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The Structure of Expertise in Criminal Cases

dc.contributor.authorSlobogin, Christopher, 1951-
dc.identifier.citation34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 105 (2003-2004)en_US
dc.description.abstractThis essay, part of a two-issue symposium on the implications of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and its progeny, is built around three propositions about expert testimony and criminal cases. First, the "Daubert trilogy's" focus on verifiability as the threshold for expert testimony pushes the criminal justice system away from the notion that knowledge is socially constructed and toward a positivist epistemology that assumes we can know things objectively. Second, in the long run, that development will be good for prosecutors and bad for criminal defendants, given the different types of expertise on which they rely. Third, the consequence of this differential impact will be a criminal justice system that is not only less fair, but also less reliable.en_US
dc.format.extent1 document (23 pages)en_US
dc.publisherSeton Hall Law Reviewen_US
dc.subject.lcshEvidence, Expert -- United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshCriminal justice, Administration of -- United Statesen_US
dc.titleThe Structure of Expertise in Criminal Casesen_US

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