflects a curious combination of strong preconceived beliefs and limited empirical evidence.

(Livtack et al. 1998:3)

To those convinced that theory in this area implies almost no general effects, the weak, partial, and inconclusive flavor of the empirical literature is not puzzling at all. It is what one would expect.

(Treisman 2007:269)

Decentralization advocates persuasively argue that state decentralization stimulates popular participation in political, institutional and organizational spaces that are far more limited in centralized settings. The implementation of elections for local government officials, for instance, opens up new opportunities for individuals to become more involved with political parties and to directly compete and run for public office (O'Neill 2005). With more money and more power at their disposal, local officials establish participatory mechanisms to tap into the sentiments of voters, neighborhood organizations and citizen groups, as part of making plans and budget tradeoffs (Campbell 2003). From this perspective, decentralization should give citizens the opportunity to interact with the local government, and to deliberate and influence decision-making processes on the allocation of public resources. Important political spaces, such as the voting booth, institutions of political representation, participatory budgeting, open municipal meetings, and other forms of demand-making on local governments are deemed responsible for improving the prospects for democratic consolidation at the local level (Campbell 2003; Eaton 2004; Montero and Samuels 2004).

But do these theories find support in the empirical evidence? Many researchers have attempted to identify some of these participatory outcomes that decentralization reforms seek to achieve, but to date, results remain somewhat inconclusive. Scholars such as Forewaker and

Landman (2002), for example, analyzed the quality of democracy in 40 nations over a 30-year period, using a variety of measures of accountability, representativeness, participation and other elements of democracy. They found that federal, and arguably more decentralized countries had slightly lower levels of participation relative to unitary states. Diskin, Diskin, and Hazan's (2005) cross-national comparison of 62 countries found no statistical support for the association between federalism and the likelihood of democratic collapse. Litvack et al. (1998) concluded that from the abundance of research on these questions, the empirical support for the idea that decentralization contributes to higher levels of participation is weak at best. In a similar vein, Treisman (2007) found that the significant results of much of the research wash out when the models are more fully specified. In short, these scholars suggest that almost no generalizations that are robust in terms of the effects of decentralization on democracy have emerged.

My findings do not agree with the prior work of weak, inconsistent results. Rather, I find robust, generalizable results in two important arenas: political parties and public protests. Resting upon a theory about the *political survival of local elites*, in this chapter I put into question the non-findings advanced in the literature by arguing that the effects of decentralization with respect to participatory democracies should depend on the actions that local political leaders take in order to ensure their permanence in power. In this view, local governments use the tools that decentralization brings with it not only to exert greater control over local resources, but also to prevent the emergence of political competitors that can put their permanence in power at risk. Since the most significant threats for hanging on power come from either opposition political groups or even from within the incumbent's political party, my hypothesis is that as a territory becomes more decentralized, local political elites will increase their efforts to prevent citizen participation in political parties. In other words, political, fiscal and administrative decentralization in Latin America empowers local officials, but at the same time *decreases* the citizen levels of agency with respect to elected municipal officers.

This hypothesis challenges the common held notion that decentralization necessarily increases accountability for at least two reasons. First, political elites in decentralized settings have greater leverage over other actors to implement institutions that guarantee their political

survival. Second, decentralization transfers autonomy to settings that usually have less horizontal checks and balances than the national level, and therefore local power concentration deterrence heavily rests on vertical mechanisms only, such as sub-national elections. Thus concentration of power should be more difficult to control at the local than the national level. Citizen principals, as a result of this agency loss, may try to employ non-institutionalized mechanisms in order to influence the way in which newly empowered municipalities design and implement collective decision-making. These non-institutionalized forms of participation can be expressed as protests, street demonstrations and riots, among others.

After querying the 2008 *AmericasBarometer* data set created by LAPOP, I find support for the theory that the implementation of decentralization reforms does not necessarily translate into higher and more democratic forms of citizen participation in politics. Rather, what I consistently find is that citizen participation in political parties and movements is lower in more decentralized territories but at the same time, citizen involvement in protests and more active forms of participation are significantly higher as decentralization increases. The picture this paints is one of decentralized reforms “lighting a fire” under citizens in a way that makes them more likely to look beyond simple acts of participation, such as voting or demand-making at municipal offices, toward more activist forms of participation.

This chapter is divided in six sections. Section two takes a historical look of the milestones of decentralization since the last democratic transition and shows the state of the reform in Latin America and the Caribbean. This section allows understanding how decentralization reforms have been implemented in order to evolve from centralist, power-concentrating systems to power-sharing societies that promote citizen participation. Section three presents a brief literature review that complements the purported connection between decentralization and participatory democracy discussed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation project. Section four develops a theory of the political survival of local elites, which elaborates on the relationships between citizen principals and local official agents at different degrees of state decentralization. This section also presents the data and methods employed to test this theory. Section five shows the results of hierarchical linear and non-linear models.

Section six discusses both findings and non-findings and concludes. These six sections constitute the research agenda of this chapter intended to contribute to the main goal of this dissertation, which tries to discover the most relevant effects of decentralization on Latin America's participatory democracies.

The Quest for Decentralization in Latin America and the Caribbean

Historical compilations of decentralization reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean show the centralizing heritage received from the Spanish and Portuguese colonizers in the Americas as an efficient means for extracting resources. The seminal work of Claudio Véliz published in 1980 is arguably one of the most important contributions to the scholarly literature to understand the historical roots of this centralist heritage. Véliz suggests that the highly centralized political institutions established by the colonial masters with the purpose of extracting and sending resources to Europe generated a path-dependent political culture that affected subsequent political evolution. Consequently, the relationship between the state and society was shaped by a state-centered developmental model of economic growth, along with the emergence of corporatist institutions that characterized Latin America in most of the twentieth century (Montero and Samuels 2004).

After almost a century of centrist planning, the developmental model reached a point where national level politics alone were unsustainable. The crisis of the centralist model was one of efficiency, where the increasing external indebtedness, the growing deficit of the public means of production and the monopoly of the state of external currency made the conduction of national politics and economics nonviable. Along with democratization, decentralization thus emerged not only as a condition to change the relationship between the state and society, but also to overcome the crisis of the developmental model. Decentralization was seen as a tool to achieve three major objectives: (a) *Efficiency*, by improving the allocation of public services according to sub-national preferences; (b) *Growth and income redistribution*, by reorganizing access to land and to other resources, and by consequence, decreasing poverty; and (c) *Democratic governance*, by increasing citizen participation and decreasing corruption (Finot 2001).

Seele (2004) makes an analysis of how decentralization began to alter the compensatory forces of economically and politically dominant regional elites, as well as citizen mobilizations demanding social inclusion in political decision-making in the late twentieth century. This alteration of the state-society relationship was in part responsible for the onset of a permanent bargain for the reallocation of political, fiscal and administrative transference of power that entered into effect in Latin American and the Caribbean at the end of the 1970s.¹ Daughters and Harper (2007) argue that early state decentralization reforms took place in the political arena, specifically with the creation of local-level representative democracies. Mayoral elections began with high expectations, given the natural advantage the local and intermediate levels have over the national level to link the needs of the population with the goods and services offered by local governments.

In the mid 1990s, one of the first conditions for political decentralization was widely accomplished among the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean—democratic mayoral elections were instituted in the entire region, except in Suriname.² The first country to hold elections for local governments was Mexico in 1917. This coincided with the year of its post revolutionary regime transition. The last countries in the region to carry out local elections were Guyana and Panamá, both in 1995, and the years of their transition to democracy were 1966 and 1989 respectively. Even though Uruguay held mayoral elections for the first time in 2010, elections of departmental officials representing sub-national governments started in 1984. Table III-1 shows the first years of mayor elections, along with the capacity of sub-national indebtedness.

Table III-1 shows that most Latin American and Caribbean countries experienced profound political reforms during the 1970s and 1980s with respect not only to regime transitions at the national level but also at the municipal level. Even though countries in the region counted with sub-national authorities during the authoritarian period, higher levels of government usually appointed them. With the beginning of the regime transitions, however, elections replaced

¹ See Robert Daughters and Leslie Harper (2007), Tulia Falletti (2005), Kathleen O'Neill (2005) Daniel Treisman (2002).

² Cuba is not taken into account in this analysis.

appointments in most Latin American sub-national governments; initiating in this way a deep transformation of how politics are carried out at the local level.

Table III-1: First year municipal elections and sub-national indebtedness

Country	Municipal Mayor Elections	Prohibition of Subnational Indebtedness	Authorization from National Government for Indebtedness	Restriction in the Use of Public Debt Funding
Argentina	1983		•	•
Belize	1981	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Bolivia	1985		•	•
Brazil	n.a. ^a		•	•
Chile	1992	•		
Colombia	1988		•	•
Costa Rica	1949		•	•
Dominican Republic	1966	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Ecuador	1983		•	•
El Salvador	1985		•	•
Guatemala	1985		•	•
Guyana	1995		•	•
Honduras	1982		•	•
Jamaica	1962		•	
Mexico	1917		•	•
Nicaragua	1992	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Panama	1995		•	•
Paraguay	1991		•	•
Peru	1980		•	•
Surinam	n.e. ^b	•		
Trinidad y Tobago	1962		•	•
Uruguay	1984	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Venezuela	1989	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

Source: Inter American Development Bank (2004) Created by Robert Daughters and Leslie Harper (2007) and restructured by the author. ^aData not available ^bLocal government is non-existent

Newly elected local officers soon discovered an urgent need for fiscal resources in order to fulfill the duties and responsibilities that political decentralization brought with it. As a result, sub-national governments started to push for the decentralization of economic resources and for autonomy of sub-national indebtedness, especially during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Thus, three common forms of local revenue were implemented: (1) excise taxes,³ (2) intergovernmental transfers,⁴ and (3) the generation of income by looking for external sources of funding (see Table III-1 for information about sub-national indebtedness).⁵ To show the evolution of fiscal decentralization around the world, Falleti (2005) states that in the 1980s, sub-national governments collected, on average, 15 percent of total income, and spent on average 20 percent of total expenditures. By the late 1990s, those figures had risen to 19 percent and 25 percent, respectively, and had even doubled in some regions. According to Daughters and Harper (2007) these data hide a significant difference among countries, particularly in terms of expenses and investment. In the period from 1996 to 2004, Inter-American Development Bank data reveal that, in descending order, three countries—Argentina, Brazil and Colombia—had high rates of fiscal decentralization, measured as the percentage of a country's total expenditure spent by sub-national governments, with percentages close to 50 percent. These figures place those countries among the group of the most decentralized countries in the world.⁶

A second group of countries—Mexico Venezuela, Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador—present a moderate yet equally significant level of fiscal decentralization that ranged between 18 and 32 percent in 2004. Of the eight countries in these two groups, four are federal systems of government.⁷ Additionally, Colombia deserves especial attention because this country has had a historically regionalist tradition that has allowed for higher levels of decentralization. A third group

³ The most common are taxes on property, vehicles, and industry and commerce.

⁴ They can be made permanent and egalitarian through legislation or at the discretion of higher levels of government.

⁵ This is in the case of municipal external indebtedness or through fees for the provision of water, electricity, etc.

⁶ The list of these countries includes Canada, the United State, and North-European countries (Daughters y Harper, 2007).

⁷ Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela (Central Intelligence Agency, 2007)

of countries—Uruguay, Guyana, Chile, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Paraguay, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Jamaica and Haiti—are characterized by low levels of expenditure decentralization, from 14 percent in the case of Uruguay, to 1 percent in the cases of Panama Jamaica and Haiti. In the same vein, since the mid 1990s, a growing number of restrictions on sub-national indebtedness have been put in place across the region in order to avoid the problems of excessive debt that arose from the policies adopted by Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. A summary of the current characteristics of sub-national public indebtedness is presented in Table III-1.

Not only have fiscal and political decentralization trends been evident in the region; today, local governments are increasingly responsible for the provision of public goods and services. In other words, municipalities are more responsible nowadays for planning and executing education, public health, urban highways, drinking water and sewerage, waste collection, electric power supply and other administrative duties and responsibilities than even before. As in the case of fiscal decentralization, there is important variation in the level of administrative decentralization across countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. According to qualitative World Bank data⁸ the three countries where such service provision responsibilities have expanded the most are Bolivia, Colombia and Chile. On the other hand, countries where these services are administered more often by the national government are Panama, the Dominican Republic and Jamaica. Fiscal and Administrative rankings are depicted in Figure III-1.⁹

⁸ For more information, see <http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/qualitativeindicators.htm#a> Accessed on October 4, 2010.

⁹ Fiscal decentralization is measured as the percentage of sub-national over total government expenditure (2004). Data for this measure comes from the International Monetary Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank. This author computed the administrative decentralization measure from qualitative World Bank data. For more information about the administrative decentralization construct, see the *Independent Variables* section in this chapter.




Figure III-1: Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization Rankings in Latin America and the Caribbean

Decentralization and the Promise of Participatory Democracy

One of the characteristics of the centrist planning of the state described in the previous section was the mounting complexity of public administration. With the advent of the crisis of the developmental state, citizen participation became ever more difficult because the developmental model favored both clientelism and corruption, as small and hermetic groups made exclusionary decisions that helped only a few while placing the majority of the population in a disadvantaged position. In many countries, a large part of the external resources that came from international loans were inefficiently allocated due to increasingly high levels of corruption (Treisman 2000). Centralization reached the extreme in the early 1960s in a context of intensification of the Cold War, with the implementation of military dictatorships in many countries across the region (Finot 2001).

Along with the third democratic wave of the late 1970s and 1980s, however, policy-makers and international organizations saw decentralization as a means of power-sharing, not

only across levels of government but also between the state and civil society. As a result of the new spaces created for sub-national elections, policy-makers and international organizations envisioned an opportunity for social organizations and traditionally discriminated minorities to voice their needs and complaints. From this point of view, decentralization was not only intended to increase the chances for popular participation, but it was also oriented to address inequalities under the “equal opportunity” principle (Finot 2001).

In general terms, the concept of citizen participation has been linked to governmental decision-making. But if expanded to mean people’s involvement in the provision of cooperative solutions, the concept expands to refer to both direct participation in decision-making for the provision of social goods and services, and indirect participation through the election of representatives who make those decisions. In the same vein, citizen participation becomes an indispensable means to achieve efficiency and democratic governance, as well as an important political objective to ensure governability. As a consequence of decentralization, citizens also seek more active, visible ways of exerting oversight than mere voting or attending town hall meetings. In short, decentralization may be viewed as an increase in citizens agency.

Based upon these theoretical benefits that decentralization is supposed to bring, several observers quickly linked various areas of citizen participation with this state reform policy. Arguably, one of the most important works in this domain is that of Campbell (2003), who observed the incidence of what he calls “the quiet revolution” on at least six areas of citizen participation in the local governments of various Latin American towns and cities. Campbell claims that “arranged in terms of complexity and formality, [these areas of participation] are tapping into grassroots opinion, mobilizing grassroots groups, beneficiary contributions, citizen-initiated contact, the electoral and voting system and the legal and judicial system” (2003:81).

Most of the forms of citizen participation mentioned by Campbell in his book are related to formal institutions and organizations of the local government. For instance, the author notes that the most common and easily arranged form of citizen participation is that of tapping into popular grassroots opinions, where local authorities simply visit local groups, invite them to the municipality, organize hearings or conduct opinion surveys to listen and interpret their demands.

Other forms of increased participation are the mobilization of citizens through local government material contributions to solve community problems, the creation of community centers through donations, citizen initiatives to create published ratings of local governments to increase accountability, the increased accessibility of the electoral systems and the legal recognition of local interest groups.

More recently, scholars have incorporated consulting mechanisms into the equation of decentralization and citizen participation. The most recurrent of these mechanisms is, perhaps, the practice of participatory budgeting. Most of the decentralization literature documents Porto Alegre in Brazil as the pioneer in terms of institutionalizing citizen-group participation in the decision-making process of capital investment in their city (Campbell 2001; Eaton 2004; Finot 2001; Fisman and Gatti 1999; Garcia-Guadilla and Perez 2002; Tulchin and Selee 2004). Other countries, such as Bolivia, have formally signed into law the consultation of Municipal Development Plans with local territorial organizations in order to get access to intergovernmental transfers (Finot 2001). Finally, other consulting mechanisms frequently mentioned in the decentralization literature are referenda, recall of elected public officials, mandatory provision information sources, etc.

The mechanisms analyzed above make particular emphasis on citizen participation in formal institutions of the local government. Other studies have focused, on the other hand, on people's participation in institutions and organizations of the civil society. The seminal work of Robert Putnam (1993), for instance, suggests that social capital, and more specifically, citizen participation in organizations of the civil society is a product of a dense network of secondary associations tradition, rather than the implementation of decentralizing reforms that occurred in Italy in the 1970s. In particular, Putnam argues that in contrast to Northern Italy, the authoritarian ruling elites of the Southern region during much of the XIX Century destroyed the "horizontal ties of solidarity in order to maintain the primacy of vertical ties of dependence and exploitation" (1993:136). Thus for Putnam, as well as for other scholars such as Forewaker and Landman (2002); Diskin, Diskin, and Hazan (2005); and Treisman (2007) discussed in the outset of this

chapter, there is no relationship between state decentralization and citizen participation in organizations and institutions of the civil society.

The Contradictory Effects of Decentralization: The Political Survival of Local Elites

The literature reviewed in this chapter suggests that most of the scholarly work on the effects of state decentralization on citizen participation has focused on individual country studies or have scaled down the analysis to towns or cities. By using direct methods of observation, many scholars have reached the conclusion that state decentralization fosters citizen participation, especially in formal institutions of the local government. However, when scaled up to regional or global analyses, this linkage between decentralization and participation weakens considerably. Additionally, the research in this field distinguishes between the effects of decentralization on participation in formal institutions of the local government on the one hand, and in organizations of the civil society on the other. While national and sub-national case studies show a positive relationship between decentralization and citizen participation in local government institutions, the link between this state reform and participation in civil society organizations appears to be less clear. Based upon this literature, in this dissertation I claim that state decentralization has contradictory effects on citizen participation according to the type of institution or organization to be studied. The impact of decentralization on participatory democracy may in part be explained through the following hypothesis:

The Political Survival of Local Elites and Institutionalized vs. Mobilized forms of Citizen Participation. This hypothesis is based on the premise that local political elites, or a coalition of elites, seek to hang on power as long as they can, in order to enjoy the privileged positions that political, fiscal and administrative decentralization brings with it to the municipal arena. Thus, I expect that elites in relatively more decentralized contexts struggle more fiercely to remain in power the longest, because they have much more to lose if a politician outside the elite or the coalition of elites replaces their leader. There are at least two avenues that local elites can take in order to avoid replacement of their leader. First, they can use all the democratic tools they have

at their disposal in order please citizen principals. These are tools of good governance, such as administrative efficacy, governmental transparency, inclusionary politics, etc. By behaving in this way, local agents may increase the incumbent's chances of reelection, or the election of one of the elite group members in case there is no reelection.

Second, local elite principals could also use undemocratic tools to avoid replacement of their preferred leader. These tools are related to either corrupt practice, such as political clientelism (i.e. the exchange of goods for votes, bribes, and other private gains), nepotism and other forms of favoritism; or authoritarian practices, such as unfair elections, exclusionary politics, and restrictions on the media, among others. Of course, local political leaders can also choose to use a mixture of both alternatives to increase their chances of political survival. Drawing upon the conclusions reached by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) in their book *The Logic of Political Survival*, I hypothesize that empowered local officials will tend to resort to undemocratic practices in order to guarantee their permanence in power. These conclusions center on the fact that in many cases, good policies (i.e. democratic) are detrimental to political survival, whereas bad policies often enhance political survival.¹⁰

There are at least two citizen principals' responses to the combination of state decentralization and local political elites' behaviors. First and foremost, citizens should try to find solutions to their collective problems more often in relatively more decentralized municipal governments in comparison to the frequency of municipal demand-making in more centralized countries. This hypothesis may be constrained, however, to the level of recognition and identification of the duties and responsibilities assigned to each governmental level. In other words, principals should carry out municipal dealings more often in relatively more decentralized countries, but this frequency is contingent upon the level of information at principals' disposal.

¹⁰ The choices made by political elites will depend, of course, on the size of the winning collation and the behavior of the selectorate. However, for the purpose of this dissertation I base my analyses on the general empirical evidence shown by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) that autocratic leaders stay in office roughly twice as long as leaders in democratic nations. To my view, this evidence may also hold at the sub-national level. For more information see: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003).

Second, if citizen principals perceive that different levels of government are not fulfilling their needs and demands, they could try to make their voices heard by engaging in either *institutionalized* or *mobilized* forms of participation (Seligson 1980). While the former comprises institutional forms of participation, such as political parties and movements, citizen initiatives and recalls, among others; the later is related to street protests, demonstrations, riots, etc.

What would result from the daily interactions between principals and agents at different decentralization degrees in terms of participatory democracy? Since the transfer of political, fiscal and administrative powers from national and intermediate levels of government to municipal governments increase, in general terms, the ability and capacity of local government agents to exercise control and authority over citizen principals, I expect to find in more decentralized contexts local political elites that promote exclusionary behaviors in order to maintain and endure in their privileged positions. As a result, local agents in relatively more decentralized territories should dissuade or discourage citizen participation in institutions that may pose a threat large enough to challenge their continued control over resources and decision-making.

Institutions of political representation, such as political parties and movements, are arguably the citizen organizations that pose the largest threats, since in a democracy, which is the case of most if not all the Latin American countries studied here, these institutions seek to influence government policies usually by nominating their own candidates with the purpose of seating them in political office. In contrast citizen principals that have lost agency due to decentralization should try to engage in mobilized forms of participation, since they are not able to find the appropriate spaces of political representation. Additionally, if citizens are able to recognize the new municipal duties and responsibilities that result from decentralization, they should carry out dealings more often at the local government and try to participate in municipal meetings.

Other forms of participatory democracy, such as voter turnout, may show mixed results, due to the fact that local political elites could either discourage or encourage principals' participation according to their anticipated calculus of the electoral outcomes. In other words, local agents may promote voter turnout in more decentralized setting if they think they could win

the following electoral period. At the same time, local political elites could place obstacles to voters if they fear potential undesired outcomes. Finally, other forms of civic engagement and participation in local organizations of the civil society are explored in this chapter at different decentralization degrees. Based on Putnam's (1994) seminal contribution *Making Democracy Work*, I would expect that these social capital variables are independent from the levels of state decentralization. This expectation is based on Putnam's finding that the quality of democracy was explained by the social engagement and participation preconditions of the North and South of Italy, and not on the deep institutional reforms carried out in that country.

Alternative Explanations and Control Variables

The section above has put forward a theory of political survival of local elites intended to discover the general effects of state decentralization on Latin America's participatory democracies. This section advances two rival hypotheses and a set of control variables that will be used in the empirical models to determine the factors that affect citizen participation. The rival hypotheses center around (1) Political trust and governance; and (2) Ethnic self-identification. The control variables focus on the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population.

Political Trust and Governance. The relationship between political trust and governance on the one hand, and the degree of citizen participation on the other, has been studied for quite some time and has been widely documented in the scholarly literature about civic engagement and participation. Arguably, some of the most notable contributions to this literature are the works of Almond and Verba in 1963 and Gamson in 1968. While Almond and Verba concluded that a sense of political efficacy and trust in political institutions are related with both party and organizational activism, Gamson manifested that a high sense of political efficacy in combination with low levels of political trust are important for citizen mobilization. Seligson (1980) noted that the now classical theories developed by Almond and Verba, on the one hand and Gamson on the other lacked "the unfortunate conceptual bifurcation of political participation into *institutionalized*

and *mobilized* modes...” (75). Examples of institutionalized modes of participation are “campaigning and voting,” while examples of mobilized modes of participation are “riots and other forms of civil disorder” (75-76). As a result, Seligson finds in the same study that “...among Costa Rican peasants institutionalized participation is related to a sense of efficacy, whereas mobilized participation is related to low trust” (97). Based on these claims, I expect to find a positive relationship between a sense of political efficacy and good governance among the citizenry and higher levels of participation in institutionalized organizations. In particular, those who think that governmental performance is efficacious should participate more often in institutionalized organizations, such as elections and political parties.

Conversely, I expect to find a negative relationship between trust in political institutions and mobilized participation. In other words, those individuals who manifest high levels of trust in formal political institutions should participate less often in public protests, riots and street demonstrations. The expectations above could be expanded in at least three ways. First, I evaluate not only the impact of efficacy *perceptions*, but also the effects of citizen *experiences* with institutional performance on political participation. In this sense, I expect to find greater citizen participation in contexts of low municipal corruption or crime victimization. Where crime and corruption rates are high, citizens may try to avoid any contact with institutionalized organizations in order to evade being victimized by these social ills. However, an alternative hypothesis may be formulated from the rationale that those who participate more often in institutionalized organization may precisely be the victims of crime and corruption in the first place. In other words, it may very well be possible to find an inverse relationship between corruption in particular and political efficacy in general, and citizen participation. This tautological reasoning suggests a high level of endogeneity between these variables; therefore their relationship will be analyzed with theoretical caution.

Second, based on the social capital theory advanced by Putnam (1993) and others, I would expect a positive relationship between political trust and citizen participation in institutionalized organizations. More specifically, I expect to find greater institutionalized modes of citizen participation in contexts of high political trust in formal organizations of the democratic

regime. However, where political trust in these organizations is low I expect to find greater citizen engagement in mobilized modes of political participation, as mentioned before. Third, I also expect to find a positive association between preferences for direct democracy and both institutionalized and mobilized modes of citizen participation. In this view, those who think that the people should govern directly rather than through elected representatives should be relatively more engaged in all citizen participation modes.

Ethnic Self-identification. Another way to explain variations across levels of citizen participation in formal governmental institutions and civil society organizations focuses on individual ethnic self-identification. In this view, ethnic groups' perceptions of political representation should be directly related to the degree of citizen participation. In cases where ethnic groups are satisfied with the way they are represented by elected public officials, direct participation in public decision-making should be more sporadic. In contrast, ethnic groups who consider themselves as underrepresented minorities may perceive that elected representatives do not address their preferences properly, and therefore prefer to have greater stake in public decision-making in order to satisfy their specific demands.

This hypothesis should be affected, of course, by the legislative context of each country. Nations with proportional representation formulas for seat assignments should be able to represent a larger portion of ethnic minorities than single district majority systems. Additionally, some countries in Latin America and the Caribbean apply different formulas for seat assignments in congress and in city councils. Nonetheless, I would expect that ethnic perceptions of their political representation affect more broadly their participatory behavior than the actual proportion of seats allocated in institutions of representation.

Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics of the Population. A fourth possible way to explain variations in the degree of citizen participation is by analyzing education levels, age, sex, income and the city or town of residence of the citizenry. Drawing upon Lipset's *Political*

Man (1981), once again,¹¹ I would expect to find high education levels, economic prosperity, older individuals and men to be associated with higher levels of citizen participation in political or voluntary organizations of any type. In contrast, low education, economic insecurity, younger individuals and females should be associated with lower levels of citizen participation. In terms of the size of the city of residence, I expect to find greater citizen participation in smaller towns. The rationale behind this hypothesis is that in smaller municipalities, the implementation of goods and services, such as the construction of street or water pipelines, is usually carried out between municipal employees in concomitance with member of the benefited community. In larger cities, however, the implementation of these services is usually carried out on its entirety by the local government (see Montalvo 2010).

Measuring the Impact of State Decentralization on Participatory Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean

In order to test the hypothesis of the political survival of local elites and to assess its rival hypotheses, I query the *AmericasBarometer* 2008 data set to operationalize measures that I think will be helpful in determining how citizen participation is shaped in Latin America and the Caribbean. This data set contains responses of 37,035 individuals in 22 countries in the region.¹² In the next pages, I will describe both the dependent and independent variables I use for each hypothesis, and will discuss how these variables are operationalized.

Dependent Variables. In this chapter, I evaluate the effects of state decentralization on ten measures of participatory democracy. According to the theory advanced in the previous section, these measures of citizen participation are grouped into two the following: (a) Citizen participation in municipal meetings; (b) Citizen demand-making on municipal governments; (c)

¹¹ For an expansion of Lipset's theory, see Chapter II.

¹² These countries are: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. For more information see Chapter I and www.lapopsurveys.org

Citizen participation in meetings of religious organizations; (d) Citizen participation in meetings of parents associations; (e) Voter turnout; (f) Citizen participation in protests and demonstrations; (g) Citizen participation in political parties and movements; (h) Citizen participation in labor unions; (i) Citizen participation in professional associations; and (j) Citizen participation in communitarian activities.

All dependent variables were obtained by LAPOP with the instrument attached in Appendix A1. Dependent variables (a) and (b) were obtained through the following questions: "Have you attended a town meeting, city council meeting or other meeting in the past 12 months?" and "Have you sought assistance from or presented a request to any office, official or councilperson of the municipality within the past 12 months?" The original 1 and 2 dichotomous scale was recoded to a 0 and 1 dichotomy, where 0 means "No" and 1 means "Yes." Dependent variables (c), (d), (g), (h), (i), and (j) were obtained through the following item: "I am going to read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you attend their meetings at least once a week, once or twice a month, once or twice a year, or never: Meetings of any religious organization?; Meetings of a parents' association at school?; Meetings of a political party or political organization?; Meetings of a labor union?; Meetings of an association of professionals, merchants, manufacturers or farmers?; and Meetings of a community improvement committee or association?" The original 0 to 100 scale was recoded to a scale that ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 means "Never," 33 means "Once or twice a year," 67 means "Once or twice a month," and 100 means "Once a week." Dependent variable (e) was obtained through the following question: "Did you vote in the last presidential elections of (year of last presidential elections)?" The original 1 and 2 dichotomous scale was recoded to a 0 and 1 dichotomy, where 0 means "Did not vote" and 1 means "Voted." Finally, dependent variable (f) was obtained through the following question: Do you participate in public demonstrations or protests? Do you do it sometimes, almost never or never? The original 1 to 3 scale is trichotomy, where 1 means "Sometimes," 2 means "Almost Never," and 3 means "Never." A summary of the descriptive statistics for the ten dependent variables is depicted in Table III-2.

Table III-2: Decentralization and Participatory Democracy: Dependent Variables

VARIABLE NAME	CODE	N	MEAN	SD	MIN	MAX
Participation in Municipal Meetings	NP1S	24,910	0.11	0.31	0	1
Demand-Making on Municipal Governments	NP2S	24,910	0.14	0.34	0	1
Participation in Meetings of Religious Organizations	CP6R	24,910	43.57	42.35	0	100
Meetings of Parents Associations	CP7R	24,910	24.56	30.67	0	100
Voter Turnout	VOTE	24,910	0.766	0.42	0	1
Participation in Protests and Demonstrations	PROT2008	23,521	2.78	0.59	1	3
Participation in Labor Unions	CP10R	24,910	4.21	15.45	0	100
Participation in Political Parties and Movements	CP13R	24,910	7.6	20.20	0	100
Participation in Professional Associations	CP9R	24,910	7.8	20.33	0	100
Participation in Communitarian Activities	CP5R	24,910	19.07	28.57	0	100

Independent Variables. Based on the theoretical section, the explanatory variables in this chapter center around: (a) State decentralization; (b) Political trust and democratic governance; (c) Ethnicity; and (d) Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population. In terms of *State Decentralization* this chapter focuses on four measures to capture every dimension of the reform plus an index of the administrative and fiscal dimensions. First, the measure of *fiscal decentralization* is computed as the percentage of sub-national over total government expenditure from IMF and IADB data. Second, the measure of *administrative decentralization* is computed from qualitative World Bank data.¹³ These data show whether a service is executed by the central, the intermediate or the local government, or by a combination of the three, as explained below.

When a service is totally executed by the local government, it receives 100 points. If a services is executed by either the intermediate or the central government, it receives 50 or 0 points, respectively. If the service is provided by both the intermediate and local governments or by the central and local governments, or by all three, it receives 75 points. Finally, if the service is provided the central and the intermediate levels of government, it receives 25 points. Administrative decentralization is then the average of the scores received by each country in the provision of preschool, primary and secondary education, public health, urban highways, drinking

¹³ See section II of this chapter for more information about the data sources for state decentralization.

water and sewerage and waste collection. The selection of services and the scores given to each category are based on what I think are the most recurrent administrative duties decentralized according to the scholarly literature.

With very few exceptions, mayors are nowadays popularly elected across all Latin American countries, giving to political decentralization dimension the empirical characteristic of a *constant* instead of a variable.¹⁴ This is why the third dimension of state decentralization is a dichotomous variable that takes on the value of 1 if the system is “Federal,” and 0 if the system is “Unitary,” instead of a more standard measure that would determine whether a mayor is elected or appointed. The fourth and final measure of decentralization is an index of the fiscal and administrative dimensions of state decentralization.¹⁵ This index is shown in Figure III-2.¹⁶

A control, level II variable used in this section is the *Human Development Index*.¹⁷ This construct is a composite statistic created by the United Nations Development Programme that classifies countries according to their level of life expectancy, education, and per-capita GDP as an indicator of standard of living.¹⁸ This index goes from 0 that means, “least developed” to 1 that means “most developed.”

¹⁴ See Table III-1 for more information.

¹⁵ The scale reliability coefficient for this index is 0.77.

¹⁶ In order to develop a more meaningful construct, the fiscal decentralization dimension was transformed into a ranking that goes from 0 to 100, where 0 represents the least fiscally decentralized and 100 the most fiscally decentralized countries in the region. The index depicted in Figure III-2 is, as a result, the average value of the fiscal and administrative dimensions.

¹⁷ Since the number of level-II cases is low, I think this single variable may be useful as a proxy to control for some of the socioeconomic contexts of Latin American nations.

¹⁸ For more information see: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/>




Figure III-2: Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization Index in Latin America and the Caribbean

Next, the independent variables that measure *Political Trust and Democratic Governance* are divided into two groups. First, *Trust in Political Parties*, *Trust in the Municipal Government*, and *Trust in Elections* are measured with a scale that goes from 0 if the respondent “Does not trust them at all” to 100 if the respondent “Trusts them a lot.” Second, *crime* and *municipal corruption victimization* take on the value of 0 if the respondent “Has not been victimized during the last year” and 100 if the respondent “Has been victimized during the last year.” Additionally, *Satisfaction with Local Services* is measured with a scale that goes from 0 if the respondent thinks, “the services provided by the municipality are very poor” to 100 if the respondent thinks, “the services provided by the municipality are very good;” and *Efficacy of the National*

Government is an index that goes from 0, representing the lowest level of efficacy in the eyes of the respondent to 100, representing the highest efficacy level.¹⁹

Table III-3: Decentralization and Participatory Democracy: Independent Variables

VARIABLE NAME	CODE	N	MEAN	SD	MIN	MAX
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>						
Education	EDS	24910	9.45	4.36	0	18
Age	Q2S	24910	38.51	15.45	16	96
Female	MUJER	24910	0.49	0.5	0	1
Quintiles of Wealth	QUINTALL	24910	3.02	1.4	1	5
Size of City/Town of Residence	TAMANOR	24910	2.81	1.57	1	5
<i>Ethnicity</i>						
White	WHITE	24910	0.27	0.44	0	1
Mestizo	MESTIZO	24910	0.48	0.5	0	1
Indigenous	INDIG	24910	0.06	0.25	0	1
Black	BLACK	24910	0.12	0.32	0	1
Other	OTHER	24910	0.07	0.26	0	1
<i>Governance Indicators</i>						
Crime Victimization	VIC1R	24910	17.86	38.3	0	100
Satisfaction with Local Services	SGL1R	24910	50.49	23.31	0	100
Municipal Bribe	EXC11S	24910	3.19	17.57	0	100
Efficacy of National Government	EFICGOV	24910	44.34	26.51	0	100
<i>Political Trust Indicators</i>						
Trust in Political Parties	B21R	24910	34.36	28.66	0	100
Trust in the Municipal Government	B32R	24910	50.56	29.66	0	100
Trust in Elections	B47R	24910	51.06	30.9	0	100
<i>Support for Direct Democracy</i>						
Support for Direct Democracy	POP107R	24910	40.72	33.21	0	100

COUNTRY-LEVEL						
VARIABLE NAME	CODE	N	MEAN	SD	MIN	MAX
Human Development Index 2007	HDI07	21	0.78	0.08	0.53	0.88
Federal Systems	POL	21	19.05	40.24	0	100
Fiscal Decentralization	FISC	21	16.52	15.54	1	49
Administrative Decentralization	ADM_I	21	46.59	28.28	3.48	100
Index of Administrative and Fiscal Decentralization	DINDEX	21	40.16	27.55	2.76	88.42

¹⁹ For more information, see: Mitchell A. Seligson, *Challenges to Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Evidence from the AmericasBarometer 2006-07* (Nashville: Vanderbilt University, 2008).

The *Ethnic Self-Identification* variables are dummies for *Mestizo*, *Indigenous*, *Black* and *Other*, using *White* as base category. Finally, the *Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics of the Population* are: (a) *Education*, which goes from 0 to 18 years of completed education; (b) *Quintiles of wealth*, which goes from 1 to 5;²⁰ (c) *Sex*, coded as 1 if “Female” and 0 if “Male;” and (d) *Size of the city/town of residence*, coded from 1 that means “Rural Area” to 5 that means “Metropolitan Area.” A summary of the independent variables descriptive statistics is depicted in Table III-3.

As in Chapter II, in this chapter I fit several multi-level models in order to test the associations among the dependent and explanatory variables described in the hypotheses of this study.²¹ The model specification depends upon whether the dependent variable is continuous, dichotomous or categorical. The *intra-class correlation coefficients* are calculated by fitting fully unconditional models, according to the specification of the dependent variables.²² Drawing upon the theory of this chapter and according to the statistical significance of the relationship between state decentralization and some of the aspects of participatory democracy, the following models are fitted:²³

Equation III.1

Dependent variable: Citizen Participation in Political Parties or Political Movements (continuous)

Level-1 Model:

$$Y = B_0 + B_1*(B21R) + B_2*(VIC1R) + B_3*(SGL1R) + B_4*(B32R) + B_5*(EFICGOV) + B_6*(MUJER) + B_7*(Q2S) + B_8*(EDS) + B_9*(POP107R) + B_{10}*(TAMANOR) + B_{11}*(QUINTALL) + B_{12}*(MESTIZO) + B_{13}*(INDIG) + B_{14}*(BLACK) + B_{15}*(OTHER) + B_{16}*(MCORR) + B_{17}*(B47R) + R$$

²⁰ For more information about how the quintals of wealth were created, see: Abby Córdova, *Nota metodológica: midiendo riqueza relativa utilizando indicadores sobre bienes del hogar* (Nashville: El Barómetro de las Américas, 19, 2009).

²¹ All the statistical analyses in this chapter are carried out in STATA 10.1 and HLM 6.08.

²² The intra-class correlation for categorical dependent variables is not meaningful because the level-1 variance is heteroscedastic.

²³ A more complete explanation about these and other hierarchical models is developed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation.

Level-2 Model (*no multi-level interaction*):

$$B0 = G00 + G01*(HDI07) + G02*(POL) + G03*(DINDEX) + U0$$

Level-2 Model (*multi-level interaction*):

$$B0 = G00 + G01*(HDI07) + G02*(POL) + G03*(DINDEX) + U0$$
$$B1 = G10 + G11*(DINDEX)$$

Equation III.2

Dependent variable: Citizen Participation in Public Demonstrations or Protests (categorical)

Level-1 Model

$$\text{Prob}[Y(1) = 1|B] = P(1)$$
$$\text{Prob}[Y(2) = 1|B] = P(2)$$
$$\text{Prob}[Y(3) = 1|B] = P(3) = 1 - P(1) - P(2)$$

$$\log[P(1)/P(3)] = B0(1) + B1(1)*(B21R) + B2(1)*(VIC1R) + B3(1)*(SGL1R) + B4(1)*(B32R) + B5(1)*(EFICGOV) + B6(1)*(MUJER) + B7(1)*(Q2S) + B8(1)*(EDS) + B9(1)*(POP107R) + B10(1)*(TAMANOR) + B11(1)*(EXC11S) + B12(1)*(QUINTALL) + B13(1)*(MESTIZO) + B14(1)*(INDIG) + B15(1)*(BLACK) + B16(1)*(OTHER) + B17(1)*(B47R)$$

$$\log[P(2)/P(3)] = B0(2) + B1(2)*(B21R) + B2(2)*(VIC1R) + B3(2)*(SGL1R) + B4(2)*(B32R) + B5(2)*(EFICGOV) + B6(2)*(MUJER) + B7(2)*(Q2S) + B8(2)*(EDS) + B9(2)*(POP107R) + B10(2)*(TAMANOR) + B11(2)*(EXC11S) + B12(2)*(QUINTALL) + B13(2)*(MESTIZO) + B14(2)*(INDIG) + B15(2)*(BLACK) + B16(2)*(OTHER) + B17(2)*(B47R)$$

Level-2 Model

$$B0(1) = G00(1) + G01(1)*(HDI07) + G02(1)*(POL) + G03(1)*(DINDEX) + U0(1)$$
$$B0(2) = G00(2) + G01(2)*(HDI07) + G02(2)*(POL) + G03(2)*(DINDEX) + U0(2)$$

Variable coding is depicted in Table II-1.

Results

After carrying out several statistical analyses, this chapter finds no statistical relationship between state decentralization and most of the participatory democracy measures, except for: (a) Citizen participation in political parties or political movements; and (b) Citizen participation in public demonstrations or protests. In the following pages, I will report the degree of citizen

participation in each of these two organizations and institutions affected by decentralization. Additionally, I will present the results of the hierarchical models fitted to determine statistical significant correlations. Finally, I will show a multi-level interaction that puts in context some of the most statistically powerful associations between explanatory and dependent variables.

Citizen Participation in Political Parties and Movements




Figure III-3: Citizen Participation in Political Parties or Movements, 2008

The first statistically significant result found in this chapter is the association between state decentralization and citizen participation in political parties and movements. Figure III-3

shows the frequency of citizen participation in meetings of these organizations of political representation in the region. At least three aspects of the comparative frequency of participation can be highlighted. First, citizen participation in political parties or movements in Latin America and the Caribbean appears to be rather low, as the regional average is only 7.6 points in a 0 to 100 scale. However, people's participation in this type of organizations of political representation is also low in relatively more advanced democracies. A separate analysis of LAPOP data (not depicted in the figure above) shows that the frequency of citizen participation in political parties or movements in Canada and the US is only 7.6 and 9.4 points in the same scale that goes from 0 to 100, respectively, positioning these countries close to the regional average.

Second, Figure III-2 shows that there is significant variation among rates of participation in political parties and movements across nations. At one extreme, countries like the Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Nicaragua show the highest rates of citizen participation, even above the advanced industrial democracies of Canada and the US. It is particularly important to note that the participation rate for citizens of the Dominican Republic is 24 points; that is, three times more participation than the average Latin American and Caribbean country. The other two countries with relatively high levels of participation, Paraguay and Nicaragua, show rates of 11.1 and 10.8, respectively.

At the other extreme, countries like Bolivia, Ecuador and Chile show the lowest rates of participation in political parties and movements in the region. The inhabitants of a relatively stable democracy, such as Chile, show a participation rate as low as 1.6 points, placing this country next to Ecuador and Bolivia, two “partly free” regimes according to Freedom House, with participation rates of 3.7 and 3.4 respectively.²⁴ Third, the computation of intra-class correlation coefficient for this variable shows that almost 5 percent of the variance can be explained across countries, suggesting that citizen participation in political parties and movements may vary according to the country's degree of state decentralization.

²⁴ For more information see: www.freedomhouse.org

Table III-4: Results from the Means-As-Outcomes and Slopes-As-Outcomes Models

Participation in Political Parties and Movements				
	Model I		Model II	
	Means as Outcomes		Means and Slopes as Outcomes	
Intercept	7.72***	(1.344)	7.741***	(1.344)
Individual-Level				
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>				
Education	0.336***	(0.035)	0.333***	(0.035)
Age	0.034***	(0.008)	0.033***	(0.001)
Female	-2.057***	(0.246)	-2.434***	(0.246)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.345***	(0.097)	-0.344***	(0.097)
Size of City/Town of Residence	-0.856***	(0.088)	-0.867***	(0.087)
<i>Ethnicity (Base category: White)</i>				
Mestizo	0.185	(0.338)	0.175	(0.338)
Indigenous	1.086*	(0.598)	1.040*	(0.597)
Black	1.683***	(0.624)	1.760***	(0.624)
Other	-0.047	(0.599)	-0.043	(0.598)
<i>Governance Indicators</i>				
Crime Victimization	0.023***	(0.003)	0.022***	(0.003)
Satisfaction with Municipal Services	0.007	(0.006)	0.007	(0.006)
Municipal Bribe	0.045***	(0.007)	0.044***	(0.007)
Efficacy of National Government	0.011*	(0.06)	0.010*	(0.06)
<i>Political Trust Indicators</i>				
Trust in Political Parties	0.082***	(0.005)	0.083***	(0.005)
Trust in the Municipal Government	-0.002	(0.005)	-0.002	(0.005)
Trust in Elections	0.019***	(0.005)	0.019***	(0.005)
<i>Support for Direct Democracy</i>				
Support for Direct Democracy	0.013***	(0.005)	0.013***	(0.004)
Country-Level				
<i>Means as Outcomes</i>				
Human Development Index (2007)	-9.358	(16.037)	-3.807	(16.041)
Federal System	0.028	(0.037)	0.029	(0.037)
Index of Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization	-0.100*	(0.052)	-0.099*	(0.052)
<i>Slopes as Outcomes</i>				
Trust in Political Parties x Index of Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization	--	--	-0.001***	(0.000)
Variance Components				
Random effect				
Participation in Political Parties, u_{0j}	27.338***		27.338***	
Reliability estimate	0.988		0.988	

Note: Individual and country-level variables grand-mean centered, except for group-mean centered interaction variables

* = $p < .10$; ** = $p < .05$; *** = $p < .01$ Number of Countries = 22 Number of Cases = 37,035

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

What are some of the factors that help to explain variations in the degree of citizen participation in political parties and movements both within and across countries? Table III-4 summarizes the results obtained through hierarchical linear modeling. There are four aspects of the results that are worth noting according to the theory advanced in this chapter. First, Model I shows that after controlling for levels of human development and system type (i.e. federal vs. unitary), the degree of fiscal and administrative decentralization is *negatively* correlated to citizen participation in political parties and movements. In other words, as countries become more decentralized in fiscal and administrative terms, citizen participation in these institutions of political representation *decreases*. Substantively, the largest possible effect of decentralization on citizen participation in political parties or movements is depicted in Appendix A4. This result shows that moving from Jamaica to Colombia decreases, on average, citizen participation in these institutions and organizations of political representation by -8.56 points in a 0 to 100 scale.

Second, some of the *political trust and governance* indicators that are significantly associated with citizen participation in meetings of political parties and movements show a positive contribution. As trust in elections and trust in political parties increase, citizen participation in these institutions of political representation increases as well. Similarly, those who perceive that the national government is efficacious participate more often in political parties and movements. Thus, political parties are seen as vehicles for national political representation, so in more decentralized countries citizens have less need for political parties, as they are not as relevant for local level politics. However, social ills such as crime and corruption victimization are also positively associated with participation in the institutions and organizations of political representation studied in this section. In other words, as crime and corruption victimization increase, political party engagement increases too. This may represent for citizens system failure at the local level, so citizens turn to parties and away from municipal governments. Finally, those individuals who think that citizens should govern directly and not through elected representatives show higher rates of participation in political parties and movements. This result suggests that those individuals who participate more often in political institutions in general may do so because

they perceive they should take a more direct involvement in governmental activities in the first place. However, further evidence is needed to support this claim. Sub-national coefficients, like trust in the municipal government or satisfaction with the services provided by the local government are not statistically significant.

Substantively, the largest effect on citizen participation is the one exerted by the degree of trust in political parties, with a total effect of 8.2 points in the scale that goes from 0 to 100. Not surprisingly, this is the largest effect not only across all political trust and governance indicators, but also among all level-I variables. For this reason, it is imperative to know if state decentralization affects the strong existing association between trust in political parties and participation in these institutions. Model II in Table III-4 shows the results of the multi-level interaction.²⁵ The negative coefficient indicates that the positive effect of trust in political parties on citizen participation in meetings of political parties and movements *decreases* as the degree of fiscal and administrative decentralization increases. Results depicted in Figure III-4 show that the slope of trust in political parties is a flatter in relatively more decentralized contexts (red line).²⁶




Figure III-4: Multilevel Interaction between Decentralization Degree and Trust in Political Parties on Citizen Participation in Political Parties and Movements

²⁵ It is worth noting that substantive and statistical significance in both Models I and II are remarkably similar, thus no individual interpretation of each model will be made in order to save space.

²⁶ Negative values in the X-axis and the decentralization index are due to centering. See Chapter I for more information.

Third, the indigenous and black categories in the ethnic self-identification variables are positively related to citizen engagement in political parties and movements. Statistically, both blacks and indigenous populations participate more often in these institutions and organizations of political representation in comparison to whites. Substantively, the participatory frequency for blacks is 1.68 points greater than whites, while the participatory frequency for indigenous it is 1.1 points greater than whites. Finally, while education and age are positive contributors; female, quintiles of wealth, and size of the city or town of residence are negative contributors. In other words, as individuals get more years of completed education and grow older, their level of participation in political parties and movements increases. On the contrary, women, richer individuals and those residing in larger cities tend to participate less often in these institutions of political representation.

Citizen Participation in Public Protests and Demonstrations




Figure III-5: Citizen participation in Protests and Manifestations, 2008

The second dependent variable that shows a statistically significant association with state decentralization is the percentage of people who participate in protests and manifestations. Controlling for the effects of the complex design, as all the statistical analyses in this dissertation are, the regional mean of citizen participation in this mobilized mode is 12.62 percent. Results depicted in Figure III-5 show that there is significant variation in the percentage of participation across countries. Countries with the highest rate of participation in protests and manifestations are Bolivia, Argentina and Peru, with 29.3, 27.3 and 17.4 percent, respectively. On the other hand, countries with the lowest rates of participation are the Dominican Republic, Brazil and El Salvador, with 7.0, 5.8 and 4.7 percent, respectively.

When citizen participation in protests and demonstrations is analyzed as a trichotomous variable, it can be seen that 86.6 percent of the inhabitants of Latin America and the Caribbean do not participate in this mobilized mode. The remaining 12.4 percent participate either sometimes (7.2 percent) or almost never (5.2 percent). It is interesting to note, nonetheless, that 18.2 percent of U.S. citizens reported having participated in public protests or demonstrations.²⁷ This is almost six percentage points above the regional mean of participation. Additionally, if we compare participation frequencies, it is striking to see that the percentage of people who participate in political parties and movements is only two points greater than the percentage of people who participate in public protests or demonstrations.

²⁷ This question was not asked in Canada.

Table III-5: Results from the Hierarchical Model for the Multinomial Citizen Participation in Protests

Participation in Protests and Demonstrations (Model III)				
	Category (1)		Category (2)	
	Sometimes Participate		Almost Never Participate	
Base category: Never Participate				
Intercept	-2.550***	(0.134)	-3.013***	(0.196)
Individual-Level				
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>				
Education	0.093***	(0.007)	0.053***	(0.008)
Age	0.001	(0.002)	0.001	(0.002)
Female	-0.244***	(0.050)	-0.243***	(0.059)
Quintiles of Wealth	-0.009	(0.019)	0.021	(0.023)
Size of City/Town of Residence	0.000	(0.018)	-0.054**	(0.021)
<i>Ethnicity (Base category: White)</i>				
Mestizo	0.154**	(0.070)	0.010	(0.085)
Indigenous	0.573***	(0.109)	0.020	(0.150)
Black	0.274**	(0.130)	0.025	(0.157)
Other	-0.045	(0.125)	0.137	(0.146)
<i>Governance Indicators</i>				
Crime Victimization	0.006***	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)
Satisfaction with Municipal Services	-0.001	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
Municipal Bribe	0.006***	(0.001)	0.003**	(0.001)
Efficacy of National Government	-0.004***	(0.001)	0.001	(0.001)
<i>Political Trust Indicators</i>				
Trust in Political Parties	0.004***	(0.001)	0.004***	(0.001)
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.000	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.001)
Trust in Elections	0.000	(0.001)	-0.000	(0.001)
<i>Support for Direct Democracy</i>				
Support for Direct Democracy	0.003***	(0.001)	0.016*	(0.001)
Country-Level				
<i>Means as Outcomes</i>				
Human Development Index (2007)	1.839	(1.694)	-3.21	(2.145)
Federal System	-0.003	(0.003)	0.001	(0.005)
Index of Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization	0.009*	(0.005)	0.005	(0.007)
Reliability Estimate				
Reliability estimate	0.939		0.952	

Note: Individual and country-level variables grand-mean centered, except for *Federal System*

* = $p < .10$; ** = $p < .05$; *** = $p < .01$ Number of Countries = 20 Number of Cases = 27,977

Source: AmericasBarometer by LAPOP

What are the characteristics of the individuals who sometimes or almost never participate, in comparison with those who never participate in public protests or demonstrations? Is there any effect of the degree of state decentralization on the odds of citizen participation? The answers to these questions are depicted in Table III-5. Results from the hierarchical model for the multinomial dependent variable of citizen participation in protests and demonstrations show at least four theoretically relevant findings. First, as the degree of fiscal and administrative decentralization increases, the log odds of participating sometimes increases relative to those who never participate. However, there is no statistically significant association between state decentralization and the log odds of participating almost never, relative those who never participate in public protests and demonstrations. A complete set of participation probabilities is depicted in Appendix A5.²⁸

Second, among the political trust indicators, only trust in political parties and support for direct democracy show significant associations with citizen participation in protests and manifestations. As trust in political parties increases, the log odds of being in the sometimes participate and almost never participate categories also increase, relative to being in the never participate category. Similarly, those who think that people should govern directly and not through elected representatives have higher log odds of belonging to the sometimes participate or the almost never participate categories, relative to belonging to the never participate category. With regards to the governance indicators analyzed in this study, as crime and corruption victimization increase, the log odds of both almost never participating and sometimes participating increase, relative to never participating in protests and manifestations. Finally, as the perception of national governmental efficacy increases, the log odds of sometimes participating decreases, relative to never participating. The difference between the almost never participate category and the never participate category, however is no statistical significant effect, with respect to perceptions of national government efficacy.

Third, most of the coefficients for the association between the ethnic self-identification indicators and the sometimes participate category are positive and statistically significant.

²⁸ The formula use to convert log odds to probability is: $\phi_{ij} = 1 / 1 + \exp(-\eta_{ij})$.

However, all of the coefficients for the association between the ethnicity variables and the almost never participate category are not significant. Specifically, being in the mestizo, indigenous or black category, as opposed to being in the white category, increases the log odds of participating sometimes in protests and manifestations relative to never participating. Fourth, two of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics also show significant contributions. Belonging to the female category, as opposed to the male category, decreases the log odds of sometimes participating or almost never participating relative to never participating in protests and demonstrations. Conversely, as education increases, the log odds of sometimes participating in protests and manifestation increases relative to never participating. Finally, the difference between the categories almost never participate and never participate is not statistically significant with respect to an individual's years of completed education.

Lessons from State Decentralization and Participatory Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean

Four important lessons are drawn from the results presented above. First, in this chapter I have found two opposing, yet significant correlations between state decentralization and participatory democracy. According to the empirical analyses in Latin America and the Caribbean, high levels of fiscal and administrative decentralization are associated with both *low* levels of participation in political parties and *high* odds of participation in public protests. These results offer confirmatory evidence for the theory of political survival of local elites developed in the outset of the chapter. In general terms, these results suggest that in order to prevent replacement of their preferred political authorities, local political elites or coalitions of elites use the tools that result from decentralization with the purpose of preventing the emergence of local political competitors, making no distinction with regards to the political party ideology or affiliation. In other words, as decentralization increases, local political elites will discourage more fiercely citizen participation even in their preferred political parties in order to avoid potential competition. As a result of this behavior, those citizens that find it difficult to participate in political parties and perceive that local governments are not fulfilling their expectations are more likely to switch their

involvement in institutionalized to mobilized modes of participation (i.e. protests, demonstrations and riots), just as Seligson pointed out nearly 30 years ago in the 1980.

Differently put, these findings suggest that there are some internal mechanisms in state decentralization that make political parties seem less effective to citizens as institutions of political representation. As a result, individuals may face incentives to turn to mobilized modes of participation in order to voice their demands. In short, state decentralization may be producing an unintended deinstitutionalization of citizen participation in organizations of political representation in Latin America and the Caribbean, and fomenting at the same time public demonstrations, protests and riots. What are the internal mechanisms of decentralization that make individuals less prone to participate in formal institutions of political representation? The answer to this question revolves around political survival of local elites, and will be fully developed in Chapter V.

A cautionary note must be introduced to the analysis above, because the inverse direction of causality may be possible. In this view, countries where institutionalized modes of participation are low and the likelihood of mobilized modes is high may dwell citizens who have crafted the relatively high levels of fiscal and administrative decentralization. A partial solution to this potential caveat would be to carry out a comparative historical analysis in order to determine if most of the pressure to decentralize comes from above or below. Chapter V, as a result, will develop a critical juncture analysis in order to at least partially tap into this endogeneity problem.

Second, in this chapter I found no statistical evidence for the association between state decentralization and participation in consensus institutions. In other words, the theory implying that state decentralization increases citizen participation in city council meetings or fosters demand-making on municipal governments does not pass the empirical test here. Even though this part of the results is consistent with Putnam's (1994) claims and with the cites put forward in the epigraph of this chapter, it is important to note that the low number of level-II cases may also be responsible for these non-findings. To try to solve this problem, I will carry out a similar analysis in Chapter IV with 46 level-II cases in order to increase the statistical power necessary to more appropriately verify the theory of the effects of state decentralization on participation in local institutions of the civil society.

Third, the results presented here show that there is a positive association between crime and corruption victimization on the one hand, and citizen participation in political parties and public protests on the other. These findings may be explained in two ways. First, individuals who experience these social ills may be more inclined to participate in political parties or public protests in order to change the course of social interactions. Second, those who participate more often may also be more likely to be exposed to higher levels of crime and corruption. Additionally, higher levels of trust in political parties and a preference for direct democracy are also positively correlated with participation in political parties and public protests. No statistically significant relationship was found, however, between low levels of trust in other institutions and mobilized modes of participation.

Finally, some of the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population as well as the ethnic self-identification variables also show consistent association patterns with participation in political parties and public protests. The results presented here show that more educated individuals and men are usually more prone to participate in political parties and engage in public protests or demonstrations. Additionally, mestizos and indigenous populations are more likely to participate in political parties and public demonstrations, relative to whites. In the next chapter, I will explore whether or not the findings presented here survive the level of analysis test in 46 Argentinean municipalities.

CHAPTER IV

IV. EXPLORING THE LINK BETWEEN DECENTRALIZATION AND PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 46 ARGENTINEAN MUNICIPALITIES

In the prior chapter, this dissertation found that state decentralization is negatively associated with citizen participation in political parties and movements on the one hand, and positively associated with citizen participation in public protests and manifestations on the other. These results suggest that decentralization reforms activate certain internal social mechanisms that foster changes from institutional modes to mobilized modes of citizen participation. These changes, in my opinion, arise as a result of choices made by local political elites and the responses of citizen principals to local agents behaviors. In general terms, political elites seek to guarantee their survival by placing obstacles to citizen participation in institutions that may place their permanence in power at risk. The most important institution in this regard is political parties, and the efforts of local elites to prevent citizen participation in these organizations of political representation should be higher as decentralization increases. Citizens, as a result, try to voice their complaints and demands about the government in mobilized forms of participation, such as public demonstrations and riots, because they perceive they are not able to meet their demands through institutionalized forms, especially in relatively more decentralized contexts.

Chapter III, however, was not able to establish a clear connection between decentralization and citizen participation in either municipal institutions or other organizations of civil society. One of the main reasons behind this inability to find empirical correlations may be methodological rather than theoretical. Since the number of level-II cases available was limited to 22 countries, the large confidence intervals in the associations between individual-level and country-level variables may falsely lead to believe that there is no theoretical connection between decentralization and citizen participation in local organizations of the civil society. In effect, we

have a strong risk of “type II errors.”¹ In order to avoid these potential errors, this chapter introduces a new data set that will allow carrying out a sub-national comparative analysis of survey data representative at 46 municipalities in Argentina. The characteristics of this data set will not only help to increase the statistical power of hierarchical models, but will also allow to assess the particular effect that every decentralization dimension has on participatory democracy. Data for this analysis come from “Programa de Auditoria Ciudadana (PAC),” collected through survey research by the Argentinean Government in three waves between 2003 and 2008. Data were gathered through 18,583 face-to-face public opinion interviews and respondents were selected in a stratified and clustered sample design.

In general terms, this chapter finds, once again but with increased statistical robustness, that state decentralization is negatively associated with citizen participation in political parties. In particular, those Argentinean territories with relatively higher levels of administrative decentralization, measured as municipal per capita expenditures relative to total provincial per capita expenditures, are ones in which citizens are less likely to participate in political parties than those with lower per capita expenditures. This result is consistent with what was found in Chapter IV and with what will be reported on Chapter V.

Another hypothesis that finds empirical support in this chapter is that state decentralization increases citizen demand-making on municipal governments. As a result of bringing the government closer to the people, citizens should be able to carry out dealings at governmental offices more easily because they do not have to travel long distances, especially if they live far away from the national capital, in order to voice their needs and demands. Moreover, empowered individuals should be able to direct their demands to municipal offices, especially in territories that have the ability to tax their residents. By recognizing which governmental level is in

¹ Type II errors occur when we fail to reject the null hypothesis when it is, in fact, false. An example of this type of error may occur if we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient that results from the association between state decentralization and demand-making on municipal governments is not significantly different from zero; or in other words, we wrongly conclude that there is no statistical association between decentralization and demand-making on municipal governments. For more information see Appendix A in Damodar Gujarati, *Basic Econometrics, Fourth Edition* (West Point: Mc GrawHill, 2003).

charge of collecting and spending taxes, citizen principals could increase their oversight over public expenditures, especially if they reside closer to governmental offices. Consistent with this theory, results from the hierarchical models show that fiscal decentralization fosters citizen participation in Argentinean municipal governments. Those municipalities that have the ability to tax their residents experience more demand-making relative to those municipalities where tax impositions are forbidden by law.

Finally, the hypothesis developed in Chapter III that claims that voter turnout may show mixed results, due to the fact that local political elites could either discourage or encourage principals' participation according to their anticipated calculus of the electoral outcomes, is also tested in this chapter. In other words, this hypothesis states that local agents may promote voter turnout in more decentralized setting if they think they could win the following electoral period. At the same time, local political elites could place obstacles to voters if they fear potential undesired outcomes. Results from the hierarchical models indicate that in the 46 Argentinean municipalities subject to this study, political decentralization is *negatively* associated to voter turnout. In municipalities regulated by organic charters, voter turnout is *lower* than in municipalities that do not possess this constitutional document. A potential explanation for this finding is that municipal charters are designed by local elites and other actors in such a way as to make it difficult for citizens to participate as voters in electoral processes. An alternative explanation may be that citizen principals are relatively more disenchanted with the way electoral systems work in municipalities that possess organic charters, and hence prefer to refrain from voting. Not matter which explanation, or a combination of the two, is the most appropriate for this finding; it seems clear that municipal organic charters in Argentina are associated with a greater electoral apathy among the citizenry.

Just as in Chapter III, in this chapter I was not able to find a clear statistical relationship between state decentralization and citizen participation in local organizations of the civil society, such as meetings of neighborhood associations, labor unions, meetings of parents associations and meetings of professional associations. These non-findings corroborate Putnam's (1994) theory that suggests that civic engagement and participation in civil organizations is rather a

societal precondition rather than a product of decentralization. It is also important to note, however, that the study of mobilized modes of citizen participation, such as public protests, demonstrations and riots, was not included in the PAC questionnaires. Therefore, the positive statistical association between decentralization and mobilized modes of participation found in Chapter III cannot be corroborated through PAC data.

In sum, I was able to find statistically significant associations between state decentralization and participatory democracy in three out of seven institutions and organizations. While citizen participation in political parties is less frequent in relatively more decentralized Argentinean municipalities, the effect of municipal decentralization on citizen participation in other institutions is rather mixed. On the one hand, fiscal decentralization shows a positive association with the frequency with which citizens carry out dealings at the municipality; on the other, political decentralization in Argentinean municipalities is related to lower levels of voter turnout, at least in the 46 cities and towns selected for this study.

In the following section I will carry out an analysis of the evolution of Argentinean municipalities, making a particular emphasis on the transformation from “cabildos” (Spanish city councils) to modern municipal governments, the assignment of municipal competences, and the state of decentralization in the 46 municipalities. I will then summarize the theoretical framework that has been discussed throughout this dissertation to analyze the effects of decentralization on participatory democracy. Next, I will briefly describe the data and variables that will be used in my analysis, followed by a specification of the hierarchical models that will allow me to verify the theoretical association between decentralization and citizen engagement in institutionalized vs. mobilized modes of participation in Argentina. Subsequently, I will present the results obtained by fitting three multi-level models to test the theory summarized in this chapter and fully developed in the introductory chapter of this dissertation. Lastly, I will discuss the results and conclude.

A Look into the Evolution of Argentina’s Municipal Governments

The first forms of municipal governments in Argentina were contemporaneous to the Spanish conquest (Iturburu 2001). When founding a new city, Spanish colonizers used to

jurisdictionally delimit a territorial circumscription, usually composed of both rural and urban areas, and then established a “cabildo.” The functioning of this very first form of city council (the cabildo) was based upon customary laws and municipal ordinances instead of a normative of general scope (Iturburu 2001). Initially, these forms of local governments were very aristocratic since only conquistadores and their descendents were allowed to represent them. However, the composition of city councils gradually changed until the XVII century, when groups of neighbors were allowed to buy municipal positions in city council auctions.² This new governing class quickly offered less resistance to the Spanish Crown, giving away the original autonomy with which Argentinean cabildos were initially constituted (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 1981).

In general terms, the duties and responsibilities of these early Argentinean city councils were the registration of professional titles, land distribution, maintenance of the city’s health and infrastructure, conservation and inspection of city jails and hospitals, control of farmer’s markets, price regulations, fixing salaries, costs and prices, primary schooling, political advisory, and justice administration. In some occasions, city council officers invited neighbors, clergymen and military officers to open city council meetings to discuss issues that needed public opinion support. Final decision-making remained, however, on the hands of municipal officers. Public funding to accomplish the above duties and responsibilities was obtained usually through taxes, especially to agriculture and stockbreeding, transit in bridges, public auctions, and public spaces; and through the leasing of public houses and communal lands (Iturburu 2001).

In 1776, the Spanish Crown created the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata that led to a territorial restructuring. As a result of this reform, the newly created “intendencias” were in charge of improving tax collection, promoting economic development, and strengthening the political centralization of the Spaniard Empire. The quartermaster (intendente) was directly appointed by the King and was responsible for the administration of justice, fiscal revenues, and

² According to Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré (1981) and Iturburu (2001), King Philip II of Spain introduced a system where some municipal positions were auctioned, except for mayors’ offices, in order to obtain fiscal resources. This system allowed buyers, under certain conditions, to re-sell, donate or transfer their perpetual positions in municipal offices.

homeland security (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 1981). A little after the “May Revolution,”³ during 1813 and 1814 the new Provinces were created based upon the former “intendencias,” and were administered by governors appointed by the central government. However, the 1820 outset of the central government facilitated the creation of an autonomous Provincial system that abolished the cabildos, which duties and responsibilities were carried out by the newly created executive, legislative and judicial powers of the Argentinean Provinces (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 1981; Iturburu 2001).

After an anarchic period, the 1853 National Constitution established that:

*Each Province shall write a Constitution for itself that ensures the administration of justice, its municipal regime and its primary education. Under these conditions, the federal Government shall guarantee each province the use and exercise of its institutions (Constitutional Provision cited by Iturburu 2001:24).*⁴

However, the “municipal regime” expression was ambiguous enough to create a century-long controversy, where a group interpreted this Constitutional Provision as an autarkic form of government in opposition to a second group that interpreted it as an autonomous level of government (Ternavasio 1990; Passalacqua 1992; Rosatti 1994). In this context, Provincial Constitutions were in charge of defining the competences and resources of the municipal jurisdiction, giving it in most cases only administrative responsibilities and limiting the political dimension to the provincial and national levels of government (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 1981; Iturburu 2001).

This deinstitutionalization of the “cabildos” deepened in the 1930s when the national government decided to transfer the provision of public goods and services that once belonged to the municipality to the private sector and to the provincial and national levels of government (Dromi 1983). In the same decade, developed countries began to adopt the Keynesian economic model, and Argentina, along with other countries in the region, started to implement the import

³ Argentina’s May Revolution (May 18 to May 25, 1810) is considered the starting point for the Argentine War of Independence. For more information see: H. Tau Anzoátegui and E. Martiré, *Manual de Historia de las Instituciones Argentinas* (Buenos Aires: Macchi, 1981).

⁴ Translated from Spanish to English by this author.

substitution and industrialization (ISI) model that drastically changed the role of the state in the economy. The ISI model intensified after 1945, and political, administrative and fiscal powers were highly concentrated in the central offices of authoritarian regimes until 1973. Starting in this year and until the mid-1980s, the centrist state was not only hyper-dimensioned, but also had concentrated a considerable external debt, an increasing fiscal deficit and hyperinflation. The popular demands, along with the economic debacle exerted significant pressures in 1983 to bring about democracy. This democratization process favored decentralization as an initiative intended to strengthen the local levels of government.

Municipal decentralization initiatives included in the 1994 constitutional reform formally granted institutional autonomy to Argentinean municipalities. These initiatives included, but were not limited, to the transfer of functions and competences that once were responsibility of the national and provincial levels of government (Arroyo 1997). Thus, the current duties and responsibilities of modern Argentinean municipalities can be summarized in two groups. First, the “traditional competences” that includes: (a) Administrative organization of the local government to plan the future, organize the system, manage personnel, governing activities and controlling results; (b) Urban development, including urban planning, public works (construction of gas pipelines, water and sewerage infrastructure, urban hygiene, waste collection, urban illumination, etc.); (c) The provision of some public services (potable water and sewerage, garbage collection, street maintenance); and (d) The regulation of communitarian life, such as local security, commercial and industrial security and safety, urban transit, etc. (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 1981; Iturburu 2001).

Table IV-1: Population, Organic Charter and Taxation in 46 Argentinean Municipalities

Province	Municipality	Municipal Population	Organic charter	Municipal Tax
	Pergamino	99,193	No	No
	Olavarria	103,961	No	No
	Junin	88,664	No	No
	Morón	309,380	No	No
	Bragado	40,259	No	No
Buenos Aires	Villa Gesell	24,282	No	No
	Balcarce	42,039	No	No
	General Belgrano	15,381	No	No
	General Pueyrredón	564,056	No	No
	Bahía Blanca	284,776	No	No
	San Fernando	151,131	No	No
Catamarca	San F. del Valle de Catamarca	141,260	Yes	No
Corrientes	Monte Caseros	24,671	Yes	Yes
	Curuzú Cuatiá	36,390	Yes	Yes
Chaco	Roque Saenz Peña	88,164	No	Yes
Chubut	Comodoro Rivadavia	137,061	Yes	Yes
	Gualeguaychú	76,220	No	No
	Crespo	18,296	No	No
	Concepción del Uruguay	67,474	No	No
Entre Ríos	Diamante	19,545	No	No
	Villaguay	32,027	No	No
	Cerrito	4,653	No	No
	Concordia	141,971	No	No
	Libertador San Martín	5,273	No	No
Formosa	Pirané	19,124	No	Yes
Jujuy	Palpala	48,199	Yes	Yes
La Pampa	General Pico	53,352	No	No
	Lujan de Cuyo	104,470	No	No
	Lavalle	32,129	No	No
Mendoza	Godoy Cruz	182,977	No	No
	Las Heras	182,962	No	No
	Malargüe	23,020	No	No
	Guaymallén	251,339	No	No
	San Martín de los Andes	23,519	Yes	Yes
Neuquén	Villa La Angostura	7,526	No	Yes
	Neuquén	203,190	Yes	Yes
San Luis	Rawson	107,740	Yes	No
	Rivadavia	76,150	No	No
	Rafaela	83,563	No	No
	Rosario	909,397	No	No
Santa Fe	Firmat	18,294	Yes	No
	Las Rosas	12,793	No	No
	El Trebol	10,506	No	No
Tucumán	Yerba Buena	50,783	No	No
Salta	Coronel Moldes	4,194	No	Yes
Córdoba	Villa Gral Belgrano	5,888	No	Yes

Source: INDEC, 2001 and Ministerio del Interior de la República Argentina, 2008.

Second, the “new competences” envision the Argentinean municipality as a promotion agent. This consists of, on the one hand, (a) The architectural policies of local development, the design and implementation of strategies, territorial and societal revalorization; and (b) The management of territorial image in order to generate innovative surroundings capable of attracting, retaining and fomenting investments and employment. On the other hand, the new municipality is in charge of connecting both the educational and productive systems, in order to avoid brain drain, reinforce human capital and strengthen local firms. Other new municipal duties and responsibilities include the procurement of social welfare by detecting specific local necessities and registering them in the political agenda, coordinating technical studies and public deliberation, intervening in executive decision-making, executing projects, evaluating results and communicating social dynamics of the city hall (Tau Anzoátegui and Martiré 1981; Finot 2001; Iturburu 2001).

In spite of the general duties and responsibilities mentioned above, not all municipal governments share the same degree of fiscal, administrative and political decentralization. For instance, there are some municipalities that have the right to develop a local constitution known as “organic charter.” This type of municipal constitution is intended to regulate the local government’s functioning and giving it higher levels of political autonomy. There are at least three prerequisites that municipalities need to fulfill before being able to write an organic charter. First, the municipality’s Provincial Constitution should allow the establishment of an organic charter. Second, there should be a minimum of inhabitants in the municipality interested in drafting an organic charter. Finally, there should be enough *political will* to use this municipal right.⁵ Table IV-1 summarizes population sizes and municipal possession of organic charters in 46 Argentinean local governments selected for this dissertation.

Table IV-1 also depicts those municipalities that exercise their right to collect tax income. It is important to note, however, that not all municipalities are allowed to tax their residents.

⁵ For more information about the requirements to draft an Organic charter, see Mónica Iturburu, *Municipios Argentinos, Segunda Edición* (Buenos Aires: Dirección Nacional de Estudios y Documentación del Instituto Nacional de la Administración Pública, 2001).

Municipal taxation ability depends on whether or not the Province to which the local government belongs has formally decentralized this fiscal competence. Other sources of municipal income in Argentina are: (a) services fees; (b) economic activities or concessions; (c) fines received from contraventions; (d) loans; (e) donations and subsidies; and (f) fiscal transfers from other levels of government (known in Argentina as co-participation).⁶ National legislation, Provincial Constitutions and organic charters (where applicable) regulate not only municipal income but also local governments' expenditures. An important sum of the annual municipal budget is spent in both the traditional and new municipal competences described earlier in this section. Figure IV-1 shows a comparative analysis of the levels of administrative decentralization in the 46 municipalities selected for this study in municipal per capita expenditure units.

The bar chart on the right of Figure IV-1 (1b) shows the per capita municipal expenditure as a proportion of the total per capita expenditure of the province. This ratio allows comparing municipal per capita spending controlling for average provincial expenditures.⁷ The bar chart shows that municipalities like Rawson, Rivadavia and Curuzú Cuatiá have the lowest levels of per capita expenditure relative to the total average spent in their provinces. On the other hand, per capita expenditures in municipalities like Coronel Moldes and Malargüe even surpass the average per capita provincial expenditures.⁸ Additionally, the bar chart on the left of Figure IV-1 shows a proxy for municipal human development, based on Census data of socioeconomic indicators such as health, education and quality of housing materials.⁹ At one extreme, municipalities such as Libertador San Martín, Morón and Bahía Blanca, show the highest levels of human development. At the other extreme, municipalities like Pirané, Coronel Moldes and Lavalle show the lowest levels of human development. The possession or lack of an organic charter, the capacity to tax municipal inhabitants and the municipal per capita expenditure ratio

⁶ For more information about municipal sources of income in Argentina, see Javier Curcio, *Financiamiento municipal y reducción de la pobreza en Argentina*, Medio ambiente y desarrollo (Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 2005), 71.

⁷ The computation of this ratio is further explained in the variable description section.

⁸ This is why their values are above 1.

⁹ The computation of the human development proxy is further explained in the variable description section.

will serve as measures of political, fiscal and administrative decentralization respectively; and both the municipal population and human development levels will serve as control variables.




Figure IV-1: Human Development and Municipal Expenditure Ratio in 46 Argentinean Municipalities

State Decentralization and Participatory Democracy in 46 Argentinean Municipalities

How do these features of Argentinean municipalities shape the degree of citizen participation in consensus and dissension institutions? This dissertation found in Chapter III that state decentralization is associated with lower levels of citizen participation in political parties on the one hand, and with higher log odds of participation in public protest on the other. In this chapter I will verify if some of these results hold when using sub-national level data. This empirical verification is based upon the theory of state decentralization and participatory democracy advanced throughout this dissertation. In general terms, I claim that state decentralization has contrasting effects on citizen participation according to the type of institution or organization to be studied. This theory may be summarized in the following hypothesis (political survival of local elites) that will be tested in this chapter, along with a rival explanation (democratic governance) and a set of control variables (socioeconomic characteristics of the population):

Political Survival of Local Elites. The study of the impact of state decentralization on citizen participation in governmental institutions and organizations of the civil society is at the heart of this dissertation. Consistent with the theory developed in both the introductory chapter and Chapter III, the general expectation is that local political elites will either encourage or discourage citizen participation depending upon their expected utility. In this view, decentralization *increases* citizen participation in institutions and organizations that foster the likelihood of political survival of local elites, or that do not pose a risk large enough to negatively modify the status quo. In contrast, state decentralization *decreases* citizen participation in organizations and institutions that may challenge the political stability of local elites. As a result, I expect to find once again a negative relationship between decentralization and citizen participation in political parties. Conversely, there should be higher levels of demand-making on municipal governments in more decentralized settings. Finally, it Putnam (1994) is right, I expect

to find statistical independence between decentralization and participation in local organizations of the civil society.¹⁰

Democratic Governance. The degree of democratic governance is another way to explain different levels of citizen participation. In this view, a sense of institutional efficacy should be associated with greater citizen participation in institutional modes. In other words, those individuals who positively rate the work of municipal employees, those who assess the performance of municipal institutions as adequate, and those who are satisfied with the way democracy works at the municipal level should participate more often in municipal meetings or carry out more dealings at the local government. Conversely, those who regard the local or national governments as inefficacious or have been victimized by municipal corruption should participate more often in mobilized modes such as protests, manifestations and riots. Finally, consistent with the findings of previous chapters and the theory advanced by Putnam (1993) and others, I expect to find little or no effect of state decentralization on citizen participation in organizations of the civil society.

Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Population. A third way to explain variations in the degree of citizen participation is through the socioeconomic characteristics of the population. Based on Lipset's findings (1981), I expect to encounter a positive association between high education levels, economic prosperity, aging individuals and men, and citizen participation in political or voluntary organizations of any type. In contrast, low education, economic insecurity, younger individuals and females should be negatively associated with citizen participation. Finally, in terms of population size, I expect to find greater citizen participation in smaller towns. The rationale behind this hypothesis is consistent with what was found in Chapter III: The collaboration between larger shares of the population and municipal officers is logistically easier in smaller than in larger municipalities (see also Montalvo 2010).

¹⁰ See Chapters I and III for fully developed hypotheses.

Political Survival of Argentinean Local Elites: The Linkage Between Theory and Observation

The three hypothesis described above summarize the factors that I believe are affecting the depth of participatory democracy in the 46 Argentinean municipalities selected for this study. In order to test these hypotheses, I query the PAC's public opinion survey data gathered between 2003 and 2008. These data were obtained through face-to-face public opinion interviews of 18,583 non-institutionalized individuals, with a sample design that allows reaching conclusions at the municipal level. Respondents were selected probabilistically and the sample design included area stratification and clustering at the neighborhood level. At the household level, individuals were selected using sex and age quotas, taking into consideration only respondents of at least 18 years of age. The error margins oscillate between +/- 2.9 and +/- 4.8 depending upon the dispersion of the variable, with a confidence interval of 95 percent.

Dependent Variables. In this chapter, I evaluate the effects of state decentralization on seven measures of participatory democracy in Argentina. According to the theory advanced throughout this dissertation, these measures of citizen participation are: (a) Citizen dealings at the municipal government; (b) Voter turnout; (c) Citizen participation in parents-teachers associations; (d) Citizen participation in political parties; (e) Citizen participation in labor unions; (f) Citizen participation in cooperatives; (g) Citizen participation in neighborhood meetings.

PAC obtained all variables included in this chapter with the instrument that is included in Appendix A6 of this dissertation.¹¹ Dependent variable (a) was obtained through the following question: "In the past 12 months, have you turned to any municipal office to carry out a transaction?"¹² The original 1 and 2 dichotomous scale was recoded to dummy variable, where 0 means "No" and 1 means "Yes." Dependent variable (b) was obtained through the following question: "Taking your age into account and the elections you could have participated in, would you say that you have..." The original 1 to 8 scale was recoded to a 0 to 100 scale, where 0

¹¹ Questionnaire in Spanish.

¹² All questions shown here were translated by this author.

means “Not voted in any election” and 100 means “Voted in all elections.” Variables (c); (e); (f); and (g) were obtained through the following battery of questions: “Do you currently participate in an organization of any type, for example: parent-teacher associations, religious or ecology group, neighborhood club, political parties, labor unions, etc.? Only if respondent does participate in an organization: In which of the following organization do you participate? Option 01: Labor union? Option 03: Neighborhood meetings? Option 04: Parent-teacher association? and Option 07: Cooperatives? The original filter and the 1 to 2 scale were recoded to a dummy variable where 0 means “Does not participate” and 1 means “Does Participate.” Finally, dependent variable (d) is a combination of the following questions: “Do you currently participate in an organization of any type, for example: school cooperator, religious or ecologist group, neighborhood club, political parties, labor unions, etc.? Only if respondent does participate in an organization: In which of the following organization do you participate? Option 02: Political party?” and “To all except those who currently participate in political parties (Option 02): Have you ever participated in a political party?” The original 1 to 2 scales were recoded to a dummy variable where 0 means, “Does not and have not participated” and 1 means “Participates or have participated.”

Independent Variables. Drawing upon the theoretical section, the explanatory variables in this chapter center around: (a) Municipal decentralization; (b) Democratic governance; and (d) Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the population. In terms of *Municipal Decentralization* this chapter focuses on three measures to capture every dimension of the reform. First, a measure of *political decentralization* indicates whether or not a particular municipality possesses an organic charter. With this measure I intend to capture the degree of municipal political autonomy (from higher levels of government) that all 46 popularly elected mayors have in their jurisdictions. As a result, the political decentralization dimension in this study takes on the value of 1 if an organic charter regulates the municipality, and 0 otherwise.¹³ Second, a measure of *fiscal decentralization* differentiates local governments that generate their own revenues through income tax from those that only depend on tax transfers from other levels

¹³ Source: Argentine Ministry of Interior's Webpage: <http://www.mininterior.gov.ar/>. Last accessed: November 2009.

of government. In this case, this fiscal decentralization measure takes on the value of 1 if the local government taxes its residents, and 0 otherwise.¹⁴

Finally, the *administrative decentralization* measure for this chapter is a ratio of municipal per capital expenditure to total provincial per capita expenditures. For example, the 2007 municipal budget in Gualeguaychú was 54,644,632.00 pesos for a 2001 population of 76,220. In the same year, the total provincial expenditure in Entre Rios (i.e. the sum of national, provincial and municipal expenditures) was 4,332,451,227.04 pesos for a 2001 population of 1,158,147. Thus the measure of administrative decentralization (MER) is computed as follows:

Equation IV.1

$$MER = \frac{\frac{m_budget}{m_population}}{\frac{tp_expenditure}{p_population}} = \frac{\frac{54,644,632}{76,220}}{\frac{4,332,451,227.04}{1,158,147}} = 0.192.$$

Where:

m_budget is the executed municipal budget for 2007;¹⁵

m_population is the 2001 municipal population;¹⁶

tp_expenditure is the 2007 total provincial expenditure (i.e. the sum of national, provincial and municipal expenditures in a particular province);¹⁷ and

p_population is the 2001 provincial population.¹⁸

Additionally, two level-II indicators are used as control variables: *size of the municipal population* and a *proxy of municipal human development*. While the former is measured through the 2001 municipal population in thousands of inhabitants, the latter is an index of three census'

¹⁴ Source: Javier Curcio, *Financiamiento municipal y reducción de la pobreza en Argentina*, Medio ambiente y desarrollo (Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, 2005), 71.

¹⁵ Source: municipal and provincial WebPages, and local newspapers.

¹⁶ Source: 2001 National Census (www.indec.gov.ar).

¹⁷ Source: Dirección de Análisis de Gasto Público y Programas Sociales – Secretary of Economic Policy of the Ministry of Economics and Public Finances (<http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/default.htm>)

¹⁸ Source: 2001 National Census (www.indec.gov.ar).

constructs: (a) *Quality of housing materials in the municipality*, measured through a scale that goes from 0 “worst quality” to 1 “best quality;” (b) *Educational level in the municipality*, measured through a scale that goes from 0 “least educated” to 1 “most educated;” and (c) *Health level in the municipality*, measured as the percentage of individuals in the municipality with access to health care.¹⁹

Next, six independent variables are operationalized to measure the concept of *Democratic Governance*. First, *support for political parties* is measured with a dummy variable that takes on the value of 0 if respondent thinks that “Democracy can function without political parties” and 1 if respondent thinks that “There cannot be democracy without political parties.” Second, *need for improvement of quality of national politics and institutions* is measured through a scale that goes from 0 that means “Nothing needs to be improved” to 100 that means “A lot needs to be improved.” Third, *satisfaction with the way democracy works at the municipality* is measured through a scale that goes from 0 “Not satisfied at all” to 100 “Very satisfied.” Fourth, *municipal bribe* is measured as 0 if the respondent “has not been victimized” and 1 if the respondent “has been victimized.” Fifth, *performance of municipal institutions perception* is measured with a scale that goes from 0 if the respondent thinks it is “Very bad” to 100 if the respondent thinks it is “Very good.” Sixth, *evaluation of municipal employees* is measured from 0 if respondent thinks they perform “Very badly” to 100 if respondent thinks they perform “Very good.” Finally, the *Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Population* are: (a) *Education*, which is a scale that goes from 1 “Incomplete primary school” to 9 “Graduate school” of either the respondent or the head of the household; (b) *Socioeconomic status*, which goes from 1 “Marginal” to 7 “High 1;”²⁰ (c) *Sex*, coded as 1 if “Female” and 0 if “Male;” and (d) *Age Cohort*, coded from 1 “18 and younger” to 7 “66 and older.” A summary of the independent variables descriptive statistics is depicted in Table IV-2.

¹⁹ The data source for this index is the 2001 National Census and its scale reliability coefficient is 0.827.

²⁰ For more information about how to compute this index, see www.indec.gov.ar.

Figure IV-2: Descriptive Statistics from PAC 2003- 2008, INDEC 2001, and Municipal WebPages

INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL						
VARIABLE NAME	CODE	N	MEAN	SD	MIN.	MAX.
<i>Dependent Variables</i>						
Participation in Political Parties	POLPAR	17,909	0.18	0.39	0	1
Participation in Labor Unions	LABU	17,425	0.01	0.12	0	1
Participation in Cooperatives	COOP	17,425	0.01	0.11	0	1
Dealings at Municipal Government	MUNIDEAL	18,583	0.35	0.48	0	1
Voter Turnout	PARP86	18,388	83.96	28.89	0	100
Participation in School Cooperators	SCHOOL	17,424	0.04	0.21	0	1
Participation in Neighborhood Meetings	NEIGHBOR	17,432	0.03	0.18	0	1
<i>Socioeconomic Variables</i>						
Education	EDU_IMP	18,581	3.65	2.01	1	9
Age Cohort	AGER	18,581	4.09	1.66	2	7
Female	SEX	18,583	0.52	0.5	0	1
Socioeconomic Level	NESR	18,558	3.4	1.78	1	7
<i>Democratic Governance Indicators</i>						
Need for Improvement of Quality of National Politics and Institutions	DEMP11	17,980	84.46	22.06	0	100
Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality	DEMP16	17,982	47.42	26.89	0	100
Performance of Municipal Institutions	EVAP34	18,103	60.04	20.8	0	100
Evaluation of Municipal Employees	EVAP43	17,563	61.53	21.1	0	100
Municipal Bribe	CLIEP69	17,630	0.07	0.25	0	1
<i>Support for Political Parties</i>						
Support for Political Parties	DEMP10	17,518	0.7	0.46	0	1
MUNICIPAL-LEVEL						
VARIABLE NAME	CODE	N	MEAN	SD	MIN.	MAX.
Organic Charter	CHART	46	0.2	0.4	0	1
Municipal Expenditure Ratio	SUBEX	46	0.35	0.28	0.09	1.43
Municipal Population (Thousands)	M_POP01K	46	107.11	159.73	4.19	909.4
Municipal Tax	MTAXR	46	0.24	0.43	0	1
Human Development Proxy	HDP01	46	64.33	6.85	46.09	78.37

As in previous chapters, this chapter fits several multi-level models in order to test the associations among the dependent and explanatory variables described in the hypotheses of this study.²¹ The model specification depends upon whether the dependent variable is continuous or dichotomous. The *intra-class correlation coefficients* are calculated by fitting fully unconditional models, according to the specification of the dependent variables.²² Drawing upon the theory of this chapter and according to the statistical significance of the relationship between state decentralization and some of the aspects of participatory democracy in 46 Argentinean municipalities, the following models are fitted.²³

Equation IV.2

Dependent variable: Citizen Participation in Political Parties (dichotomous)

Level-1 Model:

$$\text{Prob}(Y=1|B) = P$$

$$\log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(SEX) + B2*(AGER) + B3*(DEMP10) + B4*(DEMP11) + B5*(DEMP16) + B6*(EVAP34) + B7*(EVAP43) + B8*(CLIEP69) + B9*(EDU_IMP) + B10*(NESR)$$

Level-2 Model:

$$B0 = G00 + G01*(CHART) + G02*(SUBEX) + G03*(M_POP01K) + G04*(MTAXR) + G05*(HDP01) + U0$$

Equation IV.3

Dependent variable: Voter Turnout (continuous)

Level-1 Model

$$Y = B0 + B1*(SEX) + B2*(AGER) + B3*(DEMP10) + B4*(DEMP11) + B5*(DEMP16) + B6*(EVAP34) + B7*(EVAP43) + B8*(CLIEP69) + B9*(EDU_IMP) + B10*(NESR) + R$$

²¹ All the statistical analyses in this chapter are carried out in STATA 10.1 and HLM 6.08.

²² The intra-class correlation for dichotomous dependent variables is not meaningful because the level-1 variance is heteroscedastic.

²³ For more information about these models, see the note on *hierarchical linear modeling* in the introductory chapter of this dissertation.

Level-2 Model

$$B0 = G00 + G01*(CHART) + G02*(SUBEX) + G03*(M_POP01K) + G04*(MTAXR) + G05*(HDP01) + U0$$

Equation IV.4

Dependent variable: Dealings at Municipal Government (dichotomous)

Level-1 Model

$$\text{Prob}(Y=1|B) = P$$

$$\log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(SEX) + B2*(AGER) + B3*(DEMP10) + B4*(DEMP11) + B5*(DEMP16) + B6*(EVAP34) + B7*(EVAP43) + B8*(CLIEP69) + B9*(EDU_IMP) + B10*(NESR)$$

Level-2 Model

$$B0 = G00 + G01*(CHART) + G02*(SUBEX) + G03*(M_POP01K) + G04*(MTAXR) + G05*(HDP01) + U0$$

Results

After carrying out several statistical analyses, this chapter finds evidence for the statistical association between municipal decentralization and: (a) Citizen participation in political parties; (b) Voter turnout; and (c) Dealings at the municipal government. In the following pages, I will report the degree of citizen participation in each of these institutions and its association with the level of municipal decentralization in the 46 Argentinean municipalities selected for this study. Also, I will describe the effects of the democratic governance indicators and the socioeconomic variables on the degree of citizen participation in the domains described above.

Citizen Participation in Political Parties




Figure IV-3: Citizen Participation in 46 Argentinean Municipalities

Figure IV-3 shows the percentage of individuals who currently participate or have participated in the past in political parties, in the 46 municipalities subject to this study. On average, 18.2 percent of Argentinean residents of these municipalities currently participate or have participated in political parties. Municipalities with the highest participatory rates are Pirane, Rivadavia and Neuquen, with 41.3, 32.1 and 30.9 percent respectively. On the other hand, municipalities with the lowest participatory rates are Comodoro Rivadavia, Balcarce and Bahia Blanca, with 10.6, 10.0 and 8.8 percent respectively. The 32.5 participation range that exists between the municipality with the highest participation level (Pirané) and the municipality with the lowest participation level (Bahia Blanca), suggests that there is a wide variation of participation rates in the 46 municipalities selected for this dissertation. What are the municipal-level and individual-level factors that may help to explain the different degrees of citizen participation in Argentinean political parties?

Table IV-2 shows results from the hierarchical model. There are at least three aspects of these results that are worth noting. First, the measure of administrative decentralization used in this chapter (municipal expenditure ratio), is negatively associated with the degree of citizen participation in political parties. The statistical meaning of this finding is that a 1-unit increase in the level of municipal per capita expenditures, relative to total provincial per capita expenditures, is associated with a -0.3 decrease in the log odds of citizen participation in political parties in the 46 municipalities depicted in Figure IV-3. Substantively, the probability of citizen participation in political parties associated with a 1-unit increase in the administrative decentralization measure is 0.42.²⁴ Other municipal-level factors negatively associated with citizen participation in political parties are *municipal population* and *human development*. In other words, a 1-unit increase in municipal population and human development is associated with a -0.001 and -0.032 decrease in the log odds of citizen participation in political parties, respectively. In substantive terms, however, these effects are not as large as the effect of administrative decentralization (0.50 and 0.49 respectively).

²⁴ A complete set of probabilities is depicted in Appendix A7.

Table IV-2: Results from the Hierarchical Model for Dichotomous Participation in Political Parties

Participation in Political Parties		Means as Outcomes	
Intercept		-1.550***	(0.056)
Individual-Level			
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>			
Education		0.136***	(0.016)
Age Cohort		0.189***	(0.016)
Female		-0.350***	(0.046)
Socioeconomic Level		-0.040*	(0.022)
<i>Governance Indicators</i>			
Evaluation of Municipal Employees		0.004***	(0.001)
Performance of Municipal Institutions		-0.005***	(0.001)
Municipal Bribe		0.821***	(0.079)
Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality		-0.001	(0.001)
Need for Improvement of Quality of National Politics and Institutions		0.003**	(0.002)
<i>Support for Political Parties</i>			
Support for Political Parties		0.227***	(0.053)
Country-Level			
<i>Means as Outcomes</i>			
Human Development Proxy (2001)		-0.032***	(0.007)
Municipal Population (Thousands)		-0.001**	(0.000)
Organic charter		0.103	(0.133)
Municipal Tax		0.058	(0.131)
Municipal Expenditure Ratio		-0.305**	(0.139)
Variance Components			
Random effect			
Participation in Political Parties, u_0		0.082***	
Reliability estimate		0.786	

Note: Independent variables grand-mean centered, except for uncentered centered dichotomous municipal-level variables. Robust standard errors.

* = $p < .10$; ** = $p < .05$; *** = $p < .01$ Number of Municipalities = 46 Number of Cases = 18,583

Source: Programa Auditoria Ciudadana

Second, *support for political parties; need for improvement of quality of national politics and institutions; municipal corruption victimization; and evaluation of municipal employees* are positively associated with citizen participation in political parties. While the largest effect in this set of variables is that of municipal corruption victimization, the smallest is that of the need for improvement of quality of national politics and institutions. In other words, a 1-unit increase in municipal corruption victimization is associated with a 0.821 increase in the log odds of participation in political parties. In contrast, a 1-unit increase in the perception that national politics and institutions need to be improved is associated with a 0.003 increase in the log odds of participation in political parties. On the other hand, *performance of municipal institutions perception* is negatively associated with citizen participation in political parties. A 1-unit increase in the perception that municipal institutions are performing well is associated with a -0.005 decrease in the log odds of participation in these institutions of political representation. This effect, however, is not substantively large in comparison to other effects, since the probability of a unit increase in the performance of municipal institutions perception is only 0.499.

Finally, the variables *education* and *age cohort* are positively associated with citizen participation in political parties. Statistically, a 1-unit increase in education and in the age cohort variable increases in 0.136 and 0.189 the log odds of citizen participation in political parties, respectively. Substantively, a 1-unit increase in education and in the age cohort variable is associated with a probability of 0.534 and 0.547 of participation in political parties, respectively. In contrast, the variables *female* and *socioeconomic level* are negatively associated with citizen participation in political parties. Statistically, being in the female category and a 1-unit increase in socioeconomic level decrease in 0.350 and 0.040 the log odds of citizen participation in political parties, respectively. Substantively, being in the female category and a 1-unit increase in socioeconomic level are associated with a probability of 0.413 and 0.490 of participation in political parties, respectively. Along with the measure of administrative decentralization, being in the female category exert the largest *negative* effects on citizen participation in these institutions of political representation.

Voter Turnout




Figure IV-4: Voter Turnout in 46 Argentinean Municipalities

Even though voting in elections is compulsory in Argentina, there is wide variation in voter turnout levels, not only across Argentinean citizens as individuals, but also across municipalities. Figure IV-4 shows the results of the frequency of citizen participation in Argentinean elections. In a scale that goes from 0 that means “Not voted in any election” to 100 that means “Voted in all elections” the average citizen participation in elections for the 46 municipalities selected in this study is 83.96, suggesting a rather high rate of voter turnout.²⁵ The three municipalities with the highest voter turnout levels are Crespo, El Trebol and Villaguay with 92.1, 90.2, and 90.1 points, respectively. At the other extreme, Comodoro Rivadavia, Libertador San Martin, and San Fernando del Valle de Catamarca show the lowest levels of voter turnout, with 77.0, 75.4 and 72.9 points respectively. In the following lines I will report some of the factors associated with this different degrees of citizen participation in Argentina’s elections.

Results depicted in Table IV-3 show a negative association between *organic charter* and *voter turnout*. In other words, being regulated by an organic charter *decreases* voter turnout by - 4.357 points in the 0 to 100 scale.²⁶ In terms of democratic governance, *support for political parties, need for improvement of quality of national politics and institutions* and *performance of municipal institutions perception* are positively associated with voter turnout. From these variables, citizen perception that the quality of national politics and institutions need improvement shows the largest possible effect (3.8 in the 0 to 100 scale) and performance of municipal institutions perceptions the lowest (2.3). Finally, *education level, age cohort, female, and socioeconomic level* are positively related to voter turnout. Substantively, the largest possible effect on voter turnout is that of the age cohort. Those individuals who are 66 and older have an electoral participation frequency of 19.31-points greater than those between 18 and 25 years of age. In contrast, the smallest effect on voter turnout is shown by female, who participate 1.72-points more often than men.

²⁵ According to the *AmericasBarometer* 2008 data set, the percentage of Argentines who voted in the last election is 78.5 percent.

²⁶ The largest possible effects of independent variables are depicted in Appendix A8.

Table IV-3: Results from the Hierarchical Linear Model for Continuous Voter Turnout

Voter Turnout		
	Means as Outcomes	
Intercept	85.352***	(0.607)
Individual-Level		
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>		
Education	1.102***	(0.195)
Age Cohort	3.862***	(0.277)
Female	1.722***	(0.585)
Socioeconomic Level	0.664***	(0.216)
<i>Governance Indicators</i>		
Evaluation of Municipal Employees	0.001	(0.014)
Performance of Municipal Institutions	0.023*	(0.014)
Municipal Bribe	0.292	(1.022)
Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality	0.014	(0.010)
Need for Improvement of Quality of National Politics and Institutions	0.038**	(0.013)
<i>Support for Political Parties</i>		
Support for Political Parties	2.521***	(0.500)
Country-Level		
<i>Means as Outcomes</i>		
Human Development Proxy (2001)	-0.0680	(0.115)
Municipal Population (Thousands)	-0.004	(0.004)
Organic charter	-4.357**	(2.121)
Municipal Tax	0.753	(1.585)
Municipal Expenditure Ratio	-1.549	(1.508)
Variance Components		
Random effect		
Voter Turnout, u_0	13.508***	
Reliability estimate	0.851	

Note: Independent variables grand-mean centered, except for uncentered centered dichotomous municipal-level variables. Robust standard errors.

* = $p < .10$; ** = $p < .05$; *** = $p < .01$ Number of Municipalities = 46 Number of Cases = 18,583

Source: Programa Auditoria Ciudadana

Dealings at Municipal Governments




Figure IV-5: Dealings at Local Government in 46 Argentinean Municipalities

The final dependent variable statistically associated with one of the measurements of municipal decentralization is the extent to which citizens carry out dealings at any of the 46 municipalities in this study. Figure IV-5 shows that in comparative terms, Cerrito, Rosario and Las Rosas are the municipalities with greater citizen demands, with 53.5, 52.5, and 50.8 percent, respectively. At the other extreme, Gualeguaychú, San Fernando and Godoy Cruz dwell citizens that show the lowest participation rates with 23.0, 16.8 and 13.8 percent, respectively. The average rate of demand-making on the 46 municipal governments subject to this study is 34.7 percent, and the participation range is 40 percent. This large range and the frequency distribution of citizen dealings at the local government suggest that there is a wide variation of participation across municipalities. What factors could explain the frequency of citizen demand-making in some Argentinean municipalities?

Table IV-4 shows that residing in municipalities that excise taxes from their population increases the log odds of demand-making at the local government. The probability of carrying out dealings at municipalities that tax their citizens is 0.58.²⁷ Additionally, those individuals who think that the quality of national politics and institutions need to be improved, those who have been victimized by corruption at the municipal government and those who positively evaluate municipal employees show higher log odds of demand-making at the municipal government. Substantively, the effects of a 1-unit increase in municipal employee evaluations and in the quality of national politics and institutions perceptions on the frequency of citizen dealings at the municipality are not very large (probabilities of 0.501 and 0.502, respectively). However, there is a 0.6 probability that those who have been victimized by corruption at the municipal government have also presented solicitudes in municipal offices. Finally, the individual's socioeconomic level, age and education are positively associated with the log odds of carrying out dealings at the municipal government. The demand-making probabilities associated with a unit increase in the socioeconomic level, age and education, however, are not very large (0.519, 0.515 and 0.531, respectively).

²⁷ The complete set of probabilities is depicted in Appendix A9.

Table IV-4: Results from the Hierarchical Model for Dichotomous Dealings at Municipal Governments

Dealings at Municipal Government		Means as Outcomes	
Intercept		-0.654***	(0.074)
Individual-Level			
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>			
Education		0.125***	(0.017)
Age Cohort		0.060***	(0.015)
Female		-0.0144	(0.038)
Socioeconomic Level		0.078***	(0.026)
<i>Governance Indicators</i>			
Evaluation of Municipal Employees		0.007***	(0.001)
Performance of Municipal Institutions		-0.001	(0.001)
Municipal Bribe		0.427***	(0.069)
Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality		0.001	(0.001)
Need for Improvement of Quality of National Politics and Institutions		0.006**	(0.001)
<i>Support for Political Parties</i>			
Support for Political Parties		0.014	(0.040)
Country-Level			
<i>Means as Outcomes</i>			
Human Development Proxy (2001)		0.010	(0.009)
Municipal Population (Thousands)		0.000	(0.000)
Organic charter		0.102	(0.168)
Municipal Tax		0.313**	(0.149)
Municipal Expenditure Ratio		0.384	(0.277)
Variance Components			
Random effect			
Dealings at Municipal Government, u_0		0.188***	
Reliability estimate		0.929	

Note: Independent variables grand-mean centered, except for uncentered centered dichotomous municipal-level variables. Robust standard errors.

* = $p < .10$; ** = $p < .05$; *** = $p < .01$ Number of Municipalities = 46 Number of Cases = 18,583

Source: Programa Auditoria Ciudadana

Discussing Results and Moving Forward

This chapter has shown, once again, that at least one decentralization dimension is negatively associated with citizen participation in political parties. In particular, high levels of municipal per capita expenditures relative to total provincial per capita expenditures are associated with lower probabilities of citizen participation in these institutions of political representation. Consistent with what has been said in previous chapters, there seems to be some internal mechanisms behind decentralization that contribute to a deinstitutionalization of citizen participation in political parties. In the next chapter, I will qualitatively analyze the hypothesis that empowered local political elites have greater incentives and tools to discourage citizen participation in institutions of political representation. These incentives and tools that may result from decentralization are at the disposal of strong local elites in order to prevent the emergence of political competitors who can put them at risk of removal from office in the following electoral period.²⁸ The qualitative analysis in the next chapter may also prove useful for dealing with a potentially endogenous relationship between decentralization and participatory democracy.

Not only administrative decentralization is negatively associated with citizen participation in political parties: As municipal size of the population and municipal human development increase, the likelihood of participating in these institutions of political representation decreases. It is important to note, however, that the effect sizes are relatively smaller in comparison to the administrative decentralization measure. Notwithstanding, these relationships suggest that wealthier, healthier and more educated populations on the one hand, and municipalities with larger numbers of inhabitants on the other participate less often in political parties. As a reminder, PAC questionnaires did not include any item to measure citizen engagement in mobilized modes of participation. Hence, it is impossible to determine whether or not the very same variables that negatively affect citizen participation in political parties increase public engagement in protests, manifestations and riots, as they did when we studied the Latin American and Caribbean region.

²⁸ This hypothesis is only valid, of course, in municipalities considered as full electoral democracies.

In this chapter, decentralization is also theoretically and empirically found to be associated with participatory democracy in at least two other ways. First, the political decentralization measure employed here is negatively related to voter turnout. Specifically, in those municipalities where an organic charter binds citizens and politicians, the likelihood of voter turnout is smaller than in municipalities without Organic charters. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that these charters leave so little room for political maneuver to elected public officials, that citizens regard voting as meaningless. Another potential explanation is that organic charters condition the electoral structure in such a way as to make it difficult for individuals to vote. All in all, this is an association that requires further research in order to best comprehend the negative effect of written sub-national constitutions on voter turnout.

Second, the fiscal decentralization measure employed in this chapter is positively associated with the frequency that citizens carry out dealings at the municipal government. In other words, the likelihood of demand-making at the local government is higher in municipalities that tax their citizens in comparison to those municipalities that do not possess a taxation structure. A plausible explanation may be that once individuals contribute directly to the fiscal income of local governments, citizens appear to become more interested in either controlling or extracting back resources from municipal offices. Hence, municipal taxation may be used as a tool to increase local officials' accountability, and at the same time recognize with more efficacy territorially specific citizen needs and demands. In the next chapter, I will scale down the analysis of decentralization to two neighboring but dramatically different towns in terms of civic virtue in Argentina: Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay.

CHAPTER V

V. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF MUNICIPAL PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY: GUALEGUAYCHÚ AND CONCEPCIÓN DEL URUGUAY

Give a Man a Fish, Feed Him For a Day. Teach a Man to Fish, Feed Him For a Lifetime.
(Chinese Proverb)

Why can two nearly identically decentralized towns have dramatically different outcomes with respect to participatory democracy? The puzzle behind this question can be best explained by carrying out a comparative study of Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay in Argentina. These two neighboring towns share not only remarkably similar foundation histories, geographic characteristics and socioeconomic levels, but they are also regulated under the same provincial constitution that dictates the levels of institutional decentralization in both territories. However, one town transited to a relatively consolidated democracy, characterized by a regular alternation in power of local authorities, a strong social capital and important levels of citizen satisfaction with the way democracy functions at the local level. The other remains today a single-family politically dominated town, with relatively lower levels of citizen participation and a generalized disenchantment with local political affairs.

Table V-1 shows the historical and socioeconomic similarities and the political differences of these twin towns. Don Tomás de Rocamora, a Nicaraguan politician and soldier, founded several villages in the Province of Entre Ríos, Argentina. Among these villages, he founded both Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay in 1783. Both towns currently have nearly the same number of inhabitants, and both municipalities invested almost 700 pesos per person in 2008. The Partido Justicialista has traditionally governed both towns since the return to democracy in Argentina in 1983. However, public opinion data collected by the *Programa de Auditoría Ciudadana* (PAC) reveal dramatically different citizen evaluations of and attitudes towards the way democracy functions at the local level. At the one extreme, Gualeguaychuenses constantly place their municipality in the top-ten ranking of best performance in terms of respect for citizen

rights, efficacy and transparency. At the other extreme, Uruguayenses rate their municipal government among the 10 worst local governments, in an evaluation of 46 Argentinean municipalities.

Table V-1: Twin Cities with Opposed Political Outcomes

	Gualeguaychú	Concepción del Uruguay
Contextual Factors		
Year Founded	1783	1783
Founder	Tomás de Rocamora	Tomás de Rocamora
Population	76220 (2001)	67474 (2001)
Province	Entre Ríos	Entre Ríos
Municipal Budget per capita (2008)	716.93	673.59
Number of Municipal Councilors	12	12
Mayor's Political Party	Partido Justicialista	Partido Justicialista
Incumbent was Reelected?	No	Yes
Existence of Representatives of the Traditional Opposition Party (Unión Cívica Radical) in the City Council	Yes	No
Public Opinion and Behavior (Rankings: 1st=Highest 46th=Lowest)		
Belief that Citizen Rights are Respected at the Municipality	3rd	38th
Evaluation of Municipal Efficacy	4th	45th
Citizen Participation in Political Parties	10th	43rd
Belief that Municipality is Free from Corruption	7th	28th

Sources: Municipal WebPages and Programa de Auditoria Ciudadana (PAC)

What factors could explain this contrast? How does the same set of decentralization reforms produce such different outcomes? Previous chapters have been useful in uncovering connections between decentralization and participatory democracy. However, they have proven less useful in determining when decentralization contributes to the consolidation of democracy, when it does not, and why. In this chapter, I hold decentralization and other municipal level factors constant and compare two cases with opposing decentralization outcomes in order to identify the most important explanations that make decentralization a successful policy or a failure

with respect to enhancing the quality of local participatory democracy. Thus, the goal of this chapter is three-fold. First, resting upon Collier and Collier' *Shaping the Political Arena* (2002), I examine what these scholars refer to as a *critical juncture*, a point in history that established certain paths of development for these two towns that opened up certain possibilities and foreclosed others in a way that shaped Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay's participatory democracies for years to come. Second, based on the work of Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003) I examine the size of local political coalitions and their behaviors with respect to the goal of political survival and the size of local elites' coalitions, and how these behaviors have modified the levels of local democracy in both towns. Finally, I intend to assess how citizens in Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay carry out the tasks of decentralization as a response to local elites' behavior, using Hiskey's principal-agent work (2010) as analytical framework.

In order to accomplish the goals put forward in this chapter, I first conduct a comparative historical analysis of Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay. The aim of it is to find a critical juncture that can best explain the different paths taken by these two neighboring towns in the development of their local political systems amidst a context of decentralization reforms. Second, I carry out 24 semi-structured interviews with local elites. These interviews are intended to gathered information that can explain democratic or undemocratic actions taken by local political elites with the purpose of surviving in office. Finally, I assess focus groups responses in Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay with the goal of understanding citizens' behaviors and opinions that result from local political elites actions or inactions.

Results from the comparative historical analysis, local elite interviews and focus groups unveil an intriguing factor: Decentralization policies seem to have worked better in territories where citizens, instead of local authorities, have exerted greater pressures for the implementation and functioning of local institutions; that is, places where citizens have pressured in a greater extent for political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization in comparison to other social actors. To explain this finding further, decentralization successes should be more common in settings where citizens are the key actors of their own development, as opposed to towns where caudillos have been responsible for most of their progress. As the epigraph of this chapter suggests,

decentralization policies fail in places where citizens are either unwilling or unable to provide support for democratic development. In the particular case of the two Argentinean towns studied in this chapter, part of the answer can be found in the popular dictums of each society: While Concepción del Uruguay “developed under the heat of her caudillos,” Gualeguaychú is the mother of her own developments” (these quotes are popular sayings in both towns). As a result of this diverting social construction, the former continues to be a family-led illiberal democracy, while the latter has transited to a relatively consolidated participatory democracy.

This chapter consists of five sections. Section two develops the theory and hypotheses of this chapter that derive from the literature on critical junctures, political survival and agency theory. Section three explains the qualitative research methods and how the data were acquired. Section four describes and discusses empirical results. Finally, section five concludes.

Explaining the Social Construction of Participatory Democracy Through Critical Junctures, Political Survival and Agency Theory

Relying on three aspects of the social construction of participatory democracy can help to explain different outcomes of similar decentralization policies. The first aspect proposed in this chapter is historical. This aspect is based on the discovery of a *critical juncture*, or as Collier and Collier put it “a period of significant change, which typically occurs in distinct ways in different units of analysis and which is hypothesized to produce distinct legacies” (2002:29). Thus, the general idea behind the quest for a critical juncture in Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay is the finding of crucial choices made during a transition that established a path dependent direction. With the purpose of establishing a critical juncture, three elements must be considered: (a) A significant change that must have occurred within each case; (b) This change must have taken place in different ways in each case; and (c) This change must have produced different outcomes (Collier and Collier 2002).

In the case of Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, the period of basic change corresponds to the foundation of both towns. The contrasts involve the varied roles of the founding fathers in determining which city shall be selected as the provincial capital. Finally, the

legacy consists of different routes to the consolidation of participatory democracies: Decentralization and development carried out mainly by local political elites, and decentralization and development carried out by citizen groups along with the municipal government. Other elements of this critical juncture are mechanisms of production of the legacy, its perpetuation through ongoing institutional and political processes and the consolidation of the way participatory democracies function in each town (Collier and Collier 2002).

The second aspect proposed in this chapter to explain the social construction of participatory democracy is the study of the political survival of local elites. This aspect is based on an adaptation to the local level of the *selectorate theory* put forward by Bueno de Mezquita and others in 2003. Leaders, all of whom face emerging challengers who wish to remove them from office, maintain their coalition of supporters by providing them a mixture of public and private goods and services. When leaders depend on a “small” group or elite coalition to survive in office, they engender loyalty by providing them with access to ample personal, private goods and services they would not otherwise receive if they were not in the elite. Family-ruled towns are a good example of small elite coalitions. In this context, alternation in power is less frequent and citizen participation is highly discouraged.

In contrast, contexts where many supporters demand for rewards, the costs of private benefits required to keep their loyalty is just too high. Instead, those leaders who rely on a “large” local elite coalition to remain in office emphasize the provision of goods and services that benefit everyone in the society. In this framework, democratic alternation of power is more frequent because coalition members can defect to a rival since they do not enjoy private benefits. As a result, in large coalition contexts citizen face less restrictions to participate in oversight and decision-making. Thus, the consolidation of municipal participatory democracies in both Galeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay depends in important ways on the size of the local elite coalition. That is, as the size of the coalition grows larger, the town’s decision-making and oversight becomes more participatory and democratic.

The third and final aspect proposed in this chapter revolves around the citizen principal-local government agent dynamics proposed by Hiskey in 2010. In his work *The Promise of*

Decentralized Democratic Governance, Hiskey states that as a result of decentralization, “there is a change in the responsibilities that both [principals and agents] have in carrying out the duties such reforms assign to them” (2010:30). Thus, the understanding of these new interactions between principal and agents and the willingness and capacity of citizens and local political officers to carry out their responsibilities may serve to identify reasons behind the different degrees of participatory democracy that result from similar decentralization policies.

Viewing Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay through the lens of agency theory, the principal-agent dynamic analyzed above suggests that decentralization policies may not work as expected in contexts where citizens are unwilling or unable to take an active role as principals in both decision-making and accountability processes, as a result of entrenched and powerful local agents (Hiskey 2010). Taking into account this reasoning, it may also be important to distinguish between the different sources of decentralizing pressures. The literature in this regard distinguishes between “local-up” dynamics, in which decentralization is forced on national decision-makers from pressures exerted by sub-national officials, and “national-down” patterns, in which national actors, operating in an strategic mode, decide to decentralize (Eaton 2004; Falletti 2010; Grindle 2007; O’Neill 2005; Tulchin and Selee 2004).

This chapter introduces a third element to explain different degrees of citizen participation in equally decentralized territories: the “citizen-up” dynamic. This dynamic suggests that in some towns, principals instead of local agents exert the most significant pressures for the transfers of power to their territories. In contrast, towns where “local-up” processes were led by a local *caudillo* (or family of caudillos), institutions are designed in such a way as to favor power concentration among agents that in the end will restrict principals’ participation in decision-making and oversight activities. The “national-down” dynamic, as a result, may only reinforce the pre-existing dynamics between local agents and citizen principals.

These three aspects, intended to explain the social construction of participatory democracy, are interrelated with one another. They will help to analyze the association between decentralization and participatory democracy from a historical perspective, and its effects on the relationship between local political elites and citizens in Gualeguaychú and Concepción del

Uruguay. The following section presents the research design and qualitative methods employed in this study to gather the empirical evidence necessary to test the hypotheses advanced in this chapter.

In Search of Qualitative Evidence

Case Selection

In order to discover why similar decentralization policies can produce dramatically different outcomes with respect to participatory democracy, two Argentinean towns were carefully selected for comparison. These two towns are Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, and were chosen using the Mill's Method of Difference. This method involved selecting municipalities that are similar in ways that are treated as parameters but dissimilar with regards to the dependent variable (Mill 1970). In terms of parameters, Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú are two middle size towns located in the Province of Entre Rios. Both towns inherited the legacy of Spanish colonial rule. Both share common borders. Both are located on the shores of the Uruguay River. Both have remarkably similar income levels, populations and area sizes. Both towns exist under the Constitution of the Province of Entre Rios. Both have experienced significant decentralization reforms, following Argentina's transition to democracy in 1983.

In terms of participatory democracy, however, these two towns are almost exact opposites. PAC data shows that while Gualeguaychú enjoys high levels of citizen support for democracy, political participation, tolerance and interpersonal trust, Concepción del Uruguay is characterized for a tradition of public apathy, little institutional and interpersonal trust and high levels of dissatisfaction with the way democracy works at the municipal level. In short, the former town transited to a relatively consolidated democracy, while the latter remains today a single-family politically dominated town. What makes these twin towns so different with respect to their degree of democratic consolidation? To answer this question, I combine three qualitative

methods that I think best capture the essence of the sociopolitical disparities between the two towns: (a) Historical Comparative Analysis; (b) Semi-structured Elite Interviews; and (c) Focus Groups.

Research Methods

While the public opinion databases employed in previous chapters provided powerful resources to find some of the correlates between decentralization and participatory democracy, the use of quantitative methods is less powerful for discovering the mechanisms behind these correlations. Holding the degree of decentralization constant, in this chapter I use three qualitative methods intended to uncover some of the causal differences behind Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay's democracies. First, I carry out comparative historical research based on historical literature and specialized interviews with historians. With this type of research I intend to unveil antecedent conditions, cleavages, and legacies that will help me to identify the most telling critical juncture that made these towns to take so different paths. The antecedent condition, as Collier and Collier put it, "represents [the] base line against which the critical juncture and the legacy are assessed" (2002:30). Thus, the antecedent condition in the historical comparative component of this study is the period right before the foundation of both towns. The cleavage, as a result, corresponds to the period between the foundation of Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, and the establishment of the provincial capital by the founding fathers. Finally, the legacy is the asymmetry between both towns' levels of participatory democracy.

The second qualitative method of this chapter is the application of 24 semi-structured interviews to local elites and experts in the area of local democracy. These semi-structured interviews were carried out during April 2010, with the purpose of identifying both historical reasons and elite behaviors that shaped the different paths that Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay have taken on their way to democratic consolidation. For this purpose, these interviews included councilors, historians, jurists and journalists that were crucial in the efforts of understanding some of the mechanisms that connect political elite behavior and local participatory democracy. They also allowed collecting information about how decision-making is

carried out and implemented, what are the deadlocks in the process, and what is the generalized perception of local political elites about opposition groups and emerging political competitors. The master questionnaire used for these semi-structured interviews can be found in Appendix A10.

The third and final qualitative method is the implementation of four focus groups per town. The four focus groups in Gualeguaychú were carried out on October 28 and 29, 2004, taking into consideration two variables of basic segmentation: age and socioeconomic level. Two groups of young adults between 18 and 35 years of age were formed; one representing middle and middle-high social classes, and the other representing middle-low and low social classes. The other two groups include older adults 36 years old and older, also segmented in two categories: one representing middle and middle-high social classes, and the other representing middle-low and low social classes. The four focus groups in Concepción del Uruguay were carried out on November 10 and 11, 2005, taking into consideration the same two variables of basic segmentation applied in Gualeguaychú. Pseudo-probability sampling was implemented as the scheme of participant selection in both towns. Finally, the purpose of these eight focus groups is to determine the differences between agent-principal relations and their impact on participatory democracy.

Twin Towns, Mismatched Democracies?

A Glance at Entre Rios History: Antecedent Conditions

Before the arrival of the first Spaniard conquerors, the current territory of the Entre Rios province (where Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay are located) was occupied by different nomad ethnicities, such as the chanas-timbues, the charruas and the guaranies (Taborda 1963). However, these indigenous groups were defeated and reduced by Governor Hernandarias as Entre Rios entered to form part of the Viceroyalty of Peru under the Jurisdiction of Buenos Aires and Santa Fe. Spanish colonizers continued their expedition against the charruas situated in the Oriental Band, and started to found the first villas of the province. In

1783, a short period after the Viceroyalty of La Plata was created, Viceroy Juan Jose de Vertiz y Salcedo ordered Tomás de Rocamora the Organization of the Entrerrian territory, and proceeded to found the villages of Gualeguay, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay (Taborda 1963).

In 1810, the Entrerrian villages adhered to the May Revolution that constituted the first effort to gain independence, collaborating logistically and militarily with Manuel Belgrano during the Libertarian Expedition to Paraguay. The relationship with Buenos Aires deteriorated one year later due to an agreement signed in Montevideo with the Viceroy with the purpose of reoccupying Guleguay, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay and the entire Oriental Band in exchange of the unblock of the harbor. The Entrerrian villages, under the command of local caudillos, managed to defeat the realists that occupied their territories, and since then Entre Rios adopted a strong federalist position (Taborda 1963). For this reason, Entre Rios did not accept the Unitarian constitution of 1826 promoted by Buenos Aires.

The French blockage between 1838 and 1840, and the Anglo-French blockage between 1845 and 1850 allowed merchant vessels to freely navigate both the Parana and Uruguay rivers, directly favoring Entre Rios' commerce that was previously monopolized by the Port of Buenos Aires. When these blockages were withdrawn, along with the traditional insistence of Entre Rios for a true federalism, resentment ignited between Entre Rios Governor Justo Jose de Urquiza and Buenos Aires Governor Juan Manuel de Rosas. In 1852 in the Battle of Caseros, Urquiza defeated Rosas and in 1860 dictated the new Constitution of Entre Rios (Taborda 1963).

During the great European immigration between 1853 and 1930, Entre Rios was one of the provinces that received the largest number of immigrants who in turn formed a large number of agricultural colonies. The 1929 world's economic crisis, known as The Great Depression, hurt the agricultural international sector, which accelerated the province's urbanization process. The industrialization process initiated during the 1930s caused a provincial exodus because the provincial urban centers could not assimilate all the population that arrived from the countryside. These facts influenced in the provincial constitutional reform of 1933 (Taborda 1963). Other important constitutional reforms were carried out between 1946 and 1955; however, provincial authorities reestablished in 1955 the constitutional chart of 1933.

Several coups that occurred between 1930 and 1983 eliminated provincial autonomies. Military governments, directly appointed by the dictator in charge, assumed the position of “provincial governors.” The most important events during this period were the construction of the Sub-pluvial Tunnel Raul Uranga – Carlos Sylvestre Begnis that connected the cities of Parana and Santa Fe, ending with the land isolation of the Mesopotamia; and the construction in 1975 of the Zarate – Brazo Largo Rail Complex that unites Gualguaychu with Buenos Aires. In 1983, after democracy was reestablished, six governors have been democratically elected; one has been elected three times (Jorge Busti, Justicialista Party), another was elected twice (Sergio Alberto Montiel, Union Civica Radical), and two have been elected only once (Mario Armando Moine and Sergio Urribarri, both from the Justicialista Party). The historical origins of both Gualeguachú and Concepción del Uruguay discussed in this section are important to understand in which point of history both cities took different paths on their way to democratic consolidation. Before moving to the quest for critical junctures, the next section will analyze the current system of municipal decentralization in the province of Entre Ríos.

Analysis of the Current System of Municipal Decentralization in Entre Rios

Currently, there are three jurisdictional levels that articulate modern Argentina’s federalism: National, provincial and municipal. Due to its federal character the National Constitution of Argentina does not define a municipal regime of government. Rather, provincial constitutions delegate powers and functions to municipal governments, each with different modalities (Curcio 2005). In the case of Entre Rios, there are at least three salient constitutional dimensions that define the level of municipal decentralization. The first dimension is *political decentralization*. Two organs compose local governments: one executive and the other one deliberative (legislative). A mayor and a vice-mayor compose the executive power and 12 councilors compose the deliberative power. Both the executive and deliberative organs are popularly elected for four years terms (Constitution of Entre Rios, 1933).

The method of seats assignment in the Deliberant Council is a mixture of majoritarian and proportional systems. Specifically, the political party that wins the election for mayor gets

seven out of 12 seats in the Deliberant Council. The five seats remaining are allocated by the d'Hont method of proportional representation.²⁹ This combination of methods, of course, could guarantee a majoritarian local democracy that favors first-past-the-post politics. However, it also segments minorities who need to reach a consensus in order to carry out a more effective opposition. Some experts manifest at least three concerns about the fairness of this system. The first concern is that:

The electoral laws that regulate elections for local governments in the Province of Entre Rios are unfair. Let me explain to you why. In the current electoral system, political parties that obtain the majority of votes, even if it does not reach 50 percent, gets 50 percent plus one of the available legislative seats. The remaining seats are assigned by proportional representation and this formula, of course, favors mayors and atomizes minorities. Thus, a minority may have, for four years, the domain of the legislative power. As a result, the legislatures or deliberant councils will always belong to the dominant party. In other words, the Deliberant Council will always back mayors, which is unfair because there is no possibility for opposition. This phenomenon decreases minorities' political power (Public Prosecutor, University Professor, Concepción del Uruguay).

Even though this concern about the electoral system in the province of Entre Rios may be legitimate, it is also important to note that belonging to the same political party does not automatically guarantee the same political ideology between its members. Entre Rios' recent history shows a rather constant division or fragmentation of ideologies within dominant political parties (Justicialista or Peronista Party and Union Civica Radical). Some of these internal divisions could even mean open political opposition not only between members of the same political party at the local level, but also across jurisdictions; that is municipal, provincial and national levels. As one expert noted:

The political party Union Civica Radical governed this municipality during the first democratic period, from 1983 to 1987. After that, the Justicialista Party has governed until today. However, there have been three political lines inside the Justicialista Party that governed Gualeguaychú. The first line was an internal political group referenced by Dr. Hector Maya. This political group is called "Frejuli." This group governed from 1987 to 1991. From 1991 to 2007 governed a political group called "Militancia Peronista – Nuevo Espacio." Finally, from 2007 until today, there is another political group inside the Justicialista Party. Sometimes these political groups have followed the general line of the Justicialista Party, but some other times they have acted as opposition groups within the very same political party (Councilor, Schoolteacher, University Professor, Justicialista Party, Gualeguaychú).

²⁹ For more information about this method, please see <http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/generalconference/pisa/papers/PP996.pdf> (last visited, January 30, 2011).

A second concern about the fairness of the electoral system corresponds to the laws that rule political parties. Not only the hybrid majoritarian/consensus system seems to favor large parties; national parties are also entitled by law to receive public monies that small local parties are not entitled to. Most of the local elites interviewed in this study agreed that after the democratic transition of 1983 there is no normative restriction for citizens to gather in political organizations. However, a legal monetary reimbursement that applies only to national parties put small and local political parties and movements in disadvantage. As a local jurist noted:

Here, for example, based on the National Law of Political Parties, national parties get a reimbursement for every vote obtained right after an election. This is not a large amount, but when the party gets a lot of votes it represents, for example, one peso per vote or something like that. However, neighborhood unions and municipal parties are excluded from this benefit, because they are not formally considered as political parties, thus municipal political parties have almost no financial support, and on top of that, they have to pay the printing costs of the ballot and all other costs that could be otherwise avoided (Jurist, Lawyer and Journalist, Gualeguaychú).

This funding restriction may have at least three repercussions for citizens and political parties. First, national political parties have greater chances of political survival than local parties, since the former are entitled by law to receive monetary reimbursements after elections, as opposed to the latter, that depend mostly on the availability of private funds. This phenomenon may be contributing to the explanation of the bi-partisan system of political representation in Argentina, where the Justicialista Party and the Union Civica Radical permanently compete in elections, while local political parties get created and disappear frequently before and after a particular electoral period. Second, since local political parties heavily depend on private monetary contributions to survive, they may be more prone to respond to corporatist interests than national political parties that receive public funds.

However, decision-making within large national political parties should be more contested due to the generally larger number of affiliates relative to local political parties. Moreover, conflicts may arise more often in political parties of national scope among leaders who represent local vs. provincial or federal interests, while leaders of local parties may only represent municipal interests. Third, ordinary citizens may have greater influence over partisan decision-making in local parties, where most decisions are generally made at the local level, as opposed to national

political parties where decision-making may be greatly influenced by political leaders at both the provincial and national levels. As one expert noted, larger political parties pose relatively bigger challenges for new members:

Citizen participation in political parties varies because in some parties doors are open; for example it occurs to me that the Socialist Party is making a good job lately here in Gualeguaychú in terms of receiving inquiries, and it is agglutinating lots of people; however, in larger political parties it is more difficult because young individuals who want to become a member of the party may find in advance too many occupied spots. Though difficult, it is not impossible for young individuals to participate, but participatory mechanisms in large political parties are usually very closed for those who want to participate and obtain a membership (Jurist, Lawyer and Journalist, Gualeguaychú).

Finally, the third concern about Argentina’s electoral system is a mechanism that protects the survival of traditional political parties of national scope from emerging political competitors. This mechanism is the structure of the ballot. In Argentina, the ballot paper is designed in such a way as to favor a straight-party vote to choose all candidates from dominant parties with one selection, as opposed to individual candidates from weaker parties. A valid vote is casted by selecting an entire or partial list, and placing this list into an envelope that is immediately deposited into a ballot box. All candidates from a single party usually compose one list. The ballot can be cut and candidates from other lists can be selected, but if more than one candidate is chosen, the vote is spoiled. Figure V-1 shows an example of a ballot in Argentinean elections:



Figure V-1: Argentine’s Ballot for 1987 General Elections, Alianza Popular de Centro

About this ballot, one ex-political candidate interviewed explains that:

This ballot belongs to a single party. This is when I run for governor. It starts with national congressmen, governor, provincial senator, mayor and councilmen; but it could have been longer because it could have included national senators and the nation’s president. This is why I call it “sausage ballot.” One day on TV I pulled out a long sausage and asked the audience if they

thought they were able to swallow the entire thing without slicing it into pieces. Then I proceeded to explain that they face the same challenge with the ballots because in every list only a printed line without being die-cut divides the available candidates. In this context, a person who wants to select a governor from this list but a mayor from a different list has to cut the ballot and be sure not to superpose two ballots from the same political party. Additionally, the dark room to cast the ballot and the nervousness to do so quickly, especially if there are large queues, increases the chances of spoiling the vote. For this reason, lots of people just pick an entire list and cast the ballot producing, as a result, the dragging of large political parties (Jurist, Lawyer and Journalist, Gualeguaychú).

The second Constitutional dimension that defines decentralization in the province of Entre Rios is *fiscal decentralization*. The federal system in Argentina implies fiscal relationships across different levels of governments that result in complex mechanisms of intergovernmental transfers (Curcio 2005). Moreover, the concurrence of fiscal powers among the national government, provinces and municipalities require of co-participation mechanisms to assign fiscal resources across jurisdictions. In the particular case of Entre Rios, 41.8 percent of the total municipal income comes from fiscal transfers collected through taxes by the national and the provincial levels of government; 50.4 percent comes from non-tax fees and contributions; 6.7 percent from other current income and 1.2 percent from capital income. Municipal governments in Entre Rios are not allowed to collect taxes (Curcio 2005).³⁰

The third and final Constitutional dimension that defines Entre Rios' municipal governments is *administrative decentralization*. This dimension is basically defined by the traditional provision of local goods and services, such as garbage collection, potable water and public electricity, maintenance of local streets and avenues, sewerage, and the conservation of public parks. In the particular case of Entre Rios, 57,2 percent of the total income is allocated in public salaries; 22,7 percent is invested in goods and services; 13,7 percent is invested in capital goods; 4,0 percent is transferred to other institutions; and 2,6 percent goes to other current expenditures (Curcio 2005).

³⁰ Other provinces, such as Chaco or Chubut, allow their municipalities to collect taxes on urban and rural housing, and vehicles, among others.

The Political Survival of Local Elites in Concepción del Uruguay and Gualeguaychú

To my understanding, Concepción del Uruguay has been politically constructed by familial clans. Two families, one Peronist [Justicialista Party] and the other one Radical [Union Civica Radical] have been marking the political rhythm of the city generation after generation. In Gualeguaychú, in contrast, that political construction has been more disperse. There is no single family that can arrogate those rights for themselves. Thus, in Gualeguaychú there is a relatively greater degree of political alternation. Those who participate in Gualeguaychú know in advance that they could sooner or later occupy a position of collective responsibility. And this, to my judgment, is the single, most important achievement that differentiates Gualeguaychú from Concepción del Uruguay, where citizens are more apathetic with respect to participation to the point that most Uruguayenses think that if they are friends with the politician, they will get their problems solved. This, as a result, translates into a scorn of their self-participation (Journalist, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay).

As mentioned in the outset of this chapter, one of the most important differences between Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay is their levels of participatory democracy. PAC data and elite responses to semi-structured interviews suggest that in Gualeguaychú, for instance, individuals appear to have relatively higher control over the determination and development of democracy as a whole. The distinction between citizenry and political class is minimal, and today's neighbor could be tomorrow's mayor or councilor. Similarly, after a politician's term in office is due, he or she can easily reintegrate to civil society. Perhaps one of the most salient features of Gualeguaychú's society is the characteristic of being the promoter of its own development. Specifically, ordinary citizens have developed a great deal of the most important public edifications and enterprises for the city. Two quotes from local specialist briefly exemplify participatory democracy in Gualeguaychú:

In general terms, the citizen of Gualeguaychú has a very social lifestyle. A common citizen participates in a sports club, participates in an association that helps the hospital, participates in a political party; is very active. Not only minds about his own life, but he also carries out social tasks all the time in different areas. The Gualeguaychuense mobilizes... And most importantly, people from the political sector are that very same citizen. There is no distinction between a political class on the one hand, and the citizenry on the other. These political actors are the same people that form this mobilized society. For example, a former mayor belongs to the Environmental Assembly. Two or three councilors are schoolteachers and recently mobilized on the streets protesting about their salaries; thus we are the same actors. Hence, there is a very direct relationship between the political sector and ordinary citizens, and this is what differences Gualeguaychú from other cities (Councilor, Schoolteacher, University Professor, Justicialista Party, Gualeguaychú).

Gualeguaychú is proudly called the "mother of her own developments." If you analyze here in Gualeguaychú, most of the largest developments were carried out by groups of ordinary citizens.

The slaughterhouse, for example, was one of the largest export plants in the country for over half a century, and was created by Guauguaychú's cattle breeders who were not satisfied with the prices received from foreign slaughterhouses. Instead of blocking roads as they do today, Guauguaychú's cattle breeders resolved to develop their own slaughterhouse. Another example is the Guauguaychú Theatre that was developed with funds collected by several families who decided to build that colossus that is now one of the best scenarios in the country. At the same time the Theatre was being built, the current Centenario Hospital was born as a private entrepreneurship made possible by the beneficence society. I could go on and on with examples like these: the Firefighters, for instance, was entirely implemented by private initiative; the industrial park of Guauguaychú was an initiative of retailers with support from the municipality; and finally, the Carnival of Guauguaychú was an entrepreneurship of the local clubs. So this city has traditionally had a characteristic of independence and above all, mobilized things with the engine of her inhabitants without relying on the official heat to get things done (Jurist, Lawyer and Journalist, Guauguaychú).

In contrast, citizens of Concepción del Uruguay appear to have little or no control over the determination of the way democracy functions at the local level. A single family has traditionally ruled the city, thus power alternation has been rather scant. Since this family has been in power for many years, they have formed an impressive clientelistic network that poses an insurmountable challenge for politicians who want to compete in local elections. In this context, the incumbent and his family always win elections (which appear to be not free or fair) by a wide margin and political parties are meaningless. The city is also characterized by low levels of social capital, where citizens simplify their civic engagement and participation to elections, and manifest a generalized apathy and discontent with the way democracy works at their municipality. Again, two quotes from different local experts are worth noting in order to best understand Concepción del Uruguay's level of participatory democracy:

In this town, there are political groups formed by caudillos instead of political parties. The last caudillo in this town was elected mayor three or four times, and is the uncle of the current mayor and grandfather of current president of the Deliberant Council. This caudillo, which was a good person, spent his life creating a power pole through the Peronism [Justicialista Party]. His son was also national and provincial congressman. In terms of the Radicalism, they also had caudillos, but they disappeared. They do not exist anymore... Since the return to democracy in 1983, with the exception of the period between 1983 and 1987, the Peronism has always governed the city under the command of the Peronist caudillo and his family (Jurist, Concepción del Uruguay)

In this town, one family has been governing the city for more than 50 years and the next mayor will be the one that is now president of the Deliberant Council; that is, the one you just interviewed. Since this family has had the power for so long, they have an extraordinary clientelistic network. Thus it is very difficult to win elections against the incumbent that every week gives the citizen a bag of food, subsidies, jobs, etc. This should not happen in Guauguaychú. But in Concepción del Uruguay and Concordia, the incumbents or candidates related in one way or another with the incumbent win elections with a wide margin. Take into account that in Entre Rios the winner party generally prevails with a small percentage of the votes. This difference almost never surpasses three-percent of the total valid votes; that is, if the Peronism wins, it only has a three percent

advantage over the Radicals, and vice versa. However, in Concepción del Uruguay and Concordia, winners get a seven to ten-percent advantage over losers (Historian, ex-congressman, Concepción del Uruguay).

These differences may be directly affecting citizen evaluations of local democratic governance. Public opinion data obtained through the Programa de Auditoria Ciudadana (PAC) show the dramatic differences between evaluations of Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay's municipal performances. There are at least three groups of variables that are worth comparing in this chapter. First, an Index of Perceptions of Municipal Performance that includes questions related to the evaluation of the political situation of the municipality, satisfaction with performance of local democracy, evaluations of authorities' respect for citizen rights, evaluations of performance of municipal institutions and a general evaluation of municipal employees shows that in a comparative analysis of 47 Argentinean municipal governments, Gualeguaychú is located in the top five best perceptions of Municipal Performance while Concepción del Uruguay appears in the 41st position.

Second, an Index of Perceptions of Administrative Efficacy that includes questions associated with municipal employees' responses to citizen demand-making, such as long queues at the municipal government, unnecessary dealings, costly or denied information, disrespectful and impolite employees, discriminative and humiliating public officers, ranks Gualeguaychú in the top four municipal governments with best administrative efficacy, while placing Concepción del Uruguay in the next-to-last position in the same group of 47 Argentinean municipalities. Third, in an Index of Perceptions about Freedom from Corruption at the Municipal Government that includes assessments of how often citizens have to pay bribes to get things done, frequency of bribe solicitation by municipal employees and general evaluations of municipal corruptions shows that Gualeguaychú, once again is the seventh most transparent municipality, while Concepción del Uruguay is number 29.

The differences in the characteristics of local democracy (power-sharing and alternation of local elites in Guelguaychu vs. single family power concentration in Concepción del Uruguay), along with citizen evaluations of local democratic governance (high evaluations in Gualeguaychú vs. poor evaluations in Concepción del Uruguay) are closely associated with the way citizens

view and behave about local politics. In terms of behavior, there is clear difference between citizen participation in political parties. According to PAC data, while Gualeguaychú is the 10th city among 47 municipalities with the highest frequency of citizen participation in political parties, Concepción del Uruguay is the 44th. A local expert explains one of the potential reasons behind these low levels of citizen participation in political parties in Concepción del Uruguay:

Political rights are increasingly circumscribed to elections... Incumbent governments always have the possibility to make participation in political parties unattractive to ordinary citizens. Even though there is liberty to constitute new political parties under certain national and provincial electoral laws, the reality is that political parties do not reflect the ideologies. It is also true that students have been obliged to participate in political campaigns in order to keep their fellowships in this university (Lawyer, University Professor, Concepción del Uruguay).

This behavior matches very well with citizen views about the solutions to collective problems. In Concepción del Uruguay for instance, citizens expect the government to take the initiative in problem solving, in spite of its relatively lower degree of democratic governance. In other words, Uruguayenses favor the “I elected you, now is your problem” mentality. Conversely, Gualeguaychu’s citizens identify their collective problems, get organized, and directly take the initiative to overcome their difficulties. In this scenario, the municipal government supports citizens’ initiatives but it is not considered the only actor responsible for problem solving. As one observer puts it:

I think that the political differences between Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay are based not only on partisan politics, but also on the way collective leaderships have been assumed on each community. Politicians do not come from another planet; rather, they come from the same community ordinary citizens do. But Gualeguaychú’s most important achievement, in my view, is that citizens do not rest upon their leaders. Instead, Gualeguaychúenses mobilize the most with their leaders. Uruguayenses, in contrast, tend to select their leaders and leave them with the whole responsibility. I selected you, and now it’s your problem... (Journalist, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay).

In Search for Critical Junctures in Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay

Until now, this chapter has shown that even though Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay have very similar origins, they took remarkably different paths with respect to democracy. What could have caused this bifurcation in the political processes of these twin towns? To answer this question, it is necessary to go back in time and try to find the critical (or

group of critical) juncture(s) that most likely constituted the starting point for the differences mentioned in the previous section. Patterns in responses to semi-structured interviews with local experts and the historical literature suggest a very interesting juncture: When Don Tomas de Rocamora, the founding father of Gualeguay, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, decided to establish three *cabildos* with the purpose of facilitating their political and fiscal administration by delegates of the Spanish Crown, he decided that Concepción del Uruguay was the most appropriate village of the three to establish the command of the Entre Rios' parties. In other words, Rocamora determined that Concepción del Uruguay had to be the provincial capital. As a Concepción del Uruguay's Historian recognizes:

Don Tomas de Rocamora founded Concepción del Uruguay first, and then Gualeguaychú with a similar diagram of the territory: The church is located in the same place in both towns; both central parks have the same façade; the building of the first cabildo was constructed next to the park, etc. These two towns, along with Gualeguay, share very similar characteristics in terms of infrastructure. Soon after the foundations, Concepción del Uruguay became, according to Don Tomas de Rocamora, the best village of the three. Thus he relocated the command of the Entre Rios' parties, a sort of provincial government, to Concepción del Uruguay. This town became since then the provincial capital. Then the greatest Entrerrian caudillos were: Ramirez, also from Concepción del Uruguay, who governed the province from Concepción del Uruguay; Urquiza, who not only governed the province, but also was responsible for organizing the provincial capital until 1883, when it was relocated to Parana. Thus, Concepción del Uruguay lived under the official heat. This town was home of the executive, legislative and judicial powers, and the military. (Historian, ex-congressman, Concepción del Uruguay).

Rocamora, Ramirez and Urquiza were the three most important characters in the origins of both Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay. In the latter, however, they established their home and governmental headquarters. For this reason, these political leaders brought to the village of Concepción del Uruguay most of the first and crucial political and economical developments. Overall, their governments were paternalist in the sense that they ruled without consulting the town, but benefiting the citizenry (Bosch 1991). They protected local livestock, favored the installation of beef salting businesses, made obligatory the inscription of peasants, improved roads and ports, installed watermills, and supported the establishment of small industries (Bosch 1991). They established a very efficacious police, but were very cruel since minor crimes were punished with the death penalty.

These founding fathers were also characterized for carrying out the town and province's accountancy in an extremely precise manner. They applied a strict control over public funds, reduced public investments, and ordered to publish monthly statements of provincial incomes and expenditures in sub-national newspapers, located in Concepción del Uruguay (Taborda 1963). Urquiza was particularly interested in education. He extended primary schools and founded new secondary schools. In Concepción del Uruguay, he founded one of the nation's most important secondary schools: the Colegio Nacional de Concepción del Uruguay. This school boomed during the time that Buenos Aires separated from the Confederation, and under the direction of Alberto Larroque, the Colegio Nacional became for many years the most prestigious school in the country (Taborda 1963). The Colegio Nacional de Concepción del Uruguay was the *alma mater* of very important political figures of Argentina's history. As an expert notes:

The Colegio Nacional is a notable historical institution that educated three former Presidents of the Republic, two Vice-presidents, 23 Province Governors, three Presidents of the Supreme Court of Justice, and several mayors (Historian, ex-congressman, Concepción del Uruguay).

The monumental developments that Rocamora, Ramirez and Urquiza brought to Concepción del Uruguay were later complimented by the notable politicians mentioned in the paragraph above. Colegio Nacional de Concepción del Uruguay graduates funded several theatres, women's secondary schools, public libraries, factories, businesses and industries. They attracted the attention of illustrious immigrants such as Pedro Ferre, Manuel Leiva and Nicasio Oroño who were crucial characters in Argentina's development (Bosch 1991). This characteristic of a small group of citizens in charge of the city's development instead of a large portion of the population has remained until modern times, and arguably constitutes the most important factor that explains why Concepción del Uruguay has developed "under the heat of its caudillos." A local expert explains how this paternalist tradition endures until today by showing the special attention provincial authorities pay to Concepción del Uruguay relative to other cities:

In this city, the Provincial Government in general and the vice-governor specifically are very prominent in this town's decision-making. Vice-governor Laurito has been mayor for many years; he is one of the most notable Peronist caudillos of the zone, even though he is philosophically a

conservative. He exerts influence in this town in particular, because this is his town. The areas he influences the most are public works, services, etc. And if he would like to opt for another position after his term is due, he would run once again for city mayor (Public Prosecutor, University Professor, Concepción del Uruguay).

This mayor walks hand-in-hand with the provincial governor. We know that the governorship is a terrible mafia; thus this influences our governor and mayor's decisions a lot. This is why we have in this city a heavy weight in terms of decision-making (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

The founding fathers and provincial authorities, on the contrary, have traditionally neglected the city of Gualeguaychú. Citizens have had to exert significant pressures over authorities in order to obtain public goods and services, while witnessing at the same time how other neighboring towns have graciously received large quantities of aid and development. The main explanation of this inequity is that provincial authorities tend to favor the cities and towns where they come from. In this context, Gualeguaychú is not characterized for being a source of important caudillos and paternalist figures at the provincial or national levels of government. Rather, its citizenry has been permanently concerned about local politics, and most importantly, private developments. As a Historian notes:

In think that Gualeguaychú was always one of the least benefited towns by provincial incumbent governments. Historically, Gualeguaychú was always relatively more relegated. Thus, the city felt the necessity of getting stronger to knock doors in order to achieve their developments. This materialized the idea that "Gualeguaychú is the mother of her own developments." Gualeguaychú always needed to beg authorities, while witnessing, at the same time, how they graciously conceded in greater quantity goods and services to neighboring towns. Why? I think it is because we had certain governors that belonged, for example, to the city of La Concordia. Thus La Concordia grew up to become the Province's second city, with an economic power based on agriculture. It is also important to note that three times Concordian's mayor was also three times Governor of the Province of Entre Rios, so he gave to Concordia certain privileges that Gualeguaychú could not access (Historian, Gualeguaychú).

As suggested before, this abandonment of Gualeguaychú by governmental authorities is not new. It could be traced back to the city origins. Right before its foundation, Gualeguaychú was roughly composed by a dozen family settlers of European descent. These families did not have a common authority; rather, they were horizontally organized especially to protect the villages from foreign invaders and robbers. Thus, when Don Tomas de Rocamora founded the village of Gualeguaychú, he decided not to impose an external authority. Instead, he relocated these

families to a central place, distributed land and property rights, and gave them the administrative authority of the village. This self-government characteristic prevented the influence of paternalist caudillos that made the most significant contributions to the development of other villages, such as Concepción del Uruguay. In Gualeguaychú, citizens had to organize and collect private funds to carry out public developments; a characteristic that has endured until modern times. Two specialists explained in greater detail these historical facts:

Almost all cities in Entre Rios have the same characteristics: all of them were geographically isolated; all of them have, more or less, the same origins, and were founded around the same time during the Spanish Colony. So what could have made the difference? My explanation to this question revolves around the groups of immigrants that colonized the city during the mid-XIX century. It is worth noting that Gualeguaychú never received the massive immigration that occurred in other cities. Rather, a dozen French families, a dozen Scottish and English families, a dozen Basque families and a few Northern Italians notably changed Gualeguaychú (Councilor, Schoolteacher, University Professor, Justicialista Party, Gualeguaychú).

In the case of Gualeguaychú, I would say that the characteristic of a vibrant society could be traced back as far as the origins of the town. During the Viceroyalty of La Plata, there was a policy implemented by the Bourbons under the monarchy of Carlos III that consisted in the foundation of towns in the south of Entre Rios. As part of this initiative, the first Bishop of the Rio de la Plata started to adequate some abandoned chapels and casually found that some of the towns in the south of Entre Rios existed by themselves without any external authority. One of them was Gualeguaychú. That is to say that, when Tomas de Rocamora, the founder of Gualeguaychú, came to the town, he did not bring a group of inhabitants to formally found a town under the name of the King; rather, he relocated a group that was found a bit further south, brought them here with center in this plaza, distributed pieces of land, and gave them an administrative authority, founded the cabildo, built the Church, etc. However, it is important to remark that that group of inhabitants existed before the foundation; and when they did not have any formal authority, they had to defend themselves by themselves of any attempt of invasion, any attempt of burglary. As a result, since the origins of the Gualeguaychúenses they learned how to manage themselves. These first populations were Spaniards, Mestizos and some Indigenous populations. As time passed by, there was an important incorporation of Basques to our community. Since Basques are characterized by a strong temper, that also added to the way Gualeguaychúenses are. But there is another component in the way we are. It is the total isolation we used to live in until an Italian immigrant, Don David Della Chiesa, decided to conform a neighborhood consortium to build a road using communitarian private funds, to connect Gualeguaychú with Buenos Aires through a dense rainforest. From that point onwards, Gualeguaychú broke a century long isolation, because water-based communication was very limited. All of these factors; that is: the way Gualeguaychúenses themselves seek solutions to collective problems, on top of the self-government, the Basque component and the geographic isolation shaped the character of Gualeguaychúenses (Jurist, Lawyer and Journalist, Gualeguaychú).

This section shows that the most important critical juncture in Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay's histories is the fact that political authorities have traditionally neglected the former, while governmental figures have contributed in very important ways to the development of the latter. These facts have made Gualeguaychú the "mother of her own developments" characterized by a vibrant society, where citizens actively engage and participate

in communitarian issues and are the principal actors of the town's political life. In contrast, Concepción del Uruguay has developed heavily upon "the heat of her caudillos," making of this city a single family dominated town, where citizens are characterized by a general apathy and low levels of engagements and participation, waiting perhaps for the return of Rocamora, Ramirez and Urquiza to solve their problems and procure their development. The remainder of this section analyzes citizen principals' attitudes and behaviors in response to local political agents' actions.

Principals' Responses to Elite Behaviors

This section intends to analyze citizen reactions to the effects that political elites have on people, taking into account the different trajectories that Gualeguacyhu and Concepción del Uruguay have taken with respect to participatory democracy. Holding decentralization constant, the following pages make a comparative analysis of three aspects of participatory democracy: (a) Citizen Participation and Social Capital; (b) Accountability; and (c) Political Clientelism and Corruption.




Figure V-2: Municipal Government Buildings: Gualeguaychú (Left) and Concepción del Uruguay (Right)

Citizen Participation and Social Capital in Concepción del Uruguay. In modern Argentina's history, one of the milestones that mark the point of departure for the divergent

directions that citizen participation took in Concepción del Uruguay relative to Gualeguaychú is Argentina's democratic transition in 1983. Several citizen participation opportunities opened after the government of the Military Junta, allowing citizens to fully exercise their political rights and civil liberties. Even though Concepción del Uruguay was one of the pioneers in terms of cooperative organizations, Uruguayenses have been gradually losing this characteristic:

Concepción del Uruguay was one of the pioneers on cooperative movements, but similar to other things, the town has been losing real cooperatives and now the city is full of fictitious cooperatives. The latter are only formed in order to get tax breaks and file bankruptcies, so a small group can take advantage of the cooperative's profits (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

One potential reason for the decrease in Concepción del Uruguay's cooperative movements is, perhaps, that there is a belief that the municipal government only supports those cooperative movements that are in the best interests of the municipality:

The municipal government is very committed with cooperative movements that serve their interests. I could not offer a concrete example on top of my head, but if there is a cooperative that is on the best interest of the municipality, then there is large municipal support for this initiative everywhere (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

Thus, instead of forming cooperative movements, some Uruguayenses prefer to engage in local organizations of the civil society that do not require the presence or funding of the municipal government. These organizations, however, are usually a response to the perception of municipal inefficacy, rather than a coordinated effort between citizens and the local government to solve community problems. Even though there are citizen initiatives to mitigate collective problems (i.e. neighborhood assemblies), people only gather sporadically and those who do not participate continue to rely upon municipal solutions for their troubles:

Sporadically, there are neighborhood assemblies to collect money through the organization of shows, parades and concerts in order to improve roads and public illumination. These neighborhood assemblies get together because we know that the municipality does not work. In the case of municipal workers, however, they only get together to organize strikes, cutting the elevator so nobody can enter municipal facilities (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

Two other potential reasons for the decrease in citizen participation levels in Concepción del Uruguay are people's perceptions about the legal access they have to approach municipal officers and the belief that if they do approach, their voices might not be heard. In terms of opportunities, citizens claim that the local government uses all the legal machinery at their disposal to restrict their participation, especially if officers feel a potential external threat. This causes a generalized state of apathy that translates into low levels of civic engagement in municipal affairs. As for voicing their demands, people suggest that municipal officers do not take the initiative in inviting citizens to express their needs and concerns, thus individuals feel like if they go to a municipal meeting, their opinions may be worthless:

The municipality uses legal barriers to restrict citizen participation because they do things thinking about their own benefit instead of thinking about what people want. Hence, this causes a collective apathy because we know that municipal officers are untouchable, and if they call you for a particular job, such as helping in the organization of a festival, for instance, they will never pay you or in the best case scenario they will delay the payment. These attitudes make you think twice about participating in events organized by the municipal government (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

I never did anything to participate in municipal affairs, because they never did anything for us; thus neither did we... Moreover we are afraid they will say: "no, you just can't participate and your opinion is worthless." Maybe we are just shy (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

What other factors could be associated with this systematic decrease in citizen participation in Concepción del Uruguay? Low levels of civic engagement seem to have triggered sentiments of low self-esteem and discomfort with the city. Neighbors not only complain about municipal inefficacy, but also about the low commitment that individuals show about public spaces. In addition to the "we voted for you, now it is your problem" mentality, Uruguayenses seem to favor free-rider attitudes, where those who do not participate expect to enjoy the benefits created by those who engage in civic activities:

Nobody cares about this municipality. Here, if you don't work you won't eat and you do not expect that municipal officers do anything about it. Everybody minds her own business. If you don't work, municipal officers will not come to your house to offer you food for your children. Nobody cares if the municipality falls into pieces or if the neighbor loses his house; it is like everybody is closed here, everybody has her own world and that is it... It is like there is no sense of ownership in this city; it is like nobody cares. People don't mind about anything, they do not commit with the city. Since they are young, they write graffiti on all columns, monuments and city walls. This represents a lack of ownership in this town, where people do not take care of their belongings. This forms the

city's identity and what represents us. And this happens not only with young individuals but also with adults who throw garbage everywhere. (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

Just a few Uruguayenses care about municipal affairs; that's the municipal officers' business. We voted for them, now it's their problem (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

People in Concepcion del Uruguay have the comfort to say: They participate and I will get the benefits (Older adult, low SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

Citizen Participation and Social Capital in Galeguaychú. At the other side of the spectrum, Galeguaychú's citizens actively engage in civic duties. They not only demand goods and services from the local government, but also get organized to collect funds, distribute responsibilities and work together for the progress of the neighborhoods. Instead of waiting for the municipal government to take action when there is a social ill, Galeguaychúenses identify the problem and carry out political lobbies to adjust municipal legislations. In turn, when people protest the municipal government acts:

I also think that citizens have to mobilize a little. Not that I am in favor of the municipal government, but there are lots of things in this town that can be done with support of municipal officers. People here demand a lot, but also they do things themselves. For example, I have witnessed that when there are problems with alcoholism among teenagers, people mobilize. Three or four years ago, it was common to see 14 or 15 years old kids drunk in public; but a law was introduced thanks to communitarian pressures restricting the sale of alcohol until midnight (Young adult, low SES, Galeguaychú).

All in all, this municipality is accessible to people's requests if they start to mobilize. For example, people in the Oriental Republic of Uruguay will install a paper plant and citizens started to mobilize in order to avoid the pollution of this side of the Uruguay River, and the municipality is helping to promote our cause (Young adult, low SES, Galeguaychú).



Figure V-3: Advertisement at Gualeguaychús' Municipal Building Inviting to a Citizen Protest

Patterns in focus groups' responses suggest that citizens in Gualeguaychú have learned that working in collaboration with the municipal government to obtain public goods and services boosts individuals' self-esteem and increases their appreciation for and commitment with public spaces. Gualeguaychuenses seem to favor the "when you get things for free, you do not value them as much as if you had to work for them" mentality. This is a very important difference with citizens of Concepción del Uruguay who in general terms expect that paternalist caudillos bring about progress and development to the city without their direct involvement. As discussed earlier in this section, this behavior may be closely related to the poor levels of self-identification with the city.

My grandmother participates in neighborhood meetings. The other day, people got together, collected signatures, and were able to get sewerage services for 10 blocks. Another example is the 1,000 houses program in which each family have to work, along with the provincial government, certain number of hours a day. In this way, citizens learn to appreciate things. In time of elections, government officers take care of everything in other neighborhoods, in order to win some votes. These houses built entirely by government officers in electoral times are not really appreciated by neighbors. After these houses are built, neighbors sell the doors, handles, etc. In contrast, when people contribute in these housing programs, they learn to appreciate the value of their work, they meet other neighbors, and they learn to help each other (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).

The Argentinean, in general, is very lazy and wants to do little work. This is previous governments' fault because they gave them all (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).

The collaboration between the municipal government and citizen groups in Gualeguaychú is so high that an organization of local retailers decided to auto-impose an additional 15 percent sales tax with the purpose of creating an industrial park. This additional tax was collected and administered by the local government, even though it was not mandatory. This initiative was so successful that not only one of the most important industrial parks in Argentina was created, but also the local government decided to increase this voluntary tax to 30 percent in order to canalize resources to other areas. Citizen collaboration, however, transcends the municipal level: When other public enterprises need funds for public developments, for instance, citizens voluntarily assent to pay additional fees, especially when other governmental levels fail to transfer economic resources:

For your information, an unprecedented behavior for this country, Gualeguaychu's retailers decided to auto-excite an additional 15 percent sales tax with the sole purpose of creating an institution called corporation for development that later established the industrial park. This initiative worked very well; they collected money and built the park until the political rascality made some changes: They increased the tax from 15 to 30 percent, using the other 15 percent for tourism (Older adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).

The electric cooperative had large economic problems, due to the emission of federal bonds. People had to delay their payments and the bonds did not work. The cooperative had to buy machinery but did not have the economic resources to do so. A few months ago, the electric cooperative started to charge an additional 10 percent of the electricity bill, but paying this increment was voluntary; that is, it was up to you to pay it (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).

Even in the absence of the municipal government, Gualeguaychuenses keep their spirits of solidarity. These attitudes are reflected on the more than 400 NGOs that exist in a city of nearly 80,000 inhabitants. The early custom of organizing raffles, shows and events to collect funds for public investments has endured until modern times. In the case of relative deprivation, it is not uncommon to encounter citizens exchanging work for food:

There are several good will associations and NGO's. For example, Class 32 helps the town's hospital. They get together and organize raffles to get funds. We also have the friends' commission of the radio electric command. They help policemen with bulletproof jackets, among other things. This command sells bonuses in 1 peso. Some other neighbors also organize fashion shows, and they exchange food for tickets. There is even a girl that comes to my house and asks me to let her clean my sidewalk for a package of noodles. This city has a high solidarity level (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).

Finally, the city's progress is not exempt from problems. Along with the Gualeguaychú's developments, crime rates are also on the rise, especially in commercial and touristic areas. Citizens suggest that they are starting to experience social ills they did not have before:

This municipality has progressed a lot in 10 years. The carnival helped a lot. It brought things we didn't have before, good and bad. I used to live behind the corsodromo, I was 14 and used to walk with no worries. Today everything is different. You see rapes, robberies and assaults. We didn't have this much insecurity (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).

Accountability in Concepción del Uruguay. In Concepción del Uruguay, there is a generalized complaint among citizens about the low levels of accountability at the local government. Individuals claim that there are two main reasons behind phenomenon: First, there is little access to public information, especially for opposition parties, groups or political figures. Municipal officers in Concepción del Uruguay have been traditionally hiding crucial information to the citizenry, thus it is very difficult to discover sources of local corruption. However, there is an enormous concern among citizens regarding the regular adjudication of public contracts to two or three firms. Second, individual leaders find it difficult to get people organized in order to hold public officials accountable, due to the apathy and lack of interest previously mentioned in this chapter. Even when people get organized and manage to make formal requests to municipal officers, responses usually take long or occur right before elections:

Information in this municipality is not open or transparent. Municipal officers have limited the right of access to information, especially to minorities, such as the Socialist Party. This party has demanded access to municipal information in several occasions, and even filed formal complaints because they were denied access to local public accounts, information about public employees, subsidies, among others. Thus, there is no accountability because the municipal government denies information every since 1983, when we returned to democracy. This is why it is impossible to know whether or not the municipality is corrupt because the lack of information. However, it is curious to see that only two or three firms always win public bids (Public Prosecutor, University Professor, Concepción del Uruguay).

Today, I spent the entire morning at the municipality knocking at their doors, requesting a public service. It seems that I am the only one that worries, because when I organize a neighborhood meeting, only two people attend. One day we organized a meeting at the school to talk about the necessity of sewerage in our neighborhood. An engineer that works at the municipality told us that if we bought the pipes they could come to install them. We bought the pipes, and I had to chase the engineer for 15 months in order for him to install them. Three days before municipal elections municipal officers went to install the sewerage pipes. Why we as citizens have to beg municipal officers to fulfill their obligations? (Older adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

In my neighborhood, the block went to complain and municipal officers listened to their request; however they took 15 or 20 days to replace the street light bulb (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

Local media is an additional player that needs careful attention in order to best understand the municipal system of public accountability. As in other cities, the most important means of communication in Concepción del Uruguay are newspapers, radios and TV channels. The focus groups carried out throughout this study emphasized the triangular relationship among citizens, municipal officers, and media, paying particular consideration to local newspapers and radios since they are far more accessible to the civil society than TV channels. Two lessons can be drawn from the study of access to public information through local media: First, municipal and provincial media depend, in important ways, on governmental economic resources to remain in business. Both the provincial and municipal governments contribute with large shares of the total newspapers' income, usually through advertisement and official missives to the town. In this context, both levels of government could restrict freedom of information, especially if they encounter certain types of publications they dislike. In response, local newspapers are also very careful in selecting the right clients, especially if they come from emerging political competitors or opposition groups:

Municipal and provincial media depend, in general terms, on governmental resources to survive. This is why some local newspapers are very restricted in terms of the information they publish. They could even be threatened by municipal officers in terms of suspending publicity contracts they have with the local government. In Buenos Aires, in contrast, local media have other sources of economic support that comes from large enterprises. But here, the reality is different and freedom of the press is relatively conditioned to municipal funding (Newspaper Editor, Sports Club President, Concepción del Uruguay).

It is evident that if you belong to the incumbent's party the doors of all news media will be open; however, if you belong to an opposition party maybe you won't even get the smallest coverage. Most of the media function a result of the amount of money they receive from the incumbent's office (Councilor, Federal Peronism, Gualeguaychú).

These findings, along with the restrictions imposed by the local government to collect information, somehow challenge the common held notion that decentralization increases accountability. When the size of the winning coalition in local elites is small and closed (i.e. single-family politically dominated towns), and municipal governments are one of the most

important sources of income for local newspapers, the local system of public accountability tend to fail. Moreover, citizens seem to be more concerned about national than local politics. As mentioned before, several focus groups' participants have suggested that citizens elect local politicians according to their national preferences; that is, presidential candidates and their parties tend to drag votes for their local leaders and not the other way around. Thus, it may be important to rethink whether or not all politics is local, as Tip O'Neill once said, or it rather depends on how really decentralized a town is and what is the relationship among local politicians, the media and the citizenry as a whole:

The electoral will of the citizenry at the local level is strongly linked to what happens in national politics. People look for an asymmetry on local, provincial and national politics. (Young adult, High SES, Concepción del Uruguay)

Local radios, however, appear to be a better channel of communication between the citizenry and the local government. There are at least two mechanisms mentioned by individuals that are more effective to make their voices heard than going directly to the municipality. On the one hand, citizens can go to local radio stations and complain on air about what they perceive to be municipal inefficacy. On the other, citizens can leave messages on the radios' answering machines. Radio hosts air individuals' pre-recorded demands and complaints later. Of course this mechanism, that is very similar to that in Gualeguaychú, is more effective in electoral times:

When there is a particular need, there is a way to leave a message with your complaint on the reporter's answering machine, and then the reporter airs your message. This is the most effective way to make our voices heard, because we know that if we call the municipality, they will not pay attention. However, if you leave a message on the reporter's answering machine about a problem with the sewing service, you will surely get the problem fixed. This system is, of course, more effective in electoral years (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

There is a radio station here where people tell the truth and say things the way they are. This Radio is called "Vision 98.9" (Young adult, low SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

Accountability in Gualeguaychú. As opposed to Concepción del Uruguay, Gualeguaychú's municipal governments have traditionally been more open and transparent in

terms of access to information. As citizens mention below, there are important communication campaigns carried out by the local government. In some cases, municipal officers inform about the public works that they are conducting through local TV channels and other means. In other cases, local officials carry out interviews or surveys with individuals that are more likely to be affected by future public works. All in all, municipal worries about improving the channels of communication with citizens is so strong that some citizens even complain about the lack of objectivity due to the large amounts of information at their disposal.

The municipal government also keeps us informed about what they do through a local TV channel. The other day I watched a documentary about what they do with organic and inorganic waste. I got speechless because I didn't know that they even compact wastes and separate green from transparent PET containers (Young adult, high SES, Gualeguaychú).

Where I work, I received a piece of paper from municipal officers to evaluate the 25th street. I work in a private store, a confectionary. They are distributing pieces of paper for you to note how many times a day do you cross the 25th street and how can they improve it. When we had the garbage problem, they also carried out a campaign to see what people thought and after that they installed the garbage cans (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).

The municipal government provides lots of good information. The problem is that we are not able to analyze it all. Due to the large amounts of information, I think it is not objective anymore (Young adult, high SES, Gualeguaychú).

In terms of public information through local media, there are two coincidences with Concepción del Uruguay that are worth noting. First, local newspapers depend financially on municipal advertisements and other types of publications. Second, radios seem to be the most effective way to communicate with municipal officers. These facts corroborate the idea about the caveats of public accountability as a result of state decentralization:

If you read this town's newspapers, they publish the good things but not the bad things (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).

There is another way to express ourselves: When you think something is wrong in this town, there is a line in the radio where you can express your concerns. The municipal government pays a lot of attention to it (Young adult, high SES, Gualeguaychú).

Finally, the statement below also corroborates the fact local media covers more often national than local politics:

As we said before, the media is another power; and what we see the most is national politics. What happens is that the mayor and governor's actions do not have as big an impact on the economy as the president does (Young adult, low SES, Gualaguaychú).

Political Clientelism in Concepción del Uruguay. The final aspect of participatory democracy analyzed in this section is people's reaction to political clientelism. Citizens in Concepción del Uruguay seem to be aware of the clientelistic practices that affect this town. A recurrent reason identified by subjects is income inequality. In this society, those who are relatively deprived and notice that they do not have access to the levels of wealth others enjoy are more vulnerable to the exchange of private goods and services for votes. This is the reason why political clientelism is more pronounced during periods of electoral campaigns. After elections, however, clientelism may be also used as a tool to get sufficient citizen support to implement certain public policies. As some of the focus groups' subjects note:

I think equal opportunities should be included in the concept of democracy, because when there are large social injustices it is very difficult to say that democracy exists. When there are large social injustices there are large money differences. Thus in these instances, money manages a democracy that along with social injustices makes it very easy for those who have the power to buy votes to win. Democracy should be able to solve this problem, but unfortunately, the large social injustices we live in are stronger than the potential effects of democracy (Young adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

Sometimes you have to do it for necessity. For example, I would vote for a politician who is looking for me to get my vote, maybe just in exchange for a pile of food. Often times you just don't have it, so you would do anything for a pile of food. That usually happens during elections; and if you have a family and children with necessities, would you miss that chance? (Young adult, low SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

In electoral times, politicians even give you a ride home, but afterwards if they cross your way they don't even say hi. They even go to the smallest neighborhoods promising jobs (Young adult, low SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

Other important source of political clientelism is the provision of public work contracts and "jobs for the boys." Consistent with what was found in the previous section about the political survival of local elites, a very important way to ensure reelection is by building a network of clients large enough that alternation could threaten the stability of jobs and public contracts of a large portion of the population:

In previous administrations the municipality used to get full. A municipality like ours had 1,400 employees, a barbarity. If you were friends with a politician inside, you were a friend of his friends. That's the way they used to hire municipal employees (Older adult, high SES, Concepción del Uruguay).

Political Clientelism in Gualeguaychú. Gualeguaychú is not free from political clientelism either. An important lesson derived from the focus groups transcriptions is that politicians principally center on highly populated, low SES neighborhoods to build clientelistic networks. This recurrent finding may also challenge the effectiveness of elections as a tool for accountability. In other words, voting to replace “bad” politicians may prove ineffective because elected public officials know where the most populated areas are, where individuals with low SES reside, and how to provide private incentives (i.e. jobs for the boys and the exchange of private gains for votes) to regain office over and over again:

The local government is very interested in neighborhoods with high population density, because those locations are the best places to find large quantities of votes so they can catapult their political careers through the years (Older adult, high SES, Gualeguaychú).

The most important clientelistic mechanisms in this town are job promises, gifts on the Election Day, pressure enterprises to make sure that a large share of their employees vote for a particular candidate in order to get a break on municipal fees (Councilor, Justicialista Party, Gualeguaychú).

Another potential explanation for putting densely populated towns on the spotlight is the political retribution for public investments. It may be possible that in poor neighborhoods population density is higher than in richer districts. Thus a mile of road built in a poor neighborhood will benefit more people than in richer, less densely populated neighborhoods. Hence, political leaders working with political agendas may assess the costs and benefits of building roads. Overall, it may be more politically profitable to provide goods and services in densely populated areas:

These humble neighborhoods have luxury public services, but residents do not pay accordingly. I understand that there is a human and sanitary issue, but I think that municipal officers should at least charge a small fee for these services. It is likely that no elected public officer has the guts to charge a fee because they know they could lose votes; while here, in the city, there are streets that still have no pavement (Older adult, high SES, Gualeguaychú).

Two final statements are important to contextualize how neither Concepción del Uruguay nor Gualeguaychú are exempt from cronyism and the retribution of political favors to those who remain loyal with the incumbent government and municipal employees:

My mom is a friend of the mayor. I was jobless 8 years ago; my old man was a friend of the hospital director, thus I started to work as janitor. Two months after I was promoted to receptionist; I used to take note of personal facts of people who went to get X-rays, but I had no clue what an X-ray was. I resigned one month after because I knew I was doing things wrong (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).

Theoretically there are contest for the selection of municipal employees. My brother participated in that contest and got the employment. However, I am not sure if he got the employment because he won the contest or because the municipal secretary was a close friend with my old man (Young adult, low SES, Gualeguaychú).

In sum, this section has shown how citizens behave in response to the actions of local political elites. In historical terms, a social construction heavily influenced by local caudillos will remain dependent on political clientelism for years to come. In this context, citizen will develop a generalized apathy with respect to everything that has to do with public affairs. In contrast, social constructions that rely on citizen efforts to develop political capital will more likely consolidate more inclusive, participatory democracies.

Conclusion

This chapter has presented some elements to determine when decentralization works, when it does not and why. Using the Mill's Method of Difference (1970), I selected two Argentinean towns, Gualeguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, which share remarkably similar histories and socioeconomic indicators, and at the same time opposed outcomes with respect to their levels of participatory democracy. After, I perused comparative historical evidence, carried out semi-structured specialized interviews with local elites, and used focus groups' transcriptions, I was able to establish that the most relevant differences between these twin towns lie on critical junctures, local elite behaviors and the relationship between citizen principals and local government agents.

In terms of critical junctures, the most important evidence found in this chapter is that since the foundation of both towns by Don Tomas de Rocamora, Concepción del Uruguay has been almost entirely developed by local caudillos and other local political figures without a heavy

involvement of the citizenry; in contrast, groups of neighbors have organized generation after generation to develop Gualeguaychú themselves, because this town has been traditionally neglected by both the founding fathers and provincial authorities. In terms of participatory democracy, these opposed social constructions have made of Concepción del Uruguay a town where “men are used to receive fish and eat for a day;” while Gualeguaychú has become a town where “men learned how to fish themselves and eat for a lifetime.”

Local political elites, as a result, portray extremely different behaviors in both towns. In Concepción del Uruguay, a single family has politically dominated the town for over 50 years. In this context, the local political elite is composed by a small, illiberal coalition that most likely will continue to govern the town for years to come. As a result, citizens appear to have little or no control over the determination of the way democracy functions at the local level. Conversely, the local political elite in Gualeguaychú is composed by a larger coalition, where the distinction between citizenry and political class is minimal. In this context, today’s neighbor could be tomorrow’s mayor or councilor, and former politicians can easily reintegrate to civil society. As a result, individuals have higher control over the local political system.

Finally, three citizen responses to local political elite behaviors are worth noting in the context of principal-agent relationships. First, even though Concepción del Uruguay was one of the pioneers in terms of citizen participation in cooperative organizations, Uruguayenses have been gradually limiting their civic engagement due to both legal restrictions and poor local governmental responses. In contrast, citizens in Gualeguaychú continue to get organized, collect funds, and distribute responsibilities among neighbors with the purpose of collaborating with the municipal government for the town’s development. Second, holding public officials accountable is more problematic in Concepción del Uruguay than in Gualeguaychú due to heavy restrictions on the access to municipal information. Notwithstanding, citizens in both towns claim that when they encounter problems with municipal officers’ responses, they can effectively voice their demands and complaints in local radio stations. Local newspapers, however, are less effective as a means to communicate with public officers due to their large dependency on governmental funds to continue in business. Finally, income inequality seems to be crucial to understand why people

would accept the exchange of private gains for votes in both towns. Relative deprivation makes those in the lower quintiles of wealth more prone to be victimized by political clientelism, not only by receiving “gifts” during electoral periods, but also by becoming recipients of “jobs for the boys.”

CHAPTER VI

VI. CONCLUSION: DECENTRALIZATION, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY AND THE POLITICAL SURVIVAL OF LOCAL ELITES

This project has emphasized the fact that even though decentralization reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean continue to be widely implemented, their general effects on democracies remain rather unclear. More mayors are being elected, more resources are being transferred, and more responsibilities are being transmitted to municipal governments today than ever before. International development agencies, multilateral donors and NGOs continue to heavily invest economic resources and human capital into the decentralization strategy, with the main purpose of attaining human development. Similarly, national and intermediate levels of government have been decentralizing political, fiscal and economic powers in order to bring the government closer to the people. In spite of these efforts, we have very little empirical evidence that verifies the supposed benefits of decentralization with respect to the consolidation of participatory democracies.

The main goal of this dissertation project is to offer scientific responses to three research questions that I consider essential in order to understand the effects of decentralization reforms on Latin American democracies. These questions are: (1) What are the factors that explain different degrees of citizen support for decentralization? (2) What are the effects of the different levels of municipal decentralization on participatory democracies? (3) Why can two nearly identical decentralization policies produce totally opposed political outcomes? In this chapter, I offer a summary of the most relevant theoretical postulates and empirical findings that I think best respond the questions above. Next, I present several policy relevant insights that arise from the findings of this dissertation. Finally, I discuss the future research agenda.

Finding Citizen Support for State Decentralization

Many scholars argue that the success or failure of decentralization depends in important ways on the characteristics and predispositions of the target community to support or reject such reform (Hiskey 2010; Norris 2008). Thus, if decentralization programs are carried out in contexts of low citizen support for such policies, it may very well be the case that most of the efforts of governments and cooperation agencies will be illegitimate to citizens and doomed to fail. This prospect then begs the question, “What is the degree of citizen support for decentralization policies in Latin America and the Caribbean?” In this project, I discover that even though decentralization reforms intend to bring the government closer to the people, citizens in Latin America and Caribbean do not necessarily want to be closer to the government. This finding corroborates, on average, Véliz’s (1980) claims that there is a centralist tradition in Latin America. However, this author fails to explain why there is so much variation in citizen support for decentralization not only across countries, but also among individuals within countries.

Results from nearly 37,000 face-to-face interviews show that in 2008, only 35 percent of the people living in the 22 Latin American and Caribbean countries selected for this study expressed direct support for fiscal and administrative decentralization. The remaining 65 percent favors either recentralization or think that public funds and administrative duties and responsibilities should be equally distributed among national and local levels of government. This *light centralist preference* amongst Latin Americans uncovers a silent challenge that policy-makers, international organizations, NGOs and the alleged beneficiaries themselves face if they are concerned with the levels of citizen support for this state reform. Nevertheless, there is wide variation in the levels of citizen support for decentralization: In a feeling thermometer that goes from 0 “Full recentralization” to 100 “Full decentralization,” there is a nearly 30-point spread between the country with the lowest support (34.1 in Honduras) and the country with the highest support (58.5 in Bolivia). What can explain this variation?

This question is best answered by looking at both country and individual levels of *human development*. In countries with low levels of health, wealth and education, citizens prefer to invest most of their time and efforts in trying to find solutions to their individual basic needs. After

rational self-evaluations of their capabilities about fulfilling the duties of decentralization, citizens determine that they have no time or are ill equipped for empowerment activities, such as exerting more control over public affairs and participating in collective decision-making. The findings at the individual level suggest that people are not delusional about this lack of time and/or capabilities, because less educated individuals, for instance, are reluctant to take on the responsibilities assigned to them by decentralization reforms.

Therefore, in countries with low human development, people feel less supportive of decentralization because they are aware of how poorly endowed most citizen are due to low levels of health, wealth and education. In this context, citizens prefer, as a result, letting the “experts” at the national level take care of collective decision-making. Thus, in countries with low human development, citizens support, on average, *recentralization* policies. Additionally, these individuals perceive that strong central governments should be able to provide most of the solutions to their human development problems. The empirical finding that preferences for strong, authoritarian governments are related to citizen support for *recentralization* corroborates this claim.

Traditionally excluded groups, like women and ethnic minorities, should also prefer *recentralization* because they may also feel less capable of carrying out the new duties and responsibilities that result from state decentralization, in comparison with dominant groups. Alternatively, local political elites and other dominant groups may engage in governmental practices that exclude women and ethnic minorities. No matter which of these explanations is more appropriate, or a combination of the two, it is certain that the empirical evidence indicates that these groups continue to be excluded by local governments, and as a response, they favor recentralization over decentralization.

Conversely, in places where citizens perceive that they have satisfied their basic needs, they may feel more capable of carrying out self-government activities, and that is why they support *decentralization* reforms to a greater extent. These reforms should allow individuals to have greater control over politicians, public resources and decision-making. In this context, citizens signal local level politicians their desire to exert more pressures over intermediate and

national levels of government in order to achieve greater decentralization and autonomy, not only through transfers from higher levels of government, but also through keeping taxes and power at the local level.

Empirically, the multilevel models fitted here in order to explain the moderate/low levels of support for decentralization corroborate the analysis above: people residing in countries with relatively higher levels of human development tend to support decentralization to a greater extent than individuals residing in countries where human development is low. Substantively, people living in Costa Rica or Chile express a degree of support for decentralization that is, on average, nearly 14 points higher than that reported by people living in Haiti, in a 0 to 100 scale. At the individual level, however, there are two exceptions to the story developed above.

First, wealthier citizens tend to show greater support for fiscal and administrative *recentralization*. This phenomenon may be due to the fact that individuals in higher quintiles of wealth may be able (and willing) to exert larger influence over national politics. Bankers, presidents and CEOs of large companies and corporations, and owners of the means of production in general may have a closer and direct relationship with congressmen and ministers at the national level and could even play an important role in decision-making over financial and monetary policies. On the other hand richer individuals may perceive decentralization as a tool to create more bureaucracy that can lead to an increase of taxes. As for wealthier individuals living far away from national capitals and who are not interested in politics, they may perceive decentralization as a way to decrease their power over local economies, since their activities may be fiscally and administratively controlled by newly empowered local governments.

Second, people residing in smaller cities and rural areas support decentralization rather than recentralization. Assuming that most of the individuals that reside in rural areas in Latin America and the Caribbean have lower levels of human development than their counterparts residing in larger cities and national capitals, it is plausible to think that their greater support for decentralization does not translate into a need for autonomy. Rather, individuals in these territories pressure for transfers of more resources, without being willing or able to generate their own resources and pay more taxes. This story, once again, fits with the claim that citizens with

low levels of human development regard central governments as one of the most important providers of solutions to basic needs.

An alternative explanation for the different levels of citizen support for state decentralization is conditional to an intrinsic system of popular evaluation of governmental performance. This system is composed by a citizen scheme of incentives and punishments. On the one hand, when citizens perceive good performance by the national government, individuals have rational incentives to recentralize the provision of goods and services. In contrast, if individuals perceive a good performance of the local government, they should have greater incentives to favor transfers from national and intermediate levels to local levels of government.

The mixed citizen support for state decentralization analyzed so far may be contributing to the explanations for the divergent outcomes that decentralization policies produce on local democracies. In sum, the most important explanation for the divergent degrees of support for decentralization policies is that as principals become better equipped (i.e. education) to more closely monitor and shape the behavior of their agents, they are more willing to support a move in that direction. Principals with lower human development levels are more comfortable letting the “experts” in the capital city take care of things. The message is that a key element behind support for decentralization is the abilities, and the self-recognition of those abilities, of the principals to play the more active political role that decentralization assigns to them. The next section will turn to the analysis of the general effects of decentralization in Latin American.

The Effects of State Decentralization on Latin America's Participatory Democracies

The impact of decentralization is analyzed in three citizen participation modes: (1) Institutionalized modes; (2) Mobilized modes; (3) Participation in local organizations of the civil society. Institutionalized modes of participation represent citizen engagement in formal institutions, such as political parties, the voting booth and municipal offices. Mobilized modes refer to citizen participation in street protests, riots and other forms of public demonstration. Finally, citizen participation in local organizations of the civil society includes communitarian meetings, parent-teacher associations, religious organizations, etc.

The answer to the question about the possible effects of decentralization on citizen participation in institutionalized and mobilized modes is based on local political elites' behaviors and citizen responses to both decentralization and local governments' actions. The theory of political survival of local elites developed in this dissertation explains that local authorities behave in such a way as to be able to hang on in power the longest. These behaviors vary according to the degree of territorial decentralization. In relatively more decentralized territories local elites implement stronger actions in order to avoid alternation in power of their preferred local leader.

This is due to the fact that in more decentralized towns, local agents have higher levels of relative power in comparison with both higher levels of government and citizen principals, as long as the sequence of the decentralization reform has not been designed in such a way as to decrease their relative power with respect to national governments (see Falletti 2010). As a consequence, in relatively more decentralized contexts local political elites could place more obstacles to citizen participation in institutions that can put the continuity of the local elites' preferred politicians at risk. In democracy, the quintessential institutions of political representation meant to replace elected politicians are political parties and movements. As a result, citizen participation in political parties should be less frequent in more decentralized territories.

The empirical evidence corroborates the expectations above. Results from hierarchical linear models show that higher degrees of fiscal and administrative decentralization are associated with lower levels of citizen participation in political parties. This finding is consistent across the 22 Latin American countries and the 46 Argentinean municipalities selected for this investigation. This result indicates that empowered local political elites have greater incentives and tools to discourage citizen participation in institutions of political representation. These incentives and tools that result from decentralization are at the disposal of strong local elites in order to prevent the emergence of political competitors who can put them at risk of removal from office in the following electoral period.³¹

Additionally, the increase of local governments' administrative and economic resources may seem attractive to elected officers to hang on in power, thus dissuading potential political

³¹ This hypothesis is only valid, of course, in municipalities considered as full electoral democracies.

challengers. An alternative explanation to the negative correlation between decentralization and participation in political parties is that in decentralized contexts, citizens should be able to find more solutions to their collective problems at municipal offices, so they may feel less compelled to participate in formal political organizations in order to satisfy their personal and communitarian needs.

Another finding that corroborates the theory of the political survival of local elites is that decentralization reforms are negatively related to voter turnout in the 47 municipalities investigated in Argentina. Specifically, in those municipalities where organic charters bind citizens and politicians, the likelihood of voter turnout is smaller than in municipalities without these sort of municipal constitutions. The explanation for this phenomenon is that these charters, as designed by local political elites, leave so little room for political maneuvers to elected public officials, that citizens regard voting as meaningless. Another potential explanation is that organic charters condition the electoral structure in such a way as to make it difficult for individuals to vote. All in all, this is an association that requires further research in order to best comprehend the negative effect of written sub-national constitutions on voter turnout.

In terms of citizen principal actions, they can offer at least two other possible responses to decentralization and local governments' actions. First, since decentralization transfers political, fiscal and administrative powers from higher to lower levels of government, it is expected that newly empowered municipal officers are responsible for the provision of goods and services, such as health, education, sewerage, garbage collection, etc., depending upon the level and depth of the reform. Also, local governments in decentralized settings are responsible for the provision of licenses, permits, patents, and so on. For this reason, citizens should carry out dealings more frequently at the municipal offices of relatively more decentralized territories.

The empirical evidence also corroborates the hypothesis above. The fiscal dimension of decentralization is positively associated with the frequency citizens carry out dealings at municipal governments. In other words, the likelihood of demand-making at the local government is higher in municipalities that tax their citizens in comparison to those municipalities that do not possess a local taxation structure. It is worth noting, however, that this association was only found

in the models carried out with data for the 46 Argentinean municipalities. This relationship was not statistically significant in the models fitted with LAPOP data, although variables were operationalized differently.

An additional explanation for the positive association between fiscal decentralization and demand-making is that once individuals contribute directly to the fiscal income of local governments, citizens become more interested in either controlling municipal officers or extracting back resources in terms of goods and services from local government offices. Hence, municipal taxation may be used as a tool to increase local officials' accountability, and at the same time, recognize with greater efficiency territorially specific needs and demands. Moreover, citizens paying taxes to municipal governments should be interested in recognizing with more exactitude which governmental level is responsible for the provision of specific goods and services.

The second citizen response analyzed here is related to the impediment to participate in political parties and a sense of local government inefficacy in the provision of goods and services. When the government is closer to people, citizens can more easily observe what is going on with politics, but they may not necessarily have more control or agency over local officials. One of the most often publicized benefits of state decentralization is the fact that public officials are more accountable, and individuals can reward them with reelection or punish them with replacement in the next electoral period. Replacing a leader, however, is an inefficient way to exercise political accountability because citizens may have to wait several years until the following electoral contest, voting may be subject to political clientelism, and political elites may exert great pressures to dissuade open participation in political parties. In this context, the only way out for citizens is to engage in mobilized form of participation, such as public protests, demonstrations and riots.

The empirical analyses carried out in Latin America and the Caribbean yield a positive association between decentralization and the odds of participating in public protests and manifestations. This finding indicates that in decentralized contexts, individuals face incentives to turn to mobilized modes of participation in order to voice their demands. In other words, state decentralization produces an unintended deinstitutionalization of citizen participation in

organizations of political representation in Latin America and the Caribbean, and fomenting at the same time public demonstrations, protests and riots. Thus, the efforts that international organizations and policy-makers have been carrying out to decentralize seem to have produced a decline on citizen participation in institutions of political representation, and at the same time, fomenting solicitudes at local governments. However, if individuals perceive that local officials are not hearing their needs and complaints, citizens may be more inclined to protest in the streets instead of engaging in institutionalized forms of participation.

Finally, based on the theory of social capital (Putnam 1994), this dissertation project claims that the levels of citizen participation in local organizations of the civil society are independent from the levels of state decentralization. Rather, the degree of citizen engagement in these modes of participation depend upon the levels of social capital; that is, civic traditions and social, economic and cultural historical contexts. The empirical evidence in this study finds no association between the degree of state decentralization and citizen participation in labor unions, professional associations, community activities, and teacher-parent associations. In sum, while I have been able to find mixed effects of state decentralization on institutionalized and mobilized modes of participation, there is no impact of these reforms on citizen participation in local organizations of the civil society.

Similar Decentralization Policies can Produce Opposed Political Outcomes

The answer to the final research question put forward in this dissertation assesses *why two remarkably similar decentralization packages can produce dramatically different outcomes with respect to participatory democracy*. By using the Mill's Method of Difference (1970), I selected two Argentinean towns, Gualguaychú and Concepción del Uruguay, which share similar histories and socioeconomic indicators, and at the same time opposed democracy outcomes. After, I perused comparative historical evidence, carried out semi-structured specialized interviews with local elites, and used focus groups' transcriptions, I was able to establish that the most relevant differences between these twin towns lie on critical junctures, local elite behaviors and the relationship between citizen principals and local government agents.

The critical juncture found in this project suggests that the less successful town was almost entirely developed by local caudillos and other political figures without a heavy involvement of the citizenry. Conversely, groups of neighbors have organized generation after generation to develop the more successful town themselves, because founding fathers and provincial authorities have traditionally neglected it. In terms of participatory democracy, these opposed social constructions have made of the less democratic town a place where “men are used to receive fish and eat for a day;” while the more democratic town has become a place where “men learned how to fish themselves and eat for a lifetime.” As a result, local political elites portray extremely different behaviors in both towns. In one town, a single family has politically dominated the municipality for over 50 years. In this context, the local political elite is composed by a small, illiberal coalition that most likely will continue to govern the town for years to come. In this context, citizens appear to have less control over the determination of the way democracy functions at the local level. Conversely, the other town’s local political elite is composed by a larger coalition, where the distinction between citizenry and political class is minimal. There, today’s neighbor could be tomorrow’s mayor or councilor, and former politicians can easily reintegrate to civil society. Consequently, individuals seem to have higher control over the local political system.

Finally, three citizen responses to local political elite behaviors are worth noting in the context of principal-agent relationships. First, even though the less democratic town was one of the pioneers in terms of citizen participation in cooperative organizations, individuals have been gradually limiting their civic engagement due to legal restrictions and poor local governmental responses. In contrast, citizens in the more democratic town continue to get organized, collect funds, and distribute responsibilities among neighbors with the purpose of collaborating with the municipal government for the town’s development. Second, holding public officials accountable is more problematic in the less democratic town due to large restrictions on the access to municipal information. Notwithstanding, citizens in both towns claim that when they encounter problems with municipal officers’ responses, they can effectively voice their demands and complaints in local radio stations. Local newspapers, however, are less effective as a means to communicate

with public officers due to their large dependency on governmental funds to continue in business. Lastly, income inequality seems to be crucial to understand why people would accept the exchange of private gains for votes in both towns. Relative deprivation makes those in the lower quintiles of wealth more prone to be victimized by political clientelism, not only by receiving “gifts” during electoral periods, but also by becoming recipients of “jobs for the boys.”

In conclusion, these findings suggest that the success or failure of decentralization packages depend on who exerts the most significant pressures to decentralize. In contexts where the citizenry and strongly organized local groups demand political, fiscal and administrative relocation of power from national, intermediate and local levels of government to the community, participatory democracies are likely to function in a more inclusive manner. In contrast, those communities who are recipients of decentralization reforms initiated by strong local elites seem to favor exclusionary politics, where citizen participation is far more limited. In short, decentralization seems to work better when it empowers citizens more so than local governments.

Policy Implications

Four policy-relevant lessons derive from the theoretical postulates and the empirical evidence of this dissertation:

- Before decentralizing, it is necessary to carry out qualitative and quantitative studies in the selected territories, and design the decentralization programs according to the results of these studies and the objectives aimed to achieve. Thus, decentralization reforms should be designed and implemented according to the particular characteristics and needs of each context and not as a one-size-fits-all strategy.
- For decentralization to thrive, it is necessary to identify in advance how local political elites are going to implement the decentralization strategy. In other words, policy-makers should interpret if local political elites are going to use the political, fiscal, and administrative powers granted to them as a tool to increase participatory democracy or only as a mechanism to guarantee their political survival.

- Policy-makers and international organizations should work hand-in-hand with citizen groups and let them take initiatives in the formulation and implementation of decentralization reforms. This practice should allow citizens to promote their own development instead of resting upon the actions of a few strong leaders.
- After decentralization, reformers should be aware about public demonstrations, riots and protests on the one hand, and citizen participation in political parties on the other. These citizen actions can be an effective thermometer of how well or bad decentralization is working at the local level.

Future Research Agenda

An important future research agenda to complement this project should focus on the effects of municipal regulations on citizen perceptions about local democratic governance. These municipal regulations, such as local constitutions, norms, ordinances and laws, should shape citizens and local elites behaviors in such a way as to modify the functioning of democracy at the local level. In this context, one could expect to find better citizen evaluations and perceptions of municipal performance where municipal regulations allow for mechanisms of direct democracy on the one hand (i.e. referenda, public audiences and/or mandate recall); and accountability on the other (i.e. mechanisms for municipal evaluation, complaint registries and/or access to public information). These municipal regulations should serve as pressing mechanisms for local officials to be more responsive to citizens, since in this context, people are better endowed to monitor and control municipal decision-making.

A preliminary empirical assessment of the hypotheses advanced above show interesting results. Using PAC data from public opinion surveys in 46 Argentinean municipalities, three groups of variables are used to form indexes to operationalize the concept of democratic governance. First, an Index of Perceptions of Municipal Performance³² that includes questions related to evaluations of the municipality's political situation, satisfaction with performance of local

³² The Scale Reliability Coefficient for this index is 0.787.

democracy, evaluations of authorities' respect for citizen rights, evaluations of performance of municipal institutions and a general evaluation of municipal employees shows a positive correlation with the variables *age* and *wealth* at the individual level, and *recall* at the municipal level. These results suggest that as individuals grow older and wealthier on the one hand, and those municipalities that possess a normative provision allowing recalls of elected public officials on the other, tend to provide better evaluations of municipal performance. In contrast people residing in municipalities that count with plebiscitary mechanisms tend to provide lower evaluations of municipal performance.

Second, an Index of Perceptions of Administrative Efficacy³³ that includes questions associated with municipal employees' responses to citizen demand-making, such as long queues at the municipal government, unnecessary dealings, costly or denied information, disrespectful and impolite employees, discriminative and humiliating public officers shows, once again, that the variables *age* and *wealth* are positively associated with perceptions of administrative efficacy. That is to say that, as individuals grow older and become wealthier, they tend to perceive that the local government is relatively more efficacious. However, variables such as *sex*, *public audience* and *mechanisms for municipal evaluation* are negatively associated with citizen perceptions of administrative efficacy. In other words, women as opposed to men at the individual level and those municipalities that have municipal regulations allowing evaluations to municipal officers at the municipal level tend to have lower evaluations of municipal administrative efficacy.

Finally, an Index of Perceptions about Freedom from Corruption at the Municipal Government³⁴ that includes assessments of how often citizens have to pay bribes to get things done, frequency of bribe solicitation by municipal employees and general evaluations of municipal corruption shows that the variable *age* at the individual level and the variables *initiative*, *recall*, and *access to municipal information* are positively related to citizen evaluations of municipal transparency. In other words, as individuals grow older and people residing in those municipalities that have direct democracy mechanisms such as initiative and recall, and have

³³ The Scale Reliability Coefficient for this Index is 0.707.

³⁴ The Scale Reliability Coefficient for this Index is 0.710.

access to municipal information, tend to believe that the local government is relatively freer from corruption. In contrast, people living in municipalities that have normative mechanisms for public audiences and municipal evaluations tend to think that municipalities are more corrupt. The regression outputs of these multilevel models are depicted in Appendix A11.

These results confirm the hypothesis that municipal regulations –as designed by political authorities-, do have an impact on how citizen evaluate municipal performance, efficacy and freedom from corruption. In general terms, direct democracy mechanisms such as recalls of elected public officials increase the positive evaluations individuals have regarding municipal performance, maybe because local officers know that if they do not fulfill citizens' expectations they may be easily replaced, or maybe because individuals perceive that due to this municipal regulations municipal officers should be required to improve their performance. Additionally, direct democracy provisions such as citizen initiatives and recalls are positively related to municipal transparency. These results suggest that these normative mechanisms could be helpful as a tool to reduce corruption at the local level.

However, plebiscitary mechanisms are associated with lower evaluations of municipal performance and public audiences are negatively associated with perceptions of administrative efficacy. A potential explanation for these findings is that local authorities may have to rely on plebiscites and public audiences in contexts of high levels of conflict and dissension within the local government. Individuals, as a result, may perceive that in these contexts there are problems with municipal performance and administrative efficacy. In terms of municipal regulations for accountability, the existence of mechanisms to evaluate the work of municipal officers is negatively related to both perceptions of administrative efficacy and municipal transparency. However, the direction of these relationships could also work the other way around: In order to solve problems of corruption and municipal inefficacy, lawmakers at the local level may have implemented evaluation mechanisms to include citizen accountability and oversight. Further research is necessary not only to solve this endogeneity problem, but also to test and verify with more precision the hypotheses put forward in the conclusions of this dissertation.

APPENDICES

Appendix A1: LAPOP Questionnaire (AmericasBarometer 2008)

LAPOP DIMS 2008 Master Core, Spanish Versión # 15 IRB Approval: #071086

 <p>USAID DEL PUEBLO DE LOS ESTADOS UNIDOS DE AMÉRICA</p>	<p>INSERTAR AQUI EL LOGO DE LA INSTITUCION LOCAL</p>
<p>Latin American Public Opinion Project</p>  <p>LAPOP Proyecto de Opinión Pública de América Latina</p>	 <p>VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY</p>

LA CULTURA POLÍTICA DE LA DEMOCRACIA: **Nombre del País**, 2008

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- | |
|---|
| 1. Sections in yellow are ones that require customization for each country, generally the insertion of the country name in place of the word "país." |
| 2. Sections in grey indicate optional questions that each country team may wish to include or exclude. |
| 3. Each country team may, of course, propose to add individual country-specific questions not included in this draft version. |

País: 1. México 2. Guatemala 3. El Salvador 4. Honduras 5. Nicaragua 6. Costa Rica 7. Panamá 8. Colombia 9. Ecuador 10. Bolivia 11. Perú 12. Paraguay 13. Chile 14. Uruguay 15. Brasil. 16. Venezuela 17. Argentina 21. República Dominicana 22. Haití 23. Jamaica 24. Guyana 25. Trinidad 40. Estados Unidos 41. Canadá	PAIS	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
IDNUM. Número de cuestionario [asignado en la oficina] _____	IDNUM	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
ESTRATOPRI: INSERTAR AQUÍ CODIGO DEL PAIS Y LOS NOMBRES DE LOS ESTRATOS	ESTRATOPRI	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UPM. _____	UPM	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Provincia (o departamento) : _____	PROV	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Cantón (o municipio): _____	MUNICIPIO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
DISTRITO (o parroquia, etc.): _____	DISTRITO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
SEGMENTO CENSAL _____	SEGMENTO	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Sector _____	SEC	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
CLUSTER. (Punto muestral)[Máximo de 8 entrevistas urbanas, 12 rurales]	CLUSTER	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
UR 1. Urbano 2. Rural [Usar definición censal del país]	UR	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
Tamaño del lugar: 1. Capital nacional (área metropolitana) 2. Ciudad grande 3. Ciudad mediana 4. Ciudad pequeña 5. Área rural	TAMANO	<input type="checkbox"/>
Idioma del cuestionario: (1) Español INSERTAR OTROS IDIOMAS USADAS	IDIOMAQ	<input type="checkbox"/>
Hora de inicio: ____:____ [no digitar]		-----

Fecha de la entrevista día: _____ mes: _____ año: 2008

FECHA

<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
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ATENCIÓN: ES UN REQUISITO LEER SIEMPRE LA HOJA DE CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO ANTES DE COMENZAR

Q1. Género (anotar, no pregunte): (1) Hombre (2) Mujer

Q1

A4 [COA4]. Para empezar, en su opinión ¿cuál es el problema **más grave** que está enfrentando el país? **[NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS; SÓLO UNA OPCIÓN]**

A4

Agua, falta de	19	Inflación, altos precios	02
Caminos/vías en mal estado	18	Los políticos	59
Conflicto armado	30	Mal gobierno	15
Corrupción	13	Medio ambiente	10
Crédito, falta de	09	Migración	16
Delincuencia, crimen	05	Narcotráfico	12
Derechos humanos, violaciones de	56	Pandillas	14
Desempleo/falta de empleo	03	Pobreza	04
Desigualdad	58	Protestas populares (huelgas, cierre de carreteras, paros, etc.)	06
Desnutrición	23	Salud, falta de servicio	22
Desplazamiento forzado	32	Secuestro	31
Deuda Externa	26	Seguridad (falta de)	27
Discriminación	25	Terrorismo	33
Drogadicción	11	Tierra para cultivar, falta de	07
Economía, problemas con, crisis de	01	Transporte, problemas con el	60
Educación, falta de, mala calidad	21	Violencia	57
Electricidad, falta de	24	Vivienda	55
Explosión demográfica	20	Otro	70
Guerra contra terrorismo	17	NS/NR	88

Ahora, cambiando de tema... **[Después de leer cada pregunta, repetir “todos los días”, “una o dos veces por semana”, “rara vez”, o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]**

Con qué frecuencia ...	Todos los días	Una o dos veces por semana	Rara vez	Nunca	NS	
A1. Escucha noticias por la radio	1	2	3	4	8	A1
A2. Mira noticias en la TV	1	2	3	4	8	A2
A3. Lee noticias en los periódicos	1	2	3	4	8	A3
A4i. Lee o escucha noticias vía Internet	1	2	3	4	8	A4i

SOCT1. Ahora, hablando de la economía.... ¿Cómo calificaría la situación económica del país? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	SOCT1
SOCT2. ¿Considera usted que la situación económica actual del país es mejor, igual o peor que hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	SOCT2
IDIO1. ¿Cómo calificaría en general su situación económica? ¿Diría usted que es muy buena, buena, ni buena ni mala, mala o muy mala? (1) Muy buena (2) Buena (3) Ni buena, ni mala (regular) (4) Mala (5) Muy mala (pésima) (8) NS/NR	IDIO1
IDIO2. ¿Considera usted que su situación económica actual es mejor, igual o peor que la de hace doce meses? (1) Mejor (2) Igual (3) Peor (8) NS/NR	IDIO2

Ahora, para hablar de otra cosa, a veces la gente y las comunidades tienen problemas que no pueden resolver por sí mismas, y para poder resolverlos piden ayuda a algún funcionario u oficina del gobierno.				
¿Para poder resolver sus problemas alguna vez ha pedido usted ayuda o cooperación ...	Sí	No	NS/NR	
CP2. A algún diputado del Congreso/Asamblea/Parlamento?	1	2	8	CP2
CP4A. A alguna autoridad local (alcalde, municipalidad, prefecto, intendente)?	1	2	8	CP4A
CP4. A algún ministerio/secretario, institución pública, u oficina del estado?	1	2	8	CP4

Ahora vamos a hablar de su municipio ...				
NP1. ¿Ha asistido a un cabildo abierto o una sesión municipal durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR				NP1
NP1B. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los funcionarios de la municipalidad hacen caso a lo que pide la gente en estas reuniones? Le hacen caso (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR				NP1B
NP2. ¿Ha solicitado ayuda o ha presentado una petición a alguna oficina, funcionario, concejal o síndico de la municipalidad durante los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR				NP2
SGL1. ¿Diría usted que los servicios que la municipalidad está dando a la gente son: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy buenos (2) Buenos (3) Ni buenos ni malos (regulares) (4) Malos (5) Muy malos (pésimos) (8) NS/NR				SGL1
SGL2. ¿Cómo considera que le han tratado a usted o a sus vecinos cuando han ido a la municipalidad para hacer trámites? ¿Le han tratado muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal? (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien ni mal (regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (8) NS/NR				SGL2
LGL2. En su opinión, ¿se le debe dar más obligaciones y más dinero a la municipalidad, o se debe dejar que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios municipales? (1) Más al municipio (2) Que el gobierno nacional asuma más obligaciones y servicios (3) No cambiar nada [NO LEER] (4) Más al municipio si da mejores servicios [NO LEER] (8) NS/NR				LGL2
LGL2A. Tomando en cuenta los servicios públicos existentes en el país, ¿A quién se le debería dar más responsabilidades ? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho más al gobierno central (2) Algo más al gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad al gobierno central y a la municipalidad (4) Algo más a la municipalidad (5) Mucho más a la municipalidad (8) NS/NR				LGL2A
LGL2B. Y tomando en cuenta los recursos económicos existentes en el país ¿Quién debería administrar más dinero ? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho más el gobierno central (2) Algo más el gobierno central (3) La misma cantidad el gobierno central y la municipalidad (4) Algo más la municipalidad (5) Mucho más la municipalidad (8) NS/NR				LGL2B
LGL3. ¿Estaría usted dispuesto a pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad para que pueda prestar mejores servicios municipales o cree que no vale la pena pagar más impuestos a la municipalidad? (1) Dispuesto a pagar más impuestos (2) No vale la pena pagar más impuestos (8) NS/NR				LGL3
MUN15. ¿Ha participado usted en la elaboración del presupuesto del municipio? (1) Sí ha participado (0) No ha participado (8) NS/NR				MUN15

MUNI6. ¿Qué grado de confianza tiene usted en el buen manejo de los fondos por parte del municipio? [Leer alternativas] 3) Mucha confianza (2) Algo de confianza (1) Poca confianza (0) Ninguna confianza (8) NS/NR	MUNI6
MUNI8. ¿Ha realizado usted algún trámite o solicitado algún documento en el municipio durante los últimos doce meses? (1) Sí [siga] (0) No [pase a MUNI11] (8) NS/NR [Pase a MUNI11]	MUNI8
MUNI9. ¿Cómo fue atendido? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bien (2) Bien (3) Ni bien, ni mal (Regular) (4) Mal (5) Muy mal (Pésimo) (8) NS/NR (9) Inap.	MUNI9
MUNI10. ¿Le resolvieron su asunto o petición? (1) Sí (0) No (8) NS/NR (9) Inap	MUNI10
MUNI11. ¿Qué tanta influencia cree que tiene usted en lo que hace la municipalidad? ¿Diría que tiene mucha, algo, poca, o nada de influencia? 1. Mucha 2. Algo 3. Poca 4. Nada 8. NS/NR	MUNI11
MUNI15. ¿Qué tan interesado cree usted que está el alcalde en la participación de la gente en el trabajo del municipio? [Leer alternativas] (3) Muy interesado (2) Algo interesado (1) Poco interesado (0) Nada interesado (8) NS/NR	MUNI15

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP5. Ahora, para cambiar el tema, ¿En los últimos doce meses usted ha contribuido para la solución de algún problema de su comunidad o de los vecinos de su barrio o colonia? Por favor, dígame si lo hizo por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca.	1	2	3	4	8	CP5

Voy a leer una lista de grupos y organizaciones. Por favor, dígame si asiste a reuniones de las siguientes organizaciones por lo menos una vez a la semana, una o dos veces al mes, una o dos veces al año, o nunca. [Repetir “una vez a la semana,” “una o dos veces al mes,” “una o dos veces al año,” o “nunca” para ayudar al entrevistado]

	Una vez a la semana	Una o dos veces al mes	Una o dos veces al año	Nunca	NS/NR	
CP6. ¿Reuniones de alguna organización religiosa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP6
CP7. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de padres de familia de la escuela o colegio? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP7
CP8. ¿Reuniones de un comité o junta de mejoras para la comunidad? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP8
CP9. ¿Reuniones de una asociación de profesionales, comerciantes, productores, y/o organizaciones campesinas? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP9
CP10. ¿Reuniones de un sindicato? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP10
CP13. ¿Reuniones de un partido o movimiento político? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8	CP13
CP20. [Solo mujeres] ¿De asociaciones o grupos de mujeres o amas de casa? Asiste...	1	2	3	4	8 9 (HOMBRE)	CP21

LS3. Hablando de otras cosas. En general ¿hasta qué punto se encuentra satisfecho con su vida? ¿Diría usted que se encuentra: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	LS3
IT1. Ahora, hablando de la gente de aquí, ¿diría que la gente de su comunidad es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy confiable (2) Algo confiable (3) Poco confiable (4) Nada confiable (8) NS/NR	IT1

IT1A. ¿Cuánto confía usted en la gente que conoce por primera vez? ¿Diría usted que: [Leer alternativas] (1) Confía plenamente (2) Confía algo (3) Confía poco (4) No confía nada (8) NS/NR	IT1A
IT1B. Hablando en general, ¿Diría Ud. que se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas o que uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás? (1) Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas (2) Uno tiene que ser muy cuidadoso cuando trata con los demás (8) NS/NR	IT1B

[ENTREGAR TARJETA # A]

L1. (Escala Izquierda-Derecha) En esta hoja hay una escala de 1 a 10 que va de izquierda a derecha. Hoy en día mucha gente, cuando conversa de tendencias políticas, habla de gente que simpatiza más con la izquierda y de gente que simpatiza más con la derecha. Según el sentido que tengan para usted los términos "izquierda" y "derecha" cuando piensa sobre su punto de vista político, ¿dónde se colocaría usted en esta escala? Indique la casilla que se aproxima más a su propia posición.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	L1
Izquierda									Derecha	(NS/NR=88)

[RECOGER TARJETA # A]

IMMIG1. ¿Qué tan de acuerdo está usted con que el gobierno (país) ofrezca servicios sociales, como por ejemplo asistencia de salud, educación, vivienda, a los extranjeros que vienen a vivir o trabajar en el país? [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy de acuerdo (2) Algo de acuerdo (3) Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo (4) Algo en desacuerdo (5) Muy en desacuerdo (8) NS/NR	IMMIG1
IMMIG2. ¿Usted diría que la gente de otro país que viene a vivir aquí hace los trabajos que los (nacionales) no quieren, o que les quitan el trabajo a los (nacionales)? (1) Hacen los trabajos que los (nacionales) ya no quieren (2) Le quitan el trabajo a los (nacionales) (8) NS/NR	IMMIG2

PROT1. Alguna vez en su vida, ¿ha participado usted en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca? [Si contestó "nunca" o "NS/NR", marcar 9 en PROT2 y pasar a CP5]	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	PROT1
PROT2. ¿En los últimos doce meses, ha participado en una manifestación o protesta pública? ¿Lo ha hecho algunas veces, casi nunca o nunca?	(1) algunas veces	(2) casi nunca	(3) nunca	(8) NS/NR	9 Inap PROT2

Ahora hablemos de otros temas. Alguna gente dice que en ciertas circunstancias se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder por un golpe de estado. En su opinión se justificaría que hubiera un golpe de estado por los militares frente a las siguientes circunstancias **[Leer alternativas después de cada pregunta]**:

JC1. Frente al desempleo muy alto.	(1) Se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(2) No se justificaría que los militares tomen el poder	(8) NS/NR	JC1
JC4. Frente a muchas protestas sociales.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	JC4
JC10. Frente a mucha delincuencia.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	JC10
JC12. Frente a la alta inflación, con aumento excesivo de precios.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	JC12
JC13. Frente a mucha corrupción.	(1) Se justificaría	(2) No se justificaría	(8) NS/NR	JC13

JC15. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente cierre el Congreso/Asamblea, o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	JC15
JC16. ¿Cree usted que alguna vez puede haber razón suficiente para que el presidente disuelva la Corte Suprema de Justicia/Tribunal Constitucional, ADAPTAR ESTO A CADA PAÍS etc. o cree que no puede existir razón suficiente para eso?	SI puede haber razón (1)	NO puede haber razón (2)	NS/NR (8)	JC16

VIC1. Ahora, cambiando el tema, ¿Ha sido usted víctima de algún acto de delincuencia en los últimos 12 meses? (1) Sí [sigua] (2) No [pasar a VIC20] (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20]	VIC1
VIC10. [SOLO SI FUE VICTIMA DE ALGUN DELITO] ¿El delincuente o los delincuentes usaron violencia en contra de usted? (1) Sí (2) No (9) Inap	VIC10
AOJ1. ¿Denunció el hecho a alguna institución? (1) Sí [pasar a VIC20] (2) No lo denunció [Seguir] (8) NS/NR [pasar a VIC20] (9) Inap (no víctima) [pasar a VIC20]	AOJ1
AOJ1B. ¿Por qué no denunció el hecho? [No leer alternativas] (1) No sirve de nada (2) Es peligroso y por miedo de represalias (3) No tenía pruebas (4) No fue grave (5) No sabe en dónde denunciar (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	AOJ1B

[PREGUNTAR A TODOS]: Ahora por favor piense en lo que le pasó en los últimos doce meses para responder las siguientes preguntas	¿Cuántas veces? NO = 0, NS/NR=88
VIC20. ¿Alguien le robó a mano armada algo que no sea su vehículo en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?	VIC20
VIC21. ¿Se le metieron a robar en su casa en los últimos doce meses? ¿Cuántas veces?	VIC21

VIC27. ¿En los últimos doce meses algún policía lo maltrató verbalmente, físicamente o lo golpeó? ¿Cuántas veces?	VIC27
AOJ8. Para poder capturar delincuentes, ¿cree usted que las autoridades siempre deben respetar las leyes o en ocasiones pueden actuar al margen de la ley? (1) Deben respetar las leyes siempre (2) En ocasiones pueden actuar al margen (8) NS/NR	AOJ8
AOJ11. Hablando del lugar o barrio/colonia donde usted vive, y pensando en la posibilidad de ser víctima de un asalto o robo, ¿se siente usted muy seguro, algo seguro, algo inseguro o muy inseguro? (1) Muy seguro (2) Algo seguro (3) Algo inseguro (4) Muy inseguro (8) NS/NR	AOJ11
AOJ11A. Y hablando del país en general, ¿qué tanto cree usted que el nivel de delincuencia que tenemos ahora representa una amenaza para el bienestar de nuestro futuro? [Leer alternativas] (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ11A
VIC11. ¿Si tuviera que denunciar un delito o hecho de violencia, donde lo denunciaría? [No leer] [Si dice "a la autoridad competente" sondee: ¿A qué autoridad? ¿Cuál sería?] (0) No denunciaría (1) Alcaldía, municipalidad, autoridad local (2) Policía (3) Justicia (Fiscalía, Procuraduría etc) (4) Iglesia (5) Medio de comunicación (6) Otros (8) NS/NR	VIC11
AOJ12. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que el sistema judicial castigaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12
AOJ12a. Si usted fuera víctima de un robo o asalto, ¿cuánto confiaría en que la policía capturaría al culpable? [Leer alternativas] Confiaría... (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ12a
AOJ16A. En su barrio, ¿ha visto a alguien vendiendo drogas en los últimos doce meses? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR	AOJ16A
AOJ17. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que su barrio está afectado por las pandillas/maras ? ¿Diría mucho, algo, poco o nada? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR	AOJ17
AOJ18. Algunas personas dicen que la policía de este barrio (pueblo) protege a la gente frente a los delincuentes, mientras otros dicen que es la policía la que está involucrada en la delincuencia. ¿Qué opina usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) Policía protege (2) Policía involucrada con delincuencia (3) [No leer] No protege, no involucrada con la delincuencia (4) [No leer] Las dos cosas: la policía protege y está involucrada con la delincuencia (8) NS/NR	AOJ18

De los trámites que usted o alguien de su familia haya hecho alguna vez con las siguientes entidades, ¿se siente muy satisfecho, algo satisfecho, algo insatisfecho, o muy insatisfecho? **(REPETIR LAS ALTERNATIVAS DE RESPUESTA EN CADA PREGUNTA)**

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
ST1. La policía nacional	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST1
ST2. Los juzgados o tribunales de justicia	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST2
ST3. La fiscalía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST3

	Muy satisfecho	Algo satisfecho	Algo insatisfecho	Muy Insatisfecho	[No leer] No hizo trámites	NS/NR	
ST4. La alcaldía	1	2	3	4	9	8	ST4

[ENTREGAR TARJETA B]

Esta nueva tarjeta contiene una escala de 7 puntos que va de 1 que significa NADA hasta 7 que significa MUCHO. Por ejemplo, si yo le preguntara hasta qué punto le gusta ver televisión, si a usted no le gusta nada, elegiría un puntaje de 1, y si por el contrario le gusta mucho ver televisión me diría el número 7. Si su opinión está entre nada y mucho elija un puntaje intermedio. ¿Entonces, hasta qué punto le gusta a usted ver televisión? Léame el número. **[Asegúrese que el entrevistado entienda correctamente].**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Nada						Mucho	NS/NR

Anotar el número, 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

B1. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los tribunales de justicia de (país) garantizan un juicio justo? (Sondee: Si usted cree que los tribunales no garantizan en <u>nada</u> la justicia, escoja el número 1; si cree que los tribunales garantizan <u>mucho</u> la justicia escoja el número 7 o escoja un puntaje intermedio)	B1
B2. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted respeto por las instituciones políticas de (país)?	B2
B3. ¿Hasta qué punto cree usted que los derechos básicos del ciudadano están bien protegidos por el sistema político (país)?	B3
B4. ¿Hasta qué punto se siente usted orgulloso de vivir bajo el sistema político (país)?	B4
B6. ¿Hasta qué punto piensa usted que se debe apoyar al sistema político (país)?	B6
B10A. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en el sistema de justicia?	B10A
B11. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el (Tribunal Supremo Electoral)?	B11
B12. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en las (Fuerzas Armadas [o Ejército])? [No usar en Costa Rica, Panamá, o Haití]	B12
B13. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Congreso Nacional?	B13
B14. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en el Gobierno Nacional?	B14
B15. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Fiscalía General de la Nación [o Defensor Penal]?	B15
B18. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la (Policía Nacional)?	B18
B20. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Iglesia Católica?	B20
B21. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en los partidos políticos?	B21
B31. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la (Corte Suprema de Justicia)?	B31
B32. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en su (municipalidad)?	B32
B43. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted orgullo de ser (país)?	B43
B16. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Procuraduría General del Estado o Abogado del Estado?	B16
B17. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza usted en la Defensoría del Pueblo?	B17
B19. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene confianza en la Contraloría?	B19
B33. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la prefectura provincial?	B33
B37. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los medios de comunicación?	B37
B40. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en los movimientos indígenas?	B40
B42. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Servicio de Rentas Internas (SRI)?	B42
B50. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en el Tribunal Constitucional?	B50
B46 [b45]. ¿Hasta qué punto tiene usted confianza en la Comisión de Control Cívico Contra la Corrupción?	B46
B47. ¿Hasta que punto tiene usted confianza en las elecciones?	B47
B48. ¿Hasta qué punto cree Ud. que los tratados de libre comercio ayudarán a mejorar la economía?	B48

Usando la misma escala...	Anotar 1-7, 8 = NS/NR
N1. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la pobreza?	N1
N3. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual promueve y protege los principios democráticos?	N3
N9. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate la corrupción en el gobierno?	N9
N10. Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual protege los derechos humanos.	N10
N11. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual mejora la seguridad ciudadana?	N11
N12. ¿Hasta qué punto diría que el Gobierno actual combate el desempleo?	N12

[RECOGER TARJETA B

M1. Y hablando en general del actual gobierno, diría usted que el trabajo que está realizando el Presidente NOMBRE PRESIDENTE ACTUAL es: [Leer alternativas] (1) Muy bueno (2) Bueno (3) Ni bueno, ni malo (regular) (4) Malo (5) Muy malo (pésimo) (8) NS/NR	M1
M2. Y hablando del Congreso . Pensando en todos los diputados en su conjunto, sin importar los partidos políticos a los que pertenecen, usted cree que los diputados del Congreso (pais) están haciendo su trabajo muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal, o muy mal? 1) Muy bien 2) Bien 3) Ni bien ni mal 4) Mal 5) Muy Mal 6) NSNR	M2

[ENTREGAR TARJETA C]

Ahora, vamos a usar una tarjeta similar, pero el punto 1 representa “muy en desacuerdo” y el punto 7 representa “muy de acuerdo”. Un número entre el 1 y el 7, representa un puntaje intermedio. Yo le voy a leer varias afirmaciones y quisiera que me diga hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esas afirmaciones.

Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Muy en desacuerdo						Muy de acuerdo	NS/NR
							Anotar Número 1-7, y 8 para los que NS/NR
EFF1. A los que gobiernan el país les interesa lo que piensa la gente como yo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?							EFF1
EFF2. Siento que entiendo bien los asuntos políticos más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?							EFF2
ING4. Puede que la democracia tenga problemas, pero es mejor que cualquier otra forma de gobierno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?							ING4
PN2. A pesar de nuestras diferencias, los (nacionales) tenemos muchas cosas y valores que nos unen como país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?							PN2
DEM23. Puede haber democracia sin que existan partidos políticos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?							DEM23

Ahora le voy a hacer algunas preguntas sobre el rol del estado. Seguimos usando la misma escala de 1 a 7. NS/NR = 8	
ROS1. El Estado (país), en lugar del sector privado, debería ser el dueño de las empresas e industrias más importantes del país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con esta frase?	ROS1
ROS2. El Estado (país), más que los individuos, es el principal responsable de asegurar el bienestar de la gente.	ROS2
ROS3. El Estado (país), más que la empresa privada, es el principal responsable de crear empleos.	ROS3
ROS4. El Estado (país) debe implementar políticas para reducir la desigualdad de ingresos entre ricos y pobres, aun cuando esto castigue el esfuerzo individual.	ROS4
Teniendo en cuenta la situación actual del país, quisiera que me diga siempre usando la tarjeta hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones..	
POP101. Para el progreso del país, es necesario que nuestros presidentes/prime ministers limiten la voz y el voto de los partidos de la oposición. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	POP101
POP102. Cuando el Congreso estorba el trabajo del gobierno, nuestros presidentes deben gobernar sin el Congreso . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	POP102
POP103. Cuando a la Corte Suprema/Tribunal Constitucional estorba el trabajo del gobierno, debe ser ignorada por nuestros presidentes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	POP103
POP106. Los presidentes/prime ministers tienen que seguir la voluntad del pueblo, porque lo que el pueblo quiere es siempre lo correcto. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	POP106
POP107. El pueblo debe gobernar directamente, y no a través de los representantes electos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	POP107
POP109. En el mundo de hoy, hay una lucha entre el bien y el mal, y la gente tiene que escoger entre uno de los dos. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	POP109
POP110. Una vez que el pueblo decide qué es lo correcto, debemos impedir que una minoría se oponga. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8) NS/NR	POP110
POP112. El mayor obstáculo para el progreso de nuestro país es que los ricos se aprovechan del pueblo. ¿Hasta qué punto esta de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	POP112
POP113. Aquellos que no concuerdan con la mayoría representan una amenaza para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? (8) NS/NR	POP113

Ahora voy a leer una serie de frases sobre el funcionamiento de los partidos políticos y **el congreso** de **(pais)** y voy a pedirle que me indique qué tan de acuerdo o en desacuerdo está con que esas frases describen adecuadamente la realidad de los partidos y el congreso.

EPP1. Los partidos políticos (pais) hacen bien su trabajo. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	EPP1
EPP2. Los partidos políticos representan bien a sus votantes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	EPP2
EPP3. Los partidos políticos ayudan a sus votantes a lidiar con la burocracia y a resolver sus problemas. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo?	EPP3
EPP4. Los partidos políticos ayudan a los ciudadanos a entender mejor la política. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	EPP4
ECR4 Y pensando ahora en el Congreso . En su conjunto, los diputados del Congreso representan bien los intereses de los (nacionales) . ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	ECR4
ECD1. El trabajo del Congreso es importante porque impide que el presidente tenga demasiado poder. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	ECD1
ECD2. Los diputados del Congreso dedican demasiado tiempo a debatir y discutir. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	ECD2
ECR3. El Congreso aprueba leyes y políticas que son importantes para el país. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	ECR3
ECP1 Los diputados del Congreso gastan demasiados recursos en sus oficinas y en sus ayudantes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	ECP1
ECR1 A la hora de aprobar las leyes, los diputados del Congreso prestan más atención a los grupos de poder que a sus votantes. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	ECR1
ECR2 Los diputados del Congreso están demasiado lejos de la gente como uno. ¿Hasta qué punto está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo? 8. NS/NR	ECR2

[RECOGER TARJETA C]

PN4. En general, ¿Usted diría que está muy satisfecho, satisfecho, insatisfecho o muy insatisfecho con la forma en que la democracia funciona en (País) ? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Satisfecho (3) Insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR	PN4
PN5. En su opinión, ¿ (País) es un país muy democrático, algo democrático, poco democrático, o nada democrático? (1) Muy democrático (2) Algo democrático (3) Poco democrático (4) Nada democrático (8) NS/NR	PN5

[ENTREGAR TARJETA D]

Ahora vamos a cambiar a otra tarjeta. Esta nueva tarjeta tiene una escala que va de 1 a 10, con el 1 indicando que usted *desaprueba firmemente* y el 10 indicando que usted *aprueba firmemente*. Voy a leerle una lista de algunas acciones o cosas que las personas pueden hacer para llevar a cabo sus metas y objetivos políticos. Quisiera que me dijera con qué firmeza usted aprobaría o desaprobaría que las personas hagan las siguientes acciones.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente			NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
E5. Que las personas participen en manifestaciones permitidas por la ley. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E5	
E8. Que las personas participen en una organización o grupo para tratar de resolver los problemas de las comunidades. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E8	
E11. Que las personas trabajen en campañas electorales para un partido político o candidato. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E11	
E15. Que las personas participen en un cierre o bloqueo de calles o carreteras. Siempre usando la misma escala, ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E15	
E14. Que las personas invadan propiedades o terrenos privados. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E14	
E2. Que las personas ocupen fábricas, oficinas y otros edificios. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E2	
E3. Que las personas participen en un grupo que quiera derrocar por medios violentos a un gobierno elegido. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E3	
E16. Que las personas hagan justicia por su propia mano cuando el Estado no castiga a los criminales. ¿Hasta que punto aprueba o desaprueba?	E16	

Ahora vamos a hablar de algunas acciones que el Estado puede tomar. Seguimos usando una escala de uno a diez. Favor de usar otra vez la tarjeta C. En esta escala, 1 significa que desaprueba firmemente, y 10 significa que aprueba firmemente.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente							Aprueba firmemente			NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
D32. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba las protestas públicas?	D32	
D33. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba una ley que prohíba reuniones de cualquier grupo que critique el sistema político país?	D33	
D34. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure programas de televisión?	D34	
D36. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure libros que están en las bibliotecas de las escuelas públicas?	D36	
D37. ¿Hasta qué punto aprueba o desaprueba que el gobierno censure a los medios de comunicación que lo critican?	D37	

Las preguntas que siguen son para saber su opinión sobre las diferentes ideas que tienen las personas que viven en (país). Use siempre la escala de 10 puntos.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Desaprueba firmemente					Aprueba firmemente					NS/NR

	1-10, 88	
D1. Hay personas que siempre hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de (país), no sólo del gobierno de turno, sino de la forma de gobierno, ¿con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted el derecho de votar de esas personas? Por favor léame el número de la escala: [Sondee: ¿Hasta que punto?]		D1
D2. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan llevar a cabo manifestaciones pacíficas con el propósito de expresar sus puntos de vista? Por favor léame el número.		D2
D3. Siempre pensando en los que hablan mal de la forma de gobierno de (país) ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D3
D4. ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba usted que estas personas salgan en la televisión para dar un discurso ?		D4
D5. Y ahora, cambiando el tema, y pensando en los homosexuales, ¿Con qué firmeza aprueba o desaprueba que estas personas puedan postularse para cargos públicos ?		D5

[RECOGER TARJETA D]

Ahora cambiando de tema...

DEM2. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo: (1) A la gente como uno, le da lo mismo un régimen democrático que uno no democrático, o (2) La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno, o (3) En algunas circunstancias un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático (8) NS/NR		DEM2
DEM11. ¿Cree usted que en nuestro país hace falta un gobierno de mano dura, o cree que los problemas pueden resolverse con la participación de todos? (1) Mano dura (2) Participación de todos (8) No responde		DEM11
AUT1. Hay gente que dice que necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido a través del voto. Otros dicen que aunque las cosas no funcionen, la democracia electoral, o sea el voto popular, es siempre lo mejor. ¿Qué piensa usted? [Leer alternativas] (1) Necesitamos un líder fuerte que no tenga que ser elegido, o (2) La democracia electoral es lo mejor (8) NS/NR		AUT1
AUT2. ¿Con cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones está Usted más de acuerdo? [Leer alternativas] (1) Como ciudadanos deberíamos ser más activos en cuestionar a nuestros líderes o (2) Como ciudadanos deberíamos mostrar más respeto por la autoridad de nuestros líderes (8) NS/NR		AUT2
PP2. Hay personas que trabajan por algún partido o candidato durante las campañas electorales... Trabajó usted para algún candidato o partido en las pasadas elecciones presidenciales de 2002 y algún partido o candidato. ¿Con qué frecuencia ha tratado usted de convencer a otros para que voten por un partido o candidato? [Leer alternativas] (1) Si trabajó (2) No trabajó (8) NS/NR		PP2 PP1
(1) Frecuentemente (2) De vez en cuando (3) Rara vez (4) Nunca (8) NS/NR		

Ahora, me gustaría que me indique si usted considera las siguientes actuaciones 1) corruptas y que deben ser castigadas; 2) corruptas pero justificadas bajo las circunstancias; o 3) no corruptas.

<p>DC10. Una madre con varios hijos tiene que sacar una partida de nacimiento para uno de ellos. Para no perder tiempo esperando, ella paga [equivalente de \$5 U.S. en moneda local] de más al empleado público municipal. Cree usted que:: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>1) Lo que hizo la señora es corrupto y ella debe ser castigada 2) Lo que hizo la señora es corrupto pero se justifica 3) Lo que hizo la señora no es corrupto 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>DC10</p>
<p>DC13. Una persona desempleada es cuñado de un político importante, y éste usa su palanca para conseguirle un empleo público. Cree usted que: : [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>1)Lo que hizo el político es corrupto y él debe ser castigado 2) Lo que hizo el político es corrupto pero justificado 3) Lo que hizo el político no es corrupto 8) NS/NR=8</p>	<p>DC13</p>

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
Ahora queremos hablar de su experiencia personal con cosas que pasan en la vida...					
EXC2. ¿Algún agente de policía le pidió una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC2
EXC6. ¿Un empleado público le ha solicitado una mordida (o soborno) en el último año?		0	1	8	EXC6
EXC11. ¿Ha tramitado algo en el municipio/ delegación en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para tramitar algo en el municipio/delegación (como un permiso, por ejemplo) durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna suma además de lo exigido por la ley?	9	0	1	8	EXC11
EXC13. ¿Usted trabaja? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En su trabajo, ¿le han solicitado alguna mordida (coima) en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC13
EXC14. ¿En el último año, tuvo algún trato con los juzgados? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: ¿Ha tenido que pagar una mordida (coima) en los juzgados en el último año?	9	0	1	8	EXC14
EXC15. ¿Usó servicios médicos públicos en el último año? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: Para ser atendido en un hospital o en un puesto de salud durante el último año, ¿ha tenido que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) ?	9	0	1	8	EXC15
EXC16. En el último año, ¿tuvo algún hijo en la escuela o colegio? No → Marcar 9 Sí → Preguntar: En la escuela o colegio durante el último año, ¿tuvo que pagar alguna mordida (o soborno) ?	9	0	1	8	EXC16
EXC17. ¿Alguien le pidió una mordida (o soborno) para evitar el corte de la luz eléctrica?		0	1	8	EXC17

	INAP No trató o tuvo contacto	No	Sí	NS/NR	
EXC18. ¿Cree que como están las cosas a veces se justifica pagar una mordida (o soborno) ?		0	1	8	EXC18

EXC7. Teniendo en cuenta su experiencia o lo que ha oído mencionar, ¿la corrupción de los funcionarios públicos está: [LEER] (1) Muy generalizada (2) Algo generalizada (3) Poco generalizada (4) Nada generalizada (8) NS/NR					EXC7
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Ahora queremos saber cuánta información sobre política y sobre el país se le transmite a la gente...					
G11. ¿Cuál es el nombre del actual presidente de los Estados Unidos? [NO LEER: George Bush] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					G11
G12. ¿Cómo se llama el Presidente del Congreso/Asamblea de país? [NO LEER: insertar nombre] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					G12
G13. ¿Cuántas provincias/departamentos/estados tiene el país? [NO LEER: insertar número] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde NICARAGUA Y PANAMÁ ACEPTA CON Y SIN COMARCAS					G13
G14. ¿Cuánto tiempo dura el período presidencial en país? [NO LEER: insertar número de años] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					G14
G15. ¿Cómo se llama el presidente de Brasil? [NO LEER: Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, aceptar también "Lula"] (1) Correcto (2) Incorrecto (8) No sabe (9) No Responde					G15

VB1. Para hablar de otra cosa... ¿Está empadronando para votar? [Costa Rica, Panamá, Perú: ¿Tiene usted cédula de identidad? o [En El Salvador] Documento Unico de Identidad (DUI) ?] (1) Sí (2) No (3) En trámite (8) NS/NR					VB1
VB2. ¿Votó usted en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de (año última elección presidencial)? (1) Sí votó [Siga] (2) No votó [Pasar a VB10] (8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB10]					VB2
VB3. ¿Por quien votó para Presidente en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de 2000? [NO LEER LISTA] 0. Ninguno (fue a votar pero dejó boleta en blanco, o anuló su voto) 1. INSERTAR NOMBRE DE CANDIDATO Y NOMBRE DEL PARTIDO O ALIANZA 2. 3. 77. Otro 88. NS/NR [Pasar a VB8] 99. Inap (No votó)					VB3

VB10. ¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a POL1] (8) NS/NR [Pase a POL1]					VB10
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<p>VB11. ¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted ? [NO LEER LISTA].</p> <p>1. (ESCRIBIR NOMBRES DE LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS ACTUALES)</p> <p>2.</p> <p>3.</p> <p>4.</p> <p>88. NS/NR [Pase A POL1]</p> <p>99. INAP [Pase A POL1]</p>	VB11	
<p>VB12 Y Usted diría que esa simpatía por el partido [partido que mencionó en VB11] es muy débil, débil, ni débil ni fuerte, fuerte o muy fuerte?</p> <p>1) Muy débil 2) Débil 3) Ni débil ni fuerte 4) Fuerte 5) Muy fuerte 8)NS/NR</p> <p>9) INAP</p>	VB12	
<p>POL1. ¿Qué tanto interés tiene usted en la política: mucho, algo, poco o nada?</p> <p>1) Mucho 2) Algo 3) Poco 4) Nada 8) NS/NR</p>	POL1	
<p>POL2. ¿Con qué frecuencia habla usted de política con otras personas? [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>1) A diario 2) Algunas veces por semana 3) Algunas veces por mes 4) Rara vez 5) Nunca</p> <p>8) NS/NR</p>	POL2	
<p>Ahora cambiando de tema, ¿Alguna vez se ha sentido discriminado o tratado de manera injusta por su apariencia física o su forma de hablar en los siguientes lugares:</p>		
<p>DIS2. En las oficinas del gobierno (juzgados, ministerios, alcaldías)</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>	DIS2	
<p>DIS4. En reuniones o eventos sociales</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>	DIS4	
<p>DIS5. En lugares públicos (como en la calle, la plaza o el mercado)</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR</p>	DIS5	
<p>VBL1. Durante la semana en la que transcurrieron las últimas elecciones presidenciales de [insertar última fecha de elecciones presidenciales]. ¿Estaba usted trabajando?</p> <p>(1) Sí [Siga]</p> <p>(2) No [Pasar a VBL5]</p> <p>(8) NS/NR [Pasar a VB20]</p>	VBL1	
<p>VBL2. ¿En ese trabajo se desempeñaba usted como: [Leer alternativas]</p> <p>(1) Campesino o agricultor?</p> <p>(2) Asalariado del sector público?</p> <p>(3) Asalariado del sector privado?</p> <p>(4) Trabajador por cuenta propia?</p> <p>(5) Trabajador familiar no remunerado?</p> <p>(6) Patrono o socio de empresa?</p> <p>(8) NS/NR</p> <p>(9) INAP</p>	VBL2	
<p>VBL3. ¿Estaba contribuyendo al seguro social a través de ese trabajo?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	VBL3	

<p>VBL4. Siempre pensando en el empleo que tenía durante la semana previa a las últimas elecciones ¿En ese empleo, cuáles eran sus ingresos mensuales netos? [ENTREGAR TARJETA F] [10 déciles basados en la moneda y distribución del país] (00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de \$25 (02) Entre \$26- \$50 (03) \$51-\$100 (04) \$101-\$150 (05) \$151-\$200 (06) \$201-\$300 (07) \$301-\$400 (08) \$401-500 (09) \$501-\$750 (10)\$751-y mas (88) NS/NR (99) INAP [RECOGER TARJETA F Anotar ingreso y pasar a VB20]</p>	<p>VBL4</p>
<p>VBL5. [Solo para los que contestaron “No” en VBL1] ¿Cuál era la causa por la que usted no estaba trabajando en esa fecha? (1) Estaba inactivo (estudiante, labores domésticas, jubilado) [Pase a VB20] (2) Fin de empleo temporal [Pasar a pregunta VBL7] (3) Dejó voluntariamente su último empleo [Pasar a pregunta VBL7] (4) Cierre de la empresa donde trabajaba anteriormente [Pase a VBL7] (5) Despido o cese [Siga] (6) Otra razón (8) NS/NR [Pasar a pregunta VBL7] (9) IINAP (Estaba trabajando) [Pasar a VB20]</p>	<p>VBL5</p>
<p>VBL6. [Solo para los que contestaron “despido o cese” en VBL5] ¿En esa ocasión, recibió algún pago en concepto de cesantía por parte de la empresa donde usted trabajaba? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP [En todo caso pase a VBL7]</p>	<p>VBL6</p>
<p>VBL7. ¿En esa fecha, se encontraba usted disponible para trabajar y activamente buscando empleo? (1) Sí [Siga] (2) No [Pase a VB20] (8) NS/NR [Pase a VB20] (9) INAP [Pase a VB20]</p>	<p>VBL7</p>
<p>VBL8. [Solo para los que contestaron “si” en VBL7] Y siempre pensando en su situación la semana previa a las últimas elecciones ¿Cuánto tiempo llevaba buscando un empleo? (1) Menos de un mes (2) Entre un mes y tres meses (3) Entre tres y seis meses (4) Más de seis meses (8) NS/NR (9) INAP</p>	<p>VBL8</p>
<p>VB20. [Preguntar a todos] ¿Si este domingo fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, por qué partido votaría usted? (0) Ninguno (votaría en blanco o anularía el voto) (1) No votaría (2) [Insertar lista de partidos de cada país] (88) NS/NR</p>	<p>VB20</p>
<p>VB21. ¿Cuál es la forma en que usted cree que puede influir más para cambiar las cosas? [Leer alternativas] (1) Votar para elegir a los que defienden su posición (2) Participar en movimientos de protesta y exigir los cambios directamente (3) Influir de otras maneras (4) No es posible influir para que las cosas cambien, da igual lo que uno haga (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>VB21</p>

[ENTREGAR TARJETA G]

LS6. Por favor imagine una escalera con los escalones numerados del cero al diez, donde cero es el escalón de abajo y diez el más alto. Suponga que yo le digo que el escalón más alto representa la mejor vida posible para usted y el escalón más bajo representa la peor vida posible para usted.

...si el de arriba es 10 y el de abajo es 0, ¿en qué escalón de la escalera se siente usted en estos momentos?(RESPUESTA ÚNICA / ESPONTÁNEA)

0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	88
Peor vida posible						Mejor vida posible				NS/NR	

[RECOGER TARJETA G]

En esta ciudad/ área donde usted vive, está satisfecho(a) o insatisfecho(a) con... **[Repetir “satisfecho” e “insatisfecho” después de cada pregunta para ayudar al entrevistado]**

	Satisfecho(a)	Insatisfecho(a)	NS/NR o No Utiliza	
SD1. El sistema de transporte público	1	2	8	SD1
SD2. Las vías, carreteras y autopistas	1	2	8	SD2
SD3. El sistema educativo y las escuelas	1	2	8	SD3
SD4. La calidad del aire	1	2	8	SD4
SD5. La calidad del agua	1	2	8	SD5
SD6. La disponibilidad de servicios médicos y de salud de calidad	1	2	8	SD6
SD7. La disponibilidad de viviendas buenas y a precios accesibles	1	2	8	SD7
SD8. La belleza física del lugar	1	2	8	SD8
SD9. El flujo del tráfico	1	2	8	SD9
SD10. Las aceras o vías peatonales (suplidor favor adaptar)	1	2	8	SD10
SD11. La disponibilidad de parques, plazas y áreas verdes	1	2	8	SD11
SD12. La disponibilidad de sitios públicos adecuados para que la gente pueda practicar deportes	1	2	8	SD12

LS4. Considerando todo lo que hemos hablado de esta ciudad/zona, usted diría que se encuentra satisfecho o insatisfecho con el lugar donde vive?

(1) Satisfecho (2) insatisfecho (8) NS/NR

LS4

Note: insert country-specific USAID Mission items, if any, beginning here.

Ahora para terminar, le voy hacer algunas preguntas para fines estadísticos...

ED. ¿Cuál fue el último año de **enseñanza que usted completó o aprobó?**

_____ Año de _____ (primaria, secundaria, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total **[Usar tabla abajo para código]**

	1 ^o	2 ^o	3 ^o	4 ^o	5 ^o	6 ^o	
Ninguno	0	1	2	3	4	5	ED
Primaria	1	2	3	4	5	6	
Secundaria	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Universitaria	13	14	15	16	17	18+	
Superior no universitaria	13	14	15	16			
NS/NR/	88	1	2	3	4	5	

Q2. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años (0= NS/NR)

Q2

Q3. ¿Cuál es su religión? **[No leer alternativas]**

- (1) Católica
- (2) Protestante tradicional o protestante no evangélico (Adventista, Bautista, Calvinista, Ejército de Salvación, Luterano, Metodista, Nazareno, Presbiteriano).
- (3) Otra no cristiana (Judíos, Musulmanes, Budistas, Hinduistas, Taoistas)
- (5) Evangélico y pentecostal (Pentecostal, Carismático no católico, Luz del Mundo).
- (6) Mormón, Testigo de Jehová, Espiritualista y Adventista del Séptimo Día
- (7) Religiones tradicionales o nativas (Candomble, Voodoo, Rastafarian, Religiones Mayas).
- (4) Ninguna
- (8) NS/NR

Q3

Q5A ¿Con qué frecuencia asiste usted a servicios religiosos? **[Leer alternativas]**

1. Más de una vez por semana
2. Una vez por semana
3. Una vez al mes
4. Una o dos veces al año
5. Nunca o casi nunca 8. NS/NR

Q5

[ENTREGAR TARJETA F]

Q10. ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan?

[Si no entiende, pregunte: Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa por mes?]

[10 déciles basados en la moneda y distribución del país]

- (00) Ningún ingreso
- (01) Menos de \$25
- (02) Entre \$26- \$50
- (03) \$51-\$100
- (04) \$101-\$150
- (05) \$151-\$200
- (06) \$201-\$300
- (07) \$301-\$400
- (08) \$401-500
- (09) \$501-\$750
- (10)\$751-y mas
- (88) NS/NR

[RECOGER TARJETA F]

Q10

<p>Q10A. ¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas (dinero) del exterior? No → marcar 99 y pasar a Q10C 99. Inap Sí → preguntar: ¿Cuánto recibe por mes? [usar códigos de pregunta Q10 si dijo cantidad en moneda nacional; si dijo la cantidad en moneda extranjera, escribir cantidad y especificar moneda]</p>	<p>Q10A</p>	
<p>Q10A1. ¿En que utiliza generalmente el dinero de las remesas? [No leer]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Consumo (alimento, vestido) 2. Vivienda (construcción, reparación) 3. Gastos en educación 4. Comunidad (reparación de escuela, reconstrucción iglesia/templo, fiestas comunitarias) 5. Gastos médicos 6. Ahorro 7. Otro 8. NS/NR 	<p>Q10a1</p>	
<p>Q10B. ¿Hasta qué punto dependen los ingresos familiares de esta casa de las remesas del exterior? (1) Mucho (2) Algo (3) Poco (4) Nada (8) NS/NR (9) Inap</p>	<p>Q10B</p>	
<p>Q10C. ¿Tiene usted familiares cercanos que antes vivieron en esta casa y que hoy estén residiendo en el exterior? [Si dijo Sí, preguntar dónde]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Sí, en los Estados Unidos solamente (2) Sí, en los Estados Unidos y en otros países (3) Sí, en otros países (no en Estados Unidos) (4) No [Pase a Q14] (8) NS/NR [Pase a Q14] 	<p>Q10C</p>	
<p>Q16. [Sólo para los que contestaron Sí en Q10C] Con que frecuencia se comunica con ellos?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Todos los días (2) Una o dos veces por semana (3) Una o dos veces por mes (4) Rara vez (5) Nunca (8) NS/NR (9) INAP 	<p>Q16</p>	
<p>Q14. ¿Tiene usted intenciones de irse a vivir o a trabajar a otro país en los próximos tres años? 1) Sí 2) No 8) NS/NR</p>	<p>Q14</p>	
<p>Q10D. El salario o sueldo que usted recibe y el total del ingreso familiar: [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Les alcanza bien, pueden ahorrar 2. Les alcanza justo sin grandes dificultades 3. No les alcanza, tienen dificultades 4. No les alcanza, tienen grandes dificultades 8. [No leer] NS/NR 	<p>Q10D</p>	
<p>Q11. ¿Cuál es su estado civil? [No leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Soltero (2) Casado (3) Unión libre (acompañado) (4) Divorciado (5) Separado (6) Viudo (8) NS/NR 	<p>Q11</p>	
<p>Q12. ¿Tiene hijos(as)? ¿Cuántos? _____ (00= ninguno → Pase a ETID) NS/NR 88.</p>	<p>Q12</p>	<p> </p>
<p>Q12A. [Si tiene hijos] ¿Cuántos hijos viven en su hogar en este momento? _____ 00 = ninguno, 99 INAP (no tiene hijos)</p>	<p>Q12A</p>	<p> </p>
<p>ETID. ¿Usted considera que es una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o Afro-país, mulata, u otra? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra o Afro-país (5) Mulata (7) Otra (8) NS/NR</p>	<p>ETID</p>	

<p>[OJO: ESCRIBIR LAS PRIMERAS TRES INICIALES DEL PAIS EN EL CODIGO DE ESTA PREGUNTA. Por ejemplo, para Costa Rica debe de ser COSETIDA.] ETIDA. Considera que su madre es o era una persona blanca, mestiza, indígena, negra o mulata? (1) Blanca (2) Mestiza (3) Indígena (4) Negra (5) Mulata (7) Otra (8) NS/NR</p>	ETIDA
<p>[OJO: ESCRIBIR LAS PRIMERAS TRES INICIALES DEL PAIS EN EL CODIGO DE ESTA PREGUNTA. Por ejemplo, para Perú debe de ser PERLENG1.] LENG1. ¿Cuál es su lengua materna, o el primer idioma que ha hablado de pequeño en su casa? [acepte una alternativa] (1) Castellano (2) Nativo indígena [OJO: liste el nombre de los idiomas indígenas más comunes] (4) Otro (nativo) (5) Otro extranjero (8) NS/NR</p>	LENG1
<p>[OJO: ESCRIBIR LAS PRIMERAS TRES INICIALES DEL PAIS EN EL CODIGO DE ESTA PREGUNTA. Por ejemplo, para Perú debe de ser PERLENG1A.] [Solo se usa en México, Guatemala, y Perú] LENG1A. ¿Se hablaba otro idioma más en su casa cuando usted era niño? Cuál? (Acepte una alternativa) (1) Castellano (2) Nativo indígena [OJO: liste el nombre de los idiomas indígenas más comunes] (4) Otro (nativo) (5) Otro extranjero (7) Ningún otro NS/NR [8]</p>	LENG1 A
<p>[Solo se usa en México, Guatemala, y Perú] LENG4. Hablando del idioma que sus padres conocían, ¿sus padres hablan o hablaban [Leer alternativas]: <i>(Encuestador: si uno de los padres hablaba sólo un idioma y el otro más de uno, anotar 2.)</i> Sólo castellano [1] Castellano e idioma nativo [2] Sólo idioma nativo [3] Castellano e idioma extranjero [4] NS/NR [8]</p>	LENG4

<p>WWW1. Hablando de otras cosas, ¿Qué tan frecuentemente usa usted el Internet? [Leer alternativas] 1. Todos los días o casi todos los días 2. Por lo menos una vez por semana 3. Por lo menos una vez al mes 4. Varias veces al año 5. Rara vez 6. Nunca 8. NS/NR [No leer]</p>	WWW1
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Para finalizar, podría decirme si en su casa tienen: **[Leer todos]**

R1. Televisor	(0) No	(1) Sí	R1			
R3. Refrigeradora (nevera)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R3			
R4. Teléfono convencional (no celular)	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4			
R4A. Teléfono celular	(0) No	(1) Sí	R4A			
R5. Vehículo. Cuántos?	(0) No	(1) Uno	(2) Dos	(3) Tres o más	R5	
R6. Lavadora de ropa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R6			
R7. Microondas	(0) No	(1) Sí	R7			
R8. Motocicleta	(0) No	(1) Sí	R8			
R12. Agua potable dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R12			
R14. Cuarto de baño dentro de la casa	(0) No	(1) Sí	R14			
R15. Computadora	(0) No	(1) Sí	R15			

<p>OCUP4A . A qué se dedica usted principalmente? ¿Está usted actualmente: [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Trabajando? [Siga] 2. No está trabajando en este momento pero tiene trabajo? [Siga] 3. Está buscando trabajo activamente? [Pase a DESOC2] 4. Es estudiante? [Pase a MIG1 / TERMINA] 5. Se dedica a los quehaceres de su hogar? [Pase a MIG1/ TERMINA] 6. Está jubilado, pensionado o incapacitado permanentemente para trabajar? [Pase a MIG1/ TERMINA] 7. No trabaja y no está buscando trabajo? [Pase a DESOC2] 8. NS/NR 	OCUP4	
--	--------------	--

<p>OCUP1. ¿Cuál es la ocupación o tipo de trabajo que realiza? [No leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Profesional, intelectual y científico (abogados, profesores universitarios, médicos, contadores, arquitectos, ingenieros, etc.) 2. Director (gerente, jefe de departamento, supervisor) 3. Técnico o profesional de nivel medio (técnicos en computación, maestros de primaria y secundaria, artistas, deportistas, etc.) 4. Trabajador especializado (operadores de maquinaria, albañiles, mecánicos, carpinteros, electricistas, etc.) 5. Funcionarios del gobierno (miembros de los órganos legislativo, ejecutivo, y judicial y personal directivo de la administración pública) 6. Oficinista (secretarias, operadores de maquina de oficina, cajeros, recepcionistas, servicio de atención al cliente, etc.) 7. Comerciante (vendedores ambulantes, propietarios de establecimientos comerciales o puestos en el mercado, etc.) 8. Vendedor demostrador en almacenes y mercados 9. Empleado, fuera de oficina, en el sector de servicios (trabajadores en hoteles, restaurantes, taxistas, etc.) 10. Campesino, agricultor, o productor agropecuario y pesquero (propietario de la tierra) 11. Peón agrícola (trabaja la tierra para otros) 12. Artesano 13. Servicio doméstico 14. Obrero 15. Miembro de las fuerzas armadas o personal de servicio de protección y seguridad (policía, bomberos, vigilantes, etc.) 88. NS/NR 99. INAP 	OCUP1	<table border="1" style="width: 100%; height: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> <td style="width: 20px; height: 20px;"></td> </tr> </table>		

<p>OCUP1A. En su ocupación principal usted es: [Leer alternativas]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Asalariado del gobierno? 2. Asalariado en el sector privado? 3. Patrono o socio de empresa? 4. Trabajador por cuenta propia? 5. Trabajador no remunerado o sin pago? 8. NS/NR 9. INAP 	OCUP1A	
---	---------------	--

OCUP1B1. ¿En total cuántos empleados hay en la empresa o en el lugar donde usted trabaja? [Leer alternativas] [Considere total de la empresa, no sólo la división o dpto donde trabaja el entrevistado] 1. Menos de 5 empleados 2. De 5 a 9 empleados 3. De 10 a 19 empleados 4. De 20 a 100 empleados 5. Más de 100 empleados 8. NS/NR 9. INAP	OCUP1B1	
OCUP1C. ¿Tiene seguro de salud a través de su empresa o su empleador? (1) Sí (2) No (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	OCUP1C	

OCUP1D. Hasta qué punto está usted satisfecho con su trabajo? ¿Diría usted que se siente ..? (1) Muy satisfecho (2) Algo satisfecho (3) Algo insatisfecho (4) Muy insatisfecho (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	OCUP1D	
DESOC2. [SOLO SI RESPONDIÓ QUE NO TRABAJA O ESTÁ BUSCANDO TRABAJO EN OCUP4A] ¿Por cuántas semanas durante los últimos doce meses no ha tenido trabajo? _____ semanas (88) NS/NR (99) Inap	DESOC2	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>

MIG1. Durante su niñez, ¿dónde vivió usted principalmente? en el campo? en un pueblo? O en una ciudad?: 1. En el campo 2. En un pueblo 3. En una ciudad 8. NS/NR	MIG1	
MIG2. Hace 5 años, ¿donde residía usted? [Leer alternativas] 1. En este mismo municipio [Pase a TI] 2. En otro municipio en el país [Siga] 3. En otro país [Pase a TI] 8. NS/NR [Pase a TI]	MIG2	
MIG3. El lugar donde vivía hace 5 años era: [Leer alternativas] (1) Un pueblo o una ciudad más pequeño que este (2) Un pueblo o una ciudad más grande que este (3) Un pueblo o ciudad igual que este (8) NS/NR (9) INAP	MIG3	

Hora terminada la entrevista _____ : _____ TI. Duración de la entrevista [minutos, ver página # 1] _____	TI	<input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>
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
Estas son todas las preguntas que tengo. Muchísimas gracias por su colaboración.

Yo juro que esta entrevista fue llevada a cabo con la persona indicada. Firma del entrevistador _____ Fecha ____ / ____ / ____ Firma del supervisor de campo _____ Comentarios: _____ _____ Firma de la persona que digitó los datos _____ Firma de la persona que verificó los datos _____
--


Tarjeta A

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Izquierda					Derecha				

Tarjeta B



Tarjeta C



Tarjeta D

*Aprueba
firmemente*

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

*Desaprueba
firmemente*

1

Tarjeta "E"

Mejor vida posible



Peor vida posible

Tarjeta F

(00) Ningún ingreso

(01) Menos de \$25

(02) Entre \$26- \$50

(03) \$51-\$100

(04) \$101-\$150

(05) \$151-\$200

(06) \$201-\$300

(07) \$301-\$400

(08) \$401-500

(09) \$501-\$750

(10) \$751-y más

Appendix A2: Largest Possible Effect of Citizen Support for Decentralization Coefficients

Variable	Support for Administrative Decentralization	Support for Fiscal Decentralization	Support for Decentralization Index
Individual-Level			
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>			
Education	5.26	3.06	4.32
Female	-1.64	-1.10	-1.31
Quintiles of Wealth	n.s.*	-1.75	-1.28
Size of City/Town of Residence	n.s.	-3.32	-2.18
Race (Base category: White)			
Mestizo	n.s.	-1.40	n.s.
Indigenous	n.s.	-3.77	-2.34
Support for Democracy			
Preference for Authoritarian Leader	-2.49	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Social Capital</i>			
Municipal Meetings Attendance	1.80	n.s.	1.50
Demand-making on Municipal Government	2.10	1.40	1.70
Communitarian Participation	2.10	n.s.	1.66
<i>Governance Indicators</i>			
Satisfaction with Local Services	n.s.	4.50	n.s.
Trust in the Municipal Government	5.60	9.80	7.60
Efficacy of National Government	-5.40	-15.10	-10.20
Role of the State in the Economy			
Role of the State Index	-2.90	-3.10	-3.00
Country-Level			
Human Development Index (2007)	14.88	12.24	13.55

* Not Significant $p > .1$

Appendix A3: Probabilities of Hierarchical Model for Multinomial Support for Decentralization

	Probability of Support for Recentralization (relative to decentralization)	Probability of Equal Distribution (relative to support for decentralization)
Individual-Level		
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>		
Education	0.496	0.498
Age	n.s.	0.500
Female	0.529	0.555
Quintiles of Wealth	0.506	n.s.
Size of City/Town of Residence	0.512	0.510
<i>Race (Base category: White)</i>		
Indigenous	0.534	n.s.
<i>Support for Democracy</i>		
Churchillian Democracy	n.s.	0.500
Preference for Authoritarian Leader	0.531	n.s.
<i>Social Capital</i>		
Municipal Meetings Attendance	0.500	n.s.
Demand-making on Municipal Government	0.500	0.500
Communitarian Participation	0.500	n.s.
<i>Governance Indicators</i>		
Trust in the Municipal Government	0.498	0.499
Efficacy of National Government	0.502	0.501
<i>Role of the State in the Economy</i>		
Role of the State Index	0.500	n.s.
Country-Level		
Human Development Index (2007)	0.057	n.s.

* Not Significant $p > .1$

Appendix A4: Largest Possible Effects of Participation in Political Parties Coefficients

Variable	Model I	Model II
Individual-Level		
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>		
Education	6.048	5.994
Age	2.720	2.640
Female	-2.057	-2.434
Quintiles of Wealth	-1.380	-1.376
Size of City/Town of Residence	-3.424	-3.468
<i>Ethnicity (Base category: White)</i>		
Mestizo	n.s.*	n.s.
Indigenous	1.086	1.040
Black	1.683	1.760
Other	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Governance Indicators</i>		
Crime Victimization	2.300	2.200
Satisfaction with Municipal Services	n.s.	n.s.
Municipal Bribe	4.500	4.400
Efficacy of National Government	1.100	1.000
<i>Political Trust Indicators</i>		
Trust in Political Parties	8.200	8.300
Trust in the Municipal Government	n.s.	n.s.
Trust in Elections	1.900	1.900
<i>Support for Direct Democracy</i>		
Support for Direct Democracy	1.300	1.300
Country-Level		
<i>Means as Outcomes</i>		
Human Development Index (2007)	n.s.	n.s.
Federal System	n.s.	n.s.
Index of Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization	-8.566	-8.480
Trust in Political Parties x Index of Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization	--	-8.842

*n.s.: Not significant $p > 0.1$

Appendix A5: Probabilities of Hierarchical Model for Multinomial Participation in Protests

Variable	Sometimes	Almost Never
Intercept	0.072	0.047
Individual-Level		
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>		
Education	0.523	0.513
Age	n.s.*	n.s.
Female	0.439	0.440
Quintiles of Wealth	n.s.	n.s.
Size of City/Town of Residence	n.s.	0.487
<i>Ethnicity (Base category: White)</i>		
Mestizo	0.538	n.s.
Indigenous	0.639	n.s.
Black	0.568	n.s.
Other	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Governance Indicators</i>		
Crime Victimization	0.501	0.501
Satisfaction with Municipal Services	n.s.	n.s.
Municipal Bribe	0.501	0.501
Efficacy of National Government	0.499	n.s.
<i>Political Trust Indicators</i>		
Trust in Political Parties	0.501	0.501
Trust in the Municipal Government	n.s.	n.s.
Trust in Elections	n.s.	n.s.
<i>Support for Direct Democracy</i>		
Support for Direct Democracy	0.501	0.504
Country-Level		
<i>Means as Outcomes</i>		
Human Development Index (2007)	n.s.	n.s.
Federal System	n.s.	n.s.
Index of Fiscal and Administrative Decentralization	0.502	n.s.

*n.s.: Not significant $p > 0.1$

Appendix A6: PAC Questionnaire



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ENCUESTA: 205303 – Octubre 2005

N° FORMULARIO

**“PROYECTO PNUD AARG.04007 AUDITORIA CIUDADANA DE LA CALIDAD DE LAS PRÁCTICAS DEMOCRÁTICAS EN MUNICIPIOS”
CUESTIONARIO**

INTRODUCCIÓN:

Buenos días. Mi nombre es (.....) y represento a..... Actualmente estamos realizando un estudio para conocer la opinión de la ciudadanía sobre la democracia en el municipio de **(MENCIONAR MUNICIPIO)**. Este estudio se aplicará a una gran cantidad de personas en 8 municipios de todo el país. Usted ha salido sorteado entre ellas. Su identidad permanecerá en el anonimato, sus respuestas serán confidenciales y se sumarán para un análisis estadístico con las demás personas que estamos entrevistando. ¡Muchas gracias por su colaboración!

PREGUNTAS FILTRO

PF1. ¿Tiene Ud. más de 17 años de edad?

Si	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
No	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
Ns/Nc	0 <input type="checkbox"/>

(SI SI EN PREGUNTA ANTERIOR CONTINUAR. SI NO EN ALGUNA DE LAS DOS OPCIONES, TERMINAR)

PF2 ¿Podría decirme cuál es su edad exactamente? **(ANOTAR EDAD)**

PF3. Cuánto hace que Ud. reside en **(MENCIONAR MUNICIPIO)**?

Menos de un año	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	➔ TERMINAR
Más de un año	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	➔ CONTINUAR
Ns/Nc	0 <input type="checkbox"/>	

MÓDULO 1: CULTURA CÍVICA DEMOCRÁTICA

P01. Para comenzar, ¿Cómo evalúa usted la actual situación política del país? Diría que es...

Muy buena	Buena	Ni buena ni mala	Mala	Muy mala	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>

P02. Si tuviera que resumir el significado de la democracia en una palabra... cuáles serían las TRES primeras palabras que se le ocurrirían? **(RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA - ACEPTAR HASTA TRES MENCIONES - ANOTAR EN EL ORDEN EN QUE EL ENTREVISTADO LAS MENCIONE)**

P03. De estas tres cuál considera que es la más importante? **(MARCAR CODIGO, EN COLUMNA P03)**

	P03
P02.1	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
P02.2	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
P02.3	3 <input type="checkbox"/>

P04. Con cuál de las siguientes frases está usted más de acuerdo...

La democracia es un régimen de gobierno en el cual la gente elige periódicamente a sus gobernantes a través del voto.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
La democracia es una forma de vida en la cual la gente tiene derecho a participar en todas las decisiones que afectan su vida cotidiana	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
No sabe	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
No responde	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P05. Y entre estas 2 afirmaciones ¿Cuál se acerca más a su forma de pensar?

Una cosa es la democracia y otra el bienestar económico y social de la población. Por eso, para que haya democracia BASTA con que sean respetados el voto y las libertades públicas.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
El bienestar económico y social de la población es una precondition de la democracia y por eso, para que ésta exista, NO BASTA con que sean respetados el voto y las libertades públicas.	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
NO LEER Ambas	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
NO LEER Ninguno	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
NO LEER No sabe	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
NO LEER No responde	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P06. Y pensando en estas tres afirmaciones ¿Cuál se acerca más a su forma de pensar? **LEER OPCIONES**

La democracia es preferible a cualquier otra forma de gobierno	En algunas circunstancias, un gobierno autoritario puede ser preferible a uno democrático	No tengo preferencia entre un gobierno democrático y uno no democrático	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P07. ¿Usted está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la siguiente frase "Personalmente no me importaría que llegara al poder un gobierno autoritario, si pudiera resolver los problemas del país en lo que hace a seguridad, economía, etc."? **LEER OPCIONES**

Acuerdo	Desacuerdo	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P08. Supongamos que el país atravesara una muy seria crisis económica y/o social. Estaría usted de acuerdo, en ese caso con ... **(LEER FRASES UNA POR UNA)**

	SI	No	Ns/Nc
1. Estaría de acuerdo con que el presidente ordene reprimir para reestablecer el orden	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
2. Estaría de acuerdo con que el presidente controle los medios de comunicación hasta que termine la crisis	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Estaría de acuerdo con que el presidente viole algunas leyes para combatir la crisis	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Estaría de acuerdo con que el presidente deje de lado al Congreso hasta que termine la crisis	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>

P09. Hay gente que dice que sin Congreso Nacional no puede haber democracia, mientras que otra gente dice que la democracia puede funcionar sin Congreso Nacional. ¿Cuál frase está más cerca de su manera de pensar? **LEER OPCIONES**

Sin Congreso Nacional no puede haber democracia	La democracia puede funcionar sin Congreso Nacional	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P10. También hay gente que dice que sin partidos políticos no puede haber democracia, mientras que hay otra gente que dice que la democracia puede funcionar sin partidos. ¿Cuál frase está más cerca de su manera de pensar? **LEER OPCIONES**

Sin partidos políticos no puede haber democracia	La democracia puede funcionar sin partidos	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P11. ¿En qué medida cree usted que es necesario mejorar la calidad de la política y de las instituciones en la Argentina...? **LEER OPCIONES**

Mucho	Bastante	Poco	Nada	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
CONTINUAR				IR A P14	

P12. **(SI DIJO MUCHO BASTANTE O POCO)** Y en su opinión ¿Usted cree que es posible hacerlo?

Si →	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Ir a P13
No →	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	P12a ¿Por qué?
No sabe	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	
No responde	9 <input type="checkbox"/>	

P13. **A LOS QUE CONTESTAN SI:** ¿Cómo cree Ud. que podría mejorarse la calidad de la política y de los políticos?

	Si	No	No sabe	No responde
1. Participando en un partido político	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
2. Participando en una organización de la sociedad civil	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Exigiendo periódicamente rendición de cuentas a los gobernantes	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Educando cívicamente a los ciudadanos	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
5. ¿Piensa que existe otra forma de mejorar la calidad de la política y de los políticos? (REGISTRAR y PROFUNDIZAR)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P14. **A TODOS** ¿Cuál de las siguientes afirmaciones se acerca más a su forma de pensar?

Voto en las elecciones porque creo que es importante y de esta manera se pueden cambiar las cosas.	Voto en las elecciones porque es obligatorio, pero creo que con el voto las cosas se cambian poco o nada	En general no voto en las elecciones.	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P15. ¿Ud. cree que la democracia ayuda mucho, bastante, poco o nada a mejorar la calidad de vida de la gente?

Ayuda mucho	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
Ayuda bastante	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
Ayuda poco	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
No ayuda nada	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
No sabe	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
No responde	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P16. Y pensando específicamente en (**MUNICIPIO**), Usted diría que esta muy, bastante, poco o nada satisfecho con el funcionamiento de la democracia en esta ciudad...

Muy satisfecho	Bastante Satisfecho	Poco satisfecho	Nada satisfecho	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P17. En su opinión ¿En qué ámbito funciona mejor la democracia? Diría que en el país, o aquí en... (**MUNICIPIO**)?

Nacional	Local/Municipal	NO LEER Ambos por Igual	NO LEER Ninguno	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P18. ¿Por qué? (**RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA, REGISTRAR ABAJO**)

MÓDULO 2: DERECHOS Y RESPONSABILIDADES

P19. ¿Cuáles diría usted que son sus derechos como ciudadano que vive en una democracia? Por favor dígame todos los que recuerde o piense que son sus derechos (**ESPONTANEA - REGISTRAR ABAJO**) Y qué más? (**PROFUNDIZAR**)

P20. En general, ¿Usted diría que los habitantes de... (**MUNICIPIO**) conocen mucho, bastante, poco o nada cuáles son sus derechos?

Mucho	Bastante	Poco	Nada	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
IR A P23		CONTINUAR – P21		IR A P23	

P21. (**SOLO A LOS QUE CONTESTARON POCO O NADA EN LA PREGUNTA ANTERIOR**) ¿Cuál diría usted que es la principal razón por la cual la gente en esta ciudad no conoce o conoce poco sus derechos? **LEER OPCIONES**

La pobreza de la gente	La falta de educación de la gente	El desinterés de la gente por conocer sus derechos	Dirigentes que no quieren que la gente conozca sus derechos	NO LEER Otra	NO LEER Todas	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
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1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
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P22. ¿Quién o quiénes son responsables de que los habitantes de... (MUNICIPIO) no conozcan o conozcan poco sus derechos? (ESPONTÁNEA, REGISTRAR ABAJO)

A TODOS

P23. ¿En qué medida diría usted que los derechos de los habitantes de... (MUNICIPIO) son respetados por las autoridades? Diría que...

Mucho	Bastante	Poco	Nada	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P24. ¿Y en qué medida diría usted que los habitantes de... (MUNICIPIO) exigen y se aseguran que sus derechos sean respetados por las autoridades...

Mucho	Bastante	Poco	Nada	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P25. En lo personal ¿Usted ha sentido alguna vez que alguno de sus derechos no fue respetado debido a... (PREGUNTAR UNO POR UNO)

	SI	No	Ns/Nc
1. su situación económica	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
2. su sexo (por ser hombre / por ser mujer)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
3. su nivel educativo	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. el barrio o el lugar donde vive	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
5. el color de su piel	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
6. su edad	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
7. sus creencias religiosas	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
8. su preferencia u orientación sexual	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
9. su aspecto físico/ apariencia	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
10. su país de origen	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
11. Otra causa (ESPECIFICAR)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>

P26. ¿Y cuáles diría que son sus deberes como ciudadano? Por favor dígame todas las que recuerda que son sus responsabilidades como ciudadano (ESPONTÁNEA Y MÚLTIPLE) Y que más ? (PROFUNDIZAR)

P27. ¿Usted diría que los habitantes de... (MUNICIPIO) conocen sus deberes mucho, bastante, poco o nada?

P28. ¿Y cumplen con sus deberes mucho, bastante, poco o nada?

	Mucho	Bastante	Poco	Nada	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
P27 - Conocen	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
P28 - Cumplen	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P29. En su opinión, cuanta gente en (MUNICIPIO) paga sus impuestos?

Todos	La mayoría	Algunos	Nadie	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P30. En general, ¿Usted diría que los habitantes de... (MUNICIPIO) respetan mucho, bastante, poco o nada las normas?

Mucho	Bastante	Poco	Nada	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P31. En general, ¿Usted diría que los habitantes de... (MUNICIPIO) valoran y cuidan mucho, bastante, poco o nada los bienes públicos, como por ejemplo plazas, tachos de basura, semáforos, alumbrado público, etc.?

Mucho	Bastante	Poco	Nada	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P32. ¿En qué medida cree usted que las instituciones educativas contribuyen mucho, bastante, poco o nada a formar ciudadanos democráticos?

Mucho	Bastante	Poco	Nada	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P33. Ahora le voy a leer una serie de servicios y responsabilidades, y en cada caso, quisiera que me diga quién cree usted que es responsable de prestar estos servicios, si el Gobierno Nacional, el Provincial o el Municipal. Para comenzar ¿Quién es responsable de asegurar o garantizar a los habitantes de ... (MUNICIPIO)... OPCIONES MÚLTIPLES

	Gobierno Nacional	Gobierno Provincial	Gobierno Municipal	No sabe	No responde
1. Salud pública	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
2. Educación pública	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Seguridad	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Administración de Justicia	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Estado de las calles y veredas	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
6. Limpieza urbana	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
7. Iluminación pública	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
8. Jubilaciones y pensiones	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
9. Planes Sociales	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
10. Protección del medio ambiente	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
11. Obras de infraestructura	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
12. Cobro de impuestos	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
13. Relación con otros países o grupos de países	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>

MODULO 3: EVALUACION INSTITUCIONES MUNICIPALES

P34. En términos generales, ¿Cuál es su opinión sobre el funcionamiento de las instituciones municipales aquí en... (MUNICIPIO) ¿Ud. diría que funcionan muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?

P34.2. ¿Y cuál su opinión sobre el desempeño del intendente de ¿Ud. diría que se desempeña muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?

P34.3. ¿Y cuál es su opinión sobre el desempeño de los Concejales de¿Ud. diría que se desempeñan muy bien, bien, ni bien ni mal, mal o muy mal?

	Muy bien	Bien	Ni bien ni mal	Mal	Muy mal	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
P34.1 Instituciones municipales en general	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
P34.2 Intendente	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
P34.3 Concejales	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P35. ¿En los últimos doce meses ha acudido a alguna dependencia municipal para...? **(LEER OPCIONES)**

	Hacer un trámite	Pedir información	Hacer un reclamo	Otro:	No acudió
Sí	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	0 <input type="checkbox"/>
No	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	IR a p43

P36. **(SÓLO A QUIENES HAN ACUDIDO)** Quisiera saber sobre su experiencia en esa(s) visita(s). En términos generales cómo evalúa la atención que recibió?. Diría que fue...

Muy buena	Buena	Ni buena ni mala	Mala	Muy Mala	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P37. Por favor dígame si...**LEER FRASES UNA A UNA Y ESPERAR RESPUESTA**

	Si	No
1. Tuvo que hacer largas filas para ser atendido	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
2. Su turno no fue respetado y atendieron a otras personas antes que a Ud.	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Le hicieron realizar trámites innecesarios	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Le negaron información o le costó mucho obtenerla	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
5. Fueron descorteses e irrespetuosos en el trato	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
6. Se sintió discriminado o humillado	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
7. Le pidieron directa o indirectamente propina o coima	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>

(SI CONTESTO QUE “NO” EN TODAS PASA A P43)

P38. **(SÓLO A LOS QUE LES NEGARON INFORMACIÓN, ITEM 4 EN PREGUNTA ANTERIOR)** ¿Podría decirme sobre qué tema fue usted a buscar información y se la negaron? **(ABIERTA, ESPONTÁNEA Y MÚLTIPLE)**

P39. **(A LOS QUE CONTESTARON “SI” EN ALGUNA DE LOS ITEMS DE P37)** ¿Realizó alguna queja o reclamo?

Si	No	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

IR A P41 Y P42	CONTINUAR – P40	A P43
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P40. (SI NO REALIZÓ UNA QUEJA O RECLAMO) ¿Por qué no hizo ninguna queja o reclamo? (ABIERTA)

P41 (SI REALIZÓ ALGUNA QUEJA O RECLAMO) ¿A quién le presentó la queja o reclamo? (ABIERTA)

P42. (SI REALIZÓ ALGUNA QUEJA O RECLAMO) La respuesta que obtuvo fue...

Muy satisfactoria	Bastante Satisfactoria	Ni satisfactoria ni insatisfactoria	Poco satisfactoria	Nada Satisfactoria	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

A TODOS

P43 ¿Cómo evalúa usted, en general, a los empleados del Municipio de... (MUNICIPIO)? Diría que se desempeñan...

Muy bien	Bien	Ni bien ni mal	Mal	Muy mal	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P44. Por lo que usted sabe o escuchó ¿el Municipio capacita a sus empleados para que puedan desarrollar mejor sus tareas...?

Si	No	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P45 ¿En que medida considera usted que el Municipio de... (MUNICIPIO) contrata a sus empleados en función de la experiencia y/o capacidades que demuestran para realizar las tareas que deben hacer?

Siempre	Casi siempre	Bastantes veces	Pocas veces	Casi nunca	Nunca	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P46 Le parece que en los nombramientos de empleados y funcionarios municipales suelen incidir...

	Siempre	Casi siempre	Algunas veces	Raramente	Nunca	Ns/Nc
1. las relaciones de parentesco	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
2. la influencia política	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
3. la presión de alguna/ s empresa/ s	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. la presión de algún/ os sindicato/s	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>

MODULO 4: ACCESO A LA INFORMACION

P47. En términos generales ¿Cuán satisfecho está con la información que brinda a los ciudadanos el Municipio de... (MUNICIPIO) sobre sus servicios y actos de gobierno? Diría que está...

Muy satisfecho	Bastante satisfecho	Ni satisfecho ni insatisfecho	Poco satisfecho	Nada satisfecho	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P48. También en términos generales. ¿Cómo evaluaría la cantidad de información que brinda el Municipio? Diría que esta información es...

Suficiente – en el sentido que usted NO necesita o no quiere más información	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	→ IR A P50
Insuficiente – usted SI necesita o quiere más información	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	→ CONTINUAR – P49
No sabe	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	→ IR A P50
No responde	9 <input type="checkbox"/>	

P49. **(SÓLO A LOS QUE CONTESTAN INSUFICIENTE)** ¿Sobre qué servicios o actos de gobierno quisiera usted tener más información? **(ABIERTA, ESPONTÁNEA Y MÚLTIPLE)**

A TODOS

P50. Y pensando en la calidad de la información que el Municipio brinda, sea suficiente o insuficiente, diría que es..**LEER OPCIONES**

Información cierta	Falsa	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P51. Y diría que es información...? **LEER OPCIONES**

Completa	Incompleta	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P52. **(SÓLO A LOS QUE CONTESTAN FALSA (Cód. 2 en P50) O INCOMPLETA (cód. 2 en P51))** ¿La información sobre qué servicios o actos de gobierno cree usted que es falsa o incompleta? **(ABIERTA, ESPONTÁNEA Y MÚLTIPLE)**

A TODOS

P53. Ahora le voy a pedir que evalúe la información que recibe del Municipio sobre ciertos temas o áreas muy específicos. Empecemos por el Presupuesto Municipal... ¿la información que brinda el Municipio sobre el presupuesto municipal es, en términos de cantidad, completa o incompleta? Y en términos de calidad, es veraz o falsa?

	Cantidad de información			Calidad información		
	Completa	Incompleta	No sabe	Veraz	Falsa	No sabe
1. Presupuesto municipal	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
2. Compras, contrataciones, licitaciones	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
3. Acceso a información sobre servicios selectivos (vivienda, planes sociales, becas)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
4. Proyectos y obras pasadas/presentes/	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>

futuras(instalaciones, parques, etc.)						
5. Sueldos de los empleados municipales	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
6. Declaraciones juradas patrimoniales de los funcionarios jerárquicos del gobierno	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>

P54. ¿Qué campañas de comunicación y/o información sobre los servicios públicos que brinda recuerda usted que haya realizado el Municipio en los últimos seis meses? **(ABIERTA Y MULTIPLE, ACLARAR TEMA SOBRE EL QUE TRATABA LA CAMPAÑA)**

No recuerda Ninguna	98 <input type="checkbox"/>
Ns/Nc	99 <input type="checkbox"/>

P55. **(SÓLO A LOS QUE RECUERDAN UNA O MÁS CAMPAÑAS)** Esas campañas le resultaron a usted... **LEER OPCIONES**

Muy útiles	Bastante útiles	Poco útiles	Nada útiles	No sabe	No contesta
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

A TODOS

P56 ¿Se informa Ud. sobre la gestión del Gobierno Municipal?

Si →	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Sigue P56b
No →	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Pasa a P 57

P56b. ¿A través de qué medios o canales se informa usted sobre los servicios que brinda el Municipio? **MOSTRAR TARJETA 1**

	Si	No
01 Publicidad del Municipio en los medios de comunicación y en vía pública	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
02 Información en diarios locales	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
03 Información de radios locales	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
04 Información en señales de TV local	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
05 Publicaciones periódicas del Municipio / boletines	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
06 Sitio web del Municipio	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
07 Concorre directamente al Municipio y ahí le informan	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
08 Informalmente por amigos / conocidos que trabajan en el Municipio	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
09 Por lo que observa cotidianamente en su municipio	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
10 Comisiones barriales	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
11 Campañas electorales	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
99 Otro:	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>

P57. ¿Y cuál de todos estos canales o medios cree usted que sería el mejor / el más eficaz para informarse sobre los servicios y actos de gobierno del municipio? **MOSTRAR TARJETA 1**

Publicidad del Municipio en diario / radio / TV / vía pública	01 <input type="checkbox"/>
Información en diarios locales	02 <input type="checkbox"/>
Información de radio locales	03 <input type="checkbox"/>
Información en señales de TV local	04 <input type="checkbox"/>
Publicaciones periódicas del Municipio / boletines	05 <input type="checkbox"/>
Sitio web del Municipio	06 <input type="checkbox"/>
Concurre directamente al Municipio y ahí le informan	07 <input type="checkbox"/>
Informalmente por amigos / conocidos que trabajan en el Municipio	08 <input type="checkbox"/>
Por lo que observa cotidianamente en su municipio	09 <input type="checkbox"/>
Comisiones barriales	10 <input type="checkbox"/>
Campañas electorales	11 <input type="checkbox"/>
Otro:....	99 <input type="checkbox"/>

MODULO 5: RENDICION DE CUENTAS

A TODOS. ENTREGAR TARJETA 2 Y LEER: Algunas personas sostienen que “Los funcionarios del gobierno municipal deben informarle periódicamente a la gente sobre qué temas estuvieron trabajando y qué hicieron por la comunidad. De esta manera la gente común puede controlar lo que hacen los funcionarios y exigirles que hagan bien o mejor su trabajo. A esto le llaman ‘rendición de cuentas’”.

P58. En su municipio ¿cree que se informa a la gente lo suficiente sobre lo que hacen los funcionarios del gobierno municipal?

Sí	No	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P59. Usted personalmente ¿quiere o necesita estar informado sobre lo que hacen los funcionarios del gobierno municipal?

Sí	No	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P60. Y en qué medida considera que tener esta información le permitirá a usted controlar que los funcionarios hagan bien o mejor su trabajo. Diría que lo ayudaría...

Mucho	Bastante	Poco	Nada	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P61. ¿Cuán importante diría que les resulta a los funcionarios la evaluación que gente como Ud. pueda hacer sobre su desempeño laboral? Les importa...

Mucho	bastante	Poco	Nada	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P62. ¿Cuán eficaz es su voto para lograr que los funcionarios rindan cuentas de sus decisiones y actos de gobierno a la gente como usted? Diría que su voto es una herramienta...

Muy eficaz	Bastante eficaz	Poco eficaz	Nada eficaz	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P63. ¿Conoce usted de qué otras maneras puede exigirle a los funcionarios del gobierno municipal que le informen sobre sus actos y decisiones de gobierno?

Si	No	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

IR A P64	IR A68
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P64. **(SI CONTESTA AFIRMATIVAMENTE)** ¿Qué otras formas o procedimientos para exigir la rendición de cuentas conoce usted? **(ABIERTA)**

P65. ¿Utiliza Ud. estas formas de rendición de cuentas?

Si	No	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
IR A P66	IR A 67	IR A P68	

66. ¿Con qué frecuencia las utiliza?

Casi siempre	Frecuentemente	A veces	Casi nunca	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P67 ¿Por qué no las Utiliza **(ABIERTA)**

P68. **(A TODOS)** Por lo que sabe o escuchó ¿Existe aquí en... **(MUNICIPIO)** alguna organización que se dedique a explicarle a la gente como puede hacer para lograr que los funcionarios del gobierno municipal le informen periódicamente a la gente sobre qué temas estuvieron trabajando y qué hicieron por la comunidad?

Si	No	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P69. **(SI CONTESTA AFIRMATIVAMENTE)** ¿Cuál o cuáles conoce? **(ABIERTA – REGISTRAR DOS RESPUESTAS)**

MODULO 6: PERCEPCION DE CLIENTELISMO Y CORRUPCION

P70. ¿Con qué frecuencia Ud. cree que la gente de **(MUNICIPIO)** cuando solicita algo a las autoridades municipales (servicios, subsidios, participación en planes sociales, etc.), tiene que hacer algo a cambio para lograr respuesta?

Siempre	Casi siempre	Bastantes veces	Pocas veces	Casi nunca	Nunca	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P71. ¿Usted ha sabido de casos o situaciones en las que algunas personas que usted conozca personalmente tuvieron que hacer algo a cambio para obtener lo que necesitaban?

Si	No	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P72. ¿Y a usted personalmente le sucedió que algún funcionario municipal le solicitara realizar alguna tarea especial para así obtener lo que usted necesitaba?

Si	No	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P73. Cuando Ud. piensa en la palabra "corrupción" ¿con qué la asocia? **NO LEER, RESPUESTA ESPONTÁNEA, PRECODIFICADA Y MÚLTIPLE**

Cuestiones económicas	Cuestiones políticas	Tráfico de influencias	Intercambio de favores	Comportamientos mafiosos	Otros:	Ns-Nc
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	99 <input type="checkbox"/>

P74. Pensando en los servicios que brinda el Municipio, podría decirme con qué frecuencia ud. piensa que los ciudadanos tienen que hacer algunos "pagos irregulares" para lograr las cosas que necesitan?

Siempre	Casi siempre	Bastantes veces	Pocas veces	Casi nunca	Nunca	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P75. Ahora algunas preguntas sobre los posibles contactos que haya tenido usted con funcionarios de gobierno municipal: **MOSTRAR TARJETA 3**

Pensando en el último año:	SI	NO	No responde
a. ¿Ha sido testigo del pago de un soborno/ coima a funcionario municipal?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
b. ¿Le han pedido que pague un soborno / coima a un funcionario público?	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>

P76. **A LOS QUE CONTESTAN QUE SI** ¿Hizo la denuncia correspondiente?

a. SI	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Ante quién hizo la denuncia?
b. NO	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Por qué no la hizo?

A TODOS

P77. ¿Cuánta corrupción diría usted que hay en el Gobierno Municipal? Por favor, para contestarme utilice esta escala de 7 puntos. Si usted considera que el Gobierno Municipal aquí en... (**MUNICIPIO**) "es un gobierno corrupto" dígame 1, si usted considera que el Gobierno Municipal aquí en... (**MUNICIPIO**) "NO es un gobierno corrupto" dígame 7. Los números 2 a 6 puede utilizarlos para indicar una posición intermedia que se acerque a alguno de los extremos.

1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
Es un gobierno corrupto	2	3	4	5	6	No es un gobierno corrupto

P78. **A LOS QUE CONTESTAN 1, 2 o 3 EN P77** ¿En qué áreas de gobierno Usted cree que se llevan a cabo prácticas corruptas? (**ABIERTA Y MULTIPLE**)

MODULO 7: PARTICIPACION CIUDADANA

P80. ¿Cuánto interés tiene en reunirse con otras personas que no sean de su familia o amigos más cercanos para buscar soluciones a los problemas de su comunidad ? Ud. diría que está...

Muy interesado	Bastante interesado	Poco interesado	Nada interesado	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P81. En términos generales con cuál de estas frases está Ud. más de acuerdo:

La participación de personas como Ud. pueden servir para cambiar las cosas	La participación de personas como Ud. es una pérdida de tiempo porque las cosas se deciden habitualmente en otro lado	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P82. ¿Conoce qué mecanismos o espacios de participación el Municipio de pone a disposición de los ciudadanos?

Si →	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	82a. ¿Qué mecanismos conoce? (ESPONTÁNEA) → IR A P84 → IR A P84	
No →	2 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Ns/Nc →	9 <input type="checkbox"/>		

P83. **PARA LOS QUE CONTESTAN QUE SI** ¿Ud. cree que son útiles?

Si →	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	83a. ¿ Por qué cree que esos mecanismos son útiles? (ESPONTÁNEA)	
No →	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	83a. ¿ Por qué cree que esos mecanismos no son útiles? (ESPONTÁNEA)	
Ns/Nc	9 <input type="checkbox"/>		

P84. ¿Ud. cree que las opiniones, sugerencias y proyectos presentados a través de los espacios y mecanismos de participación ciudadana inciden efectivamente en la gestión del gobierno municipal?

SI	NO	NS/NC
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P85. ¿Participa usted actualmente en alguna de las siguientes organizaciones? (**MOSTRAR TARJETA 4**) y consignar si participa / no participa

	Participa	No participa
01. Sindicato	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
02. Partido político	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
03. Junta de vecinos	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
04. Cooperadora escolar	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
05. Club de barrio	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
06. Club de interés (hobbies, pasatiempos)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
07. Cooperativas	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
08. Grupo de auto-ayuda	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
09. Organización ecologista	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
10. Grupo de jóvenes	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
11. Club deportivo	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
12. Centro de estudiantes	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
13. Organización religiosa	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
14. Organizaciones de ayuda voluntaria	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
15. Otra (especificar)	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>

P86. **SOLO SI NO PARTICIPA EN NINGUNA ORGANIZACIÓN** De las siguientes razones que puede leer en esta tarjeta (**MOSTRAR TARJETA 5**) ¿Cuál diría usted que es la principal razón por la cual no participa en ninguna organización? ¿Y en segundo lugar? (**UNA SOLA RESPUESTA POR COLUMNA**)

	1ERO	2DO
01 Prefiero dedicar el tiempo a mi familia y amigos	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
02 Aunque me interesa, no tengo tiempo libre para dedicarle	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
03 No encuentro la organización o grupo que me interesa o me sirva	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
04 No sé que beneficio obtendría de participar	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
05 No tengo la seguridad de que mi esfuerzo valga la pena	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
97 Otra (especificar)	6 <input type="checkbox"/>	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
98 No sabe	7 <input type="checkbox"/>	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
99 No responde	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>

P87. **SOLO SI PARTICIPA EN ALGUNA ORGANIZACIÓN (SI EN CUALQUIERA DE LOS CASOS DE P85)** ¿Y cuán útil le parece a usted participar en alguna organización como las que le acabo de mencionar o parecida? Diría que es...

Muy útil	Bastante útil	Poco útil	Nada útil	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No contesta
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

(PREGUNTAS P88 Y P89 SOLO A LOS QUE PARTICIPAN EN PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS)

P88. ¿Alguna vez participó de algún partido político?

Sí	No	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P89. En términos generales usted diría que no participa en un partido político porque... (**LEER LAS OPCIONES Y MARCAR SÓLO UNA**)

No le interesa	Le interesa pero no tiene tiempo	Le interesa pero no encontró el partido que le gusta	Le interesa pero no tiene confianza en los partidos ni en los políticos	Otra (ESPONTÁNEA)	NO LEER No sabe	NO LEER No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	5 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

A TODOS

P90. Teniendo en cuenta su edad y las elecciones en las que pudo haber participado, usted diría que...

Votó en todas las elecciones	Votó en la mayoría	Votó sólo en algunas	No votó en ninguna elección	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>	4 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

MODULO 8 - CONOCIMIENTO DE DATOS ESPECIFICOS DEL MUNICIPIO

P91. Para terminar, querría preguntarle algunos datos sobre su municipio. ¿Podría Usted indicarme aproximadamente, según su conocimiento, cuántos habitantes hay en este municipio? (**ANOTAR CIFRA QUE DIGA EL ENTREVISTADO**)

CIFRA MENCIONADA POR EL ENTREVISTADO	No sabe	No responde
	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

P92. ¿Conoce Ud. aproximadamente, cuál es el presupuesto anual de su municipio, esto es, de cuanto dinero por año dispone actualmente la municipalidad para llevar a cabo sus tareas? (**ANOTAR CIFRA QUE DIGA EL ENTREVISTADO**)

CIFRA MENCIONADA POR EL ENTREVISTADO	No sabe	No responde
	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>
	IR P94	IR A P94

P93. **(SOLO A LOS QUE HAYAN DICHO UNA CIFRA)** ¿Y en su opinión, esta cantidad de dinero es suficiente o insuficiente para llevar a cabo todas las tareas que son necesarias para el buen funcionamiento de este municipio?

Es suficiente	Es insuficiente	No sabe	No responde
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	8 <input type="checkbox"/>	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

A TODOS

P94. ¿Podría decirme los nombres de los principales funcionarios del Gobierno local que usted recuerde? **(ABIERTA Y MULTIPLE – REGISTRAR TODAS LAS RESPUESTAS)**

P95. ¿Podría decirme cuáles son los partidos políticos que tienen representación en el Concejo Deliberante de esta Ciudad? **(ABIERTA Y MULTIPLE – REGISTRAR TODAS LAS RESPUESTAS)**

SECCION DE DATOS SOCIODEMOGRAFICOS (TODOS LOS ENTREVISTADOS)

S. Sexo	Masculino	Femenino
	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>

A. Necesitaría que me indique si el PSH (Principal Sostén del Hogar), la persona que más aporta para el sostén de este hogar, vive en esta casa.

Si	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	→ Referir todas las preguntas para determinar NSE al PSH
No	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	→ IR A B

B. ¿Podría decirme quién es el Jefe de este hogar? **(Una vez identificado el Jefe, referir todas las preguntas para determinar NSE al Jefe)**

EDUCACIÓN DEL PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar)	N1. ¿Cuál es el máximo nivel alcanzado por el PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar)?
Hasta Primario incompleto	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
Primario completo	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
Secundario incompleto	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Secundario completo	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
Terciario incompleto	5 <input type="checkbox"/>
Terciario completo	6 <input type="checkbox"/>
Universitario incompleto	7 <input type="checkbox"/>
Universitario completo	8 <input type="checkbox"/>
Postgrado	9 <input type="checkbox"/>

CONDICIÓN DE OCUPACIÓN DEL PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar)	N2. Necesitaría que me indique si el PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) actualmente: trabaja, es jubilado/a o pensionado/a, está desocupado/a o es inactivo/a
---	---

Trabaja	1 <input type="checkbox"/>
Jubilado / pensionado	2 <input type="checkbox"/>
Desocupado	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Ama de casa	4 <input type="checkbox"/>
Estudiante	5 <input type="checkbox"/>

Si PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) es: Jubilado/ Pensionado (cod. 2), desocupado (cod. 3), o inactivo (cod. 4 o 5) no hacer bloque de preguntas 3.

**CARACTERÍSTICAS OCUPACIONALES DEL PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar)
SOLO PARA PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) QUE TRABAJA**

N3. ¿El PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) tiene una ocupación o más de una? (SI MÁS DE UNA REFERIRSE A OCUPACIÓN QUE MÁS INGRESOS LE GENERA)

Una ocupación 1
 Más de una ocupación 2

N3a. ¿El PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) trabaja en relación de dependencia o por cuenta propia?

En relación de dependencia	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuántas personas tiene a cargo? →	
Por cuenta propia	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Cuántos empleados tiene? →	

N3.b Por favor, ¿me podría describir con máximo detalle la ocupación del PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar)? ¿Podría describirme cuál es su tarea? ¿Cuál es su cargo?

Puntaje	Nivel ocupacional
32 <input type="checkbox"/>	Dueño, Socio Empresas de más de 50 empleados-Alta Dirección
28 <input type="checkbox"/>	Dueño, Socio Empresas de 6 a 50 empleados-Alta Gerencia
22 <input type="checkbox"/>	Dueño, Socio Empresas de 1 a 5 empleados-Gerencia
16 <input type="checkbox"/>	Profesionales independientes sin empleados a cargo- Jefes intermedios
12 <input type="checkbox"/>	Técnicos Independientes-Técnicos en relación de dependencia
10 <input type="checkbox"/>	Comerciantes sin personal, Artesanos-Empleados especializados, supervisores, capataces
7 <input type="checkbox"/>	Autónomos especializados- Empleados sin jerarquía
6 <input type="checkbox"/>	Obreros calificados
4 <input type="checkbox"/>	Autónomo no calificado- Personal no calificado
2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Ocupación informal
4 <input type="checkbox"/>	Pasivos- Inactivos
2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Desocupados

APORTANTES AL INGRESO TOTAL DEL HOGAR

N4. Sin contar al PSH, ¿cuántas personas de las que viven en este hogar aportan dinero para afrontar los gastos de esta casa (ya sea a través de sueldos, honorarios, tickets, subsidios, jubilaciones, pensiones, ayudas de familiares que no viven en la casa, changas, rentas o cualquier otra forma de ingreso)?

(POR PROCESAMIENTO SE SUMA SIEMPRE 1 MÁS A LOS APORTANTES INFORMADOS POR EL ENTREVISTADO)

TANTES AL

TIPO DE COBERTURA DE SALUD DE QUE DISPONE EL HOGAR			
N5 ¿El PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) o el cónyuge/ pareja tiene alguna cobertura médica, ya sea obra social, medicina prepaga o plan de salud?		N5a SI RESPONDE NO TIENE NINGUNA COBERTURA 5a. ¿Se atienden mayoritariamente en hospital público o a través de consultas particulares?	
Tiene cobertura medica	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Hospital público	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Ninguna cobertura médica	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	Consulta/Atención particular	4 <input type="checkbox"/>

POSESIÓN/ USO DE BIENES Y SERVICIOS			
N6 ¿Poseen en su casa?		N6a ¿El PSH (Jefe si PSH no vive en el hogar) o el cónyuge/ pareja tiene, ya sea como titular, cotitular o adicional...	
Computadora personal	1 <input type="checkbox"/>	Tarjeta de débito bancaria	3 <input type="checkbox"/>
Conexión a Internet (gratis o paga)	2 <input type="checkbox"/>		

POSESIÓN DE AUTOMOTOR		
N7 ¿Poseen en su casa algún auto o utilitario para uso familiar, modelo 87 en adelante?		
No posee	Posee 1	Posee 2 o más
1 <input type="checkbox"/>	2 <input type="checkbox"/>	3 <input type="checkbox"/>

PUNTAJE DE NES						
Alto 1	Alto 2	Medio alto	Medio Típico	Bajo superior	Bajo Inferior	Marginal
De 57 a 100 puntos	De 48 a 56 puntos	De 37 a 47 puntos	De 29 a 36 puntos	De 17 a 28 puntos	De 12 a 16 puntos	De 0 a 11 puntos
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

GRACIAS POR SU TIEMPO- LA ENTREVISTA HA FINALIZADO

RESUMEN DE EDICION

CODIGO RESPONSABLE DE EDICION:

FECHA DE EDICION :

CODIGO DE ENCUESTADOR :

ERRORES DE EDICION

	Cantidad	Detalle
DATOS FALTANTES :		
PROBLEMAS DE PASES:		
ERRORES DE INTERPRETACIÓN:		
ERRORES CRITICOS:		
FORMULARIOS EN TINTA ROJA / VERDE / LAPIZ:		
CUESTIONARIO FOTOCOPIADO:		

ERRORES DE EDICION PARA ESCANEO

	Cantidad	Detalle
CALIGRAFIA :		
FORMULARIOS TACHADOS :		
FORMULARIOS SIN NUMERO:		
CODIGO DE ENCUESTADOR FALTANTE :		
PROBLEMAS DE PASES:		

ERRORES DE INTERPRETACIÓN:		
EDICION INCOMPLETA :		
FORMULARIOS EN TINTA ROJA / VERDE / LAPIZ:		
AJUSTES MARCADOS/ TACHADOS/ ESCRITOS CERCANOS:		
HACE LAS X PEQUEÑAS / CONFUSA		
HACE LAS X FUERA DEL CUADRADITO		

Appendix A7: Probabilities of Hierarchical Model for Dichotomous Participation in Political

Parties

Variable	Probability
Intercept	0.175
Individual-Level	
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>	
Education	0.534
Age Cohort	0.547
Female	0.413
Socioeconomic Level	0.490
<i>Governance Indicators</i>	
Evaluation of Municipal Employees	0.501
Performance of Municipal Institutions	0.499
Municipal Bribe	0.694
Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality	n.s.*
Quality of National Politics and Institutions need Improvement	0.501
<i>Support for Political Parties</i>	
Support for Political Parties	0.557
Country-Level	
<i>Means as Outcomes</i>	
Human Development Proxy (2001)	0.492
Municipal Population (Thousands)	0.500
Organic charter	n.s.
Municipal Tax	n.s.
Municipal Expenditure Ratio	0.424

*n.s.: Not significant $p > 0.1$

Appendix A8: Largest Possible Effects of Voter Turnout Coefficients

Variable	Largest Possible Effect
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>	
Education	8.816
Age Cohort	19.31
Female	1.722
Socioeconomic Level	3.984
<i>Governance Indicators</i>	
Evaluation of Municipal Employees	n.s.*
Performance of Municipal Institutions	2.3
Municipal Bribe	n.s.
Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality	n.s.
Quality of National Politics and Institutions need Improvement	3.8
<i>Support for Political Parties</i>	
Support for Political Parties	2.521
Country-Level	
<i>Means as Outcomes</i>	
Human Development Proxy (2001)	n.s.
Municipal Population (Thousands)	n.s.
Organic charter	-4.357
Municipal Tax	n.s.
Municipal Expenditure Ratio	n.s.

*n.s.: Not significant $p > 0.1$

Appendix A9: Probabilities of Hierarchical Model for Dichotomous Dealings at Municipality

Variable	Probability
Intercept	0.342
Individual-Level	
<i>Socioeconomics and Demographics</i>	
Education	0.531
Age Cohort	0.515
Female	n.s.*
Socioeconomic Level	0.519
<i>Governance Indicators</i>	
Evaluation of Municipal Employees	0.502
Performance of Municipal Institutions	n.s.
Municipal Bribe	0.605
Satisfaction with Democracy at Municipality	n.s.
Quality of National Politics and Institutions need Improvement	0.501
<i>Support for Political Parties</i>	
Support for Political Parties	n.s.
Country-Level	
<i>Means as Outcomes</i>	
Human Development Proxy (2001)	n.s.
Municipal Population (Thousands)	n.s.
Organic charter	n.s.
Municipal Tax	0.578
Municipal Expenditure Ratio	n.s.

*n.s.: Not significant $p > 0.1$

Appendix A10: Master Questionnaire for Semi-Structured Interviews

ON POLITICAL RIGHTS:

1. In general terms, could you please tell me what is your opinion about the elections for mayor and councilmen at this municipality?
2. What is your opinion about the electoral legislation that rules the elections at this municipality?
3. What do you think about the opportunities the opposition has at this municipality to exercise public office?
4. How do you evaluate the exercise of citizen voting in your municipality?
5. To what extent do you think that cultural, ethnic, religious or other minority groups enjoy of political rights and electoral opportunities?
6. Do you think that municipal employees are accountable and work with openness and transparency?

ON CIVIL LIBERTIES:

7. What is your opinion about the freedom of press at this municipality?
8. What is your opinion about the academic freedom of this municipality?
9. To what extent there is freedom of association, demonstration and open public discussions at this municipality?
10. What do you think about the existing mechanisms at this municipality to form labor unions, peasant and professional organizations?
11. To what extent do you think that there is equal opportunity at this municipality?

ON LOCAL POLITICAL ELITES:

12. Who do you think are the most important individuals in the decision-making process at this municipality?

GENERAL INFORMATION:

13. What is your current position at your job?
14. How long have you been living in this municipality?
15. Which political party do you identify with?

Appendix A11: Results from Multilevel Regressions for Democratic Governance

The outcome variable is Municipal Performance Perception Index

Fixed Effect	Coefficient	Standard Error	T-ratio	Approx. d.f.	P-value
LEVEL-1					
SEX, G10	-0.320552	0.341339	-0.939	13868	0.348
AGE, G20	0.977378	0.116885	8.362	13868	0.000
EDUCATION, G30	0.136597	0.125676	1.087	13868	0.278
WEALTH, G40	0.472917	0.121796	3.883	13868	0.000
LEVEL-2					
INTERCEPT, G00	56.867432	2.336491	24.339	25	0.000
ORGANIC CHAR, G01	-1.981030	3.693769	-0.536	25	0.596
ADM.DECENTR., G02	-0.065422	2.431276	-0.027	25	0.979
REFERENDUM, G03	-7.079049	2.043331	-3.464	25	0.002
PLEBISCITE, G04	1.801912	2.971314	0.606	25	0.549
AUDIENCE, G05	-3.845110	2.191947	-1.754	25	0.091
INITIATIVE, G06	2.828380	2.394793	1.181	25	0.249
RECALL, G07	6.069670	2.841943	2.136	25	0.042
REGISTRIES, G08	-0.560430	2.252949	-0.249	25	0.806
EVALUATION, G09	-3.263254	2.405563	-1.357	25	0.187
INFORMATION, G01	1.359561	1.040236	1.307	25	0.203

Final estimation of variance components:

Random Effect		Standard Deviation	Variance Component	df	Chi-square	P-value
INTRCPT1, level-1,	U0 R	6.46946 15.50331	41.85390 240.35256	25	1708.51805	0.000

The outcome variable is Administrative Efficacy Index

Fixed Effect	Coefficient	Standard Error	T-ratio	Approx. d.f.	P-value
LEVEL-1					
SEX, G10	-0.022193	0.005973	-3.716	6778	0.000
AGE, G20	0.021859	0.002853	7.662	6778	0.000
EDUCATION, G30	-0.000628	0.002073	-0.303	6778	0.762
WEALTH, G40	0.010245	0.002194	4.669	6778	0.000
LEVEL-2					
INTERCEPT, G00	0.852500	0.013063	65.261	25	0.000
ORGANIC CHAR, G01	-0.044041	0.032554	-1.353	25	0.188
ADM.DECENTR., G02	-0.022964	0.017398	-1.320	25	0.199
REFERENDUM, G03	-0.007103	0.022270	-0.319	25	0.752
PLEBISCITE, G04	0.013932	0.020908	0.666	25	0.511
AUDIENCE, G05	-0.047425	0.018147	-2.613	25	0.015
INITIATIVE, G06	0.020845	0.017391	1.199	25	0.242
RECALL, G07	0.013017	0.026336	0.494	25	0.625
REGISTRIES, G08	0.023794	0.015634	1.522	25	0.140
EVALUATION, G09	-0.037666	0.016745	-2.249	25	0.033
INFORMATION, G010	0.007911	0.006103	1.296	25	0.207

Final estimation of variance components:

Random Effect		Standard Deviation	Variance Component	df	Chi-square	P-value
INTRCPT1, level-1,	U0 R	0.04173 0.23393	0.00174 0.05473	25	156.18907	0.000

The outcome variable is Municipality is Free From Corruption

Fixed Effect	Coefficient	Standard Error	T-ratio	Approx. d.f.	P-value
LEVEL-1					
SEX, G10	-0.201659	0.439228	-0.459	14067	0.646
AGE, G20	3.143472	0.261320	12.029	14067	0.000
EDUCATION, G30	-0.084746	0.163030	-0.520	14067	0.603
WEALTH, G40	0.045435	0.160747	0.283	14067	0.777
LEVEL-2					
INTERCEPT, G00	60.342179	2.500739	24.130	25	0.000
ORGANIC CHAR, G01	-3.939874	3.784942	-1.041	25	0.308
ADM.DECENTR., G02	7.205661	4.814746	1.497	25	0.147
REFERENDUM, G03	-5.543834	4.403124	-1.259	25	0.22
PLEBISCITE, G04	5.032031	4.126050	1.220	25	0.234
AUDIENCE, G05	-6.222382	2.669673	-2.331	25	0.028
INITIATIVE, G06	5.971850	3.504368	1.704	25	0.100
RECALL, G07	8.222236	4.824667	1.704	25	0.100
REGISTRIES, G08	1.833771	2.498626	0.734	25	0.470
EVALUATION, G09	-7.530768	3.017825	-2.495	25	0.020
INFORMATION, G010	2.971151	1.412140	2.104	25	0.045

Final estimation of variance components:

Random Effect		Standard Deviation	Variance Component	df	Chi-square	P-value
INTRCPT1, level-1,	U0 R	8.56321 23.89665	73.32860 571.04969	25	1282.13597	0.000

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