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The "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice

dc.contributor.authorGuthrie, Chris
dc.contributor.authorRachlinski, Jeffrey John
dc.contributor.authorWistrich, Andrew J.
dc.identifier.citation58 Duke L.J. 1477 (2008-2009)en_US
dc.description.abstractAdministrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we demonstrate that these executive branch judges, like their counterparts in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing these important judicial officers.en_US
dc.format.extent1 document (55 pages)en_US
dc.publisherDuke Law Journalen_US
dc.subjectAdministrative law judgesen_US
dc.subject.lcshExaminers (Administrative procedure) -- Psychologyen_US
dc.subject.lcshJudicial process -- United Statesen_US
dc.titleThe "Hidden Judiciary": An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justiceen_US

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