Now showing items 1-5 of 5
The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation
(University of Cincinnati Law Review, 1999)
During the last decade, the stratospheric increases in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay levels have made executive compensation a popular target for shareholder activism, particularly when high pay is accompanied by poor ...
Explaining The International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture Or Market Driven?
(Vanderbilt Law Review, 2004)
If we look at convergence through the lens of the Risk Adjustment Theory, then international pay convergence will only occur if U.S. and foreign CEOs' firm-specific risk levels converge. Empirically, this is a difficult ...
Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?
(Hastings Law Journal, 2003)
This paper examines internal pay disparities in American public corporations and argues that wide gaps between the top and bottom of the pay scale can, in certain circumstances, directly and adversely affect firm value, ...
Should New Zealand Adopt Say on Pay?
(New Zealand Business Law Quarterly, 2013)
Around the globe, the latest fashion in corporate governance circles is "Say on Pay," a shareholder vote – sometimes precatory, other times mandatory – on CEO remuneration. Country after country has adopted Say on Pay in ...
The First Year of "Say on Pay" Under Dodd-Frank: An Empirical Analysis and Look Forward
(George Washington Law Review, 2013)
Using voting data from the first year of “say on pay” votes under Dodd-Frank, we look at the patterns of shareholder voting in advisory votes on executive pay. Consistent with the more limited “say on pay” voting before ...