dc.contributor.author | Rose, Amanda M. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-06-15T21:07:25Z | |
dc.date.available | 2018-06-15T21:07:25Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review PeNNumbra 87 (2011) | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/8889 | |
dc.description | article published in a law review | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | This is a response to William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011). Bratton and Wachter argue that fraud-on-the-market class actions (FOTM) should be eliminated and replaced with stepped-up public enforcement efforts targeted at individual wrongdoers (rather than the corporate enterprise, the FOTM target of choice). In this Response, I do not disagree: My own scholarship has similarly emphasized the benefits of shifting away from FOTM to greater reliance on public enforcement mechanisms. Instead, I take the opportunity to elaborate on the deterrence and corporate governance shortcomings of FOTM, strengthening further the case Bratton and Wachter make for an enhanced public enforcement role. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1 PDF (12 pages) | en_US |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | University of Pennsylvania Law Review | en_US |
dc.subject | securities fraud | en_US |
dc.subject | corporate governance | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Commercial law | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Law | en_US |
dc.title | Fraud on the Market: An Action Without a Cause | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
dc.identifier.ssrn-uri | https://ssrn.com/abstract=1962065 | |