The phenomenon of meaning and Heidegger’s ontology

Abstract

PHILOSOPHY THE PHENOMENON OF MEANING AND HEIDEGGER’S ONTOLOGY DAVID G. FRAHM Thesis under the direction of Professor Michael Hodges The thesis is presented that the “ontological meaning” of an individual thing (a being) is how its nature fits within its specific existential context(s). Martin Heidegger’s conception of meaning is examined (as well as several commentators on his conception), deficiencies are noted, and a new analysis of the phenomenon of meaning yields a fuller, more complex conception. That complex consists of six structural components (nature, vector, context, other things, humans, temporality) plus follow-on considerations (significance, the creation, and experience, of meaning). Further, this fuller conception of meaning—or more accurately, meaningful thing, being—in turn illuminates both the conception of the “Being” of beings (e.g., hammers, jugs, human beings, artworks) and the “meaning of Being” in general, two main concerns of Heidegger’s ontology. It is argued that the Being of a being is how it exists, how it uniquely fits within its existential contexts, and ultimately suggested that the meaning of Being in general may be identity through time.