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An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?
(Washington & Lee Law Review, 2006)
In this paper, we examine the key legal characteristics of 375 employment contracts between some of the largest 1500 public corporations and their Chief Executive Officers. We look at the actual language of these contracts, ...
Say on Pay Around the World
(Washington University Law Review, 2015)
Shareholders have long complained that top executives are overpaid by corporate directors irrespective of their performance. Largely powerless to stop these practices, in 2002, they prevailed upon the U.K. Parliament to ...
Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions
(Columbia Law Review, 2006)
The PSLRA's lead plaintiff provision was adopted in order to encourage large shareholders with claims in a securities fraud class action to step forward to become the class' representative. Congress' expectation was that ...
Should Labor be Allowed to Make Shareholder Proposals?
(Washington Law Review, 1998)
In this Article, we investigate whether labor unions and related entities should be permitted to continue to make shareholder proposals using Rule 14a-8 of the federal securities laws. We focus on the claim that labor is ...
Public Pension Funds as Shareholder Activists: A Comment on Choi and Fisch
(Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc, 2008)
In an important paper recently appearing in the Vanderbilt Law Review, Professors Stephen Choi and Jill Fisch generate survey evidence from public pension fund respondents that documents the low cost activism practiced by ...
ISS Recommendations and Mutual Fund Voting on Proxy Proposals
(Villanova Law Review, 2010)
This article analyzes mutual fund voting data from 2003-2008, the first
five proxy seasons for which this data is available, and seeks to identify
the extent to which mutual funds vote consistently with the voting ...
Lying and Getting Caught: An Empirical Study of the Effect of Securities Class Action Settlements on Targeted Firms
(University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2010)
The ongoing Great Recession has triggered numerous proposals to improve the regulation of financial markets and, most importantly, the regulation of organizations such as credit rating agencies, underwriters, hedge funds, ...
Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations
(Northwestern University Law Review, 2000)
Most commentators decry forum shopping. This general hostility extends to forum shopping by firms filing for bankruptcy. Indeed, Congress is considering legislation designed to reduce forum shopping by companies filing for ...
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions
(Michigan Law Review, 1998)
This paper investigates the increased shareholder activism by labor unions and their pension funds, who are now the most aggressive institutional shareholders. Sometimes unions propose traditional corporate-governance ...
The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation
(University of Cincinnati Law Review, 1999)
During the last decade, the stratospheric increases in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay levels have made executive compensation a popular target for shareholder activism, particularly when high pay is accompanied by poor ...