Law, Statistics, and the Reference Class Problem
dc.contributor.author | Cheng, Edward K. | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-06-01T19:32:34Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-06-01T19:32:34Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | |
dc.identifier.citation | 109 Columbia Law Review Sidebar 92 (2009) | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/1803/7057 | |
dc.description | article published in law review | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | Statistical data are powerful, if not crucial, pieces of evidence in the courtroom. Whether one is trying to demonstrate the rarity of a DNA profile, estimate the value of damaged property, or determine the likelihood that a criminal defendant will recidivate, statistics often have an important role to play. Statistics, however, raise a number of serious challenges for the legal system, including concerns that they are difficult to understand, are given too much deference from juries, or are easily manipulated by the parties' experts. In this preview piece, I address one of these challenges, known as the "reference class problem," and sketch a solution that I develop at greater length in my forthcoming Essay. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 1 PDF (7 pages) | en_US |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.language.iso | en_US | en_US |
dc.publisher | Columbia Law Review | en_US |
dc.subject | Statistical evidence | en_US |
dc.subject | Reference class problem | en_US |
dc.subject | Probability | en_US |
dc.subject | Model selection | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Evidence (Law) -- Statistical methods | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Evidence, Expert | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Probabilities | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Forensic statistics | en_US |
dc.title | Law, Statistics, and the Reference Class Problem | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
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