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SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry
(Duke Law Journal, 2003)
This Article examines the overlap between SEC securities enforcement actions and private securities fraud class actions. We begin with an overview of data concerning all SEC enforcement actions from 1997 to 2002. We find ...
Whither the Race? A Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate Reorganizations
(Vanderbilt Law Review, 2001)
Recent empirical work has demonstrated that large, publicly held firms tend to file for bankruptcy in Delaware. In our previous work, we have documented this trend, and argued that it may be efficient for prepackaged ...
Corporate Voting and the Takeover Debate
(Vanderbilt Law Review, 2005)
For many years academics have debated whether it is better to permit hostile acquirers to use tender offers to gain control over unwilling target companies, or to force them to use corporate elections of boards of directors ...
Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements
(Stanford Law Review, 2005)
This article presents the results of an empirical investigation of the frequency with which financial institutions submit claims in settled securities class actions. We combine an empirical study of a large set of settlements ...
What is Corporate Law's Place in Promoting Societal Welfare?: An Essay in Honor of Professor William Klein
(Berkeley Business Law Journal, 2005)
This is a short essay on what should be the fundamental criterion used to evaluate corporate law. I argue that the overall goal of good corporate law should be to assist private parties to create wealth for themselves and ...
Corporate Voting and the Takeover Debate
(Vanderbilt Law Review, 2005)
For many years academics have debated whether it is better to permit hostile acquirers to use tender offers to gain control over unwilling target companies, or to force them to use corporate elections of boards of directors ...
Comparing CEO Employment Contract Provisions: Differences Between Australia and the United States
(Vanderbilt Law Review, 2011)
The results of our comparison of U.S. and Australian contracts offer some interesting contrasts with several earlier studies that compare U.S. and U.K. CEO compensation. In those prior studies, the authors conclude that ...
Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance
(University of Chicago Law Review, 2009)
Private equity has reaped large rewards in recent years. We claim that one major reason for this success is due to the corporate governance advantages of private equity over the public corporation. We argue that the ...
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions
(Michigan Law Review, 1998)
This paper investigates the increased shareholder activism by labor unions and their pension funds, who are now the most aggressive institutional shareholders. Sometimes unions propose traditional corporate-governance ...
The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation
(University of Cincinnati Law Review, 1999)
During the last decade, the stratospheric increases in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay levels have made executive compensation a popular target for shareholder activism, particularly when high pay is accompanied by poor ...