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Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Us

dc.contributor.authorBlair, Margaret M., 1950-
dc.date.accessioned2013-11-26T20:42:53Z
dc.date.available2013-11-26T20:42:53Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.citation1 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 1 (2004)en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/1803/5736
dc.description.abstractIn this Article, I turn to the history of corporate law for insight into the role that the corporate form plays in the organization of business enterprises. I then draw implications from this history for thinking about circumstances and situations in which corporate directors should have unimpeded control over business decisions, versus situations in which shareholders should have more input and control over business decisions. In Part I, I review historical evidence of the rapid growth in demand for the corporate form to organize businesses in the United States during the early nineteenth century. I compare the law that governed corporations at that time to the law that governed partnerships and socalled "joint-stock" companies. This comparison, together with anecdotal evidence from the period, suggests that businesspeople found the corporate form to be a superior mechanism for organizing certain businesses largely because it allowed the entrepreneurs and managers to "lock in" the capital invested in the enterprise, thereby making it possible to invest in long-lived, highly specific assets.en_US
dc.format.extent1 document (45 pages)en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherBerkeley Business Law Journalen_US
dc.subject.lcshCorporate governance -- United Statesen_US
dc.subject.lcshCorporate governance -- Law and legislation -- United Statesen_US
dc.titleReforming Corporate Governance: What History Can Teach Usen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
dc.identifier.ssrn-urihttp://ssrn.com/abstract=485663


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