Location, Location, Location: How Policy and Geostrategic Position Influence State Interactions

Abstract

Through a combination of formal models and multiple regression analysis, this dissertation demonstrates how relative policy or geostrategic positioning between multiple parties influence how and whether leaders or states reach or fail to reach agreements. Chapter 1 employs a formal game model and describes how invading powers may adopt seemingly inefficient near-term government replacement policies if the anticipated long-term costs of a reformed government are deemed higher. Chapter 2 presents a stylized hold-up model to show how large and small states’ militaries may exploit one another depending on a large state’s value for a certain unique strategic resource, a small state’s access to multiple sponsors (customers), or the shared strategic interest between the two states. Chapter 3 employs multiple regression analysis to explore how multinational military exercise sponsor states leverage training events to build interoperability or screen potential allies based on regional security status. Collectively, the theoretical arguments and supporting case studies indicate that cooperation relies on options available to all participants, state positions relative to one another, and the degree to which bargains lead to desired strategic outcomes.