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An Originalist Understanding of Minimalism

dc.contributor.authorSherry, Suzanna
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-16T21:27:21Z
dc.date.available2014-05-16T21:27:21Z
dc.date.issued1993
dc.identifier.citation88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 175 (1993)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/6367
dc.descriptionarticle published in law reviewen_US
dc.description.abstractThe main burden of Professor Perry's paper is to demonstrate that an originalist may, but need not, be a minimalist. In the course of this project, Perry reiterates his earlier arguments in favor of originalism. He also tentatively endorses minimalism as a background presumption, suggesting that non-minimalist or aggressive judicial review must be affirmatively justified and should be limited to questions that are "vulnerable to majority sentiment."1 His primary argument in favor of minimalism is a democratic or majoritarian one: as between historically plausible interpretations of the written Constitution, the people and their elected representatives, rather than the unelected judiciary, ought to prevail on policy questions.en_US
dc.format.extent1 PDF (9 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherNorthwestern University Law Reviewen_US
dc.subject.lcshConstitutional law -- United States -- Philosophyen_US
dc.titleAn Originalist Understanding of Minimalismen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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